Critique of Personality Adaptations
Critique of Personality Adaptations
• It provides therapists with a conceptual fessionals and laypeople use when referring to
framework with which to understand their personality: disposition, which Allport (1955/
clients’ process and to manage their own 1983) viewed as “the raw material for the de-
anxieties. velopment of personality” (p. 24); habit, or an
• It invites therapists to think about under- acquired disposition; temperament, understood
lying and developmental issues that may in medieval physiology in terms of four cardi-
form an important part of the structure of nal humors (sanguine, choleric, phlegmatic,
their clients’ problems. and melancholic); character, usually viewed as
W hile we acknowledge that these are useful being inherently good or bad, strong or weak;
aspects of the process model, we believe that and characteristics, which, according to Cart-
all these points can be achieved in ways that wright and Graham (1984), are “relatively sta-
are more congruent with a humanistic approach ble and distinctive features of a person that are
to therapy and that fully account for the unique- likely to be manifested in particular instances”
ness of each client and each client-therapist re- (p. 110). In addition to these, modern psychia-
lationship. In this sense, we advocate less focus try distinguishes between traits and disorders.
on the therapist’s diagnosis of the client and According to the American Psychiatric Asso-
more attention to the client’s process and to the ciation (1994/2000):
therapist’s reflection on his or her own contri- Personality traits are enduring patterns of
bution to the therapy. perceiving, relating to, and thinking about
W e identify a number of problems with the the environment and oneself that are exhi-
process model and the theory of personality bited in a wide range of social and person-
adaptations: al contexts. Only when personality traits
• They attempt to present a complete under- are inflexible and maladaptive and cause
standing of personality adaptation. significant functional impairment or sub-
• They are too simplistic. jective distress do they constitute Person-
• They are also too complicated. ality Disorders. (p. 630)
• They do not account for recent research in The APA does not use the term “personality
infant and child development. adaptation,” which, in general terms, represents
• They are diagnostic and prescriptive. a common characteristic and adaptational pat-
• They promote an individualistic and indi- tern to which the individual returns when under
vidualizing view of the client. stress. From these definitions, we may see these
In this article we elaborate these criticisms and, three aspects of personality as representing a
in doing so, identify certain inconsistencies in the continuum (Figure 1).
theory, specifically regarding narcissism and Joines and Stewart (2002) also consider per-
Joines and Stewart’s (2002) rejection of the exis- sonality adaptations and disorders to be on a
tence of a narcissistic personality adaptation. We spectrum (although they do not include traits)
introduce our argument with a brief clarification but view this as representing a range from posi-
of various terms used with regard to personality. tive to negative, equating “most negative” with
dysfunctional (Figure 2).
Personality—Traits, Disorders, Adaptations, W e think this is both simplistic and proble-
and Styles matic as it represents a negative attitude toward
There are a number of words that both pro- people with personality disorders.
Figure 1
The Personality Continuum
Positive Negative
Figure 2
The Personality Continuum (based on Joines & Stewart, 2002)
Over the years, many theorists have proposed that people have something that is not a
different terms to describe these different as- full-blown disorder and that can be healthy,
pects of personality. One more recent model, then, by definition, it is not an adaptation.
based on a developmental approach, proposes Their way of being is, therefore, better de-
a continuum of structural development from scribed as a functional style (as Johnson does)
personality disorder to character neurosis to or a way of managing the world through their
character styles (Johnson, 1994). W e prefer organismic or self-organization. Figure 3 repre-
this latter term to adaptation. If we consider sents this.
Figure 3
The Personality Continuum, Including Personality Styles
Criticisms of the Process M odel and the one such example of a closed classification sys-
Theory of Personality Adaptations tem, and one in which there is no equivalent to
1. The Myth of Universal Explanation. The the APA’s DSM-IV category of “personality
notion that a piece of theory can provide a com- disorder not otherwise specified.” Today, the
plete understanding of anything— in this case, idea that there are explanations for everything
human personality— is based on the myth of may be viewed as a somewhat outdated, mod-
universal explanation, that is, that everything can ernist conceit that, in the development of ideas,
be explained by a single theory. This has been has been superseded by a paradigm shift to-
a popular notion in philosophy and theology ward relativism and postmodernism and, in the
and is the subject of recent debates in the fields context of psychotherapy, by relational per-
of linguistics, geography, and human rights. For spectives. Moreover, the notion of universal
some, it may be comforting in the same way explanation is contradicted by incomplete and
that a belief in an omnipresent and omnipotent changing categories and by changing perspec-
God may be comforting. However, for others, tives about categories (see W idiger, Simonsen,
such all-encompassing explanations are based Sirovatka, & Regier, 2006). As we pointed out
on belief and myth, are overinclusive, and invite earlier, W are’s (1983) personality adaptations
unhealthy and unthinking symbiosis (see, for do not correlate with the categorization of per-
example, Dawkins, 2006). Universal explana- sonality disorders in DSM-III (American Psy-
tions are supported by classification systems chiatric Association, 1980), with the result that
that attempt to catalogue and classify everything. neither W are’s work nor, subsequently, Joines
The theory of personality adaptations (Joines and Stewart’s (2002), encompass schizotypal,
& Stewart, 2002; Kahler, 1978; W are, 1983) is borderline, narcissistic, avoidant, or dependent
personalities. This can be contrasted with, for and cure, which presupposes and presumes the
example, Millon’s (1981, 1990, 2006) work, accuracy of diagnosis, the specificity of treat-
which does. ment, and the certainty of cure. The process
Furthermore, in the DSM-IV (American Psy- model is a classic example of this and, in our
chiatric Association, 1994/2000), the passive- experience, is especially popular among train-
aggressive personality disorder was dropped. ees. They often feel reassured by the structure
This change has not been addressed in the of the model, which provides a framework for
transactional analysis literature on personality therapeutic work and a sense of certainty. This
adaptations, with the exception of one refer- can be useful in helping to reduce therapists’
ence in Joines and Stewart (2002, p. 107) anxiety, which may, in turn, make them better
where they acknowledge this “deletion” by able to contain their client’s anxiety. However,
commenting, “W e believe that [the passive- for a therapist to be certain is, in our view,
aggressive disorder] should still be included in problematic.
the substantive listings” (p. 107). They assert Certainty may reduce therapist anxiety—
this on the basis of their clinical experience and perhaps especially among trainees— by giving
the results of research. Unfortunately, the re- them a sense of what is happening. However, it
search they cite in support of their disagree- does not help to develop their capacity to hold
ment with the APA was all published before the anxiety of not knowing and, indeed, the un-
the APA changed this categorization. In DSM- known. Many people, including experienced
IV the American Psychiatric Association (1994/ therapists, report that the more they learn, the
2000) suggests that both passive-aggressive (or more they realize what they do not know. The
negativistic) personality disorder and depres- capacity to tolerate uncertainty and to contain
sive personality disorder warrant further study the existential anxiety this brings both for one-
and provide criteria sets and axes for this. self and for another is, in our view, a signifi-
Universal explanation and fixed “truths” are cant skill for therapists. The process model in-
supported by the psychology of certainty. Cer- vites the therapist to observe microbehaviors
tainty, or apparent certainty, may be comfort- and to account for their relevance in signifying
ing. However, as a Chinese proverb puts it, “To a change in the client’s internal world. Again,
be uncertain is to be uncomfortable, but to be depending on the therapist and his or her way
certain is to be ridiculous.” Certainty and the of working, this can be reassuring and even
search for certainty close down possibilities. helpful, but the rapid drawing of conclusions
Certainty hinders the process of mentalization, can result in therapists prematurely diagnosing
which involves a process of ongoing inquiry clients based on insufficient information.
and keeping the other’s mind in mind (Fonagy, In our experience, this sense of certainty and
Gyorgy, Jurist, & Target, 2004). This inquiry predictability often breaks down when thera-
and way-of-being-with (Stern, 1998) is, of pists find exceptions to the rule or that their cli-
course, by no means certain. There is mounting ents are not behaving or responding according
research that emphasizes the importance of the to the predicted pattern of the process model.
development of the capacity to mentalize and The anxiety this provokes in the therapist has a
of reflective function— and that the absence of deleterious impact on the therapy as, common-
such capacity and function is manifested in a ly, one of two reactions takes place: The thera-
range of psychopathology. The paradigm of “cer- pist feels strong anxiety in the face of uncer-
tainty” limits the potential for contact, inquiry, tainty and experiences a need to resume struc-
attunement, and empathy (Erskine, Moursund, & ture and certainty or the therapist discounts in-
Trautmann, 1999) and the emergence and co- formation that indicates that the model is not
creation of relational alternatives and possibili- working and attempts to force the client into
ties in terms of both process and outcome. the model. W e think that both reactions are
Influenced by Berne’s own background in antitherapeutic.
medicine, much of transactional analysis is based 2. The Seduction of Being Too Simplistic. In
on the medical model of diagnosis, treatment, a number of ways, both the process model and
the theory of personality adaptations are too Other theorists argue for other personality
general and simplistic. types. Millon (2006), for example, posits the
The reduction of human process to six and existence of 15 personality types. He, however,
only six basic patterns— or seven, if Kahler’s is cautious about his categories:
(2002) “cycler” is included— does not accur- W e hold to the proposition that the diag-
ately reflect the complexity, subtlety, and re- nostic categories that comprise our nosolo-
finement of individual development, nor does gy (e.g., DSM-IV) are not composed of
it fully account for the significant impact of distinct disease entities or separable statis-
cultural modes of expression. All development tical factors; rather, they represent splen-
and all behavior is culturally embedded and did fictions, arbitrary distinctions that can
needs to be considered in relation to the culture often mislead young therapists into making
in which the individual grows and lives. Kahler compartmentalized or, worse yet, manual-
(1999) claims that drivers are culturally univer- ized interventions. (¶ 3)
sal in that they are observed in peoples of all In our view, the process model misleads thera-
cultures. W e reject this kind of cultural neutral- pists into making compartmentalized and man-
ity along with its assumptions of sameness and ualized interventions.
equivalence and question the accuracy and effi- Unlike Kahler and Joines and Stewart, Mil-
cacy of any clinician making inferences about lon (2006) does account for the complexity of
the internal process of an individual from a dif- the individual: “Looking at a patient’s totality
ferent culture. W e are not saying that theories can present a bewildering if not chaotic array
and models cannot be translated. W e are saying of possibilities, one which may drive even the
that much gets lost in translation and that, as most motivated young clinician to back off into
cross-cultural practitioners, we need to be a more manageable and simpler worldview” (¶
aware of the problems of translation and the 4). Rather than supporting a holistic view of the
dangers of making assumptions. person and a complex view of life, the process
In the way the process model is often used, model and the theory of personality adaptations
there seems to be a conflation between counter- also mislead therapists with a reductionistic and
script and drivers, and many transactional analy- simplistic view of the individual and of the pro-
sis practitioners appear to have abandoned the cess of diagnosis and a linear and manualized
analysis and description of counterscript in method of treatment. In this context, we think
favor of referring only to driver behavior. In it is interesting to note that a planning initiative
TA Today, Stewart and Joines (1987) defined a that is informing revisions of psychiatric diag-
driver as “one of five distinctive behavioral se- nostic classification systems— and that is sup-
quences, played out over a time period between ported by the APA, the W orld Health Organi-
half a second and a few seconds, which are the zation, and the US National Institutes of Health
functional manifestations of negative counter- — has identified a number of concerns regard-
scripts” (p. 328). To put forward a driver as a ing the categorical approach, specifically re-
diagnosis is to offer only a behavioral, func- garding personality disorders: “1) excessive
tional diagnosis and, in any case, is incomplete diagnosis co-occurrence, 2) inadequate cover-
in terms of Berne’s (1961/1975) four require- age, 3) heterogeneity within diagnosis, 4) arbi-
ments for diagnosis. This is, by definition, a trary and unstable diagnostic boundaries, and
one-dimensional perspective on diagnosis and 5) inadequate scientific base” (Simonsen &
one that significantly misses out on the social W idiger, 2006, p. xxvi). This work proposes a
(or relational) and intrapsychic dimensions (i.e., move away from models of specific disorders
the historical and phenomenological diagno- and toward alternative dimensional models of
ses). Since the analysis of a person’s counter- personality disorder.
script can provide important information re- 3. The Confusion of Being Too Complicated.
garding the client’s scripting process, to reduce W hile the overall view of these models is too
this to a cluster of five behavior patterns is re- generalized and simplistic, in practice they are
ductive and restrictive. also too complicated and confusing, especially
when put together in the assessing matrix accommodated. The result is a model of human
(Joines & Stewart, 2002). In our experience, interaction and attraction that is both over-
students commonly report that in practice, generalized and oversimplistic and, at the same
when interacting with a client, they find the time, overcomplicated.
assessing matrix cumbersome to use and driver 4. The Underdevelopment of Development.
patterns, the W are sequences, and the channels These models are not supported by and do not
of communication hard to remember. This com- account for research in child development (see
plexity increases when clients are seen to have Stern, 1985, 1998), which Joines and Stewart
two or even three adaptations, and, theoreti- (2002) themselves cite.
cally, the therapist is supposed to remember the The process model introduces the concepts
prescribed sequences and channels of commu- of “surviving adaptations” and “performing
nication and to move between sequences ac- adaptations.” Joines and Stewart (2002) de-
cording to what the therapist interprets as being scribed the difference: “The ‘surviving’ adapta-
the client’s current presenting adaptation. W e tion is developed as a means of taking care of
think that tracking how a client is presenting oneself when trust of the environment breaks
and experiencing is sufficient and that the addi- down. The ‘performing’ adaptation is devel-
tion of prescribed sequences overly complicates oped in order to meet the expectations within
the therapy. the family” (p. 4). This language echoes Erik-
In the model, each of the personality adapta- son’s (1951/1965) epigenetic psychosocial mod-
tions has its own core script issues, structural el of human development and, indeed, Joines
pathology, and, according to W are (1983) and and Stewart (2002) make this connection. They
Joines and Stewart (2002), its own recommend- point out that the surviving adaptations (schi-
ed treatment plan. However, the model does zoid, antisocial, and paranoid) are responses to
not sufficiently explain how therapists can the first psychosocial issue or crisis, that of ba-
work effectively when these plans are contra- sic trust versus mistrust (0-18 months). They
dictory, for example, with someone who has a then go on to suggest that the performing adapta-
histrionic performing adaptation, for which the tions (passive-aggressive, obsessive-compulsive,
sequence of interventions is Feeling–Thinking– and histrionic) develop between 18 months and
Behavior, and a schizoid surviving adaptation, 6 years of life, but they do not distinguish be-
for which the sequence of interventions is tween the two life stages encompassed by this
Behavior–Thinking–Feeling. Joines and Stew- age span, that is, autonomy versus shame (18
art (2002) suggest that, in this case, the thera- months to 3 years) and initiative versus guilt
pist should track where the client is and use the (3-7 years). Also, given that expectations with-
most relevant intervention at that moment. in the family continue at least while the child
Again, this seems to undermine the point of the remains at home, it is strange and, again, incon-
model. W e contend that tracking and moment- sistent that Joines and Stewart do not address
to-moment relating should be the focus of all Erikson’s other childhood and adolescent stages,
therapeutic work and that to follow rigid for- that is, industry versus inferiority (7-12 years)
mulations is unnecessarily complicated and in- and identity versus identity/role confusion (12-
effective. 18 years).
In their book Personality Adaptations, Joines All pathology has its origins in the infant de-
and Stewart (2002) have a chapter entitled veloping a strategy for maintaining attachment
“How the Personality Adaptations Interact.” In and contact with his or her caregiver/s (the “per-
it they take a contradictory and inconsistent forming” aspect) and understanding and making
stance to describing interpersonal attraction be- existential sense of the environment (the “sur-
tween adaptations. They state both that “like viving” aspect). Indeed, in early life (pre-18
attracts like” and that “opposites attract” (p. months), the infant deduces accurately that, to
161). By adding consideration of performing get the environment to respond positively, he
and surviving adaptations and open and trap or she must perform in the way in which his or
doors it seems that any combination can be her caregivers expect. In this sense, we perform
in order to survive, and in this sense, these as- analysis is the medical model approach to
pects of our ways of being are inextricably diagnosis ÷ treatment ÷ cure, especially in the
interlinked. They are the ways-of-being-with in applications of psychotherapy and counseling.
which the infant experiences the world in an This metaphor and such language have a
intersubjective relational context (Stern, 1985). number of implications in terms of the structure
Thus, to separate adaptations into surviving of thinking, the role and power of the clinician,
and performing is not consistent with current and the passivity of the diagnosed, disempow-
thinking about infant and child development. ered client. A number of transactional analysis
Moreover, if drivers are a manifestation of an writers have presented a different view. Steiner
internal process whereby the individual is re- (1971), who was involved in developing what
playing a counterscript that is related to her or he and others referred to as “radical psychiatry”
his conditional OKness and, as such, working and “radical therapy,” argued that “alienation is
out how to preserve the relationship with her or the essence of all psychiatric conditions . . .
his parents, it could be argued that all drivers everything diagnosed psychiatrically, unless
are a manifestation or variation of a “Please clearly organic in origin, is a form of aliena-
others” driver. tion” (p. 5). In 1978, a collection of the Gould-
According to this part of the theory, then, ings’ papers was published under the title The
everybody has two adaptations. Further, Joines Power Is in the Patient (Goulding & Goulding,
and Stewart (2002, p. 4) state that “each person 1978). In her book on transactional analysis
will have at least [italics added] one ‘surviv- psychotherapy, Clarkson (1992) made the case
ing’ adaptation which means that if an indi- against diagnosis, although she then adopted a
vidual has, say, three of the six identified adap- somewhat traditional approach. Tudor (1997)
tations, then he or she has half of the possible draws on the Marxist and radical psychiatry
personality adaptations put forward in the mod- taxonomy on alienation in writing about class-
el. This renders the diagnosis and the model conscious therapy and, more recently, writes
meaningless, which hinders rather than facili- about psychopathology as alienation (Tudor &
tates effective therapy. Joines and Stewart sug- W orrall, 2006). However, it is unclear how
gest that each successive adaptation will influ- much this radical or even antipsychiatry per-
ence the personality toward its direction and spective is taught within transactional analysis.
hold that “each person will be unique in how he Despite this tradition, transactional analysis is,
or she uses that particular style” (p. 105). W e by and large, deeply conservative and confor-
agree that each person is unique and, on this mist in its approach to people and their prob-
basis, suggest that a more accurate, realistic, lems. For a refreshing polemic against the
and humanistic approach is for therapists to medicalization of distress, see Sanders (2006).
treat individual clients as such and dispense There are a number of problems with the
with prescriptive formulations. diagnostic emphasis of the process model and
Joines and Stewart (2002) go on to suggest the theory of personality adaptations:
that it is useful “to know how each adaptation • Inconsistency: Joines and Stewart (2002)
makes contact, solves problems, and protects describe the adaptations as being “healthy
him- or herself when feeling threatened” (p. adaptations” and yet the premise of the diag-
105). Again, we agree that establishing how an nosis of personality adaptations is to define
individual makes contact, solves problems, and a method of working with pathology.
defends herself or himself is useful, but this • Limitation: Both models depend on the
needs to be worked out on an individual and re- diagnosis of driver behavior, which is
lational basis, because each individual will have based on limited observation of behavior
her or his own adaptive patterns— and such pat- and (as noted earlier) does not account for
terns may not necessarily correspond to six ba- Berne’s (1961/1975) other three require-
sic types of personalities or combinations thereof. ments for complete ego state diagnosis.
5. The Danger of Diagnosis. A significant The minute, almost obsessive focus on
aspect of Berne’s influence on transactional specific behaviors does not account for
clients who have flexibility and fluency in moment basis where she or he is at that
a range of communicative and expressive time and where she or he is presently most
styles. or least defended.
• Discounting: This mechanism is used to • Inaccuracy: The medical model of diagno-
preserve a frame of reference that, by defi- sis aims for and claims accuracy and thus
nition, is out of awareness (see Schiff & fails when it is inaccurate. W e see this in
Schiff, 1971). As transactional analysts, the process model with what is described
we are familiar with the mechanisms of as schizoid, which, in our view, is more
discounting, whereby individuals selec- akin to an avoidant process. Such misdiag-
tively ignore certain stimuli or discount its nosis is serious in that it can lead to the
significance (see Schiff et al., 1975). The mis-treatment (i.e., the wrongful treat-
rapid allocation of a personality adaptation ment) of clients who are truly schizoid.
or adaptations to a client within the initial For example, the process model calls for
or first few sessions can lead the therapist using directive, behavioral interventions
to discount information that does not fit with schizoid clients. However, such an
the perceived pattern or description of the approach is contraindicated for persons
perceived adaptation. Too many times we who are schizoid, as their core dilemma
have heard tapes presented by supervisees centers on the desire for relationship while
and trainees who have diagnosed the client at the same time they fear being controlled
with a particular adaptation, often in the and dominated. Directive interventions re-
first session. On listening to the tape, it is inforce this experience and, thereby, rein-
apparent that there is little and sometimes force the relational schema of people with
no evidence for the attribution of the par- schizoid process (Little, 2001; Yontef,
ticular adaptation and considerable evidence 2001).
for alternative diagnoses, which have been 6. The Individualization of the Person. The
discounted by the supervisee because the process model and the theory of personality
information did not fit her or his frame of adaptations— and the way they are used—
reference with regard to the client. Apart unhelpfully individualizes the client (“I’m not
from discounting the client and, at worst, OK, You’re OK”) by locating her or his pathol-
maintaining a closed diagnostic system, ogy solely within the intrapsychic process and
this approach results in severe empathic not within any social, cultural, or interactional
misattunement and seriously limits the thera- context. The model also reifies the expertise of
pist’s options for relating with the client. the therapist (“I’m OK, You’re not OK”) and
• Partiality: In his analysis of “doors to seduces him or her into playing “Psychiatry”—
therapy” with regard to each personality or, in the language of the model, “Detective.”
adaptation, W are (1983) is partial, as he is These models diagnose the client in terms of
basing the sequences on only three aspects what he or she does, not in terms of what hap-
of the human condition: behavior, feeling, pens between the client and therapist or what is
and thinking. The theory invites a false cocreated in terms of cotransferential relating
“trichotomizing” of human experience and or games. Interestingly, by their own admis-
implies that they are mutually exclusive, sion, Joines and Stewart (2002) acknowledge
when, in reality, these three aspects are that the link between personality adaptations
operating simultaneously at any one time. and examples of games is inexact, and this is
Thus, the theory is crude, rigid, and formu- one of the least developed or integrated aspects
laic. By following the various sequences, of their work.
therapists limit their interventions, their Both of these theories represent a one-person
own thinking, and the relational possibili- psychology (Stark, 2000) because their focus is
ties they may have with their clients. In on the client and the internal workings of her or
contrast, some therapists find it helpful to his mind— or, in this case, on how she or he
track with each client on a moment-to- adapts to her or his environment. According to
Klopstech (2000), “One person psychologies Our experience is that reliance on the process
view the individual in intrapsychic terms as a model can (mis)lead therapists into developing
relatively closed system” (p. 55). Joines and (if not securing) a “conviction” regarding a cli-
Stewart (2002) do account for the impact of the ent’s structure and internal dynamics, but one
therapist’s transactions with the client; how- based on scant information.
ever, they advise that the therapist “avoid in- The theory of personality adaptations ac-
viting driver behaviors” (p. 139). W e think that knowledges the adaptation more than the im-
this is only possible if the therapist is com- pact of the environment on the individual’s per-
pletely neutral and unexpressive and, as such, sonality, which, among other things, discounts
in a “Be strong” process. W e consider this both TA’s social-psychological perspective on the
unworkable and undesirable. As it stands, the relationship between individual and environ-
model does not make space for the analysis and ment. The process model also appears to dis-
processing of transference enactments as they count how different environmental or external
are taking place in the therapy or the use of the factors may influence a client’s presentation.
self of the therapist in the work. The position of For example, a woman presents as depressed,
the process model is akin to early psychoanaly- with little expressiveness and flat affect. On
sis, also a one-person psychology according to this basis, a therapist using the process model
Stark (2000), whereby the therapist’s subjec- could diagnose her as having a “Be strong”
tivity and interaction was minimized because it driver and a schizoid adaptation. On further in-
was viewed as an interfering factor in the de- vestigation, the therapist discovers that she is
velopment of the analysis. the victim of male (domestic) violence and has
The process and personality adaptations developed a depressive defense in order to
models are mechanistic and based on a reduc- manage her situation (see Holland, 1988).
tionistic view of the person as comprising only Taking a relational, transactional approach to
behavior, thinking, and feeling rather than as a the process model, we wonder what the thera-
complex, holistic being. Incidentally, this se- pist who is using the process model invites
quence represents the order of frequency of the from clients: If the process model is the stimu-
contact doors in Ware’s (1983) theory, that is, lus, what is the response? W e think that, gener-
behavior (in three adaptations), thinking (in ally, the model invites the client to comply with
two), and feeling (in one). So, applied to itself, the therapist’s investigation and to adapt to the
the personality adaptations model is a some- external detection.
what schizoid— or, using our alternative, an Finally, in using the term “personality adap-
avoidant—one! Furthermore, assuming an even tations,” the language of the model is incongru-
distribution of personality adaptations in the ent. Our understanding of the theory is that
general population, the theory, in effect, pro- “adaptation” is used therapeutically when an
poses that the predominant therapeutic strategy individual is experiencing that he or she is not
is behavioral. In our experience, this simply is able to adapt to the world. Indeed, a true per-
not true because it does not match up with what sonality adaptation would be one where the
and how most clients present. individual possesses a great deal of fluency in
The process model diagnosis is based pri- changing style according to situation. It could
marily on the “detection” of driver behaviors— be argued that multiple adaptations provide this
by the therapist. This makes the therapist not bridge (the more adaptations, the merrier).
only the expert on the client’s behavior—which, However, the theory suggests that, in situations
in any case, is only a partial diagnosis and, in which, according to Joines and Stewart
arguably the least reliable requirement for ego (2002, p. 29), “trust breaks down” in the envi-
state diagnosis— but also a detective. This is a ronment, the individual will activate his or her
revealing metaphor. W hat happens when the surviving adaptation, thus suggesting a relative
therapist feels he or she has sufficient clues? lack of fluidity and “adaptability.” W hen peo-
How much evidence is needed to secure a “con- ple are stuck or fixated, they do not adapt to or
viction”? Has the client committed a crime? negotiate with their environment or recognize
(1990), Johnson (1994), and Millon 107). It is difficult on this basis to establish the
(1999), without advancing any arguments difference between personality disorders and
against them. Interestingly, there is little personality adaptations. It is not possible for
on narcissism in the transactional analysis people who have (only) personality adaptations
literature, with only seven relatively re- not to interact with the environment in some
cent articles on the subject: Persi (1992); way when experiencing stress. Joines and
Lederer (1997, 1998); M cFarren (1998); Stewart (2002) describe characteristic patterns
Heiller (2004), who also critiques Joines of acting out for each adaptation as “typical
and Stewart (2002) for excluding narcis- areas of difficulty” and also body characteris-
sistic and borderline pathologies; Heath- tics and issues for each adaptation. Their ma-
cote (2006); and Little (2006). terial thus demonstrates that each individual
2. The Difference between Personality Dis- adaptation has its own characteristic pattern of
order and Adaptation Is a Developmental Dif- acting out on the environment and, presumably,
ference. Joines and Stewart (2002) write, “This its own pattern of acting in on the self. There-
difference in the adult’s level of functioning re- fore, their argument that personality disorders
sults from a difference in the developmental are different from adaptations in this respect is,
issues” (p. 227). W hile they appear to recog- again, inconsistent.
nize a commonality in early decision making Joines and Stewart (2002) put forward the
between what later becomes an adaptation and idea that “the six personality adaptations all
a disorder, the difference, for them, comes represent the best possible option that was
down to “the ‘price’ paid by the infant for sur- available to the individual for taking care of
vival [being] much heavier” (p. 227). This is a him or herself in some context in infancy or
particularly strange and, again, inconsistent later in childhood” (p. 228). They are not say-
argument, especially in light of what they pre- ing anything here that differs from any other
sent about the developmental aspect of the sur- aspect of a person’s script. The notion that we
viving adaptations (see earlier) (i.e., the schi- do the best we can is widely incorporated into
zoid, antisocial, and paranoid adaptations). concepts that relate to script development (see
Since they do not argue that narcissistic and W oollams & Brown, 1978). It could be argued
borderline disorders date back any earlier than that any form of pathology, including what be-
Erikson’s (1951/1965) basic trust versus mis- comes fixed as a personality disorder, was the
trust stage (0-18 months), there is no consistent best possible option the individual had of cop-
developmental argument— at least none ad- ing with and managing there and then. Joines
vanced by Joines and Stewart— that says that and Stewart do not convincingly show how the
narcissism cannot also be considered as a sur- formation of adaptations derives from a devel-
viving adaptation or that its effect is any opmental process that is special or any different
“heavier” than, say, a schizoid process. It is not from processes that lead to the development of
our purpose here to discuss the early origins of personality disorders.
self-disorders or the findings of neuroscience In their chapter entitled “A Developmental
and developmental psychology, which support Perspective,” Joines and Stewart (2002) put
our increasing ability as therapists to differenti- forward a series of hypotheses regarding par-
ate important aspects of the early interpersonal enting behavior as contributing etiologically to
field, but it is our purpose to argue for the use- the development of the different adaptations.
fulness of the theory of personality adaptation These hypotheses are extremely limited and do
across our human experience. not incorporate discussion of substantiating
Joines and Stewart (2002) suggest that per- theory. They assert, for example, that the etiol-
sonality disorders represent “chronic maladap- ogy of the schizoid adaptation is tentative par-
tive patterns of dealing with stress by acting out enting in the face of a large body of theory that
on the environment” (p. 107) and, in the case of suggests that the experience of the infant who
somatoform, substance related, and eating develops a schizoid structure is one of being
disorders, as “ ‘acting in’ on one’s body” (p. hated (see, for instance, Johnson, 1994).
(2002) also recognize this range but position chology and neuroscience with script develop-
borderline disorder as far more relationally debili- ment. The identification, for instance, of the
tating than the most severe adaptations. Again, “Take it” driver (Tudor, 2008) contributes to
this is an example of not comparing like with this work by describing a significant aspect of
like. To accept a difference between adapta- the development of a narcissistic adaptation.
tions and disorders means that any personality In contrast to these models, we think that
adaptation is not as debilitating as a personality therapy is about relationship and working in the
disorder. relational field, which is cocreated by both
client and therapist. As Summers and Tudor
Conclusion (2000) put it:
If theory is going to be of practical use, it The therapeutic relationship (or relating) is
needs to verifiable and falsifiable— and robust. a more potent phenomenon than the poten-
If transactional analysis is to develop, we, its cy (or impotency) of the therapist or client
proponents, need not only to develop new alone. It provides a supportive theoretical
theory in light of current experience and re- framework which emphasises the “we”-ness
search but also to review, revise and, where (Saner, 1989) of the therapeutic relation-
necessary, reject outmoded, outdated, oppres- ship as the medium for human develop-
sive, and offensive theory and practice. In gen- ment and change. As such it also empha-
eral, we think that transactional analysis prac- sizes the cultural context of both individu-
titioners and students shy away from critique al and field. (p. 24)
and criticism (see Tudor, 2007) and that reac-
tions to critique and criticism are too often de- Keith Tudor, M.A., [Link]., CQSW, [Link]-
fensive rather than open and engaging and chotherapy, Certified Transactional Analyst
reactionary rather than progressive and dia- (psychotherapy), Teaching and Supervising
logic. In this article, we have critiqued the pro- Transactional Analyst (psychotherapy), MAHPP,
cess model and the theory of personality adap- is registered with the United Kingdom Council
tations on the basis that they attempt to provide for Psychotherapy both as a transactional
universal explanations for complex and chang- analysis psychotherapist and as a group psy-
ing processes, that they are both too simplistic chotherapist and facilitator. He has an inde-
and too and unnecessarily complicated, that pendent/private practice as a therapist, super-
they represent the worst excesses of the diag- visor, and trainer in Sheffield, where is also a
nostic therapist, and that they confirm an indi- director of Temenos and an honorary lecturer
vidualizing approach to the individual in con- in the School of Health, Liverpool John
text. They also put the client under investiga- Moores University. He is the author of over
tion, place the therapist in the role of detective/ 100 professional papers and author and/or
technician, take her or him out of contact and editor of 10 books, the series editor of Advanc-
relationship— or relating— with the client, and ing Theory in Therapy (published by Rout-
limit consideration of important aspects of the ledge), and sits on the editorial advisory
client’s process. boards of three international journals. Please
To produce a consistent picture of personal- send reprint requests to Keith Tudor, 13A Pen-
ity adaptations and disorders, there is no reason rhyn Road, Sheffield S11 8UL, England; e-
why we cannot, if necessary, identify additional mail: [Link]@[Link] .
drivers, injunctions, process scripts, channels Mark Widdowson, [Link]. (TA psychothera-
of communication, and so on. Clearly, there is py), Teaching and Supervising Transactional
more work to be done, for example, with re- Analyst (psychotherapy), is a United Kingdom
gard to the distinction between traits and adap- Council for Psychotherapy and a European
tations; with respect to the adaptive version of Association for Psychotherapy registered psy-
other personality disorders such as the schizo- chotherapist. In his private practice in Glas-
typal, avoidant, and dependent; and on the inte- gow, he offers psychotherapy to individuals and
gration of insights from developmental psy- couples and individual and group supervision.
He is director of training at the Counselling Joines, V., & Stewart, I. (2002). Personality adaptations:
A new guide to human understanding in psychotherapy
and Psychotherapy Training Institute in Edin-
and counselling. Nottingham, England, and Chapel
burgh and associate director at The Berne In- Hill, NC: Lifespace Publishing.
stitute, Kegworth ,U.K., and a senior lecturer Kahler, T. (1975a). Drivers: The key to the process script.
at the Athens Synthesis Centre in Greece. He Transactional Analysis Journal, 5(3), 280-284.
can be reached at 3 Crossview Place, Glasgow Kahler, T. (1975b). Scripts: Process vs. content. Transac-
tional Analysis Journal, 5(3), 277-279.
G69 6JN, United Kingdom; e-mail: mark. Kahler, T. (1978). Transactional analysis revisited. Little
widdowson1@[Link] . Rock, AR: Human Development Publications.
Kahler, T. (1979). Process therapy in brief. Little Rock,
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