ADANI PORTS & SPECIAL ECONOMIC

ZONE LTD. (APSEZ)

Adani House, Nr Mithakhali Circle, Navrangpura, Ahmedabad 380009, Gujarat, India
Tel +91-79-25555801; Fax+91-79-2555 6490;[Link]

PROJECT MUNDRA KANDLA LPG PIPELINE (MKPL)

TITLE RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT (RRA) STUDY REPORT FOR MUNDRA-KANDLA

20” LPG PIPELINE PROJECT

PROJECT
MANAGEMENT
CONSULTANT ADANI GAS LTD.

EPC CONTRACTOR
HOWE ENGINEERING PROJECTS (INDIA) PVT. LTD.
ENGINEERING
CONSULTANT TRACTEBEL ENGINEERING PVT. LTD.
DOCUMENT NO. P.012770-D-10919-004

CLIENT DOCUMENT H012-E-CCP-GEN-DM-R-E-003 Rev A

NO.

PREPARED CHECKED APPROVED

REV. NO. DATE DESCRIPTION
Init. Sign Init. Sign Init. Sign

A 22-01-2019 REPORT MS HP AR

This Document is the property of MKPL. It should not be used, copied or reproduced without their written permission.
 RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT (RRA) STUDY
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................................................................4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...........................................................................................................................................5
CHAPTER-1- INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................7
1.1 SCOPE OF WORK ........................................................................................................................................7
1.2 FORMAT OF THE REPORT ........................................................................................................................8
CHAPTER-2- PROJECT DESCRIPTION & GENERAL RISK ISSUES .............................................................9
2.1 PROJECT DESCRPTION ............................................................................................................................9
2.2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION ..........................................................................................................................9
2.3 DESIGN BASIS ............................................................................................................................................ 10
2.3.1 Basis for Hydraulic Calculations and Line Sizing ............................................................................... 10
2.3.2 Location Class ......................................................................................................................................... 10
2.3.3 Line Pipe Grade and Size ...................................................................................................................... 10
2.4 CAUSES OF FAILURE FOR PIPELINES ................................................................................................ 10
2.4.1 Failure by External Mechanical Interference ....................................................................................... 11
2.4.2 Failure from corrosion defects ............................................................................................................... 12
2.4.3 Failures by Miscellaneous causes ........................................................................................................ 12
2.5 SELECTION OF FAILURE SCENARIOS ................................................................................................ 13
CHAPTER-3 - SALIENT DESIGN, OPERATIONS AND ON-GOING RISK AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT
FEATURES ................................................................................................................................................................ 14
3.1 SALIENT DESIGN SAFETY FEATURES ................................................................................................ 14
3.1.1 Route Selection ....................................................................................................................................... 14
3.1.2 Design Codes and Standards ................................................................................................................ 15
[Link] General ..................................................................................................................................................... 15
[Link] Particular Codes & Standards ............................................................................................................... 16
3.2 PROPOSED PERIODIC MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION SYSTEM BASED RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS ................................................................................................................................ 16
3.2.1 Monitoring of External Corrosion ........................................................................................................... 16
3.3 PIPE TO SOIL POTENTIAL (PSP) READING ........................................................................................ 16
3.4 CONTINUOUS POTENTIAL SURVEY ..................................................................................................... 17
3.5 INSULATING JOINT/COUPLING INSPECTION .................................................................................... 17
3.6 EXTERNAL CORROSION CONTROL FOR ABOVE GROUND SECTIONS OF PIPING ............... 17
3.7 MONITORING OF INTERNAL CORROSION ......................................................................................... 17
3.8 CHECKING OF LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM ........................................................................................ 17
CHAPTER–4-RAPID RISK ANALYSIS (RRA) ..................................................................................................... 18
4.1 RELEASE SCENARIOS ............................................................................................................................. 18
4.1.1 Enumeration ............................................................................................................................................. 18
4.1.2 Selection ................................................................................................................................................... 18
4.1.3 This Study ................................................................................................................................................. 18

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4.2 SELECTION ................................................................................................................................................. 19

4.2.1 Operating Parameters ............................................................................................................................ 19
4.2.2 Inventory ................................................................................................................................................... 19
4.2.3 Range of Incidents .................................................................................................................................. 22
4.3 INCIDENT OUTCOME CASES ................................................................................................................. 22
4.4 CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS ......................................................................................................... 23
4.4.1 Source strength parameters .................................................................................................................. 23
4.4.2 Consequential effects ............................................................................................................................. 23
4.4.3 Selection of Damage Criteria ................................................................................................................. 24
4.5 RESULTS...................................................................................................................................................... 26
CHAPTER-5-CONCLUSION & RISK REDUCTION RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................. 31
ANNEXURE-1-CONSEQUENCE RESULTS........................................................................................................ 33

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

API American Petroleum Institute

ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers
ASME The American Society of Mechanical Engineers
DT Dispatch Terminal
ESDV Emergency Shutdown Valve
HAZID Hazard Identification
HAZOP Hazard & Operability
HSE Health, Safety & Environmental
kW/m2 Kilowatt Per Meter Square
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
LEL Lower Explosive/Flammability Limit
MMTPA Million Metric Tonne Per Annum
m/s Meters Per Second
OISD Oil Industry Safety Directorate
OGP International Oil and Gas Producers Association
PHAST Process Hazards Assessment Software Tool by DNV Technica, UK
PNGRB Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board
RT Receiving Terminal
ROU Right of Use
ROV Remote Operated Valves
ROW Right of Way
SV Sectionalizing Valve

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

M/s Tractebel Engineering Pvt. Ltd. has solely performed the Rapid Risk Analysis (RRA) for the
20” Mundra to Kandla Pipeline Project owned and operated by M/s Adani Ports and Special
Economic Zone is located in Gujarat, India. This Project involves 1 DT, 1 RT and 5 SVs and the
line length is 89 kms. The RRA addresses the impact due to failures/leaks in the line and
consequence damage distances are provided in the Report. The RRA is calibrated as per
standard guidelines for
consequence modeling. The RRA was carried out after splitting the facility into Eight (08)
isolatable sections. Based on the study, the following conclusions and recommendations are
proposed based on the assessment:
The Maximum damage distance for the jet fire scenario is 430 meters at 6.31 kW/m2 thermal
radiation value (which corresponds to 1% fatality) and 370 meters at 37.5 kW/m2 thermal
radiation value (which corresponds to 100% fatality) for Isolatable Secton-07 (From XV-0531
at SV-4 to XV-0541 at SV-5).
he Maximum damage distance for the Pool fire scenario is 228 meters at 6.31 kW/m2
thermal radiation value (which corresponds to 1% fatality) and 115 meters at 37.5 kW/m2
thermal radiation value (which corresponds to 100% fatality) for Isolatable Secton-07 (From
XV-0531 at SV-4 to XV-0541 at SV-5).
The maximum damage distance for Flash Fire scenario for 50% LEL is 1600 meters and
100% LEL is 1202 meters for Isolatable Secton-07 (From XV-0531 at SV-4 to XV-0541 at
SV-5).
The maximum distance due to overpressure scenario is 970 meters at 0.1379 bar g and 775
meters at 1 bar g for Isolatable Secton-07 (From XV-0531 at SV-4 to XV-0541 at SV-5).

In addition, based on the site discussion and based on industry best practice, the following
recommendations may be implemented:
The area must be kept free of ignition sources to the extent possible via patrolling and
the same must be ensured even during maintenance activity. Non sparking tools must
be used and personnel entering the area must be “de-earthed” before entering. A
hazardous area classification study is suggested for placement of electrical equipment in
the classified area.
Ensure the area shall not be encroached by the public.
The correct installation of safety critical equipment at site and their operational reliability
are essential for the safety of the facility. In addition, initial and periodic testing of the
safety critical equipment before installation and periodically is absolutely essential and
the same must be ensured.

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Emergency procedures should be well rehearsed and state of readiness maintained.

This should be done by ensuring that the Disaster Management Plan is in tune with the
risk analysis and that regular Mock drills are held regularly with diversity of scenarios.
All key personnel should be trained in handling emergency situations and should be
apprised of their role in handling emergency situation and to ensure adequacy of the
emergency procedures simulated exercise should be carried out.
Adequate number of caution boards highlighting the hazards of LPG in the various
states in which it is present within the facility. The company should also regularly
conduct awareness campaigns to educating the public, in particular those in and around
the vicinity.
In locations where flammable vapors/ liquid may be present, precautions should be
taken to prevent ignition by eliminating / containing source of ignition. Source of ignition
may include open flames, lightening, smoking, cutting and welding operations, lighting /
hot surfaces, frictional heat, sparks (static, electrical and mechanical), spontaneous and
radiant heat.
It must be ensured that the operations are carried out in accordance with safe operating
procedures by trained and experienced personnel.
Mechanical integrity of the pipework must be ensured and constructed in accordance
with an appropriate standard.
Electrical equipment shall be used in accordance as per zone classified area.
Portable electric lamps and portable electric equipment for use in hazardous areas must
be of an approved type. Special care should be taken to prevent any mechanical
damage to flexible cables or wandering leads.
All maintenance work on electrical equipment should be undertaken under the control of
a permit or an equivalent safety management system, with procedures that ensure
electrical and mechanical isolations are effectively managed.

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CHAPTER-1- INTRODUCTION

Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Limited (APSEZ) is India’s largest private multi-port
operator. It is a part of the Adani Group, an integrated infrastructure corporation. The company
(earlier known as Mundra Port & Special Economic Zone Ltd.) changed its name to Adani
Ports and Special Economic Zone Limited on January 6, [Link] Company commenced
operations at Mundra Port and currently operates 10 ports in India comprising 45 berths and 14
terminals across 6 states at below locations:
 Port of Trivandrum, Kerala
 Mundra, Gujarat
 Hazira, Gujarat
 Dahej, Gujarat
 Tuna Port, Gujarat (Terminal)
 Mormugao Port Trust, Goa (Terminal)
 Vizag, Andhra Pradesh (Terminal)
 Kattupalli, Tamil Nadu[4]
 Ennore, Tamil Nadu (Terminal)
 Dhamra, Odisha

Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Ltd. (APSEZ) provides Dredging and Reclamation
solutions, primarily for port and harbor construction. The Adani Group started investing in
developing a dredging fleet in 2005. At present, APSEZ operates a fleet of 19 dredgers which is
the largest capital dredging capacity in India.

The Mundra SEZ is the largest port-led operational and notified multi-product SEZ in India that
offers land bank for large scale industries for manufacturing set-up based upon cluster-based
development for various industries.

With the increasing demand in various industries of LPG, supply and demand management has
assumed great importance. In view of this Gas Authority of India (GAIL) proposes to lay a
dedicated pipeline of LPG from Mundra to Mithirohar LPG terminal. The proposed Pipeline will
supply LPG to GAIL Jamnagar-Loni Pipeline (JLPL) at Mithirohar station and shall have
provision of connecting to propose Kandla-Gorakhpur (KGPL) LPG pipeline.

1.1 SCOPE OF WORK

MKPL is an 89 km pipeline which emanates from India’s biggest LPG import terminal
connecting to India’s largest LPG pipeline (JLPL) and would also be major feeder for
proposed KGPL. APSEZ is planning to lay pipe line with adequate capacity to serve the
incremental demand in JLPL and majority demand of KGPL. M/s Tractebel Engineering
Pvt. Ltd., Gurugram has solely carried out the Rapid Risk Analysis (RRA) study Report.

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The objective of the study was to identify major risk contributing events, understand the
nature of risk posed to nearby areas. In addition, the RRA study is also necessary to
ensure compliance to statutory rules and regulations. The scope of work for the RA
study is described below:

Rapid Risk Analysis would comprise of:

1. Nature, causes and consequences of hazards.
2. Risk Assessment
2.1 Hazard Identification
2.2 Hazard Analysis
3. Consequence Analysis
4. Risk Mitigation Measures

1.2 FORMAT OF THE REPORT

This present report is divided into five chapters. The present chapter (Chapter-1) gives
the general introduction, scope & related details. The details of the other sections of the
report are presented below:

Section 2: Project Description and General Risk Issues

Provides a description of the various project activities and various pipeline projects.

Section 3: Salient Design & Safety features

Provides a description of various Design safety standard followed & the Safety features.

Section 4: Rapid Risk Analysis

The damage criteria selected for the assessment process are discussed in this section.
The consequence analysis (modeling) carried out using PHAST.

Section 5: Conclusions & Risk Reduction Recommendations

Various conclusions from RRA and recommendations following out of the RRA study are
presented in this Chapter.

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CHAPTER-2- PROJECT DESCRIPTION & GENERAL RISK ISSUES

2.1 PROJECT DESCRPTION
Adani group is proposing to lay 89 km. (approx.) long LPG pipeline starting from Mundra
to MithiRohar (MKPL). The proposed Pipeline will supply LPG to GAIL Jamnagar-Loni
Pipeline (JLPL) at Mithirohar station and shall have provision of connecting to proposed
Kandla-Gorakhpur (KGPL) LPG pipeline.

Mundra LPG Terminal Pvt. Ltd (MLTPL) subsidiary of Adani Petroleum Terminal Private
limited (APTPL) is building up a state of art LPG import terminal at Mundra Port with
initial capacity of 3.6 MMTPA expandable to 8.8 MMTPA. Mundra terminal will be a
critical LPG infrastructure which will provide long term supply support to the rapidly
increasing LPG demand in the country.

GAIL’s existing Jamnagar Loni LPG pipeline (JLPL) is under expansion to 3.25 MMTPA
and is envisaged to be further expanded up to 5.2 MMTPA in near future. Due to these
expansions MKPL is expected to feed JLPL 0.8 MMTPA immediately and additional 0.6
MMTPA for JLPL later expansion. Kandla Gorakhpur pipeline (KGPL) which is under
Bidding by PNGRB for 6 MMTPA capacity is emanating at Kandla and would be majorly
fed by MKPL and IOCL Kandla LPG terminal. The pipeline is expected to be ready by
2021 and MKPL is expected to transport more than 3 MMTPA for this pipeline. MKPL
will play a crucial role in supporting reliable incremental LPG supply in JLPL and
proposed KGPL.

MKPL is an 89 km pipeline which emanates from India’s biggest LPG import terminal
connecting to India’s largest LPG pipeline (JLPL) and would also be major feeder for
proposed KGPL. APSEZ is planning to lay pipe line with adequate capacity to serve the
incremental demand in JLPL and majority demand of KGPL. The major users of this
pipeline would be Oil PSU’s i.e. IOCL, BPCL and HPCL. APSEZ has studied various
pipeline capacity scenarios keeping in mind the regional deficit and economic life of the
pipeline project.

With the above aim in mind the present project was conceived by APSEZ as a cross
country underground LPG pipeline between Mundra LPG Terminal and Mithirohar.

2.2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION

 Days of operation :365 days/year

 Hours of operation : 8760/year

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 Pipeline length : 89 Km
 Main pipeline diameter : 20 inch
 Flow Rate : 6.75 MMTPA
 Design temperature : 65˚C
 Design Pressure for Pump upstream: 35 kg/cm2g
 Design Pressure for Pump discharge: 75kg/cm2g
 Design Pressure for Pump shutoff: 67kg/cm2g

2.3 DESIGN BASIS

2.3.1 Basis for Hydraulic Calculations and Line Sizing

Basis for Hydraulic calculations for reviewing the pipeline size is considered as per
standards. Also, the pipe line is verified to be appropriate for the desired process
parameters.

2.3.2 Location Class

Suitable location classes have been considered for this pipeline design.

2.3.3 Line Pipe Grade and Size

Suitable line pipe material of construction is considered for the pipelines.

2.4 CAUSES OF FAILURE FOR PIPELINES

Pipelines offer a safe mode of transporting hazardous materials compared to other

means of transportation. However, when accidents do occur, pipelines do have the
capacity to cause multiple injuries and fatalities and property damage.

Leakages from pipelines have occurred historically due to a variety of reasons. Pipeline
transportation has emerged as the safest method of transportation of hazardous
materials in comparison to other methods. Some of the predominant causes for pipeline
failures are discussed below.

The table given next presents a generic detailed listing of potential incidents for a
pipeline system.

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Human Errors Equipment System or External Events

Failures procedural
failures
Pigging Thermal Expansion Inspection Accidental
operations Internal corrosion Operation excavation
Hot tapping External corrosion Startup / shutdown Post digging
Slug operation Bad welds Communication Wind (over ground
Repair / Fatigue Maintenance lines)
replacement Cathodic protection Leak detection Earthquake
Startup fails Emergency repair Subsidence
Changing Cyclic stress Material specs Avalanche
operations Galvanic corrosion Modifications Flood/scouring
Shutdown Internal erosion Lightning
Preparation for Control system Fire
maint. failure Vandalism/sabotag
Valve operation Brittle fracture e
Support failure Rail/road crossing
Construction Rail derailment
defects Mining
Overpressure
Plugging or fouling
Source: American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Centre for Chemical Process Safety
(CCPS)- Risk Analysis.

When considering the data basis together, one broad conclusion comes out of the
statistics, despite some variation caused by dissimilarity in the type of data collected -
failures occur in roughly equal proportions in three broad categories:

 Failures caused by external mechanical interference

 Failures caused by corrosion defects
 Failures caused by miscellaneous factors such as pipe material defects, natural
hazards or operator error.

Some of these failures are time independent occurrences (e.g. external mechanical
interference, earthquakes or overpressure), while others are time dependent (e.g.
corrosion and fatigue failures).

2.4.1 Failure by External Mechanical Interference

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Failures caused by third party external mechanical interference include such causes as:
 Being damaged by excavators or other equipment in use by other utility or
construction companies
 Hot tap in error by other utilities
 Damage during deep plowing
 Damage during construction of land drainage

The type of failure generally caused by third party mechanical interference is a puncture
or split of the pipe or a gauge severely reducing the wall thickness of the pipe. This type
of incident could have major consequences.

2.4.2 Failure from corrosion defects

Pipeline failures by corrosion can be due to internal corrosion or external corrosion.

Internal corrosion is mainly on account of corrosive or aggressive material being
transported- causes have included improper attention at upstream (at source) or erosion
due to high velocities or two phase flow.

External corrosion failures are mainly due to moisture in the ground and aggressive soils
and take two forms - small pinhole failures caused by pitting and more generalized
corrosion leading to a reduction in pipe wall thickness. External pitting corrosion leads to
small leaks that are often difficult to detect but that gradually grow in size over a period
of time. External area or plane defects cause a generalized reduction of wall thickness
that can fail eventually catastrophically under pressure, leading to large scale release.

For the project, which has external coating and is also supported by Cathodic protection,
the possibility of corrosion has been addressed at the design phase itself. Internal
coating is primarily provided to reduce frictional losses.

2.4.3 Failures by Miscellaneous causes

Pipelines can also fail for a variety of other causes. Typical causes are construction
defects, pipe material defects, operator error, and equipment failure, failure due to
internal erosion and failure due to ground slip, flood ground erosion, earthquake or
mining.

It is apparent that there is a need for good engineering right from the start- these include
issues such as route selection (away from population clusters), design margins on
pipeline (thickness, class etc.), special attention and engineering for crossings, good
construction systems, practices and procedures and strong testing and quality control

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and pre- commissioning and commissioning procedures. After the handover, there have
to be consistent and high quality operation and maintenance practices.

2.5 SELECTION OF FAILURE SCENARIOS

Potential release rates for a material from containment depend significantly on the initial
operating conditions. The pipeline system operating pressures would range from the
highest at the starting point to the lowest at the receiving or terminal points.

Factors affecting the “release rate” include the initial pressure, temperature, hole size,
hole roughness, hole orientation, gas properties, atmospheric conditions and many other
parameters.

Both, the complexity of study and the number of incident outcome cases are affected by
the range of initiating events and incidents covered. This not only reflects the inclusion of
accidents and / or non-accident-initiated events, but also the size of those events.

The selection of initiating events and incidents should take into account the goals or
objectives of the study. The main reasons for including release sizes other than the
catastrophic are to reduce the conservatism in an analysis and to better understand the
relative contributions to risk of small versus large releases. Only leakage events leading
to possibility of serious injury are considered in the study.

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CHAPTER-3 - SALIENT DESIGN, OPERATIONS AND ON-GOING RISK

AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT FEATURES

3.1 SALIENT DESIGN SAFETY FEATURES

Safety for the pipeline is provided through a mix of strong basic and detailed design and
engineering, high integrity control and instrumentation and the adoption of well proven
and modern operating and maintenance practices. Some of the important features are
described herein.

3.1.1 Route Selection

The route selection avoids, to the extent possible, congested population clusters in
proximity to the pipeline right of way or ROU. The ROU is considered in view of the
length of the pipeline for smooth movement of manpower and machinery during
construction. Some aspects of the route with pipeline features are given below. The
route has been selected based on:
 Compliance to environmental regulations
 Safety of people and property
 Shortest possible pipeline length
 Minimum number of bends
 Favorable ground profile for the pipeline hydraulics
 Accessibility to pipeline route during construction, maintenance and operation
 Location of pipeline facilities and access thereto
 Avoidance of mining, protected and reserve forests, archaeological and other
sensitive areas to the extent possible
 Avoidance of unstable ground features
 Avoidance of rocky stretches
 Avoidance of areas reserved for planned for future developments
 Flexibility for future expansion.

Suitable care has been taken for the pipeline safety while crossing obstacles like existing
pipeline, underground cables, overhead power lines etc.

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3.1.2 Design Codes and Standards

The use of latest and applicable codes and standards is another very important aspect
of the safe design for the pipeline. Codes and standards used included in project design
Basis.

[Link] General

 Basic Laws – Codes – Rules & Standards, mandatory by law in India.

 The “Rules of Good Practice” commonly used by the worldwide gas industry.
 The “Rules of Art” and “Sound Practices” of the Engineer.

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 In general, the pipeline and stations to be built in accordance with the best states of
Engineering practice.

[Link] Particular Codes & Standards

 ASME B.31.8 “Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems” – Last edition and
all the Codes and standards that it refers to.
 API 1104 welding of pipelines and related facilities.
 Codes – Rules and Standards that are mandatory in India.
 OISD 141- Design and construction requirements for cross-country hydrocarbon
pipelines latest edition.
 All pipelines and associated systems shall be designed, constructed and tested as
per latest edition of codes like PNGRB T4S, OISD-STD 141/ 214, CCOE, etc.

In addition, depending on the application and specific details, further codes and
standards references would be utilized. These include specific codes and standards for
pipeline coating, painting, electrical aspects and others.

3.2 PROPOSED PERIODIC MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION SYSTEM BASED RISK

MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

The operations and maintenance methods and inspection frequencies set out and
advised by the Oil Industry Safety Directorate shall be followed as a minimum. These
include the following:

3.2.1 Monitoring of External Corrosion

As the pipeline is externally coated and also protected with a cathodic protection system.
Measures proposed for monitoring external corrosion include:

3.3 PIPE TO SOIL POTENTIAL (PSP) READING

 PSP readings at feeding points shall be monitored fortnightly.

 The PSP reading at the test lead points for entire pipeline shall be taken once in a
quarter. The PSP survey results shall be plotted graphically to identify and locate
cathodic holidays.

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3.4 CONTINUOUS POTENTIAL SURVEY

Continuous Potential Logging (CPL) survey should be carried out once in five years.

3.5 INSULATING JOINT/COUPLING INSPECTION

Insulating joints and couplings shall be inspected once in a year.

3.6 EXTERNAL CORROSION CONTROL FOR ABOVE GROUND SECTIONS OF PIPING

Above ground piping and accessories shall be inspected visually once in a year for
external corrosion. ASME B 31.8 shall be referred for guidance.

3.7 MONITORING OF INTERNAL CORROSION

Internal corrosion is a function of what the pipeline contains and conveys. As mentioned,
the service is clean and the line is internally coated but not for internal corrosion. Internal
coating is for to reduce frictional losses.

The following schedules/activities shall be followed to monitor internal corrosion

 Effectiveness of corrosion mitigation measures checked once in a year by analyzing
the corrosion coupons.
 Electrical resistance probes may be installed for monitoring the effectiveness on
corrosion mitigation measures and reading should be checked once in a quarter.
 Whenever the sections of the pipeline are running over ground, ultrasonic thickness
measurements of the pipeline shall be taken once in two years.
 Whenever repairs to the pipeline are carried out, internal visual inspection shall be
done to supplement ultrasonic thickness readings taken externally.

3.8 CHECKING OF LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM

The instruments such as assisting leak detection, including Pressure and Flow
transmitters, alarms etc. shall be periodically calibrated for accuracy and effectiveness of
operation once in three months.

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CHAPTER–4-RAPID RISK ANALYSIS (RRA)

4.1 RELEASE SCENARIOS

4.1.1 Enumeration

Effective management of a Risk Analysis (RA) study requires enumeration and selection
of incidents, and a formal means for tracking the incidents and incident outcomes.
Enumeration attempts to ensure that no significant incidents are overlooked; selection
tries to reduce the incident outcome cases studied to a manageable number; and
tracking ensures that no selected incident and incident outcome is lost in the calculation
procedure. The starting point of the analysis is to identify all the incident scenarios (due
to “Loss of Containment” that need to be addressed). Unfortunately, there is an infinite
number of ways (incidents) by which loss of containment can occur in either category.
For example, leaks of materials can be of any size, from a pinhole leak up to a severed
pipeline. A technique commonly used to generate an incident list is to consider potential
leaks and major releases from fractures of all pipeline sections and components. This
compilation should include all pipeline sections.

4.1.2 Selection

The goal of selection is to limit the total number of incident outcome cases to be studied
to a manageable size, without introducing bias or losing resolution through overlooking
significant incidents or incident outcomes. The purpose of incident selection is to
construct an appropriate set of incidents for the study from the Initial List that has been
generated by the enumeration process. An appropriate set of incidents is the minimum
number of incidents needed to satisfy the requirements of the study and adequately
represent the spectrum of incidents enumerated. Throughout the selection process, the
risk analyst must exercise caution so that critical incidents, which might substantially
affect the risk estimate, are not overlooked or excluded from the study.

4.1.3 This Study

Hazard Identification is a very important and critical first step in the RRA process. The
HAZID identifies process and non-process hazards affecting the project execution and
operational stage. The main objective of the HAZID is to identify potential major accident
events. Based on the documents the following major hazardous substance and
scenarios were considered in the study: -

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Table 4.1 : Major Hazardous Substances

Material Physical State Hazard

LPG Liquid Jet Fire, Pool Fire, Flash Fire, and
Explosion

Accidental release of LPG can result in possible damage. Immediate ignition could lead
to jet fires on immediate ignition and delayed ignition of flammable vapor could result in
flash fires with damage within the cloud dimensions or unconfined vapor cloud
explosions with blast overpressures covering significant areas. In contrast, fires
generally have localized consequences. Fires can be put out or contained in most cases;
there are few mitigating actions one can take once a flammable gas or a vapor cloud
gets released. The most extensive incidents generally arise consequent upon the
release of flammable gases or vapor clouds.

4.2 SELECTION

The factors affecting the final outcome are many- the major aspects are discussed
below.

4.2.1 Operating Parameters

Potential release rates for a material from containment depend significantly on the initial
operating conditions. Many factors affect the release rate such as the initial pressure and
temperature, hole size, hole roughness, hole orientation, gas properties, atmospheric
conditions and many others.

4.2.2 Inventory

Inventory is very important commonly used in understanding the relative hazards and
short listing of release scenarios. Inventory plays an important role in regard to the
potential hazard. Higher the inventory of a system, there is larger the quantity of
potential release. A practice commonly used to generate an incident list is to consider
potential leaks and major releases from fractures of pipelines and vessels containing
sizable inventories. The line is divided into 8 Isolatable section, - section wise Inventory
is used for the study are provided in table below: -

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Table 4.2 Inventory used and Process Conditions

Isolatable Isolation
Section Material Inventory Time (in Flow Temperature Pressure
[Link] Description Used Leak Sizes (in Kg) minute) Rate (in deg C) in barg)
1 IS-01-From LPG Small Leak : 64855 5 6.75 25 12
Battery Limit to 25 mm MMTPA
ROV 0101
LPG Minor Leak : 39285 3 6.75 25 12
100 mm MMTPA

LPG Major Leak : 26499 2 6.75 25 12

250 mm MMTPA

LPG Catastrophic 13714 1 6.75 25 12

: 500 mm MMTPA

2 IS-02-From ROV LPG Small Leak : 31985 5 6.75 25 12

0101 to MOV 25 mm MMTPA
0303
LPG Minor Leak : 20435 3 6.75 25 12
100 mm MMTPA

LPG Major Leak : 14660 2 6.75 25 12

250 mm MMTPA

LPG Catastrophic 8885 1 6.75 25 12

: 500mm MMTPA

3 IS-03-From MOV LPG Small Leak : 1006589 5 6.75 25 12

0303 to XV 0501 25 mm MMTPA
at SV-1
LPG Minor Leak : 998856 3 6.75 25 67
100 mm MMTPA

LPG Major Leak : 994989 2 6.75 25 67

250 mm MMTPA

LPG Catastrophic 991122 1 6.75 25 67

: 500mm MMTPA

4 IS-04 From XV LPG Small Leak : 1865459 5 6.75 25 67

0501 at SV-1 to 25 mm MMTPA
XV 0511
LPG Minor Leak 1857803 3 6.75 25 67
at SV-2
:100mm MMTPA

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Isolatable Isolation
Section Material Inventory Time (in Flow Temperature Pressure
[Link] Description Used Leak Sizes (in Kg) minute) Rate (in deg C) in barg)
LPG Major Leak : 1853975 2 6.75 25 67
250 mm MMTPA

LPG Catastrophic 1850147 1 6.75 25 67

: 500 mm MMTPA

5 IS-05-From XV- LPG Small Leak : 1865459 5 6.75 25 67

0511 at SV-2 to 25 mm MMTPA
XV-0521 at SV-3
LPG Minor Leak : 1857803 3 6.75 25 67
100 mm MMTPA

LPG Major Leak : 1853975 2 6.75 25 67

250 mm MMTPA

LPG Catastrophic 1850147 1 6.75 25 67

: 500 mm MMTPA

6 IS-06-From XV- LPG Small Leak : 1768284 5 6.75 25 67

0521 at SV-3 to 25 mm MMTPA
XV -0531at SV-4
LPG Minor Leak : 1760628 3 6.75 25 67
100 mm MMTPA

LPG Major Leak : 1756800 2 6.75 25 67

250 mm MMTPA

LPG Catastrophic 1752972 1 6.75 25 67

: 500 mm MMTPA

7 IS-07-From XV- LPG Small Leak : 1088062 5 6.75 25 67

0531 at SV-4 to 25 mm MMTPA
XV -0541 at SV-
LPG Minor Leak : 1080406 3 6.75 25 67
5
100 mm MMTPA

LPG Major Leak : 1076578 2 6.75 25 67

250 mm MMTPA

LPG Catastrophic 1072750 1 6.75 25 67

: 500 mm MMTPA

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Isolatable Isolation
Section Material Inventory Time (in Flow Temperature Pressure
[Link] Description Used Leak Sizes (in Kg) minute) Rate (in deg C) in barg)
8 IS-08-From XV- LPG Small Leak : 995746 5 6.75 25 67
0541 at SV-5 to 25 mm MMTPA
upto ROV 0901
at Receiver
LPG Minor Leak : 988090 3 6.75 25 67
100 mm MMTPA

LPG Major Leak : 984262 2 6.75 25 67

250 mm MMTPA

LPG Catastrophic 980434 1 6.75 25 67

: 500 mm MMTPA

4.2.3 Range of Incidents

Both the complexity of study and the number of incident outcome cases are affected by
the range of initiating events and incidents covered. This not only reflects the inclusion of
accidents and / or non-accident-initiated events, but also the size of those events. The
following are evaluated in the study:
 Large holes in the pipeline or its associated components – these represent
catastrophic failures.
 Pinhole leaks and small leakage from the pipelines or small bore instrument tapings
are not considered as they are not likely to result in any significant injury or loss of
life.
 Incidents such as Pigging, depressurization etc. are not deliberated since they would
be carried out only very very seldom, and that too, under very closely manned/
supervised conditions.

4.3 INCIDENT OUTCOME CASES

The hazardous effects have been calculated for Jet fir, Flash fire, pool fire and Vapor
Cloud explosions - the modeling of these effects is described thereafter. The effects
which are considered are those which are capable of threatening the population near the
pipeline. These outcome events are then further analyzed in the Risk estimation
procedure.

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4.4 CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS

Using the failure case data developed, the consequence program of the software
package, undertakes consequence calculations for each identified failure scenario.

For the flammable materials, the software proceeds to determine the effect zones for the
various possible outcomes of such a release. A release can ignite as the result of the
event, which causes it, or can ignite close to the source before the flammable cloud has
travelled away from the release source. If a release does not ignite in this way, and it is
still flammable, it can be ignited at a number of points downwind if its path is such that it
goes across (for example) a road, an area where people are present or other ignition
sources. The risk analysis must account for all these possible outcomes.

The particular outcome(s) modelled depends on the behavior of the release and the
dilution regimes, which exist. This can be quite complex. The program undertakes these
calculations for the selected representative meteorological conditions, which are derived
from the annual meteorological conditions in the study area.

In consequence analysis number of calculation models is used to estimate the physical

effects of an accidental release and to predict the damage (lethality, injury, material
destruction) of the effects. The calculations can roughly be divided in three major
groups:
a) Determination of the source strength parameters;
b) Determination of the consequential effects;
c) Determination of the damage or damage distances.

The basic physical effect models consist of the following.

4.4.1 Source strength parameters

Calculation of the outflow rate for the different hole sizes (this outflow rate determines
the jet dynamics or the source strength for the flash fire or explosion scenarios).

4.4.2 Consequential effects

 Intensity of heat radiation [in kW/ m2] due to a jet fire/Pool fire as a function of the
distance to the source.
 Concentration of gaseous material in the atmosphere, due to the dispersion of gas
for the case of a flash fire.

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 Energy of vapor cloud explosions, as a function of the distance to the distance of the
exploding cloud.

4.4.3 Selection of Damage Criteria

Weather Conditions

The weather stability class is normally Class D on sunny days and Class F for Night
time. The average wind speed most of the time is 5 m/s for day time and 1.5 m/s.
combining this with stability class D and F, consequence modeling is done for both the
weather cases 5 D and 1.5 F. The ambient condition considered in this study is as
under:

Average Ambient Temperature = 26.4˚C

Average Humidity = 50 (%)

The six representative weather classes on which the analysis is based are detailed in
Table 4.3 below: -
Table 4.3: Pasquill Stability Class
Surface Wind Daytime Conditions Night Sky
Speed (m/s) Strength of Sunlight
Strong Moderate Slight Thin Overcast ≥ ≤3/8
4/8 Cloudiness** Cloudiness
<2 A A-B B E F
2-3 A-B B C E F
3-5 B B-C C D E
5-6 C C-D D D D
>6 C D D D D
*Applicable to heavy overcast conditions day or night
**Degree of Cloudiness = Fraction of sky above horizon covered by clouds.
A- Extremely Unstable Conditions
B- Moderately Unstable Conditions
C- Slightly Unstable Conditions
D- Neutral Conditions*
E- Slightly Stable Conditions
F- Moderately Stable Conditions

In its original form, the Pasquill system contains seven categories (A to F) but joint
categories are also common. Categories A (Very Unstable), D (Neutral) and F (Very
Stable) are discussed next.

Category A (very unstable) occurs typically on a warm sunny day with light winds and
almost cloudless skies when there is a strong solar heating of the ground and the air

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immediately above the surface. Bubbles of warm air rise from the ground in thermals.
The rate of change (decline) of temperature with height (lapse rate) is very high.

Category D (neutral) occurs in cloudy conditions or whenever there is a strong surface

wind to cause vigorous mechanical mixing of the lower atmosphere.

Category F (very stable) occurs typically on a clear, calm night when there is a strong
cooling of the ground and the lowest layers of the atmosphere by long wave radiation.
There is a strong inversion of temperature (i.e. warm air over cold air).
Table 4.4 : Representative Weather Class

Weather Class Wind Speed(m/s) Pasquill Stability

I 3 B
II 1.5 D
III 5 D
IV 9 D
V 5 E
VI 1.5 F
Source: Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures by FEMA, USEPA and USDOT

Damage Criteria
Jet Fire:
The consequence caused by exposure to heat radiation is a function of:
 The radiation energy onto the human body [kW/m2];
 The exposure duration [sec];
 The protection of the skin tissue (clothed or naked body).
It can be assumed that people would be able to find a cover or a shield against thermal
radiation in 20 seconds time. Furthermore, 99% lethality may be assumed for all people
suffering from direct contact with flames, such as the pool fire, a flash fire or a jet flame.
The effects due to relatively lesser incident radiation intensity are given below.
In the study, the following criteria were used for estimation of heat radiation due to fire
fatalities:

These values may be compared to commonly encountered heat radiation values:

Table 4.4 Thermal Radiation Exposure Effects

INCIDENT
RADIATION TYPE OF DAMAGE
(kW/m2)
Indicative of painful burns and blistering after 20 second exposure
4.7 kW/m2 (0% lethality)
Indicative of second degree burns after 20 second exposure (1%
6.3 kW/m2 fatality)

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Indicative of piloted ignition for susceptible structures (50% fatality)

Significant chance of fatality for medium duration exposure.
Thin steel with insulation on the side away from the fire may reach
Thermal stress level high enough to cause structural failure.
12.5 kW/m2 Wood ignites after prolonged exposure.
Indicative of total asset loss (100% fatality)
37.5 kW/m2 Cellulosic material will pilot ignite within one minute’s exposure
Source: QP-PHL-S-100, QP-GDL-S-032 & Report Number: 434 International Association of Oil & Gas Producers
(OGP)- March 2010

Flash Fire Selection Criteria:

The consequence distances should be identified for the following Lower Explosive Limit: -
50 % Lower Explosive Limit
100 % Lower Explosive Limit

Explosion Criteria:

The Modeling has been carried out for the following values of the overpressure values:

Table 4.5: Overpressure Effects

Level of
TYPE OF DAMAGE
Concern
"Safe distance" (probability 0.95 of no serious damage1 below this
value); projectile limit; some damage to house ceilings; 10% window
0.02068 bar glass broken.
0.1379 bar Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses
Frameless, self-framing steel panel building demolished; rupture of oil
0.2068 storage tanks
Range for 1-99% fatalities among exposed population due to direct
1 bar blast effects
Source: Report Number: 434 International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP)- March 2010- Table 2.8
4.5 RESULTS

Quantity of hazardous chemical and the location of accident, have the potential of affecting
personnel within the installation or at times the general population in the surrounding area.
The results of consequence analysis carried out for the identified accident scenarios are
given below for different isolatable sections:

Table: 4.6 Jet Fire Results

[Link] Description Material Leak Incident Heat Radiation Incident Heat Radiation
Size (kW/m2) (kW/m2)
4.73 6.31 12.5 37.5 4.73 6.31 12.5 37.5

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Distance in meter Distance in meter

(Weather Class 5/D) (Weather Class 1.5/F)

1 From Battery Limit to

ROV 0101 25 mm 30.8 30.2 29.5 --- 30.5 30 29.5 ---
100 mm 106 104 99 94 99 97 92.5 87.5
LPG
250 mm 238 231 220 207 215 209 194 180
500 mm-
CR 440 421 399 370 390 372 348 312
2 FROM ROV 0101 TO
MOV 0303 25 mm 30.8 30.2 29.5 --- 30.5 30 29.5 ---
100 mm 106 103 99 94 99 97 92.5 87.5
LPG
250 mm 238 231 220 206 215 209 194 180
500 mm-
CR 440 421 400 368 390 372 348 312
3 FROM MOV 0303 TO
XV 0501 AT SV-1 25 mm 30.9 30.4 29.5 --- 30.8 30.2 29.5 ---
100 mm 106 104 99 94 99 97 92 87
LPG
250 mm 239 232 220 208 215 209 194 181
500 mm-
CR 440 429 398 370 390 372 348 312
4 FROM XV 0501 AT
SV-1 TO XV 0511 AT 25 mm 30.9 30.6 29.7 --- 30.9 30.5 29.4 ---
SV-2 100 mm 106 104 99 94 99 97 92 87
LPG
250 mm 239 231 220 207 215 210 194 181
500 mm-
CR 440 429 398 370 390 372 348 312
5 FROM XV-0511 AT
SV-2 TO XV-0521 AT 25 mm 30.9 30.6 29.7 --- 30.9 30.5 29.4 ---
SV-3 100 mm 106 103 99 94 99 97 92 87
LPG
250 mm 237 231 220 207 215 210 195 181
500 mm-
CR 440 428 396 370 390 372 348 312
6 FROM XV-0521 AT
SV-3 TO XV-0531 AT 25 mm 30.9 30.7 29.7 --- 30.8 30.5 29.5 ---
SV-4 100 mm 106 104 99 94 99 97 92 87
LPG
250 mm 239 231 220 207 215 210 195 181
500 mm-
CR 440 429 397 370 390 372 348 312
7 FROM XV-0531 AT
SV-4 TO XV-0541 AT 25 mm 30.9 30.7 29.4 --- 30.8 30.5 29.5 ---
SV-5 100 mm 106 104 99 94 99 97 92 87
LPG
250 mm 240 231 220 208 215 210 195 181
500 mm-
CR 440 430 397 370 390 372 348 312
8 From XV-0541 at
25 mm 30.9 30.7 29.7 --- 30.8 30.5 29.5 ---
SV-5 to upto ROV
0901 at Receiver 100 mm 106 104 99 94 99 97 92 87
LPG
250 mm 240 231 220 206 215 210 195 181
500 mm-
CR 440 429 397 370 390 372 348 312

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Table: 4.7 Pool Fire Results

Leak Incident Heat Radiation Incident Heat Radiation

Size (kW/m2) (kW/m2)
4.7 6.31 12.5 38 4 6.31 12.5 37.5
[Link] Description Material
Distance in meter Distance in meter
(Weather Class 5/D) (Weather Class 1.5/F)

25 mm 5.6 5.7 7.15 --- 15.1 13.6 10.5 5.9

100 mm 65 59 46.8 29 66 57.5 43 23.5
From Battery Limit to ROV
1 LPG 250 mm 144 129 101 65 137 121 91 51
0101
500 mm-
209 188 148 95 201 179 132 74
CR
25 mm 5.6 5.7 7.15 --- 15 13.6 10.5 5.9
100mm 65 59 46.9 29 66 57.5 43 23.5
FROM ROV 0101 TO MOV
2 LPG 250 mm 144 129 101 65 137 122 92 51
0303
500 mm-
180 164 128 83 390 372 348 312
CR
25 mm --- --- --- --- 14.5 13.2 10.1 5.8
100 mm 68 61 48.2 31 65 58.5 44 23.5
FROM MOV 0303 TO XV
3 LPG 250 mm 146 132 103 67 137 124 94 51
0501 AT SV-1
500 mm-
256 228 179 112 242 218 160 90
CR
25 mm --- --- --- --- 14.5 13.2 10.1 5.8
100 mm 67 60.5 48.2 31 65 58.5 44 23.5
FROM XV 0501 AT SV-1
4 LPG 250 mm 145 132 104 67 137 124 94 51
TO XV 0511 AT SV-2
500mm-
255 228 180 115 245 218 162 90
CR
25 mm --- --- --- --- 14.5 13.1 10.1 5.8
100 mm 67 60.5 48.2 31 65 58 43.5 23.5
FROM XV-0511 AT SV-2
5 LPG 250 mm 145 132 103 67 138 124 93 48.5
TO XV-0521 AT SV-3
500mm-
255 228 180 115 242 218 160 90
CR
25 mm --- --- --- --- 14.5 13.1 10.1 5.8
100 mm 67 60.5 48.2 31 65 58 43.5 23.5
FROM XV-0521 AT SV-3
6 LPG 250 mm 145 132 104 67 138 124 94 51
TO XV-0531 AT SV-4
500 mm-
255 228 180 115 242 218 160 90
CR
25 mm --- --- --- --- 14.5 13.1 10.1 5.8
100 mm 67 60.5 48.2 31 65 58 43.5 23.5
FROM XV-0531 AT SV-4
7 LPG 250 mm 145 132 104 67 138 124 94 51
TO XV-0541 AT SV-5
500 mm-
255 228 180 115 242 218 160 90
CR
25 mm --- --- --- --- 14.5 13.1 10.1 5.8
From XV-0541 at SV-5 100 mm 67 60.5 48.2 31 65 58 43.5 23.5
8 to upto ROV 0901 at LPG 250 mm 145 132 104 67 138 124 94 51
Receiver 500 mm-
255 228 180 115 242 218 160 90
CR

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Table: 4.8 Flash Fire Results

Leak Sizes Leak Sizes
25 100 250 500- 25 100 250 500 mm-
S.N Descripti Materi
LEL Value mm mm mm CR mm mm mm CR
o on al
Distance in meter (Weather Class Distance in meter (Weather Class
5/D) 1.5/F)
FROM 50% LEL-(8824
Battery ppm) 47 162 355 530 72 280 650 1100
1 LPG
limit to
100% LEL-(1.765
ROV 0101 32 115 250 385 55 210 510 820
FROM 50% LEL-(8824
ROV 0101 ppm) 47 160 350 530 72 275 649 1080
2 LPG
to MOV
100% LEL-(1.765
0303 32 115 250 385 55 205 499 810
FROM 50% LEL-(8824
MOV ppm) 48 164 370 700 72 285 720 1600
3 0303 TO LPG
XV 0501 100% LEL-(1.765
AT SV-1 32 118 260 500 55 212 550 1202
FROM XV 50% LEL-(8824
0501 AT ppm) 48 165 370 700 72 285 720 1600
4 SV-1 TO LPG
XV 0511 100% LEL-(1.765
AT SV-2 32 118 259 500 55 212 550 1202
FROM 50% LEL-(8824
XV-0511 ppm) 48 165 370 700 72 285 720 1600
AT SV-2
5 LPG
TO XV-
100% LEL-(1.765
0521 AT
SV-3 32 118 259 500 55 212 550 1202
FROM 50% LEL-(8824
XV-0521 ppm) 48 165 370 700 72 285 720 1600
AT SV-3
6 LPG
TO XV-
100% LEL-(1.765
0531 AT
SV-4 32 118 259 500 55 212 550 1202
FROM 50% LEL-(8824
XV-0531 ppm) 48 165 370 700 72 285 720 1600
AT SV-4
7 LPG
TO XV-
100% LEL-(1.765
0541 AT
SV-5 32 118 259 500 55 212 550 1202
From 50% LEL-(8824
XV-0541 ppm) 48 165 370 700 72 285 720 1600
at SV-5
8 to upto LPG
ROV 100% LEL-(1.765
0901 at
Receiver 32 118 259 500 55 212 550 1202

Table: 4.9 Explosion Results

[Link] Description Material Leak Overpressure Overpressure
Size
0.02068 0.1379 0.2068 0.02068 0.1379 0.2068
bar bar bar 1 bar bar bar bar 1 bar
Distance in meter (Weather Class Distance in meter (Weather
5/D) Class 1.5/F)
1 From Battery LPG 25 mm 100 56 52 45 205 105 97 80
Limit to ROV
0101 100 mm 380 218 206 76 820 415 375 318
250 mm 850 480 451 390 1160 680 675 655
500 mm- 850 575 565 540 1150 1095 1092 1085

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CR
2 FROM ROV LPG 25 mm 100 56 52 45 205 105 97 81
0101 TO
MOV 0303 100mm 380 217 206 177 810 410 375 315
250 mm 722 430 408 360 955 670 665 650
500 mm-
CR 740 560 550 540 1090 955 952 950
3 FROM MOV LPG 25 mm 100 56 52 45 205 105 97 80
0303 TO XV
0501 AT SV- 100 mm 390 220 205 179 840 425 390 320
1 250 mm 910 510 472 416 2120 1100 1010 830
500 mm-
CR 1720 970 900 775 3975 2100 1990 1750
4 FROM XV LPG 25 mm 100 56 52 45 205 105 97 80
0501 AT SV-
1 TO XV 100 mm 390 220 205 179 840 425 390 320
0511 AT SV- 250 mm 910 510 472 416 2120 1100 1010 830
2 500mm-
CR 1740 960 900 770 4400 2350 2180 1850
5 FROM XV- LPG 25 mm 100 56 52 45 205 105 97 80
0511 AT SV-
2 TO XV- 100 mm 390 220 205 179 840 425 390 320
0521 AT SV- 250 mm 910 510 475 416 2120 1100 1010 830
3 500mm-
CR 1740 960 900 770 4400 2350 2180 1850
6 FROM XV- LPG 25 mm 100 56 52 45 205 105 97 80
0521 AT SV-
3 TO XV- 100 mm 390 220 205 179 840 425 390 320
0531 AT SV- 250 mm 910 510 475 416 2120 1100 1010 830
4 500 mm-
CR 1740 960 900 775 4400 2350 2180 1810
7 FROM XV- LPG 25 mm 100 56 52 45 205 105 97 80
0531 AT SV-
4 TO XV- 100 mm 390 220 205 179 840 425 390 320
0541 AT SV- 250 mm 910 510 475 416 2120 1100 1010 830
5 500 mm-
CR 1720 970 900 775 4050 2120 2000 1720
8 From XV- LPG 25 mm 100 56 52 45 205 105 97 80
0541 at SV- 100 mm 390 220 205 179 840 425 390 320
5 to up to
ROV 0901 250 mm 910 510 475 416 2120 1100 1010 830
500 mm-
at Receiver CR 1720 970 900 775 3950 2100 1990 1750

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CHAPTER-5-CONCLUSION & RISK REDUCTION RECOMMENDATIONS

The main conclusions drawn from the Consequence Analysis are given below- critical actions
for safeguarding against the incidents are also mentioned below: -:

The Maximum damage distance for the jet fire scenario is 430 meters at 6.31 kW/m2 thermal
radiation value (which corresponds to 1% fatality) and 370 metres at 37.5 kW/m2 thermal
radiation value (which corresponds to 100% fatality) for Isolatable Secton-07 (From XV-0531
at SV-4 to XV-0541 at SV-5).
he Maximum damage distance for the Pool fire scenario is 228 meters at 6.31 kW/m 2
thermal radiation value (which corresponds to 1% fatality) and 115 meters at 37.5 kW/m2
thermal radiation value (which corresponds to 100% fatality) for Isolatable Secton-07 (From
XV-0531 at SV-4 to XV-0541 at SV-5).
The maximum damage distance for Flash Fire scenario for 50% LEL is 1600 meters and
100% LEL is 1202 meters for Isolatable Secton-07 (From XV-0531 at SV-4 to XV-0541 at
SV-5).
The maximum distance due to overpressure scenario is 970 meters at 0.1379 bar g and 775
meters at 1 bar g for Isolatable Secton-07 (From XV-0531 at SV-4 to XV-0541 at SV-5).

In addition, based on the discussion and based on industry best practice, the following
recommendations may be implemented:
The area must be kept free of ignition sources to the extent possible via patrolling and
the same must be ensured even during maintenance activity. Non sparking tools must
be used and personnel entering the area must be “de-earthed” before entering. A
hazardous area classification study is suggested for placement of electrical equipment in
the classified area.
Ensure the area shall not be encroached by the public.
The correct installation of safety critical equipment at site and their operational reliability
are essential for the safety of the facility. In addition, initial and periodic testing of the
safety critical equipment before installation and periodically is absolutely essential and
the same must be ensured.
Emergency procedures should be well rehearsed and state of readiness maintained.
This should be done by ensuring that the Disaster Management Plan is in tune with the
risk analysis and that regular Mock drills are held regularly with diversity of scenarios.
All key personnel should be trained in handling emergency situations and should be
apprised of their role in handling emergency situation and to ensure adequacy of the
emergency procedures simulated exercise should be carried out.
Adequate number of caution boards highlighting the hazards of LPG in the various
states in which it is present within the facility. The company should also regularly

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 RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT (RRA) STUDY
REPORT FOR MUNDRA-KANDLA 20”LPG
PIPELINE PROJECT

conduct awareness campaigns to educating the public, in particular those in and around
the vicinity.
In locations where flammable vapors/ liquid may be present, precautions should be
taken to prevent ignition by eliminating / containing source of ignition. Source of ignition
may include open flames, lightening, smoking, cutting and welding operations, lighting /
hot surfaces, frictional heat, sparks (static, electrical and mechanical), spontaneous and
radiant heat.
It must be ensured that the operations are carried out in accordance with safe operating
procedures by trained and experienced personnel.
Mechanical integrity of the pipework must be ensured and constructed in accordance
with an appropriate standard.
Electrical equipment shall be used in accordance as per zone classified area.
Portable electric lamps and portable electric equipment for use in hazardous areas must
be of an approved type. Special care should be taken to prevent any mechanical
damage to flexible cables or wandering leads.
All maintenance work on electrical equipment should be undertaken under the control of
a permit or an equivalent safety management system, with procedures that ensure
electrical and mechanical isolations are effectively managed.

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 RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT (RRA) STUDY
REPORT FOR MUNDRA-KANDLA 20”LPG
PIPELINE PROJECT

ANNEXURE-1-CONSEQUENCE RESULTS

RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT (RRA) STUDY Page 33

 RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT (RRA) STUDY
REPORT FOR MUNDRA-KANDLA 20”LPG
PIPELINE PROJECT

WEATHER CLASS – 5/D

RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT (RRA) STUDY Page 34

 MUNDRA KANDLA LPG PIPELINE

DAY GRAPHS

IS-1

FROM BATTERY LIMIT TO ROV 0101

25MM
LEAK SIZE-100MM
LEAK SIZE-250MM
LEAK SIZE-500MM
IS-2

FROM ROV 0101 TO MOV 0303

LEAK SIZE-25MM
LEAK SIZE-100MM
LEAK SIZE-250MM
LEAK SIZE-500MM
IS-3

FROM MOV 0303 TO XV 0501 AT SV-1

LEAK SIZE-25MM
LEAK SIZE-100MM
LEAK SIZE-250MM
LEAK SIZE-500MM
IS-4

FROM XV 0501 AT SV-1 TO XV 0511 AT SV-2

LEAK SIZE-25MM
LEAK SIZE-100MM
LEAK SIZE-250MM
LEAK SIZE-500MM
IS-5

FROM XV-0511 AT SV-2 TO XV-0521 AT SV-3

LEAK SIZE-25MM
LEAK SIZE-100MM
LEAK SIZE-250MM
LEAK SIZE-500MM
IS-6

FROM XV-0521 AT SV-3 TO XV-0531 AT SV-4

LEAK SIZE-25MM
LEAK SIZE-100MM
LEAK SIZE-250MM
LEAK SIZE-500MM
IS-7

FROM XV-0531 AT SV-4 TO XV-0541 AT SV-5

LEAK SIZE-25MM
LEAK SIZE-100MM
LEAK SIZE-250MM
LEAK SIZE-500MM
IS-8

FROM XV -0541 AT SV-5 TO ROV-0901

LEAK SIZE-25MM
LEAK SIZE-100MM
LEAK SIZE-250MM
LEAK SIZE-500MM
 RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT (RRA) STUDY
REPORT FOR MUNDRA-KANDLA 20”LPG
PIPELINE PROJECT

WEATHER CLASS – 1.5/F

RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT (RRA) STUDY Page 35

 MUNDRA KANDLA LPG PIPELINE

NIGHT GRAPHS

IS-1

FROM BATTERY LIMIT TO ROV 0101

25MM
LEAK SIZE-100MM
LEAK SIZE-250MM
LEAK SIZE-500MM
IS-2

FROM ROV 0101 TO MOV 0303

LEAK SIZE-25MM
LEAK SIZE-100MM
LEAK SIZE-250MM
LEAK SIZE-500MM
IS-3

FROM MOV 0303 TO XV 0501 AT SV-1

LEAK SIZE-25MM
LEAK SIZE-100MM
LEAK SIZE-250MM
LEAK SIZE-500MM
IS-4

FROM XV 0501 AT SV-1 TO XV 0511 AT SV-2

LEAK SIZE-25MM
LEAK SIZE-100MM
LEAK SIZE-250MM
LEAK SIZE-500MM
IS-5

FROM XV-0511 AT SV-2 TO XV-0521 AT SV-3

LEAK SIZE-25MM
LEAK SIZE-100MM
LEAK SIZE-250MM
LEAK SIZE-500MM
IS-6

FROM XV-0521 AT SV-3 TO XV-0531 AT SV-4

LEAK SIZE-25MM
LEAK SIZE-100MM
LEAK SIZE-250MM
LEAK SIZE-500MM
IS-7

FROM XV-0531 AT SV-4 TO XV-0541 AT SV-5

LEAK SIZE-25MM
LEAK SIZE-100MM
LEAK SIZE-250MM
LEAK SIZE-500MM
IS-8

FROM XV -0541 AT SV-5 TO MOV-0602

LEAK SIZE-25MM
LEAK SIZE-100MM
LEAK SIZE-250MM
LEAK SIZE-500MM