GR No.

129899
April 27, 2000

People of the Philippines v. Rodulfo Villa y Delgado

Facts:

In the early morning of 22 June 1991 Dionito Fernandez was cutting grass in his yard in New
Cabalan, Olongapo City. Accused Rodolfo Villa, Jr., a member of the CAFGU and neighbor of Dionito,
suddenly came out of his house with his M-1 Garand rifle and shot Dionito from behind killing him
instantly. Ronald Fernandez and Sheila Fernandez, children of Dionito, rushed to their fathers rescue after
hearing the gunshot but the accused also fired at them fatally hitting Ronald who was embracing his father,
and mortally wounding Sheila on the thigh and stomach. Samuel Eclevia, another neighbor of the
Fernandezes, attempted to wrestle the rifle from the accused but Samuel too was gunned down.

Villa surrendered to a certain Captain Dolino. He was accordingly charged with multiple murder.
When arraigned on 3 October 1991 he entered a plea of not guilty. His counsel, Atty. Dumpit, manifested
in open court that the accused was desirous of changing his plea to guilty. Thereafter, the accused invoked
self-defense insofar as Fernandez was concerned, as the latter tried to stab him with a bolo. Thus, according
to the accused, he was forced to shoot Dionito with his rifle. The trial court then proceeded to propound
searching questions on the accused to determine whether he understood the nature and consequences of
his change of plea, and upon being satisfied with the answers given by the accused who was assisted by
counsel, the court allowed the change of plea.

The trial court issued an order appointing Atty. Alinea as counsel de oficio for the accused, as his
counsel de parte Atty. Dumpit was unavailable due to his ongoing medical treatment. Before the defense
could present its evidence, Atty. Alinea manifested his inability to confer with the accused but moved that
a psychiatric examination of the accused be made. The motion was granted and the accused was examined
at the Olongapo City General Hospital to ascertain he was suffering from mental illness before, during and
after the commission of the crime.

After more than a month of psychiatric evaluation, the attending physicians submitted to the trial
court a psychiatric evaluation report, which stated in part “Evaluation shows that the patient is suffering from
Insanity or Psychosis classified ashizophrenia. This is a mental illness characterized by deterioration in social and
occupational functioning, auditory hallucination, delusion, thought disturbances and poor judgment. He is at present
incompetent to stand trial”. Six months later, a follow-up report was made, that the patient’s status had
improved enough for him to withstand the rigors of the trial. A petition for release of the accused has been
filed, praying that he be discharged and returned to jail for the speedy disposition of the case. The trial
court granted the petition and the trial resumed with the accused now raising insanity as a defense.

The trial court disregard the defense of insanity and forthwith convicted the accused of the crimes
charged. The court is not convinced that the accused was suffering from insanity of schizophrenic type
before or during the killing. In order that insanity can be considered as an exempting circumstance, it must
be shown to exist just before or during the commission of the offense. Also, in order to exempt the accused
from criminal liability it must be shown beyond cavil of doubt that there was complete deprivation of
reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of the commission of the crime. These the accused
failed to prove.

Issue:

Whether accused-appellant was insane during the commission of the crimes as would exempt him
from criminal liability

Ruling:

The court affirm the judgment of conviction. . Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation
of intelligence while committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least
discernment because there is complete absence of power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of
freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has
not lost consciousness of his acts.

Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is
manifested in language and conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature
and consequences of his acts. Hence, insanity may be shown by the surrounding circumstances fairly
throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged persons general conduct and
appearance, his acts and conduct consistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and
beliefs, as well as his improvident bargains. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts,
by means of which we read thoughts, motives and emotions of a person, and through which we determine
whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.

Examining the evidence on record, we are convinced that accused-appellant was sane at the time
he perpetrated the killings. The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably negate a complete
absence of intelligence on his part: (a) Immediately after he killed the victims he thought of surrendering
to the PC Detachment in Olongapo City; (b) He showed remorse during his confinement at the Mental
Hospital; and, (c) He was able to give a Sworn Statement before the Prosecutors Office in Olongapo City
immediately after the commission of the crimes narrating his version of the incident.14 These are hardly the
acts of a person with a sick mind. In People v. Ambal we held: "The fact that immediately after the incident
(accused) thought of surrendering to the law-enforcement authorities is incontestable proof that he knew
that what he had done was wrong and that he was going to be punished for it." Similarly, a feeling of
remorse is inconsistent with insanity, as it is a clear indication that he was conscious of his acts, he
acknowledged his guilt and was sorry for them.
GR No. 140344
August 18, 2000

Solomon Rabor v. People of the Philippines

Facts:

On 17 August 1981, at around 9 o’clock in the evening, Hikaru Miyake, a Japanese national,
residing with his Filipina wife and children in Gem Village, Ma-a, Davao City was taking his usual
"Japanese-style" bath in a drum behind his house. As he soaked his body inside the drum filled with
warm water, he heard a sound which made him turn to the direction where it came from. Miyake sensed
that there was something wrong, so he hurriedly got out of the drum. He then saw petitioner about one
and a half meters away rushing towards him with a bolo. Petitioner attacked Miyake who fought and
grappled with the former for the possession of the bolo. The struggle lasted for about two (2) minutes.

Petitioner fled when he lost possession of the bolo. As a result of the attack, Miyake sustained
injuries on the different parts of his body. Miyake’s security guard arrived to give assistance to his
employer. The security guard saw petitioner flee towards the direction of his house. Miyake was
immediately brought to the Brokenshire Hospital where he was confined for ten (10) days.

Petitioner was hired to bring the Miyake children to their school while petitioner’s wife gave
them piano lessons. This cordial relationship between Miyake and petitioner, however, abruptly ended
when their respective wives quarreled with each other over a sum of money which Mrs. Miyake loaned
to petitioner’s wife. Since then, petitioner became hostile towards the Miyakes.

Petitioner threw stones at the house of Miyake. In the afternoon of that same day, Miyake went to
his house, which was just about fifty (50) meters away, to try to patch things up with him. Nonetheless,
on account of the strained relations between them, Miyake terminated the services of petitioner and his
wife. Petitioner, while riding on his motorcycle, would stop in front of the Miyake residence and shout, "I
want to fight and I will kill you." Miyake ignored these threats to avoid any trouble. Then came that
fateful day of 17 August 1981.

After trial, the Court a quo rendered judgment convicting petitioner of the crime of frustrated
murder.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Issue:

A. Whether or not the decision of the court of appeals finding the petitioner guilty of frustrated
murder is contrary to law;

B. Whether or not the medical certificate presented by the prosecution is hearsay.

D. Whether or not the court of appeals in disregarding the alibi of the petitioner has decided
questions of substance not in accord with law and the applicable decision of the honorable court.

E. Whether or not the prosecution is guilty of suppression of evidence

Ruling:

The petition is partly meritorious.

The first three issues shall be discussed jointly as they are interrelated. They all pertain to
petitioner’s contention that he was wrongly convicted of the crime of frustrated murder. Petitioner
maintains that the wounds sustained by the victim were not fatal; hence, the crime committed was
merely attempted not frustrated. Further, the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not
allegedly sufficiently proven in this case. Petitioner thus is of the view that the crime should be homicide
and not murder. Contrary to petitioner’s insistence, some of the wounds inflicted on the victim were fatal.

Given the foregoing testimony that Miyake could have died if not for the timely medical treatment,
the trial court correctly held that the stage of execution of the crime was frustrated. A felony is "frustrated
when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator."

In order that evident premeditation may be properly considered in imposing the proper penalty,
the following requisites must be established: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the
crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient
lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of
his act.

None of these requisites can be inferred from the facts of this case. For one, the records do not
show the time when petitioner resolved to commit the crime. The date and, if possible, the time when the
offender determined to commit the crime is essential, because the lapse of time for the purpose of the
third requisite is computed from date and time. Absent this first requisite, evident premeditation was
thus incorrectly appreciated in this case.

Evident premeditation having been wrongly appreciated in this case and there being no other
qualifying circumstance established during the trial, the Court now holds that the crime committed in
this case is frustrated homicide.

The guilt of petitioner for the crime of frustrated homicide had been sufficiently established
beyond reasonable doubt.