Political Law; Constitutional Law; Executive Department; Powers; Diplomatic

Powers

The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with
the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to
the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed
by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of
increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law. [Sec. 20, Art. VII,
1987 Constitution]

The provision is clear, it allows the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no
prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments
are more onerous than others. This Court may not ascribe to the Constitution meanings and restrictions
that would unduly burden the powers of the President. [Constantino v. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064,
October 13, 2005]

As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and
otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the
sole authority to negotiate with other states. [Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July
6, 2005]

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. [Sec. 21, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution]

A treaty is defined as “an international instrument concluded between States in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments, and whatever its particular” [Bayan v. Executive Secretry, G.R. No. 138570, October 10,
2000]

International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving
international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international
agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and
traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of
executive agreement. [Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, G.R. No. L-14279,
October 31, 1961]“Treaties” as “international agreements entered into by the Philippines which require
legislative concurrence after executive ratification,” while “executive agreements” are “similar to treaties
except that they do not require legislative concurrence.” [Executive Order No. 459, section 2 (b) and (c)]
Having this distinction in mind, an agreement not between states is neither a treaty nor an executive
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agreement. Thus, a contract for the construction of a railway system between the North Luzon Railways
Corporation (NLRC) and China National Machinery and Equipment Corporation (CNMEC) is not an
executive agreement. The contract was not concluded between the Philippines and China. The NLRC
and CNMEC entered into the contract as entities with personalities separate from their governments. [
China National Machinery and Equipment Corp. v. Santamaria, G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012]

The question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its citizens against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is committed by the Constitution to the
political branches. The Treaty of Peace with Japan barred future claims such as those asserted by
petitioners. The Executive Department has determined that taking up the cause of petitioners will be
inimical to the foreign policy interests of the country. [Vinuya v. Romulo, G.R. No. 162230, April 28,
2010]

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Political Law; Constitutional Law; Executive Department; Powers; Military Powers

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the
same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if
the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts
and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. [Sec. 18, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution]

The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which
begins with the simple declaration that “[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines x x x” Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5,
Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute
authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the
ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which
may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law. [Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006]
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The reason for this rule was best explained by the Court in another case, there it held that, “[I]t cannot be
gainsaid that certain liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech, may be
circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed,
because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on
the maintenance of discipline within its ranks.” [Kapunan v. Villa, G.R. No. 83177, December 6, 1988]

The President also has the power of calling-out the military. In one case, President Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 proclaiming a state of national emergency, this was supported by the
Solicitor General’s comment and Memorandum showing a detailed narration of the events leading to the
declaration. The Court held that absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the
President was justified in issuing the proclamation, calling for military aid. Indeed, judging from the
seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing
to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However,
Presidential Proclamatton1017 as declared unconstitutional insofar as it grants the President the
authority to promulgate decrees, because legislative power is peculiarly within the province of Congress.
[David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006]

When the President calls out the armed forces to suppress lawless violence, rebellion or invasion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. The Court cannot overrule the
President’s discretion or substitute its own. The only criterion is that, “whenever it becomes necessary”,
the President may call out the armed forces. [Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No.
141284, August 15, 2000] In essence, the President has discretionary authority to declare a state of
rebellion. The Court may only look into the suffieciency of the factual basis for the exercise of the power.
However, mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected
rights. [Sanlakas v. Reyes, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004]

The President also has the power to organize courts martial for the discipline of the members of the
armed forces, create military commissions for the punishment of war criminals. [Ruffy v. Chief of Staff,
G.R. No. L-533, August 20, 1946] But military tribunals cannot try civilians when civil courts are open
and functioning. [Olaguer v. Military Commision No. 34, G.R. No. L-54558, May 22, 1987]

[see Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658 and [Link]. 231771 and G.R. No. 231774, July 4,
2017]

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Judicial Review

Constitutional Basis

The power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article
VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)

[Francisco vs House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003]

Theory, Rationale, and Restrictions of Judicial Review

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as
its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because
the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of
the government. [Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936 cited in Francisco
vs House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003]

By virtue of this prerogative, the Supreme Court either checks or legitimates the acts of a coordinate
department, challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The decision rendered then, whether one of
approval or of rejection, of validity or of unconstitutionality, is controlling. [Mitra vs Comelec, G.R. No.
L-56503, April 4, 1981]

Requisites of Judicial Review

The Court's power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following
requisites are complied with, namely:

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(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

[See Montesclaros vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2002]

A. Actual Case or Controversy

An actual case or controversy is one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal
or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Stated otherwise, it is not the mere
existence of a conflict or controversy that will authorize the exercise by the courts of its power of review;
more importantly, the issue involved must be susceptible of judicial determination. Excluded from these
are questions of policy or wisdom, otherwise referred to as political questions. [Garcia v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009]

A justiciable controversy has been defined as, a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law through the
application of a law. Courts have no judicial power to review cases involving political questions and as a
rule, will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and in
cases that has become moot. Subject to certain well-defined exceptions courts will not touch an issue
involving the validity of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that
has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its validity. [Cutaran vs DENR,
G.R. No. 134958, January 31, 2001]

Prematurity

In PACU vs. Secretary of Education [G.R. No. L-5279, October 31, 1955] the petition contesting the
validity of a regulation issued by the Secretary of Education requiring private schools to secure a permit
to operate was dismissed on the ground that all the petitioners have permits and are actually operating
under the same. The petitioners questioned the regulation because of the possibility that the permit
might be denied them in the future. The Court held that there was no justiciable controversy because the
petitioners suffered no wrong by the implementation of the questioned regulation and therefore, they are
not entitled to relief. A mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education will withdraw the permit does
not amount to a justiciable controversy.

In Montesclaros vs. Comelec [G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2002], the prayer to prevent Congress from
enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual
justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A
proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. There can be no
justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power
of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.

Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from
setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress
in the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members
of Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral
Committee of approved bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber
of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of
private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal processes or
| Page 2 of 5
procedures of Congress.

Exceptions to mootness

As an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review. [Pimentel vs Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005; Tolentino v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004 citing Acop vs. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134855, July
2, 2002]

As a general rule, courts decline jurisdiction over cases rendered moot. However, courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, in the following situations:
(i) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(ii) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
(iii) when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public;
(iv) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
[see David vs Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006]

B. Proper Party

"Legal standing" or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act. xxx Thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action. [Tolentino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004]

The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a person's
constitutional rights are adversely affected by the statute or ordinance, he has no legal standing.
[Jumamil [Link], G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005]

[see also Joya vs PCGG, G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993; Agan vs PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, May
5, 2003, CHR Employee's Association vs CHR, G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004]

Citizen Standing

The mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest, when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right. [Chavez vs PEA AMARI, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002]

When the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement
of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation
the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it
being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. [Tanada
vs Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985]

Voter's Standing

The Court has relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised its discretion to give due course to
voters' suits involving the right of suffrage. [Tolentino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004]

| Page 3 of 5
Taxpayer's Standing

Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure
of money raised by taxation. The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of
executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds...A taxpayer need not be a
party to the contract to challenge its validity. [Jumamil vs. Cafe, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005]

Association's standing

The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view
fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An association has standing to file suit
for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization
has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents. x x x The [association] is the appropriate party to
assert the rights of its members, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical. The
[association] is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the
expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances. [Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines vs. (DOH) Health Secretary Francisco T. Duque III, G.R. No. 173034,
October 9, 2007]

An association has legal standing to to represent its members because the results of the case will affect
their vital interests. [Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. v. Yuipco, G.R. No. 135092, May 4, 2006]

Exception to locus standi requirement: Transcendental importance

In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement when a petition raises an issue
of transcendental significance or paramount importance to the people.

Objections to a taxpayer's suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are procedural
matters. Considering the importance to the public of a suit assailing the constitutionality of a tax law, and
in keeping with the Court's duty, specially explicated in the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or
not the other branches of the Government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and
the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Supreme Court may brush
aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of the suit.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following determinants formulated
by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or
other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the
lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.
[Jumamil vs. Cafe, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005][ see also David vs Arroyo, G.R. No.
171396, May 3, 2006]

C. Lis Mota of the case

The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question
is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case,
i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. [National Economic
Protectionism Association et al. vs. Ongpin, G.R. No. 67752, April 10, 1989]

Lis mota - the fourth requirement to satisfy before [the] Court will undertake judicial review - means that
the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case
| Page 4 of 5
can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law. The
petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional
question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality; to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. [Garcia v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009]

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Political Law; Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Concepts; Judicial Review

Judicial review is the power of the Courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in light of
their conformity with the Constitution. The power is inherent in the Judicial Department, by virtue of the
doctrine of separation of powers. [Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political law (2009)] This is not an
assertion of superiority by the Courts over the other departments, but merely an expression of the
supremacy of the Constitution. [Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936].

All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or agreement, or law, which shall be
heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to
be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential
decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted thereon. [Sec. 4 (2), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution]

Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts. [Sec. 5 (2), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution] Such
implies that lower courts can also exercise such power. In one case, the Supreme Court said that the
lower courts should not shy away from the task of deciding constitutional questions when properly raised
before them. [Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987] This was later
on affirmed in another case, where the Court held that, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review
not only in the Supreme Court but also in Regional Trial Courts. Furthermore, B.P. 129 grants RTCs the
authority to rule on the conformity of laws and treaties with the Constitution. [Mirasol v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001]

Requisites of Judicial Review

1. Actual case or controversy

2. Locus Standi
3. Question is raised at the earliest opportunity
4. Lis Mota of the case

Actual case or controversy means a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims which
can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. [Guingona v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 125532, July 10, 1998]. The controversy must be definite and concrete, bearing upon the legal
relations of the parties who are pitted against each other due to their adverse legal interest. [John Hay
People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim, G.R. No. 119775, October 24, 2003] The issues raised in the
case must not be moot and academic, or because of subsequent developments, have become moot and
academic. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events. [Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004]

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Locus standi is defined as the right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. [Black’s Law
Dictionary, 6th ed., 1991] In private suits, real party in interest rule governs. [Sec. 2, Rule 3, 1997
Rules of Court] A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefitted or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. [Salonga v. Warner Barnes, G.R. No.
L-2246, January 31, 1951]. The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits where the
plaintiff asserts a public right in assailing the validity of an official act, and he does so as a representative
of the general public. To establish legal standing, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and securing relief as a citizen or taxpayer. [David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006]

A person has standing to challenge the validity of governmental act only if he has a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. [People v. Vera, G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937] To put it differently, a citizen can
raise a constitutional question only if he can show the following: (1) that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. [
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998] Note, however, that when the subject in issue is of
transcendental interest to the public, the Court entertains the suit even if those suing do not have
personal and direct interest such that they stand to suffer harm. [Kilosbayan v. Guingona, G.R. No.
113375, May 5, 1994] The following maybe parties (a) Taxpayers, when public funds are involved [
Tolentino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004]; (b) Government of the Philippines, when
questioning the validity of its own laws [People v. Vera, supra]; (c) Legislators, when the powers of
Congress are being impaired [PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994]; (d)
Citizens, when the enforcement of a public right is involved [Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, April
24, 1985]. Thus, when a citizen questions the circulars issued by the Commission on Audit lifting the
pre-audit of government transactions of the national government agencies, government-owned and
controlled corporations, and local governments, he has standing to file the case since he would be
adversely affected by the illegal use of public money. [De la Llana v. Commission on Audit, G. R. No.
180989, 7 February 2012]

The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent
court that can resolve the same, such that, if not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the
trial and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal. [Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No.
149036, April 2, 2002] However, in criminal cases, the question can be raised at any time at the
discretion of the court; in civil cases, the question can be raised at any stage of the proceedings if
necessary for the determination of the case itself; and in every case, except when there is estoppel, it
can be raised at any stage if it involves the jurisdiction of the court. [Zandueta v. De la Costa, G.R. No.
L-46267, November 28, 1938]

The doctrine of separation of powers demand that proper respect be accorded to the other departments,
courts are loathe to decide constitutional questions as long as there is some other basis that can be
used for a decision. The constitutional issue must be the lis mota of the case. [De la Llana v. Alba, G.R.
No. L-57883, March 12, 1982] As an example, in a case where Fertiphil Corporation sought the refund
of the capital recovery component it had paid to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority levied under LOI
| Page 2 of 3
No. 1465 by challenging the validity of the LOI, the Supreme Court held that the issue of constitutionality
of the LOI was adequately pleaded in the complaint; it is the lis mota of the case because the trial court
cannot determine the claim without resolving the issue of constitutionality.[Planters Products v.
Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008] Note, however, that the Court will not pass
upon the question of constitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on
some other ground, such as the application of the statute or general law. [Ty v. Trampe, G.R. No.
117577, December 1, 1995] Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify
its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not that is doubtful,
speculative or argumentative. [Arceta v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895, June 15, 2004]

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Political Law; Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Supreme Court; Procedural
Rule-Making

Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance
to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. [Sec. 5 (5), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution]

The 1987 Constitution gave the Supreme Court, for the first time, the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. More importantly, it took away the
power of the Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
Thus, for instance, the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by the Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled by Congress. [Baguio Market
Vendors v. Judge, G.R. No. 165922, February 26, 2010]

The rules must provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases; they
must be uniform for all courts of the same grade; and must not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. [Primicias v. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953] Thus, a Supreme Court circular which
orders that appeals from decision of administrative agencies shall be filed with the Court of Appeals,
does not diminish, increase or modify the substantive right to appeal. It merely transferred the venue of
appeal and its period, which are procedural in character. [First Lepanto Ceramics, v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994]

Because of this constitutional grant, it was held that it is within the competence of the Supreme Court, in
the exercise of its power to promulgate rules governing the enforcement and protection of Constitutional
rights and rules governing pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, to create a Special Division in
the Sandiganbayan which will hear and decide the plunder case of former President Estrada. [Re:
Request for creation of a special division, A.M. No. 02-1-09-SC, January 21, 2002].

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IBP vs Zamora (2000)

Summary Cases:

● Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) vs Hon Ronaldo Zamora, Lacson 338 SCRA 81

Subject:

Judicial Review; Legal standing; Commander in Chief powers (Power to Keep Peace and Order);
Political Question (vis-à-vis exercise of Calling Out Power); Calling Out Power (vs Power to declare
martial law and the Power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus); Civilian supremacy;

Facts:

In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and
carnappings, President Estrada, in a verbal directive, ordered the Philippine National Police (PNP) and
the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. In
compliance with said order, LOI 02/2000 was issued creating Task Force Tulungan under the leadership
of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.

The verbal directive was later formalized into a memorandum whereby President Estrada, invoking his
powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, directed the AFP Chief
of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines, unconstitutional.

The issues are: (1) Whether or not IBP has legal standing; (2) WON the President's factual determination
of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review; and, (3) WON the calling of the
armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

Held:

Judicial Review

1. The power of judicial review is defined in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

2. When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely:

(1) existence of an actual and appropriate case;

(2) personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) constitutional question is the lis mota of the case

Legal Standing

3. "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged.
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4. The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.

5. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions

6. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other
groups and the whole citizenry. IBP has not shown any specific injury which it, or nay of its members,
has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act.

7. Moreover, the fundamental purpose of the IBP, which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of
Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice, is
alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines.

8. Nevertheless, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush
aside technicalities of procedure. The Court may adopt a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a
petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.

Commander in Chief powers (Power to Keep Peace and Order)

9. While the parties are in agreement that the power exercised by the President is the power to call out
the armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power involved may be no more than the maintenance
of peace and order and promotion of the general welfare.

10. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal
threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order
and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion,
within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by
the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the
President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the
President's exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace,
and maintain public order and security. (citing Marcos vs Manglapus)

Political Question (vis-à-vis exercise of Calling Out Power)

11. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are "political questions." The reason is that
political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular
act or measure being assailed.

12. Political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of government."

13. The Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political question
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject
to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the
| Page 2 of 4
limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.

14. A court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the
President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of
discretion. A showing that plenary power is granted either department of government, may not be an
obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable
controversy

15. There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution (Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution)
to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the
necessity for the exercise of such power. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the
President's wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether
such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.

16. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's
decision is totally bereft of factual basis.

17. The court held that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement.
In his Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, "[V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups,
kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila.”

18. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be
objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several
factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the
court may use to judge necessity, in many instances, the evidence upon which the President might
decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical
proof. On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather
information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state.

Calling Out Power (vs Power to declare martial law and the Power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus)

19. With regard to the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President's action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the
calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

20. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to
grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by this Court.

21. Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1)
| Page 3 of 4
there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it.

22. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only
criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion."

Civilian Supremacy

23. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. The LOI sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines' authority.

24. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of
the police force. Neither does it amount to an "insidious incursion" of the military in the task of law
enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution. It is noteworthy that the Metro
Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. The real
authority in these operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the
military.

25. Such being the case, it does not matter whether the AFP Chief actually participates in the Task
Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or control over the same. Since none of the
Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy
the civilian character of the PNP. What we have here is mutual support and cooperation between the
military and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy.

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Ocampo vs. Enriquez (2016)

Summary Cases:

● Ocampo vs. Enriquez (Marcos burial case)

Subject: Requisites for exercise of judicial review; Requirement of a justiciable controversy; Political
question; President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a
political question that is not a justiciable controversy; Locus standi requirement; Petitioners have no legal
standing; No standing as taxpayers; No standing as members of the Bar; No standing as concerned
citizens; No standing as human rights victims; No standing as legislators; Petitioners violated the
doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies; Petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts;
The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence; The principles and state policies embodied in the Constitution are not self-executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts; No violation of the
Constitution; No violation of R.A. No. 289; Proposed internment of Marcos in the LNMB does not confer
upon him the status of a "hero"; No violation of R.A. No. 10368; No violation of International Human
Rights Laws; The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically, capriciously
or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias; National shrines; The Libingan Ng Mga Bayani is not
a national shrine covered under PD 105, but a national military shrine under the jurisdiction of the PVAO;
The interment of Marcos does not violate the physical, historical, and cultural integrity of the LNMB as a
national military shrine; Presidential power of control (incumbent President Duterte not bound by political
agreements entered into by his predecessors); Allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a
former President and awarded veteran satisfies the public use requirement; The presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty has not been overcome; AFP Regulation G 161-375 remains
authoritative in determining who are entitled and disqualified to be interred at the LNMB; Doctrine of
qualified political agency (Alter ego principle); Qualification of Marcos under AFP Regulation G 161-375;
(notwithstanding the corruption tainting his presidential legacy, he is qualified to be buried in the LNMB
based on his other achievements); Marcos possessed none of the disqualifications under AFP
Regulations G 161-375; Marcos' ouster from the presidency via people power revolution is not
tantamount to his dishonorable discharge from the military service; Equal protection clause is not
violated;

Facts:

Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo Visaya directing the latter to undertake
preparations to have the remains of the late former President Ferdinand E. Marcos be transported from
Ilocos Norte in order to be interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB), in accordance with the verbal
order of President Rodrigo Duterte to implement his election campaign promise

In turn, AFP Rear Admiral Enriquez issued the directives to the Philippine Army (PA) Commanding
General to provide the service honors, specifically to provide all necessary military honors accorded for a
President.

Petitioners, representing various groups and interests (mostly on human rights), filed the present
petitions with the Supreme Court, to challenge the above directives.

Issues:

Procedural

| Page 1 of 13
(A) WON President Duterte's determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB poses a
justiciable controversy.
(B) WON petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.
(C) WON petitioners violated the doctrine administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts.

Substantive

(A) WON the President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the
law or jurisprudence

(B) WON the President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is tainted with arbitrariness, malice, ill will
or
personal bias

(C) WON historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and their cronies,
and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier
and former President to interment at the LNMB.
Held:

I. Procedural Issues

A. Justiciable controversy

Requisites for exercise of judicial review

1. It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
may be heard and decided by the Court unless the following requisites for judicial inquiry are present:

(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

2. In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the
discussion of the last two superfluous.

Requirement of a justiciable controversy

3. An "actual case or controversy" is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference
or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis
of existing law and jurisprudence.

4. Related to the requisite of an actual case or controversy is the requisite of "ripeness," which means
that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as
a result of the challenged action.

Political question

| Page 2 of 13
5. Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the
assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.
Those areas pertain to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. As they are concerned with questions of policy and issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure, political questions used to be beyond
the ambit of judicial review.

6. However, the scope of the political question doctrine has been limited by Section 1 of Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution when it vested in the judiciary the power to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a
political question that is not a justiciable controversy

7. President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political
question that is not a justiciable controversy. In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 ) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB,
which is a land of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes,
President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing
and forgiveness. There being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, President
Duterte's decision on that political question is outside the ambit of judicial review.

B. Locus standi

Locus standi requirement

8. Defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, locus standi requires that a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining
an injury as a result of an act complained of, such proper party has no standing.

Petitioners have no legal standing

9. Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their
capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers,
have no legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to show that they have suffered or will
suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

(a) No standing as taxpayers

10. Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed
or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. In this case, what is essentially being assailed is
the wisdom behind the decision of the President to proceed with the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
As taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds, without showing that Marcos
is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either express or implied provision of the Constitution, the
laws or jurisprudence.

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(b) No standing as members of the Bar

11. Petitioners Saguisag, et al., as members of the Bar, are required to allege any direct or potential
injury which the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as an institution, or its members may suffer as a
consequence of the act complained of. Suffice it to state that the averments in their
petition-in-intervention failed to disclose such injury, and that their interest in this case is too general and
shared by other groups, such that their duty to uphold the rule of law, without more, is inadequate to
clothe them with requisite legal standing.

(c) No standing as concerned citizens

12. As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. In
cases involving such issues, the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights
outweigh the necessity for prudence.

13. At this point in time, the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally established as a national
military cemetery and declared a national shrine would have no profound effect on the political,
economic, and other aspects of our national life considering that more than twenty-seven (27) years
since his death and thirty (30) years after his ouster have already passed. Significantly, petitioners failed
to demonstrate a clear and imminent threat to their fundamental constitutional rights.

(d) No standing as human rights victims

14. As human rights violations victims during the Martial Law regime, some of petitioners decry
re-traumatization, historical revisionism, and disregard of their state recognition as heroes. Petitioners'
argument is founded on the wrong premise that the LNMB is the National Pantheon intended by law to
perpetuate the memory of all Presidents, national heroes and patriots. The history of the LNMB, as will
be discussed further, reveals its nature and purpose as a national military cemetery and national shrine,
under the administration of the APP.

(e) No standing as legislators

15. Apart from being concerned citizens and taxpayers, petitioners Senator De Lima, and Congressman
Lagman, et al. come before the Court as legislators suing to defend the Constitution and to protect
appropriated public funds from being used unlawfully. In the absence of a clear showing of any direct
injury to their person or the institution to which they belong, their standing as members of the Congress
cannot be upheld. They do not specifically claim that the official actions complained of, i.e., the
memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense and the directive of the APP Chief of Staff regarding
the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, encroach on their prerogative as legislators.
C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies

16. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of administrative processes
available. If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction,
then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought.

17. For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until the system of
| Page 4 of 13
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. While there are exceptions to
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners failed to prove the presence of any of
those exceptions.

18. Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and
directive before the Secretary of National Defense. The Secretary of National Defense should be given
opportunity to correct himself, if warranted, considering that AFP Regulations G 161-375 was issued
upon his order. Questions on the implementation and interpretation thereof demand the exercise of
sound administrative discretion, requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of his office to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact. If petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the decision
of the Secretary, they could elevate the matter before the Office of the President which has control and
supervision over the Department of National Defense (DND).

D. Hierarchy of Courts

Petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts

19. While direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this case, petitioners cannot
simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires such petitions to be filed first with the
proper Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of
law in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.
II. Substantive Issues

A. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution,
the law or jurisprudence

The principles and state policies embodied in the Constitution are not self-executing provisions,
the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts

20. Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it has the
effect of condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby violating the letter and spirit of
the 1987 Constitution, which is a "post-dictatorship charter" and a "human rights constitution." There is
no merit to the contention. While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its
entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related
to the Martial Law period.

21. By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." They
are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the
legislature in its enactment of laws. The principles and state policies enumerated in Article II are not
"self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do
not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation." (see Tanada v.
Angara, and Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato)

(a) No violation of the Constitution

22. Sec. 1 of Art. XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision considering that a law should
be passed by the Congress to clearly define and effectuate the principle embodied therein. As a matter
| Page 5 of 13
of fact, pursuant thereto, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6713 ("Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees”), R.A. No. 6770 ("The Ombudsman Act of 1989”), R.A. No. 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), and Republic Act No. 9485 (“Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007”).
To complement these statutes, the Executive Branch has issued various orders, memoranda, and
instructions relative to the norms of behavior/code of conduct/ethical standards of officials and
employees.

23. Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution is also
misplaced. Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional duty of educational institutions in teaching
the values of patriotism and nationalism and respect for human rights, while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a
transitory provision on sequestration or freeze orders in relation to the recovery of Marcos' ill-gotten
wealth. Clearly, with respect to these provisions, there is no direct or indirect prohibition to Marcos'
interment at the LNMB.

24. The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII pertaining to the duty of the President to "ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed," which is identical to Sec. 1, Title I, Book III of the Administrative Code of
1987, is likewise not violated by public respondents. Being the Chief Executive, the President represents
the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
or her department. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary
and proper steps" to carry into execution the law. The mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being
inherently executive in nature and is intimately related to the other executive functions. It is best
construed as an imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power. The provision simply underscores
the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is
obliged to obey and execute them. Consistent with President Duterte's mandate under Sec. 17, Art. VII
of the Constitution, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not contravene R.A. No. 289, R.A. No. 10368,
and the international human rights laws cited by petitioners.

(b) No violation of R.A. No. 289

26. R.A. No. 289 authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as the burial place of the mortal
remains of all the Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes and patriots. In 1953, President Quirino,
by virtue of Proclamation No. 431, reserved a site in Quezon City for the construction of the National
Pantheon. In 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 42 revoking Proclamation Nos. 422
and 431, and reserving the parcels of land embraced therein for national park purposes to be known as
Quezon Memorial Park.

26. Petitioners that public respondents are not members of the Board on National Pantheon, which is
authorized by the law to cause the burial at the LNMB of the deceased Presidents of the Philippines,
national heroes, and patriots.

27. Petitioners failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition that the LNMB and the
National Pantheon are one and the same. The LNMB is distinct and separate from the burial place
envisioned in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land subject matter of President Quirino's Proclamation No. 431,
which was later on revoked by President Magsaysay's Proclamation No. 42, is different from that
covered by Marcos' Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon does not exist at present. To date, the
Congress has deemed it wise not to appropriate any funds for its construction or the creation of the
Board on National Pantheon. This is indicative of the legislative will not to pursue, at the moment,
the establishment of a singular interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the
Philippines, national heroes, and patriots. Perhaps, the Manila North Cemetery, the Manila South
Cemetery, and other equally distinguished private cemeteries already serve the noble purpose but
without cost to the limited funds of the government.
| Page 6 of 13
Proposed internment of Marcos in the LNMB does not confer upon him the status of a "hero"

28. Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as relevant to the issue, still, petitioners' allegations must fail.
To apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent and the brave" or "hero" would be
violative of public policy as it will put into question the validity of the burial of each and every mortal
remains resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers since the allocation of
plots at the LNMB is based on the grant of authority to the President under existing laws and
regulations.

29. Also, the Court shares the view of the OSG that the proposed interment is not equivalent to the
consecration of Marcos' mortal remains. The act in itself does not confer upon him the status of a
"hero." Despite its name, which is actually a misnomer, the purpose of the LNMB, both from legal and
historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to
require that only those interred therein should be treated as a "hero." Lastly, petitioners' repeated
reference to a "hero's burial" and "state honors," without showing proof as to what kind of burial or
honors that will be accorded to the remains of Marcos, is speculative until the specifics of the interment
have been finalized by public respondents.

(c) No violation of R.A. No. 10368

30. In restoring the rights and upholding the dignity of Human Rights Violations Victims (HRVVs), which
is part of the right to an effective remedy, R.A. No. 10368 entitles them to monetary and non-monetary
reparation. R.A. No. 10368 also requires the recognition of the violations committed against the HRVVs,
regardless of whether they opt to seek reparation or not.

31. The Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10368 are
not exclusive as it includes the prohibition on Marcos' burial at the LNMB. It would be undue to extend
the law beyond what it actually contemplates. With its victim-oriented perspective, our legislators could
have easily inserted a provision specifically proscribing Marcos' interment at the LNMB as a "reparation"
for the HRVVs, but they did not. As it is, the law is silent and should remain to be so. This Court cannot
read into the law what is simply not there. It is irregular, if not unconstitutional, for Us to presume the
legislative will by supplying material details into the law. That would be tantamount to judicial legislation.

32. Considering the foregoing, the enforcement of the HRVVs' rights under R.A. No 10368 will surely not
be impaired by the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. The assailed act has no causal connection and
legal relation to the law. The subject memorandum and directive of public respondents do not and
cannot interfere with the statutory powers and functions of the Board and the Commission. More
importantly, the HRVVs' entitlements to the benefits provided for by R.A. No 10368 and other domestic
laws are not curtailed.

33. It must be emphasized that R.A. No. 10368 does not amend or repeal, whether express or implied,
the provisions of the Administrative Code or AFP Regulations G 161-375. It is a well-settled rule of
statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. In order to effect a repeal by
implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law
that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible must be made
before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. There must
be a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in character.

(d) No violation of International Human Rights Laws

34. Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB will violate the rights of the HRVVs to "full"
| Page 7 of 13
and "effective" reparation, which is provided under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). We do not think so.

25. The ICCPR, as well as the U.N. principles on reparation and to combat impunity, call for the
enactment of legislative measures, establishment of national programmes, and provision for
administrative and judicial recourse, in accordance with the country's constitutional processes, that are
necessary to give effect to human rights embodied in treaties, covenants and other international laws.

36. The Philippines is more than compliant with its international obligations. When the Filipinos regained
their democratic institutions after the successful People Power Revolution that culminated on February
25, 1986, the three branches of the government have done their fair share to respect, protect and fulfill
the country's human rights obligations.

37. Contrary to petitioners' postulation, our nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single
resolve of President Duterte, acting through the public respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB. The
preservation and popularization of our history is not the sole responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a
joint and collective endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this country.
B. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias

National shrines

38. As one of the cultural properties of the Philippines, national historical shrines (or historical shrines)
refer to sites or structures hallowed and revered for their history or association as declared by the
National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP). As sites of the birth, exile, imprisonment,
detention or death of great and eminent leaders of the nation, it is the policy of the Government to hold
and keep the national shrines as sacred and hallowed place.

39. P.D. No. 105 strictly prohibits and punishes by imprisonment and/or fine the desecration of national
shrines by disturbing their peace and serenity through digging, excavating, defacing, causing
unnecessary noise, and committing unbecoming acts within their premises.

40. The NHCP manages, maintains and administers national shrines, monuments, historical sites,
edifices and landmarks of significant historico-cultural value. Excluded, however, from the jurisdiction of
the NHCP are the military memorials and battle monuments declared as national shrines, which have
been under the administration, maintenance and development of the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office
(PVAO) of the Department of National Defense (DND).

The Libingan Ng Mga Bayani is not a national shrine covered under PD 105, but a national
military shrine under the jurisdiction of the PVAO

41. In 1954, President Magsaysay, Sr. issued E.O. No. 77, which ordered "the remains of the war dead
interred at the Bataan Memorial Cemetery and at other places in the Philippines, be transferred to, and
reinterred at, the Republic Memorial Cemetery at Fort Wm Mckinley, Rizal Province". He later issued
Proclamation No. 86, which changed the name of Republic Memorial Cemetery to Libingan Ng Mga
Bayani (LNMB) to symbolize "the cause for which our soldiers have died" and to "truly express the
nations esteem and reverence for her war dead.” Marcos then issued Proclamation No. 208, which
excluded the LNMB from the Fort Bonifacio military reservation and reserved the LNMB for national
shrine purposes under the administration of the National Shrines Commission (NSC) under the DND.

42. P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208 predated P.D. No. 105,
| Page 8 of 13
the LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in the latter. The proposition
that the LNMB is implicitly covered in the catchall phrase "and others which may be proclaimed in the
future as National Shrines" is erroneous because:

(a) Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior to P.D. No. 105.
(b) Following the canon of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, the LNMB is not a
site "of the birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or death of great and eminent leaders of the
nation."
(c) Since its establishment, the LNMB has been a military shrine under the jurisdiction of the
PVAO. The reasons being that "the administration, maintenance and development of national
shrines consisting of military memorials or battle monuments can be more effectively
accomplished if they are removed from the [DEC] and transferred to the [DND] by reason of the
latter s greater capabilities and resources" and that "the functions of the [DND] are more closely
related and relevant to the charter or significance of said national shrines."

The interment of Marcos does not violate the physical, historical, and cultural integrity of the
LNMB as a national military shrine

43. Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and hallowed" refer to
the LNMB as a place and not to each and every mortal remains interred therein. Hence, the burial
of Marcos at the LNMB does not diminish said cemetery as a revered and respected ground. Neither
does it negate the presumed individual or collective "heroism" of the men and women buried or will be
buried therein. The "nation’s esteem and reverence for her war dead," as originally contemplated by
President Magsaysay in issuing Proclamation No. 86, still stands unaffected. That being said, the
interment of Marcos, therefore, does not constitute a violation of the physical, historical, and
cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national military shrine.

44. Reference should be made to Arlington National Cemetery (Arlington), which is identical to the LNMB
in terms of its prominence in the U.S. As one of the U.S. Army national military cemeteries, the Arlington
is under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Army. Similar to the Philippines, the U.S. national
cemeteries are established as national shrines in tribute to the gallant dead who have served in the U.S.
Armed Forces.

Presidential power of control (incumbent President Duterte not bound by political agreements
entered into by his predecessors)

45. The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO, which is empowered
to administer, develop, and maintain military shrines, is under the supervision and control of the DND.
The DND, in turn, is under the Office of the President.

46. The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing
provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be
limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by the
alleged 1992 Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the
remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he is free to amend,
revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his predecessors, and to determine policies which
he considers, based on informed judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out
his mandate.
Allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President and awarded veteran
satisfies the public use requirement

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47. Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for public use and
for specific public purposes any of the lands of the public domain and that the reserved land shall remain
subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation. At
present, there is no law or executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is
located from the use it was originally intended by the past Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at
the LNMB for Marcos as a former President and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of
National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether recognizing
his contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the public use requirement. The disbursement of
public funds to cover the expenses incidental to the burial is granted to compensate him for valuable
public services rendered.

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty has not been overcome

48. Likewise, President Duterte's determination to have Marcos' remains interred at the LNMB was
inspired by his desire for national healing and reconciliation. Presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty prevails over petitioners' highly disputed factual allegation that, in the guise
of exercising a presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually motivated by utang na loob (debt
of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the Marcoses. As the purpose is not self-evident, petitioners
have the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of their claim. They failed. Even so, this Court
cannot take cognizance of factual issues since We are not a trier of facts.

AFP Regulation G 161-375 remains authoritative in determining who are entitled and disqualified
to be interred at the LNMB

49. A review of the regulations issued by the APP Chief of Staff as to who may and may not be interred
at the LNMB underscores the nature and purpose of the LNMB as an active military cemetery/grave site.

50. Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the LNMB:

(a) Medal of Valor Awardees;

(b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP;
(c) Secretaries of National Defense;
(d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP;
(e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP;
(f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include active draftees and trainees who died in
line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations or
combat related activities;
(g) Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the PCG and the PNP;
(h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas;
(i) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose interment or
reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of National
Defense; and
(j) Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows of
Former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff.

51. The following are not qualified to be interred in the LNMB:

(a) Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and
(b) Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude.

52. In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations G 161-375
| Page 10 of 13
remains to be the sole authority in determining who are entitled and disqualified to be interred at the
LNMB. Interestingly, even if they were empowered to do so, former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, who were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the
rules by expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB.

Doctrine of qualified political agency (Alter ego principle)

53. The validity of AFP Regulations G 161-375 must be sustained for having been issued by the AFP
Chief of Staff acting under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense, who is the alter ego of the
President.

54. Under alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency, which recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to
act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive
and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive. (see Jason vs. Torres)

55. It has been held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect of
law and, until set aside, is binding upon executive and administrative agencies, including the President
as the chief executor of laws.
C. Entitlement of Marcos to be buried in the LNMB

Qualification of Marcos under AFP Regulation G 161-375 (notwithstanding the corruption tainting
his presidential legacy, he is qualified to be buried in the LNMB based on his other achievements)

56. AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in the absence of clear and unmistakable
showing that it has been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Neither could it be considered ultra vires for purportedly providing incomplete, whimsical, and capricious
standards for qualification for burial at the LNMB.

57. It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to argue that the word
"bayani" in the LNMB has become a misnomer since while a symbolism of heroism may attach to the
LNMB as a national shrine for military memorial, the same does not automatically attach to its feature as
a military cemetery and to those who were already laid or will be laid therein. As stated, the purpose of
the LNMB, both from the legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people
buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein should be treated as a
"hero." In fact, the privilege of internment at the LNMB has been loosen up through the years. Since
1986, the list of eligible includes not only those who rendered active military service or military-related
activities but also non-military personnel who were recognized for their significant contributions to the
Philippine society (such as government dignitaries, statesmen, national artists, and other deceased
persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or
Secretary of National Defense). In 1998, the widows of former Presidents, Secretaries of National
Defense and Chief of Staff were added to the list.

58. Whether or not the extension of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted and should be restricted in
order to be consistent with the original purpose of the LNMB is immaterial and irrelevant to the issue at
bar since it is indubitable that Marcos had rendered significant active military service and military-related
| Page 11 of 13
activities.

59. For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, we may disregard Marcos as a President
and Commander-in-Chief, but we cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the other
positions he held or the awards he received. In this sense, Marcos should be viewed and judged in
his totality as a person. While he was not all good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly, just a human
who erred like us.

Marcos possessed none of the disqualifications under AFP Regulations G 161-375

60. Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the disqualifications
stated in AFP Regulations G 161-3 75. He was neither convicted by final judgment of the offense
involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.

61. It is argued that Marcos committed offenses involving moral turpitude for his gross human rights
violations, massive graft and corruption, and dubious military records, as found by foreign and local
courts as well as administrative agencies. Despite all these ostensibly persuasive arguments, the fact
remains that Marcos was not convicted by final judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude. No
less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a person shall not be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law and that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.

62. To note, in the U.S., a person found to have committed a Federal or State capital crime (i.e., a crime
which a sentence of imprisonment for life or death penalty may be imposed) but who has not been
convicted by reason of not being available for trial due to death or flight to avoid prosecution, may be
ineligible for interment, inurnment, or memorialization in an Army national military cemetery.
Nevertheless, such ineligibility must still observe the procedures specified in§ 553.21.

63. The various cases cited by petitioners, which were decided with finality by courts here and abroad,
have no bearing in this case since they are merely civil in nature; hence, cannot and do not establish
moral turpitude.

Marcos' ouster from the presidency via people power revolution is not tantamount to his
dishonorable discharge from the military service

64. Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service. PVAO expressly recognized him
as a retired veteran pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as amended.

65. With respect to the phrase "[p]ersonnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from
the service, " the same should be viewed in light of the definition provided by AFP Regulations G
161-375 to the term "active service" which is "[s]ervice rendered by a military person as a Commissioned
Officer, enlisted man/woman, probationary officer, trainee or draftee in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and service rendered by him/her as a civilian official or employee in the Philippine
Government prior to the date of his/her separation or retirement from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for which military and/or civilian service he/she shall have received pay from the Philippine
Government, and/or such others as may be hereafter be prescribed by law as active service (PD 1638,
as amended)." To my mind, the word "service" should be construed as that rendered by a military
person in the AFP, including civil service, from the time of his/her commission, enlistment, probation,
training or drafting, up to the date of his/her separation or retirement from the AFP. Civil service after
honorable separation and retirement from the AFP is outside the context of "service" under AFP
Regulations G 161-375.
| Page 12 of 13
66. Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency during the EDSA
Revolution is tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion or discharge from the military service.
The fact that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under the 1987 Constitution only
enshrines the principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the military. Not being a military person
who may be prosecuted before the court martial, the President can hardly be deemed "dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service" as contemplated by AFP Regulations G 161-375.
Dishonorable discharge through a successful revolution is an extra-constitutional and direct sovereign
act of the people which is beyond the ambit of judicial review, let alone a mere administrative regulation.

67. It is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the people through the
so-called EDSA Revolution. Said political act of the people should not be automatically given a particular
legal meaning other than its obvious consequence - that of ousting him as president. To do otherwise
would lead the Court to the treacherous and perilous path of having to make choices from multifarious
inferences or theories arising from the various acts of the people.

Equal protection clause is not violated

68. It is argued that to limit the application of the disqualifying provisions of AFP Regulations G 161-375
only to soldiers would be unfair (since, unlike Presidents, soldiers have an additional cause for
disqualification) and lead to absurd results (because soldiers who were dishonorably discharged would
be disqualified for acts that are less atrocious than that committed by Marcos). Also, the AFP regulations
would place Marcos in the same class as the other Philippine Presidents when in fact he is a class of his
own, sui generis. The other Presidents were never removed by People Power Revolution and were
never subject of laws declaring them to have committed human rights violations. Thus, the intended
burial would be an act of similarly treating persons who are differently situated.

69. The equal protection clause is not violated. Generally, there is no property right to safeguard
because even if one is eligible to be buried at the LNMB, such fact would only give him or her the
privilege to be interred therein. Unless there is a favorable recommendation from the
Commander-in-Chief, the Congress or the Secretary of National Defense, no right can be said to have
ripen. Until then, such inchoate right is not legally demandable and enforceable.

70. Assuming that there is a property right to protect, the requisites of equal protection clause are not
met. In this case, there is a real and substantial distinction between a military personnel and a former
President. The conditions of dishonorable discharge under the Articles of War attach only to the
members of the military. There is also no substantial distinction between Marcos and the three Philippine
Presidents buried at the LNMB (Presidents Quirino, Garcia, and Macapagal). All of them were not
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. In addition, the classification between a military personnel
and a former President is germane to the purposes of Proclamation No. 208 and P.D. No. 1076. While
the LNMB is a national shrine for military memorials, it is also an active military cemetery that recognizes
the status or position held by the persons interred therein.

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Vinuya vs Romulo (2010)

Summary Cases:

● Vinuya vs Romulo 619 SCRA 533

Subject: Political Question, Foreign Relations, Peace Treaties, International Claim, Jus Cogens

Facts:

Members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization, established for the purpose of
providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second
World War, claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the
Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), and Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who
ordered the establishment of the "comfort women" stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the
Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims
of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the
Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Held:

Political Questions

1. Political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

2. The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislative—'the political'--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may
be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.

3. Decisions relating to foreign policy are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.
They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they
advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor
responsibility.

Foreign Relations

4. The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign relations.

5. The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes with life and
death significance to the nation especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of
government which can act on the basis of the best available information and can decide with
decisiveness

6. The presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider
degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are
adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of an international
obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of
| Page 1 of 3
other problems with equally undesirable consequences.

Application of “Political Questions” and “Foreign Relations” Doctrine

7. The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our
country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious
implications for stability in this region.

8. For the Court to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the
foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has
been constitutionally committed

9. As a general principle the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy
considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the
petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether
further steps are appropriate or necessary.

10. The Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioners’ claims.

Peace Treaties

11. International settlements generally wipe out the underlying private claims, thereby terminating any
recourse under domestic law.

12. The treaty of peace abolishes the subject of the war, and that after peace is concluded, neither the
matter in dispute, nor the conduct of either party, during the war, can ever be revived, or brought into
contest again. All violence, injuries, or damages sustained by the government, or people of either, during
the war, are buried in oblivion; and all those things are implied by the very treaty of peace; and therefore
not necessary to be expressed.

International Claim

13. The only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has
been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf.
Even then, it is not the individual’s rights that are being asserted, but rather, the state’s own rights.

14. Once a State has taken up a case on behalf of one of its subjects before an international tribunal, in
the eyes of the latter the State is sole claimant.

15. The State is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is
granted, and when will it cease. It retains a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined
by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case.

16. The International Law Commission’s (ILC’s) Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection states:
-The right of diplomatic protection belongs to or vests in the State;

-It affirm its discretionary nature by clarifying that diplomatic protection is a "sovereign prerogative"
of the State; and

-stress that the state "has the right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a national. It is
under no duty or obligation to do so."
| Page 2 of 3
17. There is no sufficient evidence to establish a general international obligation for States to exercise
diplomatic protection of their own nationals abroad. Though, perhaps desirable, neither state practice nor
opinio juris has evolved in such a direction. If it is a duty internationally, it is only a moral and not a legal
duty, and there is no means of enforcing its fulfillment.

Jus Cogens

18. The term "jus cogens" (literally, "compelling law") refers to norms that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense
that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international
norms of equivalent authority.

19. Though there was a consensus that certain international norms had attained the status of jus cogens,
the ILC was unable to reach a consensus on the proper criteria for identifying peremptory norms.

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