Understanding Citizenship in India
Understanding Citizenship in India
Structure
Objectives
Introduction
What is Citizenship?
8.2.1 Citizenship and Individualism
8.2.2 Citizenship and Multiculturalism
Citizenship and Rights in the Indian Constitution
8.3.1 Who are the Citizens of India?
8.3.2 Recognition of Community in Indian Citizenship
8.3.3 Directive Principles of State Policy
8.3.4 Rights and Franchise
8.3.5 Duties of Citizenship
Tensions in Citizenship
8.4.1 Citizenship and Gender
Pathways to Citizenship
Let Us Sum Up
Key Words
Some Useful Books
Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises
8.0 OBJECTIVES
The constitution of India is a comprehensive document giving details about the rights
and citizenship. When you finish reading this unit you should be able to understand
the legal-formal aspects of citizenship as incorporated in Part I1 of the Constitution
of India. .Reading it wifh Part 111, IV and IVA of the Constitution on Fundamental
Rights, Directive Principles and Fundamental Duties respectively, you should also be
able to comprehend the nature of citizenship as envisaged by the constitution makers.
After going through this unit you should be able to explain:
8.1 INTRODUCTION
It was, however, the French Revolution and the 'Declaration of the Rights of Man
and Citizens' that established the notion of the citizen as a 'free and autonomous
individual' entitled to take part in making decisions that all are required to obey,
combining thereby the classical notions of citizenship with individualism. With the
development of capitalist market relations and the growing influence of liberalism in
the nineteenth century, the notion of the citizens as individuals with private and
conflicti~iginterests gradually gained primacy. The ideas of citizenship as a primarily
civic activity, public spiritedness and active political participation in a community of
equals were now being seen as belonging to the past.
In much of liberal theory till most of the twentieth century, the bias in favour of the
individual citizen continued and citizenship was seen as a legal status indicating the
possession of rights which an individual citizen held equally with others. The dominant
liberal model of citizenship has, however, been criticised precisely on these grounds.
The idea that the (individual) citizen can enjoy rights independent of the community
to which he/she belongs, has been questioned. Given that modern societies are'
n~ulticultural,the specific contexts, cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic, etc., of citizens
are being seen as determining citizenship in significant ways. In most western
societies ethn~c,religious and racial co~n~nunities have pressed for rights which would
look at their special needs and would thereby substantiate the formal equality of
citizenship. 'There is a growing effort to redefine citizenship by giving due importance
to cultural differences among individuals and strike a balance between the numerous
cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic identities while constructing a common political
Part 11 of the Constitution (Articles 5 to 1 l), titled Citizenship, answers the qiiestion
'Who is a citizen of India?' at tlie time of the colnlnencement of tlie Constitution on
26 November 1949, i.e. the date on wliicli the Constitution was adopted by the
Constituent Assembly. While the Constitution came into full force only on 26 January
1950, provisions dealing with citizensliip (Articles 5 to 9), became operative on the
date of its commenceme~it. Tlie distinction between tlie Indian citizen and the non-
citizen (alien) thus becanie effective on this date. While a citizen elljoys certain rights
and performs duties wliicli distinguisli himllier from an alien, the latter lias certain
rights of 'personhood' wliicli sllie possesses irrespective of the fact that slhe i's not
a citizen. Under Articles 5 to 8 of the Constitution the following categories of persons
became the citizens of India at the date of the commencement of Constitution:
a) those domiciled and born in India;
b) tliose domiciled, not born in India but either of wliose parents was born in India;
C) those domiciled, not born in India, but ordinarily resident in India for more than
five years;
d) those resident in India, who migrated to Pakistan after 1 March 1947 and returned
later on resettlement permits;
e) those resident in Pakistan, who migrated to India before 19 July 1948 or those
who came afterwards but stayed on for more than 6 months and got registered;
f) tliose whose parents and grandparents were born in India but were residing
outside India.
Through Article 1 1 the Constitution autliorised the Parliament to make laws pertaining
to acquisition and termination of citizenship subsequent to tlie commencement of the
'~onstitution. Tlie Citizenship Act (LVII of 1955) made elaborate provisions specifying
how citizenship could be acquired by birth, descent, registration, naturalisation or
through incorporation of territory. Tlie Act was amended i l l 1986 to deal with large-
scale lnigratio~ifrom Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and some African countries. Unlike the
United States of America (U.S.A.) where citizens have dual citizenship, national
citizenship and that of the federal unit (states), Indians do not have separate citizenship
of the states. Unlike some countries which allow its citizens to hold simultaneously
the citizenship of two cou~itries'(e.~., multiple citizenship is permitted in Italy), an
Indian citizen loses herlliis citizenship if sllie acquires tlie citizenship of another
country.
We mentioned in the previous section that the notion of citizenship as prevalent in the
nineteenth century and understood thereafter, was largely a system of rights and
obligations that defined the relationship between nation-states and their individual
members. The defining parameters of this relationship was constituted by equajity and
freedom. Equality hinted at an identity and sameness as against iniquitous systems
based on ascriptive hierarchies of race and caste. Freedom read with equality would
then imply a freedom to pursue individual aims and aspirations to the best of one's
capacities in conditions where social differences have been negated or minimised.
The citizen in liberal theory was thus the 'floating individual' shorn of all characteristics
of his / her social context. It may be pointed out, however, that these defining
principles of citizensliip were not seen as commensurate with the kind of social
relations whicli existed in non-western societies e.g., India, where religion and caste
were seen as the basis of social life. This so called 'difference' in the organisation
of tlie social structures in the West and East was sought by the colonisers as a
justification for subjecting the colonised population(s) to imperial rule. We also saw
that liberal theory in the eighties is increasingly seeking ways to accommodate itself
to multicultural societies in the West and the realisation that community membership
forms a significant determining factor of the individual member's needs and capacities.
If one reads carefully Part III of the Constitution of India enumerating the Fundamental
Rights of the citizens of India, one notices that both the individual and the community
have been made the subjects of these rights. One can say therefore, that there exists
two languages of rights in the constitution, one catering to the individual citizen and
the other to the community. By and large Articles 14 to 24 appear to give to individual
citizens the various rights of equality and freedom while Articles 25 to 30, seem to
cater to the specific needs of religious-cultural communities. A closer reading of the
Articles would, however, show that there is in fact no compartmentalisation and some
seemingly individual-catering rights are interwoven with a commitment to community
rights. If, for example, one looks at Articles 14 and IS, one sees that they assure
equality before the law for every citizen and seek to substantiate this equality by
prohibiting discriminatio~ibased on caste, religion, race etc., thus mitigating differences
provided by social contexts. The articles, however, also reserve for the state a
commitment to community-ship, in other words, allowing for certain rights in favour
of Scheduled Castes, Sclieduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes. Thus Article
15 lays down that 'The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only
of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them' and then in clause (4)
reserves for the state the right to make 'any special provision for the advancement
of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes'. Similarly Article 16 which guarantees equality of
opportunity for all citizens in matters of public employment, also provides for
compensatory discrimination in favour of certain communities. Article 17 abolishes
untouchability, a debilitating condition imposed on the Scheduled Castes. Articles 25
to 30 concern themselves with freedom of religion and minority rights assuring freedom
of conscience, the freedom to religious communities to establish and maintain religious
ilistitutions and to 'manage their ow11affairs in matters of religion', to acquire and
administer property, impart religious education, preserve their language, script, culture
etc. This cluster of rights deals explicitly with the rights of religious and cultural
communities and minority groups and also f o r m the basis of tlie rights of religious
communities to ad~niliisterthemselves in civil matters by their own 'personal laws'.
A significant factor in this cluster of rights is the scope given to the Indian state to
regulate, reform and in some cases administer these communities and institutions.
Thus, while the (individual) citizen of liberal theory persists as a subject of rights, the
Constitution gives significance to tlie tommunity as a relevant collective unit determining
the circumstances of the lives of individuals. The Indian Constitution has thus made
community membership a relevant consideration for differentiation among citizens, so
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that equality among citizens could be made more substantive. It has introduced thus Rights and Citizenship
a 'differentiated-citizenship' to assure that Communities (e.g. Scheduled Castes or
Dalits) which had in the past been victims ofsocial discrimination and continue to be
disadvantaged, were able to compete on equal terms with the rest of society. Social
equality was also substantiated by assuring that while the claims of each community
to be culturally difference could be preserved, there would at the same time be an
assurance of sameness or equality among communities. The rights of the various
communities to preserve their cultural heritage was therefore recognised in the
Constitution and the state was to assure non-discrimination. Thus, social and religious
communities were given the right to be culturally different and the state was to assist
them in preserving their difference. At the same time, the notion of social equality
also required that historical disabilities were compensated and equality was made
substantive by assuring equality of opportunities. Thus caste communities were
compensated for past discriminations and segregation by including them in the body
politic as equal citizens. This equality was assured by giving them special provisions
to overcome circumstantial disabilities. A policy of reservations in public employ~nent
was therefore envisaged. (Gurpreet Mahajan, Identities and Rights, Aspects of
Liberal Democracy in India, OUP, Delhi, 1998, Chapter: Introduction: Negotiating
Differences Within Liberalism).
Article 44 of the Directive Principles enjoins the State to 'secure for all its citizens
a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India'. This article needs special
attention because it encapsulates what we earlier mentioned as the Constitution's
'simultaneous commitment' to individual and community rights. It moreover, provides
a window into the tensions which inform citizenship, and its criticism from some
quarters, especially the feminists. We shall take the article and its implications in
detail in the following section.
Apart from the provisions in these Parts, other sections of the Constitution, are also
interspersed with provisions which give substance to citizenship. Provisio~ls
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Philosophy of Indian to 'elections' and 'franchise' are especially ilnportant in the context of the long history
Constitution
of deprivation of political rights under colonial rule. It is significant that the Constitution
made 'universal adult franchise' the basis of elections to the Lok Sabha and the
Legislative Assembly of States. Article 326 of the Constitution conferred voting rights
to all citizens above the age of 21 (changed to 18 by the Constitution 61st Amendment
Act of 1988, with effect from 1 April 1989). It is crucial that the Constitution did
not lay down any property and education criteria. Women, who in most western
countries were enfranchised only in the present century, were also enfranchised on
equal footing with men.
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3) What are the "non-justiciable" rights?
I t has often been pointed out that the Preamble, Fundamental Rights and Directive
Principles embody the value o f freedom and equality, made complete and substalitive
by ideals o f economic and social justice. Criticisms coming from various quarters
point out, however, that the nature o f citizenship in tlie Indian Constitution and the
manner in which i t has unfolded over the years, have shown that the values o f
freedom and equality have been largely elusive. Studying tlie nature o f empowerment
o f citizens within the Constitution, [Link], a Marxist scholar points out the
precarious nature o f rights i n the Constitution. He e~nphasisesthat not only are rights
not resewed to the people, tliere is no preservatio~io f tlie Fundamental Riglits already
guaranteed to them. The Constitution itself permits and provides the procedure for
their amendment and over-riding by the State. Further, the Directive Principles are
not addressed to the people, which means that tlie people cannot move the courts to
instruct the government to provide conditions in which their rights could be made more
meaningful. Again, asserts Desai, while there does not appear to be any explicit
system o f accountability for the State, the people are given some 'fundamental duties'.
Desai feels that in the absence o f any similar obligations for the State, the provisions
relating to Fundamental Duties could be used to abridge the basic rights o f citizens.
Finally, the fact that certain basic rights such as tlie rights to work, shelter, education
and medical amenities are not Fundamental Rights indicates the class and gender
biases o f the Constitution-makers. Under such conditions large sections o f 'toiling'
citizens i.e. the socially and economically underprivileged, including women, are forced
to live in conditions in which their empowerment as citizens remains unrealised.
Legally too, women face numerous disabilities. The provisions o f Article 44 o f the
Directive Principles advising the State to 'secure for the citizens a uniform civil code
throughout the territory o f India' has been particularly in focus in recent years.
Various women's groilps have demanded that this directive be implemented to rectify
women's subordinate positio~iin matters pertaining to marriage, dowry, divorce,
parentage, guardianship, maintenance, inlieritance, succession etc., which are presently
determined by the 'personal laws' o f specific religious communities. While there is
a diversity o f opinio~iamong women's groups, they liave by and large, demanded a
system of gender-just laws which would help them realise tlieir potential as citizens.
Towards tlie beginning, we defined citizensliip as 'ful I' and 'equal' membersliip in a
community, i~nderstoodin tlie modern context as the nation-state. We have seen that
social I economic contexts (caste, gender, class, religion) are important factors
deterlninilig tlie extent to wliicli a persoli is able to realize this 'full' and 'equal'
membership. l'lie Constitution, as we have seen, holds out tlie promise o f assuring
this real isation for a1l sections o f people, by re~novingdebilitating circumstances or
providing enabling conditions. Tlie previous section, liowever, also shows 11sthat at
any give11moment, tlie realisation o f citizenship is mediated by class, gender, religion,
caste etc., in mutually incompatible or even a~itagonisticset o f alignments. Tlie State
itself may fail in its proniise o f providing the resources for the realisatio~io f citizenship
and alternatively, it may, through its institi~tionseven become an aggressor and violator
o f citizens' riglits. 1-his, however, does not mean that citize~isliipi s a static category.
The history o f the origins o f citizenship as a system o f equality against hierarchical
and ascriptive inequalities has shown that citizensliip lias always been a mosaic o f
struggles. People's movements have historically been conducive to the enhancement
o f citizensliip riglits. Tlie suffrage movemelits in western countries succeeded in
getting the right to vote for women. Workers movements worldwide have contributed
towards the regulation o f work hours, amelioratio~io f work conditions and welfare
measures for industrial workers. A range o f popular movements and struggles
seeking to redefine or enlarge the frontiers o f citizenship have also occurred in India.
Almost all o f them had roots in local situations but tlie issues tliey raised stranded up
with similar issi~esraised elsewhere, and agitated the minds o f a wider public. The
women's movement, tlie dalit movement, tlie environmental movement, the peasant
niove~nelitetc., not only liigliliglit tlie manner in wliicli citizensliip is eroded but also
liave i~nportantbearings on tlle definition o f the nature and substance o f citizenship
riglits. The struggles by the people o f Nar~nadavalley against tlie building o f Sardar
Sarovar Dam, for example, liigliliglits tlie claims o f the people o f the Narmada valley
to the riglit to protest against tlieir marginalisation at the hands o f the government. A t
the very basis of tlie struggle, however, is also the consistent refusal o f the people
o f tlie valley to give up tlieir identity, their history, tlieir culture and means o f livelihood,
which tliey derived fro111 generations o f living as a self-sustaining community in the
region. Tlie struggle thus aspires to check the erosion o f the rights o f people by the
develop~nentalpolicies of the State and also demands the provision o f social co~iditions
which would make tlieir riglits substantive.
Similarly, the National Commission for Women, set up in 1992, under a Parliamentary
Act (The National Commissio~ifor Wome~iAct, 1990) has, through wide ranging
investigative and recommendatory powers, concerned itself with matters relating to
women's rights under the constitution and issues of women's socio-economic conditions,
health and violence against them. Over the years the Co~nmissio~i has taken up cases
of violence, torture. and harassment of wolneli (including molestation, rape, dowry
related violence, custodial rape and death, torture and harassment witlii~ifamily, in tlie
workplace, and issues of women's legal and political riglits for investigatio~iand
redemption. Tlie National Human Riglits Com~nissionis another institution establislied
by an Act of Parliament (Tlie National Human Rights Act, 1993) to inquire into
violations of people's rights. Institutions like the National Commission for Women and
National Human Riglits Commission, when effectively used or pressurised by the
people, could contribute towards substantiating citizenship.
2) In what way do the institutions, like National Colnmissio~ifor Woman and the
National Human Rights Commission help us enhance our citizenship rights?
I Preamble (to the Constitution): A document setting out the ideals, ainis and
!
objects which tlie Constitution ri~akersintended
i to realise tliroi~glitlie co~istitutio~i.
I
I Race : A scientifically and politically co~itroversial
I
h
category, race refers to biological (genetic)
differences which supposedly distinguish one
I superiority to others.
Niraja Gopal Jayal, Denlocracy and the State, OUP, Delhi, 1999, (Chapter 4, Section
IV: Citizenship in the 1Varrnada Valley).
1) 1-he constitutional rights given to the citizens, especially the under-privileged are
not properly guarenteed.
2) They raise tlie issues relating to the rights o f wornen and other citizens through
various means including the public Interest litigation and social Action Litigation.