G.R. No.

18316 September 23, 1922 COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS PHILIPPINE ACETYLENE

LUZON STEVEDORING COMPANY, vs. WENCESLAO TRINIDAD,
Collector of Internal Revenue,. COMPANY
Facts:

Facts: Philippine Acetylene Company is engaged in the manufacture

Plaintiff is engaged in the stevedoring business in said city consisting
of oxygen, acetylene and nitrogen, and packaging of liquefied
of loading and unloading cargo from vessels in port, at certain rates of
charge per unit of cargo; that all the work done by it is conducted petroleum gas in cylinders and tanks. It imported from the United
under the direct supervision of the officers of the ships and under the States a custombuilt liquefied petroleum gas tank. For the said
instruction given to plaintiff’s men by the captain and officers of said importation, the company
ships.
was assessed a special import tax amounting to PhP 3,683.00. The
company paid the tax under protest. Philippine Acetylene Company
The defendant alleged that during the first quarter of the year 1921 argues that it is exempt from the payment of the special import tax. It
the plaintiff was engaged in business as a contractor, its gross cites as basis for its exemption Sec 6 of RA No.1394 which states that
receipts from said business during said quarter amounting to special import taxes shall not be imposed on machinery, equipment,
P242,281.33, and that the defendant, under the provisions of section accessories and spare parts, imported into the Philippines, for the use
1462 of Act No. 2711, levied and assessed on the above-mentioned of industries. The company maintains that it is an
amount the percentage tax amounting to P2,422.81, which the plaintiff
paid on April 18, 1921, under protest, this protest having been duly industry as defined in Sec 6 of RA No. 1394. The Court of Tax
overruled by the defendant. Appeals sustained Philippine Acetylene Company’s contention and
declared the latter exempt from the payment of the
Issue: Is the plaintiff a contractor? special import tax.

Held:
Issue: Whether or not Philippine Acetylene Company may be
considered engaged in an industry as contemplated in Sec 6 of RA
No, plaintiff is not a contractor in the sense that that word is used in
No. 1394 and, therefore, exempt from the payment of the special
said section 1462 of Act No. 2711
import tax.

Although, in a general sense, every person who enters into a contract

may be called a contractor, yet the word, for want of a better one, has Held: Philippine Acetylene Company is not an industry as defined in
come to be used with special reference to a person who, in the pursuit Sec 6 of RA No. 1394. To be an industry, the company must be
of an independent business, undertakes to do a specific piece or job
engaged in some productive enterprise, not in merely packaging an
or work for other persons, using his own means and methods without
submitting himself to control as to the petty details. The true test of a already finished product. The operation for which the company
‘contractor’ would seem to be that he renders the service in the employs the gas tank in question does not involve manufacturing or
course of an independent occupation, representing the will of his production. It is nothing but packaging; the liquefied gas, when
employer only as to the result of his work, and not as to the means by obtained from the refinery, has to be placed in some kind of container
which it is accomplished.” to facilitate its transportation. When sold to consumers, it undergoes
no change or transformation, but is merely placed in smaller cylinders Dra. Brigida Buenaseda et. al. vs. Sec. Juan Flavier et. al. [G.R. No.
for convenience. The process is certainly not 106719. September 21, 1993]
15AUG
production in any sense. The decision of the CTA is reversed and Ponente: QUIASON, J.
Philippine Acetylene Company is held liable for the payment of the FACTS:
special import tax, as it is not an industry exempt from the payment of The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for
such tax. Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the Order of the
Ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr.
Brigida S. Buenaseda [Link]. The questioned order was issued in
connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman
(OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the
petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
Supreme Court required respondent Secretary to comply with the
aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor General, in his comment,
stated that (a) “The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend
suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;” and (b) “Assuming
the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government
official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the
exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in
the instant case”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government
officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the
Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative
complaints filed against said officials and employees.

HELD:
YES. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside.

RATIO:
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power “to
recommend the suspension” of a public official or employees (Sec. 13
[3]), it referred to “suspension,” as a punitive measure. All the words
associated with the word “suspension” in said provision referred to
penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine,
censure. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word “suspension”
should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is
associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering
the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power investigation thereof. It is not imposing suspension as a penalty (not
to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing punitive suspension). What the Constitution contemplates that the
administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. Ombudsman may recommend are punitive suspensions.
The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the
Anent the issue of the Motion for Disbarment filed with the
requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the
Ombudsman, the same is not proper. It cannot be filed in this special
administrative charges.
civil action which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of
discretion for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of
In 1992, the NCMH Nurses Association (NCMH) filed a case of graft judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of procedure for the
and corruption against Dr. Brigida Buenaseda and several other discipline of members of the bar separate and apart from the present
government officials of the Department of Health (DOH). The special civil action. However, the lawyers of Buenaseda were reminded
not be carried away in espousing their client’s cause. The language of
Ombudsman (then Conrado Vasquez), ordered the suspension
a lawyer, both oral or written, must be respectful and restrained in
of Buenaseda et al. The suspension was carried on by then DOH
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession and with his behavioral
Secretary Juan Flavier, being the officer in charge over Buenaseda et attitude toward his brethren in the profession.
al. Buenaseda et al then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, questioning the suspension
order. NCMH submitted its Comment on the Petition where they
attached a Motion for Disbarment against the lawyers of Buenaseda
et al.
Allegedly, the lawyers of Buenaseda et al advised them not to obey the
suspension order, which is a lawful order from a duly constituted
authority. NCMH maintains that such advice from the lawyers constitute
a violation against the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Solicitor General, commenting on the case, agreed with
Buenaseda’s lawyers as he maintained that all the Ombudsman can do
is to recommend suspensions not impose them. The Sol-Gen based
his argument on Section 13 (3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power,
function, and duty to:
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend
government officials. Whether or not a Motion for Disbarment may be
filed in a special civil action.
HELD: Yes, the Ombudsman may impose suspension orders. The
Supreme Court clarifies that what the Ombudsman issued is an order
of preventive suspension pending the resolution of the case or
LATCHME MOTOOMULL v. JOFFRE DELA PAZ, GR No. L-45302, Petitioners, on February 20, 1976, appealed to public respondent
1990-07-24 Court of Appeals under R.A. No. 5434, and on February 26, 1976,
filed an Urgent Motion for Restraining Order and Preliminary
Facts: Injunction (Ibid., pp. 63-74). Respondent Court of Appeals,... in a
It started on May 4, 1974 when, perhaps with the view of resolution dated February 27, 1976, gave due course to the appeal
augmenting... its paid-up capital, the Board of Directors approved and ordered the issuance of a restraining order (Ibid., p. 151).
Resolution No. 27, authorizing the issuance of unissued shares of Issues:
stock on a one to one basis to its stockholders on or before June 30,
1974. However, it is claimed by petitioners that on May The privotal issue in this case is the meaning of the word "Court" as
used in Section 5 of R.A. No. 5434,
23, 1974, the Board of Directors amended the said resolution through
its Resolution No. 33, authorizing the issuance of unissued shares out Ruling:
of the capital stock on a one to two basis to its stockholders payable
on or before August 31,... 1974. The resolution was to be submittted From the outset, the law unequivocably stated its declared objective
for the approval of all the stockholders in a special meeting to be that appeal shall not stay the appealed decision, award, order,
called for the purpose two weeks from the date of the etc. The exception given is where the officer or body rendering the
resolution. Allegedly, the resolution was approved by the... same, or the court on motion, after hearing... should provide
stockholders at a special meeting held on June 11, 1974, with the otherwise. In line with the above objective, the law provides further
qualification that a stockholder may not be required to exercise his that the propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the
right under said resolution. The resolution was submitted to the award, order, decision or ruling may be raised only by motion in the
Securities and Exchange Commission by its corporate counsel main case.

Ricardo A. Nava through a letter dated June 25, 1974, which also Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted that if the adverse
included the list of stockholders indicating the number of shares to be party intends to appeal from a decision of the SEC and pending
alloted each of them from the unissued shares of stock appeal desires to stay the execution of the decision, then the motion
must be filed with and be heard by the SEC before the adverse party
Petitioners Latchme Motoomull and Manuel Lacson purchased perfects... its appeal to the Court of Appeals (Rollo, p. 250).
unissued stock in accordance with the resolution and within the period
stated therein, while the other stockholders did not exercise their By and large, such interpretation gives meaning and substance to the
right. avowed purpose of the law where the need for immediacy of
execution of decisions arrived at by said bodies, was recognized and
Payment of the exemption fee, however, was made only on considered imperative.
November 29, 1974 and as such, the certificate of exemption or
resolution granting the same was issued by the Securities and Principles:
Exchange Commission only on December 4, 1974. More importantly, according to the maxim noscitur a socies where a
Proclamation No. G-74 (EXH. '27') was allegedly passed by the new particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
members of the board of directors declaring the foregoing susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be
stockholders as directors of the Sarkara Trading Co., Inc., for the made clear and specific by... considering the company of words in
fiscal year 1974-75. The foregoing... incident was apparently the which it is found or with which it is associated (Gonzaga, "Statutes
ultimate reason which constrained the private respondents to institute and Their Construction, p. 116 citing Black on Interpretation of Laws,
action against petitioners. 2d ed., pp. 194-196), or stated differently, its obscurity or doubt may
be reviewed by... reference to associate words (Luzon Stevedoring
Co. v. Trinidad, 43 Phil. 804 [1922]). Accordingly, an interpretation
which lead to patent inconsistency must be rejected as not in G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012
accordance with the legislative intent (Commissioner of Customs v. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
Philippine Acetylene Co., 39 SCRA 71 [1971]). JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G.
ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the
vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato
Corona’s departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the
need to create a separate, competent and independent body to
recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body
representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment
process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution

states that “(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as
ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme
Court, and a representative of the private sector.” In compliance
therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC,
designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to
act as one of the ex officio members.

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially

altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th)
member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half
(1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the
legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the
framers originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby
allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC. The
phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to
bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature
on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms,
Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a so provided.
bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have
made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word
in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by
principle of balance. considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which
it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since
representatives of Congress to be members of the JBC does not a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other
render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by
presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely provide the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes
balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of
presidential appointees the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion
whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a
it is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC
for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for
rectification of legal blunders. Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is
plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such
Issue: as records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof
letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution. that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members
Held: only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of
Congress to perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that
Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional. matter.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that
where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted admitted from the Congress and House of Representatives, the
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional
that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their Commission, held that “Congress,” in the context of JBC
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that
such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph there are still differences between the two houses and that an inter-
1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of the
representative of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a” legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution, the same
preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no
room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No
of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of
designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers.
Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire Mutuc vs. COMELEC
legislative department. AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private
sector and the three branches of government would have an active G.R. NO. L-32717
role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary. November 26, 1970
Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence
in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one FERNANDO, J.:
full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would “negate the principle of
equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined FACTS:
in the Constitution.”
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for the position of a delegate to the
composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another Constitutional Convention, from using “jingles in his mobile units
member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against equipped with sound systems and loud speakers” on 22 October
that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing 1970. Petitioner impugned the act of respondent as violative of his
Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in right to free speech. Respondent however contended that the
recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional
circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates “to purchase,
countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights,
must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” It was
no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the
sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible
itself to the whims and caprices of the government and the people propaganda material, under the phrase “and the like.”
who run it.
ISSUE:
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current Whether “jingles” falls down on the prohibited electoral propaganda
composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless gadgets of R.A. No. 6132.
valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts,
actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally RULING:
recognized. They are not nullified.
For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot
composition of the Judicial and Bar Council IS declared merit our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to
enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is
Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the
with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as means of inducement
disposition is immediately executory. to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for
distribution.
 ISSUE
PRIVATE ACTS AND CONTRACTS STATUTE Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is
considered an “open space” as defined in P. D. 1216.
EMETERIA LIWAG, Petitioner vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent RULING
G. R. No. 189755 Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an “open
July 04, 2012 space.” The Court used the basic statutory construction principle of
ejusdem generis to determine whether the area falls under “other
Sereno, J.
similar facilities and amenities” since P. D. 1216 makes no specific
mention of areas reserved for water facilities.
FACTS Ejusdem generis states that where a general word or phrase
In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same
Loop, loaned from Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or to
Corporation. The former failed to settle its debts with the latter, so, he be restricted to – things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or
assigned all his rights to Marcelo over several parcels of land in the class as, those specifically mentioned. Applying that principle, the Court
Subdivision including the receivables from the lots already sold. found out that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common
welfare of the community. Therefore, the phrase “other similar facilities
As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot buyers, and amenities” should be interpreted in like manner.
the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human Settlement
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility is available in the It is without a doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of
subdivision. The said water facility has been the only source of water the community. Water is a basic necessity, without which, survival in
of the residents for thirty (30) years. the community would be impossible.

In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to

Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
C-350099 was issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes died.
Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the respondent
Association demanding the removal of the overhead water tank over
the parcel of land. The latter refused and filed a case before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty
Corporation, petitioner and the surviving heirs of Hermogenes.
The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent Association.
One of the things it affirmed was the existence of an easement for water
system/facility or open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099
wherein the deep well and overhead tank are situated. However, on
appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board found
that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space
 On March 12, 1996, the herein petitioners, in their capacity as
taxpayers, but who are also among the PNP officers implicated in the
HUMAN RIGHTS STATUTE
alleged rubout, filed before the court a quo a petition for injunction with
CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP and SR. SUPT. FRANCISCO G. prayer for temporary restraining order questioning the legality of the
ZUBIA JR., petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T. admission of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz into the Program.
GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department Petitioners contend that under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981, law
of Justice, and SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR JUDE ROMANO, enforcement officers, like SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz, are
in his capacity as the Director of the Government’s Witness disqualified from being admitted into the witness protection program
Protection Program; SPO2 EDUARDO DELOS REYES and SPO2 even though they may be testifying against other law enforcement
CORAZON DELA CRUZ, respondents-appellees officers.
G. R. No. 134855
July 2, 2002 ISSUE
Austria-Martinez, J.
Whether or not SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz’s
FACTS admission into the Witness Protection Program is wrongful and illegal.
On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) suspected members of the
Kuratong Baleleng gang were killed along Commonwealth Avenue in
RULING
Quezon City in an alleged shootout with the Anti-Bank Robbery
Intelligence Task Group of the Philippine National Police (PNP). No. It is true that the proviso in Section 3(d) of R. A. No. 6981
disqualifies law enforcement officers from being admitted into the
SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal
Program when they "testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or
Investigation Command (CIC) of the PNP and who was one of the
before any investigating authority." This is the general rule. However,
officers assigned to conduct an investigation of the May 18, 1995
Section 4 provides for a specific and separate situation where a witness
incident, made a public disclosure of his findings that there was no
testifies before a legislative investigation. An investigation by a
shootout and the eleven (11) suspected members of the Kuratong
legislative committee does not fall under the category of "any
Baleleng gang were instead summarily executed. SPO2 Corazon dela
investigating authority" referred to in Section 3. Section 4 contains only
Cruz, also a member of the CIC, made the same statement
a proviso that the witness' admission to the Program must be
corroborating the claim of SPO2 delos Reyes.
recommended by the legislative committee when in its judgment there
The Senate conducted hearings to determine the is a pressing necessity therefor and said recommendation is approved
circumstances surrounding the subject incident. SPO2 delos Reyes by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
and SPO2 dela Cruz testified before the Senate hearings. On June 2, Representatives, as the case may be. Section 4 does not contain any
1995, former Senator Raul Roco, who was then the Chairman of the proviso similar to Sec. 3(d), nor does Section 4 refer to the application
Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, recommended that of the proviso under Section 3.
SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz be admitted to the
It is basic under the law on statutory construction that where the
government's Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program.
law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. The operation
Accordingly, SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz were admitted
of a proviso is usually and properly confined to the clause or distinct
into the said Program.
portion of the enactment which immediately precedes it or to which it
pertains, and does not extend to or qualify other sections or portions of
the statute, unless the legislative intent that it shall so operate is clearly RULING
disclosed.
Yes. The term “wage” as used in Section 6 of RA 6727 pertains
to no other than the “statutory minimum wage” which is defined under
the Rules Implementing RA 6727 as the lowest wage rate fixed by law
SOCIAL SECURITY AND EMPLOYEE’S COMPENSATION
that an employer can pay his worker. The basis thereof under Section
STATUTE
7 of the same Rules is the normal working hours, which shall not
NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY (NFA), and JUANITO M. DAVID, in exceed eight hours a day. Hence, the prescribed increases or the
his capacity as Regional Director, NFA Regional Office No. 1, San additional liability to be borne by the principal under Section 6 of RA
Juan, La Union, petitioners, vs. MASADA SECURITY AGENCY 6727 is the increment or amount added to the remuneration of an
INC., represented by its Acting President & General Manager, employee for an 8-hour work.
COL. EDWIN S. ESPEJO (RET.), respondents
Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its
G. R. No. 163448 terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
March 8, 2005 interpretation or construction, be extended to others. Since the increase
in wage referred to in Section 6 pertains to the “statutory minimum
Ynares-Santiago, J. wage” as defined herein, principals in service contracts cannot be made
FACTS to pay the corresponding wage increase in the overtime pay, night shift
differential, holiday and rest day pay, premium pay and other benefits
On September 17, 1996, MASADA Security Agency Inc. granted to workers. While basis of said remuneration and benefits is
entered into a one-year contract to provide security services to the the statutory minimum wage, the law cannot be unduly expanded as to
various offices, warehouses, and installations of NFA within its scope include those not stated in the subject provision.
in Region I. Upon the expiration of the said contract, the parties
extended the effectivity thereof on a monthly basis under the same The settled rule in statutory construction is that if the statute is
terms and conditions. clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without interpretation.
Meanwhile, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity
Board issued several wage orders mandating increases in the daily PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION, represented herein by its
wage rate. Accordingly, respondent requested NFA to increase their President, GREGORY K. LOY, Petitioner, vs. THE PROVINCE OF
monthly contract rate including the daily minimum wage, overtime pay, BENGUET, Respondent.
holiday pay, 13th month pay, holiday and rest day pay. Respondent also
claimed the increase in Social Security System and Pag-ibig premiums G.R. No. 183137, 10 April 2013.
as well as in the administrative costs and margin. NFA granted the
request of the respondent but only with regard to the increase in the LEONEN, J.:
daily minimum wage.
Petitioner Pelizloy Realty Corporation owns Palm Grove Resort in
ISSUE Tuba, Benguet, which has facilities like swimming pools, a spa and
Whether or not the additional liability of NFA under Section 6 of function halls.
RA 6727 is limited only to the increment in the statutory minimum wage
rate. In 2005, the Provincial Board of Benguet approved its Revenue Code
of 2005. Section 59, the tax ordinance levied a 10% amusement tax
on gross receipts from admissions to "resorts, swimming pools, bath barred from levying amusement taxes even if amusement taxes are a
houses, hot springs and tourist spots." form of percentage taxes. The levying of percentage taxes is
prohibited "except as otherwise provided" by the LGC. Section 140
Pelizloy's posits that amusement tax is an ultra vires act. Thus, it filed provides such exception.
an appeal/petition before the Secretary of Justice. Upon the
Secretary’s failure to decide on the appeal within sixty days, Pelizloy Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of
filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction before the RTC. amusement taxes on "the proprietors, lessees, or operators of
theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other
Pelizloy argued that the imposition was in violation of the limitation on places of amusement."
the taxing powers of local government units under Section 133 (i) of
the Local Government Code, which provides that the exercise of the However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and
taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall tourist spots are not among those places expressly mentioned by
not extend to the levy of percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on Section 140 of the LGC as being subject to amusement taxes. Thus,
sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on goods or the determination of whether amusement taxes may be levied on
services except as otherwise provided. admissions to these places hinges on whether the phrase ‘other
places of amusement’ encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath
The Province of Benguet assailed the that the phrase ‘other places of houses, hot springs, and tourist spots.
amusement’ in Section 140 (a) of the LGC encompasses resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots since Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or
Article 131 (b) of the LGC defines "amusement" as "pleasurable phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the
diversion and entertainment synonymous to relaxation, avocation, same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or
pastime, or fun." phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons,
things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as
RTC rendered a Decision assailed Decision dismissing the Petition for those specifically mentioned."
Declaratory Relief and Injunction for lack of merit. Procedurally, the
RTC ruled that Declaratory Relief was a proper remedy. However, it Section 131 (c) of the LGC already provides a clear definition:
gave credence to the Province of Benguet's assertion that resorts, "Amusement Places" include theaters, cinemas, concert halls,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission
encompassed by the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ in Section to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances.
140 of the LGC.
As defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary, ‘show’ means "a
ISSUE: W/N provinces are authorized to impose amusement taxes spectacle or display of something, typically an impressive one"; while
on admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot ‘performance’ means "an act of staging or presenting a play, a
springs, and tourist spots for being "amusement places" under the concert, or other form of entertainment." As such, the ordinary
LGC. definitions of the words ‘show’ and ‘performance’ denote not only
visual engagement (i.e., the seeing or viewing of things) but also
RULING: NO. active doing (e.g., displaying, staging or presenting) such that actions
are manifested to, and (correspondingly) perceived by an audience.
Amusement taxes are percentage taxes. However, provinces are not
Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath Cagayan Valley Enterprises vs CA
houses, hot springs and tourist spots cannot be considered venues
primarily "where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing
or viewing the show or performances". While it is true that they may FACTS
be venues where people are visually engaged, they are not primarily
venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display, stage or
present shows and/or performances. 1. La Tondena Inc (LTI) registered with the Phil Patent Office 350 cc.
White flint bottles it had been using for its gin named Ginebra San
Miguel.

2. LTI filed a case for injunction and damages against Cagayan Valley
Enterprises, Inc. (Cagayan, for brevity) for using the 350 c.c., white flint
bottles with the mark "La Tondeña Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel"
stamped or blown-in therein by filling the same with Cagayan's liquor
product bearing the label "Sonny Boy" for commercial sale and
distribution, without LTI's written consent

3. In its subsequent pleadings, Cagayan contended that the bottles

they are using are not the registered bottles of LTI since the former was
using the bottles marked with "La Tondeña, Inc." and "Ginebra San
Miguel" but without the words "property of" indicated in said bottles as
stated in the sworn statement attached to the certificate of registration
of LTI for said bottles.

4. CA Ruled injunction as permanent, Cagayan filed an MR but was

denied. Hence, this present petition

ISSUE/S

W/N Cagayan can used the bottles

RULING & RATIO

NO THEY CANNOT Republic Act No. 623, as amended, since they bear the name of the
principal, La Tondeña Inc., and of its product, Ginebra San Miguel. The
omitted words "property of" are not of such vital indispensability such
RA 623 grants protection to a qualified manufacturer who successfully that the omission thereof will remove the bottles from the protection of
registered with the Philippine Patent Office its duly stamped or marked the law. The owner of a trade-mark or trade-name, and in this case the
bottles, boxes, casks and other similar containers. The mere use of marked containers, does not abandon it by making minor modifications
registered bottles or containers without the written consent of the in the mark or name itself. With much more reason will this be true
manufacturer is prohibited, the only exceptions being when they are where what is involved is the mere omission of the words "property of"
used as containers for "sisi," bagoong," "patis" and similar native since even without said words the ownership of the bottles is easily
products. Identifiable. The words "La Tondeña Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel"
stamped on the bottles, even without the words "property of," are
sufficient notice to the public that those bottles so marked are owned
It is an admitted fact that herein petitioner Cagayan buys from junk by LTI.
dealers and retailers bottles which bear the marks or names La
Tondeña Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel" and uses them as containers
for its own liquor products. The contention of Cagayan that the -Petitioner also claims that hard liquor is not included under the
aforementioned bottles without the words "property of" indicated term "other lawful beverages" as provided in Section I of Republic
thereon are not the registered bottles of LTI, since they do not Act No. 623, as amended by Republic Act No. 5700, this is without
conform with the statement or description in the supporting affidavits merit. The title of the law itself, which reads " An Act to Regulate the
attached to the original registration certificate and renewal, is Use of Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs,
untenable. Barrels and Other Similar Containers" clearly shows the
legislative intent to give protection to all marked bottles and
containers of all lawful beverages regardless of the nature of their
Republic Act No. 623 which governs the registration of marked bottles contents. The words "other lawful beverages" is used in its general
and containers merely requires that the bottles, in order to be sense, referring to all beverages not prohibited by law. Beverage is
eligible for registration, must be stamped or marked with the defined as a liquor or liquid for drinking. Hard liquor, although regulated,
names of the manufacturers or the names of their principals or is not prohibited by law, hence it is within the purview and coverage of
products, or other marks of ownership. No drawings or labels are Republic Act No. 623, as amended.
required but, instead, two photographs of the container, duly signed by
the applicant, showing clearly and legibly the names and other marks
of ownership sought to be registered and a bottle showing the name or Decision of CA Affirmed and petition is denied
other mark or ownership, irremovably stamped or marked, shall be
submitted.

-The term "Name or Other Mark of Ownership" means the name of

the applicant or the name of his principal, or of the product, or
other mark of ownership. The second set of bottles of LTI without the
words "property of" substantially complied with the requirements of
ESCRIBANO vs AVILA Whether or not the power is lodged exclusively in the city attorney of
that city.
HELD:
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance has the authority to conduct preliminary
investigations of the crime of libel.
The governor-elect of Cotabato, Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun,
Court of First Instance may conduct preliminary investigations
filed directly a complaint for libel with the Court of First Instance
because this power is not lodged exclusively in the city attorney. The
against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong, Cotabato on September
enumeration in the law of the public officers and the courts that may
25, 1968.
conduct preliminary investigations was designed to divest the ordinary
According to the complaint, Escribano was charged with having said municipal court of that power but not to deprive the Court of First
in a speech, which was broadcasted on a radio station that, “Mr. Instance of that same power.
Pendatun is the worst animal that ever live in this province.”
The power of the CFT to conduct a preliminary investigation is derived
Mayor Escribano questioned the authority of Judge Avila to conduct from the constitutional grant of power for a judge to hold a preliminary
the preliminary investigation of the offense. In line to this claim, Judge examination and to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants.
Avila ruled in his orders of march 5, 20 and 27, 1969 that he had the What is important to remember is that preliminary investigations by
power to conduct preliminary investigation the CFT is the exception to the rule and not the general rule.

Escribano filed in this Court against Judge Avila and Pendatun the Legislative body, by means of that amendment of Article 360, never
instant special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition on April 1, intended to take away the jurisdiction of the proper Court of First
1969, praying that the said orders of Judge Avila be set aside. On Instance to conduct a preliminary Investigation in libel cases.
April 18, Escribano filed a supplemental petition to annul Judge Avila’s
order of March 29, 1969. In that order he found that Pendatun’s
evidence had “established a probable cause to believe that” libel by
radio had been committed and that Escribano “probably committed
the same.” The city fiscal field an information for libel against
Escribano.
Escribano invokes the provisions of Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, whiwch were inserted by Republic Act No. 4363, which do not
empower the Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary
investigation of written defamations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of
the crime of libel committed by means of radio at Cotabato City is
invested in their Court of First Instance, or,
SARIO MALINIAS, petitioner, COMELEC Res. No. 2968 purposive of the maintenance of peace and
vs. order around the vicinity of the canvassing site.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ,
ANACLETO TANGILAG and VICTOR DOMINGUEZ, respondents. Also, they said that the presence of the policemen within the said area
is to prevent some groups who were reportedly had the intention to
G.R. No. 146943, October 4, 2002 disrupt the canvass proceedings. They claimed that such a response
was not unwarranted as this has already happened in the past, wherein,
FACTS: in fact, the petitioners were among them.

On July 31, 1998, Sario Malinias and Roy S. Pilando, who were COMELEC’s Ruling:
candidates for governor and congress representative positions,
respectively, filed a complaint with the COMELEC's Law Department After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss the
against Victor Dominguez, Anacleto Tangilag and others for their petition against the respondents for insufficiency of evidence to
violation of the following laws: establish probable cause. Malinias filed an MR but it was also denied
for failure of adducing additional evidence thereon.

Not satisfied with the same, Malinias filed to SC a petition for review
1. Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646; and on certiorari on this case.
2. Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881.

Dominguez was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, ISSUE:

Sabangan, Mountain Province. Corpuz was then the Provincial Director
of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while Tangilag Did COMELEC abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint for
was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain lack of probable cause?
Province.
RATIO DECIDENDI OF SC:

The petitioners said that due to said violations, their supporters were No. SC AFFIRMED the decision of COMELEC and found the conduct
deprived from participating in the canvassing of election returns as they of its investigation and ruling on the case to be in accord with its
were blocked by a police checkpoint in the course of their way to the jurisdiction and duties under the law. In this case, COMELEC did not
canvassing site at the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc, Mountain commit any grave abuse of discretion as there is nothing capricious or
Province. despotic in the manner of their resolution of the said complaint, hence,
SC cannot issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

On the said violations, the only evidence that was successfully

Among the private respondents, only Corpuz and Tangilag submitted presented by the petitioner is the mass-affidavits of his supporters,
their joint Counter-Affidavit, wherein they admitted that they ordered the which were considered self-serving and cannot be admitted by the
establishment of checkpoints all over the province to enforce the court thus, the same are not enough to prove his claims.
COMELEC Gun Ban and its other pertinent rules pursuant to
Also, the allege violation of the respondents of Sec. 25 of R.A. 6646 limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction,
and Sec. 232 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 are not included in the acts defined be extended to other matters.
as punishable criminal election offenses under Sec. 27 of R.A. 6646
and Sec. 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. No. 881, respectively.

Here, Sec. 25 merely highlights one of the rights of a political party or

candidate during elections whereas, the violation of Sec. 232, which
enumerates the persons who are not allowed inside the canvassing
site, can only be subjected to an administrative disciplinary action and
cannot be punished by imprisonment as provided for under Sec. 264
of the same law.

Moreover, it is clear in the defense of the respondents that they did

not violate Sec. 261 (i), a criminal offense, which prohibits any officer
or employee of political offices or police force from intervening in any
election campaign or from engaging in any partisan activity except to
vote or maintain public order.

In the said defense, the respondents said that setting up the

checkpoints was done to enforce the COMELEC's firearms ban,
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2968 and not to prejudice any
candidate from participating in the canvassing. As such, the actions of
the respondents are deemed lawful and not in excess of their
authority.

Ruling related to Statutory Construction

Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio

alterius, there is no ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute
private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg.
881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act.

"It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention

of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all
others. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a

number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what is
expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium facit
cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly
[G.R. No. 132527. July 29, 2005] further provides that $100 monthly and $200 yearly tax-free shopping
COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. HON. RUBEN privileges is granted to SSEZ residents living outside the Secured Area
TORRES of the SSEZ and to Filipinos aged 15 and over residing outside the
SSEZ.
This is a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction seeking to enjoin and
prohibit the Executive Branch from allowing, and the private ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed issuances are unconstitutional,
respondents from continuing with, the operation of tax and duty-free illegal and void for being an exercise of executive lawmaking, contrary
shops located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the to RA No. 7227 and in violation of the Constitutional provisions,
Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), and to declare Section 5 of EO particularly the equal protection clause, prohibition of unfair competition
No. 80, EO No. 97-A, and Section 4 of BCDA Board Resolution No. 93- and combinations in restraint of trade, and preferential use of Filipino
05-034 as unconstitutional, illegal, and void. labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods?

FACTS: On March 13, 1992, RA No. 7227 was enacted, providing for, HELD: On the issue of executive legislation, petitioners contend that
among other things, the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark the wording of RA No. 7227 clearly limits the grant of tax incentives to
and Subic military reservations and their extensions into alternative the importation of raw materials, capital and equipment only. Hence,
productive uses in the form of special economic zones in order to they claim that the assailed issuances constitute executive legislation
promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in for invalidly granting tax incentives in the importation of consumer
particular and the country in general. Among the salient provisions are goods such as those being sold in the duty-free shops, in violation of
as follows: “SECTION 12. x x x The Subic Special Economic Zone shall the letter and intent of RA No. 7227. The Court held that Section 12 of
be operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring RA No. 7227 clearly does not restrict the duty-free importation only to
free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported 'raw materials, capital and equipment. To limit the tax-free importation
out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives privilege of enterprises located inside the special economic zone only
such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and to raw materials, capital and equipment clearly runs counter to the
equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory intention of the Legislature to create a free port where the 'free flow of
of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine goods or capital within, into, and out of the zones' is insured. The
territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the phrase 'tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and
Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines; equipment was merely cited as an example of incentives that may be
x x x” given to entities operating within the zone. Moreover, the records of the
Senate containing the discussion of the concept of 'special economic
On April 3, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos issued EO No. 80, which zone in Section 12 (a) of Republic Act No. 7227 show the legislative
declared, among others, that Clark shall have all the applicable intent that consumer goods entering the SSEZ which satisfy the needs
incentives granted to the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone of the zone and are consumed there are not subject to duties and taxes
under RA No. 7227. in accordance with Philippine laws. However, the second sentences of
paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of EO No. 97-A, allowing tax and duty-free
Pursuant to the directive under EO No. 80, the BCDA passed Board removal of goods to certain individuals, even in a limited amount, from
Resolution No. 93-05-034 on May 18, 1993, allowing the tax and duty- the Secured Area of the SSEZ, are null and void for being contrary to
free sale at retail of consumer goods imported via Clark for Section 12 of RA No. 7227. Said Section clearly provides that
consumption outside the CSEZ. exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special
Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be
On June 10, 1993, the President issued EO No. 97 and subsequently, subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code
EO No. 97-A to Clarifying the Tax and Duty Free Incentive within the and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines.
Subic Special Economic Zone Pursuant to RA No. 7227. EO No. 97-A
On the other hand, insofar as the CSEZ is concerned, the case for an hinder the Legislature from using tax incentives as a tool to pursue RA
invalid exercise of executive legislation is tenable. No. 7227’s policies of developing the SSEZ into a self-sustaining entity
While Section 12 of RA No. 7227 expressly provides for the grant of that will generate employment and attract foreign and local investment.
incentives to the SSEZ, it fails to make any similar grant in favor of other
economic zones, including the CSEZ. Tax and duty-free incentives Lastly, on the issue of preferential use of Filipino labor, materials
being in the nature of tax exemptions, the basis thereof should be and goods, the Court held that this Constitutional provision did not
categorically and unmistakably expressed from the language of the intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
statute. Consequently, in the absence of any express grant of tax and investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
duty-free privileges to the CSEZ in RA No. 7227, there would be no economy. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and
legal basis to uphold the questioned portions of two issuances: Section reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
5 of Executive Order No. 80 and Section 4 of BCDA Board Resolution Furthermore, Executive Department, with its subsequent issuance of
No. 93-05-034, which both pertain to the CSEZ. Executive Order Nos. 444 and 303, has already provided certain
measures to prevent that unfair competition.
On the issue on equal protection, it is an established principle of
constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Section 5 of
is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification. Executive Order No. 80 and Section 4 of BCDA Board Resolution No.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinction, (2) be 93-05-034 are hereby declared NULL and VOID and are accordingly
germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing declared of no legal force and effect. All portions of Executive Order
conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. No. 97-A are valid and effective, except the second sentences in
In this case, the Court found that there’s real and substantial distinction paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of said Executive Order, which are hereby
between residents within the secured area and those living within the declared INVALID.
economic zone but outside the fenced-off area. A significant distinction
between the two groups is that enterprises outside the zones maintain
their businesses within Philippine customs territory, while private
respondents and the other duly-registered zone enterprises operate
within the so-called 'separate customs territory. The classification is
also germane to the purpose of RA No. 7227 because its purpose is to
convert the lands formerly occupied by the US military bases into
economic or industrial areas. In furtherance of such objective,
Congress deemed it necessary to extend economic incentives to the
establishments within the zone to attract and encourage foreign and
local investors. The classification, moreover, is not limited to the
existing conditions when the law was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, inasmuch as the law envisioned the former military
reservation to ultimately develop into a self-sustaining investment
center. And, lastly, the classification applies equally to all retailers found
within the 'secured area.

On the issue of unfair competition, the Court held that the mere fact
that incentives and privileges are granted to certain enterprises to the
exclusion of others does not render the issuance unconstitutional for
espousing unfair competition. Said constitutional prohibition cannot
People vs Manantan acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even
jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts.
Facts:
From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54,
"justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth
Revised Election Code. However, Manantan claims that as "justice of
Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-
peace", the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the
appellee. Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of
said section. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding
the First Instance', the words "justice of the peace" were omitted. It
that a justice of peace is within the purview of Section 54.
follows that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the
Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of
peace" in RA 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its
any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the
operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already
national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no
comprehended in the broader term "judge".
classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise
exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part therein,
invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person,
except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a
object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have
peace officer.".
been omitted intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the
Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449
omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar, the
of the Revised Administration Code wherein, "No judge of the First
legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political
province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or
activities. In Section 54, justices of the peace were just called
any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any
"judges". Also, the application of this rule does not proceed from the
candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part
mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a
therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the
reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been
words "justice of peace" was omitted revealed the intention of
omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no
Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its operation.
omission but only substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the
Issue:
only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule
Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the
merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an
Revised Election Code?
aid in determining the meaning of penal laws.
Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its
Held:
purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and
Yes, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly
various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations,
included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because
judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included
the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First
in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass.
Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was
The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously
no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the
applied by CA and lower courts because they were not able to give
enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more
reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of
generic and broader term, "judge.", which includes all kinds of judges.
peace".
A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who,
by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority. This term
includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated questions while
NUEVA ERA VS. MARCOS appealable to it. It ruled that no further appeal of the RTC decision
may be made pursuant to Section 119 of the Local Government Code.
G.R No. 169435 February 27, 2008
However, the SC ruled that the CA erred in declaring that only the
FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Marcos
RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the SP.
passed a resolution claiming a portion of Nueva Era due to the
creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte pursuant to Appeal is a purely statutory right and it cannot be exercised unless it
the description of Marcos' eastern boundaries as stated in the second is expressly granted by law. Nevertheless, the CA can pass upon the
paragraph of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753. Marcos submitted its petition for review precisely because the law allows it. B.P. Blg. 129,
claim to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte. as amended, which is supplemented by Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, gives the CA the authority to entertain appeals of such
Petitioner Nueva Era, contended that its entire land area was an
judgments and final orders rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
ancestral domain of the "tinguians," an indigenous cultural community,
appellate jurisdiction.
which must be protected and therefore must be preserved as part of
Nueva Era. In addition, according to petitioner, Marcos was created
out of the territory of Dingras only and since R.A. No. 3753 specifically
mentioned seven (7) barrios of Dingras to become Marcos, the area
which should comprise Marcos should not go beyond the territory of
said barrios.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of
Nueva Era. On appeal by Marcos, the RTC affirmed the decision of
the SP. Uncontented, Marcos filed a petition for review of the RTC
decision before the CA, which reversed and set aside the decision of
the SP and RTC.
ISSUE: WON THE MODE OF APPEAL ADOPTED BY MARCOS IN
BRINGING THE CASE TO THE CA IS PROPER
RULING: Yes, Marcos correctly appealed the RTC judgment via
petition for review under Rule 42. Under Section 118 (b) of the Local
Government Code, "boundary disputes involving two (2) or more
municipalities within the same province shall be referred for
settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned." The dispute
shall be formally tried by the said sanggunian in case the disputing
municipalities fail to effect an amicable settlement. The SP of Ilocos
validly took cognizance of the dispute between the parties. The
appeal of the SP judgment to the RTC was likewise properly filed by
Marcos before the RTC. The problem, however, lies in whether the
RTC judgment may still be further appealed to the CA. The CA
pronounced that the RTC decision on the boundary dispute was not