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Analytical comparison between BOT, BOOT, and PPP project delivery systems

Conference Paper · January 2011

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 Analytical comparison between BOT, BOOT, and PPP project
delivery systems

Marjan Bashiri
[Link] student of project management in university of Calgary
Marjanb874@[Link]
Shabnam Ebrahimi
[Link] student of project management in university of Calgary
shabnamebrahimee@[Link]
Maryam Fazlali
[Link] student of project management in university of Calgary
fazlalim@[Link]
Seyed Jamshid Hosseini
[Link] student of project management in university of Calgary, expert of National Gas
Company
jam_jam56@[Link]
Narges Jamal
[Link] student of project management in university of Calgary, expert of Oil Pipeline and
Telecommunication Company
nargesjamal@[Link]
Parviz Salehvand
[Link] student of project management in university of Calgary, expert of Oil Pipeline and
Telecommunication Company
[Link]@[Link]
Keywords
BOT, BOOT, PPP, Contract, public sector, private sector
Abstract
Selection of a project delivery system which enhances quality, reduces cost, and
speeds up the project is one of the best ways of optimization and prevention of
wasting national funds. Consequently, it is essential for every owner to select
appropriate project delivery system considering her financial, managerial, and expert
capabilities, as well as level of other parties' commitment to the project to accomplish
the project with best quality, least time, and cost. In this paper, three project delivery
system including BOT, BOOT, and PPP are examined according to their nature,
advantages, disadvantages, scope of application, and an analytical comparison is made
between them. Since, every project is unique and has its own specification, it is
concluded that optimized project delivery system should be selected according to
owner requirements, project specifications and characteristics, environmental
conditions, and project's practical principles.

1
Introduction

Nowadays, major changes are being occurred in the methods of project execution around the world.
Research and experience indicate that selection of best project delivery system can reduce project's
cost and time up to twelve and thirty percent respectively. Therefore, selection of project delivery
system is one of the most important project strategic decisions which will be conducted at the end of
feasibility studies and coincident with making decision about method of project's financial provisions.
Hence, considering this important point and in order to select the appropriate system that best
complies with the owner's and project's requirements, studying and distinguishing different project
delivery systems is necessary.
Project Delivery System, Project delivery system is a general term which describes method of
combination and organization of design, procurement, and construction services of project in addition
to operation, commissioning, and maintenance which can be executed by owner or other parties. In
other words, project delivery system determines sequence of project's processes, contractual
relationships, and area of obligations and commitments of main parties. The main difference between
various types of project delivery system is distribution of project's risks between different parties who
are involving in project [1].

Build Operate Transfer, BOT

In recent years, a growing trend emerged among governments in many countries to solicit
investments for public projects from the private sector. The main reasons for this trend are a shortage
of public funds and a hands-off approach of government agencies. The Build Operate Transfer (BOT)
approach is an option for the government to outsource public projects to the private sector [2].
Background, The first official private facility development under the name “Build Operate Transfer”
was used in Turkey in 1984, by Prime Minister Ozal, as part of an enormous privatization program to
develop new infrastructure [2]. However, the BOT approach was used as early as 1834 with the
development of the Suez Canal. This revenue-producing canal, financed by European capital with
Egyptian financial support, had a concession to design, construct, and operate assigned to the Egyptian
ruler Pasha Muhammad Ali [3]

Definition, In the BOT approach, a private party or concessionaire retains a concession for a fixed
period from a public party, called principal (client), for the development and operation of a public
facility. The development consists of the financing, design and construction of the facility, managing
and maintaining the facility adequately, and making it sufficiently profitable. The concessionaire
secures return of investment by operating the facility and, during the concession period, the
concessionaire acts as owner. At the end of the concession period, the concessionaire transfers the
ownership of the facility free of liens to the principal at no cost [4].

BOT projects are very useful in bidding situations. By implementing these methodologies, the
company or the government can share the risk of the project [5].

BOT projects include a wide array of public facilities with the primary function to serve public needs,
to provide social services and promote economic activity in the private sector. The most common
examples are roads, bridges, water and sewer systems, airports, ports and public buildings [2]. Figure
1 shows stages of BOT projects.

2
 Figure 1: stages of BOT project

Major Participants in BOT Projects

Five major participants are identified in every BOT project.

Principal: The principal is usually a government agency, a local or federal government body that
recognizes the need for a public facility but is unable to financially support the project.

Concessionaire: The concessionaire is the owner of the facility during the concession period and
realizes profits on the initial investment through the usage of the facility.

Investors: Financing is supplied by the private sector and the investors include both shareholders and
lenders.

Contractor: The contractor is responsible for the construction of the project and for hiring
subcontractors, suppliers and consultants.

Operator: The operator is in the concessionaire’s service and manages the operational stage of the
facility [6].

Advantages, The most important advantages of BOT are: utilization of private sector's investment
instead of public sector's, transferring all the risk to private sector, transferring technical knowledge is
one of the most important benefits of this method for developing countries, political resistance in using
private sector is less than other methods because project will owned by the government finally [7].

Disadvantages, These kinds of projects are very complicated from the viewpoint of technical and
financial issues and need high level experts and consultants, increasing expenditures of users in
operation time, contrast between benefits of private sector with public sector.

Risk distribution in BOT, Each sector risk transfer in BOT is shown in the below table.
Table 1: Risk distribution in BOT

Development risks Construction risks Operation risks Financial risks Income risks

1. Tender Risks 1. Completion in time 1. Lack of 1. Repayment 1. Demand for

2. Delays 2. Technology competent 2. Payments the service
3. Environmental 3. Supplier contracts 2. operators from the 2. Competition
law 4. Access to material, energy 3. Lack of 3. lenders 3. Out of date
and transports performanc 4. Rate of services
5. Lack of competent e interest
6. labour 4. Unexpected 5. Currency
7. Permits interruption rates
8. Cost overruns s 6. Inflation
BOOT

There are many factors that make BOOT attractive and suitable for governments as a project
delivery method includes stable political system, predictable and proven legal system, government
support for a project that is also clearly in the public interest, Long term demand, limited competition,
reasonable profits, good cash flows, predictable risk scenarios.
Definition, Build-Own-Operate-Transfer is a founding model and a form of concession in which a
public authority makes an agreement with a private company (concessionaire) to Design Build, Own
and Operate a specific piece of an infrastructure such as power, transport, water, and telecom
industries, within receiving the right to achieve income from the facility under a period of time
(concession period approximately 15-25 years), and later transferring it back into public ownership
through a single organization or consortium (BOOT provider) [8]

The earned income can be based on a variety of arrangements, ranging from a fixed annual fee (flat
rate) to the measured quantity supplied (unit rate) and "Take-or-pay" arrangements are effectively two
part tariffs expressed in a different manner.

The objectives of BOOT’s participants including Government, Special Purpose Company (SPC), the
Contractor, the Lenders, the Operator, and the Sponsors are reducing the capital expenses and
government’s role in build, operation and maintenance of infrastructures, making new jobs for
unemployed citizens and accountable atmosphere for a reliable and appropriate quality, providing
opportunities for a comparative or competitive climate and a sympathetic cost benefit for both parties,
introducing innovative and alternative technology.

Figure 2: typical BOOT consortium [8]

Risk Distribution, To face risk related to “nonrecourse” funding in this model lender would treat the
cash flows of the project as the only source from which loans would be repaid and the project assets as
the only available collateral. In South-Asia region and South-east Asia region technical, financial, and
political risks (more crucial respectively) were experienced in BOOT projects conducted [9].

Practical Implications, As the infrastructure projects need large investment and long time period, the
risks for investor is also comparatively more. Thus investor always requires government support
including perfect law and regulations system, guarantees, develop strong domestic capital, ensure easy
and speedy processing of the project, fair sharing of risks between both parties, and provide realistic
incentives, adequate returns and protection of the investment [10, 11].

Advantages, This method of founding includes could be beneficial for public and private sectors such
as: strong financial incentives for the BOOT operator, transferring construction and long-term
operating risks onto the BOOT provider, risk mitigation through the involvement of multiple
participants, increase the project certainty and early interest recovering through involving a BOOT
operator, encouraging maximum innovation allowing to have the most efficient designs, high
accountability for the asset design, construction and service delivery due to recover the expenditures
and, enhancing BOOT operators and project’s management knowledge through experience, minimal
costs of company structuring matters.

Disadvantages, Moreover the defects of this model are described as: higher cost for the end user due
to the BOOT provider accountability of 100 percent financing and on-going maintenance, negative
reaction of community to private sector involvement, not realizable full benefits of economic
development a sole sourced BOOT provider, time consuming and resource hungry management and
monitoring of the operating contract with the BOOT operators, requirement of a rigorous selection
process in selecting a BOOT partner [10].

Public Private Partnership

The P3 procurement model is unique in that the private sector assumes a major share of the
responsibility for the delivery and the performance of the infrastructure – from designing the concept,
architectural and structural planning to its long-term maintenance. When applied effectively, the P3
model can provide additional value to taxpayers by leveraging the right capabilities to complete the
job on time and on budget, allowing for greater integration of project planning and design and
eliminating major shortfalls around building, construction and maintenance.
Background, Pressure to change the standard model of Public Procurement arose initially from
concerns about the level of public debt, which grew rapidly during the macroeconomic dislocation of
the 1970s and 1980s. In 1992, however, the Conservative government of John Major in the United
Kingdom introduced the private finance initiative (PFI), the first systematic program aimed at
encouraging public-private partnerships. In the 1992 program, the main focus was on reducing the
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement, although, as already noted, the effect on the public accounts
was largely illusory. The Labor Party (UK) government of Tony Blair elected in 1997, persisted with
the PFI sought to shift the emphasis to the achievement of "value for money" mainly through an
appropriate allocation of risk. [12].

Definition, P3 is a service contract between a public authority and a private sector concessionaire,
where the public authority pays the concessionaire to deliver infrastructure and related services,
Typically, the concessionaire, who builds the infrastructure asset, is financially responsible for its
condition and performance throughout the asset lifetime, or the duration of the agreement [13], or it
describes a government service or private business venture which is funded and operated through a
partnership of government and one or more private sector companies. These schemes are sometimes
referred to as PPP, P3 or P3 [12]. Stages of P3 are indicated in theFigure 3.

Figure 3: Stages of P3 method

Advantages, P3 main features and benefits are, Delivers value for money, Engages in a competitive
process to achieve the best project for the best cost, Transfers appropriate risks, Establishes
performance standards and payment mechanisms, Maintains government involvement to oversee
public interest, improve project delivery, better project discipline, reduce scope creep, faster
procurement [14].

Disadvantages, Having disproportionately high costs associated with their implementation, both for
the sponsoring government entity and for the private sector entities, improving the quality and clarity
of tender documents, particularly with respect to the output specifications is required, Sometimes,
there are not sufficient numbers of experienced private contractors to create the competitive tension
required to achieve the best value for money, PPPs carry an implicit government guarantee and
therefore should be priced as government risk This appears to be a philosophical objection about the
line between what is privately provided and what the state should provide [12]. Moreover, non-
complete contracts and uncertainty over a long horizon are other P3 challenges.

Risk distribution in P3, Risk transfer in P3 is deemed in the Table 2 and responsibilities of each
sector are indicated in Figure 4.
Table 2: risk distribution in P3

Public Sector Shared or Deal Private Sector

Specific

4. Legislative Change 1. Environmental 1. Design

5. First Nations 2. Demand 2. Construction Costs
6. Land Acquisition Growth 3. Industrial Relations
7. Force Majeure 3. Energy Costs 4. Maintenance
8. Site Geotech 4. Schedule 5. Permitting
6. Commissioning
 Figure 4: public and private sector responsibilities

Analytical comparison

The greatest advantage of BOT for the government is the subcontracting of the majority of the risks
to the private sector, with the latter willing to finance and assume risks in the development of a public
facility. At the end of the concession period, the government will inherit a well-operated project
without investing public funds and with little risks. A consequence of not investing its own money is
that the project can take place even if the government’s budget is limited. The finance is obtained by
private organizations and the execution of the project is independent of the financial planning of the
government.
Furthermore, because the design, development, and construction are all the responsibilities of a single
party, the concessionaire, the facility should be more effective and efficient [6].

BOOT versus BOT, The definition of BOOT and BOT is very close together and the only difference
is the ownership of facilities in BOOT and because of this, quality of the work is vital to private.
BOOT is more efficient because the ownership of facilities prepare a better environment for
management. The BOOT contracts have the tendency to work well when the purpose of the project is
to offer a service, but if the aim is to improve a service or make more efficient a system, this modality
is not recommended. These methodologies increment the complexity of the financial study.

P3 versus BOT & BOOT, In PPP, private sector has a role as engineer or constructor. Ownership,
operation and financing are the public role. On the other hand a pure private is responsible for all
matter. In BOOT final owner is public, but concession for a long period of time (25-30 year) is
regarded to private.

The ownership shifts from public to private as we move from PPP to BOOT.

Also private sector accepts more risk and preparing capital investment in BOOT/BOT.
Clear law and regulation and Stable political and economical environment is an important factor that
effect BOOT/BOT project more than PPP, The degree of involvement in BOOT/BOT is restricted.
The advantage of this, is releasing from project jobs and disadvantage is low control of government on
project. Britain vs. turkey is a good example. Crises in political relation of two countries caused the
British party leave project dam building in turkey and because Turkish government was not involved
with project document, they were unable to continue the project.

Comparison between these three project delivery system based on some important criteria and aspects
is briefed in Table 3.
Table 3: brief comparison between methods

Comparison aspects

Method Risk Public Duration involvement investment Cost for end efficiency
support period user

BOT 90% by vital Long term Less public 70-100% by Higher cost Medium-
private project (20- involvement private sector for end user high
sector 30)

BOOT 90% by vital Long term Less public 70-100% by Higher cost high
private project involvement private sector for end user
sector (30+)

P3 90% by Not more Short term More public Lower by lower cost for high
public important project involvement private sector end user
sector

The spectrum of fully government venture to complete private sector initiative is indicated in the next
figure which distinguishes each of P3 models position in respect of its closeness to each of private or
government sector. Moreover, in the following table risks versus rewards of all of them is compared.

Figure 5: PPP Models, Traditional Investment Responsibility

Table 4: Risks versus Rewards

Type of PPP Design and Contract BOT Lease Joint BOOT BOO
Model Build License Agreements Venture

Degree of Risk X X XX XX XXX XXXX XXXX

Degree of       

Reward 

Conclusion and recommendations

There is a wide range of contractual forms for PPP based on risk allocation. Risk to private sector
increases in BOT and BOOT.
Previous experiences show that there is significant potential in attracting investment from the private
sector, but successful PPP profoundly depends on planning actions prior to implementation. PPP
should be carefully planned and presented based upon simple, transparent and strategic principles. The
role of a legal and regulatory framework for PPPs is vital to its success. PPP policies are important as
a starting point for the PPP process. Consequently, governments need to be the driving force behind
the creation and implementations of PPP policies. Trust alone is not sufficient for the success of PPPs.
Governments have an important role in assuming leadership, promoting transparency and enforcing
laws. Successful PPPs are those that clearly delineate the responsibilities of each party, while also
allocating risks to the party best able to manage them. Thus they require carefully designed, well-
written contracts, and close monitoring or regulation. Governments contemplating PPPs should
consider the technical, financial, economic, and legal feasibility of a project while seeking to match
government goals with investor interest. PPP relationships are difficult to design, implement and
operate. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the risk of remaining locked-in an inefficiently designed
contractual arrangement is high.

Recommendations:
 Governmental sector should develop tools and methods that could accurately analyse the
complex reality of PPP projects.
 There is a need for capacity-building and education within governmental institutions on the
benefits of PPP
 It is better that government sectors provide incentives to the private sector by compensating
private firms for proposals. Private firms need to be reassured that their novel ideas and
proposals will not be exploited and that they will have a chance to provide a return on their
creativity
 The role of the private sector in creating and implementing PPPs needs to be clearly defined
 If there is not a complete feasibility study, please do not use PPP.
  Co-operation between the public and private sectors can be a powerful incentive for
improving the quality and efficiency of public services, and a mean of public infrastructure
financing.
 Governments set up a specialized unit to define and implement the country-specific BOT/PPP
policy, with a global approach designed to ensure horizontal co-ordination between the
various governmental departments and public bodies involved.
 The quantity and quality of general information to all bidders of BOT/PPP projects be
improved in order to minimize the necessity of bidders making their own costly technical
investigations.
 Governments carefully select the payment mechanism and – where necessary – guarantee
sufficient financing and / or modest subsidy in order to make feasible projects.
 Risks of BOT/PPP projects should be borne by the party which is in the best position to assess
and influence the probability and financial impact of its occurrence as well as to manage and
bear the consequences of its materialization.
 Value for money and the evaluation of overall expected efficiency should be determined when
choosing a PPP approach and when deciding which of the available models is best suited for
the case at hand.

 The agencies in BOT/PPP projects review and extend their political risk cover program in
terms of scope and volume in order to adapt their products to the specific requirements for
such projects.
 Evaluation criteria should be made clear in the tender documents of BOT/PPP contracts
beforehand.
 Governments should take adequate steps to reduce currency risks to facilitate implementation
of BOT/PPP projects.
 Since the private sector is guided by profit motives, PPP’s may not be suitable for sectors
where public safety is a major concern, operating is expensive, marketability of services is
low. Accordingly, the most optimal and commonly observed areas for private sector
participation are water and waste, roads, bridges and tunnels, telecommunications.

After examining three project delivery systems, what emerges from the observation of currently
adopted schemes is that each PPP arrangement should be designed and adapted to the specific
characteristics of the asset at stake, as well as to the peculiar abilities of all partners involved in the
project. Each of these arrangements offers various and wide range of services to the involved parties.
Therefore, in order to guarantee value for money, the relative strengths and weaknesses of each PPP
scheme should be considered. Depending on the sector of application, some models are better suited
than others in delivering targeted outputs and in ensuring accurate risk management. Choosing the
wrong model or inaccurately evaluating the risk management capacities of each party may have
extremely costly consequences and a negative impact on public accounts.

References:
1- Thomas, S. M, measuring the impacts of delivery system on project performance, Construction
Industry Institute, 2003.

2- Prof. Drs. Ir. Sebastiaan C.M. Menheere, P. S, Case Studies On Build Operate Transfer. Delft,The
Netherlands, Delft University of Technology, 1996.
 3- Argyris G. Kagiannas, K. D., The role of Build Operate Transfer in promoting, Athens: National
Technical University of Athens, December 2003.

4- Verhoeven, L., BOT in netherlands, university of technology, Delft, Netherlands, 1997.

5- Valencia, L., Financing methods in project management and its relevance in succeed of a project.

6- Menheere, C. P., Case studies on Build, Operation, and Transfer, 1996.

7- Kumaraswamy, M. Z., Governmental role in BOT- led infrastructure development, International

Journal of Project Management, 2001, 195-205.

8- Arndt, R. H., Is build-own-operate-transfer a solution to local government’s infrastructure funding

problems? Victoria, Australia, The University of Melbourne.

9- Low, I. M. Mega Projects in Transport and Development:Background in Australian Case Studies,

City Link Motorway Expansion, Melbourne: Australasian Centre for the Governance and Management
of Urban Transport (GAMUT), The University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia (an initiative of
the Volvo Research and Educational Foundations), December 2006.

10- Marcus Jefferies, R. G., Critical success factors of the BOOT procurement system: reflections
from the Stadium Australia case study. Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management,
2002, 352-361.

11- Pakkala, P., Innovative Project Delivery Methods for Infrastructure. Helsinki, Finnish Road
Enterprise, 2002.

12- Wikipedia, t. f. (2010, May 26). Public–private partnership. Retrieved May 31, 2010, from
Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia:
[Link]

13- Canada, P. (2010, may-June). P3 Canada Fund. Retrieved May 30, 2010, from public-private
partnerships Canada:
[Link]

14- Peter Owles, P. B., Public Private Partnerships and New Zealand Land Transport Projects, 2010.
Retrieved May 31, 2010, from conferenz: [Link]
partnerships-and-new-zealand-land-transport-projects.

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