PROPERTY - FIRST SET OF CASES Pagulayan's claim of ownership over the

subject properties on the ground of the latter's

FLORENCIA ARJONILLO, [Link] alleged lack of financial capability to
PAGULAYAN purchase the land and erect a building
Facts: thereon
Avelardo Cue(Cue) died single with no Though it has been held that placing a parcel
surviving descendants or ascendants but was of land under the mantle of the Torrens system
survived by his nieces and nephews. On 21 does not mean that ownership thereof can no
June 1989, they executed an extra judicial longer be disputed,this Court cannot ignore
settlement of the estate of Cue. According to the fact that Arjonillo, together with her co-
the heirs of Cue, the decedent acquired the heirs, failed to discharge the burden of proving
properties during his lifetime. Lot 999-B-3-B, their claim by a preponderance of evidence
however, is registered in the name of Demetria as required under the law. Based on the
Pagulayan(Pagulaya). foregoing, we find no persuasive argument in
Some of the heirs of Cue, including Arjonillo, the instant petition that will convince us to
instituted Civil Case No. 4778 with the RTC for overturn the assailed judgment of the
"Reivindicacion. They alleged that although appellate court.
the property was registered in the name of
Pagulayan, it was Cue who purchased it using Pablo C. Hidalgo, Petitionervs. Sonia Velasco,
his own funds. On the other hand, Pagulayan Respondent
alleged that she acquired the property from Gr No. 202217
Spouses Chua for and in consideration of April 25, 2018
₱20,000.00 which was acknowledged to have
been received in full by the vendors as
evidenced by the deed of absolute sale Facts:At controversy is the possession of a
executed. Three Hundred Fifty-Two (352) square meters
The RTC rendered a decision declaring that piece of residential land in Brgy. Santa Lucia,
Pagulayan is not the rightful owner of the Municipality of Narvacan, Province of Ilocos
subject property and, consequently, ordered Sur, denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 77.
the partition of the subject lot and building
among the heirs of Cue. Petitioner claims that in year 2000 its previous
The CA, reversed and set aside the RTC owner, the late Juana H. Querubin, executed
decision and dismissed the case, the CA found a Deed of Donation in his favor, conveying
that petitioners failed to discharge the burden three (3) parcels of land unto him, including
of proving their allegation that the properties in Cadastral Lot No. 77; consequently, Tax
dispute form part of the estate of Cue. Declaration No. 92-001-00987 was issued in his
name.
Issue:
Whether or not the disputed properties Sometime in January 2005, petitioner visited
belong to Cue Cadastral Lot No. 77 and saw, to his surprise,
that herein respondent Sonia
HELD: Velasco (respondent) was in possession of the
Arjonillo and her co-heirs claim that the property. He sent several letters demanding
subject properties were owned by their that she vacate; the last demand letter was
predecessor, Cue. They sought to recover its dated 9 January 2006. Respondent replied. In
full possession from Pagulayan by filing an a letter dated 2 February 2006, she informed
accion reivindicatoria before the RTC. It is then petitioner that per the instructions of one
incumbent upon them to convince the court Josefina Reintegrado Baron, whom she
by competent evidence that the subject claimed was the property's owner and from
properties form part of Cue's estate because in whom she derived her rights, she was not to
order to successfully maintain actions for allow petitioner to take its possession.
recovery of ownership of a real property, the
complainants must prove the identity of the On 8 December 2006, petitioner filed before
land and their title thereto as provided under the MCTC, a complaint for Unlawful Detainer
Article 434 of the Civil Code. with Damages against respondent. In her
Rather than dispensing with their burden of Answer, respondent contended, in the main,
proof as required under the law, Arjonillo and that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the
her co-heirs concentrated on attacking Complaint for Unlawful Detainer with
Damages, and raised the additional defenses, the termination of the latter's right of
to wit: first, that Josefina Reintegrado Baron possession;
had not been impleaded as party 3. That thereafter, the defendant remained in
defendant; second, that the ejectment possession of the property and deprived the
complaint was not compliant with the one- plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
year filing period for unlawful detainer cases; 4. That within one year from the last demand
and, third, that petitioner was guilty of laches. on defendant to vacate the property, the
The MCTC ruled against respondent, thus plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
elevating the case to RTC. The RTC rendered These averments are jurisdictional and must
decision in respondent’s favor saying that appear on the face of the [Link]
petitioner had failed to aver in the Complaint demonstrable on its face, the subject
for Unlawful Detainer with Damages certain complaint fails to aver, at the very least, the
jurisdictional elements as to qualify the first and the second recitals. We thus agree
complaint as an unlawful detainer suit. For with both the RTC and the CA that it fails to
instance, he failed to aver that respondent satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of an
had held possession of Cadastral Lot No. 77 by action for unlawful detainer, following which,
virtue of an express or implied contract that the MCTC could not exercise jurisdiction over
later expired or [Link], it.
petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the
CA. The CA agreed with the R TC that The bare allegation of petitioner that
the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the "sometime in May, 2007" she discovered that
complaint and quoting: [T]he allegations in the the defendants have entered the subject
complaint failed to make out a case for property and occupied the same," as correctly
unlawful detainer. It clearly did not contain found by the MCTC and CA, would show that
any averment of fact that would substantiate respondents entered the land and built their
petitioner's claim that he permitted or tolerated houses thereon clandestinely and without
the occupation of the property by the petitioner's consent, which facts are
respondent. The complaint made out by the constitutive of forcible entry, not unlawful
petitioner is for forcible entry which the MCTC [Link] likewise agree with the conclusion
cannot duly take cognizance of because that the MCTC would still not be able to validly
there is no statement in the complaint as to exercise jurisdiction over the subject complaint
when the respondent entered into the even if it were to be treated as an action for
premises of the land. Hence, petition for review forcible entry.
in Supreme Court.
The one-year period within which to bring an
Issue: Whether or not the ejectment case be action for forcible entry is generally counted
granted. from the date of actual entry on the land,
except that when the entry is through stealth,
Ruling: The ejectment complaint is dismissed. the one-year period is counted from the time
plaintiff learned thereof.
In ejectment complaints, such allegations must
correspond to the classes of actions defined In the present case, petitioner discovered
and provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the respondent's entry "Sometime on January
Rules of Court, namely forcible entry and 2005."Hence, he had until January 2006 within
unlawful detainer. which to file the necessary ejectment suit. He
filed the present complaint over a year later,
The complaint at bar identifies itself as an on 8 December 2006.
unlawful detainer suit.
In Cabrera v. Getaruela,the Court held that a Roger V. Navarro, Petitioner,
complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action Vs.
for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: Hon. Jose L. Escobido, Presiding Judge, Rtc
Branch 37, Cagayan De Oro City, And Karen T.
1. That initially, the possession of the property Go, Doing Business Under The Name Kargo
by the defendant was by contract with or by Enterprises, Respondents.
tolerance of the plaintiff;
2. That eventually, such possession became Facts:
illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of Private respondent (Karen Go) files a
complaint with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of replevin against petitioner (Navarro) for Ruben Manalang, Carlos Manalang,
the seizure of 2 motor vehicles under lease Concepcion Gonzales And Luis Manalang,
agreement. Petitioner maintains among others Petitioners, Vs. Bienvenido And Mercedes
in the case at bar that the complaints were Bacani, Respondents.
premature because no prior demand was
made on him to comply with the provisions of FACTS:
the lease agreements before the complaints Petitioners were co-owners for lot in
for replevin were filed. question and caused a relocation and
Issue: verification survey which showed that
WON prior demand is a condition respondents had encroached on a portion of
precedent to an action for a writ of replevin. said lot. When the respondents refused to
vacate the encroached portion and to
Held: surrender peaceful possession thereof despite
No. Petitioner erred in arguing that prior demands, the petitioners commenced this
demand is required before an action for a writ action for unlawful detainer.
of replevin is filed since we cannot liken a MTC dismissed on the ground of lack of
replevin action to an unlawful detainer. jurisdiction. RTC reversed the decision of the
For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the MTC and remanded case on appeal. MTC
applicant must do is to file an affidavit and ultimately dismissed case. Another appeal to
bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the RTC was made. RTC ordered the petitioners to
Rules, which states: conduct a relocation survey to determine their
Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond. allegation of encroachment, and also heard
The applicant must show by his own the testimony of the surveyor. The RTC then
affidavit or that of some other person who reversed the MTC’s decision.
personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of Issue:
the property claimed, particularly describing Whether or not the action for unlawful
it, or is entitled to the possession thereof; detainer proper.
(b) That the property is wrongfully
detained by the adverse party, alleging the Ruling:
cause of detention thereof according to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief; CA correctly held that a boundary
(c) That the property has not been dispute must be resolved in the context of
distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a “accionreivindicatoria”, not an ejectment
fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of case. The boundary dispute is not about
execution or preliminary attachment, or possession, but encroachment, that is, whether
otherwise placed under custodialegis, or if so the property claimed by the defendant
seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A
custody; and boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily
(d) The actual market value of the under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the
property. proceedings under which are limited to
The applicant must also give a bond, unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In
executed to the adverse party in double the unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully
value of the property as stated in the affidavit withholds the possession of the premises upon
aforementioned, for the return of the property the expiration or termination of his right to hold
to the adverse party if such return be such possession under any contract, express or
adjudged, and for the payment to the implied. The defendant’s possession was lawful
adverse party of such sum as he may recover at the beginning, becoming unlawful only
from the applicant in the action. because of the expiration or termination of his
The SC held that there is nothing in the right of possession. In forcible entry, the
afore-quoted provision which requires the possession of the defendant is illegal from the
applicant to make a prior demand on the very beginning, and the issue centers on which
possessor of the property before he can file an between the plaintiff and the defendant had
action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand the prior possession de facto.
is not a condition precedent to an action for a The MTC dismissed the action because
writ of replevin. it did not have jurisdiction over the case. The
dismissal was correct. It is fundamental that the
allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought by the complaint
determine the nature of the action and the Ruling:
court that has jurisdiction over the action. To
be clear, unlawful detainer is an action filed by We agree that ownership carries the right of
a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person possession, but the possession contemplated
against whom the possession of any land or by the concept of ownership is not exactly the
building is unlawfully withheld after the same as the possession in issue in a forcible
expiration or termination of the right to hold entry case.
possession by virtue of any contract, express or Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to
implied. possession de facto, or... actual or material
However, the allegations of the possession, and not possession flowing out of
petitioners’ complaint did not show that they ownership; these are different legal concepts
had permitted or tolerated the occupation of for which the law provides different remedies
the portion of their property by the for recovery of possession.
respondents; or how the respondents’ entry The word "possession" in forcible entry suits
had been effected, or how and when the refers to nothing more than prior physical
dispossession by the respondents had started. possession or possession de facto, not
All that the petitioners alleged was the possession de jure. Title is not the issue and the
respondents’ “illegal use and occupation” of absence of it "is not a ground for the courts to
the property. As such, the action was not withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment
unlawful detainer. case."Thus, in a forcible entry case, "a party
who can prove prior possession can recover
Nenita Quality Foods Corporation V. such possession even against the owner
Crisostomo Galabo Adelaida Galabo, Gr No. himself.
174191, 2013-01-30
Paul P. Gabriel, Jr., Ireneo C. Calwag, Thomas
Facts: L. Tingga-An, And The Heirs Of Juliet B.
Respondents are the heirs of DonatoGalabo. Pulkera, Petitioners, Vs.
Donato obtained Lot 102, a portion of the Carmeling Crisologo, Respondent.
Arakaki Plantation. When the Board of
Liquidators (BOL) took over the administration Facts:
of the Arakaki Plantation Lot No. 102 was not Crisologo allegedthat she was the registered
included. The respondents, however, continue owner of two parcels of andcovered by two
to possess, occupy and cultivate Lot No. 102. certificates of title. She discovered that
When NQFC opened its business in Davao City, petitioners unlawfully occupied her properties.
it allegedly offered to buy Lot No. 102. Donato Petitioners countered that the titles of
denied and put up "Not For Sale" and "No Crisologo were declared void by the Supreme
Trespassing" signs on the property. Court because she failed to comply with the
Crisostomo Galabo, son of Donato, fenced off conditions for thevalidation of said titles and
the entire perimeter of Lot No. 102 and built his that petitioners had been in open,
house on it. Respondents received a letter actual,exclusive, notorious, uninterrupted, and
from Santos Nantin demanding that they continuous possession of the subject land, in
vacate Lot No. 102. The respondents denied good faith.
this claim and maintained that they had been Issue:
occupying Lot No. 102, which the BOL itself Who between petitioners and respondent
recognized. NQFC's workers, with armed Crisologo have a better right of possession
policemen entered by force Lot No. 102 to over the subject parcels of land.
fence it.
Crisostomo received a letter from NQFC's Ruling:
counsel demanding that he remove his house The Court holds that Crisologo has a better
from Lot No. 102. NQFC subsequently removed right.
the existing fence and cut down various trees AccionPubliciana: its nature and purpose
that the respondents had planted on the Also known as accionplenaria de posesion,
property. accionpubliciana is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of
Issue: possession of realty independently of title. It
Whether or not there has been prior physical refers to an ejectment suit filed after the
possession of NQFC Lot No. 102. expiration of one year from the accrual of the
cause of action or from the unlawful case is a suit against the State and is therefore
withholding of possession of the realty. valid.
The objective of the plaintiffs in
accionpubliciana is to recover possession only, Issue:
not ownership. When parties, however, raise 1) Whether or not a replevin may be instituted
the issue of ownership, the court may pass for recovery of property under custodia legis.
upon the issue to determine who between the 2) Whether or not replevin in this case is a suit
parties has the right to possess the property. against the State
This adjudication, nonetheless, is not a final
and binding determination of the issue of
ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving
Ruling:
the issue of possession, where the issue of
ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of 1) No! Replevin cannot be issued to recover a
possession. The adjudication of the issue of property lawfully taken by virtue of legal
ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an process and considered in the custody of the
action between the same parties involving title law.
to the property. The adjudication, in short, is
not conclusive on the issue of ownership. 2) Yes! This suit is not valid because the State
The respondent’s certificates of title give her may not be sued without its consent or when
the better right to possess the subject parcels the public official acted in bad faith in the
of land discharge of his duties. It has been established
As the lawful possessor, the respondent has the that the DENR acted within its authority.
right to eject the petitioners. Hence, its action is the action of the State.
The testimonial and documentary evidence on
record prove that Crisologo has a preferred
claim of possession over that of petitioners. It G.R. No. 137705 (August 22, 2000)
cannot be denied that she bought the subject SERG'S PRODUCTS, INC., And SERGIO T.
properties from the previous owner in 1967, GOQUIOLAY, [Link] LEASING AND FINANCE,
which was why the transfer certificates of title INC.,
were subsequently issued in her name. Records
further show that she has been paying the Facts:
realty taxes on the said properties since “After agreeing to a contract stipulating
[Link] importantly, there is no question that a real or immovable property be
that she offered to sell to petitioners the considered as personal or movable, a party is
portions of the subject properties occupied by estopped from subsequently claiming
them. Hence, she deserves to be respected otherwise. Hence, such property is a proper
and restored to her lawful possession as subject of a writ of replevin obtained by the
provided in Article 539 of the New Civil Code. other contracting party.”
On February 13, 1998, respondent PCI
Calub V. Ca Leasing and Finance, Inc. filed with the RTC-
QC a complaint for a sum of money with an
Replevin cannot be issued to recover a application for a writ of replevin docketed as
property lawfully taken by virtue of legal Civil Case No. [Link] March 6, 1998,
process and considered in the custody of the upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing,
law. A replevin case against the State, without respondent judge issued a writ of replevin
its consent, cannot prosper. directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the
machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing
Facts:
after 5 days and upon the payment of the
Petitioner from DENR apprehended two necessary [Link] March 24, 1998, in
vehicles carrying illegally sourced lumber and implementation of said writ, the sheriff
thereafter confiscated them. The owners of the proceeded to petitioner’s factory, seized one
vehicles filed an action for replevin to recover machinery with the word that he would return
the vehicles. They won in the trial court on the for the other machineries.
ground that petitioner did not act in Petitioners filed a motion for special
accordance with the law. So petitioner protective order invoking the power of the
appeals on the ground that the replevin in this court to control the conduct of its officers and
amend and control its processes, praying for a
directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of
the writ of [Link] motion was opposed The Court has held that contracting
by PCI Leasing on the ground that the parties may validly stipulate that a real
properties were still personal and therefore still property be considered as personal.18After
subject to seizure and a writ of replevin. agreeing to such stipulation, they are
In their Reply, petitioners asserted that consequently estopped from claiming
the properties sought to be seized were otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a
immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from
Code, the parties’ agreement to the contrary denying the truth of any material fact found
notwithstanding. They argued that to give [Link] the present case, the Lease
effect to the agreement would be prejudicial Agreement clearly provides that the machines
to innocent third parties. They further stated in question are to be considered as personal
that PCI Leasing was estopped from treating property. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the
these machineries as personal because the Agreement reads as follows:
contracts in which the alleged agreement "12.1 The PROPERTY is, and shall
were embodied were totally sham and at all times be and remain,
farcical. personal property
Petitioners contend that the subject notwithstanding that the
machines used in their factory were not proper PROPERTY or any part thereof
subjects of the Writ issued by the RTC, because may now be, or hereafter
they were in fact real property. become, in any manner affixed
or attached to or embedded in,
Issue: or permanently resting upon, real
Whether or not the aforementioned property or any building thereon,
property is subject to writ of replevin? or attached in any manner to
what is permanent."
Held: Clearly then, petitioners are estopped
Yes, the property is subject to writ of from denying the characterization of the
replevin. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides subject machines as personal property. Under
that writs of replevin are issued for the recovery the circumstances, they are proper subjects of
of personal property only. Section 3 thereof the Writ of [Link] should be stressed,
reads: however, that our holding -- that the machines
should be deemed personal property pursuant
"SEC. 3. Order. -- Upon the filing to the Lease Agreement – is good only insofar
of such affidavit and approval of as the contracting parties are concerned.
the bond, the court shall issue an
order and the corresponding writ NOTES: “After agreeing to a contract stipulating
of replevin describing the that a real or immovable property be
personal property alleged to be considered as personal or movable, a party is
wrongfully detained and estopped from subsequently claiming
requiring the sheriff forthwith to otherwise. Hence, such property is a proper
take such property into his subject of a writ of replevin obtained by the
custody." other contracting party.”

In the present case, the machines that BA Finance Corporation v. Hon. Court of
were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were Appeals and Roberto M. Reyes G.R. No.
placed by petitioners in the factory built on 102998,July 05, 1996
their own land. Indisputably, they were
essential and principal elements of their Facts:
chocolate-making industry. Hence, although
each of them was movable or personal Spouses Manahan executed a promissory
property on its own, all of them have become note binding themselves to pay Carmasters,
"immobilized by destination because they are Inc., P83,080.00 in 36 monthly installments. To
essential and principal elements in the secure payment, the Manahan spouses
industry." In that sense, petitioners are correct executed a deed of chattel mortgage over a
in arguing that the said machines are real, not motor vehicle, a Ford Cortina. Carmasters later
personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of assigned the promissory note and the chattel
the Civil Code. mortgage to petitioner BA Finance
Corporation with the conformity of the nothing more than the right of possession. The
Manahans. When the latter failed to pay the person in possession of the property sought to
installments, petitioner sent demand letters. be replevied is ordinarily the proper and only
The demands not having been heeded, necessary party defendant, and the plaintiff is
petitioner filed a complaint for replevin with not required to so join as defendants other
damages against the spouses, as well as persons claiming a right on the property but
against a John Doe, praying for the recovery not in possession thereof. The Rules of Court
of the vehicle with an alternative prayer for the allows an application for the immediate
payment of a sum of money should the possession of the property but the plaintiff must
vehicle not be returned. The lower court issued show that he has a good legal basis, i.e., a
a writ of [Link] service of summons upon clear title thereto, for seeking
the spouses Manahan was caused to be such interim possession.
served by petitioner. The original of the
summons had the name and the signature of Where the right of the plaintiff to the possession
private respondent Roberto M. Reyes of the specific property is so conceded or
indicating that he received a copy of the evident, the action need only be maintained
summons and the complaint. Petitioner, against him who so possesses the property. The
through its Legal Assistant, issued a certification court, in an earlier case held that persons
to the effect that it had received from Orson R. having a special right of property in the goods
Santiago, the deputy sheriff of the RTC the the recovery of which is sought, such as a
Ford Cortina seized from private respondent chattel mortgagee, may maintain an action
Roberto M. Reyes, the John Doe referred to in for replevin therefor. Where the mortgage
the complaint, in Sorsogon, Sorsogon. authorizes the mortgagee to take possession of
Consequently, the lower court came out with the property on default, he may maintain an
an order of seizure.A few months later, the action to recover possession of the mortgaged
court issued an order dismissing the caste for chattels from the mortgagor or from any
failure to prosecute and further ordering the person in whose hands he may find them.
plaintiff to return the property seized with all its
accessories to defendant John Doe in the A chattel mortgagee, unlike a pledgee, need
person of Roberto M. Reyes. not be in, nor entitled to, the possession of the
property unless and until the mortgagor
The order was recalled, but summons still could defaults and the mortgagee thereupon seeks
not be served on the Manahans. So, the trial to foreclose thereon. Since the mortgagee’s
court dismissed the case and ordered that the right of possession is conditioned upon the
vehicle be returned to Reyes. On appeal, the actual fact of default which itself may be
CA denied petitioner’s motion for controverted, the inclusion of other parties, like
reconsideration. Hence this petition. the debtor or the mortgagor himself, may be
required in order to allow a full and conclusive
Issue: determination of the case. When the
mortgagee seeks a replevin in order to effect
Whether or not a mortgagee can maintain an the eventual foreclosure of the mortgage, it is
action for replevin against any possessor of the not only the existence of, but also the
object of a chattel mortgage even if the latter mortgagor’s default on, the chattel mortgage
were not a party to the mortgage. that, among other things, can properly uphold
the right to replevy the property. The burden to
Ruling: establish a valid justification for that action lies
with the plaintiff. An adverse possessor, who is
No. Replevin is both a form of principal not the mortgagor, cannot just be deprived of
remedy and of a provisional relief. It may refer his possession, let alone be bound by the terms
either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the of the chattel mortgage contract, simply
possession of personal chattels being because the mortgagee brings up an action
wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by for replevin.
another, or to the provisional remedy that
would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing SECOND SET OF CASES
during the pendency of the action and hold
it pendente lite. The action is primarily City of Iloilo v. Judge Legaspi, GR No. 154614
possessory in nature and generally determines
Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of For a writ of possession to issue, only two
Iloilo enacted regulation ordinance granting requirements are required: the sufficiency in
authority to Mayor Mansueto A. Malabor to form and substance of the complaint and the
institute expropriation proceedings on Lot No. required provisional deposit. Section 19 of Rep.
935, registered in the name of Manuela Yusay, Act No. 7160 provides that the local
located at barangay Sto. Niño Norte, Arevalo, government unit may take immediate
Iloilo City. Mayor Malabor wrote the heirs of possession of the property upon the filing of
Manuela Yusay, through Mrs. Sylvia Yusay del the expropriation proceedings and upon
Rosario, Administratrix of the estate of Manuela making a deposit of at least fifteen percent
Yusay, making a formal offer to purchase their (15%) of the fair market value of the property
property known as Cadastral Lot No. 935 with based on its current tax declaration. As long as
an area of 85,320 square meters covered by the expropriation proceedings have been
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-67506 of commenced and the deposit has been made,
the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City for P250 per the local government unit cannot be barred
square meter for the purpose of converting the from praying for the issuance of a writ of
same as an on-site relocation for the poor and possession.
landless residents of the city in line with the
city’s housing development program. With National Transmission Corporation V. Oroville
apparent refusal to sell the property, the city Development Corporation
represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treñas filed an G.R. No. 223366, August 1, 2017
expropriation case based on the Power of
State on Eminent Domain. Upon the strict Facts:
compliance to the governing rules on Reyes and Calingasan owned two
expropriation, the city of Iloilo argued that it is parcels of land located in Cagayan De Oro
entitled to an immediate issuance of a writ of City. In 1983, petitioner National Transmission
possession. Corporation constructed a power transmission
line on said properties. Reyes sold his land to
Issue: one Antonio Navarette who later sold the
Whether the issuance of a writ of possession is same property to Oroville Development
proper. Corporation, which is now covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title. Likewise, Calingasan sold
Ruling: her land to which has also become covered of
Petitioner has the irrefutable right to exercise its Transfer Certificate of Title to Oroville. Thus, in
power of eminent domain. It being a local 1995, Oroville became the registered owner of
government unit, the basis for its exercise is said contested properties, with a total land
granted under Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160, area of 13, 904 square meters traversed by the
to wit: Sec. 19 Eminent Domain. - A existing Tagoloan-Pulangi transmission
local government unit may, through its chief [Link] offered to buy the propertiesfrom
executive and acting pursuant to an the Oroville to be used for the construction of
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent the Abaga-Kirahon 230 kV transmission line in
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare Mindanao. Oroville, through its representative
for the benefit of the poor and the landless, requested to reroute the Abaga-Kirahon kV
upon payment of just compensation, pursuant transmission line because the Tagoloan-
to the provisions of the Constitution and Pulangi 138 kV transmission line is already
pertinent [Link] expropriator may traversing its properties.
immediately enter the property subject of Transco was also informed that Oroville
expropriation proceedings if the following has not been paid just compensation for the
requisites are present:the complaint for construction of the Tagoloan-Pulangi 138 kV
expropriation filed in court issufficient in form transmission line in its property. Transco,
and substance; andthe expropriator must however, refused refused tko reroute the
deposit the amount equivalent to 15% of the proposed Abaga-Kirahon 230 kV transmission
fair market value of the property to be line because it planned to construct the said
expropriated based on its current tax transmission line parallel to the existing
[Link] if the government fails to use Tagoloan-Pulangi 138 kV transmission line. On
the property expropriated for the purpose for April 20, 2007, Oroville filed a complaint for
which it was intended, the landowner has the injunction and damages with prayer for
right to buy-back the same. issuance of a temporary restraining order
against Transco, seeking to enjoin the
construction of the proposed Abaga-Kirahon private respondent The Roman Catholic Bishop
230 kV transmission line. of Bangued, Inc. With the desire to be
exempted from a real estate tax, the latter
issue: filed a petition for declaratory relief on the
Whether there is taking of Oroville’s ground that other than being exempted from
property for purposes of eminent domain in payment of real estate taxes, the Bishop also
1983 asserts that its properties are also "being
actually, directly and exclusively used for
held: religious orcharitable purposes as sources of
YES. The Court ruled that there is taking support for the bishop, the parish priest and his
of the property for purposes of eminent helpers. After conducting a summary hearing,
domain in 1983. The landmark case of respondent Judge Hernando granted the
Republic v. Vda De Castellvi provides an exemption without hearing the side of the
enlightening discourse on the requisites of Province of Abra. The petitioner then filed a
taking. First,the expropriation must enter a motion to dismiss but the same was denied.
private property; Second,the entrance to the Hence, this present petition for certiorari and
private property must be for more than a mandamus alleging denial of procedural due
momentary period; Third, the entry into the process.
private property should be under warrant or
color of legal authority; Fourth, the property Issue: Whether the properties of the church in
must be devoted for public use or otherwise this case is exempt from taxes.
informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
and Fifth,the utilization of the property for Ruling:
public use must be in such a way as to oust the No. They are not tax exempt.
owner and deprive him of all beneficial Respondent Judge Hernando would not
enjoyment of the property. have made an error had he merely compared
The first and fourth requisites are present the provisions of the present Constitution with
in this case. Transco took possession of that appearing in the 1935 Charter on the tax
Oroville’s property in order to construct exemption of "lands, buildings, and
transmission lines to be used in generating improvements." There is a marked difference.
electricity for the benefit of the public. Under the 1935 Constitution: "Cemeteries,
The second requisite is likewise present churches, and parsonages or convents
as there can be no question that the appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings,
construction of transmission lines meant an and improvements used exclusively for
indefinite stay in the property of Oroville. religious, charitable, or educational purposes
Further, Transco’s exercise of its eminent shall be exempt from taxation." The present
domain is pursuant to its authority granted Constitution added "charitable institutions,
under Section 8 of RA 9136 of the Electric mosques, and non-profit cemeteries" and
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001. required that for the exemption of "lands,
Finally, Oroville has been deprived of buildings, and improvements," they should not
the beneficial enjoyment of its property. In only be "exclusively" but also "actually and
several rulings, notably, it has already been "directly" used for religious or charitable
declared that “since the high-tension electric purposes. The Constitution is worded
current passing through the transmission lines differently. The change should not be ignored.
will perpetually deprive the property owners of It must be duly taken into consideration.
the normal use of their lands”. Reliance on past decisions would have
Therefore, it is only just and proper to sufficed were the words "actually" as well as
require NTC to recompensate them for the full "directly" not added. There must be proof
market value of their property. therefore of the actual and direct use of the
lands, buildings, and improvements for religious
Province of Abra vs Judge Hernando, or charitable purposes to be exempt from
The Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. taxation.
There was an allegation of lack of
Facts: jurisdiction and of lack of cause of action,
The Province of Abra sought to tax the which should have compelled the judge to
properties of The Roman Catholic Bishop of accord a hearing to the province rather than
Bangued, Inc. Ancheta, the provincial assessor deciding the case immediately in favor of the
made the tax assessment of the properties of Bishop. Exemption from taxation is not favored
and is never presumed, so that if granted, it landowner should be given just compensation
must be strictly construed against the and an opportunity to be heard.
taxpayer. There must be proof of the actual The danger of such an ordinance is that it
and direct use of the lands, buildings, and makes possible arbitrary discriminations and
improvements for religious (or charitable) abuses in its execution, depending upon no
purposes to be exempted from taxation. conditions or qualifications whatever, other
than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
Republic of the Philippines v. Fajardo authorities as the touchstone by which its
G.R. No. L-12172 validity is to be tested. Fundamental rights
under our government do not depend for their
Facts: existence upon such a slender and uncertain
Fajardo etal. were convicted for violation of thread. Ordinances which thus invest a city
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the council with a discretion which is purely
Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the
having constructed without a permit from the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable
municipal mayor a building that destroys the and invalid. The ordinance should have
view of the public plaza. established a rule by which its impartial
Appellant filed a written request with the enforcement could be secured.
incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building adjacent to their gasoline APO FRUITS CORPORATION And HIJO
station on a parcel of land registered in PLANTATION, INC. Vs. THE HON. COURT OF
Fajardo’s name, located along the national APPEALS And LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
highway and separated from the public plaza
by a creek. The request was denied, for the
reason among others that the proposed Facts:
building would destroy the view or beauty of APO Fruits Corporation, Inc/ (AFC) and
the public plaza. The appellants proceeded Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) were owners of 5
with the construction of the building without a parcels of land, 1338.6 hectares, located in
permit, because they needed a place of San Isidro, Tagum, Davao. On 12 October
residence very badly, their former house 1995, the two voluntarily offered to sell the
having been destroyed by a typhoon and properties to the DAR. DAR offered P86.9
hitherto they had been living on leased Million for AFC’s land and P164.4 Million for
property. HPI’s land with a total of about P251.3 Million.
AFC, HPI, and DAR cannot agree on a price
Issue: Whether the ordinance is a valid hence Compliant for Determination of Just
exercise of eminent domain. Compensation was filed before DAR
Adjudication Board on 14 February 1997. The
Ruling: DARAB failed to render a decision on the
valuation of the land for three years. But
No. The ordinance is null and void. nevertheless, the government, through the
A Municipal Ordinance is unreasonable and Land Bank of the Philippines, deposited P26
oppressive if it operates to permanently Million into AFC’s account and P45 Million into
deprive appellants of the right to use their own HPI’s account as downpayment in 1996. The
property; it then oversteps the bounds of DAR also caused the titling of the land in the
police power without just compensation. We name of the Republic of the Philippines in
do not overlook that the modern tendency is December 1996. Later, titles were given to
to regard the beautification of neighborhoods farmers under the CARP. Due to DARAB’s
as conducive to the comfort and happiness of failure to adjudicate, AFC and HPI filed a
residents. But while property may be regulated complaint for determination of just
in the interest of the general welfare and, in its compensation before the RTC of Davao which
pursuit, the State may prohibit structures rendered a decision in favor of AFC and HPI.
offensive to sight. (Churchill and Tait v. Rafferty, The RTC ruled, based on the reports it
32 Phil., 580), the State may not, under guise of gathered from assessors, that the purchase
police power, permanently divest owners of price should be higher than what was offered
the beneficial use of their property and by DAR; that the purchase price should be at
practically confiscate them solely to preserve P103.33/ sq.m; that DAR is to pay AFC and HPI
or assure the aesthetic appearance of the a total of 1.38 Billion. DAR appealed to the CA,
community. To legally achieve that result, the the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
 of Court. Evergreen is the registered owner of a
Issue: parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate
Whether or not there was just of Title No. PT-114857 (Subject Property).
compensation. Republic-DPWH seeks to expropriate a portion
of the Subject Property covering 173.08 square
Ruling: meters (Subject Premises) which will be used
No, there is no just compensation. AFC’s for a public purpose - the construction of
and HPI’s land were taken in 1996 without just Package 3, Marikina Bridge and Access Road,
compensation. DARAB, an agency of the DAR Metro Manila Urban Transport Integration
which was commissioned by law to determine [Link] on the zonal, industrial
just compensation, sat on the cases for three classification and valuation of the Bureau of
years, which was the reason that AFC and HPI Internal Revenue (BIR) of the real properties on
filed the cases before the RTC. The RTC’s the place where the Subject Property is
finding is to be sustained as it based its ruling situated, the properties have an appraised
on evidence. DAR was given chance to value of ₱6,000.00 per square meter. While
support its ruling on why the purchase price Republic-DPWH offered to acquire the Subject
should be at a lower amount but DAR failed to Premises by negotiated sales Evergreen
present such evidence. To allow the taking of declined this offer. Thus, Republic-DPWH filed a
landowners’ properties, and to leave them complaint for expropriation on 22 March 2004.
empty-handed while government withholds
compensation is undoubtedly oppressive. The The RTCrendered its Decision fixing the
concept of just compensation embraces not just compensation for the Subject Premises at
only the correct determination of the amount ₱25,000.00 per square meter. The RTC directed
to be paid to the owners of the land, but also Republic-DPWH to pay Evergreen the amount
the payment of the land within a reasonable of ₱3,288,520.00, which was the amount due
time from its taking. Without prompt payment, after deducting the deposit made by
compensation cannot be considered “just” Republic-DPWH which had already been
inasmuch as the property owner is being withdrawn by [Link] Republic-DPWH
made to suffer the consequences of being and Evergreen filed their respective Motions for
immediately derived of his land while being Partial Reconsideration but denied. In CA, it
made to wait for a decade or more before increased the amount of just compensation for
actually receiving the amount necessary to the Subject Premises at ₱35,000.00per square
cope with his loss. meter, however, denied the claim of
Just compensation is defined as the full and consequential damages or interest by
fair equivalent of the property taken from its Evergreen. In the SC, both petitionfor review
owner by the expropriator. It has been on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
repeatedly stressed by this Court that the Court.
measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s
loss. The word "just" is used to modify the Issue: Whether or not Evergreen is entitled to
meaning of the word "compensation" to the payment of interest for the Subject
convey the idea that the equivalent to be Premises expropriated by Republic-DPWH.
given for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample. Ruling:

The limit here is that, just compensation “must Yes, evergreen is entitled to legal interest on
not be DELAYED” for the government to the balance of the just compensation. Section
exercise its power of eminent domain. 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides
that "no private property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation." Just
EVERGREEN MANUFACTURING compensation in expropriation cases has been
CORPORATION, [Link] OF THE held to contemplate just and timely payment,
PHILIPPINES, Represented By The DEPARTMENT and prompt payment is the payment in full of
OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, the just compensation as finally determined by
Respondent the courts. Thus, just compensation envisions a
payment in full of the expropriated property.
Absent full payment, interest on the balance
Facts: These are consolidated petitions for would necessarily be due on the unpaid
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules amount. In Republic v. Mupas,we held that
interest on the unpaid compensation
becomes due if there is no full compensation
for the expropriated property, in accordance
with the concept of just compensation. We
held:The reason is that just compensation
would not be "just" if the State does not pay
the property owner interest on the just
compensation from the date of the taking of
the property. Without prompt payment, the
property owner suffers the immediate
deprivation of both his land and its fruits or
income. The owner's loss, of course, is not only
his property but also its income-generating
potential.

Ideally, just compensation should be

immediately made available to the property
owner so that he may derive income from this
compensation, in the san1e manner that he
would have derived income from his
expropriated property.

However, if full compensation is not paid. for

the property taken, then the State must pay for
the shortfall in the earning potential
immediately lost due to the taking, and the
absence of replacement property from which
income can be derived. Interest on the unpaid
compensation becomes due as compliance
withthe constitutional mandate on eminent
domain and as a basic measure of fairness.

Thus, interest in eminent domain cases "runs as

a matter of law and follows as a matter of
course from the right of the landowner to be
placed in as good a position as money can
accomplish, as of the date of taking."