EN BANC

[G.R. No. 58445. April 27, 1989.]

ZAIDA G. RARO , petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION

COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences) , respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR LAW; EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION; OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES;

SICKNESS NOT COVERED THEREIN; POSITIVE PROOF NECESSARY TO BE
COMPENSABLE. — Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation clearly de nes who are entitled. It provides: "SECTION 1. . . . "(b) For the
sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be
the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these rules with the
conditions set therein satis ed; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions." The law, as it now
stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing — that the illness was caused by
employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the
obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The
existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed. In Navalta v.
Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988) this Court
recognized the fact that cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes people
in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a particular form
of cancer is caused by speci c working conditions (e. g. chemical fumes, nuclear
radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot conclude that it was the employment which
increased the risk of contracting the disease.
2. ID.; ID.; OLD WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW DISTINGUISHED FROM
PRESENT SCHEME UNDER THE NEW LABOR CODE. — On January 1, 1975, the
Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel scheme under the new Labor
Code. The new law discarded, among others, the concepts of "presumption of
compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on social security
principles. The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies — the
Government Service Insurance System and Social Security System — under the
Employees' Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible
equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the
employee's right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability. Instead
of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we now have
a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by employers to a trust
fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement.
3. ID.; ID.; NATURE AND PURPOSE OF PRESENT LAW EXPLAINED. — The non-
adversarial nature of employees' compensation proceedings is crucial to an
understanding of the present scheme. There is a widespread misconception that the
poor employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 [Link]
 employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable presumptions. This is
fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if bene ts are
paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins its employees
in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving
a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by employment. It is a
government institution which protects the stability and integrity of the State Insurance
Fund against the payment of non-compensable claims. The employee, this time
assisted by his employer, is required to prove a positive proposition, that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by working conditions. The social insurance
aspect of the present law is the other important feature which distinguishes it from the
old and familiar system. Employees' compensation is based on social security
principles. All covered employers throughout the country are required by law to
contribute xed and regular premiums or contributions to a trust fund for their
employees. Bene ts are paid from this trust fund. At the time the amount of
contributions was being xed, actuarial studies were undertaken. The actuarially
determined number of workers who would probably le claims within any given year is
important in insuring the stability of the trust fund and making certain that the system
can pay bene ts when due to all who are entitled and in the increased amounts xed by
law.
4. ID.; ID.; PREVIOUS DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF "PRESUMPTION OF
COMPENSABILITY" SUPERSEDED. — For the guidance of the administrative agencies
and practicing lawyers concerned, this decision expressly supersedes the decisions in
Panotes v. Employees' Compensation Commission [128 SCRA 473 (1984)]; Mercado v.
Employees' Compensation Commission [127 SCRA 664 (1984)]; Ovenson v.
Employees' Compensation Commission [156 SCRA 21 (1987)]; Nemaria v. Employees'
Compensation Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases with conclusions
different from the instant case.
5. ID.; ID.; COURTS WITHOUT POWER TO LEGISLATE TO INCREASE NUMBER
OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES. — If increased contributions or premiums must be paid
in order to give bene ts to those who are now excluded, it is Congress which should
amend the law after proper actuarial studies. This Court cannot engage in judicial
legislation on such a complex subject with such far reaching implications. We trust that
the public respondents and the Social Security System are continually evaluating the
actuarial soundness of the trust funds they administer. In this way, more types of
cancers and other excluded diseases may be included in the list of covered
occupational diseases. Or legislation may be recommended to Congress either
increasing the contribution rates of employers, increasing bene t payments, or making
it easier to prove entitlement. We regret that these are beyond the powers of this Court
to accomplish.
PARAS, J., dissenting:
1. LABOR LAWS; EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION; OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES;
"BRAIN TUMOR" THOUGH NOT COVERED THEREIN, COMPENSABLE; DOUBTS SHOULD
BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF LABOR. — We nd this petition impressed with merit. While
"brain tumor" is not expressly or speci cally referred to as an occupational disease, and
while admittedly its precise causes are still unknown. We may say that the disease is
akin to "cancer of the brain" and should therefore be regarded as either compensable or
a borderline case. At any rate, the precise work of the petitioner at the Bureau of Mines
and Geo-Sciences consisted of the following: "As Mining Recorder II, to record and le
mining instruments and documents in the Mining Recorder's Section and to type
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 [Link]
 correspondence and other documents pertaining to the same action. It will readily be
seen that her work required at times mental concentration. Whether this is speci cally
causative of brain tumor is of course still unknown but doubts must generally be
resolved in favor whenever compensation for disease is concerned. It would certainly
be absurd to throw upon petitioner the burden of showing that her work either caused
or aggravated the disease, particularly when both the GSIS and ECC profess ignorance
themselves of the causes of the disease. In a case like the present one, even medical
experts have not determined the cause of cancer, and therefore the duty to prove does
not exist for it is absurd for the law to require an impossibility. In the more recent case
of Flaviano Nemaria, Petitioner versus Employees' Compensation Commission and
Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of Education and Culture),
respondents, promulgated October 28, 1989 and following the rule We enunciated in
the Mercado case, We stated: "Thus the requirement that the disease was caused or
aggravated by the employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause can
be determined or proved. Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to
prove the link exist. For certainly, the law cannot demand an impossibility."

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR. , J : p

Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a

source of confusion among the claimants and the government agencies enforcing the
employees' compensation law. The strongly lingering in uence of the principles of
"presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" found in the defunct Workmen's
Compensation Act but expressly discarded under the present compensation scheme
has led to conflict and inconsistency in employees' compensation decisions.
The problem is attributable to the inherent di culty in applying the new principle
of "proof of increased risk." There are two approaches to a solution in cases where it
cannot be proved that the risk of contracting an illness not listed as an occupational
disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions. The one espoused by the
petitioner insists that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary work connection
because the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that working
conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment. On the other hand, the
respondents state that if there is no proof of the required work connection, the disease
is not compensable because the law says so.
The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by
the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional o ce on
March 17, 1975. About four years later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent
headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take sick leaves every now and
then, she sought medical treatment in Manila. She was then a Mining Recorder in the
Bureau. prLL

The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from
brain tumor. By that time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning power had
been lost.
A claim for disability bene ts led by her husband with the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) was denied. A motion for reconsideration was similarly
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 [Link]
 denied. An appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission resulted in the
Commission's affirming the GSIS decision.

The following issues are raised in this petition:

"1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during
employment is compensable under the present compensation laws.

"2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable

under the present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as
occupational disease." (p. 17, Rollo)

The key argument of the petitioner is based on the fact that medical science
cannot, as yet, positively identify the causes of various types of cancer. It is a disease
that strikes people in general. The nature of a person's employment appears to have is
no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one
who works on land, in water, or in the bowels of the earth. It makes no difference
whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar
worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.
It is not also correct to say that all cancers are not compensable.
The list of occupational diseases prepared by the Commission includes some
cancers as compensable, namely —
"Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment

xxx xxx xxx

16. Cancer of stomach and other Wood workers, wood
lymphatic and blood forming products industry carpenters,
vessels; nasal cavity and loggers and employees in pulp
sinuses and paper mills and plywood
mills.

17. Cancer of the lungs, liver Vinyl chloride workers,

and brain. plastic workers."

(Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation)

The petitioner questions the above listing. We see no arbitrariness in the

Commission's allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be compensated
for brain cancer. There are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly
induced by speci c causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette
smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for speci c cancers, and
asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks of
contracting specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.
The first thing that stands in the way of the petition is the law itself.
Presidential Decree No. 422, as amended, the Labor Code of the Philippines
defines "sickness" as follows:

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 [Link]

 ART. 167. De nition of Terms . — As used in this Title, unless the context
indicates otherwise:
xxx xxx xxx

"(1) Sickness means any illness de nitely accepted as an occupational

disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject
to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by
working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine
and approve occupational disease and work-related illnesses that may be
considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment. (PD 1368,
May 1, 1978)."

Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation clearly
defines who are entitled. It provides:
"SECTION 1.
xxx xxx xxx

"(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable,
the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A"
of these rules with the conditions set therein satis ed; otherwise, proof must be
shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions." (Emphasis supplied)
The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing — that
the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available,
therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement
that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be
presumed. cdphil

I n Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 46684, April 27,
1988) this Court recognized the fact that cancer is a disease of still unknown origin
which strikes people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown
that a particular form of cancer is caused by speci c working conditions (e. g. chemical
fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot conclude that it was the
employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease.
To understand why the "Presumption of compensability" together with the host
of decisions interpreting the "arising out of and in the course of employment" provision
of the defunct law has been stricken from the present law, one has to go into the
distinctions between the old workmen's compensation law and in the present scheme.
On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel
scheme under the new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the
concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a
system based on social security principles. The present system is also administered by
social insurance agencies - the Government Service Insurance System and Social
Security System - under the Employees' Compensation Commission. The intent was to
restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's
compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for work-connected death
or disability. (Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980];
Armena v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851 [1983]; Erese v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192 [1985]; De Jesus v. Employees'
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 [Link]
 Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92 [1986]; Sarmiento v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, et al., G.R. No. 65680, May 11, 1988).
Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the
employer, we now have a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by
employers to a trust fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can
prove entitlement.
In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (supra), we a rmed the
validity of the new law by explaining the present system as follows:
"We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attack against the
constitutionality of the new law on employee's compensation. It must be noted
that the petitioner led his claim under the provisions of this same law. It was
only when his claim was rejected that he now questions the constitutionality of
this law on appeal by certiorari.
"The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and
rejected claims according to its provisions. We nd in it no infringement of the
worker's constitutional rights."
xxx xxx xxx

"The new law establishes a state insurance fond built up by the contributions of
employers based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not
have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There
is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply
les a claim with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which
then determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical
evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of bene ts is
more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death bene ts
has also been doubled.

"On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly
premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet
sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet
these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously
documented or long past claims.
"The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's
compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fund
under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation
process and it has no control, as in the part, over payment of bene ts. The open
ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered
claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

"Since there is no employer opposing or ghting a claim for compensation, the

rules on presumption of commensability and controversion cease to have
importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which
called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the
claimant, is now absent. . . ."
"The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. There
is no serious attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.

"The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that

should be addressed to the President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 [Link]
 not the former workmen's compensation program with its presumptions,
controversions, adversarial procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the
present scheme must be decided by the political departments. The present law
was enacted in the belief that it better complies with the mandate on social
justice and is more advantageous to the greater number of working men and
women. Until Congress and the President decide to improve or amend the law, our
duty is to apply it." (at pp. 4, 5, and 6)

The non-adversarial nature of employees' compensation proceedings is crucial

to an understanding of the present scheme. There is a widespread misconception that
the poor employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate
employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable presumptions. This is
fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if bene ts are
paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins its employees
in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving
a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by employment. It is a
government institution which protects the stability and integrity of the State Insurance
Fund against the payment of non-compensable claims. The employee, this time
assisted by his employer, is required to prove a positive proposition, that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by working conditions.
The social insurance aspect of the present law is the other important feature
which distinguishes it from the old and familiar system.
Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All covered
employers throughout the country are required by law to contribute xed and regular
premiums or contributions to a trust fund for their employees. Bene ts are paid from
this trust fund. At the time the amount of contributions was being xed, actuarial
studies were undertaken. The actuarially determined number of workers who would
probably le claims within any given year is important in insuring the stability of the
trust fund and making certain that the system can pay bene ts when due to all who are
entitled and in the increased amounts fixed by law.
We have no actuarial expertise in this Court. If diseases not intended by the law
to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State
Insurance Funds is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by
the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens
of millions of workers and their families look for compensation whenever covered
accidents, diseases, and deaths occur. As earlier stated, if increased contributions or
premiums must be paid in order to give bene ts to those who are now excluded, it is
Congress which should amend the law after proper actuarial studies. This Court cannot
engage in judicial legislation on such a complex subject with such far reaching
implications.
We trust that the public respondents and the Social Security System are
continually evaluating the actuarial soundness of the trust funds they administer. In this
way, more types of cancers and other excluded diseases may be included in the list of
covered occupational diseases. Or legislation may be recommended to Congress
either increasing the contribution rates of employers, increasing bene t payments, or
making it easier to prove entitlement. We regret that these are beyond the powers of
this Court to accomplish.
For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practicing lawyers
concerned, this decision expressly supersedes the decisions in Panotes v. Employees'
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 [Link]
 Compensation Commission [128 SCRA 473 (1984)]; Mercado v. Employees'
Compensation Commission [127 SCRA 664 (1984)]; Ovenson v. Employees'
Compensation Commission [156 SCRA 21 (1987)]; Nemaria v. Employees'
Compensation Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases with conclusions
different from those stated above.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the
public respondents is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C .J ., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ ., concur.

Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J ., dissenting :

I do not think that the Labor Code intended to do away with the "presumption of
compensability" prevailing under the old Workmen's Compensation Act. It must be
noted that as a social legislation, the Code is fundamentally a measure intended to
afford protection unto the working class. If any protection should be given to labor, it is
in workmen's compensation cases that protection is a felt need.
The primacy that the majority would give to the integrity of the trust fund "to
which the tens of millions of workers and their families look for compensation
whenever covered accidents, diseases, and deaths occur" 1 is correct but, in my view,
hardly the point. In granting the petitioner compensation," I do not believe we would
have dissipated substantially the State Insurance Fund, and considering the fact that
the petitioner is a victim [Link]

It must likewise be noted that the petitioner is suffering from cancer (brain
tumor), whose cause medical science is yet to unravel. It would then be asking too
much to make her prove that her illness was caused by work or aggravated by it, when
experts themselves are ignorant as to what brings it about.
I do not believe, nally, that the question is a matter for legislation. Compassion,
it is my view, is reason enough.

PARAS, J ., dissenting :

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated August 27, 1981 of
respondent — Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 1692
entitled "Zaida G. Raro vs. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)", which
dismissed the claim of petitioner Zaida G. Raro for compensation bene ts under
Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended for her ailment diagnosed as "brain tumor."
Petitioner assigns the following alleged errors:
First
THE SYSTEM AND THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT BRAIN TUMOR
IS ALLEGEDLY NOT A LISTED OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE; HENCE, PETITIONER IS
REQUIRED TO PROVE BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT IT WAS CAUSED BY
HER EMPLOYMENT.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 [Link]
 Second
THE SYSTEM AND THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT BRAIN TUMOR
WHICH CAUSE IS UNKNOWN CANNOT BE CAUSED BY THE NATURE OF
PETITIONER'S EMPLOYMENT.
Third
THE SYSTEM AND THE COMMISSION ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING BRAIN
TUMOR AS A BORDERLINE CASE, HENCE COMPENSABLE.
Fourth
THE SYSTEM AND THE COMMISSION DISOBEYED THE STATUTORY MANDATE
THAT ALL DOUBTS SHALL BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF LABOR AND IGNORED
THE NATURE OF LABOR LAWS AS SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS.

The undisputed facts, summarized by the O ce of the Solicitor-General, are as

follows:
Petitioner was hired as clerk on March 17, 1975 by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-
Sciences at its office in Daet, Camarines Norte.
In the course of her employment, petitioner contracted an ailment which was
diagnosed as brain tumor. Petitioner stopped working because of said ailment.
On January 7, 1980, petitioner led with respondent GSIS a claim for disability
benefits under P.D. 626, as amended.
On November 24, 1980, respondent GSIS denied petitioner's claim on the ground
that brain tumor was not an occupational disease. Respondent GSIS also denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. llcd

On appeal, respondent ECC sustained the GSIS decision.

We find this petition impressed with merit.
While "brain tumor" is not expressly or speci cally referred to as an occupational
disease, and while admittedly its precise causes are still unknown, We may say that the
disease is akin to "cancer of the brain" and should therefore be regarded as either
compensable or a borderline case. At any rate, the precise work of the petitioner at the
Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences consisted of the following:
"As Mining Recorder II, to record and le mining instruments and documents in
the Mining Recorder's Section and to type correspondence and other documents
pertaining to the same action. (See Petitioner's Brief, Rollo, p. 13)

It will readily be seen that her work required at times mental concentration.
Whether this is speci cally causative of brain tumor is of course still unknown but
doubts must generally be resolved in favor whenever compensation for disease is
concerned. It would certainly be absurd to throw upon petitioner the burden of showing
that her work either caused or aggravated the disease, particularly when both the GSIS
and ECC profess ignorance themselves of the causes of the disease.
Nowhere is this truism more glaring than in cancer, the most dreaded of all
diseases mankind has ever known. Held the Supreme Court in the case of Acosta v.
Employees' Compensation Commission (L-55464, Nov. 12, 1981): "It is generally
accepted that the exact origin of practically all types of cancer is not yet determined.
Scientists and medical experts are still in the process of discovering the most effective
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 [Link]
 cure for the malady. With this backdrop, one should not expect ordinary persons to
prove the real cause of the ailment of the deceased when the experts themselves are
still in the dark."
In a case like the present one, even medical experts have not determined its
cause, and therefore the duty to prove does not exist for it is absurd for the law to
require an impossibility. Thus in the case of Mercado, Jr. v. Employees Compensation
Commission, 139 SCRA 270 citing Cristobal v. ECC, 103 SCRA 329, We ruled as follows:
"While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation
espoused under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have been abandoned
under the New Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be
challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law in general still subsists.
". . . As agents charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and
secured by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more
liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is
some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection, 103 SCRA 329, 336).

". . . Where however, the causes of an ailment are unknown to and/or

undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of any casual
link between the ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized so that
those who have less in life will have more in law . . .
". . . The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an
award of compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment — the
cause or origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical
science — was in fact caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his
working conditions. Plainly, the condition would be an impossible one, specially
considering that said claimant is most probably not even conversant with the
intricacies of medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of the material
resources to employ medical experts to demonstrate the connection between the
cause and the disease. Considering the liberal character of employment
compensation schemes, the impossible condition should be deemed as not
having been intended and/or imposed. (139 SCRA, pp. 275-276)
". . . As an employee, he had contributed to the nds of respondent for 34 years
until his forced retirement. In turn respondent should comply with its duty to give
him the fullest protection, relief and compensation bene ts as guaranteed by
law." (Ibid., p. 277)

In the more recent case of Flaviano Nemaria, 2 Petitioner versus Employees'

Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of
Education and Culture), Respondents, promulgated October 28, 1987 and following the
rule We enunciated in the Mercado case, We stated:
"Thus the requirement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the
employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined
or proved. Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the
link exists. For certainly, the law cannot demand an impossibility."

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is my humble opinion that this petition should be

GRANTED. The decision of the respondent in Employees Compensation Commission
should be SET ASIDE and another should be rendered ordering the respondents to pay
the herein petitioner the full amount of compensation under Presidential Decree No.
626 as amended.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 [Link]
 Footnotes
1. Decision, 9.
2. G.R. No. 57889.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 [Link]