Extinction of Criminal Liability

People vs. Saturnino Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 190610 March 25, 2012

Facts:
 December 01, 2004 both Saturnino Dela Cruz and Jose Brillantes y Lopez were charged of violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The former was charged of illegal possession of Dangerous Drugs of
Shabu while the latter was charged of illegal sale and illegal possession of Dangerous Drugs of
Shabu.
 RTC held both of them guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
 On July 29, 2008 a Notice of Appeal was filled by Brillantes through counsel before the Supreme
Court but his co - accused Dela Cruz did not appeal his conviction.
 While the case is pending appeal, Brillantes died.

Issues:
1. Whether of not Brillantes criminal liability extinguishes upon his death?
2. Whether or not the death of Brillantes is applicable to Section 11, Rule 122 of Rules of Court?

Ruling:

1. Yes, The RPC is instructive on the matter. It provides in Article 89(1) that:

Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

It is plain that both the personal penalty of imprisonment and pecuniary penalty of fine of Brillantes were
extinguished upon his death pending appeal of his conviction by the lower courts.

We recite the rules laid down in People v. Bayotas,11 to wit:

“Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of
the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in
senso strictiore."

2. No, The appeal of Brillantes culminating in the extinguishment of his criminal liability does not
have any effect on his co- accused De la Cruz who did not file a notice of appeal. The Rules on
Criminal Procedure on the matter states:

RULE 122 - Appeal

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. —

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except
insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter; (emphasis ours)
xxx

1. The extinguishment of Brillantes’ criminal and pecuniary liabilities is predicated on his death and
not on his acquittal. Following the provision, the appeal taken by Brillantes and subsequent
extinguishment of his liabilities is not applicable to De la Cruz.

PEOPLE vs. WILLIAM CASIDO

G.R. No. 116512 || March 7, 1997 || DAVIDE, JR., J.
(Amnesty)

FACTS:
 In its Resolution on July 30 1996, the SC ruled the “conditional pardons granted to William Casido
and Franklin Alcorin are void for having been extended on 19 January 1996 during the pendency
of their appeal”
o Ordered the re-arrest of accused-appellants Casido and Alcorin, and required the
Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, and Pardon (PCGBRP) to show
cause why they should not be held in contempt for acting on and favorably
recommending approval the application for pardon of accused-appellants despite the
pendency of their appeal
 In a comment for the PCGBRP, two members of their Secretariat, Assistant Chief Prosecutor
Mariano and Solicitor in the OSG Ballacillo submitted the following explanation:
o President constituted the PCGBRP on August 11 1992 to establish guidelines for the grant
of bail, release, or pardon of persons convicted of crimes against national security and
public order.
o Those charged can establish by sufficient evidence that they have actually committed any
of the crimes enumerated may apply for possible grant of bail, release or pardon. A
Secretariat was also constituted and tasked to process and evaluate applications of those
desiring pardon or recommended for release or bail
o In the processing and evaluation of the applications, it was the agreement of Secretariat
and counsels who are usually the lawyers of NGOs that simultaneous with the processing
of applications, motions for the withdrawal of the applicant’s appeals must be filed with
the SC
o Applications for conditional pardon were recommended to the president and was signed
by the President on January 19 1996 and subject prisoners were released on January 25
1996
o Prior to their release, petitioners Casido and Alcorin filed a “Motion to Withdraw Appeal”
which was received by the SC on January 11, 1996 however the PCGBRP failed to verify
whether the counsel of the accused had also withdrawn their appeal or that the NGO
lawyers filed in their behalf a motion to withdraw appeal
o It was upon honest belief of Secretariat that NGO lawyers would perform their agreed
undertaking so the Secretariat endorsed applications for conditional pardon of the
subject prisoners for favorable action by the Committee and then by the President
o Explained that the Secretariat was only prompted to act and to avoid repetition of grant
of presidential clemency under similar circumstances, shall require applicants for any
executive relief to show proof that their appeal, has been withdrawn and the withdrawal
has been also approved before acting on their applications
 SC required the submission of members of Secretariat who participated in deliberation on the
accused-appellants application for pardon and recommended the grant thereof
 o February 9-11, 1995 a Working Group was constituted to investigate cases of prisoners
who are alleged to have committed crime in pursuit of political objectives, among these
cases were those of Casido and Alcorin
o After such the Working Group issued Resolution No. 1 stating that “prisoners be
recommended to the Secretariat of PCGBRP”
o The recommendations of the Working Group and the Secretariat were based on the
undertaking of those representing political prisoners who promised that the
corresponding withdrawals of appeal would be filed with SC and other courts concerned
(this undertaking of NGOs was verbal and not made in writing)
o They state that they acted in good faith and when they made the recommendations or
issued Resolution No. 1 were not aware of the relevant rulings of SC, and that they were
pressed on by the members of the NGOs to act on certain applications, and that they
made clear to those following up that the appropriate withdrawal of appeals should be
filed
o They did not secure written commitment for the withdrawal of appeal by accused Alcorin
and Casido before their applications for pardon were reviewed, because they believed in
good faith that the promise of those who followed up would be complied with
 The SC received a letter from the Chairman of the National Amnesty Commission, informing the
court that the applications for amnesty of accused-appellants Casido and Alcorin were “favorably
acted” upon by the National Amnesty Commission (NAC)
o That they were indeed confirmed members of CPP/NPA/NDF whose killing of Victoriano
mapa was committed in pursuit of their political beliefs
 Solicitor General: “in an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, the accused-
appellants applied for pardon before the PCGBRP and amnesty before the NAC”
o Since amnesty may be granted before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution
or even after conviction, amnesty granted to accused-appellants rendered moot and
academic the question of premature pardon granted to them

Amnesty vs. Pardon

 Amnesty: Proclamation of Chief Executive w/ concurrence of Congress, a public act of which courts
should take judicial notice
o Granted to classes of persons who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution or sometimes after conviction
o Looks backward and abolishes the offense itself, person released with amnesty stands
before the law as though he had committed no offense
 Pardon: granted by the Chief Executive and is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by
the person pardoned
o Granted after conviction, looks forward and relieves offender from consequences of
offense but does not exempt one from paying of civil indemnity
o Does not restore right to hold public office, or right to suffrage, unless it is expressly
restored in terms of pardon

ISSUE/S:
 W/N the release of Casido and Alcorin is justified by the pardon -- NO
 W/N the release of Casido and Alcorin is valid -- YES

HOLDING:
 The release of Casido and Alcorin was VALID solely on the ground of amnesty.

RATIO:
  The explanation of the Secretariat of PCGBRP is unsatisfactory in saying that its members were
unaware of the resolutions of SC in earlier cases, and it already stressed the necessity of a final
judgment before parole or pardon could be extended
 The members of Secretariat implied that they were all at the time aware that a pardon could only
be granted after conviction by final judgment as evidenced by the requirement from lawyers of
applicants to file motions of withdrawal from SC of applicants appeals, they cannot plead
ignorance
 Pardon is void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction
by final judgment, but the grant of amnesty voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347 was
valid

Avoidance of Greater Evil or Injury

Ty vs. People
G.R. No. 149275, September 27, 2004 B.P. 22

FACTS:

 Ty’s mother was confined in Manila Doctor’s Hospital to which a medical bill amounting to 600,000
pesos was made to be paid to TY, after signing a contract of responsibility with the hospital. Ty,
issued 7 checks to cover the said expenses, all of which were dishonored for being drawn against
a closed a account. Manila Doctors Hospital then instituted criminal actions against Ty for violation
of BP22.
 In her defense she alleged that she issued the checks involuntarily because her mother threatened
to commit suicide due to the inhumane treatment she allegedly suffered while confined in the
hospital. She further claimed that no consideration was obtained by her because all the checks
were made as payment to the medical bills.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from
criminal liability.

RULING:

For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1)
existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is
greater than or at least equal to that committed.

It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that the
ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for
one’s life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or
remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must be of such
character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was
compelled to issue the checks a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could
be discharged for fear that her mother’s health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment
of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the
uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.

To begin with, there was no showing that the mother’s illness was so life-threatening such that her
continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded
apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the law’s intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal
liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide. In other words, the fear
she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere
instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospitals threats or demands.

Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a crime. She did not
take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own words,
she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother may
be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. And if indeed she was coerced to open an account with the
bank and issue the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.

Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without funds may result in a
violation of B.P. 22.

At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was
issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to
whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee
the obligation. The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into
circulation

PEOPLE V RICOHERMOSO
11 Feb L – 30527 – 28 | March 29, 1974 | J. Aquino

Facts:

 Geminiano de Leon, together with his common-law wife, son Marianito de Leon and one Rizal
Rosales, chanced upon Pio Ricohermoso. Owning a parcel of land, which Ricohermoso cultivated
as kaingin, Geminiano asked about his share of palay harvest and added that she should be allowed
to taste the palay harvested from his land. Ricohermoso said Geminiano could collect the palay
anytime.
 Upon returning from his trip to Barrio Bagobasin, Geminiano dropped by Ricohermoso’s house and
asked him about the palay, to which the latter answered defiantly that he will not give him the
palay, whatever happens. Geminiano remonstrated and that point (as if by prearrangement),
Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo, while his father-in-law Severo Padernal got an axe, and
attacked Geminiano. At the same time and place, Ricohermoso’s brother-in-law Juan Padernal
suddenly embraced Marianito. They grappled and rolled down the hill, at which point Marianito
passed out. When he regained consciousness, he discovered that the rifle he carried beforehand
was gone and that his father was mortally wounded.
 The defendants shifted the responsibility of killing in their version of the case.
Issue:

1. Whether or not appellant Juan Padernal can invoke the justifying circumstance of avoidance of a
greater evil or injury

Held:

1. No. Juan Padernal’s reliance on the justifying circumstance is erroneous because his act in
preventing Marianito from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, the aggressors in this case,
was designed to insure the killing of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to the assailants and not
an act to prevent infliction of greater evil or injury. His intention was to forestall any interference
in the assault.
Treachery was also appreciated in the case. The trial court convicted the appellants with lesiones
leves, from an attempted murder charge with respect to Marianito de Leon.
Judgment as to Juan Padernal affirmed.

(Note: Severo Padernal withdrew his appeal, thus, in effect, accepted the prosecution’s version of the case
and trial court’s finding of guilt.)

People vs. Norma Hernandez

55 O.G. 8645
FACTS:
 Vivencio Lascano, and Maria Norma Hernandez have a boyfriend- girlfriend relationship. The two
talked about getting married.
 Vivencio’s parents went to the house of Norma to have a “pamamanhikan”. They brought chickens
and goats.
 The marriage was set on March 19, 1955. The preparation went on but on the day of wedding,
Norma is did not show up, causing Vivencio and his family great same and humiliation.
 Norma Hernandez confessed that she was not really in love with him, and that she accepted the
proposal because she was convinced by her parents. That she decided to leave home as last
recourse to prevent the marriage. Norma’s parents also corroborated her testimony.
 RTC convicted her of serious slander by deed because she purposely and deliberately fled to
prevent celebration of marriage. Thus, she appealed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Or Not Norma should be convicted on the ground of serious slander by deed

HELD:
1. NO, SC reversed the RTC judgment and acquitted the appellant. Agreement to marry cannot be
held liable for Slander by Deed. — A party to an agreement to marry who backs out cannot be held
liable for the crime of slander by deed , for then that would be an inherent way of compelling said
party to go into a marriage without his or her free consent, and this would contravene the principle
 in law that what could not be done directly could not be done indirectly; and said party has the
right to avoid to himself or herself the evil of going through a loveless marriage pursuant to Article
11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
One of the essential requisites of slander hasn’t been proven. There is no malice in the act of the
appellant changing her mind. She was merely exercising her right not to give her consent to the
marriage after mature consideration. Furthermore, there were no strained relations existing
between the complainant & appellant before the incident. There always existed good relations
between them for they were neighbors so it cannot be sustained that appellant was motivated by
spite or ill-will in deliberately frustrating the marriage. Appellant has the privilege to reconsider
her previous commitment to marry and it would be utterly inconsistent to convict her for slander
by deed simply because she desisted in continuing with the marriage. If she would be liable then
that would be tantamount to compelling her to go into a marriage without her free consent.
Appellant had the right to avoid to herself the evil of going through a loveless marriage. Justifying
Circumstances (Art. 11 par.4, RPC) Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not act
which causes damage to another, provided that the following requisites are present; First. That
the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; Second. That the injury feared be greater than that
done to avoid it; Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

Fulfillment of Duty

Cabanlig v Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148431 July 28, 2005

Facts:

 This petition for review seeks to reverse the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated 11 May 1999
and Resolution dated May 2001 affirming the conviction of SPO2 Ruperto Cabanlig ("Cabanlig") for
homicide. The Sandiganbayan sentenced Cabanlig to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
months of arresto mayor as minimum to two years and four months of prision correctional as
maximum and to pay P50,000 to the heirs of Jimmy Valino ("Valino"). Cabanlig shot Valino after
Valino grabbed the M16 Armalite of another policeman and tried to escape from the custody of
the police. The Sandiganbayan acquitted Cabanlig's co-accused, SPO1 Carlos Padilla ("Padilla"),
PO2 Meinhart Abesamis ("Abesamis"), SPO2 Lucio Mercado ("Mercado") and SPO1 Rady Esteban
("Esteban").
 On Sep 24 1992 a robbery occurred in the Municipality of Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. The authorities
apprehended 3 suspects: Jordan Magat ("Magat"), Randy Reyes ("Reyes") and Valino. The police
recovered most of the stolen items but a flower vase and small radio were still missing. Reyes told
authorities that the items were at his house. Cabalig asked his colleagues to accompany him to
retrieve said items. When Cabalig brought out Magat and Reyes out of their cell intending to bring
them during the retrieval operation, Valino informed Cabanlig that he moved the locations of the
items without knowledge of the other two. Cabanlig then decided to bring along Valino, leaving
the two, for the ret. op.
 Around 6:30 pm, Cabanlig and his collegues, 5 of them, escorted Valino to recover the missing
flower vase and radio. The policemen and Valino were aboard a police vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up
jeep. The jeep was built like an ordinary jeepney. The rear end of the jeep had no enclosure. A
metal covering separated the driver's compartment and main body of the jeep. There was no
 opening or door between the two compartments of the jeep. Inside the main body of the jeep,
were two long benches, each of which was located at the left and right side of the jeep.
 Cabanlig, Mercado and Esteban were seated with Valino inside the main body of the jeep. Esteban
was right behind Abesamis at the left bench. Valino, who was not handcuffed, was between
Cabanlig and Mercado at the right bench. Valino was seated at Cabanlig's left and at Mercado's
right. Mercado was seated nearest to the opening of the rear of the jeep.
 Just after the jeep crossed the Philippine National Railway bridge, Valino suddenly grabbed
Mercado's M 16 Armalite (he was able to do so when Mercado tried to reach his back to nurse an
itch because of some flying insects) and jumped out of the jeep. Mercado shouted “hoy” and
Cabanlig acted immediately. Without issuing any warning, Cabanlig fired one shot at Valino, and
after two to three seconds, Cabanlig fired four more successive shots. Valino did not fire any shot.
Valino died sustaining three mortal wounds — one at the back of the head, one at the left side of
the chest, and one at the left lower back.
 The following morning, Sep 29, 1992, a certain SPO4 Lacanilao investigated the case. He met with
Mercado to whom the latter related that he and his fellow policemen “salvaged” a person the
night before. Mercado then asked Lacanilao why he was interested in the identity of the person
who was "salvaged." Lacanilao then answered that "Jimmy Valino" was his cousin. Mercado
immediately turned around and left.
 Cabanlig admitted shooting Valino. However, Cabanlig justified the shooting as an act of self-
defense and performance of duty. Mercado denied that he told Lacanilao that he and his co-
accused "salvaged" Valino. Cabanlig, Mercado, Abesamis, Padilla, and Esteban denied that they
conspired to kill Valino.

Issue:
Whether or not Cabanlig could invoke defense of fulfillment of duty to justify his actions .

Held:

YES. The requisites of fulfillment of duty are:

1. The accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office;
2. The injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.

A policeman in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure
and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and
protect himself from bodily harm.

Unlike in self-defense where unlawful aggression is an element, in performance of duty, unlawful aggression
from the victim is not a requisite.

Undoubtedly, the policemen in the case at bar were in the legitimate performance of their duty when
Cabanlig shot Valino. Thus fulfillment of duty is a justifying circumstance applicable to the case.

However, to determine if this defense is complete, it has to be determined if Cabanlig used necessary force
to prevent Valino from escaping and in protecting himself and his co-accused policemen from imminent
danger.
The court rules yes as well. Valino was committing an offense when he grabbed the M16 Armalite. The
policemen had the duty then to not only apprehend Valino but also retrieve the firearm. Had Cabanlig failed
to shoot Valino immediately, the policemen would have been sitting ducks. They were facing imminent
danger as Valino had with him the armalite, so the policemen had to act swiftly.

The Court states that Sandiganbayan was wrong in holding that Cabanlig had no right to shoot without
giving Valino the opportunity to surrender and that they should have issued a warning first.

The duty to issue a warning is not absolutely mandated at all times and at all cost, to the detriment of the
life of law enforcers. In this case, the embattled policemen did not have the luxury of time. Neither did they
have much choice. Cabanlig's shooting of Valino was an immediate and spontaneous reaction to imminent
danger. At any rate, Mercado’s “hoy” already served as a warning to Valino.

Cabanlig is thus not guilty of homicide. At most, Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban are guilty
only of gross negligence for transporting an arrested robber without handcuffs.

Court reverses decision of Sandiganbayan and acquits Cabanlig of the crime of homicide.

PEOPLE V. PATROLMAN DOMINGO BELBES

FACTS :
Patrolman Domingo Belbes was assigned to maintain peace and order at the prom night of Pili Barangay
High School. During the event, he responded to a report by two female students that someone was making
trouble at one of the school’s temporary building. He and Patrolman Jose Pabon found Fernando Bataller,
drunk, with his two companions, and it appeared that Fernando was breaking the bamboo walls of the
temporary building. Belbes, armed with an armalite, fired at Bataller, who was hit at several different parts
of his body, and died. Whether or not there was a confrontation is disputed (appellee says there was none,
appellant (Belbes) says there was).
Trial court held Belbes guilty for murder. In his appeal, Belbes said he fired the shots at Bataller out of self-
defense and that he was performing his official functions when he did so.
FACTS (DETAILED VERSION):
APPELLEE’s VERSION:
 On the evening of February 16, 1990, Patrolan Domingo Belbes (appellant) and Pat. Jose Pabon
were assigned to maintain peace and order at the Junior and Senior Prom of Pili Barangay High
School, Pili, Bacacay, Albay.
 9:00 PM: Two female students approached Teacher-in-charge Mila Ulanca and said that somebody
was making trouble. Belbes (armed with an armalite rifle), and Pabon (armed with a .38 caliber
revolver) responded to the scene.
 Meanwhile, Fernando Bataller, who was drunk, was with his cousin Carlito Bataller, and friend
Rosalio Belista. While vomiting and holding on to the bamboo wall of the school’s temporary
building, the bamboo splits broke. The policemen then arrived.
 Moments (six seconds according to Mrs. Mila Ulanca) after, bursts of gunfire “Rat-tat-tat-tat-tat”
were heard. Without warning, Belbes had fired his gun at Fernando Bataller, who was hit on
different parts of the body and died.

APPELLANT’s (BELBES’s) VERSION:

 He and Pabon found Fernando Bataller making trouble and destroying the wall of the temporary
building. Fernando was drunk or a little tipsy, and was not vomiting.
  The two approached Fernando and identified themselves as policemen, but the former ignored
them. Pabon was in front of Fernando (one meter away from each other). Fernando lunged with a
knife at Pabon, but the latter avoided it.
 Fernando then stabbed Belbes, hitting the latter’s left shoulder.
 Belbes filed a warning shot. Fernando’s companions (Carlito and Rosalio) became aggressive.
Fernando grabbed the armalite.
 While Belbes and Fernando were struggling, the gun went off once, hitting Fernando. He cannot
recall how many more shots were fired after – the gun was semi-automatic.

TRIAL COURT: Found Belbes GUILTY of MURDER and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
APPEAL: Belbes admits to firing the gunshots that killed Bataller. But he claims that he did so in self-defense,
and that that he was only performing his official functions when he responded in the course of police duties
to the information that somebody was making trouble and disturbing the peace.

ISSUE/HELD:
Whether or not the Trial Court was correct in holding the accused guilty for murder.

RATIO:
No, Appellant offers no material evidence to sufficiently support his claim of self-defense on the face of
mortal danger while on police duty. Where the accused admits to killing the victim in self defense, the
burden of evidence shifts to him.
However, the evidence reveals an incomplete justifying circumstance defined in Article 11, paragraph
number 5 of the Revised Penal Code. For a person not to incur criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment
of a duty, 2 requisites must concur: (1) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty; (2) that the
injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office.
Although Belbes did act in the performance of his duty (first requisite), the second requisite is lacking, for
the killing need not be a necessary consequence of the performance of his duty.

CONCLUSION:
Trial court decision MODIFIED. Appellant is guilty only of homicide, mitigated by the incomplete justifying
circumstance of fulfillment of duty. Sentence: indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor
minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum.
EFFECT OF JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE:
Penalty of homicide if reclusion temporal. But with one mitigating circumstance, maximum of penalty
should be RT in its minimum period, and minimum of penalty should be from prision mayor.

Obedience to Lawful Order of a Superior

PEOPLE V BERONILLA
11 Feb L – 4445 | February 28, 1955

Facts:

 Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco and Jacinto Adriatico file an appeal from the
judgement of the Abra CFI, which convicted them of murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal,
the elected mayor of La, Paz, Abra (at the outbreak of war), which was found to be aiding the
enemy.
  Borjal moved to Bangued because of death threats was succeeded by Military Mayor Manuel
Beronilla, who was appointed by Lt. Col. Arbold, regimental commander of the 15 th Infantry of the
Phil. Army, operating as guerilla unit in Abra. Simultaneously upon his appointment, Beronilla
received a memorandum which authorized him to appoint a jury of 12 bolo men to try persons
accused of treason, espionage and aiding or abetting the enemy.
 Upon the return of Borjal and his family to Abra, to escape bombing in Bangued, he was placed
under custody and tried and sentenced to death by the jury based on various complaints made by
the residents. Beronilla reported this to Col. Arnold who replied, saying “…I can only compliment
you for your impartial but independent way of handling the whole case.”
 Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the executioner, digger and jury, were indicted for the
murder of Borjal. Soon after, President Manuel Roxas issued Executive Proclamation 8, which
granted amnesty to persons who committed acts in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy
against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
 The rest of defendants applied and were granted amnesty, but Beronilla and others were convicted
on the grounds that the crime was made on purely personal motives and that the crime was
committed after the expiration of time limit for amnesty proclamation.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the defendant-appellants’ actions are covered by justifying circumstances for
obedience to lawful order of superior?

Held:

Yes. The accused acted upon orders of their superior officers, which as military subordinates, they could
not question and obeyed in good faith without the being aware of its illegality.

The evidence is sufficient to sustain the claim of the defense that arrest, prosecution and trial of Borjal was
done in pursuant to express orders of superiors. Additionally, it could not be established that Beronilla
received the radiogram from Colonel Volckmann, overall area commander, which called attention to the
illegality of Borjal’s conviction and sentence. Had Beronilla known the violation, he would not have dared
to report it to Arnold. The conduct of the accused also does not show malice on their part because of the
conduct of the trial, defense through counsel given to Borjal, suspension of trial based on doubts of illegality
and death sentence review sent to the superior officers.

Criminal intent then could not be established. The maxim here is actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea (Crime
is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of to be innocent).

Additionally, the lower court should not have denied their claim to the benefits of the Guerilla Amnesty
Proclamation No. 8 inspite of contradictory dates of liberation of La Paz, Abra. Even if the dates were
contradictory, the court should have found for the Beronila, et al because if there are “any reasonable doubt
as to whether a given case falls within the (amnesty) proclamation should be resolved in favor of the
accused.”

Judgement reversed, appellants acquitted.

 Battered Woman Syndrome
People vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004
FACTS:

 That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15November1995, attacked and wounded his husband,
which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant she did not provoke her husband
when she got home that night it was her husband who began the provocation. The Appellant said
she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would
deliver her baby safely. In fact, The Appelant had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre
as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on
December 1, 1995.
 The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5)
times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The Apellant said that the
reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about
his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.
 The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown to be suffering from Battered
Woman Syndrome.
 The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was then found
guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked
while asleep.

ISSUES:
1. Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-defense, and can she be held liable
for the aggravating circumstance of treachery?

2. Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression does not
warrant complete or incomplete self-defense.

Ruling:
1. No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the appellant has
been shown to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the
woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a sufficient
time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She
had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's
bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even
the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that
presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
2. No, There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that
the offended party might make.
The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from
mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. Besides,
equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery
cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have
been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.
 In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that the appellant intentionally chose
a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any
retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun
occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her spouse. In the
absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by
which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the doubt should be resolved in
her favor.

HELD:

The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there
being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission
of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

ADDENDUM:

When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome) as self defense be appreciated?

Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical
assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a
predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she
can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.' Still, impending
danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's
use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the
required imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-
defense may be appreciated.

Insanity

People vs. Dungo 199 SCRA 860

Facts:
 Rosalino Dungo stabbed Mrs. Sigua, with a knife from the envelope he was carrying, inside the
field office of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Mrs. Sigua died and an information for murder
was filed against Dungo. The accused raised the defense of insanity. During the trial, the
prosecution presented the victim’s husband, Atty. Sigua, to testify that the accused visited their
house to confront him on why his wife was making it difficult for the accused to transfer the
landholding his father to him. The trial court convicted him because the act of concealing a fatal
weapon and the act of taking flight in order to evade arrest indicates that accused was sane during
the time he committed the stabbing.
 The case went up to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
Issue:
1. Whether it is permissible to receive evidence of the accused’s mental condition for a reasonable
period both before and after the time of the act in question.

Ruling:

1. Yes. The Court held that “Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental
condition of the person whose sanity is in issue, at the very time of doing the act which is
the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to receive evidence of his mental
condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in question.
Direct testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to
establish insanity as a defense.”

People vs. Genosa

GR No. 135981, 2000-09-29

Facts:

 Genosa, with intent to kill, with treachery and... evident premeditation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA,
her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had
provided herself for the purpose... which caused his death.
 The Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of parricide... after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and
none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of
DEATH.
 She claims that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her... husband was
equivalent to self-defense.

Issues:

1. Whether the appellant should be examined by qualified psychologists or psychiatrists in

order to determine her... state of mind at the time of the killing?

Ruling:

1. Considering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts
of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court
believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said...
acts actually caused the victim's death.

Prayer sought by appellant for the exhumation of the victim's body cannot be granted.

WHEREFORE, the Urgent Omnibus Motion of Appellant Marivic Genosa is PARTLY GRANTED.

Principles:
there are four characteristics of the syndrome: (1) the woman believes that the violence was her
fault; (2) she has an inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere; (3) she fears
for her life and/or her children's lives; and (4) she has an... irrational belief that the abuser is
omnipresent and omniscient.

People vs. Nunez

G.R. Nos. 112429-30 July 23, 1997

Facts:
 Accused Nunez persuaded victim Joseph Rivera to go with him in the pretext that he
would turn over the proceeds of the sale of the gun to the latter’s father. Joseph then
tagged along him victim Neil Patrick Quillosa as his companion in going home after.
 Both victims’ hands and feet were tied with wire and rope inside the nipa hut and accused
- appellant Rodolfo Cayetano came and checked if the 2 victims were tied securely.
 The victims were brought to the river by the accused and accused – appellant. There
accused dragged Neil in the middle of the river and left him there to drown while accused
– appellant stood guard over Rivera.
 While accused – appellant was busy cutting grass near the river, Rivera escaped.
 Accused Nunez and accused – appellant Cayetano were charged with the crimes of
kidnapping for ransom and kidnapping with Murder.
 But accused appellant claims that he does not know how to read and that he can write
only his name and count up to fifty only.
 Nonetheless, the lower court in a joint decision4 convicted both accused and accused-
appellant with Kidnapping for Ransom and accordingly sentenced both to reclusion
perpetua.
 Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant claims that the lower court erred:

1. In not finding that accused-appellant's low level of intelligence/state of

imbecility exempts him from any criminal liability.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the accused – appellant’s low level of intelligence/ state of imbecility
exempts him from any criminal liability?

Held:

No, accused-appellant claims that he possesses a very low level of intelligence as revealed in his
direct testimony and cross-examination, indicating a mental age of between six (6) to ten (10)
years of age. To prove his imbecility, he cited his act of cutting grass when he should be guarding
his victim. As such, he should be exempted from criminal liability under the Revised Penal Code.
Even assuming that he is liable, the lower court should have proceeded against him pursuant to
the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
The Court is not persuaded by such remonstrations. The defense counsel's attribution of
imbecility is not supported by evidence. Imbecility, one of the exempting circumstances under
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, is defined as feeblemindedness or a mental condition
approaching that of one who is insane. It is analogous to childishness and dotage. An imbecile,
within the meaning of Article 12, is one who must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of will at the time of committing the crime.5 He is one who, while
advanced in age, has a mental development comparable to that of children between two and
seven years of age.6

Accused-appellant's act of cutting grass rather than guarding his victim could hardly be indicative
of imbecility. Rather, it may be considered as negligence but definitely not childishness or even
that of one completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of the will. In fact,
accused-appellant admitted on cross-examination that he can tell what is right and what is wrong.
Assuming arguendo that accused-appellant is an imbecile or a feebleminded person, in the case
of People v. Formigones,8 it was held that feeblemindedness is not exempting, because the
offender could distinguish right from wrong. An imbecile or an insane cannot. In any case, Article
800 of the Civil Code provides that "the law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the
absence of proof to the contrary." The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved.
Moreover, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary. It is improper to presume that acts were
executed unconsciously.9

This Court fully agrees with the lower court that Kidnapping for Ransom was committed against
Joseph Rivera, as the essential element that the victim must have been restrained or deprived of
his liberty was present when both victims were tied and when the gun was brandished and fired
to intimidate them.

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 12778-MN, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

1. Yes. The Court held that “Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental
condition of the person whose sanity is in issue, at the very time of doing the act which is
the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to receive evidence of his mental
condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in question.
Direct testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to
establish insanity as a defense.”

People of the Philippines vs. Robinos

G.R. no. 138453 (May 29, 2002)

FACTS:
 On March 25, 1995, at around seven o'clock in the morning, fifteen-year old Lorenzo
Robiños was at their home in Barangay San Isibro in Camiling, Tarlac cooking dinner, heard
his parents, appellant Melecio Robiños and Lorenza Robiños – victim, who were at the
 sala, quarrelling. Lorenzo heard his mother saying, 'Why did you come home, why don't
you just leave?' After hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo, saw his father, with a
double-bladed knife, stab his mother on the right shoulder. Upon witnessing appellant's
attack on his mother, Lorenzo immediately left their house and ran to his grandmother's
house where he reported the incident.
 Benjamin Bueno, the brother of the victim Lorenza Robiños, was was informed by his
nephew of the incident immediately called the police station and reported the said
incident. The police, together with Benjamin Bueno and some barangay officials
proceeded to the scene of the crime. When appellant failed to come out, the police, with
the help of barangay officials, detached the bamboo wall from the part of the house
where blood was dripping. The removal of the wall exposed that section of the house
where they saw appellant, lying on his side and holding a bloodstained double-bladed
knife with his right hand, embracing his wife, uttering the words, “I will kill myself, I will
kill myself.” Lorenza, who was lying on her back and facing upward, appeared to be dead.
The police and the barangay officials tried to pull appellant away from Lorenza's body,
appellant tried to resist the people who held him but was overpowered. The police, with
the help of the barangay officials present, tied his hands and feet with a plastic rope.
However, before he was pulled away from the body of his wife and restrained by the
police, appellant admitted to Rolando Valdez, a neighbor of his and a barangay kagawad,
that he had killed his wife.
 Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he indeed killed
his wife, but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by interposing the defense of
insanity.

BACKDROP IN COURTS:
RTC Tarlac – Lorenza who was 6 mons. Pregnant at the time of the killing, found Melecio Robiños
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion and
sentencing him to death.

ISSUE/s:
1. Whether or not appellant was indeed insane at the time of the commission of the crime?

HELD:
1. NO. A defendant in a criminal case who relies on the defense of mental incapacity has the
burden of establishing the fact of insanity at the very moment when the crime was
committed. Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the
commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.
Testimonies from both prosecution and defense witnesses show no substantial evidence
that appellant was completely deprived of reason or discernment when he perpetrated
the brutal killing of his wife. It was also admitted that a domestic altercation preceded the
 fatal stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said that appellant attacked his wife for no reason at all
and without knowledge of the nature of his action. The bulk of the defense evidence
points to his allegedly unsound mental condition after the commission of the crime.
(Prison inmates testified that he was not engaging, quiet, and seen talking to himself) –
baka tanungin ni sir, examples
As to the contention of the defense of the testimony of Dr. Maria Mercidita Mendoza,
who examined accused, was still mentally ill; that accused was experiencing hallucination
and suffering from insanity. The court noted that when Dr. Mendoza, she conducted the
mental, physical and neurological examinations on the accused 7 months after the
commission of the offense. That span of seven 7 months has given the accused an
opportunity to contrive and feign mental derangement. Dr. Mendoza had no opportunity
to observed and assessed the behavior of the accused before, during and immediately
after the commission of the offense. Thus making her findings inconclusive.

*Side issue - As to the penalty imposed, although the RTC correctly rejected the defense of
insanity, it nonetheless erred in imposing the death penalty on appellant. It imposed the
maximum penalty without considering the presence or the absence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion, the penalty to be imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is
parricide. The rules with respect to the application of a penalty consisting of two indivisible
penalties are prescribed by Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent portion of which
is quoted as follows:

"In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxx xxx xxx

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied."

Hence, when the penalty provided by law is either of two indivisible penalties and there are
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty shall be imposed. Considering
that neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances were established in this case, the imposable
penalty should only be reclusion perpetua.

Final Ruling: The SC affirmed with modifications the decision of the RTC. Reducing the penalty
imposed to reclusion Perpetua.