Republic of the Philippines Legislature to establish by law probate courts to take charge

SUPREME COURT even of estates of persons who had died before its approval.
Manila The creation of the People's Court to try treason cases
EN BANC arising from acts committed during the Japanese occupation
G.R. No. L-6359 December 29, 1953 is another example of recent times.
CARMEN CASTRO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, It is argued that Republic Act No. 772 should not be enforced
vs. as to accidents happening before its approval, because it
FRANCISCA SAGALES, defendant-appellee. has introduced changes affecting vested rights of the parties.
Roberto P. Ancok and Antonio S. Atienza for appellants. Without going into details, it might be admitted that changes
Lorenzo G. Valentin for appellee. as to substantive rights will not govern such "previous"
BENGZON, J.: accidents. Yet here we are dealing with remedies and
Appeal from an order of Hon. Jesus Y. Perez of the Court of jurisdiction which the Legislature has power to determine
First Instance of Bulacan dismissing plaintiff's complaint for and apportion. And then it is hard to imagine how one litigant
workmen's compensation on the ground that the matter could acquire a vested right to be heard by one particular
properly falls within the jurisdiction of the Workmen's court, even before he has submitted himself to that particular
Compensation Commission. court's jurisdiction.
Republic Act No. 772 effective June 20, 1952 conferred upon In the United States actions pending in one court may be
the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner "exclusive validly taken away by statute and transferred to another (See
jurisdiction" to hear and decide claims for compensation 21 C.J.S., p. 148).
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, without costs.
to this Supreme Court. Before the passage of said Act Paras, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista
demands for compensation had to be submitted to the Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
regular courts.
The fatal accident which befell Dioscoro Cruz, husband of FACTS:
plaintiff Carmen Cruz, having occurred in January 1952 and Republic Act No. 772 effective June 20, 1952 conferred upon
action having been commenced in the Court of First Instance the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner "exclusive
of Bulacan in August, 1952, the resultant issue is the proper jurisdiction" to hear and decide claims for compensation
forum: either the courts or the Workmen's Compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal
[Link]
to this Supreme Court. Before the passage of said Act
For the appellants, it is contended that the date of the
demands for compensation had to be submitted to the
accident, and not the date of filing the complaint, should be
considered because the right to compensation of the laborer regular courts.
or employees or his dependents, like the obligation of the
employer to pay the same, begins from the very moment of The fatal accident which befell Dioscoro Cruz, husband of
the accident. plaintiff Carmen Cruz, having occurred in January 1952 and
It is true that the right arises from the moment of the action having been commenced in the Court of First Instance
accident, but such right must be declared or confirmed by of Bulacan in August, 1952.
the government agency empowered by law to make the
declaration. If at the time the petition for such declaration is ISSUE:
addressed to the court, the latter has no longer authority to The proper forum: either the courts or the Workmen's
do so, obviously it has no power to entertain the petition. Compensation Commission
Republic Act No. 772 is very clear that on and after June 20,
1952 all claims for compensation shall be decided
RULING:
exclusively by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,
It is true that the right arises from the moment of the
subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. This claim having
been formulated for the first time in August,1952 in the Court accident, but such right must be declared or confirmed by
of First Instance of Bulacan, the latter had no jurisdiction, at the government agency empowered by law to make the
that time, to act upon it. No constitutional objection may be declaration. If at the time the petition for such declaration is
interposed to the application of the law conferring jurisdiction addressed to the court, the latter has no longer authority to
upon the Commission, because the statute does not thereby do so, obviously it has no power to entertain the petition.
operate retroactively; it is made to operate upon Republic Act No. 772 is very clear that on and after June 20,
claims formulated after the law's approval. As attorney for 1952 all claims for compensation shall be decided
appellee suggests, had the claim been filed before the exclusively by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,
effectivity of Republic Act No. 772 in a court of first instance, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. This claim having
the question might be debatable whether such court should been formulated for the first time in August,1952 in the Court
now continue hearing the matter or not. "A retrospective law, of First Instance of Bulacan, the latter had no jurisdiction, at
in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested that time, to act upon it. No constitutional objection may be
rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new
interposed to the application of the law conferring jurisdiction
obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new
disability, in respect of transactions or consideration already upon the Commission, because the statute does not thereby
past. Hence, remedial statutes, or statutes relating to operate retroactively; it is made to operate upon claims
remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or formulated after the law's approval. As attorney for appellee
take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of suggests, had the claim been filed before the effectivity of
the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not Republic Act No. 772 in a court of first instance, the question
come within the legal conception of a retrospective law, or might be debatable whether such court should now continue
the general rule against the retrospective operation of hearing the matter or not. "A retrospective law, in a legal
statutes" (50 Am. Jur. p. 505). sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights
A parallel situation is not far to seek. The right of the heirs to acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation
the decedent's estate begins from the moment of death. And and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new.
yet it undoubtedly could be within the power of the
 wharfage and, secondly, in view of other related provisions of
the same city charter.
G.R. No. L-14526 March 31, 1965
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION; CARLOS A. GO The word "public", as employed to describe a wharf, does
THONG & COMPANY; CEBU NAVIGATION COMPANY, not refer to its ownership either by the National Government
INC.; CEBU-BOHOL FERRY CO., INC.; COROMINAS, or by a province or municipality. It denotes rather the nature
RICHARDS NAVIGATION CO., INC.; HIJOS DE F. of its use. Thus public wharves have been held to be those
ESCANO, INC.; PACIFIC LINES, INC.; ROYAL LINES, used generally by the public, free of charge or for
INC.; SOUTHERN ISLAND SHIPPING CORPORATION; compensation, while a private wharf is one whose owner or
SWEET LINES SHIPPING; VISAYAN TRANSPORTATION lessee has exclusive enjoyment or use thereof (Hamilton v.
CO., INC.; PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO.; Portland State Pier Site District, 112 A. 836). Piers, or
COMPAÑIA MARITIMA; and GENERAL SHIPPING CO., landing places and wharves may be private or they may be
INC., plaintiffs-appellants, in their nature, public, although the property may be in an
vs. individual owner, where the latter is under obligation to
THE CITY OF CEBU; FELIPE PAREJA, as City Treasurer concede to others the privilege of landing their goods or of
of Cebu; THE HON. SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., as Mayor of mooring their vessels there, upon payment of a reasonable
the City of Cebu, defendants-appellees. compensation as wharfage (Dutton v. Strong, 17 Law Ed. 29,
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for plaintiffs-appellants. 1 Black 35, 66 U.S. 339). So a wharf may be public whether
Cebu City Fiscal and Quirico del Mar for defendants- it belongs to the National Government, to a municipal
appellees. corporation or to a private individual or concern.

MAKALINTAL, J.: Assuming the public character of a wharf by reason of its

availability for public use, the right to impose wharfage dues
The principal question here is whether or not under its rests on a different basis — that of ownership. For wharfage
charter, Commonwealth Act No. 58, the City of Cebu may is a charge against the vessel by way of rent or
provide by ordinance for the collection of wharfage from compensation for its being allowed to lie alongside a wharf
shipping concerns whose vessels dock at the public wharves for the purpose of loading or unloading freight (Phil. Sugar
of piers located in said city but owned by the National Centrals Agency vs. Insular Collector of Customs, 51 Phil.
Government. The ordinance, No. 207, was purportedly 131, citing Parkersburg and Ohio River Transportation Co.
enacted by the Municipal Board on August 14, 1956 and vs. City of Parkersburg, 27 Law Ed. 584) and, of course, for
approved by the City Mayor on the following August 27. the use of the artificial facilities offered for that purpose (City
Plaintiffs paid the wharfage charges under protest since of Shreveport vs. Red River and Coast Line, 55 Am. Rep.
September 1, 1956 and on May 8, 1957 filed this action in 504). That the right to charge wharfage is based on
the Court of First Instance of Manila to have the said ownership has been impliedly recognized by this Court
ordinance declared void, its enforcement enjoined in so far in Province of Mindoro v. Cruz, 74 Phil. 108, as follows: "...
as the wharves, docks and other landing places belonging to the subsequent classification of the port of Calapan as a
the National Government were concerned, and all the national port did not, and was not intended to, divest the
amounts thus far collected by defendants refunded to them. province of Mindoro of its part ownership of the wharf and,
accordingly, of its right to collect wharfage for its use as it
The court a quo dismissed the complaint after trial and the had theretofore done"; and "not until its complete ownership
case has come to us on appeal by plaintiffs. has become vested in the National Government by the mode
of transfer provided by law may the province of Mindoro be
Appellants have raised some questions of fact, and in divested of this right."
particular point out certain events and circumstances to
show that ordinance No. 207 was not and could not have Under the foregoing test the right to collect the wharfage in
been enacted, as alleged by appellees, on August 14, 1956. question here belongs to the National Government, as in fact
This case, however, may be decided solely on the legal it has always collected the same from appellants. It is
issue presented by the parties. The Municipal Board's unreasonable to conclude that the legislature, simply
authority to pass the ordinance is claimed by appellees because it employed the term "public wharves" in section 17
under section 17 (w) of the charter of the City of Cebu, which (w) of the charter of the City of Cebu, thereby authorized the
states: latter to collect wharfage irrespective of the ownership of the
SECTION 17. General powers and duties of the wharves involved. The National Government did not
Board.—Except as otherwise provided by law, and surrender such ownership to the city; and there is no
subject to the conditions and limitations thereof, justifiable ground to read into the statute an intention to
the Municipal Board shall have the following burden shipowners, such as appellants, with the obligation of
legislative powers: paying twice for the same purpose.
xxx xxx xxx
(w) To fix the charges to be paid by all watercrafts Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration
landing at or using public wharves, docks, levees, of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a
or landing places. particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory
construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase
The lower court ruled upholding appellees' contention in this might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one
respect, that in using the terms "public wharves, docks, actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is
levees, or landing places," the legislature made no considered with those with which it is associated. Thus an
distinction between those owned by the National apparently general provision may have a limited application if
Government and those owned by the City of Cebu and that viewed together with other provisions.
consequently both fall within the scope of the power granted.
Appellants assail this construction as erroneous, first in the Section 17 (w) of the charter of the City of Cebu is a case in
light of the generally accepted meaning of "public wharf" as it point. It authorizes the Municipal Board to fix the charges to
may have a bearing on the right or authority to charge be paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public wharves,
docks, levees, or landing places. There is indeed no national government, provincial, or municipality, because the
distinction therein between public wharves owned by the local legislators did not make distinction between those
National Government and those owned by the city itself. But owned by the national government and those owned by the
the subsection immediately preceding (v) impliedly city of Cebu.
establishes such a distinction. It empowers the Municipal Issue: Whether or not the city of Cebu may provide an
Board "to provide for the construction and maintenance, and ordinance charging vessels dock at public wharves of piers
regulate the use, of public landing places, wharves, piers,
located in the said city but owned by the national
docks and levees." It seems fairly evident that when the
government
lawmaking body used the term "public wharves, etc." in
subsection 2, it meant to refer to those mentioned in the Held: No.
preceding subsection, namely, the "public wharves, etc." Ratio: Because Sec 17(w) of the Charter of Cebu would
constructed and therefore owned by the City of Cebu. refer only to those public wharves or landing places owned
Section 30 of the charter has a similar bearing on the by the City of Cebu and not those owned by the national
question, in granting to the City Engineer "the care and government, under the exclusive supervision of Bureau of
custody of all public docks, wharves, piers, levees, and Customs, Sec. 1142 of Revised Administrative Code.
landing places, when erected" — undoubtedly referring to StatCon maxim: Legislative intent should accordingly be
those constructed and owned by the city. For in so far as ascertained from a consideration if the whole context of the
those belonging to the National Government are concerned statute and not from an isolated part or particular provision.
they remain under the exclusive control, direction and
management of the Bureau of Customs, according to section
1142 of the Revised Administrative Code. And appellants
have accordingly been paying to the National Government
fees for the use of its wharves in Cebu, pursuant to law,
particularly Republic Act No. 1371 which took effect on July
1, 1955 and was later on embodied in the new Tariff and
Customs Code.

The court a quo ruled that Section 17 (w) of the city charter
is "plainly evincive of the power to tax for revenue purposes,"
and therefore the wharfage charges imposed by ordinance
pursuant thereto are proper even if the amounts actually
collected are much more than what may be justified as
license fees under the police power of regulation of "shipping
offices" granted under section 17 (1) of the same charter.
The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty and for it to be
exercised by a municipal corporation requires a clear
delegation of the power by means of charter grant or by a
general enabling statute. The power is not inherent in a
municipal corporation (Saldaña vs. City of Iloilo, 55 O.G.
10267), and if there is any doubt as to whether or not such
power has been delegated to it the doubt must be resolved
negatively (We Wa Yu vs. City of Lipa, 54 O.G. 4055).

But even if the wharfage dues authorized under Section

17(w) be considered as taxes for revenue, such authority
nevertheless is limited to public wharves, docks, levees and
other landing places belonging to the City of Cebu and not to
those owned by the National Government under the
exclusive supervision of the Bureau of Customs.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed

from is reversed; Ordinance No. 207 of the City of Cebu is
declared null and void, and appellees are ordered to refund
to appellants all amounts collected thereunder and to refrain
from making such collection. Costs against appellees.

Facts: Ordinance No.207 was passed by Municipal Board of

Cebu, which required ships whose vessels dock at the public
wharves of piers located in the said city, but owned by the
national government. The petitioner paid the wharfage
charges under protest. Aboitiz questioned the validity of the
ordinance contending that the said ordinance could not have
been enacted because the right to collect wharfage belongs
to the national government. As a result of this ordinance,
they will be paying twice. The petitioner attacked Sec. 17(w)
of the ordinance which states that “charges to be paid by all
watercrafts landing at or using public wharves, docks,
levees, or landing places,” questioning the application of the
word “public” whether it refers to the ownership of the
 were the accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves,
Jr. of Branch II (Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833
and 1839, respectively).
Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge
Republic of the Philippines Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dated
SUPREME COURT December 9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on the
Manila grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the
SECOND DIVISION land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the
G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980 decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or
As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the rule
SERNA. JR., as complainant all private of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the
prosecutor, petitioners, cultivation of a grazing land.
vs. Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court by using in lieu of "stealth and strategy" the expression "with
of First Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO DACULLO, threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the
GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner". The
CAJES and MODESTO S SUELLO, respondents. fiscal asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered and
AQUINO, J.:p that the amended informations be admitted.
The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase
No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies "and for other purposes" in the decree does not include
to agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect on agricultural purposes because its preamble does not mention
August 20, 1975) provides: the Secretary of Agriculture and makes reference to the
SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, affluent class.
intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court
absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal is devoid of merit.
occupying or possessing the property of the latter We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree
against his will for residential, commercial or any does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows
other purposes, shall be punished by an that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban
imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in
a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating
five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The preamble of the decree is quoted below:
(2nd paragraph is omitted.) WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite
The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated
R. Ello filed with the lower court separate informations October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of
against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as National Defense, Public Work. 9 and
penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information communications, Social Welfare and the Director of
against Mario Aparici which is similar to the other fifteen Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the
informations, reads: Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation
That sometime in the year 1974 Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and
continuously up to the present at City and District Engineers, "to remove an illegal
barangay Magsaysay, municipality of constructions including buildings on and along
Talibon, province of Bohol, Philippines esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks
and within the jurisdiction of this and those built without permits on public and private
Honorable Court, the above-named property." squatting is still a major problem in urban
accused, with stealth and strategy, enter communities all over the country;
into, occupy and cultivate a portion of a WHEREAS, many persons or entities
grazing land physically occupied, found to have been unlawfully occupying
possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente public and private lands belong to the
de la Serna, Jr. as successor to the affluent class;
pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna WHEREAS, there is a need to further
of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919, intensify the government's drive against
accused's entrance into the area has this illegal and nefarious practice.
been and is still against the win of the It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers
offended party; did then and there to illegal constructions on public and private property. It is
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which
and cultivate a portion of the said provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of
grazing land; said cultivating has public health, safety and peace and order.
rendered a nuisance to and has On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on
deprived the pasture applicant from the public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in
full use thereof for which the land this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes
applied for has been intended, that is it unlawful for any person, corporation or association to
preventing applicant's cattle from forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands. That law
grazing the whole area, thereby causing provides:
damage and prejudice to the said SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any
applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. person corporation or association to
Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic) enter or occupy, through force,
Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth,
Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and Modesto Suello any public agriculture land including
 such public lands as are granted to
private individuals under the provision of
the Public Land Act or any other laws
providing for the of public agriculture
lands in the Philippines and are duly
covered by the corresponding
applications for the notwithstanding
standing the fact that title thereto still
Republic of the Philippines
remains in the Government or for any
SUPREME COURT
person, natural or judicial to investigate
Manila
induce or force another to commit such
acts.
Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding EN BANC
one thousand or imprisonment for not more than one year, or
both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the
court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
(See People vs. Lapasaran 100 Phil. 40.)
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) BARA LIDASAN, petitioner,
invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, vs.
the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal
constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of
statutory construction which is resorted to when the Suntay for petitioner.
legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Barrios and Fule for respondent.
Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. SANCHEZ, J.:
No costs.

SO ORDERED. The question initially presented to the Commission on

Elections,1 is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An
Facts: Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court against 16 Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of
Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another
persons charging them with squatting, as penalized in
province — Cotabato — to be spared from attack planted
Presidential Decree 772. Respondent Echavez dismissed
upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be
the case on the grounds that 1) the accused entered the land enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
through stealth and strategy and not with the use of force, shall be expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer
intimidation, or threat or taking advantage of the absence of is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the present original petition
the owner (as described in the Presidential Decree); and 2) for certiorari and prohibition.
under the rule of ejusdem genernis, the decree does not
apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law
Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decree 771 penalizes House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in
dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba,
squatting and similar acts also apply to agricultural lands
reads:
Held: No.
Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga,
Ratio: The preamble shows that it was intended to apply to Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
squatting in urban communities or particularly to illegal Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan,
constructions in squatter areas. The complainant involves Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan,
pasture lands in rural areas. The rule of ejusdem generis (of Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and
the same kind) does not apply to this case. Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and
Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are
StatCon maxim: A preamble may restrict what otherwise separated from said municipalities and constituted
appears to be a broad scope of a law. into a distinct and independent municipality of the
same province to be known as the Municipality of
Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of
government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.

Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors

of the new municipality shall be elected in the
nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for
local officials.

Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just

mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final
the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of approval in the House of Representatives4 where the bill,
Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. being of local application, originated.5

Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to
resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent portions of which employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
are: precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title
should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it
For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of
inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of
voters and for other election purposes, the Commission
the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and
RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And
of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios of
this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study
Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis,
and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and,
Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung situated in
thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.6
the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of
Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon,
Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat- In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute
bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and conforms with the constitutional requirement, the following,
Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of we believe, may be taken as guidelines:
Cotabato.
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios — in two misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential,
municipalities in the province of Cotabato — are transferred and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it
to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is
change in the boundaries of the two provinces. so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry
as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the
to or indicating one subject where another or different one is
Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive
really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of
indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting
legislation."
In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance
rather than its form should be considered, and the purpose
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its
of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all
own interpretation, declared that the statute "should be
persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court.7
implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court."
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at
the disputed statute. The title — "An Act Creating the
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and
Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del
prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the
Sur"8 — projects the impression that solely the province of
detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter
Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not
for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be
the slightest intimation is there that communities in the
declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of
adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new
August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the
Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao
same for electoral purposes, be nullified.
del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title
misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the
1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one
aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and
expressed in the title of the bill."2 Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it
also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province
different from Lanao del Sur.
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the
constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon
legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not
conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members
subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise
language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato
those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory is being taken away from their towns and province
and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were
statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which
constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act
command."3 Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the 4790.
Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to
read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact,
in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act
Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to
two provinces resulting in "the substantial diminution of "challenge the attention of those affected by the
territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the act to its provisions." Savings Bank vs. State of
incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.
the municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to
the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need not
The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation
be expressed in the title of the law." This posture — we must
of the act of Muskegon county. The act goes
say — but emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions
beyond the restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs.
in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable
Wooly, supra: "The title is erroneous in the worst
portion of territory from one province to another of necessity
degree, for it is misleading."9
involves reduction of area, population and income of the first
and the corresponding increase of those of the other. This is
as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political
title did not reflect this fact. subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not expressed in
the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional."10
Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511,
October 29, 1966, as controlling here. The Felwa case is not We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
in focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695)
reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain
2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be
Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was
salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the
assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment that the
municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with
provisions of the law (Section, 8 thereof) in reference to the
the mere nullification of the portion thereof which took away
elective officials of the provinces thus created, were not set
the twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang
forth in the title of the bill. We there ruled that this pretense is
in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoning advocated
devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act creating said provinces
is that the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios
must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the
actually in the province of Lanao del Sur.
affairs thereof" — which is "manifestly germane to the
subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute
now before us stands altogether on a different footing. The We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and
lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate of long standing, that where a portion of a statute is rendered
provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor logical unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be
consequence of the creation of the new municipality of separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Black,
Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the two provinces may however, gives the exception to this rule, thus:
be made without necessarily creating a new municipality and
vice versa.
. . . But when the parts of the statute are so
mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is considerations, inducements, or compensations
drawn to Hume vs. Village of Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649. for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all
Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of could not be carried into effect, the legislature
Muskegon." The statute, however, in its section 1 reads: would not pass the residue independently, then, if
"The people of the state of Michigan enact, that the following some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions
described territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa which are thus dependent, conditional, or
Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and the same is hereby constituted connected, must fall with them,11
a village corporate, by the name of the Village of Fruitport."
This statute was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of
Ottawa county, in an action to restraint the Village from In substantially similar language, the same exception is
exercising jurisdiction and control, including taxing his lands. recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court, thus:
Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the
Michigan State Constitution, which reads: "No law shall The general rule is that where part of a statute is
embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while
its title." The Circuit Court decree voided the statute and another part is valid, the valid portion if
defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted separable from the invalid, may stand and be
to uphold the decree of nullity. The following, said in Hume, enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion
may well apply to this case: must be so far independent of the invalid
portion that it is fair to presume that the
It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they
village of Fruitport," would have been a sufficient had supposed that they could not constitutionally
title, and that the words, "in the county of enact the other. . . Enough must remain to make a
Muskegon" were unnecessary; but we do not complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which
agree with appellant that the words last quoted carries out the legislative intent. . . . The language
may, for that reason, be disregarded as used in the invalid part of the statute can have no
surplusage. legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever,
and what remains must express the legislative will
independently of the void part, since the court has
. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a no power to legislate, . . . .12
court cannot reject a part of the title of an act for
the purpose of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody,
56 N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.
Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are
intended, by the Act, to create the restricted area of nine to constitute a town at all, it is the function of Congress, not
barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur of this Court, to spell out that congressional will.
into the town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns of
Buldon and Parang, Cotabato were to be excluded
Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null
therefrom? The answer must be in the negative.
and void in its totality.14

Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They

3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by
serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the
respondent, namely, that petitioner has no substantial legal
functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency
interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic
of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in
Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is that
the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for
petitioner is not the real party in interest.
their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.13

Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that

Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the
it violates the constitutional requirement that the subject of
consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of
the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore,
maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst
hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests
these are population, territory, and income. It was apparently
are impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio
these same factors which induced the writing out of House
in Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing has been
Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking of the
transferred to a different provincial hegemony.
original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new
municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now
Republic Act 4790, reads: The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community
affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that the
law so created is not dismembering his place of residence
The territory is now a progressive community; the
"in accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in this
aggregate population is large; and the collective
jurisdiction.15
income is sufficient to maintain an independent
municipality.
Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967
elections. His right to vote in his own barrio before it was
This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the
annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is
inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and
the case here, to vote in a town different from his actual
enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy.
residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of
hitherto different communities which are fanned into the new
When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, town; he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and
unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios — not as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and
nine barrios — was in the mind of the proponent thereof. benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the
That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of desire
thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the to vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should
government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality be cast for the officials in the town before dismemberment.
of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be
number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the
progressive community, large aggregate population, community affected thereby,16 it stands to reason to say that
collective income sufficient to maintain an independent when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen
municipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to
out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that the inhabitants challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by
of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be Congress.
formed into a municipality, what with the consequent duties
and liabilities of an independent municipal corporation?
For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790
Could they stand on their own feet with the income to be
null and void, and to prohibit respondent Commission from
derived in their community? How about the peace and order,
implementing the same for electoral purposes.
sanitation, and other corporate obligations? This Court may
not supply the answer to any of these disturbing questions.
And yet, to remain deaf to these problems, or to answer No costs allowed. So ordered.
them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability,
we are afraid, is to impute to Congress an undeclared will.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,
With the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the
Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
basic considerations of progressive community, large
aggregate population and sufficient income, we may not now
say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine Separate Opinions
— of the original twenty-one — barrios, with a seat of
government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly
stretches judicial interpretation of congressional intent FERNANDO, J., dissenting:
beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line
which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative With regret and with due recognition of the merit of the
premises. Paying due respect to the traditional separation of opinion of the Court, I find myself unable to give my assent.
powers, we may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 Hence these few words to express my stand.
to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally
Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the predicated was the violation of the above constitutional
creation of the municipality of Dianaton in the province of provision. This Retirement Act for senators and
Lanao del Sur. The title makes evident what is the subject representatives was entitled "AN ACT AMENDING SUB-
matter of such an enactment. The mere fact that in the body SECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH
of such statute barrios found in two other municipalities of ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS
another province were included does not of itself suffice for a AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY
finding of nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision HUNDRED NINETY-SIX." As we noted, the paragraph in
invoked. At the most, the statute to be free from the Republic Act No. 3836 deemed objectionable "refers to
insubstantial doubts about its validity must be construed as members of Congress and to elective officers thereof who
not including the barrios, located not in the municipalities of are not members of the Government Service Insurance
Butig and Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, but in Parang and System. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these
Baldon, Cotabato. officials, would relate to a subject matter which is not
germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words, this
portion of the amendment ( re retirement benefits for
The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be
Members of Congress and appointive officers, such as the
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each house) is not
shall be expressed in the title of the bill.1 This provision is
related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act
similar to those found in the Constitution of many American
No. 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance
States. It is aimed against the evils, of the so-called omnibus
System and which provides for both retirement and
bills, and log-rolling legislation, and against surreptitious or
insurance benefits to its members." Nonetheless our opinion
unconsidered enactments.2 Where the subject of a bill is
was careful to note that there was no abandonment of the
limited to a particular matter, the members of the legislature
principle of liberality. Thus: "we are not unmindful of the fact
as well as the people should be informed of the subject of
that there has been a general disposition in all courts to
proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision
construe the constitutional provision with reference to the
thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider
subject and title of the Act, liberally."
being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the
bill.
It would follow therefore that the challenged legislation
Republic Act No. 4790 is not susceptible to the indictment
It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or
that the constitutional requirement as to legislation having
impede proper legislation. The construction must be
only one subject which should be expressed in his title was
reasonable and not technical. It is sufficient if the title be
not met. The subject was the creation of the municipality of
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general
Dianaton. That was embodied in the title.
object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing
each and every end and means necessary for the
accomplishment of that object. Mere details need not be set It is in the light of the aforementioned judicial decisions of
forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of the this Court, some of the opinions coming from jurists
act a complete index of its contents. The constitutional illustrious for their mastery of constitutional law and their
provision is satisfied if all parts of an act which relates to its acknowledged erudition, that, with all due respect, I find the
subject find expression in its title.3 citation from Corpus Juris Secundum, unnecessary and far
from persuasive. The State decisions cited, I do not deem
controlling, as the freedom of this Court to accept or reject
The first decision of this Court, after the establishment of the
doctrines therein announced cannot be doubted.
Commonwealth of the Philippines, in 1938, construing a
provision of this nature, Government v. Hongkong &
Shanghai Bank,4 held that the inclusion of Section 11 of Act Wherein does the weakness of the statute lie then? To
No. 4007, the Reorganization Law, providing for the mode in repeat, several barrios of two municipalities outside Lanao
which the total annual expenses of the Bureau of Banking del Sur were included in the municipality of Dianaton of that
may be reimbursed through assessment levied upon all province. That itself would not have given rise to a
banking institutions subject to inspection by the Bank constitutional question considering the broad, well-high
Commissioner was not violative of such a requirement in the plenary powers possessed by Congress to alter provincial
Jones Law, the previous organic act. Justice Laurel, and municipal boundaries. What justified resort to this Court
however, vigorously dissented, his view being that while the was the congressional failure to make explicit that such
main subject of the act was reorganization, the provision barrios in two municipalities located in Cotabato would
assailed did not deal with reorganization but with taxation. thereafter form part of the newly created municipality of
While the case of Government vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Dianaton, Lanao del Sur.
Bank was decided by a bare majority of four justices against
three, the present trend seems to be that the constitutional
To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must
requirement is to be given the liberal test as indicated in the
be construed as to exclude from Dianaton all of such barrios
majority opinion penned by Justice Abad Santos, and not the
mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found in municipalities
strict test as desired by the majority headed by Justice
outside Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can
Laurel.
meet the test of the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this to do
violence to the legislative intent. What was created was a
Such a trend has been reflected in subsequent decisions new municipality from barrios named as found in Lanao del
beginning with Sumulong v. Commission on Elections,5 up to Sur. This construction assures precisely that.
and including Felwa vs. Salas, a 1966 decision,6 the opinion
coming from Justice Concepcion.
This mode of interpreting Republic Act No. 4790 finds
support in basic principles underlying precedents, which if
It is true of course that in Philconsa v. Gimenez,7 one of the not precisely controlling, have a persuasive ring.
grounds on which the invalidity of Republic Act No. 3836 was In Radiowealth v. Agregado,8 certain provisions of the
Administrative Code were interpreted and given a
"construction which would be more in harmony with the
tenets of the fundamental law." In Sanchez v. Lyon
Construction,9 this Court had a similar ruling: "Article 302 of
the Code of Commerce must be applied in consonance with
[the relevant] provisions of our Constitution." The above
principle gained acceptance at a much earlier period in our
constitutional history. Thus in a 1913 decision, In re
Guariña:10"In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine
Commission we deem it our duty not to give it a construction
which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the
language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another
construction not in conflict with the higher law. In doing so,
we think we should not hesitate to disregard contentions
touching the apparent intention of the legislator which would
lead to the conclusion that the Commission intended to enact
a law in violation of the Act of Congress. However specious
the argument may be in favor of one of two possible
constructions, it must be disregarded if on examination it is
found to rest on the contention that the legislator designed
an attempt to transcend the rightful limits of his authority, and
that his apparent intention was to enact an invalid law."

American Supreme Court decisions are equally explicit. The

then Justice, later Chief Justice, Stone, construed statutes
"with an eye to possible constitutional limitations so as to G.R. No. L-26100 February 28, 1969
avoid doubts as to [their] validity." 11 From the pen of the
articulate jurist, Frankfurter:12 "Accordingly, the phrase CITY OF BAGUlO, REFORESTATION ADMINISTRATION,
"lobbying activities" in the resolution must be given the FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, SR., FRANCISCO G.
meaning that may fairly be attributed to it, having special JOAQUIN, JR., and TERESITA J. BUCHHOLZ petitioners,
regard for the principle of constitutional adjudication which vs.
makes it decisive in the choice of fair alternatives that one HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First
construction may raise serious constitutional questions Instance of Baguio,
avoided by another." His opinion in the Rumely case BELONG LUTES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF
continues with the above pronouncement of Stone and two APPEALS, respondents.
other former Chief Justices: "In the words of Mr. Chief
Justice Taft, '(i)t is our duty in the interpretation of federal
statutes to reach conclusion which will avoid serious doubt of 1st Assistant City Fiscal Dionisio C. Claridad, Augusto
their constitutionality', Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United Tobias and Feria, Feria, Lugtu and La'O for petitioners.
States, 275 US 331, 346, 48 S. Ct. 194, 198, 72 L. ed. Bernardo C. Ronquillo for respondents.
303. . . . As phrased by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, "if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal SANCHEZ, J.:
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided.' Crowell v. Benson, 285, 296, 76 Petitioners attack the jurisdiction of the Court of First
L. ed. 598, and cases cited." The prevailing doctrine then as Instance of Baguio to reopen cadastral proceedings under
set forth by Justice Clark in a 1963 decision,13 is that courts Republic Act 931. Private petitioner's specifically question
"have consistently sought an interpretation which supports the ruling of the Court of Appeals that they have no
the constitutionality of legislation." Phrased differently by personality to oppose reopening. The three-pronged
Justice Douglas, the judiciary favors "that interpretation of contentions of all the petitioners are: (1) the reopening
legislation which gives it the greater change of surviving the petition was filed outside the 40-year period next
test of constitutionality."14 preceding the approval of Republic Act 931; (2) said
petition was not published; and (3) private petitioners,
as lessees of the public land in question, have court
It would follow then that both Philippine and American standing under Republic Act 931. The facts follow:
decisions unite in the view that a legislative measure, in the
language of Van Devanter "should not be given a
construction which will imperil its validity where it is On April 12, 1912, the cadastral proceedings sought to be
reasonably open to construction free from such reopened, Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No.
peril."15 Republic Act No. 4790 as above construed incurs no 211, Baguio Townsite, were instituted by the Director of
such risk and is free from the peril of nullity. Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio. It is not
disputed that the land here involved (described in Plan Psu-
186187) was amongst those declared public lands by final
So I would view the matter, with all due acknowledgment of decision rendered in that case on November 13, 1922.
the practical considerations clearly brought to light in the
opinion of the Court.
On July 25, 1961, respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the
cadastral court to reopen said Civil Reservation Case No. 1
as to the parcel of land he claims. His prayer was that the
land be registered in his name upon the grounds that: (1) he
and his predecessors have been in actual, open,
adverse, peaceful and continuous possession and Then came the judgment of the Court of Appeals of
cultivation of the land since Spanish times, or before September 30, 1965. The court held that petitioners were not
July 26, 1894, paying the taxes thereon; and (2) his bound by the declaratory judgment heretofore hated.
predecessors were illiterate Igorots without personal Nevertheless, the appellate court ruled that as lessees,
notice of the cadastral proceedings aforestated and private petitioners had no right to oppose the reopening of
were not able to file their claim to the land in question the cadastral case. Petitioners moved to reconsider. It was
within the statutory period. thwarted on May 6, 1966.

On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G. Petitioners now seek redress from this Court. On July 6,
Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J. 1966, respondents moved to dismiss the petition before us.
Buchholz registered opposition to the reopening. Ground: On August 5, 1966, petitioners opposed. On August 12,
They are tree farm lessees upon agreements executed by 1966, we gave due course.
the Bureau of Forestry in their favor for 15,395.65 square
meters on March. 16, 1959, for 12,108 square meters on
1. Do private petitioners have personality to appear in the
July 24, 1959, and for 14,771 square meters on July 17,
reopening proceedings?
1959, respectively.

First, to the controlling statute, Republic Act 931, effective

On May 5, 1962, the City of Baguio likewise opposed
June 20, 1953.
reopening.

The title of the Act reads —

On May 8, 1962, upon Lutes' opposition, the cadastral
court denied private petitioners' right to intervene in the
case because of a final declaratory relief judgment dated AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER
March 9, 1962 in Yaranon vs. Castrillo [Civil Case 946, COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN
Court of First Instance of Baguio] which declared that CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE
such tree farm leases were null and void. BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF
JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY
YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.
On May 18, 1962, private petitioners moved to reconsider.
They averred that said declaratory relief judgment did not
bind them, for they were not parties to that action. Section 1 thereof provides —

On September 14, 1962, the cadastral court reversed its own SECTION 1. All persons claiming title to parcels of
ruling of May 8, 1962, allowed petitioners to cross-examine land that have been the object of cadastral
the witnesses of respondent Lutes. proceedings, who at the time of the survey were in
actual possession of the same, but for some
justifiable reason had been unable to file their
On October 16, 1962, Lutes replied to and moved to dismiss
claim in the proper court during the time limit
private petitioners' opposition to his reopening petition. On
established by law, in case such parcels of land,
October 25, 1962, private petitioners' rejoinder was filed.
on account of their failure to file such claims, have
been, or are about to be declared land of the
On August 5, 1963, the cadastral court dismissed private public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings
petitioners' opposition to the reopening. A motion to instituted within the forty years next preceding the
reconsider was rejected by the court on November 5, approval of this Act, are hereby granted the right
1963. within five years 2 after the date on which this Act
shall take effect, to petition for a reopening of the
judicial proceedings under the provisions of Act
On January 6, 1964, it was the turn of the City of Baguio
Numbered Twenty-two hundred and fifty-nine,
to lodge a motion to dismiss the petition to reopen. This
as amended, only with respect to such of said
motion was adopted as its own by the Reforestation
parcels of land as have not been alienated,
Administration. They maintained the position that the
reserved, leased, granted, or
declaratory judgment in Civil Case 946 was not binding on
otherwise provisionally or permanently dispos
those not parties thereto. Respondent Lutes opposed on
ed of by the Government, and the competent
February 24, 1964. On April 6, 1964, private petitioners
Court of First Instance, upon receiving such
reiterated their motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.
petition, shall notify the Government through
the Solicitor General, and if after hearing the
On September 17, 1964, the court denied for lack of merit parties, said court shall find that all conditions
the City's motion as well as the April 6, 1964 motion to herein established have been complied with,
dismiss made by private petitioners. and that all taxes, interests and penalties
thereof have been paid from the time when
land tax should have been collected until the
On November 13, 1964, all the petitioners went to the Court day when the motion is presented, it shall
of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with order said judicial proceedings reopened as if
preliminary injunction. 1 They then questioned the cadastral no action has been taken on such parcels. 3
court's jurisdiction over the petition to reopen and the latter's
order of August 5, 1963 dismissing private petitioners'
opposition. The appellate court issued a writ of preliminary We concede that in Leyva vs. Jandoc, L-16965, February 28,
injunction upon a P500-bond. 1962, a land registration case where oppositors were
"foreshore lessees of public land", a principle was hammered
out that although Section 34, Land Registration Republic Act 931 and place it beyond the reach of a petition
Act, 4"apparently authorizes any person claiming any kind of for reopening. 10
interest to file an opposition to an application for
registration, ... nevertheless ... the opposition must be based
In line with the Court of Appeals' conclusion, not disputed by
on a right of dominion or some other real right independent
respondent Lutes herein, the cadastral court should have
of, and not at all subordinate to, the rights of the
ruled on the validity of private petitioners 'tree farm leases
Government."5 The opposition, according to
— on the merits. Because there is need for Lutes' right to
the Leyva decision, "must necessarily be predicated upon
reopen and petitioners' right to continue as lessees to be
the property in question being part of the public
threshed out in that court. We, accordingly, hold that private
domain." Leyva thus pronounced that "it is incumbent upon
petitioners, who aver that they are lessees, have the
the duly authorized representatives of the Government to
necessary personality to intervene in and oppose respondent
represent its interests as well as private claims intrinsically
Lutes' petition for reopening.
dependent upon it."

2. Petitioners next contend that the reopening petition below,

But the Leyva case concerned an ordinary land registration
filed under R.A. 931, should have been published in
proceeding under the provisions of the Land Registration
accordance with the Cadastral Act.
Act. Normally and logically, lessees cannot there present
issues of ownership. The case at bar, however, stands on a
different footing. It involves a special statute R.A. 931, which To resolve this contention, we need but refer to a very recent
allows a petition for reopening on lands "about to be decision of this Court in De Castro vs. Marcos, supra,
declared" or already "declared land of the public domain" by involving exactly the same set of facts bearing upon the
virtue of judicial proceedings. Such right, however, is made question. We there held, after a discussion of law and
to cover limited cases, i.e., "only with respect to such of said jurisprudence, that: "In sum, the subject matter of the petition
parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, for reopening — a parcel of land claimed by respondent Akia
granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed — was already embraced in the cadastral proceedings filed
of by the Government." 6 The lessee's right is thus impliedly by the Director of Lands. Consequently, the Baguio cadastral
recognized by R.A. 931. This statutory phrase steers the court already acquired jurisdiction over the said property. The
present case clear from the impact of the precept forged petition, therefore, need not be published." We find no
by Leyva. So it is, that if the land subject of a petition to reason to break away from such conclusion.
reopen has already been leased by the government, that
petition can no longer prosper.
Respondent Lutes attached to the record a certified true
copy of the November 13, 1922 decision in the Baguio
This was the holding in Director of Land vs. Benitez, L- Townsite Reservation case to show, amongst others, that the
21368, March 31, 1966. The reopening petition there filed land here involved was part of that case. Petitioners do not
was opposed by the Director of Lands in behalf of take issue with respondent Lutes on this point of fact.
62 lessees of public land holding revocable permits issued
by the government. We struck down the petition in that Case
We here reiterate our ruling in De Castro, supra, that the
because the public land, subject-matter of the suit, had
power of the cadastral court below over petitions to reopen,
already been leased by the government to private persons.
as in this case, is not jurisdictionally tainted by want of
publication.
Of course, the Benitez ruling came about not by
representations of the lessees alone, but through the
3. A question of transcendental importance is this: Does the
Director of Lands. But we may well scale the heights of
cadastral court have power to reopen the cadastral
injustice or abet violations of R.A. 931 if we entertain the
proceedings upon the application of respondent Lutes?
view that only the Director of Lands 7 can here properly
oppose the reopening petition. Suppose the lands office fails
to do so? Will legitimate lessees be left at the mercy of The facts are: The cadastral proceedings sought to be
government officials? Should the cadastral court close its reopened were instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision
eyes to the fact of lease that may be proved by the lessees was rendered on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition
themselves, and which is enough to bar the reopening to reopen on July 25, 1961.
petition? R.A. 931 could not have intended that this situation
should happen. The point is that, with the fact of lease, no
question of ownership need be inquired into pursuant to R.A. It will be noted that the title of R.A. 931, heretofore
931. From this standpoint, lessees have sufficient legal transcribed, authorizes "the filing in the proper court, under
interest in the proceedings. certain conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land
that have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial
decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the
The right of private petitioners to oppose a reopening petition approval of this Act." The body of the statute, however, in its
here becomes the more patent when we take stock of their Section 1, speaks of parcels of land that "have been, or are
averment that they have introduced improvements on the about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of
land affected. It would seem to us that lessees insofar as judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next
R.A. 931 is concerned, come within the purview of those preceding the approval of this Act." There thus appears to be
who, according to the Rules of Court, 8 may intervene in an a seeming inconsistency between title and body.
action. For, they are persons who have "legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties." 9 In the event herein private petitioners are able to It must be stressed at this point that R.A. 931 is not under
show that they are legitimate lessees, then their lease will siege on constitutional grounds. No charge has been made
continue. And this because it is sufficient that it be proven hero or in the courts below that the statute offends the
that the land is leased to withdraw it from the operation of constitutional injunction that the subject of legislation must
be expressed in the title thereof. Well-entrenched in It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is
constitutional law is the precept that constitutional questions adopted by the Legislature, more thoroughly read than the
will not be entertained by courts unless they are "specifically act itself, and in many states is the subject of constitutional
raised, insisted upon and adequately argued." 11 At any rate it regulation." 24 The constitutional in jurisdiction that the
cannot be seriously disputed that the subject of R.A. 931 is subject of the statute must be expressed in the title of the
expressed in its title. bill, breathes the spirit of command because "the
Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to
read during its deliberations the entire text of the
This narrows our problem down to one of legal
bill." 25Reliance, therefore, may be placed on the title of a bill,
hermeneutics.
which, while not an enacting part, no doubt "is in some sort a
part of the act, although only a formal part." 26 These
Many are the principles evolved in the interpretation of laws. considerations are all the more valid here because R.A. 931
It is thus not difficult to stray away from the true path of was passed without benefit of congressional debate in the
construction, unless we constantly bear in mind the goal we House from which it originated as House Bill 1410, 27 and in
seek. The office of statutory interpretation, let us not for a the Senate. 28
moment forget, is to determine legislative intent. In the words
of a well-known authority, "[t]he true object of all
The title now under scrutiny possesses the strength of clarity
interpretation is to ascertain the meaning and will of the law-
and positiveness. It recites that it authorizes court
making body, to the end that it may be enforced." 12 In
proceedings of claims to parcels of land declared public land
varying language, "the, purpose of all rules or maxims" in
"by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years
interpretation "is to discover the true intention of the
next preceding the approval of this Act." That title is written
law." 13 They "are only valuable when they subserve this
"in capital letters" — by Congress itself; such kind of a title
purpose." 14 In fact, "the spirit or intention of a statute prevails
then "is not to be classed with words or titles used by
over the letter thereof." 15 A statute "should be construed
compilers of statutes" because "it is the legislature
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
speaking." 29 Accordingly, it is not hard to come to a
necessary, the letter of the law." 16 By this, we do not "correct
deduction that the phrase last quoted from R.A. 931 — "by
the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give
virtue of judicial decisions rendered" — was but inadvertently
due course to" its true intent. 17
omitted from the body. Parting from this premise, there is, at
bottom, no contradiction between title and body. In line with
It should be certain by now that when engaged in the task of views herein stated, the title belongs to that type of titles
construing an obscure expression in the law 18 or where which; should be regarded as part of the rules or provisions
exact or literal rendering of the words would not carry out the expressed in the body. 30 At the very least, the words "by
legislative intent, 19 the title thereof may be resorted to in the virtue of judicial decisions rendered" in the title of the law
ascertainment of congressional will. Reason therefor is that stand in equal importance to the phrase in Section 1 thereof,
the title of the law may properly be regarded as an index of "by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted."
or clue or guide to legislative intention. 20 This is especially
true in this jurisdiction. For the reason that by specific
Given the fact then that there are two phrases to consider
constitutional precept, "[n]o bill which may be enacted into
the choice of construction we must give to the statute does
law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
not need such reflection. We lean towards a liberal view. And
expressed in the title of the bill." 21 In such case, courts "are
this, because of the principle long accepted that remedial
compelled by the Constitution to consider both the body and
legislation should receive the blessings of liberal
the title in order to arrive at the legislative intention." 22
construction. 31 And, there should be no quibbling as to the
fact that R.A. 931 is a piece of remedial legislation. In
With the foregoing guideposts on hand, let us go back to the essence, it provides a mode of relief to landowners who,
situation that confronts us. We take another look at the title before the Act, had no legal means of perfecting their titles.
of R.A. 931, viz: "AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN This is plainly evident from the explanatory note thereof,
THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, which reads:
OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND
THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE
This bill is intended to give an opportunity to any
OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE
person or claimant who has any interest in any
FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF
parcel of land which has been declared as public
THIS ACT." Readily to be noted is that the title is not merely
land in cadastral proceeding for failure of said
composed of catchwords. 23 It expresses in language
person or claimant to present his claim within the
clear the very substance of the law itself. From this, it is easy
time prescribed by law. There are many
to see that Congress intended to give some effect to the title
meritorious cases wherein claimants to certain
of R.A. 931.
parcels of land have not had the opportunity to
answer or appear at the hearing of cases affecting
To be carefully noted is that the same imperfection in the their claims in the corresponding cadastral
language of R.A. 931 aforesaid — from which surfaces a proceedings for lack of sufficient notice or for other
seeming inconsistency between the title and the body — reasons and circumstances which are beyond their
attended Commonwealth Act 276, the present statute's control. Under C.A. No. 276, said persons or
predecessor. That prior law used the very same language in claimants have no more legal remedy as the
the body thereof and in its title. We attach meaning to this effectivity of said Act expired in [Link] measure
circumstance. Had the legislature meant to shake off any seeks to remedy the lack of any existing law within
legal effects that the title of the statute might have, it had a said persons or claimants with meritorious claims
chance to do so in the reenactment of the law. Congress or interests in parcels of land may seek justice and
could have altered with great facility the wording of the title of protection. This bill proposes to give said persons
R.A. 931. The fact is that it did not.
 or claimants their day in court. Approval of this bill BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, petitioner,
is earnestly requested.
vs.
In fine, we say that lingual imperfections in the drafting of a HON. JUDGE ASAALI S. ISNANI, RUFINO
statute should never be permitted to hamstring judicial LABANG, ALBERTO S. LIM, JR., JESUS
search for legislative intent, which can otherwise be
discovered. Legal technicalities should not abort the ACEBES, IN THEIR RESPECTIVE
beneficent effects intended by legislation. The sum of all the CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT
foregoing is that, as we now view Republic Act 931, claims of
title that may be filed thereunder embrace those parcels of OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA
land that have been declared public land "by virtue of judicial DEL SUR, CITY FISCAL OF PAGADIAN
decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the
approval of this Act." Therefore, by that statute, the July 25, CITY AND STATE PROSECUTORS, ANTI-
1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes to reopen Civil GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the
cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on which was INC., and ARTEMIO
rendered on November 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year ROMANILLOS, respondents.
period.lawphi1.nêt

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petition for certiorari is

hereby granted; the cadastral court's orders of August 5, SARMIENTO, J.:
1963, November 5, 1963 and September 17, 1964 are
hereby declared null and void and the cadastral court is
hereby directed to admit petitioners' oppositions and proceed The petitioner, then provincial Governor of
accordingly. No costs. So ordered. Zamboanga del Sur and a candidate for
reelection in the local elections of 1971,
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando,
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur. seeks injunctive relief in two separate
Concepcion, C.J., Castro and Capistrano, JJ., took no part.. petitions, to enjoin further proceedings in
Criminal Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC
Republic of the Philippines XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the then
SUPREME COURT Circuit Criminal Court sitting in Pagadian
Manila City, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71, 5-
71, 6-71, and 7-71 of the respondent
SECOND DIVISION
Fiscal's office of the said city, all in the
G.R. No. L-33628 December 29, 1987 nature of prosecutions for violation of
certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, SANTIAGO Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No.
EISMA, MIRUFO CELERIAN, JOSE 3019) and various provisions of the Revised
SAYSON, CESAR TABILIRAN, and Penal Code, commenced by the respondent
MAXIMO ADLAWAN, petitioners, Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc.
vs.
HON. JUDGE MELQUIADES B. On June 16, 1971 and October 8, 1971,
SUCALDITO, RUFINO LABANG, respectively, we issued temporary
MENELEO MESINA, ARTURO restraining orders directing the respondents
GUILLERMO, IN THEIR RESPECTIVE (in both petitions) to desist from further
CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT proceedings in the cases in question until
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA further orders from the Court. At the same
DEL SUR, CITY FISCAL OF PAGADIAN time, we gave due course to the petitions
CITY AND STATE PROSECUTOR, and and accordingly, required the respondents
ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE to answer.
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
The petitions raise pure question of law. The
No. L-34162 December 29, 1987 facts are hence, undisputed.
On September 26, 1970, the private
respondent Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines, Inc., filed a complaint with the expire on November 2, 1969; that
respondent City Fiscal, docketed as nevertheless the said amount was paid and
Criminal Case No. 1-70 thereof, for violation it was made to appear that it was collected
of the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law as by Tecson Trucking Company, although
well as Article 171 of the Revised Penal there was nothing due from tile latter and
Code, as follows: the voucher was never indorsed or signed
by the operator of Tecson Trucking; and that
xxx xxx xxx
in facilitating and consummating the
SPECIFICATION NO. I — aforecited collection, respondent officials,
hereinabove cited, conspired and connived
That on or about October 10, 1969, above- to the great prejudice and damage of the
named respondents, conspiring and Provincial Government of Zamboanga del
confabulating together, allegedly conducted Sur. 1
a bidding for the supply of gravel and sand
for the Province of Zamboanga del Sur: that xxx xxx xxx
it was made to appear that Tabiliran
On the same date, the private respondent
Trucking Company won the bidding; that,
commenced Criminal Case No. 2-71 of the
thereafter, the award and contract pursuant
respondent City Fiscal, another proceeding
to the said simulated bidding were effected
for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 as
and executed in favor of Tabiliran Trucking
well as Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Company; that, in truth and in fact, the said
Code. The complaint reads as follows:
bidding was really simulated and the papers
on the same were falsified to favor Tabiliran xxx xxx xxx
Trucking Company, represented by the
That on or about April 8, 1970, a bidding
private secretary of respondent Bienvenido
was held for the construction of the right
Ebarle, formerly confidential secretary of the
wing portion of the Capitol Building of the
latter; that said awardee was given wholly
Province of Zamboanga del Sur, by the
unwarranted advantage and preference by
Bidding Committee composed of
means of manifest partiality; that
respondents cited hereinabove; that the
respondent officials are hereby also charged
said building was maliciously manipulated
with interest for personal gain for approving
so as to give wholly unwarranted advantage
said award which was manifestly irregular
and preference in favor of the, supposed
and grossly unlawful because the same was
winning bidder, Codeniera Construction,
facilitated and committed by means of
allegedly owned and managed by
falsification of official documents.
Wenceslao Codeniera, brother-in-law of the
SPECIFICATION NO. II wife of respondent Bienvenido Ebarle; that
respondent official is interested for personal
That after the aforecited award and
gain because he is responsible for the
contract, Tabiliran Trucking Company,
approval of the manifestly irregular and
represented by respondent Cesar Tabiliran,
unlawful award and contract aforecited; and
attempted to collect advances under his
that, furthermore, respondent, being a
trucking contract in the under his trucking
Member of the Bidding Committee, also
contract in the amount of P4,823.95 under
violated Article 171 of the Revised Penal
PTA No. 3654; that the same was not
Code, by making it appear in the very
passed in audit by the Provincial Auditor in
abstract of bids that another interested
view of the then subsisting contract with
bidder, was not interested in the bidding,
Tecson Trucking Company; which was to
when in truth and in fact, it was not so. 2
xxx xxx xxx and regulations of public bidding, committed
as follows:
On January 26, 1971, the private
respondent instituted I.S. No. 4-71 of the 1. That on June 16, 1970, without
respondent Fiscal, a prosecution for publication, respondents conducted the so-
violation of Articles 182, 183, and 318 of the called "bidding" for the supply of gravel and
Revised Penal Code, as follows: sand for the province of Zamboanga del
Sur; that said respondents, without any valid
xxx xxx xxx
or legal ground, did not include or even
That on or about April 4, 1967, in Pagadian open the bid of one Jesus Teoson that was
City, said respondent testified falsely under seasonably submitted, despite the fact that
oath in Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC CAD he is a registered duly qualified operator of
REC. NO. N-468, for registration of title to "Teoson Trucking Service," and
Lot No. 2545 in particular; notwithstanding his compliance with all the
rules and requirements on public bidding;
That respondent BIENVENIDO EBARLE that, instead, aforecited respondents
testified falsely under oath during the illegally and irregularly awarded said
hearing and reception of evidence that he contract to Cesar Tabiliran, an associate of
acquired said lot by purchase from a certain respondent Governor Bienvenido Ebarle;
Brigido Sanchez and that he is the owner, and
when in truth and in fact Lot 2545 had been
previously acquired and is owned by the 2. That in truth and in fact, aforesaid
provincial Government of Zamboanga del "bidding" was really simulated and papers
Sur, where the provincial jail building is now were falsified or otherwise "doctored" to
located. favor respondent Cesar Tabiliran thereby
giving him wholly unwarranted advantage,
2. That aforesaid deceit, false testimony and preference and benefits by means of
untruthful statement of respondent in said manifest partiality; and that there is a
Cadastral case were made knowingly to the statutory presumption of interest for
great damage and prejudice of the personal gain because the transaction and
Provincial Government of Zamboanga del award were manifestly irregular and
Sur in violation of aforecited provisions of contrary to applicable law, rules and
the Revised Penal Code. 3 regulations.4
On February 10, 1971, finally, the private xxx xxx xxx
respondent filed a complaint, docketed as
I.S. No. 5-71 of the respondent Fiscal, an The petitioner initially moved to dismiss the
action for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 aforesaid preliminary investigations, but the
and Articles 171 and 213 of the Revised same having been denied, he went to the
Penal Code, as follows: respondent Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable
xxx xxx xxx Melquiades Sucaldito presiding, on
We hereby respectfully charge the above- prohibition and mandamus (Special Case
named respondents for violation of Sec. 3, No. 1000) praying at the same time, for a
R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti- writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin further
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Articles 171 proceedings therein. The court granted
and 213, Revised Penal Code and the rules preliminary injunctive relief (restraining
order) for which the Anti-Graft League filed
a motion to have the restraining order lifted c. That the provisions of law and rules on
and to have the petition itself dismissed. promotion, seniority and nepotism have
been observed.
On May 14, 1971, the respondent, Judge
Sucaldito, handed down the first of the two required by law in such cases, in support of
challenged orders, granting Anti-Graft the appointment he extended to
League's motion and dismissing Special ELIZABETH EBARLE-MONTESCLAROS
Case No. 1000. as Private Secretary in the Office of the
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur,
On June 11, 1971, the petitioner came to
although he well know that the latter is
this Court on certiorari with prayer for a
related with him within the third degree of
temporary restraining order (G.R. No.
consanguinity.
33628). As we said, we issued a temporary
restraining order on June 16, 1971. CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Meanwhile, and in what would begin yet That on or about December 18, 1969, in
another series of criminal prosecutions, the Pagadian City, and within the jurisdiction of
private respondent, on April 26, 1971, filed this Honorable Court, BIENVENIDO A.
three complaints, subsequently docketed as EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and
Criminal Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC feloniously made untruthful statements in a
XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the narration of facts by accomplishing and
Circuit Criminal Court of Pagadian City for issuing a certificate, to wit:
violation of various provisions of the Anti-
c. That the provisions of law and rules on
Graft Law as well as Article 171(4) of the
promotion, seniority and nepotism have
Revised Penal Code, as follows:
been observed.
That on or about December 18, 1969, in
required by law in such cases, in support of
Pagadian City, and within the jurisdiction of
the appointment he extended to TERESITO
this Honorable Court, BIENVENIDO A.
MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece
EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Elizabeth Ebarle, as Motor Pool Dispatcher,
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there
Office of the Provincial Engineer of
unlawfully and feloniously extended and
Zamboanga del Sur, although he well knew
gave ELIZABETH EBARLE
that the latter is related with him within the
MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his brother,
third degree affinity.
his relative by consanguinity within the third
degree, and appointment as Private CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
Secretary in the Office of the Provincial
Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although Subsequently, on August 23, 1971, the
he well know that the latter is related with private respondent brought I.S. No. 6-71 of
him within the third degree by consanguinity. the respondent Pagadian City Fiscal against
the petitioner, still another proceeding for
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5 violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and
Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code,
That on or about December 18, 1969, in
thus:
Pagadian City, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, BIENVENIDO A. First Count.
EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and
feloniously made untruthful statements in a That on or about December 1, 1969, in
narration of facts by accomplishing and Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE,
issuing a certificate, to wit: , Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur,
did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave ZACARIAS
feloniously extended and gave MARIO UGSOD, JR., son of the younger sister of
EBARLE, son of his brother, his relative by Governor Ebarle, his relative by
consanguinity within the third degree, an consanguinity within the third degree, an
appointment as SECURITY GUARD in the appointment as Architectural Draftsman in
Office of the Provincial Engineer of the Office of the Provincial Engineer of
Zamboanga del Sur although he well knew Zamboanga del Sur although he well know
that the latter is related with him in the third that the latter is related with him in the third
degree by consanguinity and is not qualified degree of consanguinity.
under the Civil Service Law.
Fifth Count.
Second Count.
That on February 5, 1970, at Pagadian City,
That in January, 1970, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial
Gov. BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then
replaced JOHNNY ABABON who was then and there unlawfully and feloniously
the incumbent Motor Pool Dispatcher in the extended and gave TERESITO
Office of the Provincial Engineer of MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece
Zamboanga del Sur with his nephew-in-law ELIZABETH EBARLE, his relative by affinity
TERESITO MONTESCLAROS relative by within the third degree, an appointment as
affinity within the third Civil degree, in Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the
violation of the Civil Service Law, this Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur,
knowingly causing undue injury in the although he wen knew then that the latter
discharge of his administrative function was not qualified to such appointment as it
through manifest partiality against said was in violation of the Civil Service Law,
complaining employee. thereby knowingly granting and giving
unwarranted advantage and preference in
Third Count:
the discharge of his administrative function
That on or about December 18, 1969, in through manifest partiality.
Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE,
II. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur,
SECTION 4 (b), R.A. 3019
did then and there unlawfully and
feloniously extended and gave ELIZABETH That on August 19, 1967, respondent
EBARLE MONTESCLAROS, daughter of BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Governor of
his brother, his relative by consanguinity Zamboanga del Sur, taking advantage of his
within the third degree, an appointment as position caused, persuaded, induced, or
Private Secretary in the Office of the influence the Presiding Judge to perform
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, irregular and felonious act in violation of
although he well know that the latter is applicable law or constituting an offense into
related with him within the third degree of awarding and decreeing Lot 2645 of the
consanguinity, and said appointment is in Pagadian Public Lands subdivision to him
violation of the Civil Service Law. who, according to the records of the case,
failed to establish his rights of ownership
Fourth Count.
pursuant to the provisions of the Land
That on or about January 22, 1970, in Registration law and the Public Land Act, it
Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, appearing that the Provincial Government of
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Sur as and is a claimant
did then and there unlawfully and and in adverse possession of Lot 2545
whereon the Provincial Jail Building thereon On September 21, 1971, the private
still stands. respondent instituted I.S. No. 7-71 of the
said City Fiscal, again charging the
III. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF
petitioner with further violations of Republic
ARTICLE 171 (4), REVISED PENAL CODE
Act No. 3019 thus:
First Count.
First Count.
That on or about December 18, 1969, in
That on or about December 2, 1969, in
Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE,
Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE,
then and there unlawfully and feloniously
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur,
made untruthful statement in a narration of
did then and there unlawfully and
facts by accomplishing and issuing a
feloniously extend and give unwarranted
certificate, to wit:
benefits and privileges BONINDA EBARLE,
c. That the provisions of law and rules on wife of his brother Bertuldo Ebarle, the
promotion, seniority and nepotism have former being his relative by affinity within the
been observed. second civil degree, an appointment as
LABORATORY TECHNICIAN in Pagadian
required by law in such cases, in support of City, although he well knew that the latter is
the appointment he extended to TERESITO related to him in the second degree by
MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece affinity and is not qualified under the Civil
ELIZABETH EBARLE, as Motor Pool Service Law.
Dispatcher, Office of the Provincial Engineer
of Zamboanga del Sur, although he wen Second Count.
knew that the latter is related with him within
That on or about January 1, 1970, at
the third degree of affinity and is in violation
Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE,
of the Civil Service Law.
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur,
Second Count. did then and there unlawfully and
feloniously extend and give unwarranted
That on or about December 18, 1969, in benefits and privileges JESUS EBARLE,
Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, nephew of said respondent, an appointment
then and there unlawfully and feloniously as DRIVER of the Provincial Engineer's
made untruthful statements a certificate, to Office, Pagadian City, although he well
wit: knew that Jesus Ebarle is related to him
c. That the provisions of the law and rules within the third civil degree by consanguinity
on promotion, seniority and nepotism have and is not qualified under the Civil Service
been observed. Law.

required by law in such cases, in support of Third Count.

the appointment he extended to That on or about November 1, 1969, at
ELIZABETH EBARLE-MONTESCLAROS Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE,
as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur,
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and
although he well knew that the latter is feloniously extend and give unwarranted
related with him within the third degree of benefits and privileges PHENINA
consanguinity, and is in violation of the Civil CODINERA, sister-in-law of said
Service Law. CONTRARY to aforecited respondent, an appointment as
laws. 8 CONFIDENTIAL ASSISTANT in the Office
of the Provincial Governor, Pagadian City, GUIDED," 10 preliminary to their criminal
although he well knew that Phenina recourses. At the same time, he assails the
Codinera is related to him in the second civil standing of the respondent Anti-Graft
degree of consanguinity and is not qualified League to commence the series of
under the Civil Service Law. prosecutions below (G.R. No. 33628). He
likewise contends that the respondent Fiscal
ALL CONTRARY TO AFORECITED LAW.
(in G.R. No. 34162), in giving due course to
Please give due course to the above the complaints notwithstanding the
complaint and please set the case for restraining order we had issued (in G.R. No.
immediate preliminary investigation 33628), which he claims applies as well
pursuant to the First Indorsement dated thereto, committed a grave abuse of
August 27, 1971 of the Secretary of Justice, discretion.
and in the paramount interest of good
He likewise submits that the prosecutions in
government. 9
question are politically motivated, initiated
The petitioner thereafter went to the by his rivals, he being, as we said, a
respondent Court of First Instance of candidate for reelection as Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable Asaali Zamboanga del Sur.
Isnani presiding, on a special civil action
We dismiss these petitions.
(Special Civil Case No. 1048) for prohibition
and certiorari with preliminary injunction. The petitioner's reliance upon the provisions
The respondent Court issued a restraining of Executive Order No. 264 has no merit.
order. The respondent Anti-Graft League We reproduce the Order in toto:
moved to have the same lifted and the case
MALACAÑANG
itself dismissed.
RESIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT
On September 27, 1971, Judge Isnani
issued an order, dismissing the case. OF THE PHILIPPINES
On October 6, 1971, the petitioner instituted MANILA
G.R. No. 34162 of this Court, a special civil
action for certiorari with preliminary BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
injunction. As earlier noted, we on October PHILIPPINES
8, 1971, stayed the implementation of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264
dismissal order.
OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH
Subsequently, we consolidated both COMPLAINANTS CHARGING
petitions and considered the same GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND
submitted for decision. EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF
Principally, the petitioner relies (in both IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED.
petitions) on the failure of the respondents WHEREAS, it is necessary that the general
City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League to public be duly informed or reminded of the
comply with the provisions of Executive procedure provided by law and regulations
Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE by which complaints against public officials
PROCEDUE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS and employees should be presented and
CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS prosecuted.
AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION
OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE
WHEREAS, actions on complaints are at case of provincial and city officials, with the
times delayed because of the failure to provincial governor or board secretary in
observe the form.91 requisites therefor, to case of municipal officials, and with the
indicate with sufficient clearness and municipal or city mayor or secretary in case
particularity the charges or offenses being of barrio officials.
aired or denounced, and to file the
5. Those against members of police forces
complaint with the proper office or authority;
shall be filed with the corresponding local
WHEREAS, without in any way curtailing board of investigators headed by the city or
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of municipal treasurer, except in the case of
expression, the Administration believes that those appointed by the President which
many complaints or grievances could be should be filed with the Office of the
resolved at the lower levels of government if President.
only the provisions of law and regulations
6. Complaints against public officials and
on the matter are duly observed by the
employees shall be promptly acted upon
parties concerned; and
and disposed of by the officials or
WHEREAS, while all sorts of officials authorities concerned in accordance with
misconduct should be eliminated and pertinent laws and regulations so that the
punished, it is equally compelling that public erring officials or employees can be soonest
officials and employees be given opportunity removed or otherwise disciplined and the
afforded them by the constitution and law to innocent, exonerated or vindicated in like
defend themselves in accordance with the manner, and to the end also that other
procedure prescribed by law and remedies, including court action, may be
regulations; pursued forthwith by the interested parties
after administrative remedies shall have
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E.
been exhausted.
MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of
hereby order: October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy.
1. Complaints against public officials and
employees shall be in writing, subscribed (Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
and sworn to by the complainants,
President of the Philippines
describing in sufficient detail and
particularity the acts or conduct complained By the President:
of, instead of generalizations.
(Sgd.) ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
2. Complaints against presidential
appointees shag be filed with the Office of Executive Secretary 11
the President or the Department Head It is plain from the very wording of the Order
having direct supervision or control over the that it has exclusive application to
official involved. administrative, not criminal complaints. The
3. Those against subordinate officials and Order itself shows why.
employees shall be lodged with the proper The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF
department or agency head. IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention,
4. Those against elective local officials shall not even by implication, of criminal
be filed with the Office of the President in "offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While
"crimes" amount to "irregularities," the decide complaints against members of the
Executive Order could have very well Philippine police.
referred to the more specific term had it
Clearly, the Executive Order simply
intended to make itself applicable thereto.
consolidates these existing rules and
The first perambulatory clause states the streamlines the administrative apparatus in
necessity for informing the public "of the the matter of complaints against public
procedure provided by law and regulations officials. Furthermore, the fact is that there
by which complaints against public officials is no reference therein to judicial or
and employees should be presented and prejudicial (like a preliminary investigation
prosecuted. 12 To our mind, the "procedure conducted by the fiscal) recourse, not
provided by law and regulations" referred to because it makes such a resort a secondary
pertains to existing procedural rules with measure, but because it does not intend to
respect to the presentation of administrative serve as a condition precedent to, much
charges against erring government officials. less supplant, such a court resort.
And in fact, the aforequoted paragraphs are
To be sure, there is mention therein of "court
but restatements thereof. That presidential
action[s] [being] pursued forthwith by the
appointees are subject to the disciplinary
interested parties, " 17 but that does not, so
jurisdiction of the President, for instance, is
we hold, cover proceedings such as criminal
a reecho of the long-standing doctrine that
actions, which do not require a prior
the President exercises the power of control
administrative course of action. It will indeed
over his appointees. 13 Paragraph 3, on the
be noted that the term is closely shadowed
other hand, regarding subordinate officials,
by the qualification, "after administrative
is a mere reiteration of Section 33 of
remedies shall have been
Republic Act No. 2260, the Civil Service Act
exhausted," 18 which suggests civil suits
(of 1959) then in force, placing jurisdiction
subject to previous administrative action.
upon "the proper Head of Department, the
chief of a bureau or office" 14 to investigate It is moreover significant that the Executive
and decide on matters involving disciplinary Order in question makes specific reference
action. to "erring officials or employees ... removed
or otherwise vindicated. 19 If it were
Paragraph 4, which refers to complaints
intended to apply to criminal prosecutions, it
filed against elective local officials,
would have employed such technical terms
reiterates, on the other hand, the
as "accused", "convicted," or "acquitted."
Decentralization Act of 1967, providing that
While this is not necessarily a controlling
"charges against any elective provincial and
parameter for all cases, it is here material in
city officials shall be preferred before the
construing the intent of the measure.
President of the Philippines; against any
elective municipal official before the What is even more compelling is the
provincial governor or the secretary of the Constitutional implications if the petitioner's
provincial board concerned; and against any arguments were accepted. For Executive
elective barrio official before the municipal Order No. 264 was promulgated under the
or secretary concerned. 15 1935 Constitution in which legislative power
was vested exclusively in Congress. The
Paragraph 5, meanwhile, is a reproduction
regime of Presidential lawmaking was to
of the provisions of the Police Act of 1966,
usher in yet some seven years later. If we
vesting upon a "Board of
were to consider the Executive Order law,
Investigators" 16 the jurisdiction to try and
we would be forced to say that it is an
amendment to Republic Act No. 5180, the however, make such charges Identical to
law on preliminary investigations then in one another.
effect, a situation that would give rise to a
The complaints involved in G.R. No. 34162
Constitutional anomaly. We cannot
are, in general, nepotism under Sections
accordingly countenace such a view.
3(c) and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019;
The challenge the petitioner presents exerting influence upon the presiding Judge
against the personality of the Anti-Graft of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
League of the Philippines to bring suit is del Sur to award a certain parcel of land in
equally without merit. That the Anti-Graft his favor, over which the provincial
League is not an "offended party" within the government itself lays claims, contrary to
meaning of Section 2, Rule 110, of the the provisions of Section 4(b) of Republic
Rules of Court (now Section 3 of the 1985 Act No. 3019; and making untruthful
Rules on Criminal Procedure), cannot abate statements in the certificates of appointment
the complaints in question. of certain employees in his office. On the
other hand, the complaints subject matter of
A complaint for purposes of preliminary
G.R. No. 33628 involve charges of
investigation by the fiscal need not be filed
simulating bids for the supply of gravel and
by the "offended party." The rule has been
sand for certain public works projects, in
that, unless the offense subject thereof is
breach of Section 3 of the Anti-Graft statute;
one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the
manipulating bids with respect to the
same may be filed, for preliminary
construction of the capitol building; testifying
investigation purposes, by any competent
falsely in connection with Cadastral Case
person. 20 The "complaint" referred to in the
No. N-17, LRC Cad. Rec. N-468, in which
Rule 110 contemplates one filed in court,
the petitioner alleged that he was the owner
not with the fiscal, In that case, the
of a piece of land, in violation of Articles
proceeding must be started by the
182, 183, and 318 of the Revised Penal
aggrieved party himself. 21
Code; and simulating bids for the supply of
For as a general rule, a criminal action is gravel and sand in connection with another
commenced by complaint or information, public works project.
both of which are filed in court. In case of a
It is clear that the twin sets of complaints
complaint, it must be filed by the offended
are characterized by major differences.
party; with respect to an information, it is the
When, therefore, we restrained further
fiscal who files it. But a "complaint" filed with
proceedings in I.S. Nos. 1-71, 2-71, and 4-
the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be
71, subject of G.R. No. 33628. we did not
filed by any person.
consequently stay the proceedings in CCC-
The next question is whether or not the XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, CCC XVI-8-
temporary restraining order we issued in ZDS, and I.S. Nos. 6-71 and 7-71, the same
G.R. No. 33628 embraced as well the proceedings we did restrain in G.R. No.
complaint subject of G.R. No. 34162. 34162.

It is noteworthy that the charges levelled This brings us to the last issue: whether or
against the petitioner — whether in G.R. No. not the complaints in question are tainted
33628 or 34162 — refer invariably to with a political color.
violations of the Anti-Graft Law or the
It is not our business to resolve complaints
Revised Penal Code. That does not,
the disposition of which belongs to another
agency, in this case, the respondent Fiscal.
But more than that, and as a general rule, T. DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR.,
ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO
injunction does not lie to enjoin criminal V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA,
prosecutions. 22 The rule is subject to REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M.
MENDOZA, respondents.
exceptions, to wit: (1) for the orderly
administration of justice; (2) to prevent the G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978
use of the strong arm of the law in an THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
oppressive and vindictive manner; (3) to vs.
avoid multiplicity of actions; (4) to afford JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO
adequate protection to constitutional rights; LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y
and (5) because the statute relied on is ROQUE and ALFREDO VERSOZA, respondents.
constitutionally infirm or otherwise G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978
void. 23 We cannot perceive any of the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
exceptions applicable here. The petitioner vs.
cries foul, in a manner of speaking, with JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST
respect to the deluge of complaints INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE
LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ, SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO
commenced by the private respondent ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y
below, but whether or not they were filed for UBALDO, respondents.
harassment purposes is a question we are G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978
not in a position to decide. The proper
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
venue, we believe, for the petitioner's vs.
complaint is precisely in the preliminary THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the
investigations he wishes blocked here. Court of First Instance of Samar, and PANCHITO
REFUNCION, respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom,
Office of the City of Fiscal of Manila and the Office of
The temporary restraining orders are LIFTED Provincial Fiscal of Samar for petitioners.
and SET ASIDE. Costs against the petitioners.
Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and
Garcia.
It is so ORDERED.
Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon
Bundalian Jr., et al.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras,
and Padilla, JJ., concur. Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32
and L-46313-16.

Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.

Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the

People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the
Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are
consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic
G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978 question of law.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First
vs. Instance, namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila,
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVIII,
PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS, NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the
GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C. MAISO, Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M.
EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO Polo, presiding, (1 Petition).
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the Executive dated April 1, 1975
respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a INFORMATION
motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges
mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of
them — the details of which will be recounted below — an a VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL
Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on DECREE NO. 9 in relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of
a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege the Chief Executive dated April 1, 1975, committed as
facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential follows:
Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element
That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City
of the crime.
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his
form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal residence a bladed and pointed weapon, to wit: an ice pick
possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential with an overall length of about 8½ inches, the same not
Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This is the central issue which being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his
we shall resolve and dispose of, all other corollary matters livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
not being indispensable for the moment.
Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)
A — The Information filed by the People —
The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except
1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court for the name of the accused, the date and place of the
presided by Judge Purisima follows: commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus 3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First
PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, accused. Instance of Samar is quoted hereunder:

Crim. Case No. 19639 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus

PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused.
VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF
PROCLAMATION 1081 CRIM. CASE NO. 933

INFORMATION For:

The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF

DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3, Presidential Decree
DEADLY WEAPON
No. 9 of Proclamation 1081, committed as follows:
(VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9)
That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and INFORMATION
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in
his possession and under his custody and control one (1) The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar,
carving knife with a blade of 6-½ inches and a wooden accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime of ILLEGAL
handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11-¾ inches, POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF
which the said accused carried outside of his residence, the PD NO. 9 issued by the President of the Philippines on Oct.
said weapon not being used as a tool or implement 2, 1972, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept. 21
necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection and 23, 1972, committed as follows:
therewith.
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening
Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66) at Barangay Barruz, Municipality of Matuginao, Province of
Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the Honorabe Court, the abovenamed accused, knowingly,
name of the accused, the date and place of the commission wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carried with him outside of
of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved. his residence a deadly weapon called socyatan, an
instrument which from its very nature is no such as could be
2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with
used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a livelihood,
the Court presided by Judge Maceren follows:
which act committed by the accused is a Violation of
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus Presidential Decree No. 9.
REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)
CRIM. CASE NO. 29677
B. — The Orders of dismissal —
VIOL. OF PAR. 3,
In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts
PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI concurred with the submittal of the defense that one
essential element of the offense charged is missing from the
No. 266 of the Chief Information, viz: that the carrying outside of the accused's
residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in further strengthened by the fact that all previously existing
furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related laws that also made the carrying of similar weapons
to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized punishable have not been repealed, whether expressly or
lawlessness or public disorder. impliedly. It is noteworthy that Presidential Decree No. 9
does not contain any repealing clause or provisions.
1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:
xxx xxx xxx
... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of
bladed weapon or the like outside residence may be The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these
prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information must deadly weapons if not concealed in one's person and if not
specifically allege that the possession of bladed weapon carried in any of the aforesaid specified places, would
charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in furtherance of appear to be not unlawful and punishable by law.
the conditions of rampant criminality, organized lawlessness,
public disorder, etc. as are contemplated and recited in With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9,
Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid of however, the prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal Hilario H.
this specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, Laqui, contends in his opposition to the motion to quash, that
the information is not complete, as it does not allege this act is now made unlawful and punishable, particularly by
sufficient facts to constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the intention of the person
No. 9. The information in these cases under consideration carrying such weapon because the law makes it "mala
suffer from this defect. prohibita". If the contention of the prosecution is correct, then
if a person happens to be caught while on his way home by
xxx xxx xxx law enforcement officers carrying a kitchen knife that said
person had just bought from a store in order that the same
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not may be used by one's cook for preparing the meals in one's
difficult to believe the murmurings of detained persons home, such person will be liable for punishment with such a
brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed severe penalty as imprisonment from five to ten years under
weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before, the decree. Such person cannot claim that said knife is going
policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — now to be used by him to earn a livelihood because he intended it
have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for merely for use by his cook in preparing his meals.
extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to
imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree
a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came No. 9 were to be interpreted and applied in the manner that
from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace that the prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions
officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even of the President in promulgating this decree may thus be
that could only convey the coercive message of one year in perverted by some unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It
jail, now anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or may be used as a tool of oppression and tyranny or of
pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already extortion.
serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more
incriminating than the infamous paltik. xxx xxx xxx

For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court
intentions and wisely applied, its necessity can never be that the act which the President intended to make unlawful
assailed. But it seems it is back-firing, because it is too hot in and punishable by Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by
the hands of policemen who are inclined to backsliding. paragraph 3 thereof, is one that abets or is intended to abet
subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found criminality, chaos and public disorder. (pp. 28-30, rollo of L-
in the heart of the Fiscal and the conscience of the Court, 46229-32)
and hence this resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is
prompted by the desire of this Court to apply said 3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar
checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66) expounded his order dismissing the Information filed before
him, thus:
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the
charges as follows: ... We believe that to constitute an offense under the
aforcited Presidential decree, the same should be or there
xxx xxx xxx should be an allegation that a felony was committed in
connection or in furtherance of subversion, rebellion,
As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by insurrection, lawless violence and public disorder. Precisely
Proclamation No. 1081 is the maintenance of law and order Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of martial law
throughout the Philippines and the prevention and throughout the country was issued because of wanton
suppression of all forms of lawless violence as well as any destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness
act of insurrection or rebellion. It is therefore reasonable to and anarchy. And in order to restore the tranquility and
conclude from the foregoing premises that the carrying of stability of the country and to secure the people from
bladed, pointed or blunt weapons outside of one's residence violence anti loss of lives in the quickest possible manner
which is made unlawful and punishable by said par. 3 of P.D. and time, carrying firearms, explosives and deadly weapons
No. 9 is one that abetssubversion, insurrection or rebellion, without a permit unless the same would fall under the
lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder or is exception is prohibited. This conclusion becomes more
intended to bring about these conditions. This conclusion is compelling when we consider the penalty imposable, which
is from five years to ten years. A strict enforcement of the their agent; or if such unlicensed firearm is used in the
provision of the said law would mean the imposition of the commission of crimes against persons, property or chastity
Draconian penalty upon the accused. causing the death of the victim used in violation of any other
General Orders and/or Letters of Instructions promulgated
xxx xxx xxx under said Proclamation No. 1081:

It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and (b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to
during martial law, as a matter of status symbol, carrying life imprisonment as a Military Court/Tribunal/commission
deadly weapons is very common, not necessarily for may direct, when the violation is not attended by any of the
committing a crime nor as their farm implement but for self- circumstances enumerated under the preceding paragraph;
preservation or self-defense if necessity would arise
specially in going to and from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of (c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs
L-46997) shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager,
members of the board of directors or other responsible
In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were officers of any public or private firms, companies,
given before arraignment of the accused. In the criminal corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly allow
case before the Court of (First Instance of Samar the any of the firearms owned by such firm, company,
accused was arraigned but at the same time moved to quash corporation or entity concerned to be used in violation of said
the Information. In all the cases where the accused were General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.
under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate
release unless held on other charges. 2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand
grenades, rifle grenades and other explosives, including, but
C. — The law under which the Informations in question were not limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs,"
filed by the People. "fire bombs," or other incendiary device consisting of any
chemical, chemical compound, or detonating agents
As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused containing combustible units or other ingredients in such
are charged with illegal possession of deadly weapon in proportion, quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by fire,
violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3. by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of
all or part of the compound or mixture which may cause such
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:
a sudden generation of highly heated gases that the
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing
destructive effects on continguous objects or of causing
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 injury or death of a person; and any person convicted thereof
and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to
SEPTEMBER 23, 1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE fifteen years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may
UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFORE. direct.

WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated 3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed,
September 21, 1972, the Philippines has been placed under pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan knife," "spear,"
a state of martial law; "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except
where such articles are being used as necessary tools or
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in
General Order No. 6 dated September 22, 1972 and General connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof
Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have been shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to
promulgated by me; ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may
direct.
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder mentioned in 4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs
the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and 2 and 3 is committed during the commission of or for the
abetted by the use of firearms, explosives and other deadly purpose of committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be
weapons; imposed upon the offender in its maximum extent, in addition
to the penalty provided for the particular offenses committed
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, or intended to be committed.
Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, in older to attain the desired result of the Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the
aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.
and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
(SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7
is unlawful and the violator shall, upon conviction suffer: President

(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or Republic of the Philippines
electrocution as a Military, Court/Tribunal/Commission may
direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is unlicensed D. — The arguments of the People —
and is attended by assault upon, or resistance to persons in
In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General
authority or their agents in the performance of their official
who as stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila and the
functions resulting in death to said persons in authority or
Provincial Fiscal of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the circumstances of the commission of the crime and the
questioned orders of dismissal, the main argument advanced penalty imposed for the offense.
on the issue now under consideration is that a perusal of
paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited acts need We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned
not be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed statute and the city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D.
is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or
public policy.1 provision, and repeal by implication is not favored. 6This
principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal
The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against
statutory offenses the intention of the accused who commits the state and liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In fact,
the act is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are
voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and condemns repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non-
not only the carrying of said weapon in connection with the observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or
commission of the crime of subversion or the like, but also practice to the contrary.
that of criminality in general, that is, to eradicate lawless
violence which characterized pre-martial law days. It is also Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act
argued that the real nature of the criminal charge is may be made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a
determined not from the caption or preamble of the prosecuting fiscal, under the statute, or the city ordinance, or
information nor from the specification of the provision of law the presidential decree. That being the case, the right
alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted
facts in the complaint or information.2 with the facts constituting the essential elements of the
offense charged against him, if he is not to become an easy
E. — Our Ruling on the matter — pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent or
misguided official action — a fear understandably shared by
1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands respondent Judges who by the nature of their judicial
charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the functions are daily exposed to such dangers.
nature and cause of the accusation against him.3
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are
Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of charged in the caption as well as in the body of the
Court, expressly requires that for a complaint or information Information with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then
to be sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the are the elements of the offense treated in the presidential
offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained decree in question?
of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid
surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the
prepare his defense accordingly. 4 carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or
pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or
To comply with these fundamental requirements of the implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of
Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet,
imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact, another compelling lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is
essential in these cases. As stated in the order of respondent It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a
Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the
the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other
ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides: words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons
described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense
Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the
concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation,
kris, or other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the the act falls within the purview of the city ordinance or some
provisions of this section shall, upon conviction in a court of statute when the circumstances so warrant.
competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not exceeding
five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only
exceeding six months, or both such fine and imprisonment, reasonably, logical, and valid construction given to P.D. 9(3).
in the discretion of the court.
3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one
Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by and all situations where a person carries outside his
Ordinance No. 3928 which took effect on December 4, 1957, residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in the
in turn penalizes with a fine of not more than P200.00 or decree irrespective of motivation, intent, or purpose,
imprisonment for not more than one months, or both, at the converts these cases into one of "statutory construction."
discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry concealed in That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is manifest
his person in any manner that would disguise its deadly from the conflicting views which arise from its
character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial
weapon ... in any public place. Consequently, it is necessary task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of
that the particular law violated be specified as there exists a the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal
substantial difference between the statute and city ordinance statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of
on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the the accused and strictly against the state.
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative evident when the word or phrase is considered with those
measure — a presidential decree in these cases — the with which it is associated. Thus, an apparently general
primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and provision may have a limited application if read together with
spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for other provisions. 9
in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr.
Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must
statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict be within its reason or intent.
adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice
and contradictions. 8 In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas"
clause, the presidential decree states:
There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent
or reason for P.D. 9(3). NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed Forces of the
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the
enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled out in aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6
the "Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
the state of martial law in the country pursuant to
Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the xxx xxx xxx
desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General
From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9
Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D.
are those related to the desired result of Proclamation
9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion,
1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public
Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and therefore have no
disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed and
relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed
abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other
weapons. With respect to Proclamation 1081 some of the
deadly weapons.
underlying reasons for its issuance are quoted hereunder:
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a
WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms
statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is not an
against our duly constituted government and against our
essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers,
people, and having committed and are still committing acts
or cure inherent defects in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-
of armed insurrection and rebellion consisting of armed
42050-66); that the explanatory note or enacting clause of
raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton acts of murders,
the decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the
spoilage, plunder, looting, arsons, destruction of public and
decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such
private buildings, and attacks against innocent and
explanatory note merely states or explains the reason which
defenseless civilian lives and property, all of which activities
prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of
have seriously endangered and continue to endanger public
46997)
order and safety and the security of the nation, ...
We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem
xxx xxx xxx
of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it
becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a
decree and this can be found among others in the preamble state of anarchy and lawlessness, chaos and disorder,
or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events turmoil and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an
which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff actual war between the forces of our duly constituted
sanctions stated therein. government and the New People's Army and their satellite
organizations because of the unmitigated forays, raids,
A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of
ambuscades, assaults, violence, murders, assassinations,
the makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied,
acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations,
and objects which are to be accomplished, by the provisions
treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders and depredations
of the statute." (West Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635,
committed and being committed by the aforesaid lawless
639, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble"; emphasis
elements who have pledged to the whole nation that they will
supplied)
not stop their dastardly effort and scheme until and unless
While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it they have fully attained their primary and ultimate purpose of
may, when the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of forcibly seizing political and state power in this country by
interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or overthrowing our present duly constituted government, ...
uncertainty which otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du (See Book I, Vital Documents on the Declaration of Martial
Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words and Law in the Philippines by the Supreme Court of the
Phrases, "Preamble") Philippines, pp. 13-39)

In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed
al. this Court had occasion to state that '(L)egislative intent weapon with a motivation connected with or related to the
must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is
whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular provision within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.
alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For
Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be
taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a
achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. (U.S. v.
meaning quite different from the one actually intended and
American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN
Pictures v. Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; limited." 11 The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to
emphasis supplied) escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a
precise definition of forbidden acts.12
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment
should be kept in mind, and the statute should be construed Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this
with reference to its intended scope and purpose. (Statutory manner, viz:
Construction by E.T. Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person
Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis supplied) should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within
them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is
5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to not made clearly so by the statute. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36
inquire into the consequences of the measure if a strict Phil. 243, 246)
adherence to the letter of the paragraph is followed.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws,
exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor
were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is penal laws. (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684, 692)
favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.9-a F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.

It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must
the President of the Republic there was no intent to work a be alleged in the Information in order that the latter may
hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an
authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a Information is determined solely by the facts alleged
weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on.10 therein.13 Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey
the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is
At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima in order.
the following:
Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not defendant may move to quash the complaint or information
difficult to believe the murmurings of detained persons when the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed
weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before, In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused
policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — now is charged with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, failure to allege
extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to in the Information that the judgment was rendered knowing it
imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or to be unjust, is fatal. 14
a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came
from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice
officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of the Court
that could only convey the coercive message of one year in affirmed an order of the trial court which quashed an
jail, now anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or Information wherein the facts recited did not constitute a
pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already public offense as defined in Section 1, Republic Act 145. 15
serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more
G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because
incriminating than the infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-
the People could have availed itself of other available
42050-66)
remedies below.
And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:
interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity at times. To his
example We may add a situation where a law-abiding Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash.
citizen, a lawyer by profession, after gardening in his house — If the motion to quash is sustained the court may order
remembers to return the bolo used by him to his neighbor that another information be filed. If such order is made the
who lives about 30 meters or so away and while crossing the defendant, if in custody, shall remain so unless he shall be
street meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo admitted to bail. If such order is not made or if having been
being carried by that citizen places him under arrest and made another information is not filed withuntime to be
books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential specified in the order, or within such further time as the court
decree have been conceived to produce such absurd, may allow for good cause shown, the defendant, if in
unreasonable, and insensible results? custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless he is in
custody on some other charge.
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the
state and liberally in favor of an accused. Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. — The information or
complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to
leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and
be "the tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the
thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by
object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which
mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court
leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can that it is an unwise and unjust application of a law, necessary
be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant. and justified under prevailing circumstances, which renders
the measure an instrument of oppression and evil and leads
xxx xxx xxx the citizenry to lose their faith in their government.

Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and
quashing of the Informations in these cases, viz: We AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges dismissing or
quashing the Information concerned, subject however to Our
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could observations made in the preceding pages 23 to 25 of this
have filed an amended Information to include the second Decision regarding the right of the State or Petitioner herein
element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of to file either an amended Information under Presidential
respondent Judges. We have ruled that if the facts alleged in Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other
the Information do not constitute a punishable offense, the existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may warrant.
case should not be dismissed but the prosecution should be
given an opportunity to amend the Information.16 Without costs.

Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a SO ORDERED.
complaint either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780, quoted
earlier, or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Fernando, Teehankee, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero,
Ordinance No. 3928, especially since in most if not all of the JJ., concur.
cases, the dismissal was made prior to arraignment of the
accused and on a motion to quash. Castro, C.J. and Antonio, J, concur in the result.

Section 8. Rule 117 states that: Aquino, J, took no part.

An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to Separate Opinions

another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion
was based on the grounds specified in section 2,
subsections (f) and (h) of this rule.
BARREDO, J., concurring.
Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or
I concur with the qualification that under existing
Information is barred only when the criminal action or liability
jurisprudence conviction is possible, without the need of
had been extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the motion to
amending the information, for violation of other laws or
quash was granted for reasons of double jeopardy. (ibid., [h])
ordinances on concealment of deadly weapons.
As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be
Makasiar, J, concurs.
successfully invoked by the accused in all these cases
should new complaints be filed against them, is a matter We CONCEPCION, JR., J, concurring:
need not resolve for the present.
I concur with the additional observation that accused could
H. — We conclude with high expectations that police properly be convicted of a violation of Act 1780 of the
authorities and the prosecuting arm of the government true Philippine Commission or of the ordinance.
to the oath of office they have taken will exercise utmost
circumspection and good faith in evaluating the particular Separate Opinions
circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and just
conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3) BARREDO, J., concurring.
and the prosecution under said decree is warranted and
justified. This obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face of I concur with the qualification that under existing
the severe penalty imposed for the offense. jurisprudence conviction is possible, without the need of
amending the information, for violation of other laws or
On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor ordinances on concealment of deadly weapons.
Rodolfo A. Nocon on his letter to the City Fiscal of Manila on
October 15, 1975, written for the Secretary, now Minister of Makasiar, J, concurs.
Justice, where he stated the following:
CONCEPCION, JR., J, concurring:
In any case, please study well each and every case of this
I concur with the additional observation that accused could
nature so that persons accused of carrying bladed weapons,
properly be convicted of a violation of Act 1780 of the
specially those whose purpose is not to subvert the duly
Philippine Commission or of the ordinance.
constituted authorities, may not be unduly indicted for the
serious offenses falling under P.D. No. 9.17
Facts:
Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to
inquire into the wisdom of a law, it is however a judicial task These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the
and prerogative to determine if official action is within the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the
spirit and letter of the law and if basic fundamental rights of Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial
an individual guaranteed by the Constitution are not violated Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are
in the process of its implementation. We have to face the fact
consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic The petition is DISMISSED.
question of law.

The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII and

XVIII and CFI of Samar

Several informations were filed before the abovementioned

courts charging the accused of Illegal Possession of Deadly
Weapon in violation of Presidential Decree #9. The counsel
of the defense filed motions to quash the said informations
after which the respondent-courts passed their own orders
quashing the said informations on common ground that the
informations did not allege facts constituting ang offense
penalized until PD#9 for failure to state an essential element
of the crime, which is, that the carrying outside of the
accused’s residence of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is
in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with, or
related to to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness or public disorder.

The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read in

the context of Proc.1081 which seeks to maintain law and
order in the country as well as the prevention and
suppression of all forms of lawless violence. The non-
inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be
distinguished from other legislation related to the illegal
possession of deadly weapons. Judge Purisima, in particular,
reasoned that the information must allege that the purpose of
possession of the weapon was intended for the purposes of
abetting the conditions of criminality, organized lawlessness,
public disorder. The petitioners said that the purpose of
subversion is not necessary in this regard because the
prohibited act is basically a malum prohibitum or is an action
or conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The City
Fiscal also added in cases of statutory offenses, the intent is
immaterial and that the commission of the act is voluntary is
enough.

Issue:

Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and

substance to constitute the offense of “Illegal possession of
deadly weapon” penalized under Presidential Decree No. 9?

Held:

1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands

charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a

complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the
designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is
essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him
the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.

3. The supreme court says that the preamble of PD#9 states

that the intention of such decree is to penalize the acts which
are related to Proc.1081 which aim to suppress lawlessness,
rebellion, subversive acts, and the like. While the preamble
is not a part of the statute, it implies the intent and spirit of
the decree. The preamble and whereas clauses also
enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation
of the decree and the stiff sanctions provided.