Alexander the Great

Logistician

Katie L. Tackett
Dr. Li Yi
History 126
04 December 2015
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Katie L. Tackett

Dr. Li Yi

History 126

04 December 2015

Alexander the Great Logistician.

The human civilization has a long, dramatic history of different cultures waging war

against each other. The method through which the commanders of these ancient forces provided

sustenance for their troops has long been a matter of debate amongst historians. While these

historians may not all agree on the methods used to supply these forces, they can absolutely

agree on one thing. An army marches on its stomach, and while infantry forces may have been

born on day one, logistical elements were developed by day two, when commanders suddenly

realized that they had no way to feed, clothe and otherwise supply their forces.

Logistics can make or break a military campaign. That fact is as true today as it was two

thousand years ago. If you can isolate a military force from its supply line, you create a perfect

siege scenario. A starving army may not be quick to surrender, but it also doesn’t have the

energy to resist a well fed enemy. Taking this into account, it’s easy to see why ancient military

commanders would be limited in their conquest of new territories. As their forces marched

further and further from their homes, the supply lines would be stretched thin. For example,

ancient roman armies would utilize a supply line that consisted of a Supply Base, which was

essentially a large territory managed by a Roman Governor that gathered and transported

military supplies, an Operational Base, such as a city or port, and a Tactical Base to supply their

legions. While the Supply Base and Operational Base were stationary, the Tactical Base was
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actually the encampment that the military force established daily. As the army would progress,

this Tactical Base would become a storage depot that would continue to supply the legions as

they advanced. If you can imagine how many people would need to be left behind to transport

and guard grain supplies for thousands of soldiers, then it would not be difficult to understand

how extending this kind of supply line over thousands of miles would easily deplete your forces

and leave them open to defeat. A commander that could overcome logistical deficiencies and

adapt to the environment around an advancing army was a commander that could conquer the

world. Alexander III of Macedonia was able to conquer the known world, a feat that has never

been duplicated, because he inherited an enormous, disciplined fighting force from his father and

because he had a natural aptitude for military logistics. This natural aptitude is what enabled his

army to be successful where others had failed.

If you look up the question “Why was Alexander the Great great?” you will get many

results from many different search engines. For the most part, these results address Alexander’s

education, taming of Bucephalus, perfect execution of the Macedonian Military Phalanx,

establishment of the library at Alexandria and his defeat of the Persians. Articles on these events

are all over the internet and in many different books at your library. You have to dig deep to

figure out how Alexander III was so successful, where other leaders had failed. The root of his

success lies in two areas; the elite, disciplined, full time military force his father, King Philip of

Macedon, developed and his inclusion of logistics preparations in strategic planning.

Alexander III’s success is so deeply entangled with that of his father, that it is difficult to

isolate where his father’s legacy ends and Alexander’s begins. King Philip, having inherited an

unstable country on the verge of political collapse, surrounded by hostile neighbors that

constantly subjected his country to attacks, immediately set about stabilizing his claim to the
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throne by bribing the Thracian king, establishing a treaty with the Athenians and executing a

political rival that would lay claim to his throne. Within a year his rule was solidified and he set

to reorganizing the Macedonian army. Philip, having been sent to Thebes at the age of fifteen as

a hostage lived with Pammenes, a Theban General of considerable fame. Throughout his

residency he accumulated a wealth of strategic military education from his benefactor and his

benefactor’s close friend and associate, Epaminondas. Using the wealth of knowledge he

accumulated during his stay in Thebes, he made soldiering a full time occupation, paying his

troops well enough that they could soldier year round, instead of just between agricultural

harvests. Furthermore, Philip used what he had learned watching the maneuvers of the Sacred

Band, Thebes elite infantry regiment, to develop his own permanent and elite infantry unit. He

equipped this infantry, which was called Pezhetairoi, with the brutal sarissa, a spear that was

approximately 18 feet in length, and parade ground dressing and discipline to develop them into

one of the most formidable fighting forces the world had ever seen. In 358 BC, King Philip met

the Illyrians in battle and, using his reorganized Macedonian phalanx, decimated three quarters

of the Illyrian forces and sending the rest fleeing the battlefield in terror. Following the defeat of

the Illyrians, and subsequent invasion and conquer of Illyria itself, King Philip established

multiple treaties through marriage, developed an increasingly aggressive military policy and

forcefully seized Paeonia and Amphipolis. In 348 BC, the Macedonian army attacked the

Chalcidice peninsula and defeated the city-state of Olynthus. Olynthus and the other 31 Greek

cities in Chalcidice were utterly decimated and razed to the ground. The Greek citizens of these

cities were sold as slaves, and their land distributed amongst Macedonians. Among these Greek

cities was Stageira, the birthplace of the Greek philosopher Aristotle. The Chalcidice peninsula

was annexed by Macedonia, marking an end of Greek settlements on Macedonian soil.

So, when a 20 year old Alexander III ascended to the throne in 336 BC and began

marauding about Eurasia, he already had one of the most effective fighting forces on the planet

at his disposal. Even so, he picked apart the policies of his military that would impede his

success as a conqueror throughout his marches but retained many of the Philip’s veterans as well

as much of the disciplinary measures the Philip had imposed upon his army. For example, King

Philip forbade the use of wagons and limited the number of servants to one for every ten foot

soldiers and one for every cavalryman. Alexander maintained Philips policy of having his troops

carry their own arms, armor and provisions while on the march. However, where Philip had

forbidden wives and women from accompanying his forces, Alexander accepted that doing so,

while marching on Mesopotamia would undermine the morale of his troops and allowed them to

marry whichever captive women they wanted, so they would feel less inclined to return home.

The route of Alexander’s march through Eurasia was never accurately documented, or if

it was, the documentation didn’t survive the two thousand years that has elapsed since. His

routes of march, as they existed in his day, can be pieced together and reconstructed using

archaeological and paleological records as well as any general historical records that have not

been destroyed over time. Additionally, modern geographical studies and geological surveys

give us a reliable picture of the landscape and climate conditions of the area during Alexander’s

time. Reconstructing this route is critical in determining how Alexander’s supply lines operated

successfully. Estimating the logistical needs of the troops, camp followers, and animals is also

critical to this explanation. For the purposes of keeping this essay succinct, I will use the

estimates provided in Donald W. Engel’s book, “Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the

Macedonian Army”(App. 5, Table 1). This book is an in depth examination of the number of

troops, as well as camp followers, and animals that would have been transported with it. Engels
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estimates that the troop to follower ration would have been approximately one follower to every

three troops until Gaugamela, and one follower to every two troops after, with numbers

increasing as soldiers began taking wives, who promptly started giving birth to children. Some

pack and draft animals would have been needed as well, to carry critical supplies such as tents,

siege engines, firewood and spoils of war. Carts of the day were generally ineffective because

the design. The harness draped across the animal’s throat, causing it to choke. This limited the

amount of weight an animal could pull in a cart and the terrain it could carry it over. Because of

this, Philip had forbidden the use of carts and servants were made to carry it instead. Alexander

continued this tradition, for the most part, and there is no evidence that carts were used until he

reached Iran. Using population numbers derived from Engel’s book, we see that the average

number of personnel in Alexander’s army was 65,000, the number of cavalry animals was

approximately 6,100, baggage animals would have numbered around 1,300 and the number of

pack animals carrying provisions would have been about 1,120. Given that the dietary staple of

a military force during that time frame was grain, this works out to a grain requirement of

roughly 280,210 pounds of grain per day to supply his army. If we add in water requirements,

we add an additional 1, 006,680 pounds of weight per day. Obviously, transporting 1.3 million

pounds of consumable supplies is a monstrous logistical feat. Particularly so if you take into

account that his army was on the march for thirteen years. So how exactly did Alexander

accomplish this? To begin this, we look at timing.

King Philip was murdered by his spurned lover on the eve of a march to Thebes and

Athens to quell a rebellion. Alexander ascended to the throne and personally led his army to

Thebes and Athens, himself. Marching three hundred miles in eighteen days, he arrived to find

Thebes fortified. Preparations for his next assault took three days, but the results were
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devastating. No quarter was given, Thebes military forces were slaughtered, the city was razed

to the ground and the thirty thousand Thebans that did not die in the assault were sold into

slavery. The logistical importance of this swift and brutal action will be addressed later in this

essay.

According to Duris of Samos, a notable Greek historian of the era, The Macedonia army

departed in early spring of 334, on their conquest into Asia and carried a thirty day supply of

provisions with them. Provisions likely only consisted of grain, as water and protein could be

foraged during the trip. Harvests would likely be conducted around June, and marching in early

spring enabled Alexander’s army to survive on its provisions then reap the barely ripe harvests of

its enemy’s territory. This is the first evidence we see of Alexander incorporating logistical

planning into strategic planning and further evidence of a correlation between harvest time and

the timing and direction of Alexander’s marches can be found throughout the regions he

conquered.

As we have seen, it would have been physically impossible for the Macedonian army to

carry thirty days of provisions. Using the information provided by Arrian, we can recreate

portions of Alexander’s initial route through Thrace, which appears to have proceeded along a

coastal route that included Amphipolis, Abdera, and Maroneia. This would have enabled

Alexander to transport the majority of his provisions by ship, in turn allowing his soldiers to

travel with minimal supplies and resupply at ports every few days. Estimating a march rate of 19

miles per day, over mostly flat terrain and including a rest day for pack animals, we can conclude

that Alexander’s forces reached the Hellespont in 18 days. This leaves the forces, at the very

least, a ten day supply of rations on board the supply ships. As examples of superior logistical

planning go, this is exceptional. The extra grain gave his forces extra time to secure a forward
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operating base and deal with any advance Persian force. It also gave the harvest an extra ten

days to ripen before being pillaged. Here, we see how the swift and brutal destruction of Thebes

would affect his military supply system. After destroying the Persian advance forces, local

towns chose not to resist Alexander’s forces and gave them any supplies they needed.

Now Thrace wasn’t that far to march, and countless generals had invaded their neighbors

successfully in this area long before Alexander’s time and many have done it long after he was

gone. The logistics of destroying a neighbor aren’t really that exciting. Alexander’s continued

march is where the logistics of military support begin to get interesting. To begin with, we

return to the annihilation of Thebes, and what effect it had on Alexander’s march. Alexander

probably chose a coastal route, past Ilium to Antandrus and Adramyttium. Assuming he went in

a straight line from Dascylion to Sardis means that one also has to assume he found a miraculous

way of levitating his forces through the rugged mountains and steep canyons of barren scrubland

that stood between them. Nothing in any historical record indicates he was ever in Dascylion

and specifically, Arrian’s account of Alexander’s biography states that he sent his General,

Parmenio to take the town instead. Utilizing the coastal route he would have had access to large

areas of agricultural communities and small towns as well as abundant water supplies. The

overland route lacked settlements and thus would not have provided agricultural crops which he

could seize. Alexander’s reputation preceded him, and the city of Sardis surrendered to him

immediately. He confiscated their treasury and advanced to Ephesos, which also surrendered,

followed immediately by the surrender of Magnesia, Maeander, and Tralles. The horror of

Thebes was undoubtedly a primary reason for these cities surrender. Alexander used these cities

as storage depots, seizing the recently harvested crops and leaving behind a garrison or taking

hostages to ensure their continued cooperation. Moving on, he besieged Miletus, relying on a
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very small division of troops to do so. Miletus was perilously situated on the edge of Mount

Latmus. There were neither fields nor rivers in this city and resupply was a formidable problem.

Alexander’s naval fleet was brought in, but a Persian fleet of 400 ships was enroute and the

Governor of Miletus decided he would stand his ground because Miletus was an excellent harbor

and he expected that the Persians would be able to transport provisions and soldiers with little

effort. Unfortunately for Miletus, Alexander sent his Naval Admiral to occupy the small island

of Lade with 160 ships. This effectively closed off the entrance to the Miletus Harbor, and they

were forced to harbor at the Cape of Mycale instead. By closing off the Persian supply route to

Miletus, Alexander was able to breach the walls of Miletus and it’s leaders promptly threw

themselves at his feet and begged for mercy.

For the sake of keeping this paper concise, we move forward in time to Susa. After a 34

day stay in Babylon, Alexander’s forces set out on a 20 day journey into the heart of Persia.

They have traveled approximately 3500 miles at this point, from the start of their journey on

Macedonia. This is the point at which we find our hero moving from Great Liberator to Great

Conqueror. Until this point, Alexander had a realistic expectation that the majority of the local

populace would surrender to him. As an invader, this was unlikely to happen so the dynamics of

his logistic situation had to change. Using scouts, Alexander determined the layout of terrain,

roads, and resources as well as enemy movements before deciding when and where he would

enter a territory. He frequently divided his forces where a region had not surrendered, ensuring

he didn’t commit his army to a territory that could not sustain them. The various divisions would

take different routes throughout the country, leaving a main body of Soldiers behind at a well

provisioned base. This ensured that his troops would not meet the same fate as countless armies

before them, a slow death due to starvation and dehydration. Instead of accepting provisions as
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gifts or boons after a surrender, the army now pillaged and plundered towns and villages under

the careful scrutiny of Alexander’s most capable lieutenants. Uxia, for example, a region

between Susa and Persepolis, refused to surrender and demanded instead that Alexander pay

them the same tribute to cross their territory as they had received from the Persian King.

Alexander, using the intelligence he garnered from his advance scouts, attacked their mountain

forts and pillaged their cities and towns, finally accepting their surrender. This resulted in the

receipt of 30000 sheep and 500 pack animals for his forces, since these people were pastoralists

instead of agriculturists.

Upon arrival in Persepolis in February 330, Alexander had his forces dig in and rest for

several months. The trek from Persis to Ecbatana was over 500 miles of sparsely inhabited

terrain. There was simply no way for his forces to sustain themselves on that kind of march,

even if they had been able to obtain supplies from the Persepolis region, as we have already

established that they were limited to carrying a 14 day supply of provisions. By departing in

June, Alexander could once again utilize the milk ripe grain harvests. When he left Persepolis in

June, he did so with light, swift units made up of approximately 17,000 personnel. He hopped

from city to city, seizing harvests and water supplies sufficient to provision his small force.

Finally he reached Ecbatana, only to find that his opponent, Darius, was in retreat to towards

Parthia, laying waste to the countryside that would provision Alexander’s army should he choose

to follow. And follow he did, but with only the Companion cavalry, mounted scouts, mercenary

horsemen, part of the phalanx and his archers. He sent his general to retrieve the food and

treasury stored at Persepolis and Susa, which was moved forward to Ecbatana. Upon his return,

the General, Parmenio, took the remaining troops and subdued the Cadusians and marched into

Hyrcania. While this did result in the subjugation of the Cadusians, it is more likely that these
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orders were given for the purpose of provisioning the Army. While the entire Army could not

follow Alexander to because of limited water supplies, moving these forces North to regroup in

Sousia allowed them to pilfer provisions from areas with better agricultural prospects.

Finally, the most telling part of Alexander’s logistical savvy was the way his Army utilized local

crops. As the Army traveled, large swaths of cultivated land and crops were harvested. Imagine

a monstrous horde of man sized locusts numbering in the tens of thousands marching through

Kansas, if you will, and you will be able to visualize the destruction that was wrought upon these

farming communities. Obviously, this Army was not intending to return for a very long time, if

at all. There was no clear route of retreat that would have been safe to utilize. Had he turned his

Army around at any point, they would have fallen en mass to starvation and dehydration. The

only path this Army ever had was forward.

Clearly, extensive thought went into provisioning Alexander’s enormous forces along

their 22,000 mile journey to conquer the world. Logistics were routinely problematic, but by

adapting to the climate and culture of the peoples he met and lands he trekked through,

Alexander was able to overcome this with relative ease. Alexander the Great was great because

he paid attention to his supply routes, and utilized the tools he had at hand, his father’s military

legacy, to maximum effect.

Works Cited

Arrian, P. A. Brunt, and E. Iliff. Robson. Anabasis of Alexander. Cambridge,

Arrian, Curtius, Plutarch, and Michael Wood. Alexander the Great: Selected Texts from
Arrian, Curtius and Plutarch. Ed. Tania Gergel. New York: Penguin Group, 2004. Print.

Davis, Paul K. 100 Decisive Battles: From Ancient times to the Present.
New York: Oxford UP, 2001. Print.

Engels, Donald W. Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army.
Berkeley: U of California, 1978. Print.

Erdkamp, Paul. Hunger and the Sword: Warfare and Food Supply in Roman
Republican Wars, (264-30 B.C.). Amsterdam: Gieben, 1998. Print.

Green, Peter, and Peter Green. Alexander of Macedon, 356-323 B.C.: A Historical Biography.
Berkeley: U of California, 1991. Print.

Roth, Jonathan. The Logistics of the Roman Army in the Jewish War.
N.p.: n.p., 1991. Print.