Evolution, Gender, and Rape

Evolution, Gender, and Rape

edited by Cheryl Brown Travis

A Bradford Book
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
© 2003 Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Chapter 8, “Evolutionary Models of Why Men Rape: Acknowledging the Com-

plexities,” by Mary P. Koss, was originally published in 2000 in Trauma, Violence,
and Abuse, vol. 1: 182–190. Reprinted by permission of the author. Chapter 12,
“The Origins of Sex Differences in Human Behavior: Evolved Dispositions versus
Social Roles,” by Alice H. Eagly and Wendy Wood, was previously published in
1999 in American Psychologist, vol. 54 (6): 408–423. Reprinted by permission of
the author and APA Press.

The index was prepared by Celeste Newbrough.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any
electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or informa-
tion storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.

This book was set in Sabon by Graphic Composition, Inc.

Printed and bound in the United States of America.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Evolution, gender, and rape / edited by Cheryl Brown Travis.
p. cm.
“A Bradford book.”
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-262-20143-7 (hard. : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-262-70090-5 (pbk. : alk.
paper)
1. Thornhill, Randy. Natural history of rape. 2. Rape. 3. Men — Sexual behavior.
4. Human evolution. I. Travis, Cheryl Brown, 1944–.
HV6558 .E92 2003 2002071892
364.15'32—dc21
Contents

Evolutionary Models and Gender 1

1 Talking Evolution and Selling Difference 3
Cheryl Brown Travis
2 Female Sexuality and the Myth of Male Control 29
Christine M. Drea and Kim Wallen
3 Power Asymmetries between the Sexes, Mate Preferences, and
Components of Fitness 61
Patricia Adair Gowaty
4 Does Self-Report Make Sense as an Investigative Method in
Evolutionary Psychology? 87
Stephanie A. Shields and Pamela Steinke
5 Understanding Rape 105
Ethel Tobach and Rachel Reed
6 Pop Sociobiology Reborn: The Evolutionary Psychology of Sex
and Violence 139
A. Leah Vickers and Philip Kitcher

Critiquing Evolutionary Models of Rape 169

7 Of Vice and Men: A Case Study in Evolutionary Psychology 171
Jerry A. Coyne
8 Evolutionary Models of Why Men Rape: Acknowledging the
Complexities 191
Mary P. Koss
9 Theory and Data on Rape and Evolution 207
Cheryl Brown Travis
vi Contents

10 An Unnatural History of Rape 221

Michael Kimmel
11 Violence against Science: Rape and Evolution 235
Elisabeth A. Lloyd

Integrative and Cultural Models of Gender and Rape 263

12 The Origins of Sex Differences in Human Behavior: Evolved
Dispositions versus Social Roles 265
Alice H. Eagly and Wendy Wood
13 The Evolutionary Value of the Man (to) Child Affiliative Bond: Closer
to Obligate Than to Facultative 305
Wade C. Mackey
14 Rape-Free versus Rape-Prone: How Culture Makes
a Difference 337
Peggy Reeves Sanday
15 What Is “Rape?”—Toward a Historical, Ethnographic
Approach 363
Emily Martin
16 Understanding Rape: A Metatheoretical Framework 383
Jacquelyn W. White and Lori A. Post
17 Coming Full Circle: Refuting Biological Determinism 413
Sue V. Rosser
Index 425
Evolutionary Models and Gender
1
Talking Evolution and Selling Difference
Cheryl Brown Travis

Are women and men bipolar opposites in perpetual discord over conflict-
ing interests? Did we evolve to be this way? Does this reach the extent of
an evolutionary, genetic basis for sexual aggression? The publication of A
Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion by Thorn-
hill and Palmer (2000) answered these questions largely in the affirmative
and vaulted the debate into national prominence. This volume offers con-
sideration of these questions from the perspective of a variety of scientific
and scholarly disciplines and highlights the complex issues about gender,
sexuality, evolution, and violence involved in understanding the intersec-
tion of evolution, gender, and rape. The account of rape as evolutionary
offered by Thornhill and Palmer (2000) is given detailed analysis.
Gender politics are nowhere more profound than in the area of sexual
aggression. The significance of rape was first brought to widespread public
attention by the defining work of Susan Brownmiller (1975). A key feature
of her analysis was to point out that sexual aggression was sustained by
differential status and power and that it carries social meanings that ex-
press issues beyond sexuality. These ideas were elaborated and affirmed by
other scholars (e.g., Holmstrom and Burgess 1980). Careful, quantitative
field studies validated the perspective that status (i.e., the ability to access
resources and to exert choice) is a basic feature of sexual violence (Baron
and Strauss 1989). These works challenged the common myth that rape
was a rare event perpetrated by mentally weak sociopaths on careless vic-
tims and suggested instead that dynamics of power and status might touch
the lives of ordinary women and men. Indeed, it was found that ordinary
cultural discourse included commonly held beliefs and rape myths that
foster and help sustain sexual aggression (Burt 1980). It was a shocking
4 Cheryl Brown Travis

discovery that rape might be much more frequent than supposed and that
it might invade ostensibly normal dating relationships (Koss et al. 1987).
Understanding the acquisition and development of sexually aggressive be-
havior and the factors that are likely to elicit and to sustain it have been
topics of extensive and careful study (Crowell and Burgess 1996; Hall
1996; Heise 1998; Malamuth 1983; Malamuth and Check 1981; Mala-
muth, Haber, and Feshbach 1980).
If one hopes to make use of evolutionary theory to understand gender
differences and to understand sexual aggression in particular, it is neces-
sary to take a considered look at basic principles of evolution and it is
necessary to examine assumptions about gender in general. Far from be-
ing “anti-evolution,” this volume illustrates the care that must be taken
in making use of evolutionary theory and includes some attention to how
evolutionary theory might guide empirical research. Evolutionary theory
is not sexist. The basic principles of evolutionary theory have helped to
organize information, to understand some phenomena, and to generate
hypotheses. The number of scholarly disciplines, such as evolutionary an-
thropology, evolutionary biology, evolutionary ecology, and evolutionary
psychology, that have emerged evidences the appeal and usefulness of the
theory. Because applications of evolutionary principles to human rela-
tionships are frequently characterized by grandiose overgeneralization and
by political philosophy thinly disguised as evolutionary science, this chap-
ter begins with a short primer of basic concepts. Later chapters introduce
more complex questions of theory and methodology.
However, the overgeneralization and grandiosity that has characterized
popularized and simplistic accounts of gender and sexuality cannot be dis-
mantled merely by clarifying the tenets of evolutionary theory. One must
recognize the cultural context that supports and invites such accounts.
Therefore, a second section in this chapter entitled “Media, Culture,
and Science” discusses the reciprocal and mutual influences of culture and
science as these are played out in the media. The reciprocal link between
a cultural predilection for dichotomies and a gender science that supports
this predilection can be seen in the media attention given not only to A Nat-
ural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion, but to a num-
ber of studies focused on biological gender differences. I argue that there
should be a broad understanding of gender and of sexuality as phenom-
ena that are as much social as biological.
 Talking Evolution and Selling Difference 5

A final section of this chapter offers the reader a brief overview of the
entire volume and serves as an introduction to the major parts of the book.
These parts offer useful discussions of some of the more difficult problems
one must solve in order to make productive use of evolutionary theory. The
second part is focused particularly on the proposal that rape is best un-
derstood in terms of evolution, and the final third part of the volume of-
fers a range of other perspectives and models.

A Short Primer

The persistent misapplication and misuse of evolutionary principles has

generated an understanding of human maleness and femaleness as cate-
gorically opposite, universal, and invariant. Early political renderings of
evolutionary theory by politically conservative philosophers resulted in a
social Darwinism that served as an account of the disease and poverty of
worker classes. Other, pop sociobiology, accounts of human psychology
and culture were also loosely formulated in the language of evolution. The
pop sociobiology accounts of gender difference based on evolution are of-
ten what Stephen Jay Gould (Gould and Lewontin 1970) called “just-so
stories,” because things might have happened as hypothesized. Ethel To-
bach and Rachel Reed in this volume point out that simplistic evolution-
ary models of human behavior are sometimes advanced zoomorphizing
(the inappropriate interpretation of human behavior in terms of animal
models). Jerry Coyne in this volume makes it clear that the misuse of evo-
lutionary principles invokes the resentment of evolutionary biologists who
do work carefully to meet exacting standards. I have elaborated elsewhere
(Moore and Travis 2000; Travis and Yeager 1991) on problems of socio-
biological approaches that emphasize inherent gender-based conflict as a
key to sexuality.
In these “just so stories,” sexuality is cast in a one-dimensional and
somewhat problematic light. In this popularized view, sex is almost exclu-
sively a matter of reproduction and is fraught with conflict and danger.
However, others suggest quite different perspectives and propose that
much of what is understood about sex and sexuality is socially constructed
(Boyle 1994; Tiefer 1995; Travis and White 2000). Scholars from a vari-
ety of disciplines have developed this idea of knowledge as socially con-
structed; it is not simply an antiscience philosophy promulgated strictly
6 Cheryl Brown Travis

within feminism (Gergen 1985; Lewontin 1992; Parker and Shotter 1990;
Simon 1996). The history of sexology research (Tiefer 2000) illustrates the
changeable nature of the facts of sexuality and how these are understood
among scientists. In studies involving a wide range of animal species, bi-
ologist David Crews (1994) has demonstrated a wide range of permuta-
tions in reproductive anatomy, physiology, and behavior. Whether sex
among primates is largely about reproduction can be questioned. For ex-
ample, primatologist Frans de Waal (with F. Lanting, 1998) offers a quite
different picture of sexuality from field observations of one of our nearest
evolutionary neighbors, the bonobo chimpanzee, for whom sexual en-
counters are largely a form of social exchange and a basis for cohesion
rather than reproduction.
When evolutionary theorizing is used to inform a general audience
about the nature of sexuality, as well as many other phenomena, there are
a lot of references to natural selection, fitness, and environment. But often
the connection between these terms and the conclusions about sexual be-
havior are accomplished only by linguistic fiat. Basic assumptions and
corollaries often remain implicit and without empirical corroboration. To
read these accounts with a critical eye, a very short primer may be helpful.
Principles of evolution rest on three tenets and involve the ideas that:
individuals vary; some variations are more favorable for survival and re-
production than others; some of this variation is genetically based and
therefore can be inherited. Most evolution (i.e., differing gene frequencies
in successive generations) is due to differential reproductive success as a
function of these variations. It is also possible for evolution to occur
through genetic drift and other mechanisms that might seem almost to be
matters of happenstance. Evolution does not ensure that only adaptive or
beneficial traits will occur; nor does it result in an ever-upward move to-
ward perfection. From a biological perspective, the process should be
viewed as the elimination of the grossly unfit and those who have met with
an unlucky moment. Individuals who are marginally fit may continue to
reproduce as long as they do not meet with an unlucky moment. Fitness
and natural selection are important conceptual ideas of evolutionary the-
ory that must be understood in terms of gene-environment interaction.

Fitness The unit for evaluating evolutionary “success” is genetic fitness.

Specifically, the bottom line of fitness is the representation of genes in suc-
cessive generations of offspring that themselves reproduce. Contrary to
 Talking Evolution and Selling Difference 7

popular notions, fitness does not necessarily mean that the individual will
have a long or prosperous life of ease. Mutualism in the immediate in-
stance can result in greater general and inclusive fitness than immediate
exploitation. In some cases, the increased representation of an individual’s
genes in successive generations may actually be enhanced by what appears
to be altruism. W. D. Hamilton (1964) first described this seeming anom-
aly, whereby individual fitness may be enhanced because genetic relatives
in future generations carry an increased frequency of genes carried in the
altruistic individual. Thus, fitness is measured not only in the number of di-
rect offspring, but also in the offspring of genetic relatives, what is known
as inclusive fitness. The process by which these altruistic behaviors are
retained in successive generations is termed kin selection. Any argument
about the evolutionary fitness derived directly from a behavior or trait
must show that the behavior or trait results in an increased gene frequency
in several succeeding generations. That is, there must be grandchildren and
great grandchildren that reproduce these genes. Fitness is always shaped
by environmental, ecological, and social context as well as genetic factors.
Natural selection is the process by which this interaction may evolve dif-
fering gene frequencies. Patty Gowaty in this volume emphasizes that nat-
ural selection should be understood as consisting of many components
and elaborates on a “components-of-fitness” model in her chapter.

Natural selection Natural selection operates to increase (or diminish)

characteristics or behaviors that result in greater reproductive success
among future generations. Only those traits having genetic components
and some implication for reproductive success are subject to natural selec-
tion. Natural selection may operate on a wide range of adaptive patterns,
such as offspring behaviors, foraging behaviors, predator defense, social
behavior within a group, mate selection, reproductive and gestation pat-
terns, parenting behaviors, and so on. If a behavior, no matter how bene-
ficial, has no genetic component, it is not subject to natural selection.
Further, those genetic characteristics likely to be expressed in life stages af-
ter reproductive effort and parenting are less likely to be subject to natural
selection. This explains in part why, after thousands of years of evolution,
humans continue to suffer from heart disease and cancer. They are condi-
tions that for the most part express themselves after reproduction and
child rearing, when the relevant genes have already been transmitted to the
next generation.
8 Cheryl Brown Travis

Although new genes can be introduced by mutation or by the inward

migration of new individuals, adaptations largely reflect the range and lim-
its of the initial gene pool. Thus, in some ways it is better to think of adap-
tations as ways of “making do” rather than as expressions of increasingly
refined solutions. Whether one or another adaptation persists in being ex-
pressed depends on its effectiveness relative to other competing permuta-
tions. However, in circumstances of reproductive isolation with weak or
no competition, less than optimal patterns may be sustained. In these cir-
cumstances, entire populations may carry forward a less than optimal ge-
netic condition, sometimes referred to as founder effects. These founder
effects can accrue merely by entering a certain ecological niche first when
there are no competitors and not necessarily because the trait has unique
adaptive benefits.

Gene-environment interaction In every case, natural selection occurs in

a gene-environment context. That is, the benefit (if any) of a genetic com-
ponent for a characteristic depends on the environment. Environment
includes not only physical ecology, but also the behavior patterns of con-
specifics and other species. (If the termite changed its behavior what would
happen to the aardvark?) In many cases, whether a behavior pattern is
adaptive or not may depend on the frequency of the behavior relative to
similar but competing strategies that might be displayed by peers. May-
nard Smith (1977; Maynard Smith and Price 1973) has referred to this
balancing of relative frequencies among different solutions to a similar
problem as an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). For example, whether
or not cooperation or competition will accrue benefits to the individual
depends on the behavioral strategies of other members of the group. Being
cooperative in a group of similarly inclined individuals is likely to produce
benefits for the individual and related kin. Reciprocal altruism can best
evolve where there is opportunity for repeated interactions over time and
where helpful acts can be repaid, either directly to the original helper in-
dividual or to the helper’s related kin. Similarly, the fitness associated with
a given reproductive strategy may depend in part on the strategies of other
members of the group. Thus, where the reproductive norm is that of
bonded, genetically invested adults, strategies that depend on deception
and manipulation are not likely to be associated with long-term success.
Environment is a complex that includes not only the surrounding phys-
ical ecology, but also the interactive, social ecology. This is particularly im-
 Talking Evolution and Selling Difference 9

portant for species that live in groups. The expectations, beliefs, and habits
of one’s peers and partners constitute a social environment that can elicit
and sustain, or extinguish, certain behaviors as well as the feelings and ra-
tionale that support such behaviors. For humans, group living has facili-
tated foraging, predator defense, and care of offspring. Indeed, one may
argue that the survival of humans depended on the ability to sustain group
integration. Among other things, the recognition of individuals and mem-
ory for their past behavior and personal traits would have been key to the
formation and maintenance of group living among early humans. It would
be functional to be able to sort other individuals in terms of privilege and
hierarchy with respect to the self. But the ability to recognize dominance
and power would be only one way of mentally marking other individuals
in one’s group. It also would be functional to remember who was generous
and who stingy, who trustworthy and who nefarious.1 Rogues who were
disruptive to group welfare were probably excluded from most beneficial
social exchanges, and they and their offspring would have suffered the
consequences of such exclusion. One might suppose that this winnowing
process would have produced a predilection for affiliation and an emo-
tional desire to belong to a group, even if it involved restraint on immedi-
ate self-interests.
Other chapters in this volume discuss additional complexities of evolu-
tionary theory, gender, and sexuality. Despite this complexity, discussions
of genetics in human ability and behavior can take on a remarkably
simplistic tone. These discussions do not reduce simply to matters of con-
firmed or unconfirmed fact. The same errors of exaggeration, oversimpli-
fication, and overgeneralization are repeated over a wide range of topics.
Part of the reason lies in not only in casual misuse of evolutionary con-
cepts, but also in cultural bias about gender and difference.

Media, Culture, and Science

Grandiosity in the misuse of evolutionary theory does not occur simply be-
cause someone forgot basic evolutionary principles. There is a cultural
readiness to locate causes for human events in biology and a cultural re-
ceptivity for the idea that gender roles are the product of orderly laws.
Scientific reports consistent with this cultural bias receive high-profile
coverage in the media. A Natural History of Rape is part of this cultural
phenomenon. It is not simply an explication of an idea. Although it is
10 Cheryl Brown Travis

couched in scientific terms, it can be understood as a product not of sci-

ence but of culture. The emphasis on a supposedly “natural” link between
sexuality, danger, and violence might in fact reflect less about scientific em-
piricism and more about cultural beliefs that emerge from Western Chris-
tianity linking sex with sin (Pagels 1999, Ruth 1987) and the more recent
moralizing by conservative religious leaders that HIV/AIDS is punishment
for sexual sin (John 1995).
The fundamental ideas of biological determinism and categorical sex
differences resonate with long-standing cultural biases. There are ongoing
tensions about the study of gender differences: how big are they; how con-
sistent are they; how significant are they; how amenable are they to change;
and what implications do they have for social politics? Similar tensions
also exist in studies of racial politics and IQ (Gould 1981). Gender differ-
ences in math, verbal, spatial, and other cognitive functions, even when
small by scientific standards, remain topics of extensive study and con-
tinue to be reported as important news. Gender differences in psycholog-
ical qualities such as anxiety, depression, intuition, and aggression are of
similar interest. There is, in addition, a general predilection to see differ-
ences as located within individuals and thus “natural,” uniform, and in-
variant. The framing of such questions in terms of a homogeneous group
difference simultaneously reflects and contributes to a cultural under-
standing of the genders as dichotomous and categorically opposite. When
explanations for these different qualities and roles invoke brain function,
hormones, or evolution they are made to seem even more “natural,” more
invariant, and more permanent.
Western, occidental views of sex and sexuality are built around cate-
gorical dichotomies, where the creation and celebration of sex differences
are understood to be crucial to social order. One gains the impression from
this dichotomous view that society would pretty nearly collapse without
the orderliness derived from these differences. Such differences are ex-
tolled, as if orderliness in the presumed “natural” social arrangements
were a completely value-neutral condition.
Stereotypic notions of gender roles are by and large cherished in Amer-
ican culture. Popular books trade quite successfully on the same notion of
inherent, fixed gender differences. The idea that women and men are ef-
fectively from different planets was such a successful marketing idea that
it was reiterated in a book series and even became the basis for a one-man
 Talking Evolution and Selling Difference 11

Broadway show. Such books provide reassurance about the natural, and
therefore rightful, divisions of labor. They also offer reassurance about the
natural basis for unequal political privilege2 that goes along with these
gender differences.
In harmony with this cultural value system, much of the research on sex
and gender has focused on difference. This is despite the fact that an ex-
tensive body of research based on statistical techniques of meta-analysis,
developed by Eagly, Hyde, and others (Eagly and Steffen 1986; Hyde
1984), has shown that, compared to individual variability within a gender,
many of the presumed differences between genders fall in the moderate,
small, or nonexistent range. Jacob Cohen (1994) argued that the ritualized
testing of difference is flawed by numerous logical errors. As an alterna-
tive, he advocated an emphasis on estimating effect sizes and the use of
confidence intervals. This approach is important because it prompts us to
question not only whether there is a difference between groups, but to ask
about the practical size of differences.
The focus on difference carries with it a number of implications and
value judgments outlined by Dale Miller (Miller, Taylor, and Buck 1991).
The first point is that research on difference begins with an implicit nor-
mative case and tacitly seeks to explain differences from this norm. The
thing that needs explaining is, by implication, abnormal, difficult, or puz-
zling. Exceptions to the norm are seen as problematic, and explanations of
the problem tend to target internal, person-based causes while ignoring in-
teractive, contextual factors. This tradition of looking for differences is re-
lated to the fact that science occurs in a cultural context and is in part a
product of that cultural context. The history of science is replete with in-
stances where flawed and highly improbable ideas have been advanced as
science, a science that just happened to be congruous with cultural beliefs
of the time. The influence is reciprocal, and culture in turn is informed and
perpetuated by confirmatory distillations of science. The penchant for
conceptualizing male and female gender as opposites continues to charac-
terize popular culture as well as scholarly publications. This is especially
apparent in renderings of research results for public consumption in news
media.
These cultural biases are normalized and reinforced by selective report-
ing of findings, overgeneralization, and social constructions found in news
stories. In this framework, it makes cultural sense that groups with such
12 Cheryl Brown Travis

categorically and uniformly different qualities should have different social

roles, obligations, and privileges. It follows that men and women fre-
quently will find themselves with conflicting interests and that what bene-
fits one may be anathema to the other. The phenomenon is not specific to
ideas about rape and is illustrated here by the media treatment of three
other studies of sex differences.

Gender Science in the News

Dozens of news stories covered discussions of A Natural History of Rape:

Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion, in part because sex sells and ideas
about inherently conflicted roles for men and women are of considerable
interest. But the book is only one example of this cultural interest.
Nowhere has cultural and scientific bias been more evident than in re-
search on gender and brain function. There’s a long history of efforts to
use brain size and function as a basis for prejudicial discrimination, not
only involving gender but also involving color and race (Gould 1981). Re-
search selected for high media coverage is interpreted as validating com-
mon stereotypes about femininity and masculinity. The media chooses to
highlight scientific findings that confirm stereotypes because they think
people will attend to them. People do attend to these stories, because they
are easily integrated with preexisting concepts (stereotypes).
In particular, significant media attention is paid to science studies that
lend themselves to a discussion of brain differences between women and
men. Brain differences seem to be an especially favored topic in these rep-
resentations on the natural and universal aspects of gender differences.
News stories seem to promote the idea that women and men are different
and have the brains to prove it. Common flaws in these news stories in-
clude distortion and exaggeration of differences, pejorative labeling, and
overgeneralization. Findings are extrapolated by the media to aptitudes
and abilities not relevant in the least to the study being reported. Labels,
meaning, and interpretations are regularly presented in judgmental terms
that focus on women’s deficits and limitations. Further, the news stories
often locate the origins of these differences in deterministic genes and evo-
lution. Three examples illustrate this reciprocal and confirmatory rela-
tionship between culture and science.
 Talking Evolution and Selling Difference 13

Listening with Half a Brain A good example of this reciprocal relation-

ship can be seen in a study presented at the radiological meetings at Chi-
cago in fall of 2000, by Dr. Joseph Lurito and his colleagues at Indiana
University medical school. They used functional magnetic resonance im-
aging to track blood flow in the brains of ten women and ten men as they
listened to a voice reading passages from a John Grisham thriller. Both
men and women had the greatest increase in blood flow on the left side of
the brain. Both men and women also showed some increase in blood flow
on the right side. Differences between left and right brain activity were rel-
atively larger for men who showed significantly more increase in the left-
brain. The left-right hemisphere differences for women were less striking
and suggested a more even pattern of blood flow and activation. The au-
thors suggested that this even pattern of activation might allow women to
more readily recover language functions following a stroke.
Thirteen news stories depicted the differences between women and men
as more categorical than in fact they were reported in the original study. In
these stories, the difference in blood flow while listening to the Grisham
thriller was extrapolated to mean something about quality of thinking
style, about general reasoning, and about emotion. A flippant analysis
might lead one to suggest that men listen with only half a brain. However,
a number of stories took care to protect male worthiness. Lurito was
quoted in several stories as stating that the observed difference did not in-
dicate that women were better listeners. He additionally was quoted in
several of the news stories as suggesting that women might even find lis-
tening more difficult. He suggested that this might be so because women
used more of their brain to accomplish the same task. The implications of
the study for potential deficits in women and their brains were reiterated
in several stories. The general implication was that listening is difficult for
women. That is, women try harder to achieve the same result that men ac-
complish with relative ease.

Navigating with Half a Brain The journal Nature Neuroscience pub-

lished a research study conducted by Mathias Riepe and his colleagues
at the University of Ulm in Germany (Groen et al 2000) that used MRI
methodology similar to that of the paper by Lurito on listening. This study
presented 12 women and 12 men with 3 computerized virtual 3-D mazes,
each maze containing several potentially successful pathways. This task is
14 Cheryl Brown Travis

not unlike computer games in video arcades, a recreational setting fre-

quented by boys more often than by girls. The study found that the aver-
age score for the 12 men to complete a maze was 54 seconds faster than
the average score required for the 12 women. Functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging was used to measure activity in a number of different brain
regions in both the left and right hemispheres and multiple comparisons
were later conducted to assess sex differences. In four regions, women and
men both showed bilateral activation. In two brain regions men showed
bilateral activation and women unilateral, and in one region women
showed bilateral activation while men had unilateral activation. In three
other regions one gender showed unilateral activation while the other
showed no elevated activation at all. If you’re counting, that’s at least ten
comparisons.
Out of these similarities and differences, only the differences were
noted, namely that men had higher activation for the hippocampal regions
in both left and right hemispheres, whereas women showed higher activa-
tion in only the right hippocampal regions. Men showed more bilateral
activation while women showed more unilateral activation. This is a sit-
uation similar, but in reverse, to that reported by Lurito in the listening
study, that is, ostensibly women were using half their brain to accomplish
the task, while men needed to work hard with both sides of their brain.
Reports on the Riepe study credited men’s 54-second superiority in part
to the fact that compared to women they were using more of their brain.
For example, one headline read “Men really don’t need to ask for direc-
tions: Men’s brains specially wired for navigation, new research suggests,”
while another headline reassured readers that “You Know Where You Are
With a Man.” Yet another made a more direct allusion to the battle of
the sexes by proclaiming that “Maps of the Mind Reveal Why Women
Navigators Drive Men Round The Bend.” Most of the stories distorted the
findings and overgeneralized findings from the computerized maze to
statements about men’s superior ability to read and understand maps and
to find their way in unfamiliar settings—though the study did not assess
map-reading skills or navigational skills in natural settings.

Gray Matter and Computer Science In May of 1999, Ruben Gur3 and
several co-authors published an article in the journal Neuroscience re-
porting that a study of 40 women and 40 men found that compared to
 Talking Evolution and Selling Difference 15

men, women have proportionately more gray matter (GM). The men not
only had a lower percentage of GM, their GM was distributed asymmet-
rically, with relatively more GM in the left than the right hemisphere.
Women showed no asymmetries. Women and men in the study were of
comparable age and education and had equivalent IQ test scores. Partici-
pants were administered verbal subtests from the revised WAIS adult in-
telligence scale and a vocabulary test from the California Verbal Learning
Tests. They also received two spatial tests, a block design subtest from the
WAIS and a Judgment of Line Orientation test, which requires subjects to
identify the true vertical or horizontal of a stimulus line. Percentage of gray
matter and white matter were moderately correlated with verbal and spa-
tial performance for both women and men, that is, the more GM the bet-
ter the score. Women and men had similar scores in verbal performance.
Men did have higher scores on the block design test and on judging verti-
cal and horizontal orientation of lines. However, the higher test scores on
spatial tasks reported for the men were not associated with the lateral vari-
ation in GM. Men with more uneven lateral distribution of GM than other
men (or women) did not score better on these spatial-perception tasks.
Nor was laterality of GM associated with any of the verbal measures.
Thus, the distribution of GM was not associated with any of the perfor-
mance measures, any more, say, than a study of gender difference in pickle
eating and in cognitive measures. Gur and his colleagues conservatively
and appropriately noted that “These conclusions should be considered
tentative because these correlations could be spurious, pending replication
in other samples and across a wider range of cognitive measures” (Gur
et al. 1999, p. 4070). Nevertheless, media accounts distorted, exaggerated,
misinterpreted, and overgeneralized the findings. Media coverage forgot to
mention there was no association between the distribution of gray matter
and any of the measures, but instead supported a vague notion that dif-
ferences in cognitive function were produced by differences in gray matter.
Not only did these errors occur in the press, Gur himself eventually re-
peated them.
Press representations of the study and later press interviews with Gur
expanded significantly on the implications and the “facts.” The Indepen-
dent, a London-based paper, reported that women have smaller brains
than men, but use what they have more efficiently, thus accounting for why
women and men perform equally well on IQ tests. Two days later the same
16 Cheryl Brown Travis

story was picked up by the London Guardian, and the results were said to
explain why women perform better on verbal tasks while men perform
better on spatial tasks, though Gur found no gender differences in verbal
test scores.
A week or so later the story moved to the United States, and the Wash-
ington Post, Buffalo News, and Pittsburgh Gazette ran virtually identical
stories reporting sex differences in gray matter and white matter. These
stories incorrectly noted that gray matter is used for communication and
white matter is used for computation.4 This is a case where prevailing gen-
der stereotypes, not the facts, become the basis for allocating meaning to
the findings. Since stereotypes are that women are better than men in lan-
guage skills, if women have more gray matter it must be associated with
language and communication. Since men are thought to be better at math,
then brain differences in white matter are interpreted as the anatomical ba-
sis for a math propensity. In these stories gray matter is associated spe-
cifically with communication, a stereotypic feminine quality, rather than
with general intelligence, thinking, logic, or problem solving; these “tough-
minded” qualities are not part of the feminine stereotype.
One might ignore these extrapolations and overgeneralizations as
simply sloppy writing by reporters who understand little about science.
However, in July of 2000, a full year later, the Ottawa Citizen carried ex-
cerpts of an interview with Gur where he elaborated on the possible social
and educational implications. He noted that women’s brains are structured
in a way that can put them at a disadvantage when it comes to learning
computer skills, despite the fact that Gur did not assess women’s ability to
learn computer skills. In the interview Gur further suggested that the dif-
ference in brain tissue could provide a biological reason for why so few
women in North America take an interest in computer science. What the
news stories imply is that having more gray matter and having it relatively
evenly available in the brain makes it harder for people, or at least women,
to think systematically.
Despite the flaws in such logic, there is a ready home for such “expert”
reports of stereotypic gender in the general culture. The cultural desire for
ordered gender differences sets a context for the formulation of research
questions and for the interpretation of research findings. What passes for
science is often merely a reiteration of cultural myth. The same desire pro-
vides an impetus for the media attention that gives added significance to
group differences. In some cases differences are reported where none were
 Talking Evolution and Selling Difference 17

found. The Thornhill and Palmer thesis on rape as a product of evolution

was partly granted a flurry of media attention because it is a story that eas-
ily can be seen as part of this larger cultural context. It was welcomed in a
cultural context where ideas about the biological and fixed nature of sex
differences are already widely accepted.

Theory, Research, and Alternative Models: An Introduction to the Rest

of the Volume

Remaining chapters in this volume are organized in three major parts and
address the evolutionary account of rape from the perspectives of animal
behavior, ecology, evolutionary biology, cultural anthropology, philoso-
phy, primatology, psychology, and sociology. Contributors reflect varying
academic backgrounds, different research traditions, and a range of per-
sonal philosophies. None finds the evolutionary account of rape to be in
any way compelling.
The first part offers a collection of additional chapters that elaborate
and greatly extend the consideration of evolutionary theory. Discussion
includes problems of methodology, as well as nosology and logic that
plague efforts to apply evolutionary theory to human social behavior. The
second part of the volume gives specific and detailed attention to the ideas,
reasoning, and data relevant to the proposition that rape is the product, or
by-product, of evolution as these were presented in A Natural History of
Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion. The final part of the volume
offers alternative models and frameworks that include evolutionary, psy-
chological, and cross-cultural perspectives.

I Evolutionary Theory and Sociobiology Theory

Initial chapters raise a variety of theoretical and methodological issues for
evolutionary models and pop sociobiology. Chapters 2 and 3 point to ways
in which evolutionary theory can be useful to feminist analysis. Christine
Drea and Kim Wallen unveil the widespread androcentric focus of much
theorizing about gender relations. Using primate data, they demonstrate
the significant role that females play in reproductive decisions. Females are
vested with significant sexual control. They not only are active agents with
respect to their own sexual behavior, but it may be argued from empirical
data that female interests and strategies also have an significant role in
shaping and controlling male sexual behavior. This analysis is consistent
18 Cheryl Brown Travis

with the observation of Patricia Gowaty in chapter 3 that feminists and

evolutionary biologists have interesting things to say to each other. Gowaty
points to the concepts of the environment of evolutionary adaptation
(EEA) as one such fruitful area of discussion. Rather than seeing a categor-
ical divide between “nature” and “nurture” positions, she observes that most
ideas in evolutionary ecology assume that the mechanisms of heredity are
not just genes, but environments, cultures, and development.
Chapters 4 and 5 address methodological concerns and the ways in
which methodology is linked to theory. Stephanie Shields and Pamela
Steinke discuss the distinction between proximate and ultimate explana-
tions and the use of self-report data. For example, sociobiological expla-
nations often make inferences about human feelings and motivations and
rely on self-report data to confirm hypotheses about ultimate evolutionary
causes. Shields and Steinke argue that investigations of “ultimate expla-
nations” need to rely on data that can differentiate proximate from ulti-
mate. Investigatory techniques or data, such as self-report, that are derived
from proximate variables do not qualify as valid for testing ultimate ex-
planations.
Tobach and Reed elaborate on these methodological problems. They
point out that in retrospective “what if” accounts, much theorizing and
data analysis is characterized by anthropomorphic interpretations wherein
human expectations, motives, and feelings are imposed arbitrarily on an-
imal behaviors. There also is a reciprocal phenomenon of zoomorphizing,
whereby the apparent causes and effects of the behavior of other animals
is taken as sufficient for the understanding of human behavior. Specific
considerations are raised with respect to violence, including a review of the
diverse sources of information, definitions, and data concerning rape.
Vicker and Kitcher conclude the first section and point out that behav-
ioral and mathematical ecology have pursued evolutionary questions
about behavior in nonhuman animals. They contrast this careful and
painstaking work with the casual storytelling of pop sociobiology and the
putative evolutionary advantages claimed for certain forms of human be-
havior. Vicker and Kitcher argue, along with others, that model building
requires attention to the details, and mathematical modeling uncovers and
refines hidden presuppositions. They further discuss the importance of in-
traspecific variability and the role of cultural transmission, especially in
discussions of human behavior.
 Talking Evolution and Selling Difference 19

II Research Data and Rape

The second part contains a collection of short papers that directly address
the data and theory relevant to the thesis that rape evolved as a result of
natural selection and that rape therefore has a genetic component. Jerry
Coyne, an evolutionary biologist, offers a no-holds-barred critique. He
points out that most of the media coverage has pitted Thornhill and
Palmer against feminists as science vs. politics. Coyne, instead, focuses on
the science that lies behind, or does not lie behind, the evolutionary ac-
count of rape. Coyne argues that the scientific errors in this evolution-rape
thesis are far more inflammatory than are its ideological implications.
Mary Koss, whose work is challenged by Thornhill and Palmer, raises
points about the social construction of science and inherent flaws of mea-
surement in every study. She focuses on the question of who exactly suf-
fers emotionally from rape and sexual aggression. This is a key piece of
scientific data, because an important source of reasoning for the rape-
evolution account is that victims of rape suffer distress in accord with the
degree to which rape diminishes their reproductive interests. The rape-
evolution account rests to a large extent on the secondary analysis of data
initially published by McCahill, Meyer, and Fishman (1979) on responses
of rape survivors who made use of a Philadelphia hospital emergency
room. Koss questions the relevance of this data for assessing constructs de-
veloped in the rape-evolution proposal long after the original data were
collected. She further notes that the respondents of the original study rep-
resented probably only 5 percent of rape victims. She directly challenges
the assessment of distress and long-lasting impact of rape as most serious
among women of reproductive age with a number of empirical sources
documenting distress, fear, and long-lasting impact among other groups
of women.
I have indulged myself with a second chapter in this volume to give de-
tailed consideration to the data and logistics relevant to scientifically eval-
uating the rape-evolution hypothesis. I first consider the hypothesis that
rape is a by-product of selection for oversexed males and discuss the un-
examined concepts of sexuality and gender underlying this proposition. I
next consider the proposal that rape is itself an adaptation subject to nat-
ural selection. Among other key data, pregnancy rates associated with
rape are reviewed, and I offer some observations on the evolutionary (so-
cial and ecological) environment where this behavior supposedly evolved.
In addition, for rape to be an evolutionarily based adaptation, rapists
20 Cheryl Brown Travis

should differ genetically from the nonrapists in the same category, that is,
the category of youths or of misfits assumed by Thornhill and Palmer to
be the most likely characters to perpetrate rape.
Michael Kimmel concurs that the account of rape as the product of
evolution constitutes bad science. He notes that the supposed natural con-
flict between males and females is based on assumptions that females, es-
pecially female primates, are coy and careful in their sexual behavior.
However, primatologist Sarah Blaffer Hrdy (1977) has effectively refuted
this notion. She observed that females often exhibit a natural propen-
sity toward promiscuity, while it is males who may work hard to ensure
monogamy and parental certainty for themselves. Kimmel additionally
observes that the hypothesized male propensity for rape is an unacknowl-
edged form of male bashing where all men are painted with a common
brush as violent, rapacious predators.
In the final chapter of this part Elisabeth Lloyd takes issue with the
public discussions of Thornhill and Palmer regarding the conflict between
their position, construed by them as science, and that of feminist criti-
cisms, construed as antiscience politics. This is the “Galileo Defense,” the
claim that their true conclusions are the result of excellent science, and
that most critics, and especially feminists, are ignorant and politically mo-
tivated. Lloyd chooses to argue the merits of the rape-evolution proposal
by carefully examining the necessary assumptions. For example, necessary
assumptions would require that men have special psychological adapta-
tions for recognizing female vulnerability, a preference for raping women
of peak fertility, and a psychological adaptation to be sexually aroused by
gaining physical control over an unwilling sexual partner. Further as-
sumptions are that men have a psychological adaptation to rape wives and
girlfriends if they believe their women are cheating on them and an evolved
psychological tendency to be paranoid about women’s claims of being
raped.
All the chapters in this part are critical of the shallow and limited treat-
ment given to the reduction of rape in Thornhill and Palmer’s proposal.
The rape reduction programs are trivial, and this is in itself a problem be-
cause the authors purport to be motivated by a desire to reduce this
heinous act and the grief and suffering that follow from it. They offer five
pages about educational programs for young men and two pages on bar-
riers to rape, such as keeping women from any social situation that might
 Talking Evolution and Selling Difference 21

permit rape. Nothing in the book suggests that something needs to be

done about the sense of entitlement derived from being male in a patri-
archal society. Nothing suggests that it might be useful to challenge the
common cultural understanding of rape as sex and of sex as overwhelm-
ing biological desire. Nothing offers a way for women to feel a greater
sense of agency and entitlement. Nothing addresses the construction and
limitations of traditional gender roles.

III Alternative Models

The challenge is to go beyond discussing, yet again, the limits of sociobio-
logical storytelling and to offer ways to think about the problem that can
suggest useful questions, other methodologies, and different theoretical
models. Recognizing variability among individuals and among cultures is
a starting point. For example, not all men engage in rape behavior, even
when in positions that would permit rape. Thus, there are different devel-
opmental outcomes and variation among individuals. Some of this varia-
tion may be cultural context and learning.
Alice Eagly and Wendy Wood argue that the status of women’s roles
within varying cultures and contemporaneous social conditions accounts
for a significant amount of variance in individual behavior patterns, ro-
mance, attraction, and gender relationships. They further argue that forms
of sexual control emerge along with the development of particular socio-
economic structures and that these structures have had particular utility
for men. For example, men’s concern with paternity and the associated
sexual jealousy is strongest under conditions of intensive agriculture, own-
ership of private property, patrilineal inheritance, and community strati-
fication (Schlegel and Barry 1986; Whyte 1978). Eagly and Wood offer a
re-analysis of data on mate preferences from 37 countries initially pre-
sented by David Buss and find significant cross-cultural variation in the un-
derstanding of gender and women’s status. These cultural factors support
a social structural account of sex differences in mate preferences. From
this perspective, sex differences in behavior reflect the greater power and
status associated with men’s roles and from the sex-typed division of labor
and of gender.
Wade Mackey argues directly against the assumption that men are
less emotionally invested in the outcomes of their sexual encounters than
are women. Instead he offers cross-cultural analyses supporting the
22 Cheryl Brown Travis

contention that men do have affiliative, nurturing orientations toward their

own children and that this is a key element in the well-being of children.
Absence of this supporting and affiliative connection harms the child and
the community, and offers no genetic advantage to men. Mackey provides
evidence from physical as well as cultural anthropology. For example, he
notes that among species where there is active paternal involvement and
dual provisioning of young, there is also limited physical sexual dimor-
phism. Notably, human evolution shows a pattern whereby sexual dimor-
phism decreased significantly. As dimorphism declined, it is likely that the
roles of males and females were beginning to converge. He further argues
that psychological traits among men (potential fathers), such as honesty,
reliability, and trustworthiness, would have become increasingly salient.
These traits would have been desirable not only from the perspective of the
individual woman, but would have increasingly become of interest to her
genetic relatives, the kin group, and eventually her larger cultural group.
Emily Martin and Peggy Reeves Sanday argue for a cross-cultural, so-
ciological, and anthropological understanding of rape. Martin proposes
that rape can be understood only in a cultural context. She reminds us
that human behavior is complex, context-dependant, and often changes
through time and across space. Intentional actions, such as rape, cannot
be separated from the contexts in which they occur. The understanding,
meaning, and significance accorded actions are derived not from biolog-
ical features, but from society and culture. She points out that rape is
not simply a physical “thing in the world,” such as an eye with a fixed
anatomy. It can be understood only as it is constructed in social discourse.
Martin suggests that the “thick description” used in qualitative research is
more appropriate than relying on questionable sociobiology.
In her field studies, Peggy Sanday has found that the incidence of rape
varies across 95 band and tribal societies. She and other researchers have
reported that rape is absent or rare in 50 to 60 percent of these groups. This
finding directly undermines at least some of the support for the proposal
that rape evolved among men more or less universally. Findings from these
societies collectively point out an inverse correlation between the incidence
of rape and the social status of women. Societies where rape is rare are
characterized by significant roles of authority and power for women as
managers not only of their immediate families but also as personages of
consequence in society at large. Rape-prone societies are characterized by
 Talking Evolution and Selling Difference 23

interpersonal violence in general and by an emphasis on male dominance

as part of the natural way of things and on beliefs that male dominance is
important for the existence of an orderly society. Where cultural beliefs
call for men to be dominant, it additionally becomes important for men to
“stick together.” Her accounts of gang rapes in the context of American
college fraternities additionally point out that sexual gratification (if any)5
was secondary to the celebration of fraternity bonding and group pride in
the conquest of the young woman’s body. Sanday’s extensive and ongoing
work with the Minangkabau of West Sumatra, where rape is extremely
rare, has further clarified the cultural belief structures that foster peaceable
relationships.
Jackie White and Lori Post offer a multivariate model of rape. Their chap-
ter builds on White and Kowalski’s (1998) integrative contextual develop-
mental model of violence against women. The model focuses on social
development and argues for the study of behavior in context. Data on vi-
olence against women, and rape in particular, are conceptualized as a func-
tion of five interacting factors proposed by the model: sociocultural
(including historical, cultural, and community traditions and values); so-
cial networks (including the family and peer group); dyadic; situational;
and intrapersonal. Results of the analysis support the proposition that so-
ciocultural, socialization, and socioemotional experiences of men provide
a compelling and comprehensive account of variations in men’s violence
toward women.

Notes

1. Kin recognition is relevant for altruism and for exploitation and has been found
to be important in many other species, including other primates, squirrels, bees,
and wasps.
2. It is unequal; it is political; and privilege to some at the expense of others is one
of the consequences.
3. The news stories that referenced Gur’s study include the following: Connor, S.
(1999, May 18), “In brains, size doesn’t matter,” Independent (London), p. 5; (1999,
May 31), “How men’s and women’s brains differ,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Sooner
edition, p. A10; Quan, D. (2000, July 13), “Women’s brains aren’t wired for com-
puter work,” Ottawa Citizen, final edition, p. A1; (1999, May 20), Science Update:
“How to pack a thinking cap: Men have bigger heads,” Science Page, Guardian
(London), p. 103; (1999, May 30), “Shades of gray and white,” Science section,
Buffalo News, final edition, p. 6H.
24 Cheryl Brown Travis

4. White matter is most likely to reflect (almost literally) the myelin sheath sur-
rounding axons. It functions in part to prevent the equivalent of electrical inter-
ference when impulses are discharged along the axon. There is likely to be no
functional or specific cognitive process performed in this tissue.
5. Some of the participants reported later that they could not “get it up.”

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2
Female Sexuality and the Myth of Male
Control
Christine M. Drea and Kim Wallen

In A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion (MIT

Press, 2000), Randy Thornhill and Craig T. Palmer propose that rape has
been evolutionarily selected as a human male mating strategy. Their con-
ceptualization emphasizes male control of reproduction and ignores the
significant role that females play in reproductive decisions. Our chapter
illustrates the inadequacy of this male-centric view of reproduction by
demonstrating the female’s active role in controlling sexual behavior, re-
flecting not only her own sexuality, but her control over male sexual be-
havior. We draw primarily from the primate literature, but also examine
other mammalian species to illustrate the variety of female control mech-
anisms. We begin with a discussion of specialized physical, structural, and
behavioral female “barriers” to forced copulation, then present examples
of more subtle relationships between mating strategies, social structure,
reproductive cycles, and sexual behavior that emphasize female sexual
desire and mate choice. We argue that even in simians and humans where
forced copulation occurs, it is minimally effective as a means of reproduc-
tion. Last we discuss postcopulatory mechanisms that allow females con-
trol of their reproductive output. We suggest that, through behavioral,
structural, physiological, and social mechanisms, females are vested with
significant sexual control that limits the reproductive benefits of sexual
coercion.

An Emerging Discipline

Historically, the study of human sexual behavior has been hindered by

religious and societal taboos, especially against viewing females as libidi-
nous. Because women were expected to be sexually meek and obedient
30 Christine M. Drea and Kim Wallen

(Darwin 1871), their active participation in courtship or mating decisions

was deemed inappropriate and, therefore, went unconsidered. Similarly,
the early study of animal sexual behavior, particularly in nonhuman pri-
mates, centered on males. All eyes were focused on the larger, brightly
colored, sexy and pugnacious male, the perceived solicitor and initiator of
behavior, whereas smaller, drab females were seen as passive recipients of
the male’s advances (Zuckerman 1932). Thus, the female primate’s pri-
mary function in sexual activity was believed to be limited to attracting
and accommodating the male’s sexual interest (Keverne 1976; Michael
1972; Michael and Keverne 1968).
Beyond the influence of traditional cultural norms, we believe that fe-
male stereotypes probably also reflected the fact that, within the arena of
sexual selection (Darwin 1871), female choice is far less obvious than in-
termale competition. Despite its active connotation, female “choice” can
be responsive, cryptic (Eberhard 1996), and quite distinct from sexual as-
sertiveness (Small 1993). By contrast, male sexual displays are typically
showy, specifically designed to attract attention. Similarly, but more to the
point of this chapter, mechanisms by which females regulate sexuality are
more subtle and less easily recognized than is male sexual coercion.
It was not until the 1970s that sex researchers began to rethink these
biases and recognized females as initiators of sexual behavior (Beach
1976; Goy and Resko 1972). This change required new terms to describe
components of the female’s sexual repertoire (Beach 1976). The concept
of female “attractivity” was already firmly entrenched in the literature to
describe the female’s stimulus value or sexual appeal to the male. Similarly,
“receptivity” referred to the female’s psychological willingness and physi-
ological preparedness to engage in sexual behavior. But no term described
the interest of a female (or male for that matter) to initiate sexual inter-
actions. Beach corrected this omission by coining the term proceptivity
to characterize the appetitive behavior used in sexual initiation by either
males or females. However, Beach primarily applied the term proceptivity
to females, advancing the revolutionary idea that females played an active
and crucial role in soliciting sexual behavior from males.
Beach’s semantic contribution radically changed the course of research
on reproductive behavior, permanently altering our view of male and fe-
male sex roles in the process. Consequently, today, the distinction between
simply accepting a male’s advances and proactive solicitation is obvious.
 Female Sexuality and the Myth of Male Control 31

Similar trends were evident in other areas of animal behavior, such as sex-
ual selection theory, in which the contribution of female choice was being
increasingly emphasized (Hrdy 1981, 1997; Small 1989, 1993). As a re-
sult, the myth of the sexually passive female (Hrdy 1981) was discarded in
favor of viewing females as selective, dynamic, and responsible agents of
their own sexuality. Or was it?

Current Misconceptions

Although we now understand more completely the range of mechanisms

by which females regulate sexuality and shape reproductive behavior, pre-
conceptions and misconceptions linger. Thornhill and Palmer’s (2000)
proposal of human rape as an evolutionarily adaptive reproductive strat-
egy for males is a case in point. Aside from the paucity of empirical evi-
dence to support such a claim, their theory has other striking flaws that
have rightfully attracted attention and criticism (Cartmill 2000). In keep-
ing with the theme of our chapter, however, we address a less obvious flaw,
namely that it places reproductive control or power entirely in the hands
of the male. By ignoring the significant role that females play in repro-
ductive decision-making, their treatise returns to the Victorian age of coy
maidens and blushing brides. It is time to hammer a final nail into the cof-
fin of the sexually passive female. Toward that end, we highlight female
control of sexuality and use the term gynarchy to refer to female physi-
cal barriers, physiological defenses, behavioral strategies, and individual
choices (the majority of which do not imply a conscious mechanism).
A growing body of evidence shows that, except with cases of forced cop-
ulation, mating requires or is facilitated by cooperation of the female. We
present some of that literature in this review, drawing our examples of fe-
male sexuality primarily from our closest relatives—other primates. Non-
human primates are traditional subjects for the study of human behavioral
evolution (Small 1989), but because there is no typical primate (Strier
1994) that most closely embodies human characteristics, we de-emphasize
any particular species. We focus instead on the diversity of mechanisms
available to females within this order. Examples of similar strategies in
other mammals are interspersed to remind us of the pervasiveness of fe-
male reproductive control: Gynarchy is the rule rather than the exception.
Nevertheless, the diversity of control mechanisms represented in female
32 Christine M. Drea and Kim Wallen

mammals also suggests that no clear pattern of reproduction can be cor-

related with taxonomy (Weir and Rowlands 1973). If generalizing from
primate to primate is fraught with difficulty, what can be said of attempts
to generalize from insects to humans?
Before presenting evidence of gynarchy, however, we offer both a caveat
and a disclaimer. First, it is critical to note that patterns of sexual behav-
ior and sexual aggression do not necessarily serve a reproductive function.
The variety of animal sexual behavior expressed in nonreproductive con-
texts is staggering (Bagemihl 1999). Thus, motor patterns that are nor-
mally associated with mating behavior can be incorporated into different
social contexts to take on new meaning. Genital inspection can serve as a
social greeting (East, Hofer, and Wickler 1993; Kruuk 1972), and presen-
tation of hindquarters or mounting can reinforce rank relations, deter ag-
gression, reduce tension, or repair social bonds (de Waal 1988). Likewise,
sexual aggression and rape in humans is frequently described as sexuality
in the service of nonsexual needs, such as dominance (Cohen et al. 1971;
Groth, Burgess, and Holmstrom 1977).
Second, our discussion of “forced copulation,” “sexual coercion,” or
“resisted mating” (Estep and Bruce 1981; Smuts and Smuts 1993) in non-
human primates does not imply that we view these events as necessarily
similar to (or having the same underlying mechanisms as) rape in humans.
On the contrary, the term rape has connotations far beyond its dictionary
or diagnostic definitions that should limit its usage to human behavior
(Gowaty 1982). Moreover, even if applied solely to humans, the term rape
is problematical in that it subsumes behavior similar in form, but not in
function or etiology (Berlin 1988; Rada 1978). For the purposes of our
discussion we will consider only the potential reproductive consequences
of rape, not the myriad motivational or psychological factors influencing
both its occurrence and its outcome.
To consider rape a reproductive strategy, one must first discount the ma-
jority of reported cases that fail to provide any reproductive potential
(Baron 1985). Rapists who target males, prepubescent girls, pregnant and
postmenopausal women clearly are not doing so for reproductive gain.
Likewise, rapists who fail to ejaculate or ejaculate outside the vagina, in-
sert objects rather than their penis into the woman’s vagina, engage in
sodomy or oral sex rather than vaginal penetration, and severely injure or
kill their victim, are not expecting progeny. Thus, only a small subset of
rape cases, namely those involving females of reproductive age who have
 Female Sexuality and the Myth of Male Control 33

been inseminated vaginally, is relevant to substantiating Thornhill and

Palmer’s argument. This subset includes many cases in which the perpe-
trator is related to the victim (Holmes et al. 1996). If incestuous rapes re-
sult in pregnancy, there is a decreased likelihood of producing a healthy
infant.
The suggestion that rape (even narrowly defined) has been evolutionar-
ily selected as a facultative male reproductive strategy is premature, at best.
We develop our critique in primates using a definition of sexual coercion
that incorporates both structural and functional components. Accord-
ingly, sexual coercion is “use by a male of force, or threat of force, that
functions to increase the chances that a female will mate with him at a time
when she is likely to be fertile, and to decrease the chances that she will
mate with other males, at some cost to the female” (Smuts and Smuts
1993, p. 2). We argue that observed behavior might meet the physical
properties of this definition without necessarily satisfying the functional
criteria.
Without empirical assessment of a female’s sexual status, it can be only
assumed, most likely falsely, that “she is likely to be fertile.” Similarly, the
condition that females are less likely to “mate with other males” follow-
ing forced copulation is not only rarely ascertained, but of dubious rele-
vance for evaluating the reproductive success of the act in question.
Theoretically, sperm competition would reduce a male’s chances of insem-
ination, but the relationship between mating with multiple males and pa-
ternity has not been established in any nonhuman primate. Mating
behavior is a necessary but insufficient condition for reproduction. For
sexual coercion to be a male reproductive strategy it must result in the pro-
duction of offspring; yet, definitive paternity data are generally unavail-
able. Forced copulation in nonhuman primates is rare, and most of the
relevant research concentrates on the overt behavior without providing in-
formation about its reproductive consequences—information that is pre-
requisite to any discourse on functionality.

Preventative Measures: Specialized Physical, Structural, and Behavioral

Barriers

As a high-risk behavior, rape implies haste. An offender typically performs

the act quickly to reduce the potential cost of injury or avoid retaliation.
However, mating in many species is not a simple act that can be performed
34 Christine M. Drea and Kim Wallen

with great speed: Copulation can be an intricate ballet in which suc-

cessful choreography demands an investment of time and necessitates
careful coordination between the actors. Even if one excludes the rituals
of courtship, the act itself can require a certain finesse. The following are
examples of female-imposed structural, physical, and behavioral barriers
that constrain male mating behavior and highlight the fact that it takes
two to tango.
Because female genital details are typically cryptic, they generally have
been ignored in accounts of sexual behavior. Again, the extravagance and
species diversity of the male genitalia has garnered most of the attention
(Austin 1984; Dixson 1998; Eberhard 1985). Careful consideration of fe-
male reproductive anatomy, however, reveals structural incompatibilities
between the sexes, with remarkable implications for copulatory activity.
Female mammals show extensive species variation in external genital mor-
phology (Hill 1953; Ioannou 1971; Short 1979), including physical ob-
stacles that limit or complicate mating.
Highly specialized physical barriers are displayed by the female guinea
pig, for example, whose vagina is sealed by a membrane that only disap-
pears temporarily under appropriate hormonal stimulation (Young 1937).
Similarly, various female prosimians are imperforate most of the year:
Their vaginal orifice is not discernible during sexually quiescent periods
of the seasonal cycle. This condition has been described for bushba-
bies (Eaton, Slob, and Resko 1973), mouse lemurs, dwarf lemurs (Petter-
Rousseaux 1964), ruffed lemurs (Foerg 1982), and tarsiers (see Hrdy and
Whitten 1987) but may prove to be more widespread with further study.
In females of these species, estrus occurs only during certain months of the
year and is accompanied by modification of the external genitalia. A vagi-
nal aperture appears for as little as 1 to 3 days per cycle before completely
disappearing again, and sexual receptivity can last for as little as four
hours (Foerg 1982; Petter-Rousseaux 1964).
The old adage “timing is everything” is particularly germane for these
primates. Obviously vaginal closure limits the possibility of forced copu-
lation to the extremely brief period when the vagina is open. No one is ar-
guing that forced copulation could be a fruitful mating strategy in these
animals. The relevant point is that females of “primitive” primate species
exert significant control over the timing and opportunity for mating. Un-
der such conditions the only reproductive tactic that works for males is to
 Female Sexuality and the Myth of Male Control 35

be attendant and await invitational cues (Foerg 1982). By opening and

closing the orifice necessary for reproduction, females control sexual ac-
tivity. Moreover, by assuring male investment, females realign male strate-
gies to coincide with their own needs.
The most extreme example of vaginal closure of any female mammal
belongs to the spotted hyena. In this species, female external genitalia
are “masculinized”: The labia are permanently fused to form a pseudo-
scrotum and the clitoris, or pseudopenis, is elongated and fully erectile,
traversed to its tip by a central urogenital canal (Matthews 1939; Watson
1877). Thus, the female hyena must urinate, copulate, and give birth
through the small opening in her clitoris. To the untrained eye, the two
sexes are virtually indistinguishable (Drea et al. 1998; Frank, Glickman,
and Powch 1990). Because of the female’s unusual external anatomy,
males have considerable difficulty locating the elusive clitoral opening and
achieving intromission (Drea, Coscia, and Glickman 1999; Kruuk 1972).
Consequently, successful mating behavior requires extraordinary cooper-
ation and the utmost patience. Not only must the female stand exception-
ally still while the male performs his necessary acrobatics, but she must
retract her clitoris into the abdomen to allow penetration (Drea et al.
1999; Neaves, Griffin, and Wilson 1980). In addition, females are socially
dominant to hyena males (Frank 1986; Kruuk 1972), and thus misdirected
sexual advances are quite risky for the male. The technical challenges of
mating with a socially dominant partner through a peniform clitoris can
be overcome only by a high degree of male motivation combined with the
female’s willing consent.
There has been a long-standing debate about the evolutionary origins
and functional significance of female genital virilization. Because the me-
chanics of mating with a female spotted hyena would thwart any un-
wanted reproductive advances, some researchers have argued that genital
masculinization is a defense against forced copulation (East et al. 1993).
Nevertheless, others disagree with this adaptationist argument (Gould and
Lewontin 1979) and suggest that female morphology is merely a by-
product of the selection for hormonal masculinization (Gould 1981). Hor-
monal masculinization (Racey and Skinner 1979; Glickman et al. 1987)
would produce female advantage through increased size and social domi-
nance over males (Gould 1981) or through increased aggressiveness in ex-
ceptionally competitive feeding situations (Frank 1997; Hamilton, Tilson,
36 Christine M. Drea and Kim Wallen

and Frank 1986). We might never resolve the dilemma of reconstructing

the most parsimonious evolutionary explanation for why female spotted
hyenas have inconvenient genitalia or for why they are larger, more ag-
gressive, and higher ranking than males. The implication pertinent to this
discourse is that female spotted hyenas have several highly effective means
of reproductive control over males. More attention to variation among fe-
males will no doubt reveal additional mechanisms of female agency.
So far, our discussion has focused on exceptional models, but postural
constraints on mating or even various forms of behavioral accommoda-
tion are evident in numerous mammalian species. For instance, the vagina
of the female Asiatic elephant is situated far enough forward that the male
has difficulty reaching the urogenital sinus opening to achieve penetration
(Eisenberg, McKay, and Jainudeen 1971). The awkwardness of this situa-
tion is exacerbated for the male by his reduced hind limb and sacral joint
mobility. Thus, one tiny step forward is sufficient for the comparatively
petite female to foil the bull’s sexual advances. Moreover, ejaculation
appears to be reflexive, such that any false move can cause the male to ejac-
ulate prematurely outside his partner’s body. Successful penetration and
internal discharge therefore require complete cooperation on the part of
the female.
Likewise, but on a much smaller scale, the vagina of rodents (Pfaff
1980) and certain prosimians, for example, ring-tailed (Evans and Goy
1968) and ruffed lemurs (Shideler, Lindburg, and Lasley 1983), points
downward. Consequently, vaginal penetration by the male is unlikely
without the female’s assistance. In the rat, and probably in all of these
species, female sexual receptivity involves assuming the lordosis posture.
Accordingly, the female, crouches, arches her spine to elevate her hind-
quarters, rotates her pelvis so that her vagina is easily accessible by the
male (Diakow 1974; Pfaff et al. 1978), and becomes physically immobi-
lized (Smith et al. 1985). This postural shift or pelvic realignment denotes
reproductive readiness, but involves a spinal reflex that is not under female
cognitive control. Hormonally modulated brain processes disinhibit this
spinal reflex and behavioral interactions with potential mates can initiate
or facilitate the neuroendocrine events required for the display of lordosis
(Pfaff 1980). Thus, successful copulation requires physiological and be-
havioral coordination between the sexes.
 Female Sexuality and the Myth of Male Control 37

In higher primates, female sexual receptivity (her ability to engage in

sex) does not rely on the release of spinal reflexes and appears to be in-
dependent of hormonal control (Wallen 1990). Nevertheless, postures
that accommodate and facilitate sexual intercourse are common among
anthropoid primates and are an integral part of mating behavior. In many
Old World monkeys (e.g., macaques, baboons, mangabeys, and talapoins),
the male uses a “double foot clasp mount” to achieve vaginal penetration
(Dixson 1998; Goy and Wallen 1979). He grasps the female’s ankles with
his feet and she supports his entire weight while standing on all fours. An
accommodating female will spontaneously present her hindquarters to the
male, and often move her tail aside, but an unwilling female need merely
sit down to prevent the male from copulating with her. The latter is a
simple solution, maybe, but nonetheless an effective one—sufficient for a
female savannah baboon to thwart the unwanted advances of a male
nearly twice her size. Unlike in rodents and prosimians, where much of fe-
male control results from hormonal input, in anthropoid primates female
control results from behavioral ingenuity reflecting her motivation.
The disappearance of hormonal control over mating capability in an-
thropoid primates would seem to increase the success of males in forcing
copulation on females. This does not appear to be the case, however,
as very few incidences of forced copulation have been observed in these
species. Even in the most often cited case, the orangutan, female behav-
ioral strategies combined with the male orangutan’s sexual anatomy are
sufficient to prevent successful insemination: “Due to the small size of the
male penis and the difficulty of arboreal suspended copulation it is prob-
able that only when the female co-operates in the mating can successful
intromission be achieved. In one of the observed instances of rape the fe-
male continued to struggle throughout and the male’s penis could be seen
thrusting on her back” (MacKinnon 1974, p. 57). Through the power of
words, readers remember that the author termed the event “rape,” but
readily overlook the fact that this passage illustrates a completely failed
reproductive act.
Lastly, the reproductive ritual can be a complex and time-consuming en-
deavor. For instance, in the jargon of sex research, male rhesus monkeys
are “multiple intromitters” who must perform a sequence of repetitious
copulatory elements to eventually achieve ejaculation. At the height of
the breeding season, lustful females typically hound potential suitors,
38 Christine M. Drea and Kim Wallen

soliciting their sexual attention by slapping the ground repeatedly. Fruit-

ful seductions result in ventro-dorsal “pair sits.” These consortships can
last for hours, even days, and are only briefly interrupted by the female pre-
senting her hindquarters to the male. The male may inspect the female and
then respond by grasping her hips with his hands (“hip-touch”) followed
by a double foot clasp mount, pelvic thrusting, and if the male and female
are compatible, an intromission with more thrusting, and finally a dis-
mount. This sequence may be repeated as many as 50 times, although 10
to 12 repetitions are the norm. It may take anywhere from 15 minutes
to 3 hours before the male ejaculates. This is not to say that mating is al-
ways such a leisurely affair. When conditions require rapid mating, a well-
synchronized male and female can copulate in less than a minute, with a
single intromission. However, such rapidity requires the active cooperation
of the female. As in so many other species, female adjustment, compensa-
tion, and assistance reflect “much more than immobile acquiescence”
(Beach 1976, p. 126).

Turning the Tables: Reverse Sexual Size Dimorphism and Female

Dominance

Typically, mammalian males are larger, stronger, and more aggressive

than females. In light of male fighting advantages (including weaponry) in
sexually dimorphic species, females generally fare poorly in intersexual
contests of strength or domination. Therefore, the simplest proximate ex-
planation for why males might force copulation on females is because they
can (sexual or reproductive motivation need not even be a consideration).
By this line of reasoning, any species in which females are stronger than,
more aggressive than, or socially dominant over males will show a reverse
asymmetry of physical power or social leverage. In such species, a physical
contest with a female could escalate and involve risk of serious injury to
both parties. Therefore, selection pressures would operate against male
use of force during copulation. We use size as an estimate of strength (ac-
knowledging that it is not a perfect match) and adopt Rowell’s (1974) def-
inition of social dominance, whereby one sex is considered dominant if it
usually wins intersexual agonistic encounters. Size advantage is often cor-
related with enhanced dominance, and dominance often covaries with ag-
 Female Sexuality and the Myth of Male Control 39

gression, but these characteristics are not necessarily linked (Ralls 1976).
Consequently, we address size and dominance separately.
Females are larger than males in many species of invertebrates, fish, am-
phibians, reptiles, and birds, but reversed sexual size dimorphism also oc-
curs in some mammalian species (Ralls 1976). In mammals, female size
advantage is displayed in (or even characteristic of) a broad range of taxo-
nomic groups, from shrews to whales. Female bats, in particular, dwarf
their male counterparts. Among primates, only in marmosets and possibly
tamarins are females larger than males. However, many species display
sexual size monomorphism, including most prosimians and generally all
of the monogamous species (Dixson 1998). Even females of size mono-
morphic species would gain more equal footing in intersexual encounters.
The reversed sexual size dimorphism of various species undoubtedly re-
flects different selective pressures on males and females, but in some cases
the sexual “arms race” may be driven by the benefits of increasing female
sexual control.
In any discussion of size differences between the sexes, it is important
to note that categorizations are often based on gross generalizations. A
species may be labeled dimorphic even if there is only a small percentage
difference between average male size and average female size. The label fails
to reflect the range of individual variation. Thus, even in humans, one can-
not deny the significant overlap in male and female weight or height dis-
tribution patterns (Harrison, Tanner, and Pilbeam 1988). If rape were a
reproductive strategy, it theoretically would be reflected in increased sexual
dimorphism because larger males should be more likely to succeed in their
forced attempts against females. Nevertheless, the pattern of evolutionary
change in modern humans is toward moderate dimorphism, compared to
the apparently extreme sexual dimorphism of our extinct ancestors
(McHenry 1994). The increased overlap in size range of modern humans
is inconsistent with the selection for rape as a reproductive strategy.
Turning now to social dominance, we find that the general mammalian
pattern is again one in which the male is the more aggressive and more
dominant sex. As before, however, there are many exceptions. Species in
which females are unambiguously dominant over their male counterparts
include shrews (Romanow, Poduschka, and Deutsch 1996), hamsters,
duikers, otters, beavers, nutria, dwarf mongooses, and spotted hyenas
(Ralls 1976). Female social dominance is also fairly common in primates
40 Christine M. Drea and Kim Wallen

as it describes most of the Malagasy lemurs (Jolly 1966; Richard 1987).

Particularly bellicose female primates include the ring-tailed, ruffed, and
black lemurs (Digby and Kahlenberg 1999; Kappeler 1990; Meyer, Gallo,
and Schultz 1999; Raps and White 1995). The driving selective force be-
hind the evolution of female dominance may well be ecological, in that
dominance over males assures females access to higher quality resources
in times of greater energetic demands; nevertheless, female reproductive
control becomes an obvious bonus of such a social system.
Female dominance also characterizes some New and Old World pri-
mates (Hrdy 1981; Smuts 1987); however, definitional issues remain un-
resolved. Although dominance can be enforced aggressively or gained
through deference (Rowell 1974), it is a term typically reserved for the
ability to elicit submissive signals (Bernstein 1981). Thus, in the strictest
sense, all females must “consistently evoke submissive behavior from all
males in dyadic agonistic interactions” for females to be considered the
dominant sex (Kappeler 1993, p. 143). The fact that the reverse condition
is hardly always met in species traditionally considered to be male domi-
nant suggests a double standard. We hesitate to accord dominant status
to females if they gain priority of access to resources without a show of
muscle (e.g., some lemurs), if only certain females hold high positions (e.g.,
squirrel monkeys, talapoins, cebus, vervets, macaques), if males fail to dis-
play submissive gestures (e.g., patas), if dominance relations change sea-
sonally (e.g., chimpanzees), or if the sexes are codominant (e.g., gibbons)
(Kappeler 1993; Ralls 1976; Smuts 1987). Moreover, although the re-
quirement for the relationship to be judged in a dyadic context enables
human observers to rank their subjects, dyadic interactions are not nec-
essarily natural or ecologically relevant for the animal’s behavior. More
often than not, social networks involving coalitions and alliances are more
critical determinants of social interactions than are the dominance rela-
tionships between two individuals.

Strength in Numbers: Social Networking and the Politics of Sex

Social context influences the sexual behavior of primates. In female-

bonded species the matrilineal social organization is characterized by fe-
male philopatry and male dispersal (Wrangham 1980). Whereas females
remain in their natal group, males leave around puberty to join new
 Female Sexuality and the Myth of Male Control 41

groups. As a consequence, females have a lifetime in which to establish,

maintain, and benefit from social bonds with kin and nonkin. Although
some males may be socially dominant over many females, females form the
core of the group and maintain the social structure through alliances and
coalitions based on kinship and social history. In conflict situations, indi-
vidual members profit from the support available through their complex
network of social relationships.
In numerous species in which a male may outrank a female in dyadic
conflicts, females win in group conflicts. In patas monkeys, females may
attack males individually or in coalitions (Hall and Mayer 1967; Kaplan
and Zucker 1980). Similarly, rhesus macaques display sexual size dimor-
phism, males possess impressive canine weaponry, and yet their societies
include many females that outrank males because of their kinship struc-
ture and female allies. Because some of the first terrestrial primates to be
studied in detail had social structures with dominant males and extreme
sexual dimorphism, such as the baboon, the focus has been almost exclu-
sively on male control of females (DeVore 1965). This bias has carried over
even to female-bonded species where male sexual coercion, despite its rar-
ity, has been seen as an important part of the sexual life of rhesus monkeys
(Smuts and Smuts 1993). Nevertheless, others stress female participation,
noting that females can overcome male dominance through social al-
liances (Bercovitch 1991).
The bonobo (or pygmy chimpanzee) aptly illustrates the importance of
female social relations. Although females are the dispersing sex in this
species, they develop strong bonds in their new group and their coalitions
play a critical role in all aspects of behavior (Furuichi 1989; Kano 1982;
Kuroda 1979, 1980; White 1992). Male harassment of females is tem-
pered by female alliances, which allow females to counter males who
may be individually stronger. Thus, female bonobos, without the benefit
of kinship ties, can maintain a female dominance structure through social
coalitions.
Sexual relations between males and females are not simply the result of
size and power differences between individuals, but are strongly affected
by the current social context, social history, and alliances. In considering
rape as a reproductive strategy in humans, the social context of women’s
lives is as important a consideration as is the capacity of males to physi-
cally force copulation. Whether social structures that facilitate female
42 Christine M. Drea and Kim Wallen

alliances have evolved in some human societies to protect women from

rape is a matter of speculation. Our primate relatives, however, demon-
strate how effectively female coalitions increase female control of mating
and reproduction.

Female Sexuality: Desire and Reproductive Choice

It is a striking characteristic of many primate species that the capacity to

engage in sex has become uncoupled from gonadal hormones. Miller
(1931) noted this characteristic of human and nonhuman primates and
concluded that humans are uniquely capable of rape because sex could be
forced on females at any time. Although his view of forced sexual inter-
course as uniquely human is inaccurate, the capacity to engage in sex with-
out hormonal input is a hallmark of most nonhuman primates, certainly
of anthropoid primates as well as humans. More than fifty years ago it
was suggested that sexual mechanisms regulated by hormones in “lower”
species are, in primates, emancipated from hormonal control and are con-
trolled instead by higher, probably cortical, brain areas (Beach 1947).
Whereas some prosimians have hormonally controlled barriers to sexual
activity, such physical barriers have not evolved (or have disappeared) in
other primates. Thus, in anthropoids, mating has become decoupled from
fertility, as these primates are capable of mating at any time without regard
to their hormonal state (Wallen 1990, 1995).
Historically, this primate capacity for continual mating has been seen as
evidence of continual sexual receptivity (Lovejoy 1981). Although these
females can mate at any time, they certainly are not continually sexually
interested. As Beach (1974, p. 354) stated many years ago: “No human fe-
male is constantly receptive (Any male who entertains this illusion must be
a very old man with a short memory or a very young man due for bitter
disappointment).” The same applies to our anthropoid relatives; interest in
mating, that is, “sexual desire,” and not sexual capability, is under strong
hormonal control (Wallen 1990, 1995, 2000, in press; Wallen et al. 1984;
Zehr, Maestripieri, and Wallen 1998). Hormonal modulation of sexual
desire plays a particularly important role in primates because of their ca-
pacity to mate at any time and the nature of sexual behavior in complex
societies.
 Female Sexuality and the Myth of Male Control 43

Sexual intercourse is inherently risky behavior that can have negative so-
cial consequences, result in the transmission of fatal infections, and, in hu-
mans, produce unwanted pregnancies. In many primate species, females
are harassed and threatened by other group members when they sexually
consort with males (Niemeyer and Anderson 1983; Wallen and Tannen-
baum 1997), making one wonder why they would take such risks. Sexual
motivation minimizes the perceived risks and encourages females to seek
sexual opportunities and initiate sex, even when there could be immediate
negative consequences. By using the hormones regulating female fertility
to also increase female sexual desire, fertility and sexual desire can be
tightly linked (Wallen 2000; Wallen et al. 1984; Wilson, Gordon, and
Collins 1982). This linkage increases the female’s sexual initiation when
she is fertile, assuring her reproductive success even in the face of sexual
disincentives (Wallen 1995, 2000). Because this hormonal system does not
also regulate mating capability, the degree of linkage between fertility and
sexual behavior varies in anthropoid primates according to the specific so-
cial conditions. Current social context, life history, and, in humans, the
type of contraceptive used and the desire to avoid pregnancy, can break
this link, decoupling sex from fertility (Wallen 2000, in press). Thus, there
are many circumstances when the occurrence of sex bears little relation-
ship to female fertility (Wallen 1990, 1995), rape being an excellent ex-
ample of one such circumstance.
Continuous ability to mate would seem to provide ideal conditions for
the evolution of rape as a successful reproductive strategy in some pri-
mates. It has exactly the opposite effect, however, making the reproductive
payoff from rape exceedingly unlikely. When gonadal hormones control
mating capability and fertility simultaneously, a male cannot force mating
on an infertile female because she is physically incapable of mating, con-
sensually or otherwise. In prosimian primates that display cyclic vaginal
closure, forced mating with an unwilling female could be successful only
when the female is fertile because her physical ability to mate always coin-
cides with her fertility. In anthropoid primates, because they lack similar
hormonally regulated physical barriers, forced mating would be randomly
distributed across the female’s ovarian cycle. Thus, the probability that an
individual mating is a fertile mating would be accordingly small.
Although males may succeed in forcing some females to mate some of
the time, in a variety of primate species including humans (Clutton-Brock
44 Christine M. Drea and Kim Wallen

and Parker 1995; Smuts and Smuts 1993) these matings are unlikely to be
fertile matings unless they are initiated by the female. For example, despite
reports of sexual coercion in chimpanzees, several long-term studies
demonstrate female control and emphasize that females copulate promis-
cuously, but not randomly, consenting to or rejecting courtship depending
on male traits (Matsumoto-Oda 1999; Nishida 1997). Mating during the
peri-ovulatory period, when the likelihood of conception is greatest, was
reserved for high-ranking adult males. Females indicated preference by
performing a “penis erection check,” initiating courtship, or by showing
strong reluctance to mate with particular males. Female recalcitrance may
have driven rejected males to violence, but aggression proved futile as more
dominant males came to the female’s rescue. Thus, the sexual behavior of
female chimpanzees is tightly linked to their web of social relations with
males. In the wild, females exercise control through their choice of copu-
lation partners as well as their choice of male social partners, as has been
shown in captivity (Nadler et al. 1994).
The constant ability of anthropoid primate females to mate reduces the
information males obtain about female fertility. Paradoxically, many pri-
mate females advertise their fertility through sexual skin surrounding the
genitals, or the genitals themselves become flushed (dramatically chang-
ing color) or swollen (Hrdy and Whitten 1987). Although true sexual
skin is absent in prosimians and is generally rare in New World primates
(Ioannou 1971), it is prominent among Old World monkeys and some
apes (Hrdy and Whitten 1987; Nunn 1999). In these latter species, cues
that advertise the female’s fertility correlate (albeit imprecisely) with her
sexual receptivity.
In theory, such advertisement increases the female’s vulnerability to
relinquishing reproductive control to forced copulation by males. How-
ever, most of the female primates with pronounced genital swelling live in
multimale social groups, and it has been suggested that “sexual advertise-
ments” function to incite male competition, thereby increasing the like-
lihood that females will mate with the fittest males (Clutton-Brock and
Harvey 1976). Alternatively, conspicuous swellings combined with an in-
terest in copulating with multiple males (another characteristic of primate
females with conspicuous sexual signals) encourage many copulations
with different males during the short period of fertility. According to the
latter scenario, females accrue potential genetic and paternity confusion
 Female Sexuality and the Myth of Male Control 45

benefits (Hrdy 1981, 1997). Whenever sexual skin swellings are imprecise
signals for the timing of ovulation, male confusion should increase. It
may also be that sexual swellings advertise female quality as a means of
attracting males (Pagel 1994). Whatever the explanation, the presence of
sexual signals by females suggests that intersexual competition has been
resolved in favor of female interests.

Concealed Ovulation: A Cryptic Method of Female Control

Women do not have such sexual advertisements, reflecting that fertility

has become physically concealed (“concealed ovulation,” Alexander and
Noonan 1979). Concealed ovulation is thought to confuse paternity, as a
male cannot know whether a female is fertile when she engages in sex or
if paternity attribution is honestly assigned. In certain populations, men
have attempted to prevent female deception by mandating honest adver-
tisement of menstruation (Strassmann 1992).
One view is that paternity uncertainty benefits the female by reducing
possible male infanticide and increasing male investment in offspring that
he suspects might be his (Alexander and Noonan 1979). Others have sug-
gested that concealed ovulation prevents females themselves from know-
ing when they ovulate, thus limiting their ability to avoid pregnancy and,
thus, indirectly increasing their reproductive output (Burley 1979). Al-
though this notion is intriguing, it is apparent that ovulation is not neces-
sarily concealed from women. Many women can detect the slight pain that
accompanies the bursting follicle, “mittelschmertz,” and thus are aware of
when they ovulate (Adams, Gold, and Burt 1978), whereas others use dif-
ferent cues, such as increased sexual interest or genital changes (Small
1996). It appears that only males lack information in this regard, unless
their female companion lets them in on the secret (Small 1996). By physi-
cally concealing ovulation from males while being able to detect it them-
selves, females increase their control of sexuality such that they effectively
counter rape as a reproductive strategy.
The orangutan is often cited as an example of a primate species in which
forced copulation may be a mating strategy adopted by younger, less pow-
erful males. However, female orangutans also conceal ovulation and, even
in this species, we find that consort formation is crucial to male reproduc-
tive success. Orangutans display extreme sexual dimorphism, with males
46 Christine M. Drea and Kim Wallen

being approximately twice the size of females (Rodman and Mitani 1987).
Whereas some adult males (“flanged” males) develop full secondary sexual
characteristics, such as cheek flanges, crowns, long hair, throat pouches,
and larger size, others (“unflanged” males) remain in a state of arrested
development, reaching reproductive maturity but lacking these secondary
sexual characteristics (MacKinnon 1974). In addition to pronounced
physical differences, flanged and unflanged males may differ in their mat-
ing strategies. Flanged males hold territories and advertise their presence
by “long” calls, which may function in intrasexual communication to
increase spacing between rival males (Rodman and Mitani 1987) or in
intersexual communication to attract mates. Female orangutans often
approach flanged males and initiate consortships for periods of up to sev-
eral days, indicating female preference and control of the sexual interac-
tions (Rodman and Mitani 1987). By contrast, unflanged males are not
territorial and are less successful at forming consortships. Females typi-
cally resist the sexual advances of unflanged males and thus mating behav-
ior of these males is more opportunistic and sexually coercive (Galdikas
1985; Mitani 1985).
Such coercive mating tactics have been offered as evidence of “rape” in
nonhuman primates, but the behavior is not a successful reproductive
strategy unless it produces viable offspring. The general consensus has
been that there is negligible reproductive output from forced copulation in
orangutans (Fox 1998; Galdikas 1985). One study determined paternity
in 11 Sumatran orangutans (Utami 2000) and found that unflanged males
sired as many offspring as did flanged males, but they formed consortships
in order to do so. As other studies have shown (MacKinnon 1974), sub-
adult males often engage in consortships with females, implying that the
dichotomy between unflanged “rapists” and flanged consorts may not be
as clear as previously suggested.
Behavioral studies have shown that association patterns between orang-
utans are driven by the reproductive states of adult females (Mitani et al.
1991). If the female plays a key role in these association patterns (Delgado
and van Schaik 2000), we suggest that females retain control over the pa-
ternity of their offspring by preferentially associating with certain males
during their maximally fertile period. Therefore, sexually coercive males
are unsuccessful sires because they (1) lose in intermale competitions and
 Female Sexuality and the Myth of Male Control 47

are excluded from accessing fertile females (Fox 1998; Galdikas 1985)
and/or (2) lack information about female fecundity.
The latter interpretation is supported by reproductive studies in captive
orangutans. By manipulating housing conditions, a male and female pair
either were forced to cohabitate or the female controlled her access to the
male (Nadler 1982). When a consort was confined to a restricted space
and the female was unable to avoid or escape from the male, the male
initiated or forced copulation on the female. Forced copulations were as-
sociated with an increase in mating frequency, but did not result in preg-
nancy. By contrast, when the female could regulate her access to the male,
she initiated sexual activity, determined when copulation occurred, and
became pregnant. Female control of the sexual interaction reduced the
frequency of copulations, but directly increased the likelihood of con-
ception. These findings show that female choice is a more effective repro-
ductive strategy than is forced copulation.
Turning now to human rape, we recognize the lamentable fact that
women meeting our more stringent “reproductive” criteria are victims of
forced copulation. The question is not if rape sometimes results in the pro-
duction of offspring. Although the incidence of rape varies cross-culturally
(Sanday 1981), according to one count, the national rape-related pregnancy
rate was 5 percent per rape among victims of reproductive age (Holmes
et al. 1996). Instead, the question is if rape is a sufficiently effective means
of reproduction when weighed against the potential costs. We argue that
it is not.
Costs associated with the commission of rape include the risk of injury,
infection, and possible death. Female resistance alone can prove injurious,
but the potential costs escalate if the act is detected by others. Moreover,
a male opting for rape runs an increased risk of contracting a sexually
transmitted disease through intercourse with a stranger. Certain infections
could reduce the male’s reproductive potential. Moreover, as humans pos-
sess memory and language, there are potential retributive costs following
identification of the rapist. Retaliation from family members or punish-
ment from society can include castration, incarceration, and even death.
Such severe costs are presumed to outweigh the benefits of producing very
few progeny.
We propose that rape has minimal reproductive benefits because human
females (1) conceal ovulation and (2) are notoriously infertile (Short 1976).
48 Christine M. Drea and Kim Wallen

Therefore, a rapist lacks information about the reproductive state of the in-
tended mother of his children and has minimal prospects of fertilizing her
even under the most opportune conditions (Einon 1998). If rape is to have
evolved as a reproductive strategy it must have done so prior to modern
times. Thus, we shall ignore modern day concerns, such as various forms
of birth control and hysterectomy, and consider the merits of Thornhill
and Palmer’s theory only in relation to cycling, noncontracepted women.
Obviously this population is not a perfect match for the ancestral popula-
tion of potential rape victims, as the latter were likely to include a major-
ity of woman who were either already pregnant or lactating, and therefore
naturally “contracepted.” According to some estimates, primitive women
would have experienced fifteen years of lactation amenorrhea, four years
of pregnancy, and four years of menstrual cycles (Short 1976), leaving few
reproductive opportunities for an ancestral rapist.
Returning to more modern times, let us first consider the implications
of concealed ovulation. The timing of sexual intercourse in relation to ovu-
lation strongly influences the likelihood of conception, but the actual
number of fertile days in a woman’s menstrual cycle is uncertain. Ovula-
tion occurs on a single day, but sperm may be viable for up to six days, with
low probability of conception if sperm are older than three days (Wil-
cox, Weinberg, and Baird 1995). More conservative estimates place survi-
val times for sperm and the ovum at 1.4 days and 0.7 days, respectively
(Ferreira-Poblete 1997). Moreover, the ovum remains fertilizable longer
than it can produce a normal embryo (Ferreira-Poblete 1997). Within the
limited population of cycling women, a rapist’s chances of targeting a
fertile female are somewhere between 1 in 5 and 1 in 28, if we assume
that women have cycles of average length. Cycle length can be influenced
by many factors, including women’s contact with males. Sexually inactive
women, for example, have longer cycles (Einon 1998), which would de-
crease a rapist’s probability of targeting their fertile days.
Nevertheless, gamete life expectancy and cycle length are not the only
factors affecting peak fertility. Our second consideration is that the maxi-
mum fecundability estimate for women aged 20 to 29 is only 23 percent
(Short 1976). Women have low fecundity because ovulation is a rare event:
About 50 percent of menstrual cycles in women are anovular or infertile
(Baker and Bellis 1995; Döring 1969). Sexually inactive women show an
 Female Sexuality and the Myth of Male Control 49

additional drop in ovulation, sometimes by as much as 40 percent (Pollard

1994). We discounted surgical sterilization as a modern concern, but
about 8 percent of women are involuntarily sterile (Einon 1998). If anovu-
latory or infertile cycles are taken into consideration, the rapist’s odds of
targeting a fertile female drop dramatically, presenting little incentive for
a man to engage in such high-risk behavior as rape. As we shall see in the
next section, a rapist’s chances decrease even further when additional fac-
tors, such as a 38 percent embryonic mortality rate (Short 1976), are taken
into consideration.
In humans and certain apes, female fertility has been decoupled from
the capacity to engage in sex. We propose that this independence of fertil-
ity and sexual behavior serves as a mechanism that gives females control
of their sexuality and, in particular, their reproduction. Thus, although
males can force sex on these females, they are more likely than not to
“rape” an infertile female. In contrast, females, whose sexual desire is
coupled with fertility, can initiate sex at the most propitious time and in-
fluence their reproduction in a way unavailable to males.

Copulatory, Postcopulatory, and Postfertilization Mechanisms of Female

Control

As we have seen throughout this chapter, female mammals show great di-
versity in the reproductive mechanisms and behavioral strategies they use
to promote or prevent mating. Female control over reproduction (gyn-
archy), however, does not stop after the behavioral act of mating. We now
address female control mechanisms, by and large cryptic to the male part-
ner (Eberhard 1996), operating internally during copulation, after ejacu-
lation but before fertilization, and after conception.
One factor complicating fertilization is that females often copulate with
more than one male during a single reproductive cycle. Female promis-
cuity is common among mammals (including humans) and can lead to the
spermatozoa of several males “competing” to fertilize the ova (Ginsberg
and Huck 1989). Traditional models of sperm competition have viewed
the female reproductive tract as “a passive receptacle in which males play
out their sperm competition games” (Baker and Bellis 1993, p. 887), but
growing evidence suggests that females affect the outcome in several
50 Christine M. Drea and Kim Wallen

ways and at various stages (Birkhead and Møller 1993; Dixson 1998). It
is unclear what mechanisms are operating in humans; nonetheless, the
likelihood that a man will inseminate a woman should be inversely pro-
portional to the number of partners she has in a single reproductive cycle
(Einon 1998).
During mating, female behavior can influence the amount of vaginal
stimulation the female receives, which can affect her fecundity (Ginsberg
and Huck 1989) or whether or not ejaculation by the male occurs at all. If
ejaculation does occur, sperm selection, sperm transport, and the manip-
ulation of ejaculate can be important avenues of female choice or flexibil-
ity throughout the animal kingdom. For instance, in several mammalian
species, including humans, females can eject sperm immediately after cop-
ulation (Baker and Bellis 1993; Birkhead, Møller, and Sutherland 1993;
Ginsberg and Huck 1989).
Sperm that are retained rather than flushed must survive in the female
internal reproductive tract, which is a veritable obstacle course and re-
markably hostile to sperm. As sperm is a “highly perishable commodity”
(Ginsberg and Huck 1989, p. 76), anything that delays its transport affects
the likelihood of fertilization. The female’s reproductive anatomy and
physiology impose numerous constraints on males after the deposition of
semen (Dixson 1998). For instance, low vaginal pH reduces sperm sur-
vival and uterine contractions affect the rapidity of sperm transport (Baker
and Bellis 1993). The cervix acts as a physical barrier, with cervical crypts
that function as sperm reservoirs. The cervix is also a source for antisperm
antibodies, and the chemical properties of cervical mucus affect sperm vi-
ability. Moreover, filtering of sperm can occur in the uterotubule junction,
and oviductal stimulation is involved in sperm capacitation (Dixson
1998). Thus, the structure, chemical composition, and immune response
of the female genital tract prevent most sperm from ever reaching the ova,
let alone achieving fertilization (Birkhead et al. 1993; Eberhard 1985).
If fertilization occurs, the zygote typically enters the uterus, implants,
and develops into an embryo that is nurtured until parturition, but not
always. Female mammals have control mechanisms to manipulate preg-
nancy. For instance, they can avoid or abandon investment in an un-
desirable pregnancy by selective resorption (Raju, Rao, and Reddy 2000;
Westlin et al. 1995) or spontaneous abortion of the fetus (Bruce 1959;
Gosling 1986). In some species, the female may selectively invest in cer-
 Female Sexuality and the Myth of Male Control 51

tain embryos within a litter by differentially channeling the nutrients

(Gosling 1986). Both fetal resorption and expulsion can be caused by a va-
riety of physical and environmental stressors that effectively create a hos-
tile environment, including food shortage or vitamin deficiency (Wellik
and Deluca 1995). Primates may even ingest plants that induce abortion
(Garey 1997; Page et al. 1992). In humans, a woman may conceive but not
implant the conceptus or carry the embryo to term: 90 percent of fertilized
eggs fail to reach the uterus, only 58 percent implant, 42 percent survive
to day 12 (Baker and Bellis 1995), and 11 percent to 20 percent are
aborted or miscarried (Holmes et al. 1996; Pollard 1994). Additional
losses come from stillborn infants, premature infants, and perinatal mor-
tality (Einon 1998). Among healthy women trying to conceive, only two
thirds of pregnancies end in live births (Wilcox, Weinberg, and Baird
1995).
The picture that emerges is that few copulatory acts translate into pa-
ternity (Eberhard 1996) and those that do may not necessarily result in vi-
able offspring (Cunningham and Birkhead 1998). Obviously, mechanisms
for preventing pregnancy and increasing fetal mortality needn’t involve
conscious female decision making. Moreover, the extent to which humans
can unconsciously “control” unwanted pregnancies is yet unknown. The
incidence of spontaneous abortions in rape-related pregnancies is nearly
12 percent (Holmes et al. 1996). Nevertheless, women have ultimate vol-
untary control. The “morning-after” pill and planned abortions are delib-
erate mechanisms available to human victims of rape that merit more than
cursory mention (50 percent of rape-related pregnancies end in elected
abortion, Holmes et al. 1996), but modern technology is beyond the scope
of our evolutionary argument. Such reproductive control mechanisms are
unlikely to have shaped the pattern of behavior that Thornhill and Palmer
argue evolved to benefit males. The best that can be said is that if there
were ever a time when rape would have been a successful reproductive
strategy, which we strongly doubt, that time is not today.

Concluding Remarks

The mechanisms of female control that we have described encompass a

broad range of species, including those in which forced copulation has
neither been observed nor invoked as a reproductive strategy. We have
52 Christine M. Drea and Kim Wallen

included them to illustrate the underlying theme that females have evolved
a variety of mechanisms (for various and perhaps unrelated reasons) that
nevertheless function to limit male control of reproduction. “Since the fe-
male has the greatest energy investment in reproduction and human soci-
eties tend to be polygynous, the woman is the limiting resource; therefore
Nature has concentrated on female mechanisms for the natural regulation
of fertility” (Short 1976, p. 5).
To preempt critics who may accuse us of swinging the pendulum too far
in the opposite direction, let us emphasize that we are not casting males in
a passive role or denying them any say in reproduction, far from it. Instead
the evidence points toward very powerful mechanisms that give females
control of their own reproductive output. Males who form social rela-
tionships with females, attend to female social and sexual signals, and are
assimilated into female social structures readily share in mutual reproduc-
tive success. Females are as much a product of evolutionary biology as are
males and have evolved even more effective mechanisms to control repro-
duction than have males. How could it be otherwise in internally gestating
species, where only females truly know which offspring are their own?
It is undoubtedly true that there are males who may try rape as a repro-
ductive strategy, just as there are, apparently, academics who promote the
idea as an academic strategy. The latter argue that as long as there is any
nonzero probability that rape will produce an offspring it could be a viable
reproductive strategy for males without other options. This argument is
essentially unfalsifiable given the data currently available. However, in cal-
culating the costs and benefits of rape, we assert that one must consider
the effects of female sexual control. The rape strategy would pale in male
intrasexual competition to one that produces even minimally functional
social relationships with females. These relationships allow males to cap-
italize on some of the information that females have about their own fer-
tility, as evidenced through their willingness to initiate sexual activity. It is
our opinion that rape is unlikely to be a meaningful or widespread repro-
ductive strategy or to be of much evolutionary consequence. The fact re-
mains that, in this area, females have the final say. Although male control
is a powerful myth reflecting male desire, control resides in the less flashy
but more heavily invested female.
 Female Sexuality and the Myth of Male Control 53

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3
Power Asymmetries between the Sexes, Mate
Preferences, and Components of Fitness
Patricia Adair Gowaty

Despite Thornhill and Palmer’s rejection of feminist-inspired science, fem-

inists and evolutionary biologists have productive and interesting things to
say to one another. Sarah Hrdy (1981, 1986, 1997, 1999; Hrdy and Wil-
liams 1983) and others (Dickemann 1979a, b, 1981; Smuts 1992; Smuts
and Smuts 1993; Smuts 1994) have been making this point for a long time.
I hope this discussion of new Darwinian ideas about human mating sys-
tems illustrates the possibility of further productive dialogue.
Whereas Thornhill and Palmer focused on traits supposedly fixed in the
human psyche during the Pleistocene, my focus is on dynamic selective
pressures affecting natural and sexual selection of social behavior and phe-
notypic evolution in real time, ongoing, even now. Whereas Thornhill and
Palmer implicitly retain a static view of the action of genes for rape, my
view is that the mechanisms of heredity include genes, environments, cul-
ture, learning, and development. Whereas they focus almost exclusively on
individual selection, my view is that many levels of selection contribute to
dynamic interactions between the sexes. The most productive approach to
understanding power asymmetries between the sexes explicitly uses con-
cepts of multilevel selection. Whereas Thornhill and Palmer characterize
women as victims, my view is that unless extraordinary ecological pertur-
bations reduce the selective power of females, women are powerful selec-
tive forces, whether they “feel” it or not.
In the first section of the paper, I use parallels between an experiment on
fruit flies and a futuristic novel to introduce the importance of the envi-
ronments the sexes create for one another in shaping behavior, physiology,
and morphology of opposite sexes. The juxtaposition of fictional story
with experimental results anchors a discussion of the nature of Darwin-
ism, essentialism, the mechanisms of heredity, and selection pressures.
62 Patricia Adair Gowaty

The second section describes the hypothesis of sexually antagonistic se-

lection pressures currently acting on the phenotypes of the sexes. If it is
true, within-species variation among females in their abilities to remain in
control of their own reproductive decisions and behavior may be the ful-
crum on which depends much of the rest of sexual behavior. The hypoth-
esis posits that male attempts to control females’ reproductive behavior
and female attempts to resist males’ control efforts are universal or almost
universal aspects of sexual behavior. Variation in offspring viability main-
tains control-and-resistance dynamics. Offspring viability—not limited to
humans, but characteristic of sexually reproducing organisms—is another
overlooked key to understanding sexual dialectics.
The third section introduces components of fitness analyses and the
implications for understanding of within-individual fitness trade-offs in
sexual species. It is unlikely that the often-assumed positive correlation be-
tween fitness components always exists.
The fourth section emphasizes predictions and potential tests of Dar-
winian politics. In these models, first drawn to predict behavior of ducks,
the relative mating success variance among males, the relative fecundity of
females, the viability of offspring, and the within-population variance in
offspring viability are functions of female control of reproductive “deci-
sions.” In the model for humans, they are functions of women’s reproduc-
tive autonomy. Based also on variation among women in reproductive
autonomy, a model of institutionalized monogamous marriage predicts
which women are most likely to have extramarital affairs. Brownmiller’s
(1975) controversial view of the functional significance of human mono-
gamy inspired the testable avian model.
This paper shows again what Hrdy has shown repeatedly. Hypotheses
sparked by feminist consciousness can be both completely consistent with
Darwinian explanations of behavior and testable. I hope the paper con-
tributes to consilience by showing that collaboration of social scientists,
other humanists, and evolutionary biologists will hasten our understand-
ing of human behavioral evolution.

1 Females and Males Are Equal Forces in Evolution

This section emphasizes the active and varied roles of females in the on-
going conflict between the sexes. The reproductive interests of females are
 Power Asymmetries between the Sexes 63

selection pressures on males, and likewise the reproductive interests of

males are selection pressures on females. To reproduce—and sometimes
even to survive—each individual within a sex must solve the ecological
(social) problems created for them by other individuals, including mem-
bers of the opposite sex. If sexually antagonistic selection pressures are dy-
namic, there will seldom be a single, invariant solution; variability is more
likely to result from the free interplay of male and female interests. When
experimental manipulation allows one sex to dominate completely the in-
terests of individuals of the other sex, there is catastrophe for individuals
of one sex, as imagined in Burdekin’s (1937) fiction and shown in Rice’s
(1996) momentous experiment.
From my perspectives (Gowaty 1992a; 1997b) the most important ex-
periment of the twentieth century (Rice 1996) showed definitively that fe-
males are forces in evolution. It was also a female’s worst nightmare, albeit
in an experimental population of Drosophila melanogaster. Using exqui-
site knowledge of fly genomics, Rice manipulated and then removed the
genetic influence of females through selectively allowing only those sons
with no (i.e., almost no) genetic contributions from their mothers to breed.
These manipulations allowed the males to experience only the females
from the static, unselected lines of flies, so that males evolved in the ab-
sence of co-evolving female behavior and physiology. The males became
“hyper males” with superior abilities to manipulate the reproductive ca-
pacities of the females from the unselected source population. Matings of
hyper males to the females in the nonselected source lines resulted in in-
creased female mortality and reduced abilities of females to manipulate
the outcomes of competitive interactions among the males.
Rice did this experiment to understand the selective forces leading to
nonrecombining sex chromosomes (the Y does not recombine with the
X). He designed his experiment to see what happened when one made the
entire genome like a nonrecombining Y (Rice 1998). His experimental
results, however, exposed—as no previous experiment ever did—the power
of traits in one sex to affect the evolution of traits in another. The ex-
periment demonstrated the existence of “sexually antagonistic allelic co-
evolution,” which Rice defined as occurring when alleles in one sex
enhance their bearer’s fitness, but simultaneously are deleterious to the fit-
ness of the opposite sex. Rice’s explanations focused on how the posses-
sion of an allele for, say, a long tail useful in male-male competitive displays
64 Patricia Adair Gowaty

could be deleterious to a female if she also had the exaggerated trait. Dele-
terious alleles in females would provide selection favoring their modifica-
tion, not just in females, but also in males at a cost to males. This would
lead to a back-and-forth of relative advantage and disadvantage between
the sexes that would play out as an equilibrium trait value set by the costs
and benefits to males and females, that is, through sexually antagonistic
allelic co-evolution.
Among the things that fascinated me about this fly experiment was that
there is another explanation of the results. Based not on alleles in males
and females, the alternative explanation is about selection pressures fa-
voring dynamic, ongoing, perhaps ubiquitous between-sex conflict. The
conflict does not originate from within the genomes of males and females
but from between-sex contests over the control of reproduction. The se-
lective forces in these contests favor the creation by the sexes of “environ-
mental,” ecological problems that individuals of the opposite sexes must
solve to reproduce and sometimes even survive. The environmental prob-
lems that the sexes create for one another can act on genes, on culture,
through learning and development, and through interactions among all
these mechanisms of heredity. Sexually antagonistic selection pressures
(Gowaty 1992a; 1997b) may cause evolution of genes, individual pheno-
types, development, culture, and their interactions. Unless ecological or
social factors destabilize power symmetries between the sexes, sexually
antagonistic selection should be dynamic. Evolution of countertraits in
opposite sexes will oppose traits that advantage one sex at a cost to the
other. The limitation on dynamical evolution is, as it is on all evolutionary
processes, the existence of variation—in genes, in culture, or in develop-
mental systems. Rice’s experimental removal of female influence was a
huge environmental perturbation that allowed hyper males to evolve in
fewer than fifty generations. By creating the worst nightmare of a female
fly, the experiment showed that the environments created by one sex for
the other are profoundly powerful.
Rice claimed, and I agree with him, that the implications of his experi-
ment for understanding evolutionary change are huge. He said, “Sexually
antagonistic co-evolution may be far more extensive than adaptation to
the physical environment” and may be an important engine of adaptation
and speciation (Rice 1996). In the language of natural selection that I pre-
fer, his experiments showed that the ecological problems created by one
 Power Asymmetries between the Sexes 65

sex for the survival and reproductive success of the other are important—
as important as Sarah Hrdy’s (1977) observations of female counter-
strategies to sexually selected infanticide by male langurs indicated in
1977. The ecological problems created by one sex for survival and repro-
duction of the other are as important as novelist Catharine Burdekin
(1937) thought as long ago as 1930.
Catherine Burdekin created a female dystopia in her 1937 novel
Swastika Night. Readers might consider her “futuristic” novel a thought
experiment. The fictional dystopia was analogous to the experimental
dystopia. The story was about a hyper masculinist world that developed
during the first 800 years of the “Hitlerian millennium,” when the “re-
duction of women” was completed.1 In the opening of the novel, individ-
ual commitments to the cult of the masculine have come to completely
determine men’s lives. Nazi exterminations had resulted in a completely
Aryan world. Rank-and-file men had similar access to wealth and re-
sources; each had a wife. Women’s lives were limited to their role as breed-
ers. Women were captive, held under enforced monogamy in central
holding facilities, where their “husbands” visited only for sex. Men took
their sons as toddlers and raised them in crèches without further contact
with their mothers. Male-only exposures fitted the boys into the “mas-
culinist life way.” Socialization and training rendered girls and women
without self-esteem, seemingly complicit in their “reduction.” Burdekin’s
fictional details explored how small incremental exaggerations in cultur-
ally mediated sexual power asymmetries similar to those extant in Europe
during the mid-1930s might look after forty or fifty generations.
The similarities of the fly experiment to the futuristic fiction are re-
markable, even though the fly geneticist interpreted his experimental re-
sults as due to genetic changes, and the futuristic novelist created her story
on imagined cultural changes. Nevertheless, both were concerned with the
creation of “hyper males” concomitant with the reductions in the abilities
of females to control their reproduction. They are similar in that each ex-
amined how the ecological problems males create for females run amuck
when females are stripped of social agency—whether they are stripped of
their power through genes or culture. By removing female influence, by
halting female evolution, Rice showed how significantly powerful is vari-
ation in females for phenotypic evolution. Burdekin did the same thing in
her fictional thought experiment.
66 Patricia Adair Gowaty

Both the experiment and the fiction were about the dialectical interplay
of female resistance to male control of females’ reproductive behavior.
That is the most compelling lesson from the fly experiment and why I
called it the most important of the twentieth century: variation in females
in their abilities to remain in control of their own reproductive decisions
is critical to the evolutionary play between females and males.

2 Offspring Viability and Mating Behavior

This section argues that when variation in offspring viability is the main
selective pressure on reproduction, the absolute control of reproductive
“decisions” by one sex is catastrophic not just for individuals of the con-
trolled sex, but for most individuals—females and males—in a pop-
ulation. This section describes the theoretical significance of offspring
viability to the dynamics of sexually antagonistic selection pressures and
to a new view of the environment of evolutionary adaptiveness.

Contests over the Control of Reproduction and Sexually Antagonistic

Selection Pressures
Sexually antagonistic selection pressures are set in motion when advan-
tages to mating discrimination exist for individuals of both sexes, but
males are more willing than females to mate with nonoptimal partners.
This might happen whenever the encounter rates with potential mates and
postmating latencies vary between the sexes (Hubbell and Johnson 1987).
When this happens, females will reject some males as partners for copu-
lation and reproduction. Female mate discrimination thereby creates a
social (ecological) problem for rejected males, and selection then acts on
them to “change females’ minds” by persuasion, manipulation, or coer-
cion. When males attempt to influence females’ reproductive behavior,
they create a social (ecological) problem for females. Females who are sold
a bill of goods, tricked, or forced will experience detrimental fitness effects
in comparison to females who resist the sales pitch, detect the trickery, or
overcome the force. If variation in the viability of offspring favors the evo-
lution of mating preferences, as I assumed (Gowaty 1997b), among female
variation in offspring viability also must favor female resistance to coer-
cion and manipulation. In other words, females who resist male influences
on their reproductive behavior will more likely have offspring capable of
surviving the deleterious forces of evolving pathogens.
 Power Asymmetries between the Sexes 67

Recent theories argue that mate preferences are for immune-

complementary alleles (Wedekind 1999) or for general heterozygosity
(Brown 1997). In contrast, classic sexual selection theories (Hamilton and
Zuk 1982) argue that females prefer males with traits that advertise male
health relative to other males in the population. Though all are often
grouped under “good genes” explanations for female mate choice, these
hypotheses are different. Hamilton and Zuk’s idea assumes that health-
enhancing alleles in fathers will enhance also the health of offspring who
inherit them, so that there is often a best or a few best males that all fe-
males prefer. Wedekind’s and Brown’s hypotheses suggest that mate pref-
erences must be self-referential, so that individual female mate preferences
are relative to the alleles that a given female will contribute to her off-
spring, so that there is unlikely to be one best male that all females prefer.
All of these “good genes” ideas focus attention on the traits that cue mat-
ing preferences.
If one changes perspective, focusing not on the cues mediating prefer-
ence but instead on the fitness consequences of mating preferences, a new
view of the evolution of social behavior emerges (Gowaty and Hubbell
MSa; MSb). This new view posits that variation in offspring viability is a
fundamental force acting on the evolution of social and reproductive be-
havior in sexual species. It emphasizes fitness consequences when choosers
express preferences under constraints from sexually antagonistic selective
pressures (Gowaty 1997b).
This view (Gowaty and Hubbell MSb) has implications that contrast
with classical views about sex roles and sexual selection. These include:
(1) Females and males who discriminate among potential mates should be
favored, whether or not parental investment patterns vary and whether
or not rates of reproduction by females and males differ; (2) within-
population variation in females is the most important influence on the
outcomes of other sexual selection modalities, even those acting among
males; and (3) just as male attempts to influence females’ reproductive de-
cisions are mechanisms of male-male competition, mechanisms of female
resistance to male attempts to control them are mechanisms of sexual se-
lection among females (Smuts and Smuts 1993). All of this means that
(4) the list of sexually selected mechanisms is larger than usually assumed.
It includes not just male-male combat and female mate choice, but
male mate choice, female resistance, and female-female competition.
68 Patricia Adair Gowaty

(5) Within-population variation among females in their abilities to remain

in control of their own reproductive capacities is a simple variable that pre-
dicts other important trait variation, including patterns of male parental
investment (Gowaty 1996a, 1999). (6) If mate preferences arise because of
variation in offspring viability and if constraints on females’ reproductive
decisions arise from attempts by males to control females, another under-
appreciated evolutionary contest among females is the one over offspring
viability. When offspring viability varies because of constraints on females’
control of reproductive decisions, the among female variation in their abil-
ities to resist constraints is due to sexual selection, not just natural selec-
tion, acting on females (Gowaty and Hubbell MSb). This view also has
implications for our understanding of the environment of evolutionary
adaptation (EEA).

Offspring Viability and the EEA

A widely accepted assumption among evolutionary psychologists and cul-
tural anthropologists (Kaplan 1996, pp. 92–93) is that most natural selec-
tion on humans occurred in the context of hunting and gathering. This
idea has stimulated controversy, because it is an unverifiable assumption
(Foley 1996; Irons 1998) and its imagined selective consequences are
impossible or extremely difficult to evaluate (Betzig 1998). Part of the
problem is that our knowledge of social selective pressures during the
Pleistocene are guesses at best. This is not a unique problem in the study
of humans. It exists also in studies of social selection of nonhumans. The
response of behavioral ecologists has been pragmatic. We study how se-
lection works in contemporary populations. Sometimes this allows us to
infer how selection pressures may have worked during the EEA of nonhu-
man animals such as flies, mallards, and mice. We do studies of experi-
mental evolution that are obviously impossible with humans. These have
revealed, as did the fly experiment, that the list of selection pressures act-
ing on social behavior should include male control and female resistance.
The fly experiment also demonstrated what others have suspected: It is dif-
ficult to capture the dynamic traces of sexually antagonistic selection in
anything but a living population. This is the main reason that so many
practicing biologists find unverifiable assumptions about the Pleistocene
questionable sources of adaptive hypotheses, even when our studies are
limited to nonhuman animals.
 Power Asymmetries between the Sexes 69

If offspring viability selection is as important as I think, there are other

problems with the Pleistocene as the human EEA. The last 10 to 15 thou-
sand years of human evolution, during the flowering of agriculture and
subsequent settlement of people in large, sedentary groups, has been a crit-
ically important period in human evolution. During this period, selection
through offspring viability variation is likely to have been particularly im-
portant. The force of pathogens is much stronger on sedentary human
populations in close proximity to domesticated farm animals than on
smaller populations of mobile hunter-gatherers (Diamond 1997). Human
settlements with close interactions with farm animals are precisely the en-
vironments in which pathogens potentially most deleterious to humans
evolve most rapidly. Therefore, the last 10,000 years would seem a better
estimate of the human EEA than the Pleistocene. However, because off-
spring viability selection theoretically never goes away (because pathogens
have faster generation times than their hosts), the selective force on mate
preferences of offspring viability is likely to never end (Gowaty and
Hubbell MSa). Thus, if offspring viability selection continues to operate
on mating discrimination, an even better estimate of the human EEA
might be our parent’s generation or now.
Parker (1979) identified oscillatory cycles of sexual conflict as a poten-
tial mechanism of between-generation evolution. Oscillating selection may
act even more rapidly from one bout of reproduction to the next in long-
lived, iteroparous organisms such as humans in which learning and culture
are central mechanisms of information transfer between the generations
(Maynard Smith and Szathmary 1999). Modern-day cultural backlashes
to women’s control of reproduction, such as those pointed out by Faludi
(1992), may represent within-culture oscillatory cycles of male responses
to female gains in advantage. Certainly, the content of Stiffed: The Be-
trayal of the American Man (Faludi 1999) documents these most current
swings and is consistent with continuously acting forces of between-sex
contests over the control of reproduction in modern U.S. culture.
If the environment of evolutionary adaptation was our parent’s genera-
tion or now, an answer to why human social-sexual behavior currently
is so variable may lie in the dynamical sexually antagonistic interactions
fueled by variation in offspring viability. Predictions of this idea (Gowaty
and Hubbell MSb) mean that it is directly testable using experiments in
nonhumans. Predictions include:
70 Patricia Adair Gowaty

• offspring viability is higher when individuals reproduce with preferred

rather than nonpreferred partners;
• individuals reproducing with nonpreferred partners attempt to compen-

sate for lower offspring viability by increasing fertility, fecundity, parental

care, or parental effects on the timing of offspring reproduction; and
• mechanisms of male control and female resistance are facultatively ex-

pressed and costly to breeders’ survival.

One need not assume very much, in contrast to Thornhill and Palmer,
about the selective environment. Rather if one can manipulate constraints,
say by enforced reproduction with nonpreferred partners, one can mea-
sure selection differentials directly. Unlike hypotheses based on inferences
about Pleistocene-era selective forces on human sex differences, hypo-
theses about the results of ongoing, real-time selection are quantifiable,
directly observable, and, therefore, empirically vulnerable—for flies, mal-
lards, mice, other nonhumans, and also for people. Furthermore, “adaptive
responses to current environments” strikes me as a better null expectation
than imaginary, guessed-at social environments of the Pleistocene.
The possibility that selection is ongoing in real-time presents a difficulty,
however, to those defining evolutionary change only in terms of changes in
gene frequencies. In organisms with life spans vastly longer than the life
spans of their evolving pathogens or in organisms with iterated bouts of
reproduction, selection for male control alleles and female resistance al-
leles would likely be too slow to outpace the force of evolving pathogens or
counter male control or female resistance. This is the classic situation that
favors learning and phenotypic plasticity (Levins 1968; Scheiner 1993;
Dukas 1998). Because humans are long-lived and reproduce in bouts, gene
for gene substitutions would seem inefficient as mechanisms of heredity
(information transfer between generations) for control and resistance
traits. Better that long-lived humans in dynamical social environments
facultatively express changes through cultural variation and learning. Fac-
ultatively expressed and culturally mediated traits may serve survival and
reproductive success more readily than fixed, genetic traits. Thus, the role
of genes might be different from what Thornhill and Palmer assume. In
this scenario, genes coding for mate preferences code for facultatively
varying behavioral and physiological responses of individuals depending
on the environments in which they find themselves. Genetic variation may
be only for correlated traits.
 Power Asymmetries between the Sexes 71

In such a scenario, a fixed mate preference rule coding for flexible, fac-
ultative reproductive behavior might result. This rule might be to prefer a
mate most dissimilar in immune function to one’s self (Wedekind and Furi
1997), but to alter physiology or behavior (and psychology) when mating
with a nonpreferred or less optimal mate (Gowaty and Hubbell MSb). In
this case, the differences between individuals would be attributable not to
genes, but to the environments in which individuals found themselves.
And, therefore, the mechanism of information transfer (Maynard Smith
and Szathmary 1999) on which differences between individuals would de-
pend would be primarily social-environmental. This suggests that the “de-
velopmental systems” logic of Oyama (2000a, b) and Odling-Smee and
colleagues (Leland et al. 2000, 2001) might be a far better way to charac-
terize what it is that selection acts on than any partitioning of action on
genes or on culture or on their interactions.
Phenotypic plasticity as a response to changing environments suggests
that human psychology, flexibly adjusted to the problems at hand, might
be powerfully affected by conscious or unconscious perceptions of the
Darwinian success of other individuals. Has anyone investigated how the
psychology of individuals varies with conscious or unconscious percep-
tions of their relative survival or reproductive success probabilities? It
would seem a productive collaboration between social, clinical psycholo-
gists, and evolutionary biologists. How do perceptions of relative off-
spring viability affect individual desires for more or fewer children? Do
such empirical examinations of people’s perceptions of their own Dar-
winian status relative to others exist?

3 Components of Fitness

To test ideas about selection due to variation in offspring viability and sex-
ual antagonism one needs to know about more than one component of fit-
ness. This section is a brief introduction to components of fitness.
Selection occurs when there is within-sex variance in fitness. Measures
of fitness include, but are not limited to, the probability that an individual
survives to reproductive age (individual viability) and the subcomponents
of “reproductive success”: the number of mates an individual acquires
(mating success or number of copulation partners), the number of bouts
72 Patricia Adair Gowaty

of reproduction (fertility), the number of offspring born per bout (fecun-

dity), the number of offspring surviving to reproductive age (productiv-
ity), and the probability of survival of a given offspring from birth to
reproductive age (offspring viability). The best measure of an individual
breeder’s lifetime fitness is the relative number of offspring that survive to
reproductive age, which is the product of offspring viability, breeder fer-
tility, and breeder fecundity. In practice, many evolutionists use only one
fitness component as an estimate of fitness, and they often assume, un-
realistically, a positive correlation among fitness components. When in-
dividuals trade off one fitness component for another, this assumption is
often unlikely to be valid.
For example, the classic discussion (Andersson 1994) of the naturally
selected costs of some sexually selected traits in males is about components
of fitness. A big showy tail may increase the numbers-of-mates compo-
nent, but at the same time make its possessor more vulnerable to preda-
tion, lower his probability of survival or his viability. Among-individual
variance in survival is selection, which may act to dampen the expression
of the trait, even while the among-individual variance in the numbers-
of-mates component favors an increase in trait expression (Fisher 1958).
What this means is that the on-average expression of the trait will result
from within-individual trade-offs among sets of selection pressures, but it
also shows that fitness indicators need not be positively correlated.
Selection pressures acting on components of fitness of individual fe-
males have important implications for our understanding of social behav-
ior and social organization evolution, as well. Theorizing about fitness
component trade-offs for females has only recently begun. For example, if
variation among parents in offspring viability is the most important selec-
tion pressure favoring mate preferences (Gowaty 1998b; Gowaty and
Hubbell MSa, MSb), choosers reproducing with preferred and nonpre-
ferred mates will have offspring that differ significantly in viability. In turn,
if females are often subject to reproduction with nonpreferred males,
any declines in offspring viability compared to females mating with pre-
ferred males will be selection acting against reproduction with non-
preferred males. If females are so constrained that reproducing with a
nonpreferred male is the best they can do, those who attempt to compen-
sate potential fitness losses will be favored (Gowaty and Hubbell MSb).
Compensation might be through a lowering of the age of her first repro-
 Power Asymmetries between the Sexes 73

duction, which would decrease the time to the next generation. This may
increase the number of offspring a mother produces. It may act so that her
daughters and sons reproduce more rapidly than others in the population.
This could increase the offsprings’ chances to make more optimal matches
than their mother achieved. A decrease in generation time would be a mech-
anism that favors the mother’s expectation of representation in future
generations through her daughter’s fitness. A decrease in the time between
bouts of reproduction for individuals reproducing with nonpreferred, non-
optimal partners could work the same way. Or, compensation might be
through compensatory shifts in a variety of fitness measures at once.
From my point of view, for between-sex contests over the control of re-
production to be a ubiquitous feature of the lives of sexual organisms, off-
spring viability selection must also be ubiquitous. Similar experiments in
mice (Drickamer et al. 2000), mallards (Bluhm and Gowaty submitted),
killifish (Downhower and Matsui MS), cockroaches (Moore et al. 2000;
Moore et al. submitted), and flies (Anderson et al. MS) suggest that it is.
In each of these species, greater offspring viability or adult survivorship re-
sulted when females reproduced with males they preferred rather than
males they did not. These species live in different places, have different
types of macrosocial organizations, and shared common ancestors from
400 (insects and vertebrates) to 200 (birds and mammals) million years
ago. Despite only distant phylogenetic relationships, variation in offspring
viability continues to have effects.
It is difficult to know if human females also have offspring viability ben-
efits from the free expression of mating preferences, because it is impos-
sible to do the experiment. Indirect evidence (Gowaty and Hubbell MSa)
from between-country comparisons suggests that offspring viability var-
ied with the amount of social-political power mothers exercise relative to
fathers. The proxy predictor variable we used was relative literacy of
women and men. We assumed that when women’s literacy was as high or
almost as high as men’s, women’s reproductive autonomy was high and the
likelihood that they were reproducing with preferred partners also high.
We also assumed that when women’s autonomy decreased, their probabil-
ity of reproduction with nonpreferred partners increased. Our between-
country test showed that offspring viability increased with women’s
autonomy. There exists a clear sexually antagonistic effect of literacy on
fecundity: Controlling for variation in offspring viability and women’s
74 Patricia Adair Gowaty

literacy, as men’s literacy increases, fecundity increases. Controlling for

offspring viability and men’s literacy, fecundity declines. Thus, we suspect
that free expression of mating preferences is as important to humans as it
is in flies and mice.
One of the implications of within-population variation in females is
that there are many ways males may attempt to manipulate females’ repro-
ductive behavior (Gowaty 1997b). Some are “nasty,” like rape and aggres-
sion, in that they can decrease females’ survival probabilities (individual
viability). Some are “nice” in that they have a null or positive effect on fe-
male survival. Yet, even when males are “helpful,” say by brokering essen-
tial resources to females, reproducing with them could simultaneously be
costly in terms of offspring viability and favor female resistance to “help-
ful coercion.”
No one has systematically applied to any species to my knowledge a
components-of-fitness approach to dissecting the effects of all the dif-
ferent mechanisms of sexual selection on social behavior and social or-
ganization. Even partial studies are rare (Partridge 1980), though path
analyses examining the contributions of different behavioral and ecologi-
cal contributions to mating success of males have recently increased in
number. It seems to me that analysis of the components of fitness is a nec-
essary first step in our attempts to understand the Darwinian forces that
may (or may not) shape existing variation in social behavior and psychol-
ogy of humans. This method seems preferable to the often unsatisfying ap-
proach of attempting to find species-specific, unvarying sex differences in
behavior in organisms like humans. Given how much within-sex variation
in behavior exists, this essentialist approach doesn’t make sense (Gowaty
1992b).
Far from increasing the divide between the biological and social sci-
ences, the components of fitness approach brings the expertise of social
scientists directly to bear on variables that are the usual private bailiwick
of evolutionists. Social scientists and anthropologists cannot do the sorts
of manipulative experiments that behavioral and evolutionary ecologists
do on nonhuman animals. However, some correlation studies of causation
would be informative, even though not definitive. Considered against re-
sults in nonhuman animals, such studies may be especially valuable. The
next section presents operationally explicit models that might guide such
research.
 Power Asymmetries between the Sexes 75

4 Gender Politics as Darwinian Process

The two models in this section are about how constraints act on females’
reproductive decisions and affect the fitness of women, men, and their
children. The first predicts between-population variation in fitness com-
ponents when women vary in constraints. The second predicts within-
population, between-individual variation in fitness components under
institutionalized monogamous marriage.

A Bird Model Applied to Humans

I originally drew figure 3.1 (Gowaty 1996b) to explain social dynamics in
polygynous, monogamous, and promiscuous birds. It says that offspring
viability (figure 3.1a), variance among males in mating success (figure
3.1b), and fecundity (figure 3.1c) depend on variation among females in
their abilities to remain in control of their reproductive decisions. Off-
spring viability (figure 3.1a) increases as the mother’s reproductive auton-
omy increases (figure 3.1a). The percentage of men mating is relatively
small when women’s autonomy is least, so that variance among males
(figure 3.1b) is high. On the assumption that populations are outbred,
when women have complete reproductive autonomy most males mate so
that variance in male mating success is low. When women have middling
autonomy, as they may under social monogamy in birds and under insti-
tutionalized monogamous marriage in humans, the percentage of men
mating is relatively high, so that variance is low. Additionally, fecundity
(figure 3.1c) declines as women’s autonomy increases.
Human societies vary in terms of their codified, legal proscriptions
about the behavior of women (e.g., see Lerner 1986), and the mecha-
nisms constraining the behavior of women (e.g., Rogers 1995). This model
predicts that societies with the fewest codified, legal proscriptions for
women’s behavior will be those in which close to all men are able to (non-
coercively) reproduce (not marry, but reproduce). In such a society, the
variance among men in mating success will be very low. It also says that
when women have high reproductive autonomy, the viability of men’s chil-
dren will be higher than when women have lower autonomy, and the
among-women variance in the viability of children will be low.
Some data support these ideas, including data on sexual power asym-
metries associated with differences in literacy of women and men (Gowaty
76 Patricia Adair Gowaty

Figure 3.1
Theoretically, variation in women’s reproductive autonomy predicts the compo-
nents of fitness under different social-political systems. The components of fitness
are A. offspring viability (the percentage of offspring born that survive to repro-
ductive age); B. variance in male mating success (the number of women with whom
a man copulates); and C. women’s fecundity (the number of offspring born).

and Hubbell MSa). In addition, in societies where women have the lowest
autonomy, despots control their reproductive behavior (Betzig 1992a,b
1993, 1995). Women and many or most men are under the control of an
alpha male, or an elite male power coalition who exploit the productive la-
bor of many men, while also inhibiting their reproduction. The theoretical
association between women’s autonomy and among-male variance in mat-
ing success seems to correspond to contemporary, Western democracies.
 Power Asymmetries between the Sexes 77

This is not surprising, because social institutions based on “one man–one

vote” ideologies go a long way toward equalization of power asymmetries
among individual men. Is the power symmetry language of many democ-
racies manipulative code that favors reproductive symmetries among men
too? Is that, in fact, its main point? Evolutionary-minded psychologists
might consider investigation of the Darwinian costs and benefits to sig-
nalers and receivers of the social rhetoric characterizing social change ac-
tivists under despotism and more egalitarian societies.
Control by women of their reproductive capacity probably does indicate
that many rules about reproductive behavior and sexuality have been re-
laxed or never instituted (Lerner 1986). In such systems, according to this
model, the variance among men in mating success will be lower than un-
der institutionalized “one man–one woman” systems, because the most
important curbs on male mating success would be women’s differential
preferences. Assuming that offspring viability selectively shapes female
preferences (Gowaty and Hubbell MSb), the model predicts that individ-
ual women’s optimal preferences vary when there are relaxed rules about
women’s behavior. Likewise, it predicts that women’s mate preferences are
similar when male brokering constrains women’s access to resources.
A related model of Darwinian costs and benefits (one that did not take
women’s reproductive autonomy into account) predicted that reproductive
asymmetries between despots and subservient men stimulated “sub-
servient men” to formulate ideologies fueling revolutions that deposed
despots (e.g., the Scottish revolts). As far as I know, Richard Alexander
(1979) first made this argument. Similarly, the new model based on
women’s reproductive autonomy predicts that the fitness differentials be-
tween the men women freely prefer and the men women do not prefer ul-
timately motivate the development of ideologies against women’s freedom
of choice, expression, right to education, right to work, and equal pay for
equal work.
The model predicts that the ideologies arising against extreme male-
male competition and the expression of free female mate preferences are
different. The rhetoric motivating coalitions against despots will be about
power among men and differential resource distribution among men,
even when the precipitating events that may give hints to what all these re-
volutions are ultimately about is differential access to women. Male-male
coalitions against despots will also attract many women, and women will
78 Patricia Adair Gowaty

be the acknowledged leaders of some of these. The coalition rhetoric will

be against individual behavior and institutions that buttress women’s be-
havioral control of own reproduction. Thus, these coalitions will truly be
male-only institutions and they will specifically exclude women. These
male-male coalitions will seem to be about “family values” and be against
abortion, for example.

Women’s Constraints in Institutionalized Monogamous Marriage

How do the components of fitness vary in institutionalized monogamous
marriage? The hypothesized answer depends on variation among women
in their vulnerability to manipulation of their reproductive decisions.
Like many passerine birds, most people live in social monogamy (Mur-
dock 1967). Sociobiological explanations for monogamy usually focus
on female requirements for male contributions to parental care. In birds
(Gowaty 1996a, b) and in humans, females seem to vary in the level of
help that they need in provisioning their offspring, so the question, What
do women need and why do they need it? is critical to understanding insti-
tutionalized monogamous marriage. When a woman’s access to essential
resources for reproduction is constrained, she may be vulnerable to manip-
ulation of her reproductive decisions via male brokering of resources.
What constraints act on women?
Lack of inventive genius, courage, pugnacity, or energy may constrain
women’s access to essential resources (Darwin 1871). More likely, some
women may be metabolically inefficient. Institutionalized gender inequal-
ities in pay schedules may constrain some. Customs may make it unseemly
or illegal for women to be out of their homes (Jehl 1999a, b). Customs may
physically maim and mutilate in the interest of desirability or suitability for
marriage. Systematic ideological and social assaults on girls’ and women’s
self-esteem may constrain them. These sources of variation are the short
list of mechanisms that may render women vulnerable to trades between
men and women. These trades may not always serve what I assume to be
women’s most important fitness interest, the viability of their children.
In this view, what monogamous marriage institutionalizes (Lerner
1986) is a trade: In exchange for prescriptive paternity certainty (Dicke-
mann 1979a, b, 1981), women gain access to male-brokered resources.
However, even when the church sanctifies and the state legitimizes these
trades, it is unlikely that every woman experiences the same degree of
vulnerability to reproductive manipulation. This is because women vary;
 Power Asymmetries between the Sexes 79

they vary in their physiological efficiencies, in their abilities to access re-

sources besides through male brokering; in the degree of their physical and
mental mutilations. Women vary in how smart, savvy, aggressive, asser-
tive, pugnacious, energetic, and adventurous they are. They vary in how
well nourished they were as infants and children. They vary in develop-
mental experiences that contribute to levels of athleticism or mathemati-
cal abilities. Women also vary in luck. This short list suggests that typical
sociological indicators might provide insight into variation in vulnerabil-
ity to manipulation of reproductive decisions, and that these are important
to understanding fitness outcomes.
Figure 3.2 shows the number of offspring surviving to reproductive age
as a function of variation in women’s abilities to resist influences on their
reproductive behavior via male resource brokering. The horizontal axis
must indicate something operational about a woman’s intrinsic ability to
conserve energy for reproduction, the success of her own efforts to amass
necessary external resources, and the luck of ecological circumstances in
which she finds herself. The two lines in the graph in figure 3.2 indicate the

Figure 3.2
Mother’s productivity when she is helped by a male (dotted line) and when she is
not helped by a male. The two lines converge as women’s reproductive autonomy
increases. Drawn after figure in Gowaty (1996b).
80 Patricia Adair Gowaty

effect of the presence of male-brokered resources on the number of chil-

dren surviving to reproductive age.
The figure illustrates three general conditions. Panel A women have no
offspring surviving to reproductive age unless they have access to male-
brokered resources. They are highly vulnerable to male control of their
reproductive decisions because they will have no fitness without the re-
sources men control. As figure 3.1a showed, these women will have off-
spring of lower viability than other women. But, without male-controlled
resources, they will have no children. For panel B women, male-brokered
resources enhance the number of surviving offspring but the degree of fit-
ness enhancement varies among mothers. Some offspring survival is pos-
sible without male-brokered resources, but the number surviving is always
higher with access to resources from males. These women will vary in how
vulnerable they are to male manipulation of their reproductive decisions.
For panel C women, the number of offspring surviving is the same with or
without male-supplied resources. Panel C women are not vulnerable to
male influence via resource brokering. Offspring viability will be highest
for panel C mothers. All else equal, women in panel C will have affairs
more often than women in panels A and B. Panel C women will have af-
fairs with men with whom they are likely to have more highly viable off-
spring than they would with their husbands. Panel A women will be more
likely to have affairs that increase their access to male-controlled re-
sources. The viability of illegitimate offspring of panel A mothers will not
be different from that of their legitimate children. Because the motivation
for affairs of panel B women will vary, the variance in the difference scores
between legitimate and illegitimate children will be greater than for either
panel A or panel C mothers.
As is so for female birds, a woman’s vulnerabilities to male influence are
unlikely to be simply a function of her requirement for male-brokered re-
sources (Gowaty and Buschhaus 1998). Brownmiller (1975) hypothesized
that marriage may be favored because of women’s fear of rape, which fa-
cilitates advantages for some men because some women need men for pro-
tection against “nearby dangerous solicitors.” That quaint phrase came
from a discussion of factors favoring social monogamy in ducks (Heinroth
1911). So, a modification of the model encapsulates another trade: Men
get paternity certainty and women get protection, what Mesnick (1997)
called the bodyguard advantage and what some have called “institution-
 Power Asymmetries between the Sexes 81

alized extortion.” These alternatives are (1) male exploitation of a pre-

existing sensory bias, namely, women’s fear; or (2) the perverse reciprocal
altruistic creation by some men of fearful conditions for many women, fa-
voring some women trading paternity certainty for protection. Though the
arguments were originally about ducks (Gowaty and Buschhaus 1998),
some apply to women, and many of the predictions are testable, because
women vary in their vulnerability to reproductive control through male-
brokered protection.
Women vary in their abilities to protect themselves against male aggres-
sion. They vary in intelligence, perception, balance, athletic ability, disci-
plined fighting skills, training. They vary in how quickly they think when
under physical attack, in their willingness “to kick a guy in the balls,” in
how knowledgeable they are about their defensive abilities, whether they
live near or far from blood-kin. They vary in how successful they are at
building the female-female coalitions Barbara Smuts (1992, 1994) has ar-
gued are so important. They vary in whether or not they live near their
mothers, grandmothers, and other older, helpful women (Hawkes et al.
1989, 1997, 1998).
Operational and repeatable characterizations of women’s vulnerabilities
to male control are essential to fair tests of this idea. Operational, repeat-
able, systematic ways to measure within-population variation in female
autonomy in reproductive “decisions” is the major obstacle to testing the
predictions. An especially robust test would hold husbands’ economic re-
sources constant.

Summary

A Natural History of Rape prematurely rejects insights and evolutionary

hypotheses about the nature of coercive sexuality from the perspective of
females. The assumptions Thornhill and Palmer share with other evolu-
tionary psychologists about the selection pressures that shape(d) human
behavior in the Pleistocene are likely to be incomplete or possibly wrong
altogether. If offspring viability selection and sexually antagonistic selec-
tion interact, the selection pressures of most importance to social behav-
ior variation are likely to be dynamical, ongoing, and constant. If so,
contingent, environmental circumstances may more likely induce faculta-
tive behavior of individuals.
82 Patricia Adair Gowaty

To understand the interplay of male attempts to control and female at-

tempts to resist, one must include study of within-population variation
among females. Variation among females in their abilities to remain in
control of their reproductive decisions is critical to the evolutionary inter-
play between females and males. To understand sexually antagonistic se-
lection pressures, one must evaluate the components of fitness of breeders
and nonbreeders (both male and female) and the viability of their off-
spring. Variation in offspring viability is a ubiquitous selection pressure
that favors female resistance to manipulation of reproductive decisions.
These ideas suggest important fitness component trade-offs in individuals
that should be included in studies of the evolution of social behavior of
humans. I hope these ideas stimulate more collaborative research among
evolutionary biologists and social scientists. I hope they lead to well-
controlled descriptions of how variation in components of fitness affect
what individuals in real-time populations do.

Acknowledgments

I thank Cheryl Travis for her many comments on a previous draft and her
patience as I struggled to revise this paper during my mother’s unexpected
illness and death. I thank Steve Hubbell, Sarah Hrdy, and Mike Kaspari for
comments on various drafts and many conversations that helped make my
expression of these ideas clearer. For all they have taught me, I thank my
collaborators in the “free female choice consortium,” Wyatt Anderson,
Cindy Bluhm, Lee Drickamer, Jerry Downhower, Yong-Kyu Kim, Steve
Hubbell, and Allen Moore. For their persistence, creativity, and feminist
consciousness, I thank Sarah Hrdy and Susan Brownmiller. Grants from
the NIH and NSF helped support this work.

Note

1. The horror of real-life existence for women under Afghanistan’s fundamental-

ist Islamic Taliban of which the world became aware after September 11, 2001 ren-
dered the horror of Burdekin’s fiction less fantastical.

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4
Does Self-Report Make Sense as an
Investigative Method in Evolutionary
Psychology?
Stephanie A. Shields and Pamela Steinke

Scientists aim to explain things, and most of what we try to explain has
multiple causes. Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer distinguish between
proximate and ultimate explanations for rape (2000). They group to-
gether as proximate explanations a broad range of variables that sweep
across a wide set of temporal, physical, and social features. They view fac-
tors of individual genetic and learning history, concurrent situational fac-
tors, and sociocultural institutions, values, and practices that sustain or
promote a rape culture all as proximate explanations for rape. In bracket-
ing these incommensurable variables within the single category of proxi-
mate explanation, they identify for themselves a higher goal. Their beat is
ultimate explanation. They assert that “identifying ultimate causes . . . is
important, because certain proximate explanations may be incompatible
with certain ultimate explanations. This is because certain ultimate expla-
nations specify the existence of certain types of proximate mechanisms”
(p. 4). The power of ultimate explanation, they suggest, is that “an ulti-
mate explanation of a biological phenomenon can account for all proxi-
mate causes influencing the phenomenon, whether the phenomenon is an
adaptation or an incidental effect of an adaptation” (p. 12). They propose
that the more inclusive causal model offered by the ultimate explanation
gives it “enormous practical potential” because it should reveal the “best
insights about proximate causes” (p. 12). The legitimacy of any and all
proposed proximate explanations is thus weighed in terms of the specific
circumstances that they name as the ultimate explanation.
Self-report data is among the evidence they marshal, and at several
points it plays a critical role in building their case. At different points
Thornhill and Palmer consider rapists’ reports of their motives for rape,
88 Stephanie A. Shields and Pamela Steinke

women’s reports about their fear of rape, men’s beliefs about influences on
their sexuality and sexual behavior, and even devote an entire chapter to
the experience of psychological pain and distress after rape. Self-report is
not the only form of data on which Thornhill and Palmer rely, but self-
report data at several points forms a crucial link in their reasoning. In this
chapter we take a closer look at what self-report does and does not mea-
sure, how self-report has been used in creating an empirical foundation for
their argument, and how well that self-report data actually fulfills the task.
We focus specifically on a single type of data-gathering strategy in part be-
cause problems in their application of self-report data reveal a larger pat-
tern of logical inconsistency in the arguments they put forward. The core
of our claim is that investigation of putatively “ultimate explanations”
needs to rely on data that can differentiate proximate from ultimate. In-
vestigatory techniques or data derived from or otherwise dependent on
proximate variables do not automatically qualify as equally valid for,
much less relevant to, testing ultimate explanations.
Self-report, the linguistic representation of beliefs about the self, is a com-
plex “output” of language, consciousness, culture, personal values, mem-
ory, and self-presentational concerns. Self-report, in the broadest sense,
includes everything from responses to open-ended interviews designed for
a single research study, to self-assessment on closed, objectively scored
scales. Self-report relies on a panoply of cognitive capacities, and on a cul-
tural construction of the self that ascribes legitimacy and credibility to in-
dividual memory. Self-report measures the individual’s beliefs about her or
his own behavior and experience. The self-report is not the literal descrip-
tion of a discrete event or attitude, but an amalgam, sharpened or leveled,
of the many factors that might bear on the individual’s interpretation of
“experience.” Lyons (1986) argues that even reports of occurrent states via
introspection do not reflect a direct reading of one’s own internal state, but
a reconstruction of that experience, an account that interweaves memory,
immediate bodily sensation, expectancies, and heuristics with the aim of
predicting what “ought” to happen in the situation.
Thornhill and Palmer are not alone among evolutionary psychologists
who use self-report data, nor is self-report just a small and optional part
of the data on which evolutionary psychology’s arguments are based.
Other evolutionary psychologists who have used self-report data to inves-
tigate preferences regarding relationships and mating decision rules (see
 Self-Report as an Investigative Method 89

Kenrick 2001 for a brief summary), purport gender differences in experi-

ence of emotion in general (Geary 1998), and in sexual and romantic jeal-
ousy in particular (e.g., Buss et al. 1992). Each of these has been met with
criticism that supports alternate explanations equally well or better (e.g.,
Pratto and Hegarty 2000; Lott 1996) or reveals major flaws in the evidence
brought forward to support the assertion and/or the execution of research
(e.g., DeSteno and Salovey 1996).

Self-Report as Data in Evolutionary Psychology

The speculative and general nature of self-report questioning that charac-

terizes its use in evolutionary psychology, combined with multiple com-
peting influences on the content of reported behavior or beliefs about
behavior and emotions, seriously compromises the validity of self-report
for many investigations in evolutionary psychology. Here we outline three
problems that seem to us especially central.

Inequivalence of Terminology
A number of critics have noted the tendency for broad and often perplex-
ing anthropomorphism in evolutionary psychology’s ascription of behav-
ioral terms. Thornhill and Palmer define “rape” as “human copulation
resisted by the victim to the best of her ability unless such resistance would
probably result in death or serious injury to her or in death or injury to
others she commonly protects” (p. 150). Although they aim to isolate rape
from other forms of coercive sex and sexual aggression, they freely apply
the term to other species: orangutans, ducks, and even insects. In address-
ing the topic of psychological distress they especially focus on insects such
as waterstriders and dung flies—species for which notions of consent and
coercion are at least questionable and at best problematic. As we discuss
later in this chapter, “psychological distress,” which they accord important
evidentiary status, is neither easily nor unambiguously operationalized.
Experience-based terms must be understood within the context of the ex-
periencer and must be incorporated into explanatory structures very care-
fully. Words by themselves carry the freight of connotation and can too
easily be credited with an unmerited equivalency across culture and his-
torical time.
90 Stephanie A. Shields and Pamela Steinke

Asking People What They Do Not Know

The way the questions are framed inevitably influences the data that self-
report yields. In studies concerned with identifying people’s values, or
their knowledge of cultural expectations and norms, or their beliefs about
themselves, others, and the world, self-report is exactly the right method
to use. If the investigator is trying to get through to something that oper-
ates outside of reflective self-awareness, the burden is on the investigator
to demonstrate that asking people what they can know reveals something
about which they cannot have direct knowledge. Because evolutionary
psychologists try to probe ultimate explanations, which they assume to
exert an effect on us without our explicit awareness of the mechanics of
those effects, they have an especially heavy burden of proof.

Ineffective Methodological Triangulation

It is not enough to say that self-report is just one of several investigative
tools and that the aggregate of “evidence” is what matters. Converging
methods are persuasive only insofar as each method is a valid and reliable
measure of the variable under study, and one that independently con-
tributes to the explanation. Converging evidence is not inferred from the
explanation. This may seem so obvious that it need not be stated, but the
practice occurs with disappointing frequency in ultimate explanations like
Thornhill and Palmer’s.

What Self-Report Is, and What It Is Not

Self-report is an index of what people believe to be true about themselves.

It is not a literal record of the individual’s behavioral history nor is it nec-
essarily a reliable predictor of future behavior. There are many important
questions that can be profitably addressed with self-report methodologies,
and there are ample and repeated demonstrations of the unique research
insights that derive from the use of self-report data (e.g., King 2001; Selig-
man and Schulman 1986; Wylie 1974). Any legitimate use of self-report
as data, however, must take into account the fact that self-report is always
mediated. By “mediated” we mean that self-report is a self-aware con-
struction of experience even as the self-report is generated. It is always
therefore an interpretation of experience, not a “raw” throughput or read-
out of experience. The capacity to produce self-report, whether as narra-
 Self-Report as an Investigative Method 91

tive or as a response to a numerical rating scale, is shaped and constrained

by language and expression via memory (e.g., heuristics), by the structure
of language (e.g., implicit causality), by “layered experience” (i.e., the per-
son’s understanding of what ought to happen, what did happen, what is
desired to happen, etc.), to name just a few features. One might even ques-
tion when or even whether self-report is an appropriate index of processes
theorized as prior to (unlinked from? independent of?) the capacity for re-
flective self-awareness, such as the impulses and attractions that Thornhill
and Palmer hypothesize as the ultimate explanations for rape and reac-
tions to it.
We want to emphasize that we are not implying that self-report is
“spoiled data.” Self-report has frequently been singled out for method-
ological criticism (Ericsson and Simon 1980), and it is not our intent to
contribute to this bias. It is a great mistake, however, to assume that self-
report is something that it is not. Three things need to be kept in mind
when relying on self-report in any context: self-presentation, discrepan-
cies, and interpretation. After a brief review of each, we turn to how
Thornhill and Palmer inappropriately rely on self-report in trying to make
a case for the ultimate explanation of rape as a male reproductive strategy.

Self-Presentation
Self-report is an account from the teller’s perspective. Because self-report
involves privileged access to beliefs, self-report cannot be “validated” in
the same sense as can representations about others. That is, you may not
view me the same way as I view myself, but your view does not negate the
authenticity of my self-report, although it may question the report’s accu-
racy. When reporting about the self, the research participant is presumed
to have more at stake than when reporting about others. Setting aside the
possibility of self-serving bias, other aspects of memory and self-report
distortion are, as we described above, inevitably involved in telling about
oneself.
On the other hand, the bulk of the evidence on subject dissembling
shows that deliberate, malicious misrepresentation is rare (Christensen
1977). Researchers should have no reason to be overly suspicious of the
majority of their research participants’ willingness to be forthcoming, or
to be overly concerned that otherwise well-socialized individuals will fail
to follow certain general principles of cooperation inherent in interaction
92 Stephanie A. Shields and Pamela Steinke

(e.g., being truthful; being relevant) within the research situation if they
follow these principles systematically in other situations (Grice 1975).
Usually a greater problem is the research participant’s well-intentioned ef-
fort to cooperate with the aims of the investigator while maintaining or en-
hancing his or her own self-esteem, especially when discussing sensitive
topics (e.g., Gargiulo and Yonker 1983). The situation is further compli-
cated by the fact that even in the most innocuous testing situations re-
search participants express concern about whether their responses show
that they are “better than average” or at least “normal.”
Standard strategies for minimizing the problem of self-presentation
include disguising one’s hypotheses; informing the participant that there
are no “correct” or “incorrect” responses; reducing the salience of self-
presentation concerns via extradesign strategies (e.g., making the experi-
menter’s presence as unobtrusive as possible within the research setting).
These are all important and useful; nevertheless, no adjustment in data
collection or modification of the research context will transform reported
beliefs into something they are not. Reports are influenced by subjects’
concern with social desirability, but they are nevertheless statements of the
phenomenal self, even if those beliefs about the self would not be corrob-
orated by others’ judgments (Wylie 1974).

Discrepancy between Behavior or Informant-report and Self-report

Even when self-report is used appropriately, as a measure of belief, it will
not always correlate strongly with behavioral measures or informants’
reports. When behavioral or informant-report and self-report measures
are not strongly correlated, the discrepancy between measures is not in-
herently problematic. In fact, when the report is at odds with data ob-
tained by other means, the discrepancy itself can be useful data. The
discrepancy expresses which aspects of an individual’s belief system oper-
ate in accord with his or her behavior or with others’ perceptions and
which aspects do not.
A number of factors can contribute to a low correlation between self-
report and other measures. Low correlation is often due to the inappro-
priate use of self-report (White 1988). For example, people cannot predict
their reactions to situations with which they have had no experience; even
if a prediction is made on the basis of prior experience, people can only
estimate what would be normative for themselves: “(I believe) I’d never fall
 Self-Report as an Investigative Method 93

in love with someone who is already married” or “(I believe) I would

immediately help a child in need.” Similarly, informants cannot report on
others’ subjective states, only on their inferences about those states. But
just as discrepancy does not “invalidate” a self-report, agreement does
not “validate” it. Agreement between self-report and other measures, like
any other correlation, may indicate that the two measures tap the same
construct, different manifestations of the same construct, or correlated
constructs.
Discrepancy becomes useful data in a variety of areas concerned with
people’s understanding of what and how they know and feel, including
studies of memory, values, attention, and motives. Discrepancies between
expressed values and behavioral acts expressive of those values have
been at the center of the attitude inconsistency literature since the 1930s
(La Piere 1934). Discrepancies between self-report and other indices may
be particularly informative in studies of values. “Inconsistencies” reveal
the organization of the individual’s system of beliefs about correct or im-
portant attributes of social relations or personal ethics. Individual belief
systems, in turn, can then be contrasted with the individual’s knowledge
about cultural standards. Knowing what is important to or valued by
individuals better enables researchers to predict the situations in which
people will make efforts to align their actions with valued outcomes or so-
cial rules (e.g., Hunter 1984; Steinke 1992; Stokes and Hewitt 1976).

Interpretation of the Content of Self-Report

Ideally, questions are short, specific, simple, and unbiased. Yet in practice,
researchers make common technical errors such as omission of anchors,
asking people what they don’t know or cannot say, and calling for finer dis-
tinctions than people can or want to make. As a consequence, response
patterns may be influenced by factors above and beyond beliefs about the
matter in question. When the research participant appears to be incon-
sistent, it may actually be the experimenter who has erred. The problem
may be as simple as undue difficulty of individual words within questions.
Apparent uninterpretability may also occur if the legitimacy of the re-
search participant’s beliefs are challenged by the content or wording of the
instrument.
Self-reports must also be interpreted within a context that acknowl-
edges the range of characteristics of the report itself. Self-report is encoded
94 Stephanie A. Shields and Pamela Steinke

in language, takes the form of question answering or account giving, and

is a structured discourse. Because self-reports are encoded in language, the
data can be interpreted within a linguistic context (e.g., see Harré 1989).
Self-report can be interpreted as the individual’s attempt to provide a per-
sonal account or maintain a discourse. The most informative analysis may
therefore come from examining the report’s style or structure through use
of an account or discourse analysis that involves studying the function of
discourse in social situations (Potter and Wetherell 1987; van Dijk 1985).
Linguistic units are also useful when viewing self-report as occurring
within the context of question answering (Graesser and Murachver 1985;
Lehnert 1978). Question answering presumes the respondent’s implicit
knowledge of interacting syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic information
(Singer 1990). Viewing the self-report within this context allows the re-
searcher to make important predictions about the report. For example, in
any given question there is a focus to the question, which will determine
which part of the question is answered (Clark and Haviland 1977;
Graesser and Murachver 1985). Thus, the question “Did you feel anger
when your father died?” may include a focus on “you,” “anger,” “father,”
or “died.” The focus directs the respondent to the information that is new
or not presupposed and therefore in need of a response. Identifying or
marking the focus of the questions allows the researcher to make sure the
scope of the response will include the desired information (e.g., “What
was the felt emotion?”). seemingly minor changes in any linguistic or con-
textual factors may significantly alter the responses, and the investigator
needs to be mindful of how these features affect comprehension so as to
generate accurate interpretations of the data.
In summary, self-report measures beliefs, nothing more, nothing less.
Beliefs tell us about values, about what people recall, about what they are
attending to, about how they reconcile myriad conflicting pieces of infor-
mation about themselves and others. Self-report can provide a rich source
of data, but it cannot be taken as an unbiased indicator of probable be-
havior or beliefs uncontaminated by measurement context, personal his-
tory, demand characteristics, cultural mores, and so on. Schemas and
stereotypes greatly influence what we attend to, what we remember, and
the labels and meaning we give it. Take, for example, what is implied by
identifying a person or that person’s behavior as “emotional.” Deeply em-
bedded, culturally shared beliefs about the gendered nature of emotion
 Self-Report as an Investigative Method 95

color when and how we expect to see emotion. A similar kind of social
construction goes on about jealousy and the naturalness of male social
arrangements that control women. Although sociobiology often formu-
lates an evolutionary fitness account of why men are commonly jealous
about female behavior, it usually fails to recognize an equally reasonable
evolutionary account for female jealousy, and often seems not even to ac-
knowledge the commonly reported distress among women whose partners
are philandering or flirting with other women.

How Thornhill and Palmer Misapply Self-Report

The Data
In the chapter entitled “The Pain and Anguish of Rape,” Thornhill and
Palmer focus on the emotional consequences of rape, particularly psy-
chological pain. They define psychological pain as “the mental state of
feeling distraught” (p. 85), which would seem to require a careful, well-
operationalized method of measurement that has at least demonstrated
face validity and a primary concern with the victim’s perspective. In this
chapter the authors do concern themselves with women victims, but
broaden their description of distress to incorporate accounts of witnesses,
mates, and close relatives of the victim. Indeed, Thornhill and Palmer ex-
amine psychological pain because of rape’s hypothesized impact on the
woman victim’s relationship to her mate or other potential reproductive
partners. Their version of the evolutionary hypothesis predicts that psy-
chological pain will be cued or activated by (1) “events that lowered re-
productive success in human evolutionary history” and (2) “the greater
the negative effect of an event, the greater the psychological pain experi-
enced,” such that “more psychological pain is expected in a young and fer-
tile woman than in a female of pre- or post-reproductive age” as a response
to rape victimization (pp. 85–86). Their interest in subjective experience
should require them to focus on first-person accounts, yet they pay scant
attention to the subjectivity that is central to their definition of pain. In-
stead, their primary evidence pertaining to the severity of psychological
pain comes from a secondary analysis of one data set comprised of a single
interview within days following the assault. Thornhill and Palmer ack-
nowledge some of the limitations of the sample (e.g., it is disproportion-
ately poor and young), but they ignore those limitations as well as the
96 Stephanie A. Shields and Pamela Steinke

fact that they insist on inferring causal linkages (proximate as well as ulti-
mate) from correlational data.
The voluminous literature on psychological stress responses and coping
has again and again demonstrated the multidimensionality of these con-
structs. But care to resist overgeneralizing or conflating discrete constructs
is nowhere to be found in this chapter. Thornhill and Palmer do not dis-
tinguish between discrete manifestations of feeling distraught, and do not
differentiate between feelings of fear, troubled relationships, or somatic
symptoms. Nor do they consider the temporal dimension of distress re-
sponses. For example, they purport a link between “mateship status” and
severity of psychological pain. They hypothesize that “the victims’ pain
stems from their mates’ reduction or complete withdrawal of material
support” (p. 90, emphasis added). They therefore predict that partnered
women of childbearing age should experience greater distress than girls or
other women, yet they seem to believe it irrelevant that half the questions
in the distress interview concerned current relationships with men. Self-
report data tends to be used to build the case rather than test the explana-
tion, making reliance on it even more problematic. Nor are obvious
incompatible alternate explanations ruled out. For example, physical or
emotional rape trauma may generate fear or anxiousness with respect to
men, that in turn mediates disruption in ongoing relationships.
Thornhill and Palmer’s uninformed use of self-report can be contrasted
with systematic and careful studies of the consequences of beliefs about
rape. Bohner and Schwarz (1996) report a series of studies in which they
investigated whether fear of rape, in fact, is causally linked to women’s self-
perceptions and the moderating role of beliefs about rape in women’s and
men’s self-esteem after exposure to accounts of rape or assault. Their work
is notable not only because it moves beyond correlational investigation,
but because of its prudent interpretation of self-report as expressions of
belief and values. They are careful to interpret their findings as reflecting
the impact that rape threat has on women’s self-perceptions, emphasizing
that their possible impact on behavior must be explained in terms of the
moderating effects of belief.

Underestimation of Self-Presentation
Thornhill and Palmer make much of rapists’ reports of their sexual moti-
vation for the crime. Thornhill and Palmer rightly point out that we need
 Self-Report as an Investigative Method 97

to be cautious in taking those reports at face value; however, they err in

fixing only on the possibility that the content of the report might be con-
taminated by rapists’ self-presentation concerns about power and control.
They assert that rapists’ description of their actions in terms of power and
control rather than sexual desire come primarily from studies of convicted
rapists. This raises the question for Thornhill and Palmer: “Were these
men truthfully reporting their motives, or were they giving the explana-
tions desired by the researchers?” (p. 135). In setting two alternatives
(either power and control or sexual motivation) as the only and opposi-
tional explanations for rapists’ explanation of their motives, Thornhill
and Palmer sweepingly overlook other significant aspects of the context
in which the reports are obtained and other self-presentation and non-
self-presentation related motives for fashioning the report in a particular
manner. Moreover, they fail to grasp the complex relation that will exist
between any self-representation and “true” motives.

Failure to Look for Discrepancies in Data Sources

Thornhill and Palmer devote much of the discussion of the pain and an-
guish of rape to the emotional reactions of the woman’s mate, and even
consider it “highly possible” that selection “favored the outward manifes-
tations of psychological pain because it communicated the female’s strong
negative attitude about the rapist to her husband and/or her relatives”
(p. 88). Further, mate and kin themselves are hypothesized to guard their
interests by being vigilant for rapists and judging some as more threaten-
ing than others. The woman’s experience, then, is viewed as functioning
for others, and the account of her experience is given through the effect it
has on those others.
Placing the narratives of very different “stakeholders” on the same an-
alytic plane obscures the differences among these groups. It shifts the em-
phasis of the data from what the narratives can tell us about the distinctive
phenomenal experience of each group and what data might be provided
by differences among these groups, to a least-common-denominator of in-
terchangeability or equivalence. Some of the material in their discussion of
the reactions of mate and kin to a woman’s rape makes this plain. In sup-
port of their claim they cite the story of a woman assaulted by a captive
male orangutan at a field research site in Borneo. The main point they wish
to make by telling the story is that no permanent harm was done because
98 Stephanie A. Shields and Pamela Steinke

the assailant was not human. What is interesting here, in relation to the
question of report as evidence, however, is exactly how that point is
made. Thornhill and Palmer summarize a second-party summary of the
researcher’s account of the husband’s description of the incident. From the
distance of a fourth-hand account they have no qualms in concluding that
“neither the husband nor the victim seemed to suffer greatly” as a result
of the attack (p. 87).

Problematic Interpretation of the Content of Self-Report: The Narrative

Griffiths (1997) identifies a major weakness in the general reasoning of

evolutionary psychology. He notes that evolutionary psychology empha-
sizes that the adaptiveness of a biological trait is not equivalent to saying
that the trait is an adaptation. Adaptiveness is a measure of a trait’s current
effect on an organism’s reproductive fitness, whereas an adaptation is a
trait explained as resulting from natural selection. “Adaptiveness is neither
necessary nor sufficient for a trait to be an adaptation. . . . Evolutionary
psychology claims that the human mind is a bundle of cognitive adap-
tations. It does not claim that these adaptations are currently adaptive”
(p. 107)—because, of course, the environments of early evolutionary his-
tory are quite different from those inhabited by humans today. The dis-
tinction between adaptations and adaptiveness is a way for evolutionary
psychologists to argue that their description of behaviors that may have
once subserved adaptive functions in no way is an endorsement of the
“rightness” or desirability of that behavior, trait, or preference for present-
day human life. Thus, Thornhill and Palmer can argue that their descrip-
tion of rape as an adaptation can be presented as if it is a value-free
description of the state of things.
One limitation of what Griffiths (1997) refers to as “the adaptationist
program” stems from the fact that adaptationists suppose that selective
problems are very strongly associated with particular solutions to those
problems. On the one hand, adaptationists believe that they can infer the
solution from the problem. That is, believing they know what adaptive
problems an organism has faced, they infer what adaptations it will pos-
sess. Second, adaptationists think that they can infer the problem from the
solution. They believe that by looking at the complex forms evolution has
produced, they can infer the ecological interactions between ancestral or-
 Self-Report as an Investigative Method 99

ganisms and the features of the environment that selected the forms taken
by these organisms. Propensity to infer the problem from the solution,
what Tang-Martinez (1997, p. 136) calls “adaptive storytelling,” entails
constructing an explanation as to why a trait is adaptive from the initial
assumption that the trait is adaptive: “As long as the explanation is plau-
sible and consistent with evolutionary theory, it is accepted as fact,” and
so “what is essentially a hypothetical postulate is accepted as evidence and
elevated to the status of a conclusion.” Even though most evolutionary
psychologists would agree that solutions cannot simply be inferred from
the problem, they nevertheless assume that nature, not nurture, is ac-
countable, in the end, for complex behavior:
Although nature gets the last word, the evolutionary psychologist thinks that the
fact that a particular feature “makes evolutionary sense” is a reason for taking se-
riously even quite marginal data suggesting that it actually exists. If nature dis-
agrees with the adaptationist about what should have evolved, then she has to
shout. If she agrees, then she has only to whisper. (Griffiths 1997, pp. 109–110)

Does Self-report Make Sense for Evolutionary Psychology?

Self-report is embedded in a network of research variables all of which are
potentially influenced by values of the investigators. What is an evolution-
ary psychologist to do? One possible solution is to modify the use of self-
report to be less influenced by explicit personal experience. It might seem
possible, for example, to adapt techniques from psychophysics in order to
bypass the “mediated” quality of self-report. When self-report is modified
to be apparently more free of the reporter’s conscious intervention, how-
ever, the experimenter’s selection of stimulus materials and presentation of
the judgment task is not less crucial.
One example will make this point clear. Evolutionary psychologists
have proposed the “waist-to-hip ratio” hypothesis as an explanation of
why males will be attracted to certain females. The ideal ratio is purport-
edly the expression of attractiveness and fecundity that proves irresistible
to human males. In an effort to be more objective through a kind of “so-
cial psychophysics” to test this proposition, researchers have tended to rely
on a single set of line drawings that represent a range of waist-to-hip ratios
and weight. Using this standard set, several researchers have reported ver-
ifying that a specific stimulus figure is reliably identified as optimizing at-
tractiveness and perceived fecundity. Is the waist-to-hip ratio a truism not
100 Stephanie A. Shields and Pamela Steinke

to be denied? It is if you use the same stimulus figures in study after study.
Tassinary and Hansen (1998), however, showed that the apparent empiri-
cal demonstration of the validity of the hypothesis is simply an artifact of
a confound among weight, waist size, and hip size in the standard stimu-
lus figures. Using a wider range of ratios and unconfounding judgments of
attractiveness and beliefs about fecundity, Tassinary and Hansen revealed
the low correlation between the two judgments. As it turns out, then, the
apparent robustness of judgments about the waist-to-hip ratio had been
based more on the specifics of the stimulus set that served as a standard
than on the hypothesized ratio itself.

Conclusion

Our critique has focused specifically on what is wrong with using self-
report in evolutionary psychology rather than what is right (or wrong)
about its use within other theoretical perspectives. The apparent scientific
purity of evolution-framed models of social behavior gainsays the in-
evitable way in which systematic error may be encountered in theorizing
and in conducting empirical research. As we have argued above, the re-
search tools themselves are not the problem, but the use to which they are
put may be. Wylie (1997) points out that because we can readily cite er-
rors and biases in the application of a range of methods, it is important to
think through what we can actually expect of those methods as indepen-
dent indicators of fact. She emphasizes that the prevalence of error and
bias reveals “systematic error made possible by a misplaced confidence in
the powers of scientific method to neutralize, to counter or wash out, the
effects of the standpoint-specific interests that we inevitably bring to the
endeavour of science” (pp. 49–50). These are not errors of bad faith, but
expressions of the pervasiveness of how the beliefs and practices that de-
fine sex and gender difference in contemporary society impinge on science
so as to be transparent. Predominantly male science practitioners, Wylie
says, simply do not see the need to test framework assumptions about gen-
der structures and are not alert to ways in which their research design and
results might be biased by gendered presuppositions.
It is ironic, too, that Thornhill and Palmer, on the one hand, take so lit-
erally self-representations of experience that appear to be consistent with
their argument, yet do not similarly view as “data” their critics’ discussion
 Self-Report as an Investigative Method 101

of motivation, belief, or values. Thornhill and Palmer perceive feminist

views on rape as based in “ideology,” but do not explain what is to be
gained by proposing (as feminists are described as doing) that proximal,
contingent, and contextual explanations are more germane to under-
standing the dynamics of rape (and coercive sexual behavior) than are so-
called ultimate explanations. They do not explain why we should consider
a developmental account that traces factors that promote or inhibit a
propensity to rape necessarily less scientific or less descriptively accurate
than the one they offer. Thornhill and Palmer argue that their adaptation-
ist story buys more than proximate explanations do by way of rape pre-
vention. As others in this volume point out, however, Thornhill and
Palmer’s recipe for prevention mixes the already proven (rape prevention
education for men—which, because it aims to educate against coercive
sex, does not actually fit Thornhill and Palmer’s definition of rape), with
the already demonstrated ineffective (chemical castration), with the reac-
tionary blame-the-victim (women should take care against looking “too
seductive”). Most important, none of the strategies they propose demon-
strably curbs the occurrence of rape across contexts, victim profile, or per-
petrator profile.
We also have to ask why the evolutionary psychology approach has
gained a toehold in contemporary American psychology. Why is it so at-
tractive to “explain” behavior by invoking hypothetical situations from
tens of thousands of years ago over the proximate (and often apparently
chaotic) causes that are so visible in recorded history? What is the attrac-
tion? We have been down this path before. Late nineteenth-century social
applications of evolutionary theory routinely explained contemporary so-
cial fact as a manifestation of evolution pure and simple. For example, be-
fore tests of mental ability had been developed, “genius” was defined as
achievement of social or professional eminence (Shields 1982). It surprised
no one that, by this criterion, the proportion of men of genius far out-
numbered women. After all, men were the judges and admirals and the
successful inventors and artists. The point is that eminence, ostensibly an
objective, behavioral index of mental superiority, is a fundamentally
flawed indicator of natural “genius.” It was only by ignoring the correla-
tion between social eminence, economic privilege, and legal and de facto
racial and gender barriers to achievement that eminence could be enter-
tained as an index of genius.
102 Stephanie A. Shields and Pamela Steinke

To be sure, evolution manifests itself in many ways in human behavior—

the “all overishness” that takes over as we stand at the edge of a cliff, our
love affair with sweets, our capacity for language, to name just a few.
Complex and vexed interpersonal relations, in contrast, take place within
elaborately constructed and mutable social institutions. The evolutionary
account goes awry when the assumption is made that “storytelling” about
purported ultimate explanations constitutes a more useful and accurate
account of proximal events than do the obvious, contemporaneous, mate-
rial factors that have an already-demonstrated causal or correlational link
to those events.

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5
Understanding Rape
Ethel Tobach and Rachel Reed

Introduction

Several years ago, a group of well-intentioned biological and behavioral

geneticists and psychologists met with a well-known advocate of a genetic
base to so-called racial differences in IQ. They believed that if he were lit-
erate in genetics, he would abandon his formulation of group differences
in IQ in terms of genetic processes. During that conference, I (Ethel To-
bach) asked the participants to recognize the social/societal implications
of the ideology that informed the racist formulation and warned that
there was a conflagration pending if the scientific community did not ac-
tively refute that formulation. One of the behavior geneticists said, “Let
them burn.” And of course, this was just before the ghettos of the United
States broke out in righteous outrage. And of course, the deep racism in
USA society is still with us.
“[Sociobiology] went underground, where it has been eating away at
the foundations of academic orthodoxy” (Thornhill and Palmer 2000 cit-
ing Wright on p. 107). They go on to say that “sociobiology is now re-
emerging, primarily under the new label of ‘evolutionary psychology.’”
The possible effect of evolutionary psychology and human sociobiology
on public policy is evidenced in the citations by Thornhill and Palmer of
the work by Jones (1999) and Beckstrom (1993) in the application of those
ideologies to law in the courts and rape.
Is there something inherent in the genetic determinism of ethology,
sociobiology, and evolutionary psychology that attracts racists to psy-
chologists who subscribe to those theories? For example, Rushton was in-
vited to speak with Jared Taylor, of the New Century Foundation, which
106 Ethel Tobach and Rachel Reed

promotes white separatism (Staff, Southern Poverty Law Center 2000).

Despite the avowals by sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists
that a nonsexist, nonracist evolutionary psychology and human sociobi-
ology is possible, the continued expression of racist and sexist ideas about
human behavior on the basis of evolutionary psychology and sociobiology
continue to be featured in the media.
Scientific, critical examination of the activity called “rape” may help us
formulate some program for prevention and justice for the victim. Scien-
tific, societal responsibility calls on us to do this.

Plan for the Chapter

A key thesis of this chapter is that science and social responsibility should
be critically linked and integrated. In this case, being a socially responsible
scientist requires careful and detailed attention to the theory, principles,
and data of evolutionary biology and population genetics. This is nowhere
more true than when attempting to develop causal models of human so-
cial behavior, and it is especially appropriate when addressing issues of
gender and violence. Being socially responsible in science demands thor-
ough grounding in the assumptions, methodologies, and limitations of sci-
ence and scientific inference. Thus, the chapter begins with a clarification
of evolutionary principles and terminology, including acknowledgment of
those areas of debate within evolutionary theory itself. The comparative
method has been a basic approach to developing and testing hypotheses in
evolutionary theory, and thus this method is given more detailed coverage.
The epistemological debates of science in general are considered in the sec-
ond section, including what constitutes compelling statistical evidence
and the limits of causal inference based on such evidence. The nature of
data, operational definitions, and databases are discussed in detail as these
relate to rape. Finally, we examine how scientists can pursue a better and
more relevant science in response to social issues, and the case of an evo-
lutionary basis for rape in particular. Major sections are as follows:
I. Evolutionary Issues
II. Scientific Method
III. Conceptualizations of Science and Societal Responsibility of
Scientists
 Understanding Rape 107

I Evolutionary Issues

Ho and Saunders (1984) give us a picture of the present state of Darwin-

ian and neo-Darwinian theory different from that given by sociobiology
or evolutionary psychology:
It must not be supposed however, that there is anything approaching the “con-
sensus” which is often claimed for the neo-Darwinian synthesis. Pluralism is a
predominant feature of the emerging paradigm of evolution. . . . Evaluating is a
complex phenomenon and . . . different kinds of explanations will be appropri-
ate. . . . [H]igher level explanations cannot always be collapsed or reduced into
lower level ones. . . .
Above all, however, our emphasis is on process. . . . The result is a transcendence
of the predominantly Aristotelian framework of neo-Darwinism—in which or-
ganisms are explained in terms of essences or genes—to the post-Galilean world
view in which relation and process [and change—ET] are primary. (Ho and Saun-
ders 1984, p. 5)

People cannot be faulted for believing that what they believe is the truth
and the only right way of thinking . . . the scientific way. We all do that. If
we act on the premise that we are accountable to others for our beliefs and
our actions, it is incumbent on us, nonetheless, to offer the basis for our
beliefs and to demonstrate that we have considered other beliefs. It is im-
portant that when people disagree with us, we recognize the difference be-
tween the following two statements: 1. You don’t understand me; that is
why you disagree with me; and 2. You probably understand me; I don’t
know why you disagree with me.
The authors of this chapter profess to understand the evolutionary the-
ory of the human sociobiologists; however, we do not accept their theory
as the final truth; we do not accept any theory as the truth. We do find that
other theories are compatible with our own work and research and our
philosophy of science. We offer those other theories as possible candidates
for developing an agenda for discussion and research, rather than provid-
ing a detailed response to the statements by Thornhill and Palmer.

A Agents of Evolution
Thornhill and Palmer list four agents of evolution: selection, drift, gene
flow, and mutation (Thornhill and Palmer 2000, p. 6). In their discussion
of rape, they also work with adaptation, natural selection, and sexual se-
lection (Thornhill and Palmer 2000, pp. 5–15; 32 inter alia). Significant
108 Ethel Tobach and Rachel Reed

critical discussions have taken place in regard to all these processes

(Lovtrup 1974, 1987), but most fundamental to the discussion about rape
are the concepts of natural selection, sexual selection, and adaptation.
Two postulates from Darwin’s theory have been elaborated by many
evolutionary theorists: natural selection (including sexual selection) and
adaptation (survival of the fittest). The two postulates explain speciation
by descent of those individuals who survive by reason of their characteris-
tics that distinguish them from other near and distant relatives and enable
them to have viable offspring that have their characteristics and can suc-
cessfully produce viable offspring that will also have those characteristics.
The significant elaboration of these postulates was the development of ge-
netics to produce the “new synthesis” of evolutionary theory.

1 Natural selection Several questions have been raised about the con-
cept of natural selection:
• Does selection take place on the behavioral level (as a function of the in-

dividual’s or the group’s activity in response to changes in the ecological

setting in which the species acts)?
• Does selection take place on the genetic level (functional genes are re-

tained by the successfully reproducing individuals; deleterious or dysfunc-

tional genes are lost, either through activities of the nucleotides and
proteins or by the fact that the individual does not survive or does not re-
produce)?
• Is there a direction to the selection process, that is, is natural selection

“progressive” (does it inherently lead to better characteristics to ensure

survival and to greater complexity)?
• Is natural selection “determined” or random (are the successful repro-

ducing organisms successful by chance or by preceding events that of ne-

cessity bring about natural selection)?
• Is the dominant or only process in natural selection the survival of some

individuals until they are able to reproduce and the loss of others before
they can reproduce?
The prevailing conceptualization of natural selection is that it is primar-
ily based on individual survival as described in the fifth question above;
the notion that selection takes place on a group level has been discarded
by most evolutionary biologists. The evolutionary adaptiveness of rape
would then depend on the individual’s behavior being central to survival
for reproduction of viable young that would themselves reproduce suc-
 Understanding Rape 109

cessfully. The data to support this are not yet available. Given that the sur-
vival of the species depends on the survival of the individual members of
that species, the first two questions would appear to be in the affirmative:
as life depends on functional nucleotides and proteins, and as the behav-
ior of the individual is interdependent with the group’s behavior if repro-
duction is to take place (animals that reproduce asexually are at one or
another time in their life history related to other members of the species
[Tobach and Schneirla 1968]).
The third and fourth questions are mentioned as examples of the com-
plexity of the issues related to evolutionary theory. Recent authors (Camus
1997; Davies 1989; Fox 1984; Goodwin 1989; Ho 1984, 1987, 1989;
Saunders 1984; Matsuno 1984; Wicken 1984) have discussed the concept
of self-organization as a process described by Eigen (1971a, b) and Nico-
lis and Prigogine (1977) related to physical phenomena, but which may be
applied to living organisms. The relationship among internal systems is de-
veloped in living organisms through self-organizational processes in dy-
namic change in the living organisms that are open systems. In effect, the
second law of thermodynamics is modified by the special characteristics of
living systems. This leads some evolutionary biologists to emphasize de-
velopmental processes as they are open systems (Ho 1987, 1989) rather
than to focus on genetic processes, which are traditionally conceptualized
as closed systems.
One of the consequences of these discussions is the recognition of the
possibility that during evolution, change could take place on the genetic
level as well as on all other levels. Recent discoveries in genetic processes
have highlighted the dynamic possibility of change in genetic material,
which may be related to processes of speciation (Steele et al. 1998; Steele
1979). Such possibilities cast some doubt on the evolutionary psycholo-
gists’ claim that contemporary humans have the same genes as those that
were present in the early stages of human evolution.
Because change may take place on all levels, the possibility of some ran-
dom or chance process in evolution has been proposed (Lima-de-Faria
1988). Others believe that a historical, developmental approach suggests
that as evolution is change in time, preceding events produce the processes
that lead to the succeeding change in a type of “determinism” rather than
by chance (Waddington 1957, 1959). This type of determinism is in-
formed by the self-organizing principle in open living systems and is in
110 Ethel Tobach and Rachel Reed

contrast to genetic determinist formulations that the burden of funda-

mental change is primarily on genes. The genetic process is one of a num-
ber of events that once having taken place on the biochemical level
(involving proteins, enzymes, etc.) are the predecessors of the next event in
time. This type of determinism is the integration of preceding events that
operate on more than one level. In that sense this is determinism, but it is
historical and developmental. A persevering theoretical presence in these
discussions is that of Waddington (1975). See also Thom (1989), whose
concept of the epigenetic landscape has been responsible for much of the
call to rethink neo-Darwinism. S. A. Kaufman (1989) has emphasized
that there are many targets of selection, as these act interdependently in
processes that organize other processes, such as the genetic process (epi-
genesis). These concepts suggest that the behavior of an individual is the
product of developmental experiences on many levels, including the inter-
nalization of externally generated experiences.
Mayr (1976) has written that group selection as a process has not been
supported by experimental data or observations for most species. But in
humans, group selection occurs because a human group is more than a
conglomeration of individual smaller groups (families). He attributes the
difference between humans and other animals to the special neuro-
anatomical evolution in humans. He finds that there are different kinds
of human groups and that the target of selection is the group, when it is a
founder group thus giving rise to many smaller groups that may respond
to selection pressure.

2 Adaptation In a 1982 article, Gould and Vrba point out that the term
adaptation is used variously by biologists: as a process that is responsible
for variation; as an evolved structure; as a “state of being” (p. 5). None of
these usages reflects the structural and functional variations that take
place to bring about the diversity of species. They propose that the process
of adaptive variation that brings about evolutionary change is exaptation:
“characters that have evolved for other usages (or for no function at all)
and later ‘coopted’ for their current role” (p. 6). This process of expand-
ing the function and development of existing structures that may have
evolved during earlier environmental challenges is responsible for the plas-
ticity with which individuals respond to changes in the environment. For
example, the skin structures (feathers) that were present in the earliest an-
 Understanding Rape 111

cestors of contemporary birds were primarily temperature-regulating sys-

tems. When environmentally challenged, these structures became involved
in feeding, or flight. The feathers retained their temperature-regulating
function as well. We suggest that such exaptations may be processes in
behavioral evolution as well (see Tattersall 1998). These may be related
to physiological, neuroanatomical evolution of structures that become in-
volved in behavioral plasticity and diversity. This view of adaptation pre-
sents a challenge to static concepts of speciation and evolution through the
subtraction of individuals who cannot reproduce successfully. It offers an
alternative process of evolutionary change based on the interdependence
and integration of the individual’s internal and external experiences.

B Continuities and Discontinuities in Evolution

The relationship among different species attests to the finding that there
are activity patterns that are continuous throughout the animal world: in-
terindividual activity, called social behavior (Tobach and Schneirla 1968).
This continuity becomes discontinuous as the relationship between the in-
dividual and the environment changes, as the formation of different group
relationships develop, and so on. The social activity of insects is discon-
tinuous in the general pattern of social behavior. The similarities of all so-
cial behavior (interindividual activity) is subsumed in the dissimilarities in
the social insect, in which the social behavior is based primarily on chem-
ical experience during development. This type of social behavior is dis-
continuous when compared with human social behavior, in which the
interindividual activity is interdependent with the societal setting in which
the two or more individuals interact. A reliable and valid method of com-
parative studies involving different species recognizes the similarities and
the differences, in order to define those activities that are continuous and
those that are discontinuous (Albert, Walsh, and Jonik 1993).
The human sociobiologists tell us that their plan is to relate human be-
havior primarily to mammalian behavior, yet they refer to the behavior of
invertebrates, as well as vertebrates other than mammals. The attempt to
understand human behavior by extrapolating from the behavior of other
animals to human behavior without recognizing the differences as well as
the similarities results in the zoomorphism (attributing nonhuman animal
characteristics to humans) that is the hallmark of sociobiology (Harding
1985).
112 Ethel Tobach and Rachel Reed

Many scientists believe that it is easier to define behavior if zoomorphic

or anthropomorphic terms are used. The language used frequently negates
the evolutionary relationships among species and among their behavioral
patterns. It also obscures differences among species and their behavior and
leads to superficial analyses in which similarities are emphasized, and the
significance of the differences is overlooked.
Thornhill and Palmer analyze human rape in zoomorphic terms. “Mate
choice” involved in human woman/man relationships is assumed to be
based on the same processes as those in animals, ignoring the sociosocietal
processes underlying the development of the human relationship. In a sim-
ilar confusion of an appropriate comparison, they attribute human char-
acteristics to the precopulatory activities of animals. This results in the
presentation of a primarily anthropomorphic description of animal behav-
ior and a zoomorphic description of human rape behavior.
Human reproductive behavior is continuous with the hormonal, enzy-
matic, and protein processes of other animals. However, the interconnect-
edness of societal processes with these biochemical and physiological
processes results in activities that are discontinuous with those of the so-
cial behavior to which the reproductive behavior of mammals is related.
An irritable husband’s beating his wife whom he impregnated by rape
bears little relationship to the reproductive behavior of other mammals, or
primates. The production of “breeder women” (e.g., in slavery) to provide
additional group members is equally discontinuous with the reproductive
behavior of other animals.
Attention to such continuities and discontinuities can suggest appropri-
ate levels of analysis for understanding human behavior. An attempt to un-
derstand human rape by consideration of different levels of function and
of the continuities and discontinuities in evolved patterns can avoid the fal-
lacies of zoomorphism and anthropomorphism.

1 Rape: A discontinuity in evolution of reproductive behavior The hy-

pothesis of Thornhill and Palmer is that rape is evolutionarily adaptive.
If, in fact, it does not improve reproductive success, it is maladaptive. Un-
til the data are in, the issue is unresolved.
If one were to approach the problem from a consideration of continuity
and discontinuity of evolved patterns of behavior, the obvious continuity
 Understanding Rape 113

in reproductive behavior is that in all vertebrates (and especially in mam-

mals and primates), the neuroanatomic pathways and neurotransmitter
functions expressed in aggressive and reproductive behavior share many
structural and biochemical features (Rauch et al. 1999; Yoshimura and
Kimura 1991). In many species, aggressive behavior is part of the eventual
conjugation of gametic material; aggression is in effect part of the process
of sexual activity, that is, preconjugational activity. The complementary
effect of the two processes, the facilitative effect of one on the other may
have played a vital role in the evolution of some species (Tinbergen 1974).
For example, aggressive activity promotes gonadal growth in some species.
The complex interplay between the two behavioral patterns is distinctively
different in different species, and the evolutionary processes that bring the
diversity about are not clear. That their relationship may reflect the type of
social organization of the species is possible.
Shared structural-functional relationships in aggression and sexual be-
havior are continuous in the evolution of many species. The relationship
between shared structures and functions and the relative significance of
aggression in sexual behavior differs among species. This is the disconti-
nuity of the shared relationship. In other words, the facilitatory effect of
aggression on the biochemistry (hormones, structures) of reproduction
may be less in one species than in another, and this may be related to other
factors, such as social organization, ecological processes, and so on.

2 Sociosocietal pathology expressed in an individual The greatest dis-

continuity in the integration of aggression and copulation activity is seen
on the human level when the two are integrated in a new way. Nonhuman
animals can perform many activities before copulation, including: “gift”
giving, touching, vocalization, “dances,” and so on. (The seeming conti-
nuity of these activities with human activities is reflected in the anthropo-
morphic terms that biological behavioral scientists use to denote them.)
The intersensory integration of sensorimotor pathways preliminary to ac-
tual copulation may be exapted as the species becomes more dependent on
central neural systems in reproductive behavior (Rosenblatt 1974; Aron-
son 1974), so that the sensorimotor integrations in precopulatory behav-
ior in animals other than humans becomes the fine art of presexual
foreplay on the human level.
114 Ethel Tobach and Rachel Reed

Although precopulatory behavior in humans is termed “foreplay,” many

elements of “playful aggression” may be involved (Pomeroy 1969; Fou-
cault 1985). When the aggression ceases to be playful and becomes the
preeminent activity required for sexual activity, some sort of behavioral
dysfunction is involved.
That aggression and sexuality share many of the same hormonal and
neural processes is not unusual, as other behavioral pathways are inter-
dependent; for example, cognitive and emotional activities also overlap.
However, in the case of aggression and sexuality, the significance of the
interconnectedness of the two pathways is embedded in the psychosocial
development of the individual in a way that has a direct bearing on the
sociosocietal process in which women and men relate to each other. The
literature frequently raises the issue of misogyny as a fundamental pro-
cess in the rapist’s behavior (Malamuth, Heavey, and Linz 1993; Sheffield
1997). This is not a necessary process in rape, as people may rape for many
reasons, such as peer pressure, feelings about a particular person rather
than a category of people. Misogyny may be sufficient to engender rape,
however. The necessary process is the sociopathic inability to respond
to the behavior of the victim in a way that is socially healthy for both
individuals.
The psychopathology of sexual offenders has been studied by many
(Milton 1997; Firestone et al. 2000); Groth and Birnbaum (1985) wrote
that “Rape is always a symptom of some psychological dysfunction.”
The suggestion that rape is pathological does not necessarily place it
in the rubric of individual psychopathology based on genetic, hormonal,
or organismic variation. Rather, it reflects pathological conditions of
society that become translated into an individual’s pathology in which
the patterns of aggression become dominant over the patterns of sexual-
ity. The sociosocietal pathology is the relationship between women and
men in which men are socialized to believe that they are “entitled” to
satisfy their desire for sex, and that they are “entitled” to have and dem-
onstrate control of women by engaging in aggressive activities (Hill and
Fischer 2001).
Individuals growing up in this sociosocietal setting develop conceptual-
izations about societally derived acceptable behavioral patterns. How
these concepts are expressed in individual behavior is a characteristic of
ontogenic experience. The assumption that there is such a process of tran-
 Understanding Rape 115

sition from a societal pattern to an individual pattern requires careful for-

mulation and testing. There is always the possibility of individuals who are
dysfunctional because of biochemical or neurophysiological disease and
who are extremely aggressive both in and out of sexual activity.
Some believe that rape is psychopathology, on the basis of a Freudian
analysis of the behavior. Rada (1978) writes that “Biological, psycholog-
ical and social factors contribute to the commission of rape, but none,
alone, is sufficient to a complete understanding of the cause of rape or the
motivation of the rapist” (p. 22). Furthermore, Rada argues, “Rape is a
crime of control, power, and dominance. . . . In this sense, the aggressive
component appears to be more dominant in rape than the sexual compo-
nent. In fact, for many rapists the sexual act itself appears to be less im-
portant than the ritual of the rape event, which is more often carefully
planned than impulsive” (p. 24).

II Scientific Method

A Database
A critical examination of rape as derived from natural selection or other
evolutionary processes requires valid and reliable information about the
activity. We offer some material demonstrating the difficulty in obtaining
such information.

1 Conceptualizing definitions As the data concerning rape are gath-

ered by many different agents, the definition used becomes a significant
factor in the information obtained. A definition that is generally accepted
by individuals, agencies, governments, and legal instruments is a necessary
tool. The fact that there is no universally accepted definition of rape re-
quires investigation. It may be that the need for a single definition has not
been clearly established, or that societal attitudes and values prevent es-
tablishing such a definition; in the United States, the disagreement about
what constitutes state and federal rights may be involved.
Theoreticians formulate their own definitions. Thornhill and Palmer
discuss the definition of rape as a societally based tool (pp. 150–152). As
humans are elaborating the concept in a societal process (scientific re-
search), it is important to identify the societal philosophy, the societal ac-
tivity of the definers of the concept. Although Thornhill and Palmer decry
116 Ethel Tobach and Rachel Reed

the use of definition as a societal tool, it is clear that their definition is

an expression of their philosophy concerning an activity that has a partic-
ular societal significance. They define rape in their glossary as “copulation
resisted to the best of the victim’s ability unless such resistance would
probably result in death or injury to the victim or in death or injury to in-
dividuals the victim commonly protects” (p. 210). On p. 37, they add to
the definition—the “production of an ejaculate” that is “place[d] in a fe-
male’s vagina.” The emphasis is on reproduction and on copulation that
will have the benefit of producing offspring.
Recognizing that the activity of defining rape is indeed a societal pro-
cess, we base our definition of rape on the concept of sexual autonomy
(Schulhofer 1998) because the activity on which we are focusing is an
activity of humans, a social activity, and a societal activity. It is societal
because it is related to rules set down by the society in which it takes
place. This differentiates it from the anthropomorphic definition of rape in
nonhuman animals, a social process without any relationship to societal
rules. The significance of the societal situation in which the sexual assault
takes place is an important aspect of the definition of rape. In a study by
Eigenberg (2000), the correctional officers’ definitions were blurred by
their views about homosexuality so that male rape was considered con-
sensual sex, and the victim was blamed.
We, therefore, define rape as any action on the part of one person to
violate the sexual autonomy of another by penetration, no matter the ex-
tent of penetration, of the penis, finger, tongue or foreign object into the
vagina, anus, or mouth of the other. Violation of sexual autonomy denotes
the act took place without mutual consent. Absence of consent is the nec-
essary component of rape.
As the biologist (Thornhill) and the anthropologist (Palmer) (both hu-
man sociobiologists) base their evolutionary definition of rape on the re-
productive success of the act, they narrow the human scope of the activity.
In this way, they exclude all other activities that violate sexual autonomy,
which signifies consent, such as unwanted touching, voyeurism, exposing
genitalia, sexual harassment, stalking, obscene telephone calls, and so on.
As these activities would be termed facultative responses (p. 18) leading to
the achievement of the primary goal of preserving the offender’s genes in
the generation (reproductive success), the data necessary to support their
 Understanding Rape 117

view would require gathering information about whether an offender car-

rying out such activities was a “successful” rapist.
Not all rapists engage in all forms of sexual autonomy violation, but
those who violate sexual autonomy in other ways are likely to become rap-
ists (Saunders, Awad, and White 1986). Most theoreticians, including both
genetic determinists and those who are not genetic determinists, would
agree that the course of sexual crime is highly individualistic. The indi-
viduality of the behavior reflects the total experience of the individual: the
biochemistry (genes and hormones) and the physiological/psychological
developmental history. Studying the interdependency of these processes
is a necessary research commitment that is given lip service by many
theoreticians.

2 Definitions used in producing databases As much of the data are ob-

tained from societal agencies dealing with crime and law, we present tables
5.1 and 5.2, which give brief statements of legal statutes by state pertain-
ing to force or consent, and to type of penetration, thus yielding different
definitions of rape (National Sexual Violence Research Center 2000). The
variations are clearly apparent. State rape laws may be divided into four
general categories: forcible compulsion; against the victim’s will; without
consent I; and without consent II. (Definitions are given in the tables.)
Without consent II is the only criterion that does not rely on force or re-
sistance, and comes closest to defining rape as “sex without consent.” Un-
fortunately, this criterion is used in only seven of the fifty states as part of
the definition of rape; in some states, sex without consent in which force
or resistance is not demonstrated constitutes a crime of a lesser degree than
rape. This variation means that the data on which any discussion is based
are likely to be idiosyncratic. It is important to keep this caveat in mind in
all discussions, including ours.

3 Some sources of data Rape definitions vary not only among states,
but among studies, some including only certain types of penetration com-
mitted against certain people (e.g., women).
The Uniform Crime Report (UCR), coordinated by the FBI, is an annual
compilation of crime statistics voluntarily submitted by law enforcement
agencies in each state (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1997). The UCR
Table 5.1
How State Statutes Define Rape

Forcible Against Without Without

States Compulsion Will Consent 1 Consent 2

Alabama x
Alaska x
Arizona x
Arkansas x
California x x
Colorado x x
Connecticut x
Delaware x1
Florida x
Georgia x x
Hawaii x
Idaho x1
Illinois x
Indiana x
Iowa x x
Kansas x
Kentucky x
Louisiana x1
Maine x
Maryland x x
Massachusetts x x
Michigan x
Minnesota x
Mississippi *See below
Missouri x
Montana x
Nebraska x1 x
Nevada x
New Hampshire x x
New Jersey x
New Mexico x
New York x
North Carolina x x
North Dakota x1
Ohio x1
Table 5.1 continued

Forcible Against Without Without

States Compulsion Will Consent 1 Consent 2

Oklahoma x
Oregon x
Pennsylvania x**
Rhode Island x
South Carolina x
South Dakota x
Tennessee x x
Texas x
US Code x
Utah x x
Vermont x
Virginia x x
Washington, D.C. x x2
Washington x1 x2
West Virginia x1
Wisconsin x x2
Wyoming x

Forcible Compulsion Physical force or threat of physical force, express or im-

plied, that places a person in fear of death, physical injury to self or another person,
fear of the kidnapping of self or another person, or fear of another criminal offense.
Against Will “Against the victim’s will” is typically accompanied by the use of
force; however, it is not specifically defined.
Without Consent 1 Lack of consent in conjunction with the use or threat of force.
Without Consent 2 Lack of consent need not be accompanied by use or threat of
force. The victim must demonstrate lack of consent with words or other conduct.
x1 The statute mentions resistance, either to the utmost or a lesser degree, as a
criterion necessary to prove lack of consent. The requirement of resistance may
be waived if reasonable force or threat of force is present.
x2 In these states, lack of consent not accompanied by force or threat of force
constitutes a crime of lesser degree; a felony or a misdemeanor.
* Mississippi, based on available information, does not appear to define sexual
assault in terms similar to other states. The statute does, however, stress the im-
portance of a victim’s chaste character and requires corroborated testimony.
** In defining forcible compulsion, the Pennsylvania statute includes physical,
intellectual, moral, emotional, and psychological force, either express or implied.
Table 5.2
Types of Penetration in Rape Statutes

Criteria Not
Penetration Type of Intercourse Other Given

However All Penile Semen Vaginal Typical Male

States Slight Types of Only Emission1 Intercourse vs Deviate to Female Oral2 Objects3

Alabama x x x

Arizona x
Alaska x
Arkansas x
California x
Colorado x
Connecticut x x x
Delaware x x x
Florida x
Georgia x x
Hawaii x
Idaho x x x
Illinois x
Indiana x
Iowa x
Kansas x x x
Kentucky x x x
Table 5.2 continued

Criteria Not
Penetration Type of Intercourse Other Given

However All Penile Semen Vaginal Typical Male

States Slight Types of Only Emission1 Intercourse vs Deviate to Female Oral2 Objects3

Louisiana x x x
Maine x
Maryland x x x x
Massachusetts x
Michigan x
Minnesota x
Mississippi x x x
Missouri x
Montana x
Nebraska x x x
Nevada x x
New Hampshire x x x
New Jersey x x
New Mexico x x x
New York x x x
North Carolina x x x x
North Dakota x x x
Ohio x x x
Table 5.2 continued

Criteria Not
Penetration Type of Intercourse Other Given

However All Penile Semen Vaginal Typical Male

States Slight Types of Only Emission1 Intercourse vs Deviate to Female Oral2 Objects3

Oklahoma x x
Oregon x x x x
Pennsylvania x x x x
Rhode Island x x x
South Carolina x x
South Dakota x x
Tennessee x x x
Texas x x x
US Code x x
Utah x
Vermont x x
Virginia x
Washington, D.C. x x
Washington x x
West Virginia x x
Wisconsin x x x
Wyoming x x x

1. Semen emission is not required for penetration

2. Oral penetration is not included in the statute
3. Penetration with an object is not included in the statute
 Understanding Rape 123

uses only certain criteria: rapes against females; rapes of victims 18 years
old or older; penile-vaginal penetration. As tables 5.1 and 5.2 show, all
include penile-vaginal penetration as “rape,” but the data they collect as
“rape” include other activities.
The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) is sponsored by the
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice
Statistics (Greenfield 1997) and is an ongoing census that estimates the
number of underreported serious crimes nationwide. They randomly se-
lect households (50,000) yielding more than 100,000 individual respon-
dents to ask about sexual assaults. These include forced sexual intercourse
where the victim may be either female or male; where the offender may be
of the same sex or a different sex than the victim; unwanted sexual con-
tact; and threats and attempts to commit such offenses.
The National Women’s Study (NWS) funded by the National Institute
of Drug Abuse (Kilpatrick et al. 2000) interviewed a national probability
sample of 4,008 adult women in a three-year longitudinal study. They
defined rape as “an event that occurred without the woman’s consent, in-
volved the use of force or threat of force, and involved sexual penetration
of the victim’s vagina, mouth or rectum.” This study addresses the con-
cerns of the victims and the demographics of the victim and the offender.
They also report the effect of laws prohibiting disclosure of victims’ names
and the impact of this on rape reporting.
The National Violence against Women Survey (NVAWS) was funded by
the National Institute of Justice and the Center for Disease Control, 1995
to 1999 (Tjaden and Thoennes 2000; Kilpatrick et al. 2000). This sur-
vey used the same screening questions as those in the NWS. This study
addressed the psychological, emotional, physical, and financial effects of
rape on the survivor, and the demographics of the victim and the offender.
The National Survey of Adolescents, funded by the National Institute
of Justice, conducted interviews with a national household probability
sample of teenagers aged 12 to 17. These interviews deal with sexual as-
saults and other crimes.

4 Reporting of rape Accurate numbers are hard to come by for another

reason: underreporting. Based on information from the UCR and the
NCVS, the FBI stated that the incidence of rape is approximately 100,000
124 Ethel Tobach and Rachel Reed

rapes a year, but only one in ten rapes is reported to the police (Federal
Bureau of Investigation 1982). It should be noted that the FBI reported
96,122 rapes in 1997, a decrease that is being widely discussed today (Kil-
patrick et al. 2000). The NCVS found that 32 percent of sexual assault
cases were reported to police in 1994 (Kilpatrick and Saunders 1996).
Koss (1990) reported that only 7 percent of rapes are reported to police.
In a study done by the University of South Carolina (1992), 16 percent of
rapes and sexual assaults were reported to the police (Kilpatrick et al.
1992).
The UCR report (1982) cautions that “forcible rape is still recognized
as one of the most underreported of all index [UCR felony crimes] crimes.
Victims’ fear of their assailants and their embarrassment over the inci-
dent are just two factors that can affect their decisions to contact law
enforcement.”
Men who are raped are unlikely to report the event (Mitchell et al. 1999).
These investigators cite the reasons for the reluctance of men to report
being raped in the studies by Groth and Burgess (1980) and Kaufman
et al. (1980): fear that they would not be believed; fear that their sexual
orientation would be questioned; distress and embarrassment. In a 1999
report by Pino, men were found less likely to report rape victimization
than women.
The nonexistence of laws that prohibit the reporting of victims’ names
is another factor that leads to the underreporting of data. Kilpatrick et al.
(1992) report that “Half of rape victims surveyed (50%) stated that they
would be a lot more likely to report rapes to the police if there was a law
prohibiting news media from getting and disclosing their names and ad-
dresses” (p. 16).
Inexperience with sexual activity led 73 percent of college women
whose sexual experience satisfied the definition of sexual assault (includ-
ing rape) according to the Ohio Penal Code to consider themselves not vic-
tims of rape (Koss et al. 1987). As Donat and White (2000) point out
cultural mores and myths may well affect the women’s concept of rape or
sexual assault, leading to denial of the event.
Self-blame and denial were responsible for only 5 percent of one sample
reporting the incident to police, and for 42 percent not mentioning the in-
cident to any other person (Warsaw 1998).
 Understanding Rape 125

B Rape and Human Sociobiology

1 Assumptions in human sociobiology’s definition of rape Understand-

ing the act of rape as it involves the two sexes is sufficient to understand-
ing all types of human rape. Acts in which (1) no penetration of any part
of the body takes place, (2) no semen is produced, and (3) variations in
the copulatory act occur would not be considered rape. Therefore, the evo-
lutionary history or significance of those types of activity would not be
examined.
In human sociobiology, rape is defined as passing the semen on to a po-
tential mother. To test this assumption, relevant facts about the rape would
have to be ascertained, that is, that semen was actually produced and
transmitted. This is not always possible. Therefore, it may be necessary to
infer the facts by indirection, as by resulting pregnancies and births. Such
data are also difficult to obtain.

2 Issues of reproductive success and rape The contribution of rape

copulation to reproductive success, as evidenced by offspring that remain
viable to the point of their being able to reproduce, would appear to be
negligible. Thornhill and Palmer themselves propose that the rate of
pregnancy after rape is probably 2 percent, far below the rate of pregnancy
after planned and consensual copulation. Krueger in her article on preg-
nancy resulting from rape (1988) cites nine studies dating from 1970 to
1983. The listing in her report shows that the percentages of rapes result-
ing in pregnancy range from .6 percent (1971) to 10 percent (1978). The
median percentage is 2 to 4 percent.
That pregnancy places women at higher risk for both physical and
sexual abuse (including rape) by their partners who are presumably
responsible for the pregnancy is described by Bergen (1999) in her ar-
ticle on marital rape. In a population of adolescents pregnant as a re-
sult of sexual assault, the women were physically traumatized by the
boyfriend or spouse during the pregnancy in 80 percent of the cases (Be-
renson et al. 1992). Gessner and Perham-Hester (1999) working with
a population of 200 women in Alaska reported that mothers less than
18 years of age were more likely to experience violence after pregnancy
than women who were 18 to 19 years of age and that the percentage of
126 Ethel Tobach and Rachel Reed

women who reported experiencing violence each week increased follow-

ing pregnancy.
The establishment of accurate data about the relationship between rape
and pregnancy is further complicated by cultural factors. Koss et al.
(1987) report that approximately 15 percent to 18 percent of rape victims
become pregnant. In a more recent study, Stewart and Trussell (2000)
report that in 1998, the estimated number of rapes was 333,000 with
25,000 pregnancies, or approximately 8 percent. Koss et al. (1987) con-
trast these figures with a finding of 5 percent of such cases in the United
States. In this same chapter, Koss et al. report that in Lima, Peru, where
abortions are illegal, 90 percent of young mothers 12 to 16 years of age
delivered a child as a result of rape.
The practice of abortion in the course of human evolution and history
should not be overlooked. However, it is not possible to write a history of
rape, pregnancy, and abortion during early hominid evolution. The need
for hands to assist in presedentation survival activities may have been a
factor in such reproductive activity and control. Ancient agrarian societies
probably promoted increases in population whether reproduction was
consensual or not. With the establishment of philosophical and religious
concepts, reproductive regulation in regard to procreation, birth control,
rape, and legality or illegality of sexual activity became factors in measur-
ing reproductive success. These historical issues are not featured in socio-
biology or evolutionary psychology discussions of rape.
The possibility of abortion also affects the data of possible pregnancy
and viability of offspring. In a review by Krueger in 1988, the number of
reports of pregnancies after rape was affected by abortion laws, as many
of the victims sought financial help in obtaining abortions. In the study
carried out by Holmes et al. (1996) and cited by Thornhill and Palmer
(p. 100), 62 percent of the pregnancies were aborted either spontaneously
or medically, 32 percent of the offspring were kept by the mother, while
6 percent were placed for adoption. Access to abortion could very well af-
fect the decision of the victim and the rapist about ensuing pregnancies.
The need for such data is not considered in human sociobiology.
A historical phenomenon illustrates the significance of societal pro-
cesses for the practice of rape. As documented by Susan Brownmiller
(1975), during slavery in the United States, rape was practiced as an eco-
nomic tool to increase the number of offspring that could be worked or
 Understanding Rape 127

sold (“breeder women,” pp. 166–168). Slavery was a socioeconomic sys-

tem in the sociobiological model of reproductive success.

3 Sociobiological discussions of rape and sexuality Human sociobiol-

ogists use the term “sexuality” to denote an evolved activity pattern to ad-
vance the reproductive success of the organism. This activity pattern based
on biochemistry (genes, hormones) and physiology differs in each organ-
ism so that feminine sexuality and masculine sexuality are expressed in
different ways.
The use of the term “sexuality” or “sex” in connection with rape occa-
sions debates. Human sociobiologists see sexuality, sex, at the root of rape.
Some nonsociobiologists may also view sexuality as an evolved pattern
based on biochemistry and physiology, and view the sexuality of women
and men as being different. However, it is possible to view sexuality as a
sociosocietal process that is not necessarily associated with producing
offspring who will represent one’s genes in ensuing generations. Sexuality,
like other pleasures (activities sought out and engaged in for long periods
of time and repeatedly) such as athletics, music, doing science, or dancing,
are part of human sociosocietal behavior. The human sociobiologist sees
such pleasures as having evolved for the purpose of ensuring progeny
that will carry the genes into ensuing generations. However, here the fact
that such activities frequently result in progeny does not give any evi-
dence that they are related; to assume causality is to repeat the logical
error of post hoc, ergo propter hoc. The “sexuality” of the nonsociobiol-
ogist relates to the concept of sexual autonomy, and anything that destroys
or threatens that autonomy is nonpleasurable; that is, rape, which above all
is nonconsensual. The debate between the two approaches to rape rests on
this difference in viewing sexuality.
The automatic acceptance of the validity of the human sociobiological
assumptions leads to a lack of data and discussion in the document pro-
duced by Thornhill and Palmer. There is no recognition of the changing so-
cietal practices in regard to homophilic sex activity, the lowering of the age
at which sexual activity is undertaken by both sexes with the concomitant
likelihood of nonreproductive sexual activity, and the increase in the oc-
currence of sexual activity without a reproductive base, stimulated by var-
ious cultural agencies, aided by the development of abortifacents and
other means of birth control.
128 Ethel Tobach and Rachel Reed

C Causal Inference and Logical Fallacies

Despite the apparent difficulty in obtaining valid and reliable data about
the incidence and demographics of rape in its many forms, it is apparent
that some general characteristics, for example, age and sex of the offend-
ers and the victims, are consonant in the reports of various agencies. The
existence of such data does not provide information about the causal pro-
cesses involved in the activity. To infer causality from such data is a logical
error; that is, to say that if more men than women rape, it is something
about the men that causes them to do that; or to say if more women are
victims, it is something about the women that causes them to be victims.
Assembling facts is insufficient. Relevant assumptions need to be stated,
formulated, and tested. The formulation of the research questions should
be patent. The methods by which the facts are obtained should be replic-
able. The questions asked about the data and how the answers are ob-
tained need to be clear.
The problem with posing evolutionary processes as causal is that it is
difficult to construct hypotheses that can be tested in the usual experi-
mental fashion. Experiments based on Mendelian genetics, behavior ge-
netics, molecular genetics—all work by inference: If change occurs
concomitantly with an operation by the experimenter, a correlational
statement may be made. Despite the fact that the limitations of such an
analysis are well known, the lure of inferences about possible causes leads
one to reify such correlations and make assumptions about their having
demonstrated an agency (Nagel 1961).
As most of the data offered by the human sociobiologists are correla-
tional in character, it is worthwhile reviewing what Cohen and Nagel
(1934) say about other statistical errors that are frequently made in corre-
lational thinking. Although Cohen and Nagel are writing about the actual
calculation of correlational coefficients from quantitative measures, much
of their warnings apply equally to the use of correlational data of a rela-
tively quantitative/qualitative nature.
Another problem with sociobiological hypotheses is that observations
of events, which are not necessarily set up as experiments, are seen as sug-
gestive of causality, or some understanding of an agency in the observed
results. This is a frequently seen logical fallacy, post hoc, ergo propter hoc:
the assumption that whatever follows an event is therefore caused by it.
Cohen and Nagel (1934, p. 379) describe “A material fallacy” as one that
 Understanding Rape 129

“denote[s] false claims or illusions of proof. Whether the A that follows

event B is caused by it, is a question of fact and not merely of logic.”
Thornhill and Palmer might consider these dangers in their readiness to
place great confidence in correlations without further research to deter-
mine the processes of causal relationships among the characteristics they
chose to correlate. This cannot be done by calling on the very criteria by
which they chose the characteristics, that is, the criteria of the tenets of
evolutionary psychology and sociobiology: “Coefficients of correlation
. . . may be defined so generally that any two groups may be examined for
their degree of correlation, even if we know on other grounds that the two
groups are in fact independent of each other. [They] may be consistent
with more than one hypothesis” (p. 317). Cohen and Nagel ask: Which
correlation shall take precedence? Further, they claim that “It is very
easy to commit an error in believing there is a significant connection be-
tween two types of events on the basis that they are frequently associated”
(p. 318), and that “Obvious difficulties arise when we make comparisons
on the basis of units or classifications which do not retain the same value
or meaning for the different groups compared” (p. 320). This is another
reason for not mixing comparisons of species without taking into account
the differences between them. Finally, “Adding numbers of comparisons
as bolstering the causal relations of correlations” (p. 317) is not recom-
mended by Cohen and Nagel.
The problem with constructing narratives about evolutionary processes
involved in the activities of individuals or species is the lack of information
about events that have left no record useful for data analysis. Inferences
may be made from environmental changes that have left a record in inani-
mate aspects of the planet, in fossils and so on, but these are open to de-
bate based on other narratives and inferences. The reliance on molecular
genetic relations among species available to us through fossil material still
bases behavioral analysis on the assumption that the contemporary or-
ganisms are reliable substitutes for the extinct organisms. That DNA/RNA
configurations are insufficient to provide a precise basis for behavioral
analysis is evident in the newly emerging recognition that having the maps
of nucleotide configurations tells us little about the relationship between
them and the proteins (proteomics) that develop through their own and
their nucleotide activities (Blattner et al. 1997).
130 Ethel Tobach and Rachel Reed

The data from which the human sociobiologists construct their hy-
potheses about the relationship between contemporary human activity
and the activity of earlier species is based primarily on correlation. Does
this mean that there is no way to study the evolutionary processes that
were involved in human behavioral evolution? For some the answer lies in
seeking biochemical, physiological activity or other continuity between
other species and the human species. Such continuities are helpful in un-
derstanding some of the evolutionary processes. However, a focus on con-
tinuities without an appreciation of the discontinuities obviates an
understanding of the diversity of species, and the diversity among individ-
uals within a species.
The comparative method examines the differences among individuals
and species as well as the similarities. We have tried to illustrate this in our
discussion of rape based on an evolutionary, developmental, and compar-
ative approach by discussing the continuities and discontinuities of pro-
cesses on biochemical, behavioral, and societal levels.

III Conceptualizations of Science and Societal Responsibility of

Scientists

A War Rape: A Trial for Human Sociobiology

Rape is a psychosocial and societal process related to human history in
many ways. In the development of the concept of war, possessions and so-
cietal stratification included the institution of slavery and the commodifi-
cation of women, so that in the spoils of victory, not only land and objects
but also women were the entitlement of the victors.
Thornhill and Palmer’s discussion of war is in terms of cost-benefit anal-
ysis based on the human sociobiological hypothesis that masculine sexu-
ality operates to guarantee that his genes will be preserved in ensuing
generations. Thus, in wars, rape is an accepted activity organized by those
in charge of the men, and for the individual soldier, rape represents an op-
portunity to engage in sexual activity without the woman’s consent.
The human sociobiological approach to war rape attests to logical diffi-
culties of defining rape under all circumstances as related to reproductive
success. The military leaders in charge of organized rape as an “entitle-
ment” for the soldiers are not concerned with the result of the rapes, in
terms of increasing the population under their control. Rather they see
 Understanding Rape 131

their programs of rape as evidence of their power, their victory; they be-
lieve that men need to engage in sexual activity because of their drive (in-
stinct), an expression of an ethological concept. Those in control of these
inhuman programs are not necessarily aware of any theoretical base for
their activity, but society has presented them with these ideas.
One is reminded of Klausewitz’s definition of war as an extension of so-
cial policy. An article in the New York Times demonstrates this societal
process (Simons 2001, p. 4). The arrangement was made for such activity
to take place during the Bosnian war. The lawyers for the defense of the
soldiers responsible for the enslavement of women not only for sexual ac-
tivity but for housekeeping chores declared that the prosecution did not
prove that the alleged victims of rape were exposed to any severe physical
or psychological suffering. As a defense, these lawyers offered that this
was so because some of the women had liked the soldiers. Chief defense
counsel S. Prodanovic said that “The rape in itself is not an act that inflicts
severe bodily pain.” (p. 4) During the trial of the men accused of rape and
enslavement, it was revealed that not only was the teenager in one family
raped many times by many men, but her mother was also raped. In some
cases the women were forced to give birth to the infants conceived as a re-
sult of the rape. There are no records of what happened to those children
and whether the men responsible were concerned for the condition of the
infants.
It is difficult to contemplate obtaining data about the cost-benefit anal-
ysis of the behavior of the men involved in such a situation. Reports of men
being raped in war situations in El Salvador, Croatia, and Greece (Carlson
1997) present similar problems for testing any hypotheses that might be
generated by human sociobiology.
The issue of reproductive success in those activities is equally problem-
atic. In Algeria, abortions are prohibited, and the fate of the women and
possible births that may have taken place as a result of the war is probably
unrecorded. In Uganda, Liberia, and Myanmar, the acting out of the en-
titlement of soldiers to rape results in equally horrendous situations. The
case of the “comfort women” maintained by Japanese soldiers has added
to the impetus for the United Nations to seek justice and help for the
people who have been victimized. Some sovereign nations still do not rec-
ognize war rape as a crime, and though various international commissions
and instruments, including the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, list war
132 Ethel Tobach and Rachel Reed

rape as an international crime, action to control this behavior and render

justice to the victims has been slow and incomplete.

B Feminist Research
Thornhill and Palmer’s discussion of feminist research and social science
research requires consideration of the concepts of science and social re-
sponsibility of scientists. There is an honorable and ongoing history of the
need for scientists to be conscious of the need to be accountable and
responsible for their work (Tobach 1994). This is especially true because
of the esteem with which they are generally held in contemporary society.
This responsibility requires that we attempt to formally acknowledge the
thinking that informs our activity in the scientific community and present
it as part of that activity. For that reason, some thoughts about feminism,
feminist science, sexism, and sexist science are presented here.
Feminism is a movement. Like other societal movements, it includes
concerted, organized activities working toward or shaping some objective.
That objective is to guarantee equity for women within a commitment to
societal equity for all humans, regardless of race, ethnicity, sexual orien-
tation, class, or religious belief. People of any gender or persuasion may
participate in that movement.
A feminist is a participant in that movement. Participation is variable
and diverse. A scientist, for example, a comparative psychologist, can in-
tegrate a commitment to that movement with activities in the scientific
community (Tobach 1994).
Sexism is the practice of exclusionary, discriminatory, and exploitative
activities designed to place women in a debased condition. Such activities
are practiced in every aspect of human life, including scientific work. “Sex-
ist” is the adjective describing such activities.
The significant term in the above narrative is “scientist.” There is no con-
tradiction between being a feminist and a scientist. The best scientist is so-
cietally and scientifically responsible for the work done in the name of
science. Being societally responsible commits the scientist to a conscious-
ness about equity for all humans.
Thornhill and Palmer discuss their views of the responses to their the-
ory about rape in terms of “social science.” The history of the acceptance
of studies in social and societal activity as “science” reflects the rich, com-
plex interdependence of societal processes and human knowledge. Evalu-
 Understanding Rape 133

ation of the scholarship and research of members of the scientific com-

munity requires attention to the publications, the available documentation
of that thinking and research, no matter what the area of scholarship.
Thornhill and Palmer dismiss critics as feminists or poor (social) scientists.
However, their replies to them for the most part fall back on the initial as-
sumptions of the theory of evolution they espouse.
Thornhill and Palmer say: “Science has nothing to say about what is
right or wrong in the ethical sense. Biology provides understanding, not
justification, of human behavior. . . . It is our hope that concerned people
will . . . use . . . the knowledge that evolutionary biology provides . . . to
reduce the incidence of rape and to better deal with this horrendous
crime” (p. 199).
The people who hold to a human sociobiological ideology are very
likely to be involved as citizens in attempts to solve these problems, as are
nonsociobiologists. Perhaps the scientific work that we do should con-
tribute to those efforts in some way.
Thornhill and Palmer are critical of the hypothesis that rape and other
misogynist activities reflect the status of women in society. The testing of
that hypothesis would be a worthwhile effort that could only have some
beneficial results. If the experiment were to be conducted by providing
women with equity in all phases of life, and if rapes were to continue, and
if wars were to continue, at least the problem of exclusionary policies to-
ward women would be ameliorated.

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6
Pop Sociobiology Reborn: The Evolutionary
Psychology of Sex and Violence
A. Leah Vickers and Philip Kitcher

1 Introduction: A Dismal History

Here’s a recipe for winning fame and fortune as an architect of the new-
and-improved human sciences. First, make a bundle of claims to the effect
that certain features are universal among human beings, or among human
males, or among human females. Next, couple each claim with a story of
how the pertinent features were advantageous for primitive hominids, or
males, or females, as they faced whatever challenges you take to have been
prevalent in some lightly sketched savannah environment. (Don’t worry
that your knowledge of past environments is rather thin—be creative!) Fi-
nally, announce that each feature in the bundle has been shaped by natu-
ral selection and so corresponds to something very deep in human nature
(male human nature, female human nature), something that may be over-
lain with a veneer of culture but that molds our behavior and the forms of
our societies. Accompany everything with hymns to the genius of Darwin,
broadsides against “blank slate” views of the human mind, and vigorous
denunciations of the lack of rigor and clarity that has hitherto reigned in
the human sciences.
In the second half of the twentieth century, three major movements tried
to follow this recipe. First came animal ethology with stirring yarns about
naked apes and territorial imperatives. These stories were recast by the sec-
ond wave, as human sociobiology drew more systematically on the re-
sources of contemporary evolutionary theory. In the 1960s and 1970s, the
integration of mathematical models with field observations enabled stu-
dents of animal behavior to advance, support, and refine detailed theories
about caste structure in social insects (Oster and Wilson 1978), copulation
140 A. Leah Vickers and Philip Kitcher

in dungflies (Parker 1978), and the mating structures of red deer (Clutton-
Brock et al. 1981). Successes like these inspired the ambitious to propose
that kindred insights could be achieved with respect to our own species:
They claimed that human beings are, by nature, xenophobic and “ab-
surdly easy to indoctrinate,” that human societies are inevitably stratified
by relations of power and domination, that men are fated to be fickle and
women to be coy, that human altruism is an illusion and that we can’t hope
to achieve genuine sexual equality (Wilson 1975, 1978; Barash 1979; van
den Berghe 1979). Pop sociobiology was born.
By the middle of the 1980s, the movement had attracted a barrage of
criticism. Skeptics pointed out that, in contrast with the careful studies of
nonhuman animals, the suggestions about universals of human behavior
(or male behavior, or female behavior) rested on anecdotal evidence. Fur-
thermore, pop sociobiology contented itself with telling informal stories
about advantages, instead of putting to work the mathematical tools of
evolutionary theory, painstakingly deployed by workers on deer and
dungflies. Careful work on the evolution of behavior had appreciated,
from the beginning, the need to consider alternative hypotheses and to
discriminate among them using data from evolutionary genetics, experi-
ments, comparative observation or mathematical modeling, but no such
pains were taken by the leading proponents of pop sociobiology (see, for
critique, Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin 1984; Kitcher 1985). Nor was there,
to begin with, any appreciation of the possibility that cultural transmission
might affect the traits of human beings, and when, belatedly, pop sociobi-
ology came to terms with this issue, its attempts to show that “the genes
hold culture on a leash” depended on arbitrary assignments of values to
crucial parameters (Lumsden and Wilson 1981; Maynard Smith and War-
ren 1982; Kitcher 1985, chap. 10).
Yet perhaps the most important defect lay in the conclusions, often an-
nounced with commendable regret, that certain unpleasant features were
so deeply ingrained in human nature as to be unmodifiable. Critics noted
that such conclusions cannot validly be derived from the kinds of evolu-
tionary scenarios presented (Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin 1984; Kitcher
1985). The most those scenarios could reveal is that there are pieces of
DNA that, in the particular environments encountered by our hominid
ancestors, gave rise to characteristics—competitiveness, coyness, xeno-
phobia, whatever—that proved beneficial in those environments; the sce-
 Pop Sociobiology Reborn 141

narios have no bearing on whether, under different regimes of develop-

ment, those traits would be bound to arise (nor whether they would be ad-
vantageous in these rival circumstances).
Would-be Darwinian reformers of the human sciences adopted a strat-
egy for coping with these criticisms. “Indeed,” they explained, “some so-
ciobiologists have made unwarranted claims; but our approach should not
be dismissed; we are aware of the criticisms; we have made them ourselves;
we are reformed; we have abandoned the idea that genes are destiny;
we are evolutionary psychologists, who aim to use Darwinian insights
to fathom human tendencies.” Some of them continued to insist on the
importance of the enterprise in indicating to us how we might amend un-
wanted forms of behavior. In the late 1980s, when evolutionary psychol-
ogy kept its claims modest and its head down, charity commended giving
the new movement the benefit of the doubt. But the publication of a rous-
ing revival of the pop favorites of the past (Thornhill and Thornhill 1992)
made it apparent that the old mistakes haven’t lost their allure. Evolution-
ary psychology turns out to be pop sociobiology with a fig leaf.

2 The Pop Sociobiology Revival: An Overview

We’ll try to substantiate this last accusation by looking at two of the most
prominent exhibits in the pop revival: David Buss’s proposals about male
and female sexual attractiveness and the hypotheses of Randy Thornhill
and Craig Palmer on rape (Thornhill and Palmer—henceforth T and P—
draw on Buss’s efforts, so our critique of Buss will extend to their pro-
gram). First, however, we’ll offer a more general view of the evolutionary
psychology movement.
The principal advance evolutionary psychologists take themselves to
have made consists in recognizing that natural selection doesn’t shape hu-
man behavior directly, but rather shapes the psychological mechanisms
underlying behavior. Bad old pop sociobiology supposed that natural se-
lection would favor males who were fickle and promiscuous. Thoroughly
modern Darwinian analyses recognize the need to integrate biology with
the right approach to psychology, to wit the view that the mind consists of
lots of special-purpose devices (modules)1 that prompt different forms of
behavior. Evolutionary psychology reflects on the problems and chal-
lenges faced by our hominid ancestors, generating hypotheses about the
142 A. Leah Vickers and Philip Kitcher

kinds of psychological traits natural selection has bequeathed to us. These

hypotheses are evaluated by collecting evidence from human subjects who
report their feelings and preferences in actual or imagined situations, or by
studying human behavior. Support for a psychological claim is supposed
to come from juxtaposing contemporary data with an independent Dar-
winian expectation about what kinds of ancestral tendencies would have
contributed to reproductive success.
If this is to be successful, then both the evidence collected and the Dar-
winian theorizing have to satisfy important constraints. Let’s start with the
evidence. Whether or not this consists of responses to questionnaires or
statistical patterns of behavior, it will have probative force with respect to
a hypothesis about a psychological mechanism only if that hypothesis can
be integrated with other claims about the psychology of human subjects to
generate expectations about what should be observed in the pertinent ex-
perimental or natural situations. When the mind is conceived as a bundle
of psychological capacities and dispositions that interact with one another
and that are causally affected by external cues, the psychological account
has to tell us enough about the nature of the interactions and the responses
to the cues so that we can derive specific claims about human actions. A
claim about a single trait, in splendid isolation, leaves entirely open what
sorts of behavior are to be expected—since the activity of other mecha-
nisms could override, suppress, amplify, or redirect whatever tendency is
hypothesized—and, in consequence, loose associations between hypothe-
sized psychological tendencies and a pattern of behavior should impress
nobody.
It would, of course, be unfair to ask any evolutionary psychologist to
provide us with a complete, detailed psychology. Yet if the psychological
account provided introduces a collection of capacities that might easily
prompt an agent to incompatible forms of behavior—as for example when
we’re told that people are attracted to different characteristics that regu-
larly turn up in different locations—then we can’t tell much about what
typical subjects will do. Consider preferences for various types of food. It’s
a familiar fact that someone’s actual diet may not reflect her craving for a
particular food, precisely because what she chooses to eat is a function of
several underlying psychological dispositions. So we could “protect” an
evolutionary story about universal gustatory yearnings by supposing that
the underlying tendencies are inhibited by other mechanisms. Or, to put
 Pop Sociobiology Reborn 143

the point differently, the hypothesis that human beings have evolved to
crave large hunks of red meat (say) issues no definite predictions about the
frequency of carnivorous displays in any human population.
Turning now to the specifically Darwinian part of the enterprise, we
should recognize an important point often made by John Maynard Smith:
Model-building requires attention to the details, and mathematical mod-
eling uncovers and refines hidden presuppositions. (Maynard Smith and
W. D. Hamilton are pioneering figures in evolutionary theory, on whose
work sociobiology has drawn; the illuminating work of people like Eric
Charnov, Geoffrey Parker, Peter Harvey, John Krebs, and many others
shows the salutary influence of Maynard Smith and Hamilton.) Mathe-
matical models aren’t always necessary in evolutionary work: Sometimes
alternative hypotheses can be screened out by considerations drawn from
genetics, or careful experiments, or detailed cross-species comparisons. In
human sociobiology, however, where rival hypotheses can easily be multi-
plied, where genetic ignorance is the order of the day, where many of the
experiments that might clear up controversy are rightly forbidden as un-
ethical, and where cross-specific comparisons are vulnerable to worries
about salient differences, it’s crucial that the proposals about histories
of natural selection should be formulated clearly and precisely. Pop so-
ciobiology often substituted casual stories about selective advantages
for rigorous models of selective pressures. To do better, one must know
enough about the alleged environment in which the selection process oc-
curred to be able to formulate defensible claims about reproductive costs
and benefits.
In the human case (and, quite possibly, in investigations of other
species), it’s also important to recognize the possibility of cultural trans-
mission. Since the important work of Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson
(1985), everyone interested in Darwinizing the human sciences should
have known that a population under the joint influence of natural selec-
tion and cultural transmission can exhibit characteristics different from
those of a population under the influence of natural selection alone, and
that the modes of cultural selection generating this type of deviation can
themselves be sustained under natural selection.2 Hence, even when one
works out the precise details of a hypothesis about the natural selection of
some trait, it will always be pertinent to wonder if that characteristic
144 A. Leah Vickers and Philip Kitcher

would have emerged under the joint influence of natural selection and cul-
tural transmission. In short, then, the models that reformed pop sociobi-
ologists are going to use have to be more elaborate than those used by their
counterparts pursuing nonhuman studies.
There are two theoretical points that add further difficulties to pursuing
a serious Darwinian psychology. As many leading Darwinians have de-
clared repeatedly, Darwin replaced the notion of a species as a type
with an emphasis on intraspecific variability. Perhaps, then, evolutionary
psychology’s commitment to a universal human nature is suspect. Even
though there are surely some traits that are found (almost) universally
across our species, it’s important not to suppose that universal fixation is
the norm. One can’t reply that natural selection is a homogenizing force,
for, although there are some circumstances—when the underlying genet-
ics is free from well-known complications and there’s an optimal from of
a particular trait—in which natural selection would be expected to make
one variant virtually universal, the necessary hedges can’t be disregarded.
Sometimes the genetic details make it impossible that the optimal form of
a trait should be fixed (a simple example is when the optimal trait is coded
by a heterozygote), and there are other instances in which natural selection
is expected to generate a polymorphic equilibrium (a classic case is the
hawk-dove polymorphism from elementary evolutionary game theory).
The idea of individually selected psychological capacities should also be
carefully scrutinized. For all their shortcomings, earlier pop sociobiolo-
gists did recognize that evolution has something to do with genes, and they
were frequently chastised for naive assumptions that there were genes
available to direct females to be coy or human beings in general to be xe-
nophobic. The error, here, as we’ve already remarked, was to introduce a
form of genetic determinism: If the underlying genotype generated the per-
tinent trait in the ancestral environment, then, it was assumed, it would
yield the trait in all environments. Recent pop sociobiologists, by contrast,
don’t like to talk about genes. For all their reticence, however, they can’t
avoid advancing genetic hypotheses. After all, without a genetic basis for
a trait—that is, a tendency for the underlying genotype to yield a partic-
ular phenotype in the selective environment—there can be no natural
selection. To suppose that there’s a naturally selected psychological mech-
anism for this or that—cheater detection, say, or directing young women
to swoon at the prospect of powerful older men—is to claim that there’s
 Pop Sociobiology Reborn 145

been genetic variation in some ancestral population pertinent to the pro-

pensity to perform such narrowly defined tasks. Although they don’t say
as much, they must think that there are two alleles—call them A and B—
associated in the primeval environment (or range of environments), with
a greater or lesser ability to carry out the appointed task (detect cheats or
swoon appropriately).
Let’s take a deep breath at this point. It’s worth reminding ourselves of
what genes do. Genes encode proteins. So A and B encode different pro-
teins, and, on a simple version, it seems that evolutionary psychologists are
committed to saying that these differences amount to solely and precisely
a difference in cheat-spotting-acuity or swoonability. We’re prepared to
concede that differences in proteins might show up in alternative forms of
neural chemistry, evident in psychological changes—it’s not incredible
that a modified neural receptor protein might make a mouse, or a human,
more or less good at remembering things, or slower or faster to learn.
What’s highly implausible is that changing a protein could leave all our
psychological tendencies untouched while fine-tuning the talent for cheat-
spotting or weakness at the knees at the thought of a mate with status,
power, and wealth. Until we are offered some plausible idea about mech-
anisms, we ought to dismiss these suggestions as vague speculation. The
overreaching is hidden only because the latest Darwinizers have learned
from the demise of old-style pop sociobiology: Be cagey about genetic
hypothesizing!
This is surely simplistic, and evolutionary psychologists ought to repu-
diate the words we’ve put into their mouths. A better suggestion would be
that the pertinent proteins have lots of different phenotypic consequences,
but the one that matters concerns the narrowly specified psychological dis-
position (spotting cheats, swooning appropriately). The claim, then, is
that the rival genotypes give rise to phenotypes that differ in lots of ways,
but only the evolutionary psychologist’s favorite disposition makes a seri-
ous difference to reproductive success—the rest is a wash. The fitness con-
tribution of the chosen trait swamps any correlated effects. But, lacking
any hints about the underlying genotypes, how their differences might
make neural—and therefore psychological—differences, and what impact
such overall differences might have, there’s just no reason to believe that
claim. Why should a priori guesses about the nonexistence of correlations
with selective significance serve as the basis for evolutionary analysis?
146 A. Leah Vickers and Philip Kitcher

Let’s put the point more positively. Forget the fine-grained psychological
dispositions for the moment, and ask how natural selection might shape
human psychology. Absent revolutionary proposals, the obvious answer is
that different genotypes might encode proteins that participate differently
in the reactions that underlie neural development, in the formation or
pruning of synapses, in the sensitivity to various molecular signals, or in
the speed of processes of transmission. It doesn’t follow that selective mod-
ification of genotypes would affect all aspects of our psychology. But these
considerations do suggest the real possibility that psychological phenom-
ena are genetically linked in ways about which we’re currently ignorant, so
that a particular genetic modification would produce a spectrum of psy-
chological responses, increasing some aspects of human performance and
diminishing others. If so, then hunting for the ways in which selection has
shaped such fine-grained psychological traits as a disposition to detect
cheats is an unpromising strategy, and one can’t do any serious Darwinian
psychological analysis until there’s much greater knowledge of the intrica-
cies of neurodevelopment. Many evolutionary psychologists naively posit
their favorite psychological atoms, each under individual selective control
and thus each associated with some locus that affects nothing else. This is
myth-making, not serious science.
We anticipate a response: “We have to start somewhere. Science must
always begin from ignorance, so to demand knowledge at the beginning
is anti-science” (see Thornhill and Thornhill 1992, p. 405). We acknowl-
edge that no investigation begins from complete knowledge; so much is
truism. But well-planned investigations recognize which forms of current
ignorance matter and endeavor to ameliorate them, rather than whistling
away the complications and hoping that they won’t prove significant.
Our review of general issues is intended to highlight the mistakes that
attend the recent pop sociobiology of sex and violence. We now turn to the
details.

3 Savannah Yearnings: A Romance

The sun is setting, casting a soft bronze glow on the meadow. You, Primeval
Pru, realize that you face the hardest decision of your life as a hunter-
gatherer: It is time to choose your man. Two stand before you. On the left
is a younger man whose deep-set eyes are framed by rich black lashes.
 Pop Sociobiology Reborn 147

His body is unscarred, suggesting that he has not exerted himself much in
close encounters with beast or man. But you find it hard to turn your gaze
from his warm smile. On the right is an older, balding fellow with plain
features and a commanding manner. He gestures to his impressive hut and
his collection of animal skins. Whom should you pick?
David Buss knows. He has a theory of evolved mate selection in hu-
mans—his “Sexual Strategies Theory”—which informs us as to what
Primeval Pru and her contemporary descendants will do (or, more exactly,
what Primeval Pru would have done if she has a lot of contemporary de-
scendants). This “theory” is best conceived as an amalgam of claims about
mate selection, all of which rely on the same few fundamental tenets. The
basic principle from which Buss generates his conclusions (as do T and P
after him) is that “the sexes will differ in precisely those domains in which
women and men have faced different sorts of adaptive problems” (Buss
1995, p. 164). The pertinent evolutionary pressures are supposed to have
operated during the “environment of evolutionary adaptedness” (EEA),
apparently the Pleistocene, when our ancestors lived in hunter-gatherer
groups.
Here’s the story. Men’s and women’s roles in reproduction are asymmet-
rical in three different ways. First, men, but not women, face “parental un-
certainty.” Second, women are fertile for a smaller portion of their lives
than are men. Third, women invest considerably more in reproduction
than do men. Following many other pop sociobiologists, Buss waxes lyri-
cal about the contrast between the roughly 450 nutrient-loaded gametes
that a woman will produce in a lifetime and the millions of tiny mobile
gametes in a single male ejaculate (replenished, as he points out, at a rate
of about twelve million an hour). After conception, a woman is also com-
mitted to nine months of pregnancy, and, after birth, only she can lactate
and thus provide milk for the offspring.
These asymmetries create three adaptive problems for men and women.
Men will need to increase the probability of paternity and to identify fe-
male reproductive value (which peaks in a woman’s mid-teens when she
has all of her fertile years before her [Buss 1989]). Women will need to find
men who can provide them with resources, defend them and their children
against predators and human aggressors. Natural selection will thus select
for psychological dispositions that incline men to sexual jealousy, that will
prompt them to take advantage of whatever opportunities they have for a
148 A. Leah Vickers and Philip Kitcher

quick copulation on the side, and that lead them to be attracted to women
with the signs of peak reproductive value—full lips, clear eyes, lustrous
hair, a bouncy gait (all these figure in Buss’s catalog, as does a waist-hip ra-
tio of roughly 0.7). Similarly, selection will favor women whose psycho-
logical dispositions lead them to be attracted to older men (men with
power and resources) and that make them less inclined to wander.
So much for the Darwinian “expectations.” Now for the data. To his
credit, Buss has carried out an extensive survey in which questionnaires
were administered to members of 37 cultures in 33 countries. Besides ask-
ing for biographical information (age, sex, religion, etc.) the question-
naires contain queries about mate preferences, first in the form of
open-ended questions and then by means of rating and ranking tasks. The
open-ended part requires the subject to state the age at which he or she
wishes to marry, the age difference the subject would prefer to exist be-
tween the subject and the subject’s spouse, and the number of children de-
sired. The second part of the first instrument requires respondents to rate
18 characteristics (such as earning capacity, ambition/industriousness,
youth, physical attractiveness, and chastity) based on how “important or
desirable” each would be in choosing a mate (Buss 1989). The respondent
must give a numerical rating on a scale from 0 to 3, ranging from “irrele-
vant or unimportant” (0) to indispensable (3). The second instrument asks
subjects to rank 13 characteristics, based on their desirability in a mate.
Ten thousand and forty-seven (10,047) subjects were included in the study.
Buss reports that the results accord with his Darwinian expectations.
For 36 of 37 samples, there’s a statistically significant difference showing
that women rate “good financial prospect” higher than do men. In 29 of
37 samples, there’s a statistically significant difference with respect to am-
bition/industriousness (women rating it more highly), and in 34 samples
there’s a statistically significant difference with respect to physical attrac-
tiveness (men rating it as more important). Averaged over all samples,
women responded that they prefer men who are 3.42 years older than
themselves, while men answered that they prefer women who are 2.66
years younger (Buss 1989).
Although his study is the centerpiece of his evidence, Buss defends his
“Sexual Strategies Theory” with other considerations more squarely in the
pop sociobiological tradition.
A comparison of the statistics derived from personal advertisements in
newspapers reveals that a man’s age has a strong effect on his preferences.
 Pop Sociobiology Reborn 149

As men get older, they prefer as mates women who are increasingly
younger than they are. Men in their thirties prefer women who are roughly
five years younger, whereas men in their fifties prefer women ten to twenty
years younger (Buss 1994, p. 52).
He also reminds us of the familiar male pride in “conquests” and
“notches on the belt,” which he views as signaling an adaptation to brief
sexual encounters (Buss 1994, p. 77). A favorite tale of the differences in
“short-term mating strategies” stems from an experiment conducted on a
college campus: An “attractive person” approaches a member of the op-
posite sex and issues a sexual invitation; 100 percent of the women de-
clined, 75 percent of the men accepted (Buss 1999, p. 161).3
So there’s a clear message for Primeval Pru. Avert your gaze. Forget that
smile. Snuggle down with the animal skins.
We disagree. We don’t think we know enough to offer Pru any advice at
all. In line with the general conclusions drawn in the previous section, we
find Buss’s claims about the operation of selection naive and his alleged
empirical support questionable. Let’s start with the data.
What exactly does Buss’s questionnaire measure? Consider first the is-
sue of whether the responses accord with respondents’ preferences. Sub-
jects may have beliefs about how they should respond to the questionnaire,
or how those who distribute the questionnaire want them to respond. Al-
though Buss notes that his research assistants did not know his hypothe-
ses, any concordance between his predictions and the stereotypes
prevalent in a culture will leave his results vulnerable to bias, whatever the
ignorance of his subjects and those who administer the instruments. Fur-
thermore, even if we neglect possibilities that responses will reflect wide-
spread cultural values, Buss must assume that people have access to their
own preferences. Interestingly, he emphasizes that “sexual strategies do
not require conscious planning or awareness,” so that his faith in the ques-
tionnaire has to rest on a nice distinction in typical human levels of aware-
ness: We know our preferences but we don’t recognize why we have them
(see Buss 1992, p. 253). As we’ll note shortly, inquiring what subjects
would say in explaining their responses might well prove illuminating.
An even more fundamental assumption is that there are such things as
stable preferences that endure beyond the situation of answering the ques-
tionnaire into the contexts in which people actually make their decisions.
A significant tradition of psychological research—pioneered by Walter
Mischel over a period of three decades—has produced convincing evidence
150 A. Leah Vickers and Philip Kitcher

that many personality traits are situation-specific, and recent data suggest
that the same may apply to preferences (Mischel 1968; Moore 1999).
Yet even if we grant that Buss is measuring genuine stable preferences,
uncontaminated by cultural norms, the most important question concerns
the content of these preferences. The connection between “mate choice”—
the topic of the various questions and tasks—and sexual attraction needs
scrutiny. Choosing a mate typically means more than picking a sexual
partner (or even a reproductive partner), and, in many, if not all, of the cul-
tures that figure in Buss’s survey, the consequences of mate choice affect
many dimensions of the parties’ lives. Recall a point from the last section:
Actual behavior results from the interaction among psychological mecha-
nisms. Assuming that there are such mechanisms, it’s only the most sim-
plistic psychology that takes mate choice to reflect the pure operation of
the “sexual attraction” mechanism(s). Can we seriously believe that, in
societies in which virtually all of a woman’s aspirations will be affected
by the economic status of the man she marries, the response to questions
about “mates” will be unaffected by nonsexual considerations? Buss’s
brief attempt to confront one instance of this point—his discussion of the
hypothesis that women like men with resources because they are cut off
from acquiring such resources for themselves—fails to appreciate both the
force and the scope of the challenge. Data indicating that successful
women have a strong preference for men with resources do not forestall
the obvious concern that such women can attain their nonsexual goals, in
the kinds of societies in which they live, only by following the culturally
approved course for their less fortunate sisters and cousins. Furthermore,
the general point is that in all cases libido may run one way and socioeco-
nomic considerations quite another. Indeed, Buss might have found this
out had he probed why his respondents gave the answers they did, for their
explanations might have shown the various life dimensions along which
they viewed mate choice. Perhaps, as Mae West unfortunately did not say,
sex has nothing to do with it.
The point we’ve been developing extends to a broader criticism of Buss’s
“theory” by exposing its psychological poverty. As we noted above, in any
attempt to link hypothetical psychological traits to behavior—even to the
relatively special behavior of filling out a questionnaire—one must know
how the traits interact and how they are affected by environmental cues.
Imagine Buss’s hero, Savannah Sam, with wonderfully refined dispositions
 Pop Sociobiology Reborn 151

to react to waist-hip ratio, hair luster, bounciness in gait, and so forth. If

Primeval Pru sets all the sensitivities aquiver, then, provided that no non-
sexual disposition interferes (a large assumption), we can expect Sam to
court (if that’s the right verb) Pru. Sam’s alternatives are not likely to be
Pru, on the one hand, and Geriatric Georgina on the other. Maybe one of
the women Sam confronts is ahead on bounciness and fullness of lips, but
another wins on hair luster and waist-hip ratio. What should the poor lad
do? Buss doesn’t tell us what the mate choice should be, and this is typical
of the looseness of the amalgam of claims he offers. You can predict just
about anything you want to from his hypotheses by adjusting the relative
strength of the sexual attraction dispositions or by invoking interference
from other parts of the psyche.
Does this matter? One might think that Buss has done enough by de-
scribing a bundle of psychological traits and that he can leave it to future
researchers to decide how these traits interact to produce behavior. Recall,
however, that the point of the enterprise was to connect human psychol-
ogy with evolution under natural selection, and natural selection will pre-
sumably discriminate our primeval players on the basis of their behavior.
Until we have some idea of how the traits posited will issue in behavior, we
can’t make any judgment about their selective impact.
The elasticity of the connection between claims and evidence can be il-
lustrated by returning to the proposition-in-the-quad. On the face of it,
there’s a striking asymmetry in male and female responses to the opportu-
nity for a spot of recreational sex. But what accounts for the difference?
Just the firing of the “sexual attraction” disposition in the men and its in-
hibition in the women? We agree with Natalie Angier’s suggestion that the
evidence may have more to tell us about women’s fears than about their
sexual yearnings (Angier 1999, p. 367). Depending on how you adjust the
relative strengths of the “attraction disposition” and the “fear disposi-
tion” you can predict the data from any hypothesis you choose about
asymmetries in male-female sexual desire. Buss’s favorite has no special
privilege.
Even though we think that Buss’s arguments from the data he assembles
have the flaws to which we’ve pointed, we see his search for empirical evi-
dence as an improvement in the customs of pop sociobiology. We can’t be
so positive about his Darwinizing. Consider his claim that “over a one-
year period, an ancestral man who managed to have short-term sexual
152 A. Leah Vickers and Philip Kitcher

encounters with dozens of women would likely have caused many preg-
nancies” (Buss 1999, p. 162). A little sober physiology will show that
there’s a one to two percent chance of producing offspring per copulation.
If Savannah Sam manages one-shot sex with one hundred different
women, he may produce two offspring. His enduring evolutionary contri-
bution will, of course, depend on whether these children survive (with
whose support, exactly?). Even though one might wonder just what the
expected reproductive success might be, it’s important to recall that sig-
nificant evolutionary change can occur when selection pressures are very
small (of the order of 0.001, for example). So Sam’s modest chances may
make a crucial difference.
At just this point, however, the EEA fades into a rosy blur. Sam is sup-
posed to be competing with other aggressive males for the chance to cop-
ulate. Some of his female targets may have long-term mates, primed (we
recall) to be on the watch for lowered paternity certainty. The females
themselves (we remember) are supposed to be less-than-completely inter-
ested in casual sex, so Sam is going to have to do a fair bit of talking be-
fore they go off with him for a romp in the bushes (but stay tuned!
late-breaking news from T and P suggests that talk may not be needed!).
So let’s ask the obvious questions: How big is the population to which Sam
belongs? To what extent is it possible for his rendezvous to go undetected
by others? In what percentage of the pregnancies he brings about will the
child receive biparental support? What’s the chance of surviving to sexual
maturity without biparental support? It may spoil the fun to raise these
questions, but until they’ve been answered there’s no way of telling
whether Sam’s ventures in sperm-spreading will prove selectively advanta-
geous (or disastrous). To put it bluntly, we have to do some delicate ac-
counting to decide if the expected increase in reproductive success is
outweighed by the expected effects on Sam of the reactions of those
around him to his activities. Any serious exploration of the operations of
natural selection must make definite assumptions about what strategies
are available to the organisms involved and what ecological constraints af-
fect the reproductive payoffs.
One fundamental oversight of many misadventures in pop sociobiology
(and its recent offshoots) is their neglect of within-group differences in
strategies. Back to Primeval Pru. If (as Buss and others suggest) ancestral
societies were pyramidal, with a few men in power and many more scram-
 Pop Sociobiology Reborn 153

bling underneath, it’s not entirely obvious that being attracted to the Big
Man with the Resources is a good female strategy. Maybe there’s too much
competition there, and Pru would do better to latch on to Mid-Level Mel.
(Similarly, if all the males are drooling over Pru, Sam may do better to re-
spond to the maternal promise of Plain Jane across the watering hole.) Pru
needs enough to support herself and the kids, but that doesn’t mean she’ll
be at an advantage if she goes for power, age, and the big bucks. If she’s
good at spotting talent, then Energetic Ernie—nothing but promise but
nothing but promise!—would be a better bet. These are only possibilities,
but they are rival accounts of selection that must be explored, not simply
neglected. We leave as exercises to the reader the construction of formal
models that will yield any number of different “Darwinian expectations,”4
although we’re prepared to concede to Buss the banal point that in
none of these will Pru find Doddering Dan the Deadbeat the lodestone of
her life.
We’ll close our critique of Buss by pointing out how his conclusions, al-
legedly generated from Darwinian analyses of life in the EEA are, in fact,
used as premises in ameliorating his ignorance about ancestral environ-
ments and their demands. Consider the following claims that are typical
of Buss’s efforts in evolutionary analysis:
Women over evolutionary history could often garner far more resources for their
children through a single spouse than through several temporary sex partners.
(Buss 1994, p. 23)
A lone woman in ancestral environments may have been susceptible to food depri-
vation. She may also become a target for aggressive men. (Buss 1998, p. 416)

The second is cagey enough, but he quickly slides from the cautious “may”
in order to argue that ancestral women would need the protection and sup-
port of mates. So in both instances we have definite pronouncements about
the challenges of the EEA. Intriguing and informative pronouncements.
In fact, current researchers know very little about the EEA—or even
whether there’s some privileged time period on which we should concen-
trate in understanding the evolutionary origins of human psychological
tendencies. Should we even be concerned with selection on our hunter-
gatherer ancestors rather than considering primate evolution on the one
hand, and more recent gene-culture coevolution on the other? But Buss has
a simple way of overcoming his ignorance. Consider his defense of the idea
that paternity uncertainty was a problem for ancestral men:
154 A. Leah Vickers and Philip Kitcher

Behavioral, physiological, and psychological clues point powerfully to a human

evolutionary history in which paternity uncertainty was an adaptive problem for
men. (Buss 1996, p. 161)

So here’s the argument. We know that current preferences and propen-

sities are actually adaptations because we can identify them as selectively
advantageous in the EEA. And we recognize the selective advantages by
drawing conclusions about the EEA on the basis of our knowledge that
those current preferences and propensities are really adaptations. The
analysis is viciously circular.

4 The Slavering Beast Within: A Gothic Novella

The most substantial part of A Natural History of Rape (T and P 2000) is

its second chapter, in which the authors draw on earlier pop sociobio-
logical discussions of asymmetries in sexual strategies, particularly the
work of David Buss. The authors aim to build on those discussions to ad-
vance an account of how natural selection underlies many aspects of rape.
T and P are particularly interested in three main points, advanced in the
writings we’ve just reviewed. First, the appropriate female strategy is to be
choosy about potential mates. Second, the appropriate male strategy is to
try to copulate as much as possible. Third, males have been selected to
worry about issues of paternity. From these three points, T and P draw
their central conclusions. Rape should be especially painful to females be-
cause their attempts to choose their mates have been subverted. Males
should be more inclined to rape because they are primed to copulate even
when females are not interested, and, of course, they should be especially
tempted by those females who exhibit the signs of high reproductive value
(the young with bouncy gait, lustrous hair, and so forth). Males have also
evolved to be suspicious of female claims that they have been coerced into
copulating (more specifically: Men have evolved to suspect the claims
made by their mates), and that is why rape laws have taken the historical
forms that they have.
So there we have it. An explanation of the principal features of rape by
applying sound Darwinian principles. Add on a denunciation of that fem-
inist canard that rape isn’t a sexual act—what nonsense!—and we’re done.
Well, not quite. What exactly are the Darwinian explanations supposed
to be? Let’s begin with the fundamental phenomenon. Some men rape
 Pop Sociobiology Reborn 155

women, and, sometimes, men rape other men. Why do these acts occur
and why do they occur in the contexts they do with a certain distribution
of types of victims? Critics of previous sociobiological stories about rape
have pointed out that many instances of rape involve as victims girls who
haven’t yet reached menarche or women who are past menopause. T and
P reply that “younger women are greatly overrepresented and that girls
and older women greatly underrepresented in the data on victims of rape”
(T and P 2000, p. 72, drawing on Thornhill and Thornhill 1983). Waiving
some concerns that will occupy us later, we note that this evidence seems
relevant only to the kinds of questions that occupy Buss: The most it can
show is something about the women rapists find most attractive (and, of
course, we don’t think it shows much about that). The question has been
subtly shifted. Given that some men rape—for whatever reasons—why do
they tend to rape young women? Answer: Men are more likely to be at-
tracted to young women, so whatever it is that impels them to sexual co-
ercion, young women are more likely to be the victims.
We are concerned with two features of this answer. First, we want to
note that there’s a controversial assumption that the psychology of rape
parallels that of consensual sex. The rapist’s behavior is seen as the prod-
uct of a disposition to be attracted toward certain kinds of people, whether
or not they are willing, and a disposition to force sex on a particular oc-
casion. There’s an obvious alternative psychological hypothesis, one that
not only corresponds to many people’s introspective awareness but also
seems to permeate the folk tales, poetry, dramas, and stories of almost
every culture, that views reciprocity as a central feature of sexual attrac-
tion. If that alternative hypothesis is right, then the strategy of seeing the
rapist as someone whose tendencies to sexual attraction are just like those
of any one else of the same sex, with something extra added on, is mis-
guided. We don’t know that the hypothesis is true—indeed, we recom-
mend psychological exploration of it—but we don’t think it should simply
be dismissed without careful consideration.
We’ll spend more time on a second issue. In our view, the major ques-
tion about rape concerns the causes of coercion. At risk of being pedantic,
let’s aim for maximal clarity on this point. Imagine two stylized situations.
In the first, a man (Adam) is attracted to a woman (Eve) and makes her a
sexual proposition. Eve demurely declines. Adam does not force her (he
may try to persuade, but he doesn’t coerce). In the second, another man
156 A. Leah Vickers and Philip Kitcher

(Tarquin) is attracted to a different woman (Lucretia). Like Eve, Lucretia

says “No.” Tarquin presses on and eventually forces Lucretia to couple
with him. Surely the centerpiece of a Darwinian account of rape should
not be a story (a bad story, we’ve argued) about why Eve and Lucretia are
found attractive, but rather an explanation of the difference between
Adam and Tarquin. What is it about Adam that makes him hold back
when Tarquin uses force?
T and P don’t offer any clear answer to this question. Whether this is be-
cause they don’t have the issues in focus or because they haven’t made up
their minds we don’t presume to judge. They do tell their readers that there
are two different ways to apply Darwinian ideas to the study of rape. The
direct approach supposes that there are “psychological mechanisms de-
signed specifically to influence males to rape in ways that would have pro-
duced a net reproductive benefit in the past” (T and P 2000, p. 59). The
by-product approach proposes that there are a number of psychological
mechanisms that have been shaped by natural selection that sometimes
combine to trigger an act of rape. In a version of this approach that the au-
thors draw from Donald Symons (1979, pp. 264–267), the mechanisms
hypothesized are “the human male’s greater visual sexual arousal, greater
autonomous sex drive, reduced ability to abstain from sexual activity,
much greater desire for sexual variety per se, greater willingness to engage
in impersonal sex, and less discriminating criteria for sexual partners”
(T and P 2000, p. 62). For reasons we’ve offered in earlier sections, we
doubt that these hypothetical characteristics have been targets of natural
selection, but the example does have the virtue of exposing T and P’s in-
tended contrast. On the by-product approach, there’s no commitment to
supposing that acts of rape enhance (or once enhanced) the reproductive
success of the rapist. Maybe there are all these adapted psychological dis-
positions that sometimes combine in ways that are unfortunate for the
rapist (as well as being terrible for the victim).
T and P don’t advance any definite hypotheses about the Adam/Tarquin
difference. We’ll try to do better. Start with the direct approach. There are
two possibilities. Either the adaptation is almost universal among human
males or it isn’t. On the former assumption, the rape disposition is present
in just about every human being with a Y chromosome, and the fact that
a lot of men don’t engage in rape must be explained by invoking some com-
bination of contextual cues and the inhibiting activity of other psycholog-
 Pop Sociobiology Reborn 157

ical dispositions. Plainly there’s not going to be a lot of direct data to sup-
port this hypothesis until we’ve been told a lot more about possible cues
and interactions. But maybe we can get some clues by thinking about the
past action of natural selection.
Here’s the simplest story. Males have been programmed to rape when
they have a chance for copulating with a potentially fertile female and they
can get away with it. If there were genetic variation in some savannah pop-
ulation with respect to the disposition to use force, so that most of the
male population never engaged in sexual coercion while occasional mu-
tants would rape fertile females only under conditions in which they in-
curred no costs, then the mutants would have slightly higher expected
reproductive success (alternatively, we might suppose a disposition to use
force only when the expected costs are lower than the expected reproduc-
tive benefits). At this point, everything depends on the details. As we noted
in the last section, the chance that a copulation will lead to a birth is 1 to
2 percent (a figure with which T and P seem to agree; T and P 2000,
p. 100), and this figure has to be discounted by the chance that the child
will be abandoned, die before attaining puberty, or simply be ill prepared
for a successful reproductive future. Equally, we need a sober evaluation of
the potential costs of an act of rape. Under what conditions, if any, in the
savannah environment, could a rapist be expected to recognize that the
chances of physical injury from other hominids were sufficiently low that
the small benefit of forcing a copulation outweighed the expected costs?
Again, we leave to the reader the exercise of constructing formal models
that show rampant rape, a low incidence of rape, or no possibilities for the
aspiring rapist. Hint: It’s simply a matter of adjusting group size, daily
habits, social structures, and aggressive tendencies.
The natural selection of the rape disposition is, of course, mediated by
that remarkable mutant genotype that expresses itself in just the tendency
to coerce copulation in the face of female reluctance when the circum-
stances are right (or whose effects on fitness are only so mediated). We har-
bor doubts about that genotype just as we are doubtful that some (or all)
of us carry a genotype that enabled our Pleistocene ancestors to stand firm
and pick an extra berry or two just when a lion was sufficiently far off to
let them garner a small nutritive benefit without cost.
As we acknowledged, the story we’ve been telling is the simplest version
of the universal variant of the direct approach. One embarrassing feature
158 A. Leah Vickers and Philip Kitcher

of our tale is that it fails to account for the difference between Adam and
Tarquin—there are many Adams who seem to pass up opportunities that
Tarquins exploit. Plainly, we need some epicycles, another psychological
disposition or two to explain Adam’s undue reticence or Tarquin’s lack of
proper caution. We’ll also have to face up to the fact that rape victims are
sometimes young girls or older women, so there’ll have to be other causal
factors that make the tendency to rape misfire. Of course, as we build these
in, we’ll have to be very careful that we don’t subvert whatever story we’ve
been telling about the advantages in the ancestral environment; it will, for
example, be disastrous if the sources of inhibition or excitation might have
led our ancestors to actions that incurred great risks of injury (like the
mythical Pleistocene berry-picker who tarries an instant too long).
Maybe we can do better by switching to the polymorphic variant of the
direct approach. Now we suppose that some men develop the rape dispo-
sition and others don’t. No problem now with explaining the difference
between Adam and Tarquin: Tarquin has it, Adam doesn’t. The challenge
this time is to conjure up a plausible tale about the way in which natural
selection on our ancestors produced this polymorphism. Here’s one way to
try. Suppose that all males share a conditional disposition: If one experi-
ences one type of developmental environment the rape disposition devel-
ops, if one experiences a different type of developmental environment it
doesn’t. Back now to Savannah Sam, first bearer of the mutant allele asso-
ciated with this conditional disposition. Sam is going to have to have some
reproductive edge. If this fails to involve any act of rape on his part, then
it’s hard to see why the allele should persist in the population. But if Sam’s
Darwinian advantage is a consequence of his developing in the pertinent
environment, acquiring the rape disposition, and going in for a rape or
two, then it’s hard to see why a fixed disposition to acquire the rape dis-
position, come what may, wouldn’t have been equally good. Once again,
we urge readers to be imaginative and to construct evolutionary models
for their favorite outcomes.
Perhaps the indirect approach will fare better. Indeed, there’s a reading
of T and P on which the indirect approach must succeed if the direct ap-
proach fails. For, unfortunately, rape happens. The people who commit
rape belong to a species that has evolved under natural selection. So, when
an act of rape occurs, some combination of psychological features that hu-
 Pop Sociobiology Reborn 159

mans have evolved to have must combine with environmental stimuli to

prompt it. A triumph for the Darwinian approach to the human sciences?
Not really. The interpretation we’ve offered is banal, and would go
through equally well whatever human activity—chopstick use or needle-
point, say—we were to consider. If the indirect approach is to vindicate T
and P’s advertisement that evolutionary theory will guide “the scientific
study of life in general and of humans in particular to fruitful ends of deep
knowledge” (T and P 2000, p. 3), then it will have to provide something
more substantive than the vacuous suggestion that human actions draw on
evolved psychological mechanisms. Something more like the version T and
P reconstruct from Symons, perhaps.
Let’s assume for the time being that the asymmetries celebrated by
Symons, Buss, and T and P are genuine: Males are more inclined to want
casual sex than females and so forth (T and P 2000, p. 62). Somehow these
differences are supposed to be parlayed into an account of why rape some-
times occurs. So far as we can tell, there’s just one option that will serve T
and P’s turn. From time to time, some men get so overstimulated that they
just can’t hold back, even though what they go on to do on some of these
occasions may not enhance their reproductive success (as well, of course,
as being traumatic for their victims).
It doesn’t take much thought to see why so simple a proposal won’t do.
Without further elaborate psychological hypotheses, we have no reason to
reject the apparent evidence that a fair number of men who are as sexually
stimulated as those who rape manage to accept a woman’s refusal. On the
face of it, the difference between Adams and Tarquins isn’t simply one of
the strength of sexual desire. If T and P want to argue that appearances are
deceptive, then they have a lot of work to do—they would have to show
that there is some psychological (or neurophysiological) measure of level
of sexual arousal that distinguishes all the rapists from all those men who
accept rejection.
So what exactly is the difference between those males who behave like
Tarquin and those, equally ardent, who emulate Adam? The obvious sug-
gestion is that there are inhibitory mechanisms whose strength varies
between the cases. Can we find any Darwinian clues about what such mech-
anisms might be? T and P seem to believe we can. They cite work by “the
evolutionary psychologist Neil Malamuth” on reduced sexual restraint.
Malamuth, and others, have found that certain kinds of developmental
160 A. Leah Vickers and Philip Kitcher

experiences are correlated with an apparent “sexual impulsiveness and

risk taking.” Apparently, “reduced parental investment (resulting from
poverty or the absence of the father)” leads to “a male’s perception of
rejection by potential mates.” Allegedly, “[m]en emerge from this back-
ground with a perception of reduced ability to invest in women, an expec-
tation of brief sexual relationships with women, a reduced ability to form
enduring relationships, a coercive sexual attitude toward women, and an
acceptance of aggression as a tactic for obtaining desired goals” (T and P
2000, p. 69; previous citations from pp. 68–69).
The Darwinian language in the passage from which we have quoted is
entirely gratuitous. What the studies reveal is that boys who are brought
up in poor environments without a father have a higher tendency to har-
bor certain attitudes toward women and toward sexual relationships, atti-
tudes that increase the chances that they will force sex. There’s no warrant
whatsoever for suggesting that this has a lot to do with parental invest-
ment or the young men’s investment in potential mates. You don’t need an
evolutionary perspective to discover these attitudes and you don’t require
an evolutionary perspective to interpret them. The basic point is that there
do seem to be variations among males in the mechanisms that inhibit the
expression of sexual desire in the face of female reluctance, and, by stan-
dard psychological studies of rapists, one can find correlations between the
relative strength of the inhibitory mechanisms and characteristics of the
developmental environment.
Once we’ve come this far, it’s not hard to see that the insistent Dar-
winizing is at best irrelevant and at worst an obstacle. The fundamental
question concerns the complex of psychological attitudes that inhibit, or
fail to inhibit, the forcing of sex. If we consider the entire spectrum of
rapes, including the rape of children and postmenopausal women, which
T and P consistently downplay, we can reasonably conjecture that the
rapist’s attitude often fails to acknowledge the victim as a person and
sometimes even embodies a deliberate intention to demonstrate that the
victim is the object of hostility or contempt. Adam holds back, even in the
grip of intense desire, because he acknowledges Eve’s right to say “No.”
Tarquin, by contrast, sees Lucretia as less than fully human, or wishes to
show his dominance of her, or intends that his rape will serve as an act of
revenge. The critical task for a theory of rape is to be able to characterize
these attitudes as precisely as possible, and to understand how they come
 Pop Sociobiology Reborn 161

about. We are prepared to believe that poverty can breed frustration, that
a father’s absence and the lack of parental affection can engender tenden-
cies to see others as utensils rather than people. Exploring these psycho-
logical issues and the causal relationships they involve is not advanced by
the speculative invocations of Darwin that T and P favor.
But wait! Don’t T and P have a reply to the charges we’ve leveled? After
all, they devote an entire chapter to attacking “the social science explana-
tion of rape,” in which they consider, and take themselves to demolish, ar-
guments to the effect that rape is about hostility, dominance, punishment,
and the desire for control. Consider the following typical passage.
Brownmiller (1975) sees rape in large-scale war as stemming in part from the fren-
zied state of affairs and the great excitement of men who have just forcefully
dominated the enemy. That hypothesis predicts that soldier rapists would be in-
discriminate about the age of the victims. But they are not; they prefer young
women. (T and P 2000, p. 134)

The second sentence we’ve quoted is, we believe, unwarranted. Brown-

miller’s position, as we would reconstruct it, can be developed as a pair of
claims:
1. For whatever reasons (not necessarily the Darwinian tales T and P bor-
row from Buss), men are typically more attracted to young women.
2. The coercive expression of sexual desire is the result of a failure in an
inhibitory mechanism that can be caused by hostility toward the victim.
So Brownmiller (at least on our reconstruction) would predict both that
the frequency of rape would be greater in a situation of war, in which sol-
diers express hostility toward the victims (and, very probably, their desire
to show dominance), and that the distribution of rape victims would be
skewed toward younger women.
The logical mistake evident here is common to T and P’s other discus-
sions of social scientific hypotheses about rape in general and of feminist
proposals in particular. They claim that all kinds of confusions flow from
viewing rape “as an act of violence” (T and P 2000, pp. 136ff.). But the
confusions are all T and P’s. Rape is not just about violence: There’s a dif-
ference between the rapist and the batterer. In our judgment, however, rape
isn’t just about sex either. If T and P had seen clearly that they need to ac-
count for the difference between Adam and Tarquin, they would have rec-
ognized that other psychological mechanisms and attitudes come into play
162 A. Leah Vickers and Philip Kitcher

and would have appreciated the obvious possibility that, in most instances
of rape, motives of aggression and dominance are also present. Further,
they might have seen that general characteristics of societies are pertinent
to the attitudes that adult human beings have toward one another, and in
particular to the attitudes that men have toward women. They might then
have acknowledged that broad social tendencies can permeate psycholog-
ical development and lead men to acknowledge women as full persons—
or not. The feminist authors who have suggested that prevalent cultural
images of women are relevant to how a woman’s refusal is heard have a
genuine point.5
We’ll be completely explicit. When rape occurs, there’s a sexual dimen-
sion to the event. When sexual intercourse is forced, there are typically
nonsexual dimensions to the event. The attitudes that lead to the coercive
sex often involve intentions to hurt, dominate, humiliate, and obtain re-
venge. Those attitudes are themselves often present because of a complex
developmental history, one that may involve not just details of individual
ontogenies (lack of parental affection, for example) but also more general
cultural influences that lead men not to see women as full people (but, for
example, as collections of salient body parts—genitals, breasts, buttocks,
lustrous hair, full lips, and so on).
Let’s sum up the discussion of this section. We’ve examined the two
variants of the direct adaptation approach and found that the task of
working out a coherent Darwinian model that will fit the evidence is, to
say the least, challenging; the challenge is not taken up by T and P. The by-
product approach leads fairly quickly to the sensible proposal that rape oc-
curs when certain inhibitory mechanisms are weakened. Despite their
attempts to drag in Darwinian language, T and P fail to show how evolu-
tionary psychology can illuminate the character of these inhibitory mech-
anisms. Further pursuit of the sensible proposal seems to require research
in developmental psychology and, quite possibly, elaborations of the social
science hypotheses that T and P deride.
We’ll spare the reader an equally extensive treatment of T and P’s two
other major claims, the thesis that rape is especially hurtful to women be-
cause it subverts their preferred mating strategy and the idea that rape laws
reflect male concern with paternity certainty. The analysis of these pro-
posals would proceed on similar lines. Once again, we’d ask just what the
selective advantage of intense female pain is supposed to be. Is this a psy-
 Pop Sociobiology Reborn 163

chological adaptation shared with other primates, or is it part of a female

tactic for reassuring Mr. Big Bucks with his refined paternity uncertain-
ties? We’d invite consideration of the hypothesis that people have a general
tendencies to feel hurt when they have been used and to expect tenderness
and the expression of affection in sexual contact. Similarly, it would be
appropriate to ask exactly why attitudes of suspicion toward female testi-
mony are supposed to be adaptive, and to consider the precise costs and
benefits of reacting to rape in different ways.
We have offered only hints. Any serious evolutionary account is going
to have to advance definite claims about the character of the adaptation,
the set of available strategies, and the environment in which selection is al-
leged to have taken place. This, of course, is what evolutionary theorists
do. But T and P do not live up to the standards of the discipline. Their
identification of adaptations is entirely elusive, and there’s not a shred of
discussion of available strategies (let alone of potential genetic bases for
them) or of the environmental details.
These are harsh words, and we anticipate protests. Surely T and P do ap-
peal to broad and familiar features of evolution on sexual species, the sex-
ual asymmetries, paternity worries, and so forth that they treat as cardinal
dogmas of general evolutionary theory. Isn’t it enough to rely on the work
of others and to consider ways in which the challenges of natural and sex-
ual selection might be met? No. To make progress in understanding the
springs of human behavior, it’s necessary to be far clearer about the nature
of the selection pressures, the consequences of the allegedly favored strat-
egy and the possible rivals. T and P tell us nothing specific about the prob-
lems that might be addressed by a tendency to rape or by a disposition to
feel intense pain at being raped. All their readers get are vague gestures.
Such insubstantial suggestions would not be taken seriously in other areas
of evolutionary studies. Workers on social insects or sage grouse don’t
simply talk vaguely about the requirements of obtaining food or avoiding
predators; they explore the ecological parameters they take to be signifi-
cant; they engage in studies to discover the kinds of strategies their organ-
isms can employ; they collect data on reproductive rates. We appreciate the
difficulties of meeting such high standards in the study of our own species.
But, when the gap between standards and practice is as vast as it is in T and
P’s discussion of human rape, it’s simply false advertising to claim to be in
the same business.
164 A. Leah Vickers and Philip Kitcher

5 Conclusion: In Defense of Irreverence

We believe that the studies we have reviewed are scientifically shoddy. But
there’s surely a fair amount of bad work in the world. Why should people
become so upset with the evolutionary psychology of sex and violence, as
practiced by Buss, Thornhill, and Palmer? We’ll close with a brief attempt
at explanation.
It’s not incumbent on scientific researchers to offer policy suggestions,
but some recent pop sociobiologists—including T and P—have defended
their proposals about human nature by declaring that they can help resolve
urgent social issues. Even though we concede that they have good inten-
tions, that they want to help decrease the incidence of rape, it’s hard to
avoid the judgment that T and P’s suggestions, where not banal, will do
little good. Given the speculative character of their Darwinizing and the
elusiveness of their proposals, even their inability to recognize crucial is-
sues, policies influenced by their text might well make matters worse.
Consider, for example, their suggestions about educational programs.
They begin with a program for boys, agreeing “with social scientists that
males should be educated not to use force or the threat of force to obtain
sex” (T and P 2000, p. 171). No problem so far, but we didn’t need any
Darwinizing to arrive at this judgment. Keen to show the fecundity of their
ideas, T and P continue with two disastrous further suggestions. First, they
propose that educators should explain the differences between male and
female sexuality. As we pointed out repeatedly in the last section, even
granting the pop sociobiological claims about these differences, the crucial
question is why some men (Adams) hold back from forcing women to their
desires and others (Tarquins) don’t. Any program based on stating “the
evolutionary reasons why a young man can get an erection just by looking
at a photo of a naked woman” (T and P 2000, p. 179) is pointing in the
wrong direction and encouraging a view of the springs of rape that may en-
courage young men to downplay its importance (“Well it’s only human na-
ture after all!”). The critical part of the education, as so many feminists
and their social scientific allies have insisted, should be to teach young men
that “No” means No, and to help them overcome the kinds of hostility,
dominance, and desires for power that are so frequently part of the psy-
chological cause of rape.
 Pop Sociobiology Reborn 165

A misguided program for boys is bad enough. But T and P also want a
parallel program for girls, pointing out to them the True Nature of the
Slavering Beasts with whom they are doomed to reproduce. Young women
“should be made aware of the costs associated with attractiveness” (T and
P 2000, p. 181). Not only is this vulnerable to just the criticisms we di-
rected at T and P’s tutorial for boys, but its social consequence is likely
to be a continued perception that women are partly responsible for rape
(“She was asking for it”).6 Any sensible approach to rape education should
be freed from suggestions of female responsibility or complicity, directed
toward correcting a problem in male attitudes, clearly demarcated from
the expression of some hypothetically universal male sexuality and firmly
linked to a failure in inhibiting mechanisms. T and P seem to be suggest-
ing an educational program that will reinforce attitudes that ought to be
extinguished.
No wonder, then, that they arouse such ire. But we still have told only
part of the story. If, as many scholars believe, individual ontogenies are
affected by stereotypes in the broader culture, so that male views of
women are sometimes shaped by a widespread tendency to reduce them to
sexual playthings, then pop sociobiologists don’t just ignore crucial causal
factors. In their style of analysis, their tendentious talk of “reproductive
potential,” “investment,” “paternity certainty,” and so forth, they dehu-
manize the complex activity of human courtship, love and marriage, em-
bodying in their prose just those images of women as bundles of sexually
pertinent body parts—genitals, breasts, lustrous hair and the rest—that
are taken to contribute to the devaluation of women and the incidence of
rape. Buss, T and P, and their colleagues give academic respectability to
ways of regarding women and of viewing sexual relations that many
people see as profoundly damaging, and they do so by using an idiom that
portrays women as resources and sex as commerce.
There are self-pitying moments in A Natural History of Rape in which
the authors wonder why their work inspires hostile reactions. No prizes
for guessing their preferred explanation: They stand in a line of thinkers
that extends back to Galileo, a line of fearless revolutionaries dedicated to
science and truth. We offer a harsher alternative. They pretend to scientific
rigor when they have none; they misunderstand the positions of those
whom they lambast; they blunder into sensitive issues, self-righteously of-
fering proposals that it’s reasonable to fear will be counterproductive; and
166 A. Leah Vickers and Philip Kitcher

they employ language and images that reinforce just those social tenden-
cies their opponents view as crucial factors in producing pain and humil-
iation for women.
Just as we think the comparison with Galileo inappropriate, we don’t
recommend that pop sociobiologists be shown the instruments of torture.
We think instead that what T and P and others of their ilk merit is a thor-
ough irreverence, born of recognizing that the dignity of academic prose is
not in order here. In short, the Bronx cheer.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Allan Gibbard for helpful conversations, although

we are not persuaded by his more positive view of evolutionary psychol-
ogy; we are also grateful to Patricia Kitcher for some extremely construc-
tive advice about an earlier draft. Jerry Coyne and Richard Lewontin
supplied extensive written comments on the penultimate version and have
helped us to improve it in a large number of ways; we are deeply indebted
to them.

Notes

1. A classic source of the modular approach to the mind is Fodor (1981). Whether
Fodor would recognize the use that evolutionary psychologists make of his ideas
is quite another matter. But many of the most influential writings in evolutionary
psychology, particularly the articles of Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, do cham-
pion the Fodorian notion of a module as an “informationally encapsulated psy-
chological subsystem.” The terminology is much less evident in the authors whose
views we discuss here, although they share the common evolutionary psychologi-
cal strategy of atomizing the mind into parts that are taken to be under indepen-
dent selective control. We’ll henceforth avoid the technical term “module.”
2. In a rather uninformed discussion of culture and its impact on behavior, T and
P show that they do not really understand the work of Boyd and Richerson (see T
and P 2000, p. 27). They show a similar lack of comprehension in lumping the re-
cent group selectionist proposals of Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson with
older views that have been decisively discredited (T and P 2000, p. 6). It strikes us
as odd that authors who are so keen to introduce an evolutionary perspective into
the social sciences should be so superficially informed about theoretical issues per-
taining to evolution.
3. The observant reader will note that there’s a slight problem in Buss’s co-opting
this experiment for his own purposes, since the point of his investigations is to dis-
cover what kinds of people men and women find attractive. The experiment was,
 Pop Sociobiology Reborn 167

however, carried out (by Clarke and Hartfield) on the basis of a prior estimate of
attractiveness. But we let this pass.
4. See Kitcher (1985, pp. 170–71) for some straightforward ways of replacing ca-
sual speculations about sexual strategies with the kinds of models that are con-
structed in competent evolutionary studies.
5. Perhaps there’s a more charitable interpretation of T and P, one that sees them
as recognizing the fact that rape isn’t only about sex or only about aggression
(power, dominance, etc.). Perhaps T and P and the feminists they criticize can agree
on rejecting both polar positions (rape is a matter of sex alone, rape is a matter of
aggression alone). We think that the constant emphasis on sexual strategies shaped
by selection and the failure to distinguish the question of explaining the charac-
teristics of rape victims from the question of distinguishing between Adam and
Tarquin make any such interpretation unlikely. Authors with the more charitable
interpretation clearly in view would have written a very different book.
6. As Dick Lewontin pointed out to us, this phrase needs careful consideration.
Sometimes women do dress in ways that they hope will lead men to find them de-
sirable. But surely these women do not want the male desires to lead to sexual co-
ercion. Educational programs should surely be very clear about the difference
between the desire to be desired and the desire to be attacked.

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Critiquing Evolutionary Models of Rape
7
Of Vice and Men: A Case Study in
Evolutionary Psychology
Jerry A. Coyne

In science’s pecking order, evolutionary biology lurks somewhere near the

bottom, far closer to phrenology than to physics. For evolutionary biology
is a historical science, laden with history’s inevitable imponderables. We
evolutionary biologists cannot generate a Cretaceous Park to observe ex-
actly what killed the dinosaurs; and, unlike “harder” scientists, we usually
cannot resolve issues with a simple experiment, such as adding tube A to
tube B and noting the color of the mixture.
The latest deadweight dragging us closer to phrenology is “evolutionary
psychology,” or the science formerly known as sociobiology, which studies
the evolutionary origin of human behavior. There is nothing inherently
wrong with this enterprise, and it has generated some intriguing theories,
particularly concerning the evolution of language. The problem is that evo-
lutionary psychology suffers from the scientific equivalent of megaloma-
nia. Many of its adherents are convinced that virtually every human action
or feeling, including depression, homosexuality, religion, and conscious-
ness, was put directly into our brains by natural selection. In this view, evo-
lution becomes the key—the only key—that can unlock our humanity.
Unfortunately, evolutionary psychologists routinely confuse theory
with idle speculation. Unlike bones, behavior does not fossilize, and under-
standing its evolution often involves concocting stories that sound plausi-
ble but are hard to test. Depression, for example, is seen as a trait favored
by natural selection to enable us to solve our problems by withdrawing,
reflecting, and thereby enhancing our future reproduction. Plausible?
Maybe. Scientifically testable? Absolutely not. If evolutionary biology is a
soft science, then evolutionary psychology is its flabby underbelly.
172 Jerry A. Coyne

But the public can be forgiven for thinking that evolutionary biology
is equivalent to evolutionary psychology. Books by Daniel Dennett, E. O.
Wilson, and Steven Pinker have sold briskly, and evolutionary psychol-
ogy dominates the media coverage of research on evolution. (It has also
figured in the media’s treatment of politics, as when evolutionary psychol-
ogists identified the lustful activity of Bill Clinton as the behavior of an “al-
pha male.”) In view of the scientific shakiness of much of the work, its
popularity must rest partly on some desire for a “scientific” explanation
of human behavior. Evolutionary psychology satisfies our hunger for a
comprehensive explanation of human existence, for a theory of inevitabil-
ity that will remove the ambiguities and the uncertainties of emotional and
moral life. Freud is no longer the preferred behavioral paradigm. Now
Darwin is ascendant. Blame your genes, not your mother.
Hence the excitement—and the furor—that has greeted the publication
of Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer’s (2000a) book, A Natural History
of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion.1 Determined to show that
human rape is a “natural, biological phenomenon that is a product of the
human evolutionary heritage” (Thornhill and Palmer 2000b, p. 30), the
authors take issue with social scientists and feminists (viewed as perma-
nently conjoined Siamese twins), for whom rape represents men’s deli-
berate attempt to subjugate and to humiliate women. In Thornhill and
Palmer’s account, the motive for rape is not just sexual, but reproductive.
Rape, they argue, was favored by natural selection to give sexually dispos-
sessed males the chance to have children, and to give males with mates the
chance to have extra children.
Such a sexual strategy could operate in several ways. For example, men
might resort to rape when they are socially disenfranchised and thus
unable to gain access to women through looks, wealth, or status. Alterna-
tively, men could have evolved to practice rape when the costs seem low—
when, for instance, a woman is alone and unprotected (and thus retal-
iation seems unlikely), or when they have physical control over a woman
(and so cannot be injured by her).
Thornhill and Palmer further claim that attempts to root out rape will
not succeed until one accepts its evolutionary origin and uses this precious
knowledge to make social policy:
Not only does an evolutionary approach generate new knowledge that could be
used to decrease the incidence of rape; some of the proposals put forth by individ-
uals uninformed by evolutionary theory may actually increase it. (2000b, p. x)
 Of Vice and Men 173

The media coverage of A Natural History of Rape has been critical,

but largely devoted to pitting Thornhill and Palmer against feminists,
who see the book as a misogynistic attempt to justify rape and to unravel
the progress of recent decades. The results were predictable and largely
unproductive: a lot of sound bites and shouting in television studios.2
Meanwhile, the book has been warmly embraced by some evolutionary
psychologists, notably Steven Pinker, who praised it as a “courageous, in-
telligent and eye-opening book with a noble goal.” Nearly all of these
public debates, however, have been fueled by ideology. What has been
missing is a discussion of the science that lies behind, or does not lie be-
hind, Thornhill and Palmer’s assertions. After all, their book is only as
good as their evidence.
Thornhill and Palmer have frequently invoked the authority of science
to defend their evolutionary conception of rape. They insist that their de-
tractors are motivated by ideology, while they are dispassionate scientists
whose only priority is objective truth. In their media appearances, they
have implied that their science is incontrovertible, and that any dissenter
from their conclusions must be philosophically or politically blinkered.
This is a grotesque misrepresentation of the book’s science, which has by
no means drawn unanimous approbation from the scientific community.
Far from it: to a scientist, the scientific errors in this book are far more in-
flammatory than are its ideological implications.
Like much of evolutionary psychology, Thornhill and Palmer’s book is
utterly lacking in sound scientific grounding. Moreover, the authors use
rhetorical tricks that mislead the general reader about their arguments.
Once its scientific weaknesses are recognized, A Natural History of Rape
becomes one more sociobiological “just-so” story—the kind of tale that
evolutionists swap over a few beers at the faculty club. Such stories do not
qualify as science, and they do not deserve the assent, or even the respect,
of the public.

Thornhill and Palmer’s thesis rests on current ideas about the evolution of
sex differences. It is obvious that men and women show clear differences
in many visible traits, ranging from body size to breasts. No biologist
would deny that these differences resulted from natural selection acting on
174 Jerry A. Coyne

our ancestors. (The wider pelvis of the female, for example, is essential in
childbirth.) And, given the agreement on the evolutionary basis of physi-
cal differences, it would seem foolish to deny a priori that evolution did
not also produce some differences in behavior. It is true that human cul-
ture and learning may alter behavioral traits more readily than morpho-
logical ones, but there is convincing evidence that some behavioral
differences evolved because they increased the reproductive success of our
ancestors. Since rape is an act of sexual aggression, the pertinent question
is whether males and females evolved to differ in aggression and in sexual
behavior. Most evolutionists believe that they did.
In mammals, we see a fundamental asymmetry between the roles of the
two sexes. Females must invest a great deal in their offspring (in the case
of humans, nine months of metabolic trauma plus untold years of nursing
and subsequent aggravation), while males can get away with investing very
little (minimally one dose of sperm before moving on to the next female).
This leads, in general, to a marked difference between the sexes in their
strategies for selecting mates. For the female, it pays to be prudent and
picky: She has relatively few shots at reproduction, and so must make each
opportunity count by choosing the best possible father for her children.
The male has a different approach: He wants to inseminate as many fe-
males as possible. He is interested in quantity, not quality.
For this reason, males inevitably compete for access to females. Darwin
recognized that such competition occurs in two fundamentally different
ways: males either try to impress the females (the peacock strategy) or they
try to directly dominate the other males (the deer strategy). It is the latter
course that seems most pertinent to the sexual behavior of humans, and
this internecine male competition is assumed to have driven not only the
evolution of increased male body size (on average, bigger is better in a
physical contest), but also of hormonally mediated male aggression (there
is no use being the biggest guy on the block if you are a wallflower).
Of course, there are aggressive and sexually promiscuous women as well
as meek and monogamous men; but we are talking about averages here.
Evolved differences need not be seen in every individual: many men are
smaller than the average woman.
Whatever the role of culture—of “nurture” rather than “nature”—in
determining human behavior, our evolutionary legacy is certainly alive
and well in the size difference between males and females and in those
 Of Vice and Men 175

aggression-promoting male hormones. It is no accident that most rapists,

and most violent criminals, are men. Feminists are undoubtedly right to
claim that culture reinforces sexual stereotypes, but there can be no ade-
quate explanation of patriarchy that completely ignores evolution.
Thornhill and Palmer perform an ingenious trick by advancing two dis-
parate theories to support the idea that rape is “natural and biological.”
The first is the “by-product hypothesis,” which maintains simply that
rape is a side effect of other evolved human traits. In other words, rape is
“evolutionary” because it is performed by men whose brains, bodies, and
behavior have evolved to a point where rape has become physically and
emotionally possible. This is a reasonable view—indeed, a tautology—
that few biologists will find objectionable. The second hypothesis, that of
“direct adaptation,” maintains that rape is much more than an evolution-
ary by-product: it is a direct adaptation installed by natural selection to al-
low sexually disenfranchised men to produce children.
This latter view is far more controversial but is clearly the centerpiece of
A Natural History of Rape. Nearly all of the discussion and the cited evi-
dence are directed at proving the truth of this second theory.

The “by-product hypothesis” views rape as a mere side effect of other

adaptations that natural selection built into our ancestors. That is, natural
selection favored not genes compelling men to rape, but genes producing
aspects of human emotion and behavior that, in combination with human
culture, allow the existence of rape. Thornhill and Palmer are not explicit
about which evolved features yield rape as a side effect, but a good guess
is a mixture of male promiscuity and aggression. This mixture, especially
if combined with a male animus toward women, might readily explain
rape. In this view, rape is an act of sexual violence—an outlet for rage and
sexual release directed at a convenient target. It is an act of sex and vio-
lence, with one or the other predominating according to circumstances
(date rape is more sexual, the violent rape of strangers more aggressive).
Given that in most reported cases rapists are sexually aroused, often
reach orgasm, and sometimes admit to erotic motives, it is hard to disagree
with Thornhill and Palmer’s claim that rape is at least partly a sexual act.
This claim is hardly new. Indeed, the sexual dimension of rape is painfully
176 Jerry A. Coyne

obvious. But Thornhill and Palmer note that “academic feminists and so-
ciologists” have consistently denied any sexual motivation for rape, insist-
ing instead that “rape is not about sex, but about violence and power.” It
is true that in recent decades the discussion of rape has been dominated by
such notions, though one must remember that they originated not as sci-
entific propositions but as political slogans deemed necessary to reverse
popular misconceptions about rape.
The real problem with the by-product hypothesis is its banality. It ex-
plains everything about human beings. Since we have an evolutionary his-
tory, everything that we are and do can be furnished with an evolutionary
explanation. There is no behavior, for example, that does not originate
in our having a brain that is the product of natural selection. And this
opens the evolutionary floodgates. Playing the violin? A by-product of
creativity, manual dexterity, and the ability to learn. Collecting stamps? A
by-product of our evolved desires to acquire resources and to categorize
our environment.
But such explanations are crushingly trivial, as can be seen in Thornhill
and Palmer’s declaration:
When one is considering any feature of living things, whether evolution applies is
never a question. The only legitimate question is how to apply evolutionary prin-
ciples. This is the case for all human behaviors—even for such by-products as cos-
metic surgery, the content of movies, legal systems, and fashion trends. (p. 12)

Well, if Thornhill and Palmer want to lump rape together with tummy
tucks and Titanic as “evolutionary” phenomena, then God (or Darwin)
bless them. We might as well throw in adoption (a by-product of parental
care), masturbation (a by-product of uncontrollable sexuality), bestiality
(ditto), and priestly celibacy (a by-product of religion, which is itself a by-
product of some evolved feature that nobody understands). Of course, the
interesting thing about masturbation, adoption, bestiality, and celibacy is
that they are maladaptive traits: they could never have been favored by
natural selection because their practice reduces the chance of passing on
one’s genes. And we should not forget nonsexual crimes such as murder,
assault, and robbery—all those other by-products of evolution.
The key phrase in the passage just discussed is “whether evolution ap-
plies is never a question.” This is an explicit admission that the by-product
hypothesis lacks the defining property of any scientific theory—falsifiabil-
ity, that is, the ability to be disproven by some possible observation. An un-
 Of Vice and Men 177

falsifiable theory is not a scientific theory. It is a tautology or an article of

faith. The by-product theory may justify the view of rape as an evolution-
ary pathology, an indirect consequence of male sexuality and aggression;
and the by-product theory may also justify the feminist view that rape is
simply a way for males to dominate and humiliate females. We can thus
dismiss the by-product hypothesis, because there is no conceivable obser-
vation that could disprove it.

After proposing the by-product hypothesis as their fallback position,

Thornhill and Palmer introduce the centerpiece of their book: the direct-
selection hypothesis. This theory holds that rape is not merely an aggres-
sive or sexual act, but a reproductive act—that is, one based on genes that
natural selection inserted into men’s brains. As the story goes, men who
lack committed relationships and are unable to find mates in the usual
ways can produce offspring through acts of rape. The frequency of genes
causing rape would then increase at the expense of genes carried by equally
disenfranchised but nonraping males, who leave no offspring. This would
eventually lead to the brain’s acquisition of a “rape chip,” a behavior as
hardwired as our tendencies to sleep and eat.
In the direct-selection theory, all men are born as potential rapists, but
they do not necessarily rape because the effect of the act on reproduction
depends on external circumstances. For one thing, rape can be favored by
natural selection only when it gives rapists a net reproductive gain. Thus,
Thornhill and Palmer suggest that natural selection has also endowed men
with the ability to perform a reproductive cost-benefit analysis before rap-
ing. The benefit is the likelihood that the act will produce a genetically
related offspring. The cost is that the rapist might be caught and severely
punished, depriving him of future offspring. Men will therefore rape only
when they are most likely to get away with it. Moreover, the theory pre-
dicts that men are selected to evaluate not just circumstances but also vic-
tims, choosing those most likely to be fertile. As with all behavioral
adaptations, the rapist need not be conscious of the evolutionary well-
springs of his actions, just as we do not ponder the need to stoke our me-
tabolism when sitting down to dinner.
178 Jerry A. Coyne

Viewing rape as a module of the male brain is provocative enough, but,

as diehard evolutionary psychologists, Thornhill and Palmer go on to pro-
pose that many other aspects of rape are direct adaptations. While they see
rape as adaptive for men, they concede that it is not so for women, who
suffer physical violence, possible alienation of their partner, and loss of
their own evolved ability to choose a good mate. Natural selection there-
fore gives women their own adaptation, the post-rape trauma:
Psychological pain is an adaptation that functions against such [reproductive]
losses by focusing on the causes of the losses. The result is that attention is directed
toward ways of dealing with current circumstances, given the loss, and of avoiding
a repetition of events that caused the loss. (p. 85)

(As I have noted, others have proposed a similar explanation for the evo-
lution of depression. I doubt, though, whether rape victims and depres-
sives use their trauma so productively.) And since the partner of a raped
woman may be unsure whether a subsequent child is his, Thornhill and
Palmer propose yet another direct adaptation: male suspicion about their
mate’s claim that she was raped. That, too, is biologically mandated.
Finally, in a theory almost unbelievably grandiose, Thornhill and Palmer
suggest that the opposition to their theories is itself based on evolution.
Our brains, they say, are so much the product of evolution that they have
been preprogrammed with a set of beliefs, one of which is a reluctance to
believe explanations involving evolution: “Evolved psychological intu-
itions about behavioral causation can mislead individuals into believing
that they know as much as experts do about proximate human motiva-
tion” (p. 114). Don’t like the theory? Trust the “experts,” who have
painfully overcome their aversion to evolution. (This is one of the ways in
which the new evolutionary psychologists resemble the old Marxists:
There is no place to stand outside their system of meaning, except for the
privileged place where they themselves stand.)
Although Palmer himself professes to favor the by-product hypothesis,
the authors continuously push the mixture of directly adaptive theories
that I have just described. The direct-selection theory first appears in the
fourth chapter, and the remaining eight are devoted to discussing this the-
ory alone and its implications for society. All of the supplied evidence is of-
fered in support of the view that rape is a direct adaptation, not an
evolutionary by-product. (The latter theory requires no evidence because
it is true by definition.)
 Of Vice and Men 179

Thornhill and Palmer use three lines of evidence to support the direct-
selection hypothesis. First, they maintain that rape is an adaptive act in
other species and thus could have evolved by the same route in humans. In
scorpion flies, Thornhill’s own research organism, males have an abdomi-
nal clamp that apparently evolved to help them forcibly restrain females
who resist their courtship. Several other species also seem to show forced
copulation, although whether it increases the male’s reproduction is not
known. But surely it is absurd to assume that rape may be a reproductive
strategy in humans because it is a reproductive strategy in flies or ducks.
Flies and ducks do not create and inhabit a culture, as humans do; and our
culture guarantees that there will be many meaningless parallels between
the behavior of humans and of other species. Like dandelion seeds, we
parachute, but we do so for recreational and not reproductive reasons. The
simple-minded extrapolation from a handful of animal species is no proof
that human rape is a direct adaptation.
The second test of the theory involves performing the actual reproduc-
tive calculus of a human rapist. Do rapists really have more children over
the course of their lives than equally dispossessed but nonraping males?
This calculation cannot be made in view of the large number of unreported
rapes (figures range from 50 to 80 percent) and of rapists who are never
caught. According to Thornhill and Palmer, a single rape in peacetime has
about a two percent chance of producing pregnancy. The problem is that
we will never know the reproductive costs. Does the chance of being
caught lower a rapist’s future reproductive output by more than two per-
cent? Indeed, such a calculus, based on modern statistics, may be com-
pletely irrelevant to judging the costs and the benefits obtaining when rape
really evolved. As the authors note, if natural selection built the human
“rape module,” this almost certainly occurred in our distant evolutionary
past, when society differed from our own in unknown and unknowable
ways. Human civilization, after all, arose in only the last one-tenth of one
percent of the interval since we branched off from our primate ancestors.
All that we can say, therefore, is that the reproductive benefits of ances-
tral rapists may have been lower than those of modern rapists (because of
a lack of contraception, it is possible that females were pregnant far more
often than they are now, and subsequent nursing of a child usually sup-
presses ovulation); and the costs may well have been higher (given the lack
of jails, punishments for rape were probably more severe, and the chances
180 Jerry A. Coyne

of getting caught higher in small social groups). But the important point is
that all such speculations remain mere stories about our unrecoverable
past. Thornhill and Palmer are right to note that current observations
about rape may bear little relation to forces acting in our ancestors. But
they then ignore their own warnings and proceed to buttress the direct-
selection hypothesis with statistics from modern Western societies.
The highlight of Thornhill and Palmer’s evidence—their third method of
supporting the direct-selection hypothesis—is a series of “predictions”
about what one would expect to see if rape had evolved as a direct adap-
tation. These predictions (all supposedly verified by the authors’ research)
are meant to confer the prestige of rigorous science on their argument.
When examined closely, however, the scientific evidence fails on three
counts.
First, it is hard to see from modern statistics that rape increases repro-
duction. Thornhill and Palmer make much of their verified prediction that
women of reproductive age are overrepresented among rape victims, as
one might expect if rapists prey on potential childbearers. But, looking
closer, one sees that a significant number of rape victims are either too old
or too young to reproduce. According to Thornhill and Palmer themselves,
one cited study showed that 29 percent of victims were younger than
eleven. (Given the frequency of unreported child molestation, the true per-
centage may be even higher.) Other studies concur; and, when one adds in
postmenopausal women, at least a third of all rapes have no possibility of
producing children. Also, roughly 20 percent of all rapes do not involve
vaginal penetration, and 50 percent of all rapes do not include ejaculation
in the vagina (see Thornhill and Thornhill 1983). So, although there is
some overlap between these classes, these rapes must also be excluded
from the “reproductive” category.
Thornhill and Palmer note that while few rapes in peacetime are ac-
companied by murder—as expected if rape is a reproductive act—more
than 22 percent of rapes involve violence in excess of what is needed to
force copulation. This rather plainly supports the view that at least some
rapes involve anger and gratuitous violence and are not completely moti-
vated by a desire to reproduce. Moreover, roughly 10 percent of all rapes
in peacetime are gang rapes, and, insofar as they involve more males than
are needed to overcome the victim, they must be considered less adaptive
 Of Vice and Men 181

than individual rapes because competition between ejaculates lowers each

rapist’s chance to reproduce.
Although we lack hard statistics, anecdotal evidence also suggests that
many wartime rapes involve large groups of soldiers and often culminate
in the murder or sexual mutilation of the victim. These, of course, are acts
of sexual violence, pure and simple, and cannot in any way be attributed
to reproduction. And what about wartime sex prisons, such as those set up
by occupying Japanese during World War II, in which kidnapped women
were repeatedly raped by many different soldiers? Finally, same-sex prison
rapes, which in most states are not even counted as rapes, cannot produce
offspring, but involve the subjugation of victims for sex, power, and hu-
miliation. There are thus a great many rapes that are nonreproductive.

Of course, not all biological adaptations are perfect, or apparent in every

individual. Anorexics, for example, clearly contravene our evolutionary
dictate to eat. Still, the large number of exceptions to what is proposed by
Thornhill and Palmer as a direct adaptation is disturbing. The problem is
that the authors never specify what percentage of rapes need be potentially
reproductive to show that rape evolved. Fifty percent? Eighty percent? (In-
deed, the vaginal-ejaculation data show that the proportion of “reproduc-
tive” rapes cannot exceed fifty percent; and this upper limit becomes even
smaller if we include male victims.) As with most sociobiological argu-
ments, apparently one need find only some level of concordance with pre-
diction to consider a trait to be an evolutionary adaptation.
Faced with many clear cases of nonadaptive rapes, Thornhill and Palmer
revert to their two fallback positions: the by-product hypothesis and spe-
cial pleading about the different conditions of our evolutionary past.
Thus, confronted by the annoying fact that some rapists have wealth and
high status, the authors immediately invoke the by-product hypothesis:
“Rape by men with high status and abundant resources may arise from a
combination of impunity and the hypothetical adaptation pertaining to
evaluation of a victim’s vulnerability. If so, their raping must result from
adaptations other than that suggested by the second hypothesis [direct
adaptation]. . . .” (p. 68).
182 Jerry A. Coyne

In this way, Thornhill and Palmer have constructed an airtight case, an

argument that cannot be refuted. Aspects of rape that seem adaptive must
have evolved by direct selection, while nonadaptive aspects are seen as evo-
lutionary holdovers or by-products. Lawyers call this “arguing in the al-
ternative.” It is not science, but advocacy. And if many rapes can be written
off as nonadaptive acts, why don’t Thornhill and Palmer even consider the
possibility that all rapes might be nonadaptive?
There is another difficulty that Thornhill and Palmer evade. For nearly
all of their observations, there are reasonable alternative explanations that
do not involve direct selection. As predicted by the direct-selection hy-
pothesis, for example, rapists tend to be young men from lower socioeco-
nomic classes, who supposedly have limited access to mates. (Thornhill
and Palmer offer no evidence for this supposed correlation between class
status and access to mates.) But poorer men are disproportionately repre-
sented among all violent criminals, including those committing murder,
armed robbery, and assault. Why does this observation confirm the direct-
selection hypothesis instead of the simpler view that deprived, angry males
commit violent acts that could gain them reputation, sex, or money?
Similarly, women between the ages of 18 and 30 are over-represented as
rape victims compared to older women, a trend predicted by the notion
that rapists prefer fertile victims. But what is the relative vulnerability of
women of different ages to being raped? Could they differ in their avail-
ability to men who would molest them, or in their relative tendency to re-
port rape? Or could the mostly young rapists merely be finding victims
within their easily accessed peer group?
Why, exactly, is rape “a horrendous experience for the victim?” Thorn-
hill and Palmer have an answer: the loss of her ability to choose her mate
or the possibility that the rape will alienate her existing mate. But this an-
swer is not only offensive, it is also incoherent. Why not argue that any
violation of the body is traumatic, with rape being the most extreme in-
trusion? Surely victims of homosexual rape do not walk away mentally
unscathed. The reader may find it amusing, and not all that hard, to devise
plausible alternatives for the other half-dozen observations that Thornhill
and Palmer offer as proof of the direct-selection theory.
Thornhill and Palmer also cite earlier psychological studies that seem to
support the direct-selection theory, but a trip to the library shows that the
authors misrepresent at least some of this literature. Lacking the time to
 Of Vice and Men 183

look up every citation, I decided to check three claims about rape taken
from Thornhill’s own earlier publications. I was shocked to find that none
of these claims are supported by the cited articles.
According to Thornhill and Palmer, the literature shows that female
rape victims of reproductive age suffer more trauma than do older and
younger victims (this is an essential element of their argument, since they
see rape trauma as a direct adaptation); that older and younger victims suf-
fer less rape-inflicted violence than do reproductive-age women (the latter
fight harder to protect their eggs, and males fight harder to fertilize them);
and that, compared to either pre- or postreproductive victims, raped fe-
males of reproductive age experience a higher proportion of penile-vaginal
intercourse (rapists can recognize fertile females). These three claims de-
rive from a study of 790 rape victims examined at Philadelphia General
Hospital in 1973 and 1974. The study was published by McCahill, Meyer,
and Fischman (1979), and its data further analyzed in three papers by
Thornhill and Nancy Thornhill, the latter an anthropologist and his for-
mer wife (Thornhill and Thornhill 1990a, b, 1991).
In the three publications by Thornhill and Thornhill, the data show that
while younger women (under twelve years) do indeed experience less
trauma, violence, and vaginal rape than do reproductive-age women be-
tween the ages of twelve and forty-four, older women do not differ from
reproductive-age females. Thornhill and Palmer thus achieve their “sup-
portive” results by statistical sleight of hand: they lump together younger
and older women when comparing them to reproductive-age women, and
the difference between these “reproductive” and nonreproductive” victims
results entirely from the effect of the youngest age class. This improper com-
bining of heterogeneous data allows the authors to state, misleadingly, that
“the study showed that reproductive-age victims suffered significantly more
psychological trauma than non-reproductive-age rape victims” (p. 90),
and that “reproductive-age rape victims were more often subjected to vio-
lent attacks than victims in the other two categories” (p. 91).
These three “predictions,” then, are supported by the one comparison
(younger versus reproductive) but not by the other (older versus reproduc-
tive). The general claim for rape and trauma as adaptations is achieved
only by fiddling with the data. This is not the way that scientists normally
behave. Moreover, even the differences between the youngest class and
the two older classes may be caused by phenomena other than natural
184 Jerry A. Coyne

selection. Lack of vaginal intercourse in younger victims, some of them

babes in arms, may be due to mechanical problems. And in the trauma
study, the reactions of young girls (from two months to eleven years old)
were often measured in a bizarre way—by consulting third parties. As
noted in Thornhill and Thornhill (1990a, p. 161): “the child’s caretaker
sometimes helped the child respond to interview questions, or with very
young victims, the caretaker gave the responses to the questions based on
his/her perception of the effect of the sexual assault on the child.” Does
anyone really believe that a third party can accurately judge the degree to
which a young child suffers increased “insecurities concerning sexual at-
tractiveness” or “fear of unknown men”? (These were two criteria used to
measure trauma.) Is it possible that caretakers may consciously or uncon-
sciously try to minimize the trauma suffered by young girls? Or that young
girls—or women of any age—will show full trauma only after a period of
time? (All victims were interviewed within five days of the rape.)
There are other problems with these cited studies, including the failure
to apply standard statistical corrections that, when used, weaken the
“supportive” results; but we need not go further. The studies discredit
themselves. I emphasize again that these are the only bits of supporting
“evidence” that I checked. Did I happen, by chance, to find the only three
inaccurate citations in the book?3
Thornhill and Palmer can be very nasty about those who differ with
their analysis, mainly sociologists and feminists. “[A]ccording to the as-
sumptions of the social science explanation of rape,” they write, “the prob-
lem of rape could be solved simply by teaching women that rape is a
wonderful experience” (p. 152). Also, “because the evolutionary ap-
proach threatens the theories and approaches that have traditionally been
used to study human behavior, it poses a serious threat to the status of
those who have achieved success in their fields using non-evolutionary ap-
proaches” (p. 115). It appears that Thornhill and Palmer alone care about
truth, and everyone else cares about status.
In fact, Thornhill and Palmer are accusing others of what are really their
own failings: “Not only is the bulk of the social science literature of rape
clearly indifferent to scientific standards; many of the studies exhibit overt
hostility toward scientific approaches, and specifically toward biological
approaches. The message of these studies is clearly political rather than
scientific” (p. 148). It is Thornhill and Palmer who are guilty of indiffer-
 Of Vice and Men 185

ence to scientific standards. They buttress strong claims with weak rea-
soning, weak data, and finagled statistics. Their book lacks the measured
tone and the openness to alternative theories that characterize truly scien-
tific work. (Compare their sledgehammer approach with the moderate
tone of On the Origin of Species.) It is perfectly clear to any fair-minded
reader of A Natural History of Rape that its objective is not to test whether
rape is an adaptation, but to prove it. Their evolutionary-psychological ex-
planation of rape is not their conclusion, but their premise.

By claiming that rape is a natural biological act, Thornhill and Palmer im-
mediately lay themselves open to the accusation of making excuses for
rapists. They repeatedly distance themselves from this accusation (who
wouldn’t?), properly claiming that to equate “natural” with “allowable”
or “good” is a common error known as “the naturalistic fallacy.” They add
that evolved biological impulses should not be used in court as a defense
of rapists, even though their own work has made such a defense possible.
But they do declare that social policies to eliminate rape will not work
unless they take into account the crime’s evolutionary origin. Their “evo-
lutionarily informed” suggestions are either obvious and derivable from
nonevolutionary views of rape (punish rapists more harshly, teach young
men not to rape, urge women to avoid secluded spots), fatuous (build male
and female summer camps farther apart, use chaperones early in a rela-
tionship), or invidious (counsel rape victims by telling them that their
trauma is adaptive).
Thornhill and Palmer justify Darwinian anti-rape courses for men by
noting (p. 154) that “individuals who really understood the evolutionary
bases of their actions might be better able to avoid behaving in an ‘adap-
tive’ fashion that is damaging to others.” Does anyone imagine that young
men will be less inclined to rape when they hear that it is in their genes? Or
that rape victims will be consoled by understanding the supposed evolu-
tionary roots of their trauma and depression?
There is a curious two-valued logic in the idea that those who under-
stand the evolutionary basis of a crime will be less likely to commit it. Such
a belief implies that we can, by force of will, overcome our genetic legacy.
As Thornhill and Palmer observe:
186 Jerry A. Coyne

To the extent that knowledge about the causes of things becomes a part of the en-
vironment and increases our ability to change things, men who are made aware of
the evolutionary reasons for their suspicions about their wives’ or girlfriends’
claims of rape should be in a better position to change their reactions to such
claims. (p. 159)

But Thornhill and Palmer also believe that rapists are not stopped by
knowing that their crime is both immoral and criminal—knowledge that
is also “part of the environment.” Why should knowing that rape is an
adaptation be any different?
Thornhill and Palmer also claim that women in scanty dress are more
likely to be raped, and should keep this risk in mind when picking their
clothes (p. 181):
Young women should also be informed that female choice, over the course of the
evolution of human sexuality, has produced men who will be quickly aroused by
signals of a female’s willingness to grant sexual access. . . . And it should be made
clear that, although sexy clothing and promises of sexual access may be means of
attracting desired males (Cashdan 1993), they may also attract undesired ones.

Of all the book’s claims, this one has caused the most furor among women,
feminist or otherwise. But the reader will search in vain for any evidence
that showing more skin provokes more rape. The source of Thornhill and
Palmer’s advice on this point is a complete mystery.
This brings us to the largest question broached by this book. Can
knowledge about evolution play a useful role in reforming society? I
strongly doubt it. The best approach to stopping crime, for example, is
likely to be the pragmatic one: do what works best, regardless of the
crime’s evolutionary underpinnings. Must we study the evolutionary basis
of murder to deal effectively with it? Should we think about the evolution
of greed when making antitrust laws?
A useful parallel may be drawn from medicine. Can understanding the
evolutionary origin of a disease facilitate its cure? We know both the ge-
netic and evolutionary roots of only one malady: sickle-cell anemia. The
gene that causes this disease also helps to fight malaria, and thus sickle-cell
anemia is common in residents of mosquito-infested areas of Africa (and
in their black American relatives). But this knowledge is of absolutely no
comfort to those suffering from the disease, and it has been of no use to
physicians trying to cure it.4
While denouncing feminists and sociologists for their misguided and
scientifically uninformed attempts to deal with rape, Thornhill and Palmer
 Of Vice and Men 187

overlook the major improvements that these groups have made in legal and
cultural attitudes toward rape. The dropping of the legal requirement for
eyewitness corroboration of rape; the restriction on courtroom presenta-
tion of a victim’s prior sexual history; the founding of rape crisis centers;
the establishment of more compassionate attitudes toward victims by po-
lice, hospital staff, psychiatric counselors, and juries: All of these con-
structive policy changes were brought into being by (to use Thornhill and
Palmer’s phrase) “individuals uninformed by evolutionary theory.”
Thornhill and Palmer’s attempts to gain control of rape counseling,
laws, and punishments, despite the weakness of their science, reveal their
larger goal: the engulfment of social science and social policy by the great
whale of evolutionary psychology. This attempted takeover is not new. It
was first suggested in 1978 in E. O. Wilson’s On Human Nature. More re-
cently, in Consilience, Wilson extended the program to nearly every area
of human thought, including aesthetics and ethics. We are witnessing a
new campaign for the Darwinization of Everything. Thornhill and
Palmer’s theory of rape is just the most recent attempt at annexing all hu-
man experience to evolutionary psychology.
After all, if one can give a credible evolutionary explanation for the dif-
ficult problem of rape, then no human behavior is immune to such anal-
ysis, and the cause is significantly advanced. The apocalyptic tone
pervading Thornhill and Palmer’s book reveals the party to which they be-
long: “The biophobia that has led to the rejection of Darwinian analyses
of human behavior is an intellectual disaster” (p. 122). And “in address-
ing the question of rape, the choice between the politically constructed an-
swers of social science and the evidentiary answers of evolutionary biology
is essentially a choice between ideology and knowledge” (Thornhill and
Palmer 2000b, p. 36).
Let us be clear. It is not “biophobia” to reject the reduction of all human
feelings and actions to evolution. Quite the contrary. It is biophilia; or at
least a proper respect for science. The “choice between ideology and
knowledge” is a real choice; but it is Thornhill, Palmer, and the doctrinaire
evolutionary psychologists who choose ideology over knowledge. Unfor-
tunately, they enjoy the advantage that people like scientific explanations
for their behavior and the certainty that such explanations provide. At-
tributing our traumas and misdeeds to our savannah-dwelling ancestors
lessens the moral pressure on our lives. And so the disciplinary hubris of
188 Jerry A. Coyne

evolutionary psychology and the longing for certainty of ordinary men

and women have combined to create a scientific cargo cult, with everyone
waiting in vain for evolutionary psychology to deliver the goods that it
doesn’t have.
Amid this debacle—for A Natural History of Rape is truly an embar-
rassment to the field—I am consoled by the parallels between evolution-
ary psychology and Freudianism. Freud’s views lost credibility when
people realized that they were not based on science, but were actually an
ideological edifice, a myth about human life, that was utterly resistant to
scientific refutation. By judicious manipulation, every possible observa-
tion of human behavior could be (and was) fitted into the Freudian frame-
work. Evolutionary psychologists are now building a similar edifice. They,
too, deal in dogmas rather than the propositions of science. Evolutionary
psychology will have its day in the sun, but versions of the faith such as
Thornhill and Palmer’s will disappear when people realize that they are
useless and unscientific.

Acknowledgments

This essay is a revision of a piece originally published in the New Republic

(April 3, 2000). I thank Andrew Berry, Susan Brownmiller, and Anne
Magurran for discussion and critique of the manuscript, and Leon Wies-
eltier for his perceptive editing of the original essay.

Notes

1. All unattributed quotes in the rest of this chapter are taken from A Natural His-
tory of Rape.
2. Jennifer Pozner discusses the media’s sensationalistic and nonscientific treat-
ment of the controversy in her (2000) article, “In rape debate, controversy trumps
credibility.”
3. At least one author of the original study by McCahill, Meyer, and Fischman
(1979) has repudiated Thornhill and Palmer’s conclusions. Linda Williams (for-
merly Linda Meyer) was interviewed by the Chicago Tribune about A Natural His-
tory of Rape (“A researcher blasts rape theory,” by Jeremy Manier, Mar. 12, 2000,
p. 4):
Moreover, the original survey was not intended to accurately record trauma levels
among children, said Linda Williams, a sociologist who helped direct the study.
“We did not have a clue that so many of the rape victims were going to be children
 Of Vice and Men 189

and old ladies,” said Williams, now a researcher at Wellesley College in Massa-
chusetts. “This was 1973, remember. We still thought rape victims were almost all
women of child-bearing age.”
Likewise, Pozner (2000, p. 9) notes:
This alarm at Thornhill’s misrepresentation of statistics is shared by Anthony
Goldsmith, director of the Joseph Peters Institute (formerly the Center for Rape
Concern), the group that conducted the 1973–74 research on rape victims. De-
scribing Thornhill’s claims about victims’ varying rates of trauma as a “bad anal-
ysis of the data,” Goldsmith told Extra!, “The research doesn’t support what they
claim, and that’s bad science. It’s not nice when our data is misused. I don’t like
it . . . particularly when it’s used to support a theory that hinders the way we work
with offenders.”
4. Evolutionary biology may be useful in medicine by helping us understand the
evolution of disease-causing organisms, as in cases of antibiotic resistance in bac-
teria. It is unlikely, however, that understanding the evolutionary basis of human
genetic diseases will lead to new treatments.

References

Cashdan, E. (1993). Attracting mates: Effects of parental investment on mate at-

traction strategies. Ethology and Sociobiology 14: 1–24.
Manier, Jeremy (2000). A researcher blasts rape theory. Chicago Tribune,
March 12, p. 4.
McCahill, T. W., L. C. Meyer, and A. M. Fischman (1979). The Aftermath of
Rape. Lexington, Mass.: Heath.
Pozner, Jennifer (2000). In rape debate, controversy trumps credibility. Extra! 13:
8–10.
Thornhill, R. and C. T. Palmer (2000a). A Natural History of Rape: Biological
Bases of Sexual Coercion. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Thornhill, R. and C. T. Palmer. (2000b). Why men rape. The Sciences Jan./Feb.:
30–36.
Thornhill, R. and N. W. Thornhill. (1983). Human rape: An evolutionary analysis.
Ethology and Sociobiology 4: 137–173.
Thornhill, N. W. and R. Thornhill (1990a). An evolutionary analysis of psycho-
logical pain following rape: I. The effects of victim’s age and marital status. Ethol-
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Thornhill, N. W. and R. Thornhill (1990b). An evolutionary analysis of psycho-
logical pain following rape: III. Effects of force and violence. Aggressive Behavior
16: 297–320.
Thornhill, N. W. and R. Thornhill (1991). An evolutionary analysis of psycho-
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of the sexual assault. Journal of Comparative Psychology 105: 243–252.
8
Evolutionary Models of Why Men Rape:
Acknowledging the Complexities
Mary P. Koss

Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer’s book A Natural History of Rape: Bio-
logical Bases of Sexual Coercion (2000a) sets up a stark contrast between
evolutionary theory and “feminist theory” that performed perfectly its in-
tended role as a media hook (for a summary of the book see Thornhill and
Palmer 2000b). The authors have appeared on CNN, Dateline, and other
television programs, as well as on National Public Radio, disseminating
their position. Victim advocates, National Organization of Women offi-
cers, experts on evolutionary biology, and Susan Brownmiller herself re-
butted. This media phenomenon was a sad incident for rape prevention
advocates, evolutionary biology, and science itself. The framing of the is-
sues by Thornhill and Palmer increased resistance to evolutionary analysis,
ill represented the process of science, and encouraged harmful prevention
suggestions. This commentary examines in more depth than permitted
in the public media selected hypotheses, supporting evidence, and rec-
ommendations for rape prevention. The complexity of causal analysis of
rape is highlighted, including the consensus of expert panels on violence
against women that no theory emphasizing a single cause is adequate to
explain why men rape, no matter what its ideology.

The Evolutionary Thesis

Not only do Thornhill and Palmer have some evolutionary ideas to ad-
vance, they want to do so on a battlefield. The authors frame their presen-
tation as a battle of evolution versus the social sciences, likening those who
reject a reproductive explanation for rape to right-wing fundamentalists.
As Thornhill and Palmer see it, evolutionary biology is armed with a
192 Mary P. Koss

knowledge-based approach to the issues whereas social science mounts

only an ideologically driven advance. They repeatedly put on the armor of
science. The battle cries echoed repeatedly include: Science is value free.
Science is the only road to the truth. Science has the answers. Science will
win. Most of these sentiments are naive from the perspective of the social
construction of science—no theory or measurement is free from shaping
by the human mind. Paradigms guiding designs of studies are human cre-
ations and are well known for their resistance to change even in the face of
compelling empirical data. And, as soon as statements about the meaning
of results are made, numbers become subject to interpretation. As Moore
and Travis note, “Biologically based science has the nice quality of dis-
guising politics” (2000, p. 25). By cloaking themselves in science talk
(“bio-proof”), Thornhill and Palmer aim to camouflage their unstated ide-
ological agenda, deflect attention from the obvious flaws in their logic and
supporting evidence, and inflate the importance of their own work. They
succeed only in diminishing the stature of science and fueling anti-
intellectualism by the public.
Now that we have examined the framing of the issues, let’s inspect the
evolutionary arguments themselves. Thornhill and Palmer’s primary aim is
to challenge the idea that rape is an expression of power, which they cor-
rectly identify as the prevailing view in the advocate community. The book
actually presents two alternative hypotheses of human rape. The first is the
idea that rape is a special adaptive strategy that human males have devel-
oped because it helps them to sire more offspring. The second is that rape
is a by-product of male sexual desire and preference for higher numbers of
sexual partners. The latter alternative is totally undeveloped and the en-
tire text is designed to describe, support, and consider the implications of
rape as a special adaptation. In so doing, Thornhill and Palmer commit
the same error for which their work has already been taken to task by col-
leagues (e.g., Figueredo 1992). The peer review process is the best system
yet devised to ensure that science moves forward and that bad ideas are
separated from good ideas. Given the mantle of science the authors have
gathered around them, it is surprising to see so little attention devoted to
acknowledging and responding to peer criticism of which they have long
been aware. Elaborating the by-product model would have been more
palatable to the general public because its links with reproduction are
more indirect and would have provided a basis for integration of feminist
 Evolutionary Models of Why Men Rape 193

thought about rape. But in the media world controversy sells, and some
scholars fall prey to its lures. In the field of sexual violence we have seen
this all before.
Grasping the gist of rape as a reproductive strategy involves a short over-
view of the principles of Darwinian natural selection. As Moor and Travis
succinctly summarize (1999, p. 44), “The general principles of natural
selection are not inherently sexist and simply stated propose that indiv-
iduals vary; some variations are more favorable than others; some of this
variation is heritable; differential reproductive success may occur; and dif-
fering gene frequencies may result” (p. 44). The special adaptation model
views rape as one of three strategies that have ostensibly evolved to help
males find mates, gain sexual access, and produce offspring bearing their
genes. These strategies are possessing physical attractiveness, being a pow-
erful warrior, and when all else fails, raping. Thornhill and Palmer argue
that men resort to rape when they cannot gain access to women through
looks, wealth, or status. To the extent that offspring have been conceived
by rape, any genes associated with raping are passed along.
A cornerstone of Thornhill and Palmer’s treatise is the old concept of dif-
ferential parental investment (Trivers 1972). It states that male and female
animals differ in their parental effort. Males show less parental effort in
monogamous species, which leads to greater sexual competition among
males and chosiness by females (Thornhill & Palmer 2000a, pp. 33–36).
Since the male’s minimum investment in children is limited to fertilizing
the egg, the parental investment theory states that they best ensure their
genes will be represented in future generations by mating with a large
number of females. If they cannot obtain mates through other strategies,
rape is better than leaving no offspring from this viewpoint.
To support their model, Thornhill and Palmer follow a confirmatory
strategy, listing the predictions that logically flow from it and providing
purported supportive evidence. Some of the major predictions that Thorn-
hill and Palmer make about rape as a special adaptation include: (1) Most
rape victims will be women of childbearing age (pp. 70–73); (2) rapists will
not seriously injure their victims (p. 76); (3) rape victims who experience
more violence will suffer less emotional distress (pp. 92, 192); (4) vaginal
penetration will be more distressing than other forms (pp. 94, 192); and
(5) married women and women of childbear-ing age will experience more
194 Mary P. Koss

psychological distress over rape than single women or menopausal women

(pp. 89–93, 192–193). The logic behind predictions (1) and (2) is that for
rape to be a special adaptation you need to show it has reproductive con-
sequences, in this case by demonstrating that it is done primarily to
women who could bear children as a result, and who were not so seri-
ously injured by the forced impregnation that they died, miscarried, or
gave birth to defective offspring. Predictions (3) through (5) are based on
work with former wife Nancy Thornhill. Her thinking was that women’s
emotional distress should be greater the more rape had an impact on re-
productive interests. The link of these hypotheses to the special adapta-
tion model is never explained, and they appear tangential.
Although most of the documentation provided by Thornhill and Palmer
concerns insects and birds, they also use standard social science data. They
test their deductions with secondary analysis of a data set originally pre-
sented by McCahill, Meyer, and Fischman in the pioneering work The Af-
termath of Rape (1979). The source of the data was rape survivors seeking
services at a Philadelphia emergency room. The authors fail to address po-
tential concerns with these data such as validity: How well were the con-
structs assessed given data collection predated formulation of the theory?
Was measurement of the constructs reliable and valid? Nor is generaliz-
ability to rape survivors examined. It is certainly questionable given that
only 5 percent of rape victims sought emergency room care according to
the national survey conducted for the U.S. Department of Justice (Tjaden
and Thoennes 1998).
The presentation concludes with suggestions for rape prevention activ-
ities. Thornhill and Palmer confidently predict that any prevention effort
will fail unless based on an understanding that rape evolved as a form of
male reproductive behavior. Their recommendations include: (1) educat-
ing youth that all men are potential rapists who must learn to inhibit their
natural impulses; (2) sensitizing women to the biological proclivities of men
and to the role that women’s apparel plays in triggering rape; (3) suggesting
that women should exert more control over the circumstances of dating,
socializing only in public places; and (4) providing a Darwinian perspec-
tive to women undergoing counseling to help them understand why they
are distressed about being raped.
 Evolutionary Models of Why Men Rape 195

The Evidence

Disputing the “Facts”

Had each of the deductions been the subject of a peer-reviewed empirical
paper, they would have been examined in the context of related findings
from existing literature. Thornhill and Palmer make virtually no reference
to other empirical findings on sexual assault that contradict their thesis.
The bulk of available data makes fiction of the facts, thus eliminating all
the data that the authors purport are supportive of their theory except
their observations of insect and bird behavior.

Many Rape Victims Are Children, Not Women of Reproductive Age

Contrary to the assertion that rapists favor reproductive age women, The
Rape in America national survey (Kilpatrick, Edmunds, and Seymour
1992) reported that exactly 1/3 of victims were under 11 years old when
first raped, and a total of 2/ 3 were younger than 17. The National Violence
Against Women survey reported that 22 percent of rape victims were un-
der age 12 when first sexually assaulted, and 32 percent were between 12
and 17 years old. Even without taking into account data on rapes of post-
menopausal women, men, and boys, these figures establish that a sizable
number of rapes lack reproductive consequences.

Women of Childbearing Age Do Not Experience the Most Distress

The literature on the impact of sexual trauma fails to support a link of
childbearing potential to distress. Instead, child sexual abuse is consis-
tently associated with the most severe, broad, and long-lasting effects, in-
cluding lifelong elevated risks of physical problems, emotional distress,
and more unsafe health behaviors like smoking, excessive drinking, and
lack of physical activity (see Saunders et al. 1999; Walker et al. 1999a;
Walker et al. 1999b; for a review see Messman and Long 1996). In terms
of greatest fear, the elderly suffer from rape the most (Muram, Miller, and
Cutler 1992; Warr 1985).

Distress Does Not Vary Inversely with Rapist’s Violence

The idea that less violence causes more distress is not only counter-
intuitive, it is at odds with the bulk of trauma literature. Recent nation-
wide studies established that the major predictors of posttraumatic stress
196 Mary P. Koss

disorder were objective severity of the violence inflicted, the subjective fear
of death or serious injury, and whether penetration of the body occurred
(Epstein, Saunders, and Kilpatrick 1997). Also important were how much
a woman blamed herself for what happened, and how threatening to her
worldview she saw the rape (Frazier 1990; Frazier and Schauben 1994;
Norris and Kaniasty 1991; Koss, Figueredo, and Prince, in press). Most
people intuitively understand these findings because they support the ob-
vious: The harder you are hit, the more it hurts.

All Unwanted Penetration is Traumatic in Women of All Ages

Is vaginal rape, because of its potential for impregnation, more traumatic
than other forms of penetration? This hypothesis is faulty on its face be-
cause it overlooks the invention of modern methods of birth control in-
cluding postconception interventions that restore to women control over
reproduction and render moot any selective advantage for rape. Even if
this issue had the importance attributed to it by Thornhill and Palmer,
there are several methodological obstacles that raise questions as to
whether they or anyone else could establish that vaginal penetration is
most distressing. Among the barriers to establishing a clear cut relation-
ship are: (1) the meaning of different forms of penetration is culturally
conditioned, precluding universal statements about how they would be
viewed by the survivor; (2) many rapes may involve multiple forms of pen-
etration thereby resisting categorization; and (3) the amount of injury
caused by rape is highly significant and would need to be measured and
controlled for before the relationship of distress and form of penetration
could be disentangled. Current literature establishes that all unwanted
penetration is traumatic. It may not really matter if a Chevy truck or a Ford
truck hits you; in either case you are seriously harmed.

Although Rapists Rarely Kill, Life Threat Is High

Thornhill and Palmer conclude that rapists rarely harm their victims. This
statement is somewhat true about half the picture. According to the Rape
in America study, 28 percent of rapes involve some degree of physical in-
jury. However, as we saw earlier, postassault impact is predicted not just
by objective severity but also by subjective severity. Half of all women
feared that they would be seriously harmed or killed during their rape.
 Evolutionary Models of Why Men Rape 197

Prevention Recommendations are Naive and Harmful

Although good scientific practice dictates not generalizing beyond the

capability of the data, Thornhill and Palmer move from consideration of
insects and lower animals to making recommendations for preventing hu-
man rape and treating rape survivors. They address prevention at the indi-
vidual level of causation. Ignored is the need for prevention initiatives at
broader societal levels. Even from their biological perspective, several so-
cietal-level strategies would be helpful, such as revamping the legal system
to better deter rape by enforcing penalties for men who fail to restrain, or
advocating legislation that would continue to guarantee women access to
the means to control the outcomes of forced sexual contact. Biopreven-
tion based on the flawed assumptions listed below will not solve the rape
problem.

Men as Potential Rapists

One of the critical problems faced by those who design rape prevention ed-
ucation is backlash that results in male attendees leaving even more re-
sentful and angry at women than they were prior to the program (Lonsway
1996). Thornhill and Palmer suggest that prevention programs for young
men teach them about their biological propensities to rape and warn of the
need to inhibit these impulses. In short, men should be taught that they are
all potential rapists. Years of experience in rape prevention have taught me
that this approach is not productive. Men vociferously challenge any pre-
senter who fails to distinguish between rapists and regular guys who want
emotional relationships with women who will eventually end up raising
kids they love and invest in. Nor is the recommendation grounded in es-
tablished fact. The jury is still out on men’s potential to rape, even among
evolutionary psychologists. When pushed, many who assert that all men
are potential rapists limit their assertion to the moment of birth. From
there on, the potential is shaped by social and environmental influences
that render most men incapable of raping. This is similar to saying that all
humans are potential killers at birth. Men differ greatly in the extent to
which they are aroused by sexual aggression and in their self-reported like-
lihood they would force sex on a woman. Few men say they would rape
even if guaranteed not to be caught or punished, and even with a softer
198 Mary P. Koss

wording about forcing a woman to have sex only a minority indicate any
likelihood of sexual coercion (Malamuth and Dean 1991).
Thornhill and Palmer’s suggestion that time in rape prevention should
be spent explaining Darwinian theory is laughable from the practical per-
spective. Even when rape seminars are marketed as “How To Be a Better
Lover” workshops, attendance by men is low and limited to the already
converted. And, such material takes time away from more critical preven-
tion targets, such as teaching how to get consent from a woman so that
their advances are reciprocated and educating them about what acts
constitute rape. For example, men need to know that having sex with a
drunken woman, something commonly seen as a stroke of good luck, is ac-
tually rape under the law. And they need to know that adding a drug to her
drink elevates the crime to an aggravated level with the harsh sentences
typical of the country’s war on drugs. Thornhill and Palmer’s suggestion to
focus on harsh penalties also isn’t honest about actual judicial outcomes
for date rape (Koss 2000; Koss, in press).

Women Should Dress to Avoid Rape . . . How?

How would you advise women to dress to avoid rape? There have been
rapists who were acquitted because the victims dressed “provocatively” in
a turtleneck sweater and a mid-calf skirt (Bublick 1999). Where would it
end? The mindset behind this advice is not far from that of countries where
women are required by law to dress in shapeless head-to-toe black bags
with a mask and two slits for the eyes so as not to provoke sexual attack.
As Thornhill and Palmer see it, the capacity for women to avoid rape has
been selected for because those female ancestors who reproduced most
successfully were very distressed about rape, learned how to identify the
circumstances that resulted in rape, and avoided them. The implication is
that many women today know how to avoid rape but prevention programs
are needed for those poor souls who don’t. We are not told how these
highly vulnerable women would be identified.
The entire premise is based on an empirically unfounded assumption
that women can protect themselves from rape. In fact, there has been no
success in separating those women who have and haven’t been raped on
the basis of routine activities, personalities, or beliefs. Although there have
been isolated reports that women who drink in bars have a high rape
rate (Parks and Miller 1997), longitudinal study has demonstrated that
 Evolutionary Models of Why Men Rape 199

alcohol use is triggered by past victimization and does not predict future
victimization (Kilpatrick et al. 1997). Furthermore, sexual assault is an
exception to the rule in criminology that routine activities have some
power to predict vulnerability to crime (Mustaine and Tewsbury 1998). To
the extent that rape can be predicted, history of sexual abuse in childhood
is the most prominent factor. But even sexual abuse fails the test of practi-
cal significance. Chance would allow 15 percent of rape victims to be pre-
dicted correctly, whereas child abuse increases the figure only to 19 percent
(Abbey et al. 1996; Himelein 1995; Koss and Dinero 1989). Thus, it has
not been for lack of study that no powerful correlates of vulnerability are
known.
It is also hard to see how formulating an acquaintanceship would be a
protection against rape. Fully 86 percent of rape victims knew the man
who raped them, and 20 percent of ever married women have been raped
by a spouse (Bergen 1996; Browne 1993; Tjaden and Thoennes 1998).
Furthermore, socializing in public places isn’t going to eliminate rape.
Among women raped by nonstrangers, the U.S. Department of Justice (Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics (1997) reported that 32 percent of rapes occurred
in the street or in a restaurant or bar, commercial building, parking lot,
school, park, or playground (these figures are virtually identical to those
for women raped by strangers). Giving up going out at night won’t help ei-
ther—30 percent of rapes happened in the daytime. The most scientifically
appropriate reading of the data is that rape is predictable only on the
grounds of being female and the best protection would be avoiding all men
including family members.
Advice on women’s dress and conduct should be rejected not only be-
cause it is unscientific, but also because of its tacit assumption that women
have a responsibility to act “reasonably” and live their lives in fear of rape.
This thinking is absolutely unacceptable in a democratic society. Because
rape is a gendered crime, such recommendations harm equality by in-
fringing more on women’s liberties than men’s. “Women citizens have a le-
gal entitlement to act on a day-to-day basis on the premise that others will
not intentionally rape them” (Bublick 1999, p. 1443). The U.S. Constitu-
tion guarantees freedom of movement, a right to travel, a right of locomo-
tion, and a right to associate with others. In other words, women have the
right to use public transportation, travel geographically, socialize with
whom they choose, and express themselves through their dress in anyway
200 Mary P. Koss

they find comfortable that doesn’t violate public decency laws. If as a so-
ciety we are to have a citizen duty to take reasonable steps to avoid crime,
the steps should be the same for sex crimes as other crimes, and by exten-
sion, the same for men as for women.

Problems with Bioprevention

From a public policy perspective, conceptualizing rape largely as a biolog-
ical issue reframes it as “A problem to be punished but still expected in cer-
tain unavoidable numbers of occurrences, rather than as social problem
with the possibility of social remediation” (Moore and Travis 1999,
p. 47). The work becomes misguided “When the biology of sexual repro-
duction is taken as a general template or justification for a wide range of
stereotypic gender role behaviors, often producing prescriptions for be-
havior that limit individual opportunity and choice” (Moore and Travis
1999, p. 50). Biologically based public policy recommendations in the
area of rape are downright scary. Jones (1999) moved beyond calls for re-
strictions in women’s dress and activities. He advocates: (1) performing
chemical castration as the penalty for rape; (2) varying punishments for
rape by the age of the victim with lesser penalties for older women as they
are purportedly less traumatized; (3) having male judges refrain from mak-
ing judgments on rape owing to inherent sex differences that render them
incapable of making assessments of female psychology; (4) repealing of
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 on the grounds that gender an-
imus as a motivation for rape is inconsistent with biological models; (5) le-
galizing prostitution to make “voluntary” sex partners available to men;
and (6) using evolutionary material on relative harm by form of penetra-
tion, amount of violence, and age of victim to set damages in civil trials.
Conceptualizing rape as a sex act alone ignores that it is a serious crime
where the penis is used as a weapon. Clearly a man is not engaging in a sex
act when he screams “You know you like this Bitch” while penetrating a
woman and forcefully restraining her. The force behind the criminal act
of rape is a mixture of sexual motives and motives to control/dominate/
punish that vary in degree from case to case. My example would be low in
sexual motives. Some date rapes might provide scenarios for rapes in which
sexual motives appear more prominently. The important semantic distinc-
tion is that rape is not a sex act, it is a crime that can be impelled by sex-
ual motives. Acknowledging this mixture of motives is not new. In a 1991
 Evolutionary Models of Why Men Rape 201

review, Barbaree and Marshall concluded that rape is best defined as an in-
tegration of both components and that learning how sex and aggressive el-
ements interact will advance the field.

Dismissing One-Factor Theories

As a one-factor, one-level theory, the model of rape as a special adaptation
implicates a single set of causes that reside within individuals. Rape long
ago proved itself too complex to yield to such simplistic thinking. And, al-
though cloaked in biology, individual-level evolutionary analysis is also
out of step with modern biology’s focus on more complex issues, such as
evolution of a successful adaptation between a species and its environment
and survival of the group and the species (Hyde and Oliver 2000). It is
widely accepted that sexual assault is influenced by causes at multiple
levels that range from the broader society through institutions such as the
media and religion, the family, peer group, intimate relationships, and ul-
timately by features interior to each individual.
Researchers have demonstrated the links of sexual aggression to hered-
ity, physiology, neurophysiology, social learning, gender schemas, sexual
scripts, personality traits, attitudes regarding rape, power and sex motives,
and alcohol as causes of rape interior to the individual. At the dyadic level,
studies have examined contextual features of relationships such as com-
munication styles, the type and stages of relationships, and features that
may render women more vulnerable to sexual predation. Institutional in-
fluences that have been linked to rape include family, school, athletic
teams, religion, and media promotion of sex role stereotypes that teach or
reinforce female and male role imbalances, favor impersonal sex, down-
play the seriousness of violence against women, and fail to present suc-
cessful alternatives to male aggression (see Crowell and Burgess 1996 for
a review).
Evolutionary influences have been acknowledged as part of a compre-
hensive model of rape by panels of experts such as the National Academy
of Science Panel on Violence Against Women (Crowell and Burgess 1996)
and the American Psychological Association Taskforce on Male Violence
Against Women (Koss et al. 1994). Those who wish to learn how evolu-
tionary concepts can be integrated in a model that also addresses environ-
mental and social causation are referred to the work of Neil Malamuth
and colleagues (Malamuth, 1998; Malamuth et al. 1995; also see Heise
202 Mary P. Koss

1998). Alone, biological explanations will not solve social problems be-
cause people cannot change their evolutionary history. However, a con-
ceptualization of biological influences not as hardwiring but as potential
pathways that are shaped by the environment can lead to research with
practical implications. Viewing men as inherently rapacious is hopeless.
On the other hand, knowing how harsh environments, lack of secure at-
tachments, or social learning favor the development of promiscuous male
sexuality sets a prevention agenda.

Conclusions

Evolutionary psychologists must be pulling their hair out over Thornhill

and Palmer’s book. Having recently changed the name of their field from
sociobiology, they must hope this is a perfect time to show the public the
new face of evolutionary psychology: Instead, they find the spotlight
grabbed by a work that is offensive, scientifically flawed, misguided, reck-
less, and unreflective of the field’s contributions to knowledge. It will be
much harder now in many quarters to advocate for the explanatory role
of evolutionary factors in violence against women. This is unfortunate
because scholars on sexual assault, like most scientifically oriented people,
place themselves somewhere in the evolutionary camp regarding the origins
of human behavior.

Acknowledgments

The author may be contacted at 1632 E. Lester St., Tucson, AZ 85719.

(520)626.9511 (V). (520)626.9515 (F), and electronic mail: mpk@
[Link].
Deepest appreciation is expressed to Aurelio José Figueredo and Patri-
cia Rozée for their comments on earlier drafts and sharing their expertise
in the development of this essay.

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9
Theory and Data on Rape and Evolution
Cheryl Brown Travis

The general thesis of Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer in A Natural His-
tory of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion is that there is an adap-
tive genetic basis for rape that evolved through natural selection. They do
not in any way condone rape; in fact, they spend some time to denounce it
and to acknowledge its psychologically painful consequences. Their argu-
ment is that unless we acknowledge the evolutionary and genetic basis for
rape, we cannot hope to contain it. They acknowledge that cultural factors
are relevant for the control of rape. However, the suggestions they offer to
limit rape are simplistic and suspiciously reminiscent of patriarchal “pro-
tection” of women. While they accept that culture has a role in the causes
of rape, they believe that the best way to understand culture and rape is
through evolutionary theory.
A Natural History of Rape is especially objectionable because it distorts
evolutionary theory as a basis for rape and by doing so disguises issues of
social power and privilege that might provide a more comprehensive and
useful approach to containing rape. The book represents one of many pub-
lications that play into the cultural desire to be reassured of fundamental
and categorical differences between women and men. As such, it is part of
a larger social construction of gender politics. It sells and is “news” be-
cause the thesis of the book plays a confirmatory role in cultural models
about fundamental, and “natural,” sex differences.
Thornhill and Palmer offer two possibilities for the evolutionary basis
of rape. They do not advance one hypothesis conclusively over the other
and indicate that they are in some disagreement among themselves re-
garding which is the more compelling hypothesis. One option is that rape
is a by-product of another adaptation. The other option they offer is that
208 Cheryl Brown Travis

rape is an adaptive reproductive strategy evolved directly through natural

selection pressures and consequences specific to rape.

Rape as a By-product

Thornhill and Palmer’s best guess for the by-product option is that men are
just naturally highly sexed. The sexy by-product hypothesis argues that
having a high and relatively indiscriminant sex drive is advantageous, to
males, because the more sex males have the more successful they will be in
reproducing and raising their overall fitness. They argue that “Sexual stim-
ulation is a proximate cause of raping and is the common denominator
across rapes of all kinds. Men’s sexual motivation is an ultimate product
of selection pressures in human evolutionary history” (Albuquerque
Times, July 7, 2000, emphasis added). As support for the by-product hy-
pothesis, Thornhill and Palmer note the highly sexed nature of males.
Rape is a by-product of this hyper sexuality. They point out that males are
more easily aroused, more often aroused, more desirous of sexual variety,
less discriminating about sexual partners, have a reduced ability to abstain
from sexual activity, and have a greater willingness to engage in casual sex.
This leads to more sex acts. The more sex men have, the more offspring
they will have, and the more offspring, the more fitness they attain. Ac-
cording to this model, females do not benefit in the same degree from lots
of sex with lots of partners and therefore are reluctant to participate. This
difference of interest is seen to be fundamental and in part underlies the
battle of the sexes where reproductive strategy is concerned. The general
argument is based on parental investment theory (Trivers 1972).
Differing levels of parental investment are often cited as a fundamental
basis for conflict between the sexes. The bottom line is that optimal mat-
ing strategies for males are not equivalent to those of females. Richard
Dawkins summarized the situation: “The female sex is exploited, and the
fundamental evolutionary basis for the exploitation is the fact that eggs
are larger than sperms” (1976, p. 158). Thornhill and Palmer rely heavily
on the tenets of parental investment theory in their depiction of rape as
part of an exploitative male-female dynamic.
An assumption of this model is that males have little to lose and, equally
important, little to gain by being selective or choosy. According to the the-
ory, one female is as good as another, so there was no natural selective
 Theory and Data on Rape and Evolution 209

pressure on males to be choosy or to spend much time assessing females

as potential mates. That is, all females have about the same reproductive
potential. Therefore, males have little to lose in acting indiscriminately,
even rashly. Carey Yeager and I have critiqued this model more fully else-
where (Travis and Yeager 1991).
The fact is that primate females do vary considerably in their reproduc-
tive efficacy and it would be to any male’s advantage to pay attention to
these individual differences among females. Among nonhuman primates,
compared to low-ranking females, high-ranking females are more consis-
tent in producing offspring that actually survive year to year. This may be
the result of an increased number of anovulatory cycles in low ranking
females (Chapais 1983). There can be as much as a sixfold difference
in the reproductive success of individual females (Casebolt, Henrickson,
and Hird 1985). The reproductive success of certain females may also be
passed along to their offspring in the form of social rank. This kind of vari-
ation among females is biologically important to a male, because it is likely
that he will have to establish a breeding territory or will have to take risks
in contests with competitor males. In a random, opportunistic approach
to mating, the male may be forgoing opportunities to mate with the most
fecund females. All of this involves time, energy, and forgone opportunity
and constitutes costs or investments that must be weighed against any
potential gains. Mating and reproductive strategies that reduce overall
investment costs or that offer a higher return on investments are likely to
prevail.
The oversexed by-product proposition for rape further suggests that it
was relatively easy for males to abandon one female and find another.
Maynard Smith (1977) points out that desertion works as an adaptive
strategy only so long as certain conditions are met. First, males face the
nontrivial task of finding another fertile female and doing so without in
the process being eaten, injured, or otherwise depleted. Remember that
among early humans, most fertile females would be affiliated with a more
or less stable family group constellation, and for most of the time these
females would be pregnant or nonfertile owing to lactation. Thus, the
overall effort required to secure another female might be considerable and
in any case have a relatively low probability of success. Recent evidence
also suggests that sperm may not be as energetically cheap as previously
thought and that there are some biological limits on success through
210 Cheryl Brown Travis

multiple mating. Among feral sheep, dominant rams may reach a point
where they lose out to subordinate rams because they suffer sperm deple-
tion over the period of the rut (Preston et al. 2001).

Conceptual Bias in the By-product Option

Along with observations about rape, Thornhill and Palmer make use of a
biological view of sexuality. In their framework, sexuality is a universal
biological process derived from evolution and rooted in anatomy. It is an
energy system located inside the individual. Critiques of this general un-
derstanding of sexuality and of conventional sex research are available
elsewhere by Mary Boyle (1994) and Leonore Tiefer (1995, 2000). Alter-
native frameworks (White, Bondurant, and Travis 2000) view human
sexuality as interactive and emergent, something that is created in the
moment, and something that is understood and experienced as a function
of social constructions.
In addition to problems in their basic conceptualization of sexuality,
there are a host of confounding variables ignored or dismissed by Thorn-
hill and Palmer. For example, there are a number of confounds that un-
dermine their idea that rape has evolved largely as a side effect of hyper
sexuality in males. This line of reasoning includes an implicit proposition
that men are less able than are women to abstain from sexual activity, that
is, men are not fully able to control their sexual behavior.
However, it is not the case that men are unable to control their sexual
behavior. Most men are perfectly able to contain their sexual inclinations
(if any) when it is to their advantage to do so. This is especially true when
there is high risk, such as a high probability of being caught or when be-
ing caught (even if infrequently) involves a very high cost. Male self-
control, like female self-control, is largely dependent, not on evolution,
but on context and social structural conditions of power. If we observe
that males are less likely to restrain their sexual impulses, it is most read-
ily explained by the probabilities associated with potential risks and gains
in the immediate context.
Evidentiary requirements have also been bypassed in the rape-evolution
account. Even if all the assertions about hyper-sexed males were accurate,
one would have to question whether other explanations might not account
for the same observations. As long as different theories forecast or account
for the same behavior, the mere existence of the behavior cannot be taken
 Theory and Data on Rape and Evolution 211

as confirmation of any one theory over the others. One such piece of sup-
porting evidence is that men report being more comfortable with the idea
of casual sex with a stranger. Thornhill and Palmer offer this as proof of
the hyper sexuality of men and implicitly locate this reported inclination
in the natural, universal biological realm of evolution. However, the mere
existence among men of greater comfort with casual sex is not significant
support for the rape as by-product idea, because social structural consid-
erations provide a viable alternative account for the same behavior. Re-
search findings of greater male inclinations toward casual sex may reflect
a variety of social, rather than biological, conditions. For example, soci-
ety is more tolerant of such behavior among males and in fact encourages
it. It is part of our cultural idea of masculinity. In addition, males may re-
port more likelihood of engaging in casual sex, because they assume they
can physically protect themselves if necessary. Further, what males report
about hypothetical events may have more to say about their willingness to
endorse traditional gender role ideology than it says about their actual be-
havior. Moreover, casual sex is not rape. That men may be more willing
than women to engage in casual sexual encounters does not mean they are
likely to engage in rape.

Rape as a By-product of Desire

The most fundamental error made by Thornhill and Palmer is to charac-
terize rape as largely an act of desire. The proposition that sexual motiva-
tion is the common denominator of all rape was debunked by feminists
decades ago. Some of the relevant arguments and data were elaborated in
the 1975 foundational work of Susan Brownmiller (Against Our Will).
Aggression, intimidation, and violence are the major dynamics of rape.
Sexual arousal may or may not be salient, and in any case may be a by-
product of aggression and violence rather than a precursor. Neil Mala-
muth (who is not adverse to evolutionary approaches) and his colleagues
have found that sexualized violence against women is in fact linked to vi-
olence and aggression in general (Malamuth 1983; Malamuth, Haber, and
Feshback 1980). This research found that exposure to media images of ag-
gressive sex, not simply erotic sexuality, increases the likelihood of aggres-
siveness in laboratory experiments and increases in the self-reported
likelihood of sexualized violence. The violent nature of sexual assault is
further evidenced by the fact that many victims report that they thought
212 Cheryl Brown Travis

they might be murdered or maimed. Lingering fears and anxiety following

rape are clearly based on a sense of physical vulnerability and a lack of
safety that are prompted by the violence inherent in such assaults. Even if
serious physical wounds are not inflicted, the potential of brutality is a
form of violence and is a kind of personalized terrorism.
In any case, it’s not entirely clear that Thornhill and Palmer wish to fully
endorse the hypothesis of sexual pleasure as the single most important mo-
tivation for rape. Regardless of the proximate factors underlying rape, the
evolutionary principles for natural selection must at some point be acti-
vated, that is, the principle of increased fitness. The alternative hypothesis
they offer is that rape is an adaptive reproductive strategy evolved through
direct natural selection and is retained in the gene pool because males who
rape have increased biological fitness.

Rape as Reproduction

The second proposition Thornhill and Palmer make is that rape could be
a product of direct natural selection acting directly on rape as a reproduc-
tive strategy. A key requirement for the natural selection of any attribute
or behavior is that it must result in a net reproductive benefit to those in-
dividuals that express the attribute. Rapists must beget offspring fairly
consistently through their acts of rape. Additionally, if rape is a specific
adaptation that adds to inclusive fitness, individuals who rape must differ
genetically from those who do not rape and there must be differential re-
productive success for individuals with a genetic propensity to rape. Both
of these are necessary requirements for support of the hypothesis. Thorn-
hill and Palmer provide no evidence on these points.

Who Are the Rapists?

So who are these genetic rapists? Thornhill and Palmer give a general de-
scription of rapists as those who do not otherwise have access to normal
reproductive options. This is the “limited access” feature of rapists. There
are two kinds of individuals that might fit this “limited access” condition,
young individuals of junior standing and societal misfits who are simply
lacking in social skill or merit. Further, for rape to be an evolutionarily
based adaptation, rapists should differ genetically from the nonrapists in
the same category, that is, the category of youths or of misfits. Some youths
 Theory and Data on Rape and Evolution 213

have rape genes and some do not. Some misfits have rape genes and some
do not. Supposedly those youths that express their rape genes in rape be-
havior have greater lifetime inclusive fitness than those youths that do not
have the rape gene(s). Ditto for the misfits.
Marginal misfits might be ostracized or disregarded owing to their
poverty, poor social skills, and so on, or perhaps they are a kind of scur-
rilous criminal element. They would rape because they would have only
limited access to other channels of courtship and mating (Frankie and
Johnny and Bonnie and Clyde notwithstanding). The implication of the
rape as reproduction argument is that members of these marginalized
groups differ genetically from members of mainstream society, who sup-
posedly don’t need to resort to rape. Arguments about the genetic basis
for social class and criminal behavior have been advanced in the past to
justify political and social inequities. This is called social Darwinism.
However, lack of education, poverty, and so on are not genetic conditions,
but rather matters of sociology, economics, and politics. In contrast to this
“limited access” view, there is plenty of evidence to indicate that ordinary
men, including men of high standing and power, engage in rape.
The other set of rapist candidates includes young males in junior stand-
ing who have limited access. The idea would be that it is to the advantage
of junior males to sneak copulations and thus to extend their breeding
years. It is important to note that sneaky copulations are not the same
thing as rape. In fact, it’s not entirely clear who is doing the sneaking. Field
studies of primates indicate that females often are the ones to initiate sex-
ual interplay (Hrdy 1977; Smuts 1985). Among humans, young males
who regularly relied on violence and forcible rape (or who engaged in any
behavior that consistently disrupted the social network of the group) prob-
ably would achieve only limited integration into the community. Disrup-
tive youth would be more often shunned or expelled than they would be
embraced by the larger group, and two or three years as a promiscuous
young rogue could hardly compensate for decades as a fully integrated
adult. Short-term benefits would be exchanged for long-term adult op-
portunities.

Pregnancy Rates
If rape is a reproductive strategy it must result in pregnancies. This requires
the consistent and successful operation of some basic mechanics. These
214 Cheryl Brown Travis

include penile-vaginal penetration and the ejaculation of viable sperm in

sufficient number to offer a better than average likelihood of insemination
and conception. Thornhill and Palmer suggest that if rape were a specific
adaptation (with differential reproductive success), there should be more
sperm produced in ejaculates associated with rape (p. 74). They infer that
appropriate data are not available to test this hypothesis. However, rel-
evant data do exist. Data indicate that rapists often do not have erec-
tions, fail to penetrate the vagina, or do not ejaculate. Medical studies re-
port that these problems occur in 30 to 40 percent of cases (Bownes and
O’Gorman 1991, Hook, Elliot, and Harbison 1992). During medical ex-
amination, traces of sperm may be found in only 50 percent of rape cases
(Ferris and Sandercock 1998). Case reports note that rapists often have
one or more of sexual dysfunctions and that these dysfunctions may pre-
cipitate additional violence, degradation, and brutalization of the victim
(Groth and Burgess 1977).
Furthermore, Thornhill and Palmer propose the evolution of rape as re-
production with little or no attention to the co-evolution of female repro-
ductive strategies. It is as if females did not evolve at all. Drea and Wallen,
in this volume, discuss the active female role in the shaping of sex and re-
production. Thornhill and Palmer seem to ignore the fact that in a sexu-
ally reproducing species it is difficult for one sex to evolve any strategy that
seriously impairs or limits the well being or fitness of the other sex.
For rape to be a successful reproductive strategy, a rape pregnancy must
occur and be successfully carried to term. This means that the female must
be ovulating (at most a 4–5 day window in a monthly cycle), the egg must
be fertilized, the fertilized blastocyte must implant in the uterus, and so on.
Spontaneous abortion or the use of natural abortifacients would have con-
stituted another barrier to reproductive goals of the rapist. The estimate by
Thornhill and Palmer is that pregnancy occurs in approximately 2 percent
of rapes. Despite these barriers, Thornhill and Palmer argue that repro-
duction is, or has been, a significant outcome of rape. Remember, in ad-
dition, that genetic fitness is advanced not only by having immediate
offspring, but by having offspring who themselves reproduce.
Thornhill and Palmer argue that a reproductive function can be in-
ferred because rapists choose to rape young women of reproductive age. It
is more likely the case that rapists rape those who are most often in situa-
tions where rape is possible. Thus, the age distribution may reflect oppor-
 Theory and Data on Rape and Evolution 215

tunity rather than choice. Rapists also choose to rape adult women who
are not fertile and choose young girls as well as boys and men as their tar-
gets. A third of all cases of rape perpetrated by a family member involve
children under age 12 (FBI 1998). A national study of the Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics found that one third of all emergency department (ED) cases
of violence involving patients under age 12 were admitted for completed
or suspected rape or sexual assault (Rand and Strom 1997). There are
plenty of other instances where rape occurs when reproductive interests
would not be served, for example gang rapes and rapes of men. Rapes dur-
ing social upheaval and war often involve the brutal maiming or killing
of victims. Rape is practiced in wars of ethnic cleansing, and one would
hardly think that racial purists are motivated to rape as a reproduction
strategy.

The Cost/Benefit Ratio

One must ask after all what general costs and risks are incurred in the ef-
fort to get this supposed 2 percent reproductive return. It seems unlikely
that a dedicated strategy of rape as reproduction or even rape as a by-
product of hyper sexuality would have produced a positive cost benefit ra-
tio. We’re talking about risks, contingencies, and benefits as they would
have existed a long time ago, sometimes referred to as the environment of
evolutionary adaptedness. One might pick roughly 100,000 years ago at
the beginning of the last major ice age, which imposed significant selec-
tion pressures. Alternatively, one might settle on a more recent period dat-
ing back only 14,000 years ago when the last ice age began to thaw out.
For any of these time periods, it’s pretty clear that finding and subduing
an unwilling victim involves a number of risks. Humans lived most suc-
cessfully in groups, at least somewhat sociable and collaborative. Indi-
viduals who committed egregious violations of community interests
would surely have been harassed, shunned, or driven out. Remember this
is a time before there were formal court systems or prisons. Violators
might be killed outright, or expelled, where being expelled might well
have amounted to a death sentence. If instead the rapist treks to the locale
of another band in order to reproduce through rape, he risks the travails
of any wilderness journey. He must get there and back without becoming
a prey item himself. In addition, he may be hunted and killed by members
of the other band.
216 Cheryl Brown Travis

Surviving Offspring
For rape to be a successful reproductive strategy, rape not only must result
in pregnancies, but the offspring must survive to produce offspring. The
offspring that are products of rape must fare well. They must be nourished
and protected to the same degree and intensity as other offspring. They
must additionally be integrated and welcomed into the social group with
the same opportunities and acceptance of other offspring. They must be
viewed as good partners in all the basic aspects of community life, includ-
ing and most importantly as potential mates. Since rapists abandon any
offspring produced through rape, how might these conditions be met? One
of two conditions must prevail. One option is that surrogate fathers might
readily be found to provide for a child what the rapist does not. Alterna-
tively, the conditions for thriving offspring could be met if one assumes
that the contributions of a father are more or less irrelevant.
The first set of conditions requires the support and investment of male
caretakers other than the biological father. The probability seems slim
that such providers could be readily recruited, and that fatherly contribu-
tions would be forthcoming. Sons or brothers might have an interest in
providing these contributions, but since they would have lower genetic
relatedness they would also have less vested interest than a biological
father. Alternatively, replacement of fatherly contributions could be ob-
tained if surrogates could be easily and consistently deceived about pater-
nity. Such deception may be successfully practiced on occasion, but it
appears to have limited potential. Thornhill and Palmer themselves point
out that evolution has operated to guard against male investment in off-
spring fathered by other males. Thus, it seems problematic that offspring
of rapists consistently would receive the needed nurturing, protection, and
social integration.
Perhaps after all, these fatherly investments are not necessary or par-
ticularly beneficial. The reproductive advantage of rape might be retained
if a second set of conditions held sway, namely that offspring reared
without fatherly contributions fared as well as those reared with such
contributions.
This second set of conditions could be met if one assumes that the con-
tributions of a father are more or less irrelevant. Perhaps women and their
children were the basic social unit and survived well without the input of
men. However, there is general agreement among scholars that males
probably did contribute significantly to the provisioning, protection, and
 Theory and Data on Rape and Evolution 217

socialization of young. An important aspect of male caretaking may actu-

ally be as a mediator of intrusions by other group members that might sep-
arate the mother and infant (Altmann 1980). This is not trivial, because
among nonhuman primates, junior or low-status females often have their
infants confiscated for episodes of rough and tumble play or general kid-
napping by more senior and dominant females. The result of such har-
assment and interference can easily result in the death of the infant. An
invested partner would reduce these risks.
Comparative fieldwork in primates indicates that for many species
males play significant roles in caretaking. The incidence of male parental
care among a wide range of species suggests the importance of such care.
Male-infant affiliation is reported to be normative and striking in its inti-
macy (Smuts 1985). In times of emergency, nonhuman primate males may
even adopt infants. Such behavior has been reported among nonhuman
primates and probably characterized humans too. Wade Mackey in this
volume provides an extensive discussion of these issues.
The significance of human fathers and fathering has long been endorsed
by research from a number of disciplines. Cultural anthropology studies
have included detailed descriptions of daily life that document the central
role played by fathers. For example, among the Kalahari hunter-gatherers
men spend substantial hours within the social milieu of the group, with
immediate family, children, and friends (Lee and DeVore 1976). Among
contemporary nonindustrialized societies, fathering and father roles are
held to be very important. In these societies, the cultural concept of father
may appear in a relatively elaborate form. A number of tribal groups of
the Amazonian basin have constructed complex definitions of biological
father. They believe that the sperm of many men contribute to the layered
development of a child. For example, when asked to identify their fathers,
members of the Ache of eastern Paraguay almost always list more than
one father (Hill and Hurtado 1996). Data from similar groups indicate
that children with only one acknowledged father are significantly less
likely to survive to adolescence than those able to identify a secondary
father as well.

Alternative Models

Two of the requirements for advancing a scientific causal model are that it
account for a notable percentage of the variance in the observed outcome
218 Cheryl Brown Travis

and that alternative explanations for the same outcome can be discounted.
The proposal that rape is an evolutionary reproductive success story fails
on both counts. Thornhill and Palmer note that rape is observed in virtu-
ally all cultures, and since rape is so common it therefore must be biologi-
cally based. This proposition in its most simple form is flawed because
evolutionary theory does not specify that all common behaviors are ge-
netically coded. Almost all people in China eat rice, but it is not necessary
to suppose there is a specific evolutionary adaptation for rice-eating.
The rape-evolution account is also flawed because Thornhill and Palmer
fail to note that there is a good deal of cultural variation in the incidence
of rape, as Peggy Reeves Sanday in this volume and elsewhere has ably
demonstrated. A cultural approach considers the processes and conditions
that elicit and sustain rape behaviors, including belief systems, expecta-
tions, and sexual scripts. Sanday argues that rape is culturally, not natu-
rally, selected and can be predicted in the context of this broader cultural
configuration.
Considerations of relative power, privilege, and the status of women al-
low one to understand rape as a social and cultural phenomenon. This
framework suggests different rudimentary causes and interventions to re-
duce rape. Larry Barron and Murray Strauss (1989) have offered a com-
prehensive model for rape based on analysis of rates of rape for individual
U.S. states. They found that the rate of rape varies in predictable ways from
state to state. Their model examined regional culture, social organization
and disorganization, and gender equality as a function of economic, po-
litical, and legal status in each state. Among other things, their study
found that having high rank on one measure of equality does not ensure
similarly high status on other indicators of equality. A quantitative path
analysis regressing rates of rape in each of the fifty states against carefully
quantified variables documented that direct and indirect indicators of
gender inequality were significantly associated with increased rates of
rape. Alice Eagly and Wendy Wood in this volume take a cross-cultural per-
spective to demonstrate that it is the status of women in various cultures
that influences rape and other forms of abuse. Jackie White in this volume
and elsewhere has formulated a comprehensive model of sexualized vio-
lence. In her model, rape is conceptualized as a function of five interacting
factors, including sociocultural and social networks as well as dyadic, sit-
uational, and intrapersonal factors.
 Theory and Data on Rape and Evolution 219

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uality: Unpacking hidden meanings. In C. B. Travis and J. W. White, eds., Sexual-
ity, Society, and Feminism, pp. 11–34. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological
Association.
10
An Unnatural History of Rape
Michael Kimmel

We must not treat the unknown as known and too readily accept it; and he who
wishes to avoid this error [as all should do] will devote both time and attention to
the weighing of evidence.
—Cicero, De Officiis

The ability of ideology to blind people to the utter implausibility of their positions
is perhaps the greatest threat to accumulating the knowledge necessary to solve so-
cial problems.
—Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer, A Natural History of Rape (p. 152)

I was tempted to ignore A Natural History of Rape and its modest moment
of cultural excitement entirely as just another silly and unwarranted ex-
tension of evolutionary psychology’s preposterously reductionist socio-
biology written by two vainglorious and self-promoting researchers who
have never done any research with actual human beings but feel perfectly
comfortable making all sorts of cross-cultural generalizations about them
anyway.1 These claims were so ridiculous, the authors so narcissistically
self-aggrandizing in their public pronouncements—why, I asked myself,
should I give it, or them, any more press? Who would believe this nonsense
anyway?
It was while watching my 22-month-old son playing with our neighbor’s
daughter the other day that I was convinced to respond in some way to the
view Thornhill and Palmer have of my little boy, and their view of his fu-
ture—a future of unbridled sexual predation, of the evolutionary justifica-
tion for using any means necessary—fraud or force, drugs or alcohol—to
sexually conquer an unwilling female (or male, but Thornhill and Palmer
think other males would be more compliant). And the life of our little
neighbor is even more bleak: She will have to be constantly on her guard
222 Michael Kimmel

because boys will be boys—which is to say that boys will be violent little ra-
pacious predatory beasts. She will have to modify her behavior, watch what
she wears, where she walks, and at what time, because there’s certainly no
way we’re going to be able to protect her from those little male monsters.
I see a different reality, and I want a different future for my children than
that which Thornhill and Palmer lay out for them. Fortunately, in the real
world, in which I happen to live, Thornhill and Palmer’s prognosis is
merely political resignation with a pseudo-scientific façade. My son will
live in a different world, because he already does, because the real world
he and I live in bears little resemblance to the world Thornhill and Palmer
describe, and because works like Thornhill and Palmer’s, however politi-
cally resigned they are, offer no real vision and no real hope.
And no real science either. I will argue that this “natural history” con-
tains dreadfully poor understanding of nature, of history, and of “natural
history.” The book tells us less about “the biological bases of sexual coer-
cion” than the ideological fantasies of those who justify sexual coercion.
It’s bad science, bad history, and bad politics—or, more accurately, it’s bad
politics masquerading as science.
On top of that, it’s also appallingly badly written. Let me put it this
way: compared to A Natural History of Rape, your typical NSF research
report reads like Virginia Woolf. Bad science, bad writing, and bad poli-
tics—makes you wonder not only how such a work was vetted through a
reputable university press, but also how it has received so much attention.
I believe that as unconvincing an argument as it is, it is one that has a cer-
tain currency in the current political climate. “Bad” does not mean “use-
less”; indeed, this is a work that is enormously useful to some groups.

Bad Science

Evolutionary psychology is a social science, which is to say it is an oxy-

moron. It cannot conform to the canons of a science like physics, in which
falsifiability is its chief goal and replication its chief method. It does not
account for variations in its universalizing pronouncements, nor does it
offer the most parsimonious explanations. It is speculative theory, often
provocative and interesting, but no more than that. It is like—gasp!—my
own discipline of sociology. And, like sociology, there are some practi-
tioners who will do virtually anything to be taken seriously as “science,”
 An Unnatural History of Rape 223

despite the fact that individual human beings happily confound all predic-
tions based on aggregate models of behavior.
Typically, to stake its claim for legitimacy, pseudo-science cloaks itself in
vociferous denunciations of all other pseudo-sciences. In this case, Thorn-
hill and Palmer set up straw man arguments, attribute them to a social
science utterly in the thrall of feminist rape hysteria, and then claim to de-
molish them with pseudo-scientific assertions based on selective evidence.
No wonder one medical reviewer noted the irony “that a book purport-
ing such devotion to science should have so little in it” and evolutionary
biologist Jerry Coyne calls the work “utterly lacking in sound scientific
grounding,” “an embarrassment to the field,” and “useless and unscien-
tific” (Hung 2000; Coyne 2000, pp. 28, 34).
The “argument” of the book is actually a tautology. Rape, they claim, is
“a natural, biological phenomenon that is a product of human evolution-
ary heritage” (2000a, p. 30). Well, of course it is. As is any behavior or
trait found among human primates. If it exists in nature, it’s natural. Some
“natural” beverages contain artificial—“social”—additives that give them
their color, their texture, their taste, their “meaning” or “significance.”
This is equally true of rape. Telling us that it is natural tells us nothing
about it except that it is found in nature. Years ago, in our quest for sci-
entific legitimacy we social scientists jettisoned “functionalist” explana-
tions of social phenomena—if they exist they must be there for a reason
(manifest), even if the reason is not entirely clear to us (latent). It’s amus-
ing to see evolutionary psychology, in its quest for credibility, dusting off
the structural functionalism of Talcott Parsons.
Proof of this argument is based first on Robert Trivers’s reductionist evo-
lutionary theory, which suggests that males and females have different re-
productive strategies based on the size and number of their reproductive
cells. From sperm and egg we get motivation, intention, perhaps even cog-
nition. Male reproductive success comes from impregnating as many fe-
males as possible; females’ success comes from enticing a male to provide
and protect the vulnerable and dependent offspring. Thus males have a
natural predisposition toward promiscuity, sex without love, and parental
indifference; females have a natural propensity for monogamy, love as a
precondition of sex, and parental involvement.
This arrangement gives women a lot of power. Since males are more
eager for sex than females, this gives females the power to choose which
224 Michael Kimmel

males are going to be successful. Thornhill and Palmer offer rape as the
evolutionary mating strategy of losers, males who cannot otherwise get
a date. “But getting chosen is not the only way to gain sexual access to
females,” they write. “In rape, the male circumvents the females’ choice”
(p. 53).
Trivers’s arguments have been effectively refuted by primatologist Sarah
Blaffer Hrdy, who has used the same empirical observations to construct
an equally plausible case for females’ natural propensity toward promis-
cuity (to seduce many males into believing the offspring is theirs and thus
ensure survival by increasing food and protection from those males) and
males’ natural propensity toward monogamy (to avoid being run ragged
providing for offspring that may—or may not—be their own).

Some Bad Assumptions

Thornhill and Palmer’s use of Trivers’s speculations makes two assump-
tions about rape and sex. First, they assume that rape is only about sex.
“Rapists are sexually motivated,” they write (p. 134). Second, they assume
that sex is only about reproduction. Neither of these is supported by the
evidence.
To be sure, as Thornhill and Palmer note, rape can be about sex. Surely,
three decades of feminist advocacy and social science research on date and
acquaintance rape indicates that some rapes are a product of a combina-
tion of sexual desire, contempt for women’s bodily integrity, and a feeling
of sexual entitlement. (Ironically, Thornhill and Palmer’s thesis works bet-
ter for date and acquaintance rape than it does for stranger rape, which is
their model. After all, at least some modicum of desire is potentially pres-
ent.) There are few, if any, feminists or social scientists who would, today,
argue that rape is never about sex.
But if rape can sometimes also be partly about sex, it is not only about
sex. Gang rape, prison rape, military rape of entire subject populations,
rape prior to murder, rape after murder—these don’t necessarily admit
to rape-as-alternate-strategy-to-express-sexual-desire. Rape may also be
about sexual repulsion, about rage and fear, about domination. Rape of
women may be a homosocial event, by which one group of men expresses
its domination over another group of men. Rape is a multidimensional
phenomenon, offering a large amount of variation. Thornhill and Palmer’s
 An Unnatural History of Rape 225

view of rape is monochromatic and embraces only a small fraction of its

remarkable variety.
Men use their penises for many motivations, and they aren’t all nec-
essarily reproductive. Sex can be about play, about pleasure, about ce-
menting bonds between females and males, or between males or between
females. It may—or it may not—have anything to do with reproduction.
(I would bet that neither Thornhill nor Palmer has more than three children
each, and that both have made love more than three times. I hope that their
partners would tell a story of two men who know sex is not only about
reproduction.) The clitoris, for example, seems to have evolved strictly
because of its capacity for pleasure. Since it evolved, then, it means that
women’s pleasure has something to do with reproductive success in humans.

Selective Generalization
Thornhill and Palmer’s use of evidence is so selective that it may well con-
stitute scholarly fraud. Thornhill, himself, has actually done research only
on scorpion flies, who are not exactly our closest genetic neighbors. “In
some animal species,” they write, “rape is commonplace” (2000a, p. 33).
How do they know this? By what logic do they label any mating behavior
“rape”? Is this possibly a case of anthropomorphizing mating behavior
that might instead be female preference for vigorous males? By legal
canon, “rape” requires more than aggressive sexual contact—it involves
the absence of consent and the threat or actual use of force. If we don’t
think that children or pets are legally capable of consent, why would we
think scorpion flies are? What Thornhill and Palmer call “rape” is their
term, but not by any means the only one that could adequately describe
these species’ sexual behavior.
And in many species there’s nothing that even looks remotely like what
they (mis)label rape. Actually, my two favorite sentences in the book (so
cluttered with references that it becomes a seventeen-line paragraph) are
these:
In the ten years that followed Brownmiller’s claim, studies of rape in non-human
species grew too numerous to be ignored. Evolutionary explanations of rape were
put forth in regard to insects, birds, fishes, reptiles and amphibians, marine mam-
mals, and non-human primates. (p. 144)

And the absence of rape behaviors has been equally found for varieties of
each of those species as well. Oops.
226 Michael Kimmel

And it may turn out that the cases in which rape does not take place—
cases that Thornhill and Palmer are utterly unable to explain—are more
instructive than those in which it does. Rape is virtually absent among pri-
mates in which females are seen as equally sexual as males—and equal to
them in other ways as well. Primatologist Meredith Small reminds us that
among some monkeys and apes, the female approaches the male, push-
ing her genitals in his face, slapping him, initiating sexual advances and
clearly enjoying sexual games. Jane Goodall and Barbara Smuts showed
that adult female chimpanzees mate successively with virtually every male
in the group, while adult males are the ones who are sexually choosy. Or
at least try to be. Female baboons too; Barbara Smuts comments that
she has “seen them literally hop from one guy to the next. They’ll mate
with ten different males in the space of an hour” (cited in Angier 1999,
p. 381). And Frans de Waal shows how among bonobos there’s lots of
female-female gento-genital rubbing, lots of masturbation, and lots of egal-
itarian sex, initiated largely by the females. Oh yeah, and there’s no rape.
Unable to account for variation among animal species, Thornhill and
Palmer are equally unable to account for human variation—the fact that
in some cultures rape is quite rare and in others quite common. Indeed,
they ignore any evidence of variation. In an article in the Sciences summa-
rizing their book, they cite approvingly Donald Symons’s ridiculous pro-
nouncement that, as they write, “people everywhere understand sex as
‘something females have that males want’” (2000b, p. 33). Symons’s un-
derstanding of sex as a commodity is a particularly silly example of the as-
sumptions of advanced consumer society being read back onto cultures for
which sex might be any number of other things. But while Symons simply
asserts that sex is this gendered commodity, Thornhill and Palmer add the
words “people everywhere,” rendering the merely ridiculous sublimely so.
In several cultures, we have evidence that sex is not a commodity, that
women and men “have” equal amounts of it, and that it’s not the basis of
some putative feminine “power.” We have evidence of the absence of rape,
and evidence of the presence of female promiscuity designed to promote
the likelihood of an offspring’s survival. Among the Ache foragers in
eastern Paraguay, each of the 66 children of the 17 women interviewed by
two anthropologists was attributed to an average of 2.1 proginating men.
In fact the Ache differentiate among three different categories of father:
(1) the man to whom a woman is married when the child is born; (2) the
 An Unnatural History of Rape 227

man or men she had extramarital sex with just before or during her preg-
nancy; (3) the man whom the woman believes is that actual father (Angier
1999: 382–383).
Bari women in Venezuela also engage in significant amounts of extra-
marital sex during pregnancy. When the child is born, the woman tells the
midwife who her lovers were, and the midwife then goes to each man and
says “Congratulations. You have a child.” The men are then expected to
help care and provide for the child—much to the benefit of the child. These
children have a much higher likelihood of survival than the offspring of
rape, where the men would invest little or nothing.
That leads to another problem of evidence and assumption. Thornhill
and Palmer claim that “selection favored males who mated frequently,”
and that “rape increased reproductive success” (2000a, pp. 32, 34). But
why should this be true? Might it not also be the case that being hard-
wired to be good lovers and devoted fathers enabled us to be reproduc-
tively successful? One might argue that selection favored males who mated
well, since successful mating is more than spreading of seed. After all, hu-
man males are the only primates for whom skillful lovemaking, enhancing
women’s pleasure, is normative, at least in many societies. (Don’t go talk-
ing about “her pleasure” to gorillas and especially not those pesky little
scorpion flies!)
Being an involved father assured reproductive success far better than
rape. After all, babies are so precious, so fragile that they need extraor-
dinary—and extraordinarily long!—care and devotion. Infants con-
ceived during rape would have a far lower chance of survival, which is
probably one reason we invented love. Infants conceived in rape might
well have been subject to infanticide—which has been, historically, the
most common form of birth control before the modern era. “The children
of guys who raped-and-ran must have been a scrawny lot and doomed to
end up on some leopard’s lunch menu,” as Barbara Ehrenreich (herself a
Ph.D. in biology) writes (2000, p. 88). It is quite unlikely that very many
rape-conceived babies would have survived. Rape’s persistence and its
enormous variation have other origins than the hypothesis that our great-
great-great-granddaddies to the 14th power did it.
Other evidence for their theory is explained equally well—perhaps bet-
ter—by alternate hypotheses, which both weaken their theory and reveal
their political agenda. For example, they argue that women in their peak
228 Michael Kimmel

childbearing years are far more likely to be raped, and that this is an evo-
lutionary holdover. “Women in their teens and their early twenties are
highly overrepresented among rape victims around the world” (p. 139; see
also p. 72).
But is this not better explained by the simple fact that younger women,
ages 16 to 24, are the least likely to be married and the most likely to be
out on dates with men with whom they are not in permanent relation-
ships? That is to say, they are women who are most likely to be raped
because of “opportunity”—social exposure and marital status—not age
and fecundity, which probably have little or nothing to do with it. (This
is, of course, not to say that married women are not raped. They are. Rape
by intimates—lovers, partners, husbands, boyfriends, and yes, fathers,
uncles, brothers, and step-fathers—is by far the most common form of
rape, and one that Thornhill and Palmer’s thesis is utterly unable to com-
prehend, because they suggest that rape is a function of thwarted sexual
desire and limited sexual access.)
Simple demographics offer a far more parsimonious and convincing
explanation of ages of vulnerability to rape. But let’s look at this demo-
graphic argument a little more closely. By their logic, the likelihood of rape
should correlate with the ratio of females to males in a society. In a soci-
ety in which females outnumber males, the possibility of reproductive suc-
cess would be significantly higher for males; that is, the guy would likely
find a female who would be willing to have sex with him. In such societies,
by their logic, women’s power would be lower, because they would have to
make compromises with their “natural” propensity for selectivity. Some
men whom they might have rejected were their circumstances different will
simply have to do. In such societies rape rates would be lower.
In societies in which males outnumber females, by contrast, Thornhill
and Palmer’s thesis would predict significantly higher rape rates because
males would have less likelihood of reproductive success simply by being
nice guys. Male dominance hierarchies would be more in evidence, and
males would compete for the right to mate. Women’s scarcity would in-
crease their power, because they could be choosier about with whom they
would mate. Rape rates would be high, then, because those males left out
of the reproductive mix might use rape as an alternative mating strategy.
Actually, societies in which females outnumber males are likely to be
warrior societies, in which women’s relative power is lower and rape rates
 An Unnatural History of Rape 229

higher. Rape is a crime of entitlement not evolution, of opportunity not

imperatives, of permission not passion.

Bad History

Thornhill and Palmer’s bad science is complemented by equally bad his-

tory. It’s hard to explain the persistence of rape in modern society, except
as some unnecessary evolutionary residue like the appendix or tonsils. But
they compound this by arguing against all their own evidence that rape is
more prevalent today than ever before.
Rape rates in modern society are so high because “in such societies
women rarely are chaperoned and often encounter social circumstances
that make them vulnerable to rape” (p. 194). More: “The common prac-
tice of unsupervised dating in cars and private homes, which is often ac-
companied by the consumption of alcohol, has placed young women in
environments that are conducive to rape to an extent that is probably un-
paralleled in history” (2000a, p. 36).
I would hypothesize precisely the opposite, that rape rates are lower to-
day than ever before. Rape was far more likely in medieval Europe, for ex-
ample. It’s just that we called it something else. Ever hear of “right of first
night”? (That’s coerced sex without consent, that is, rape.) In many soci-
eties, rape was a common and legitimate punishment for all sorts of per-
ceived crimes against men. And it is by far safer to be a woman alone
walking on the street at night today in a modern society than it has ever
been. (This is decidedly not to say it is safe—just safer.)
I believe that rape rates are lower today because women have more
power, including the power to redefine behavior that was once seen as nor-
mative sexual “etiquette” as date rape. In my high school locker room, I
was counseled by older athletes that “it doesn’t count unless you put it in.”
I was advised to “keep going, even if she says no, even if she screams, even
if she pushes you away. Don’t stop until she hits you,” was the felicitous
way they put it. (Incidentally, when I mentioned this to my students a few
weeks ago, one of the men said, sardonically, “You stopped too soon, man.
It’s ‘don’t stop until she hurts you.’”)
If we were honest about it, then, men of my generation (I’m 50) would
have to confess that virtually all of us are “failed attempted date rapists.”
What we called “dating” is now against the law. (Yes, of course, some were
230 Michael Kimmel

successful. But my point is that the norms have changed, and that such be-
havior is increasingly problematized, thus making dating safer for women
than ever.)
Comparatively, rape rates vary enormously among cultures. And the
best variable that determines those rape rates is women’s status. Those
countries in which women’s wages come closer to matching men’s (so the
men won’t feel they are owed something after spending money on their
date) have rape rates lower than ours. Those countries in which women
hold more political offices, in which women equal men in the professions,
in which there is adequate sex education—all have lower rape rates than
we do.

Bad Politics

Lowering rape rates is a political discussion, a discussion about the effec-

tiveness of specific policy proposals. And here Thornhill and Palmer’s bad
history leads inevitably to bad politics. They make two policy recommen-
dations that they believe will reduce the scourge of rape. The first is trans-
parently silly because it blames the victim. Women must be informed about
men’s biological predisposition to rape because it does matter how they
dress and which parties they choose to go to. The best our authors can
offer is that women should be warned about how predatory men are.
After that, well, they’re on their own. (It’s a good idea to give them that
warning when they get their driver’s licenses, since they will need their
cars to escape men’s violent predations. But, of course, Thornhill and
Palmer actually want to use driver’s licenses to warn men of their own
base proclivities.)
The press release that accompanied my copy of the book notes that the
authors recommend that “young women consider the biological causes of
rape when making decisions about dress, appearance, and social activi-
ties.” “But where is the evidence that women in mini-skirts are more likely
to be raped than women in dirndls?” asks Barbara Ehrenreich (2000,
p. 88). “Women were raped by the thousands in Bosnia for example, and
few if any of them were wearing bikinis or bustiers.” Many rapes—in war,
in prison—have nothing to do with ensuring reproductive success and
everything to do with domination and humiliation of other men. Rape
may be far more of a homosocial act than a heterosexual one.
 An Unnatural History of Rape 231

The second policy recommendation—about males—reveals Thornhill

and Palmer’s real political agenda—and it is not a pretty picture. You see,
Thornhill and Palmer hate men.
Rarely, if ever, have I read a book that is so resolutely and relentlessly
anti-male. A Natural History of Rape is the best example I can find of
male-bashing masquerading as academic pseudo-science. In their eyes, all
men are violent, rapacious predators, seeking to spew their sperm far and
wide, at whatever creature happens in their testosterone-crazed evolution-
ary path. Oh, sure, they try and sugarcoat it:
human males in all societies so far examined in the ethnographic record possess
genes that can lead, by way of ontogeny, to raping behavior when the necessary en-
vironmental factors are present, and . . . the necessary environmental factors are
sometimes present in all societies studied to date. (p. 142)

So all men have the genetic “motivation” to rape and all they need is a
social permission.
Wait a minute? Isn’t that what they claim the feminists they are trying to
discredit argued also? Is that not the justification for zero-tolerance for
rape? Isn’t that the justification for sensible arguments, like those of Peggy
Reeves Sanday, to reduce risk of rape by increasing women’s status?
As a policy recommendation, Thornhill and Palmer propose that we in-
stitute “an evolutionarily informed education program for young men that
focuses on increasing their ability to restrain their sexual behavior.”
“Restrain”? Is it that bad? How about “express”—their equally
evolution-based biological drive to experience pleasure, mutuality, and fun?
Might we not be “hard wired” for that as well? Education for restraint is
perhaps the second most politically bankrupt policy initiative around, and
utterly ineffective. (The first is demanding that women “just say no.”) If
Thornhill and Palmer were right—and of course they are not—then the
only sensible solution would be to lock all males up and release them for
sporadic, reproductive mating after being chosen by females.
Thornhill and Palmer offer a far more “misandrous” account of rape
than anything offered by their nemeses, radical feminists. In the process,
they do an enormous disservice to thinking about rape, and, ironically,
they end up reproducing the very canards about men that they project onto
feminist women. Feminists, by contrast, believe that men are capable of
doing better, of stopping rape and expressing an equally evolutionarily or-
dained imperative toward pleasure, mutuality, and equality.
232 Michael Kimmel

Conclusion

Bad science, bad history, and bad politics add up to a pretty dreadful book.
What’s missing, ultimately, from Thornhill and Palmer’s facile reduction-
ism is the distinctly human capacity for change, for choice. What’s miss-
ing is human agency.
To them, men are driven by evolutionary imperatives to rape, pillage,
destroy to make sure our seed gets planted. If women are not compliant,
we men are hard wired to take what we want anyway. They have the power
of choice, but when we’re not chosen—well, we get testy. “They made us
do it because we can’t get them any other way. And we simply must have
them.”
I’ve heard this before. From rapists! That’s who will really find Thorn-
hill and Palmer’s arguments comforting. I can imagine that Thornhill’s
phone has been ringing off the hook with attorneys defending men
accused of rape, asking him to be an expert witness for the defense. “You
see, your honor, as I wrote, ‘rape has evolutionary—and thus genetic—
origins.’”
“Aha!” Comments the defense lawyer. “So he was driven by his bio-
logical imperative to reproduce? How could he be held accountable for
some behavior that he was compelled to do by his body? He simply had
to have her!”
Feminists believe we can do better than this politically; social scientists
believe that we can do better than this book scientifically.
Nowhere is this better expressed than on a “splash guard” that a col-
league devised for Rape Awareness Week at his university. (For those who
don’t know, a splash guard is the plastic grate that is placed in men’s public
urinals that prevents splatter.) He had thousands made up with a simple
and hopeful slogan. It says simply: “You hold the power to stop rape in
your hand.”

References

Angier, Natalie (1999). Woman: An Intimate Geography. New York: Houghton

Mifflin.
Brownmiller, Susan (1975). Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape. New
York: Simon and Schuster.
———. (2000). Rape on the brain. Feminista! March 8.
 An Unnatural History of Rape 233

Coyne, Jerry (2000). “Of Vice and Men,” New Republic, April 3.
De Waal, Frans B. M. (2000). “Survival of the Rapist,” New York Times Book Re-
view, April 2.
Ehrenreich, Barbara. (2000). “How ‘Natural” is Rape?” Time, January 31.
Hung, Mindy. (2000). Review of A Natural History of Rape, in Medscape, Sep-
tember 14. <[Link]
Thornhill, Randy and Craig T. Palmer. (2000a). A Natural History of Rape: Bio-
logical Bases of Sexual Coercion. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
———. (2000b). Why men rape. The Sciences, January.
11
Violence against Science: Rape and Evolution
Elisabeth A. Lloyd

It is clear where the opposition is coming from—it’s coming from ideology. . . .

Most of the ideology is coming from certain feminist groups. It’s not feminism,
per se, that’s against us. It is certain groups of feminists that are against the applica-
tion of science for dealing with this problem. That is a socially very irresponsible
position.
—Randy Thornhill, quoted in Dano (2000)

Throughout A Natural History of Rape, co-authors Randy Thornhill and

Craig Palmer resort to what is known among philosophers of science as
“The Galileo Defense,” which amounts to the following claim: “I am tell-
ing the Truth and doing excellent science, but because of ideology and
ignorance, I am being persecuted.”1 The authors have repeated and elabo-
rated on this defense during the sizable media flurry accompanying the
book’s publication in February 2000.2
Now, history has accepted this defense from Galileo. But in order for it
to work for Thornhill and Palmer, of course, they must be telling the Truth
and doing excellent science. In this essay I shall argue that the Galileo de-
fense is impotent in the hands of Thornhill and Palmer because of glaring
flaws in their science.

1 Their Claims

Thornhill and Palmer present two alternative evolutionary explanations

for the existence of human rape. They claim that rape behavior must either
have evolved through a process of natural selection, that is, rape behavior
must be a specific adaptation, or it must be the by-product of some under-
lying traits that are themselves adaptations.
236 Elisabeth A. Lloyd

Their main arguments for these theses all rest on a hypothesis about
the evolution of sex differences: that because women bear the brunt of the
effort in reproduction—through pregnancy, nursing, and infant care—
they have evolved to be very selective about their mates.
Men, on the other hand, by virtue of the possibility of being able to
reproduce with the minimal investment of mere ejaculation, have evolved
to seek out as many mates as possible, and to copulate with no intention
of co-parenting or providing. This has led to such traits of male sexuality
as the desire for casual sex, the seeking out of a wide variety of mates,
and a stronger disregard for the particular features of a given mate. Hence,
female and male “reproductive strategies” differ: Women choose mates
carefully, whereas men seek multiple mates.3
Here is how each of Thornhill and Palmer’s two theses about rape rely
on this picture of evolved male sexuality. They call their first hypothesis—
that men have evolved, through natural selection, a specific tendency to-
ward rape behavior—the “rape-specific” hypothesis. On this view, men
who had trouble attaining sexual access to females—especially because of
low status or evidence of inferior genetic make-up—must have resorted to
rape in order to satisfy their sexual urges to mate with a larger number of
women. This trait, a disposition to rape behavior, helped get these males’
genes into the human gene pool by increasing mate number and thereby
increasing the frequency of “rape genes” in the population through the
process of natural selection. In other words, the reproductive problems
facing our human ancestors were very specific, and therefore the mecha-
nism, that is, the tendency to rape itself, that “solved” these problems is
also specific. Therefore, the rape-specific adaptation hypothesis is favored.
Evolution by natural selection occurs when individuals of one type of
genetic makeup (genotype) reproduce more successfully than individuals
of other types of genetic makeup, resulting in a change within the whole
population of the proportions of each type. For natural selection to work
in favor of a particular genotype, the genotype must be associated with a
trait that is inheritable, that is, transmitted from one generation to another
through the genes, and that increases the organism’s reproductive success.
In this case, the rapists would succeed reproductively while men who were
otherwise genetically equivalent but who were not rapists would have
failed at reproducing. The long-term effect of this pattern of reproductive
success on human demographics would thus have been the increasing fre-
quency of the rapist type within the human population.
 Violence against Science 237

When a trait evolves (or is “chosen”) through natural selection, it is

called an evolutionary adaptation. Thus, the primary hypothesis defended
in Thornhill and Palmer’s book is that rape is an evolutionary adaptation,
that is, it evolved because rape behavior itself was reproductively superior
to nonraping behavior.
Under Thornhill and Palmer’s second hypothesis, which they call the
“by-product” view, evolved psychological traits such as the male desire for
a wide variety of mates led accidentally to the existence of rape, but rape
itself was not directly selected. On this view, the act of rape is an inciden-
tal by-product of other male sexual adaptations, “especially those that
function to produce the sexual desire of males for multiple partners with-
out commitment” (2000b, p. 60). The phenomenon of evolutionary by-
products is frequent in human evolution. Manual dexterity was directly
selected because it was reproductively advantageous to our ancestors
for making tools, and so on, and is therefore an adaptation. Our use of
manual dexterity in playing the piano is a by-product of the selection on
manual dexterity. It is not an evolutionary adaptation itself. Note that se-
lection leading to evolutionary adaptation is involved in this scenario, but
the trait of playing the piano is distinct from the evolutionary adaptation
itself; it is an epiphenomenon.
Thornhill and Palmer consider two hypotheses about the evolution of
human rape—the hypothesis that rape is a specifically selected adaptation,
and the hypothesis that rape is an evolutionary by-product of selection on
other traits. Although they do not find any evidence they consider decisive
in favor of either hypothesis, nevertheless, most of the evidence they ad-
vance is explicitly intended to support the adaptive view. Thus, in what fol-
lows, I shall evaluate primarily their claims about this adaptive view.
To buttress the rape-specific hypothesis, Thornhill and Palmer propose
a number of subsidiary psychological adaptations that would have in-
creased men’s chance of reproductive success when attempting to rape.
Proposed mechanisms include men having: (1) a special psychological
adaptation that enables them to evaluate females’ vulnerability to rape
(2000b, p. 66); (2) a special psychological adaptation to prefer to rape
women at peak fertility (2000b, p. 71); (3) a psychological adaptation to
be sexually aroused by gaining physical control over an unwilling sexual
partner (2000b, p. 75); (4) a psychological adaptation to rape wives and
girlfriends if they believe their women are cheating on them (2000b,
238 Elisabeth A. Lloyd

pp. 77–78); and finally, (5) a psychological adaptation for male paranoia
about women’s claims of being raped (2000b, p. 158).
But under either evolutionary scenario, women are also hypothesized to
have evolved rape-related adaptations—specifically, an adaptation for psy-
chological anguish on being raped. The supposition is that rape victims
suffer an overall loss in reproductive success. Psychological anguish is thus
hypothesized to have been an adaptation to help women guard against
such reproductive loss. The psychological adaptation focuses the victim’s
attention on the causes of the loss and helps her avoid repetition of those
causes (2000b, p. 85). The basic evolutionary assumptions here are that
rape reduces a woman’s reproductive success by circumventing her mate
choice, that it reduces her mate’s reproductive success by lowering his cer-
tainty of paternity, and that it reduces the fitness of the relatives of the vic-
tim and her mate (2000b, p. 85). In addition, reproductive losses could be
expected from getting raped, insofar as the act causes physical injury, the
loss of a victim’s ability to use copulation as a means of obtaining material
benefits from men, the interference with a victim’s mate’s protection of her,
or a reduction in the quality or quantity of parental care given by her mate
(2000b, p. 86).
According to Thornhill and Palmer, the adaptation of psychological
anguish manifests itself differently in different circumstances of rape.
Women of peak reproductive age are hypothesized to experience more
psychological pain than females of either pre- or postreproductive age
(2000b, pp.89–90). This is because the reproductive costs to these young
women of getting raped are higher.
In addition, Thornhill and Palmer predict that reproductive-age victims
will experience more violent attacks than the pre- or postreproductive-age
rape victims (2000b, pp. 91–92). The basis of this prediction lies in the hy-
pothesis that reproductive-age women are more likely to fight back “be-
cause of the greater evolutionary historical cost to their reproductive
success of being raped” (2000b, pp. 91–92), and that rapists would be
more highly sexually motivated to complete the rape in reproductive-age
victims because of these victims’ greater sexual attractiveness relative to
victims in the other two categories (2000b, p. 92).
Other hypothesized adaptations among females include: (1) the ten-
dency to experience decreased psychological pain as the violence of the at-
tack increases—this is because physical injury helps to prove to her mate
 Violence against Science 239

that the sex really was forced and not consensual (2000b, p. 92); (2) “the
absence of orgasm during rape” (2000b, p. 99); and (3) the tendency to
avoid risky situations, especially during the fertile phase of her cycle
(2000b, p. 100).
Thornhill and Palmer then use the supposed existence of female psy-
chological rape adaptations to bolster their claims for specific male psy-
chological rape-adaptations and to counter two alternatives to their
theory. One would expect to find rape behavior to be ubiquitous in human
societies, if it is genuinely adaptive for men; women’s “apparent adaptation
to deal with rape . . . implies that rape has been common enough in human
evolutionary history to select for counter-adaptations in women” (2000b,
p. 57). This, they claim, refutes the alternative explanation that rape re-
sults from a low-frequency mutation, where a rape mutation would occur
in the population, but would not be selected either for or against. Such an
explanation would imply that rape is not an evolutionary adaptation
(2000b, p. 57). They also use the hypothesized female adaptations against
rape to argue that rape is not a recently derived cultural anomaly generated
by new circumstances in the human environment (2000b, p. 58). In other
words, they use the supposed female adaptations against rape to rule out
two possible alternatives to their two favored hypotheses.
In sum, the authors focus their attention on what they present as the
only two plausible candidates for the evolutionary explanation of rape:
Either it is an adaptation itself, or it is a by-product of other aspects of
evolved male sexuality. There is much more to be said regarding the evi-
dence that they offer for this panoply of male and female rape-related psy-
chological adaptations, some of which I shall cover in section 3, below. But
first, we must investigate the soundness of the entire evolutionary frame-
work within which the authors work.

2 The Theory

Let us examine Thornhill and Palmer’s use of evolutionary biology. They

begin by claiming that “selection is the most important cause of evolu-
tion” (2000b, p. 8). What is evident from this bit of theoretical position-
ing is that Thornhill and Palmer are in the business of looking for
explanations of traits in relation to the selective causes that produced
them, thus downplaying the other four accepted forces of evolution (drift,
240 Elisabeth A. Lloyd

mutation, recombination, and gene flow among groups in subdivided pop-

ulations; see Lloyd, 1988/1994). Evolutionary biologists standardly refer
to strategies like Thornhill and Palmer’s as “adaptationism,” since such ap-
proaches seek to explain all interesting traits in terms of selective forces
alone. In fact, Thornhill and Palmer explicitly equate an “ultimate or evo-
lutionary analysis” with adaptationism. They claim that the challenge for
such an analysis is “to determine the nature of the selective pressure that
is responsible for the trait. That selective pressure will be apparent in the
functional design of the adaptation” (2000b, p. 9). In other words, they
want to infer information about the selection pressure from the “design”
of a trait, and to assume that the only relevant evolutionary force shaping
the trait was natural selection.
Identification of the trait under evolution is an essential part of an adap-
tation explanation. When explaining the evolution of rape, Thornhill and
Palmer emphasize that rape is a reproductive act brought into play when
other means of reproduction are thwarted. It is, fundamentally, from their
evolutionary point of view, sexual intercourse with fertile female partners.
But is this a plausible description of rape? A very wide variety of acts are
considered by Thornhill and Palmer to fall under the rubric of “rape” that
they are trying to explain in evolutionary terms, including the rape of ba-
bies, men, postmenopausal women, and so on, which turn out to make up
the majority of rapes, and which are clearly not intercourse with fertile
females (Kilpatrick, Edmunds, and Seymour 1992; Coyne 2000).4 How
does this compare with evolutionary accounts of a clear single trait such
as bipedalism? There seems to be a striking disunity among the various
acts that are classed as rape. Why should we expect that one evolutionary
explanation be appropriate for all of these diverse behaviors? Thornhill
and Palmer proceed on the assumption that all rapes are fundamentally the
same. If this assumption is wrong, then there are serious problems with
Thornhill and Palmer’s evolutionary account of what may well be dis-
parate phenomena.
Given that there are alternative hypotheses that see, for example, male
on male rape as predominantly a dominance behavior, Thornhill and
Palmer cannot simply assume that all rape is a single type of behavior, that
is, one involving incentives to reproduce. Thornhill and Palmer could re-
spond that the majority of rapes, that is, all the other, nonreproductive
cases of rape, are simply generalized misfirings of the fundamental adap-
 Violence against Science 241

tation, which is one of having intercourse with fertile women. Thus, they
could claim, because they explained the “fundamental” behavior of rape,
the misfirings are evolutionarily uninteresting. But this strategy is defen-
sible only in the absence of other alternative explanations for the occur-
rences of the nonreproductive rapes, that is, in the absence of explanations
based on dominance or aggression. Thus, Thornhill and Palmer use an un-
defended and contentious assumption about the unity of rape behaviors to
launch their evolutionary adaptive explanation. On the face of it, this is a
bad start to their evolutionary project.
The traits in any adaptation account must also be inheritable. Because
Thornhill and Palmer hypothesize a species-wide trait—of universal
condition-dependent raping behavior—asking for information regarding
whether rapists’ children are more likely to rape than nonrapists’ children
may seem to be irrelevant. After all, a universal trait has no variation in the
population: everyone has it, and all offspring are expected to have it. Nev-
ertheless, evidence regarding whether rapists’ children are more likely to
rape is relevant to our consideration of Thornhill and Palmer’s hypothesis.
This is because the most promising alternate theories of rape, for example,
those involving psychopathology of various sorts, are expected to have a
genetic component, and thus to be reflected in the degree of resemblance
between parent and offspring. Hence, information about the heritability
of rape is an important—and missing—part of the evidence needed to
evaluated Thornhill and Palmer’s claims.
One also needs to show that the trait is an adaptation. There are a num-
ber of ways to do this. One is to look at existing genotypic and phenotypic5
variations in the current population of the trait: Given that few men rape,
there would seem to be ample evidence of phenotypic variation from
which to work. From this variation, the scientist can then compare the dif-
ferences in reproductive success between those exhibiting the trait and
those not. If a positive reproductive advantage for those exhibiting the trait
is found, then the evolutionist starts to look for the possible adaptive sce-
narios under which the trait could have evolved.
The problem with applying the above method to Thornhill and Palmer’s
case is that they claim the trait of potential raping behavior is universal. Be-
cause they are positing a conditional reproductive strategy, which includes
rape, as the adaptation, any variation in rates of rape among individuals or
societies can be explained away: Different societies construct different
242 Elisabeth A. Lloyd

costs and benefits to raping, and therefore there are varying frequencies of
rape. The form of the hypothesis itself may seem to make it untestable, be-
cause differences in costs and benefits can always be hypothesized. But the
hypothesis of a conditional strategy is not untestable, it is merely difficult
to test: Different costs and benefits must be shown to exist in the societies
with corresponding variations in rape rates. However, Thornhill and
Palmer have not attempted to offer any evidence of the required type.
Hence their hypothesis is, in fact, untested.
Another important research avenue exists for establishing that a trait is
an adaptation. Evolutionary biologists often compare the species in ques-
tion (in this case, human beings) with their closest relatives to see if the
trait is manifested elsewhere in the lineage. This approach is not foolproof,
but it does provide important information regarding when the trait might
have evolved and under what circumstances. If the trait is found to be an
adaptation in closely related species, then it can be viewed with more con-
fidence as an adaptation in human beings.
Finally, especially if the trait is not exhibited with any frequency in
closely related species, the scientist must examine the past evolutionary
circumstances of human beings very carefully for evidence that there was,
indeed, a plausible set of circumstances under which the trait could have
evolved. This would involve examination of past social structures, popu-
lation sizes, migration rates, and material culture. However, despite their
own warning that the trait of rape behavior is not necessarily adaptive to
current conditions, nearly all of the evidence they offer concerns precisely
contemporary circumstances of rape (2000b, pp. 71–73, 88–89). This
could be relevant evidence if they showed the relative reproductive success
of rapists and nonrapists, but they do not. Instead, they begin by assuming
that the trait is an adaptation, and reason backward from there. I have re-
viewed above the customary standards for adaptation explanations in evo-
lutionary biology. Not all of these evidentiary standards may be met, in
which case the conclusion that a trait is an adaptation is correspondingly
weakened.
Even if we accept that rape is a coherent evolutionary trait, that it is re-
lated to increasing reproductive success, and that it is inherited, the fact re-
mains that Thornhill and Palmer have given no historical evidence of the
process of selection that supposedly led to rape as an adaptation (e.g., from
archaeology or current anthropology).
 Violence against Science 243

One puzzle is that Thornhill and Palmer claim that one can rule out drift
and mutation as forces in explanations of evolutionary history when a
trait “shows evidence of functional design” (2000b, p. 10). But they make
no mention of Sewall Wright’s (1931) results to the contrary in population
genetics, which clearly demonstrate the possibility of mutation and drift
playing a major role in producing adaptations, in his Shifting Balance
theory.
Thornhill and Palmer seem to misunderstand the role of mutation per
se in evolution, by claiming that “mutation, as an evolutionary cause for
traits, may apply only to those traits that are only slightly above zero fre-
quency in the population” (2000b, p. 10). In fact, this is true only for
strongly deleterious traits.6
One especially startling aspect of Thornhill and Palmer’s version of evo-
lutionary theory is their claim that “the study of the profound implications
of evolutionary theory—particularly the ability of selection to form adap-
tations—has, until recently, been relatively unexplored” (2000b, p. 106).
Reconciling this claim with the actual history of evolutionary biology is,
to say the least, a challenge (see Clausen, 1951; Darwin 1859 /1964;
Dobzhansky 1937; Grant 1963; Lack 1954; Lewontin 1997; Mayr 1942;
Sheppard 1958; Simpson 1953; Stebbins 1950; Weismann 1904; Wright
1931). This is just part of the so-called evolutionary psychologists’ val-
orization of themselves as starting a “new” movement in evolutionary
biology.
These oversights are not trivial; Thornhill and Palmer’s fringe version of
the actual theory of evolution damages their credibility—especially in
light of their repeated claims that they are experts in evolutionary theory.
Is it possible, though, that their unusual view of the actual workings of
evolutionary theory has no real consequences for their overall line of rea-
soning? No, for they rely on these misunderstandings to eliminate alter-
native hypotheses regarding the evolution of rape. For example, they list
four evolutionary causes of trait change or trait maintenance in evolu-
tionary lines—selection, drift, gene flow, and mutation—and in the end,
discard all but selection as a possible evolutionary cause of rape behavior
(2000b, pp. 56–59). The most bizarre aspect of the little set of arguments
that they use is that, despite their later acknowledgment that population
geneticists are the experts in determining the balances and possibilities of
those four causes (2000b, p. 106), they cite no population geneticists in
244 Elisabeth A. Lloyd

their arguments that selection alone explains the existence of rape. In-
stead, they fabricate their own conclusions about the likelihood of each
cause, and then present their foregone conclusion: that only selection
could have caused the propensity to rape.
But let us return to Thornhill and Palmer’s main fallacious conclusion,
that “the diversity of life has two major components: adaptations and the
effects of adaptations” (2000b, p. 11). Regarding “effects of adaptations,”
they give the useful example of the trait of the red color of human blood:
This trait is a by-product or epiphenomenon of the chemistry of oxygen
and hemoglobin in the blood, plus the existence of human color vision.
By-products or epiphenomena are not directly selected for their advan-
tages to reproductive success, unlike real adaptations.
Thornhill and Palmer make a contentious claim about these epiphe-
nomena, namely, that they are always by-products of adaptations for other
things. This does not follow, and it is not the mainstream evolutionary
view. For example, many traits categorized as evolutionary by-products
are understood as phyletic remnants, that is, leftovers from the evolution-
ary ancestors of the species in question. But this entails neither that they
ever were nor that they were not under selection pressure. Take the human
trait of having five fingers on each hand. This trait traces to the near be-
ginnings of the vertebrate lineage. Some vertebrates, for example, horses,
have endured selection pressure to change the number of phalanges, from
five down to one for each limb. Other vertebrates underwent selection for
grasping branches, reducing the number to four, and yet most vertebrates
retain the five-digit limb. Does the fact that human beings customarily
have five digits signify that there was selection for five and only five digits
in human ancestry? The generally accepted evolutionary answer is “no”
(Gould 1977). Deviations from the basic vertebrate body plan of five dig-
its are understood as having undergone mutation and selection for those
mutations, while the default property of having five digits is not seen as
having been directly selected in this case. This phenomenon is called
“phyletic inertia,” wherein a trait remains the same unless it is actively se-
lected to change. This is true even in the deep evolutionary past, at the be-
ginnings of the vertebrate line, where having five rather than four digits
was perhaps an incidental side effect of selection on other aspects of the
vertebrate skeleton, or may well have been the only variant that, for other
reasons, survived to found the lineage of vertebrates.
 Violence against Science 245

Thornhill and Palmer hold an extreme evolutionary view of the role of

phyletic inertia in evolutionary explanations. They claim that phyletic in-
ertia—or the difficulty of changing body plans and the resultant contin-
uation of a trait in a lineage—is not an evolutionary explanation of
anything, because it does not involve an evolutionary “cause” of the main-
tenance of a trait in a lineage of species. This is because the phylogenetic
cause of a trait in a given species does not identify the “ultimate cause of
the continuance” (2000b, p. 55). They use a clever choice of example to
bolster this view: the trait of the crossing over of the digestive and respira-
tory tracts in (land) vertebrates. Here, they claim, the trait is maintained in
all relevant species through constant selection. Such a set-up, awkward
and dangerous though it is, was necessary to maintain the digestive and
respiratory functions through the history of vertebrates. And (land) verte-
brates not conforming to the basic body plan would be nonviable and
would be selected against. Therefore, they conclude, “all evolutionary
constraints and phylogenetic legacies ultimately involve selection in some
way” (2000b, p. 56). But think: Does this argument apply equally well to
having five digits, a trait that just as likely was fixed in the phylogenetic
past as an incidental correlate to a basically successful body plan? Of
course not.
Thus it is incorrect, according to modern evolutionary theory, to say
that every trait is either an adaptation or an effect of an adaptation in the
sense that Thornhill and Palmer use this dichotomy. And this mistake pro-
foundly weakens Thornhill and Palmer’s basic position, for they use this
false dichotomy to set up a false choice: Either rape is a specific adapta-
tion, directly selected for in virtue of its superior reproductive success, or
it is a by-product of other adaptations, an incidental side effect of special-
purpose adaptations to circumstances other than rape. These two options
are not, in fact, exhaustive.
Having set up their supposedly exhaustive choice between a direct-
adaptation and a by-product, they proceed to argue that very specific psy-
chological adaptations should be selected for in evolution. This discussion
reveals their adherence to the scientifically undefended thesis—in fact, one
contradicted by neurophysiological evidence (Buller and Hardcastle, in
press)—that the brain is constructed of a high number of very special-
purpose physiological mechanisms. This view is a familiar hobby-horse
of a group of authors calling themselves “evolutionary psychologists”
(Thornhill and Palmer 2000b, pp. 15–20; cf. Lloyd 1999).
246 Elisabeth A. Lloyd

While on the topic, I should point out the exceedingly high density of
references to this small group of authors in this book, who themselves en-
gage in heavy cross-citation, and the fact that these authors are considered
a fringe group by most evolutionary theorists. This group repeatedly
demonstrates its narrow understanding of evolutionary theory and its mis-
interpretations of some elements of modern evolutionary biology; they
rarely cite more mainstream evolutionary theory or genetics, either con-
temporary or historical (see Lloyd and Feldman 2002).
At any rate, Thornhill and Palmer toe the party line among evolution-
ary psychologists in their claim that we should expect human psycholog-
ical adaptations to be special-purpose rather than general-purpose. This
supposedly buttresses the rape-specific adaptation hypothesis in the fol-
lowing way: The reproductive problems facing our human ancestors were
very specific; therefore the mechanism, that is, the tendency to rape itself,
that “solved” these problems is also likely to be specific and not a by-
product of a more general adaptation. Therefore, the rape-specific adapta-
tion is favored.
There is another literature on the relations between human culture/
psychology and genetics in evolutionary biology, oddly absent from Thorn-
hill and Palmer’s book. Thornhill and Palmer ignore the careful, quantita-
tive and theoretical work that has been done on the co-evolution of genes
and culture (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1978;
1981; Durham 1991; Laland, Odling-Smee, and Feldman 1996, 2000;
Lewontin 1982). These authors concentrate on the mutual effects that
genes and culture have had and can have on human evolution. Unlike
Thornhill and Palmer, they do not see cultural and biological explanations
as on the same level of explanation, nor do they attempt to reduce one to
the other.7 Although Thornhill and Palmer do appeal to one of these au-
thors’ works (once), conclusions in this section of their book aim toward
showing that cultural research has no legitimate explanatory role outside
of direct evolutionary considerations. They quote Margo Wilson approv-
ingly, when she writes, “Darwinian selection is the only known source of
the functional complexity of living things, and biologists have no reason
to suspect that there are any others” (Wilson, Daly, and Scheib 1997,
p. 433; quoted in Thornhill and Palmer 2000b, p. 122). Contrary to this
claim, the biologists working on gene-culture co-evolution see culture as
an important contributor to the evolved complexity of human beings.
Nevertheless, Thornhill and Palmer maintain, “the realization that culture
 Violence against Science 247

is behavior places it clearly within the realm of biology, and hence within
the explanatory realm of natural selection” (2000b, p. 25). But contra
Thornhill and Palmer, the above authors have shown that different ex-
planatory levels are legitimate in evolutionary theory.

3 The Evidence

Let us now consider some of the specific evidence and arguments Thorn-
hill and Palmer offer to support their various claims about evolutionary
adaptations, keeping in mind the usual evolutionary standards of evidence
discussed previously. Overall, as Jerry Coyne and Andrew Berry pointed
out in their review in Nature, there are serious weaknesses and misrepre-
sentations in Thornhill and Palmer’s presentation of their evidence (see
Coyne, this volume).
Let us consider a few other examples of Thornhill and Palmer’s handling
of evidence and reasoning. Take their claim that rape is all and only about
sexual reproduction—the club they use to batter the view of feminists who
hold that rape is about both sex and domination or control of women.
Thornhill and Palmer admit, in passing, that some holders of the by-
product view see rape as resulting from a combination of male sexual de-
sire and the “drive to possess and control” (2000b, p. 61; they cite Ellis
1989, 1991; and Malamuth 1996). But they dismiss this very plausible
evolutionary view by claiming that ordinarily there is no drive to possess
and control victims “for prolonged periods of time” (2000b, p. 62). But,
of course, the period of time is irrelevant to whether that desire is a con-
tributing proximate cause to rape.
We should also scrutinize Thornhill and Palmer’s claim that the ability
to detect vulnerability in potential victims is a special psychological adap-
tation in men to facilitate rape (2000b, p. 66). While we are telling evolu-
tionary stories, isn’t it more likely that the ability to detect vulnerability
evolved as a broadly valuable social and parenting capacity? For example,
the ability to detect vulnerability would have been very advantageous in
the evolutionary past when men were protecting their families. This obvi-
ous alternative is not considered by Thornhill and Palmer.
And what happened to the patently obvious hypothesis that raping be-
havior is due to psychopathology? In one of the two studies of develop-
mental factors affecting rape that Thornhill and Palmer do discuss in the
book, psychopathology played a leading explanatory role. This study of
248 Elisabeth A. Lloyd

adolescent male sexual criminals by Figueredo et al. (2000) found that

these rapists were characterized by backgrounds of repeated frustration,
failed romantic and sexual relationships, as well as lower psychosocial
functioning, learning disabilities, and psychological disorders (2000b,
p. 67). But Thornhill and Palmer want to treat psychopathic men as a dis-
tinct group from rapists, claiming (with no evidence) that psychopaths
make up a distinct genetic form, and that normal men don’t have the same
adaptations.8 In fact, they suggest that “psychopathic and normal men
possess two distinct psychological adaptations with regard to rape—both
of which could be condition dependent” (2000b, p. 82; emphasis added).
Here we have a clear candidate for special pleading. Interestingly, this re-
sembles a similar problem that Thornhill and Palmer have with the fact
that high-status men, who are otherwise able to secure sexual partners,
rape, thus challenging their theory that only “losers” rape. In that case,
they propose that “their raping must result from adaptations other than
that suggested by the [low-status] hypothesis” (2000b, p. 68). Thus, we
have two more specific psychological adaptations proposed in order to
deal with anomalies from the main rape adaptation theory, under which
the genetic underpinnings of rape were supposedly fixed among human be-
ings. We can see an evasive tactic emerging: If ever an anomaly threatens
Thornhill and Palmer’s project, they simply propose more psychological
adaptations.
There is yet another type of data that is patently relevant to Thornhill
and Palmer’s hypotheses that is not considered: comparisons between hu-
man beings and our closest relatives, the chimpanzee and the bonobo.
Thornhill and Palmer seem to have an internal conflict about whether to
use comparative evidence, even though it is standard in contemporary
evolutionary analyses. In one place, they argue for the importance of com-
parative analysis, “which is a fundamental tool in biology for under-
standing causation” (2000b, p. 120). They follow this approach when
they appeal to the claim that rape occurs in many nonhuman species. But
when it comes to our closest relatives, the standards change: They claim
that it is erroneous to think that the behavior of nonhuman primates is
necessarily salient to human adaptations (2000b, p. 56). What is motivat-
ing this sudden switch? Perhaps this: The rate of rape among chimpanzees
is very low, and the majority of these are brother-sister rapes; moreover,
rape has never been observed at all in bonobos (Wrangham, personal com-
munication, 2000; see also Goodall 1986).9 These are our two closest liv-
 Violence against Science 249

ing relatives. This information is clearly damaging to their case. It places

extra burdens on them to produce a uniquely human account of the evo-
lution of rape, one that does not rely on common traits about sex differ-
ences in sexuality that we share with our nearest relatives. Instead,
Thornhill and Palmer rely heavily on comparative evidence from scorpion
flies (2000b, pp. 63–64). I leave the reader to judge whether comparisons
with scorpion flies are more relevant than comparisons with nonhuman
primates.
Moreover, the chimps and bonobos show that their by-product view is
also inadequate. If rape resulted simply from the design of male sexuality
for multiple partners, then we should expect our closest relatives to exhibit
the same rape-as-by-product behavior, given that they have similarly
evolved male sexualities. But we find the incidence of rape is either low or
nonexistent. Hence, it seems that the structure of male sexuality is, itself,
insufficient to support a by-product analysis of rape. Other authors sug-
gest that aggression and dominance are also involved, which, in the case
of human beings, might make a dangerous cocktail of causes that leads to
rape as an evolutionary by-product. Nevertheless, Thornhill and Palmer
reject these alternate views.
Finally, perhaps the crucial assumption of their entire book is that rape
was indeed, at some time in evolution, a reproductively successful strat-
egy—but they leave this assumption almost completely unsupported. In
fact, the current rape statistics provide a potential challenge to their con-
clusions. According to a study they cite themselves, the success rate that
reported rapists currently have at inseminating their victims is only about
2 percent. This 2 percent must be compared within the context of the over-
all lifetime reproductive success of those using the rape strategy, those not,
and mixed cases. Even though Thornhill and Palmer do not compare these
various strategies, it is still possible that a 2 percent rate of insemination is
strong enough to provide a selective pressure, even with high abortion
rates. However, what such a scenario requires is that raping provided, at
some time in history, a higher frequency of fertilization than nonraping for
these individuals. But they have not shown this.
Worse for Thornhill and Palmer, 50 percent of pregnant rape victims
in a U.S. study terminated their pregnancy through therapeutic abortions,
and another 12 percent resulted in spontaneous abortion (2000b, p. 100).
Thornhill and Palmer are not deterred by these contemporary results.
They dismiss objections to their views by stating that such contemporary
250 Elisabeth A. Lloyd

evidence is not relevant to whether rape was an adaptation in our evolu-

tionary past.10 They are certainly correct about this. However, the problem
is that Thornhill and Palmer make no effort to describe the relevant envi-
ronmental (including cultural) circumstances in our evolutionary past in
any detail, either in support of or against the rape hypotheses they con-
sider. What we would normally demand is some evidence regarding, for
example: the percentage of women who either abort or kill their rape-
begotten infants,11 the likelihood that any given woman of reproductive
age either is nursing (with its concomitant reduction in fertility) or is al-
ready pregnant at any given moment; or what percentage of rapists were
caught and punished, which could be calibrated to the ancestral group size
and culture, and the likelihood of being caught. But Thornhill and Palmer
make no effort to provide this crucial evidence, which is badly needed in
order to evaluate their hypotheses.

4 The Enemy

Thornhill and Palmer begin their chapter entitled “Law and Punishment”
with a caricature of social scientists, who supposedly believe in “cultural
determinism.” They claim: “Cultural determinism is consistent with free
will and with the ability of humans to change their behavior easily by
adopting new social constructs” (2000b, p. 153; emphasis added). Need-
less to say, the “ease” of adopting new social constructs is an imaginative
piece of misinterpretation by Thornhill and Palmer; social scientists tend
to view social and cultural forces as entrenched and as acting over the life-
time of the individual’s development, and thus as very difficult to change.
Hence, when Thornhill and Palmer point out that the “ease” of change “is
in conflict with everything that is known about the interaction of genetic
and environmental factors in the development of all behavioral abilities”
(2000b, p. 153), they are in agreement, not opposition, with their sup-
posed targets.
They continue by stating that our real need is to understand “how
human-mediated alterations in the developmental environment can pro-
duce desirable behavioral changes” (2000b, p. 153), thus stating the obvi-
ous, and outlining the standard goal of many socialization, criminalistic,
and psychological studies. Thornhill and Palmer see their stated goals as
conflicting with the social sciences only because they see evolutionary
 Violence against Science 251

theory as “crucial, since it predicts that the developmental events of in-

terest will occur in response to specific cues that, in our history as a species,
were most reliably correlated with reduced consensual sex with females”
(2000b, p. 154). But these specific cues are part of what the social scien-
tists in question study.
Moreover, instead of including fair critical examination of various al-
ternative hypotheses for the development of rape in men, Thornhill and
Palmer attack a caricature of what they call the “feminist psychosocial”
position. They spend a full 60 pages of this slim 200-page book attacking
feminist views on rape, which they inexplicably equate with “the social
science theory.” The feminist view supposedly says that sex has absolutely
nothing to do with rape (the “not sex” view), and that rape is instead ex-
clusively about the power and control over women, about misogyny, and
about the exercise of patriarchal values. Their ultimate target for this view
is Susan Brownmiller, who successfully inspired changes in the political
and legal atmosphere surrounding treatment of rapists and victims with
her 1975 book, Against Our Will. In Thornhill and Palmer’s précis of their
book, published in the Sciences, they wrote:
In 1975 the feminist writer Susan Brownmiller asserted that rape is motivated not
by lust but by the urge to control and dominate. In the twenty-five years since,
Brownmiller’s view has become mainstream. All men feel sexual desire, the theory
goes, but not all men rape. Rape is viewed as an unnatural behavior that has
nothing to do with sex, and one that has no corollary in the animal world.
(2000a, p. 30)

But Brownmiller never professed the primary mistake attributed to her,

namely, that rape does not involve sex. In fact, Brownmiller refers to rape
as a sexual act throughout the whole 1975 book. For example, she calls
rape “a ‘taking’ of sex through the use of threat or force” (1975, p. 377).
Elsewhere she recounts instances in which rape is a sexual reward for the
male slave, and a sexual privilege for the masters (1975, pp. 157–158). In
other words, she clearly and repeatedly categorizes rape as sex.
More recently, in an appearance on the National Public Radio show
“Talk of the Nation” with Thornhill, Brownmiller insisted:
I never said that rape was not involved with sex. Obviously, it uses the sex organs.
What the women’s movement did say, starting in the 1970s, was that rape was not
sexy, you see. The men, up to that point, had romanticized rape and always pre-
sented scenarios of beautiful but just slightly unwilling, but really teasing victims.
And the act was construed as sort of a Robin Hood act of machismo. When women
252 Elisabeth A. Lloyd

started to speak up about their own experiences of rape, the first thing they said
was, “No, there’s nothing sexy about this. This was pure power humiliation, degra-
dation.” And that’s where the feminist theory came from, out of listening to the ex-
periences of women. (Appearing on Penkava 2000; emphasis added)

Thornhill expressed surprise during this radio show at Brownmiller’s

statement that sex was involved in rape.12 But this response was disingen-
uous at best, because Brownmiller had previously attempted to correct
Thornhill’s specific misrepresentation of the feminist view as the “not sex”
view of rape. She and Barbara Mehrhof (1992) were commentators on a
1992 target article in Brain and Behavioral Sciences written by Thornhill
and his former wife, Nancy Thornhill. In the commentary, Brownmiller
and Mehrhof state, “the central insight of the feminist theory of rape iden-
tifies the act as a crime of violence. . . . The sexual motivation, orgasmic
release, is a secondary component” (1992, p. 382).
So then why does Thornhill now publicly feign surprise at Brownmiller’s
resistance to the former’s characterization of her view as the “not sex”
view? Perhaps because in their book, Thornhill and Palmer attribute to
Brownmiller a series of strawperson “arguments” that depend on her
maintaining the “not sex” view. They then attempt to debunk these argu-
ments. Let us take a closer look at what they say Brownmiller says, and
compare it to what Brownmiller actually said.
Take Thornhill and Palmer’s “Argument 9,” supposedly put forward by
Brownmiller: “It is not a crime of lust but of violence and power . . . rape
victims are not only the ‘lovely young blondes’ of newspaper headlines—
rapists strike children, the aged, the homely—all women” (2000b,
p. 138).13 In elaborating their rebuttal to this claim, Thornhill and Palmer
focus on the ages of rape victims, and argue as follows:
The statement that “any female may become a victim of rape” (Brownmiller 1975,
p. 348) does not imply that the “rapist chooses his victim with a striking disregard
for conventional ‘sex appeal’” (ibid., p. 338). Contrary to Brownmiller, although
any female might become a victim of rape, some women are far more likely to be-
come victims of rape than others. Indeed, one of the most consistent findings of
studies on rape, and one not likely to be due entirely to reporting bias, is that
women in their teens and their early twenties are highly overrepresented among
rape victims around the world. (Thornhill and Palmer, 2000b, pp. 138–139; their
emphasis)

Now let us look at what Brownmiller actually said. On the very same page
as the second sentence they quote, Brownmiller continues:
 Violence against Science 253

Statistical probability does matter. Just as there is a calculable “typical” rapist,

there is also, to a lesser degree of certainty, a “typical” victim. While any woman
is a natural target for a would-be rapist, the chances are that a rape victim will be
of the same class and race as her attacker, at least between 70 and 90% of the time.
More often than not, she will also be the same age as her attacker, or slightly
younger. Overall, the danger to women is greatest between the ages of 10 and 29.
Teenage girls, simply by being teenage girls, run the greatest risk of any age group.
(Brownmiller 1975, p. 348)

In other words, Brownmiller explicitly denies that all women are equally
likely to become rape victims, and in fact emphasizes the same results as
Thornhill and Palmer, in direct contradiction to their charge.
In all, four of the nine “feminist” arguments they attempt to debunk are
attributed to Brownmiller, so it is very significant that the textual evidence
and the verbal reports of that author deny the basic premise of these argu-
ments, namely, that sex is not involved in rape. There are further diffi-
culties, though. Feminist “Argument 1” consists of a quote taken from
opponents to a feminist understanding of rape (2000b, p. 133). Ordinar-
ily, honest scientists consider versions of arguments from their proponents
and not their proponents’ enemies. This is not the only time, however, that
Thornhill and Palmer use the tactic of representing their enemies’ views
unfairly. For example, they also use the work of antifeminist Dwight C.
Murphy (1992), who presents a popular press version of Brownmiller’s
view of rape that misrepresents Brownmiller’s position as a “not sex” view
(Thornhill and Palmer 2000b, p. 125). In sum, Thornhill and Palmer must
be considered unreliable on the issue of what feminists have said and how
it relates to their own views.
Now consider the following argument: All matter is subject to the laws
of quantum mechanics. Therefore, population geneticists cannot have a le-
gitimate explanation of the behavior of genes, because they are failing to
appeal to the fundamental causes of matter’s behavior.14 This amounts to
a denial of the legitimacy of an independent level of explanation for any
“nonfundamental” theory.
Implausibly, Thornhill and Palmer use the same form of argument in
this book, wherein higher, independent levels of explanation above the or-
dinary biological level are rejected as not being fundamental enough. This
argument is unacceptable regarding population genetics, and it is unac-
ceptable concerning the social science levels of explanation that Thornhill
and Palmer want to delegitimate.
254 Elisabeth A. Lloyd

One of the most confused and confusing aspects of Thornhill and

Palmer’s arguments is the claim that “every aspect of every living thing is,
by definition, biological” (2000b, p. 20). Their argument runs as follows.
All behavior is biological because it evolved. Therefore all explanations of
that behavior must be biological, since there is no psychological, socio-
logical, or cultural explanation that is not fundamentally biology. There-
fore, all research into behavior must involve and be guided by evolutionary
biology. As they put it, culture is “still biological and subject to the only
general biological theory—evolution by selection” (2000b, p. 24). (Never
mind the false equation of evolutionary theory itself with evolution by
selection.)
Shockingly, this line of argument is supposed to show that social scien-
tists such as psychologists and sociologists cannot do their research—
investigating and identifying the range of environmental factors influenc-
ing behavior—without doing evolutionary biology simultaneously.15 Of
course, it implies nothing of the kind: The search for environmental fac-
tors affecting phenotypes can proceed in the complete absence of a specific
evolutionary hypothesis. Furthermore, having an evolutionary hypothesis
about a trait does not by any means isolate the relevant learning factors
that go into producing that trait. Both of these points are denied vehe-
mently by Thornhill and Palmer (2000b, pp. 84, 153, 156).
Note how the apparently trivial claim that “everything is biological” is
now doing real work here. They want to claim that if someone is not us-
ing the evolutionary level of explanation for a human phenomenon, then
they are not doing any explaining at all. But even according to their own
view, research into the relevant causes of different developmental out-
comes in human beings is a necessary part of the explaining that they want
to do. If some of the relevant causes are cultural, then cultural research
into such causes is totally legitimate, and in fact necessary. Or do they
want to rule out cultural causes as possible influences on human develop-
ment? It seems that they do not, for they say, “Yes, some differences in be-
havior between individuals could be due entirely to cultural influences that
have affected their behavior” (2000b, pp. 24–25). But this does not mean,
they say, that “an individual’s culturally influenced behavior is due entirely
to environmental causes and hence is not biological” (2000b, p. 25). But
they’ve just admitted that, in the case at hand, the differences between one
individual and another can be entirely cultural, and not explicable at the
level of biology.
 Violence against Science 255

And there’s the rub. They want to deny that cultural explanations can
really explain anything—that the cultural level of investigation is a legiti-
mately explanatory one. On what basis? On the basis that “an individual’s
cultural behavior is still a product of gene-environment interactions. And
the individual can learn nothing without underlying adaptation for learn-
ing” (2000b, p. 25). Well, this is no doubt true, but we can agree to these
last statements and yet believe that a purely cultural investigation of indi-
vidual differences in development is both necessary and explanatory.
Nevertheless, Thornhill and Palmer insist that “The cultural behavior of
individuals is never independent of the human evolutionary history of se-
lection for individual reproductive success” (2000b, p. 29). What they
mean by “independent” here is explanatory independence, as becomes
painfully obvious in their fierce attack on the possibility of the social sci-
ences telling us anything useful about human rape. But they have not
successfully argued for explanatory dependence of the social on the bio-
logical; at best, they have argued the reverse, with their own admission of
the explanatory power of cultural explanation of difference.

5 Legal and Social Consequences

Thornhill and Palmer repeatedly promise that moving to the evolutionary

level of explanation will make everything better: therapeutic treatment of
rape victims; reduction in the incidence of rape; improvements in how rape
is treated in the courts; and understanding of the developmental, social,
and cultural “conditional” factors producing rapists from male babies
(2000b, pp. 82, 84, 97, 114, 153, 154, 156, 158, 187). Despite this repe-
tition, they offer no evidence whatsoever for any of these claims; all we get
are promises. But they do offer a few concrete remarks, well-supported or
not, concerning the legal treatment of rapists. They also suggest ways to
improve rape-prevention training.
As Thornhill and Palmer acknowledge, people have a strong tendency
to react to their theories by indulging in what is known as the “naturalis-
tic fallacy”: equating claims of what is “natural” with claims of what is
good or morally defensible. Since the authors do not condone rape, they
attempt to deter this reaction repeatedly. But their eagerness to publish a
poorly supported and inflammatory theory—one that predictably evokes
the naturalistic fallacy16—seems irresponsible. Accusing people of a “lack
of scholarship” just is not good enough (2000b, p. 122).
256 Elisabeth A. Lloyd

Their response to the naturalist fallacy is as follows: “Contrary to the

common view that an evolutionary explanation for human behavior re-
moves individuals’ responsibility for their actions, individuals who really
understood the evolutionary bases of their actions might be better able
to avoid behaving in an ‘adaptive’ fashion that is damaging to others”
(2000b, p. 154). Specifically how is this knowledge supposed to help
change the rapist’s behavior? Do they have evidence that such knowledge
would be connected with a lower incidence of rape? Is this even plausible?
They propose a rape-prevention education program for teenage boys—one
that could perhaps be required before they get their driver’s licenses—
which involves explaining the evolutionary basis of their sexual desires,
and which encourages them to control their sexual impulses (2000b,
p. 179). (And these are the authors who criticized the sociologists for al-
legedly believing that behavior can easily be changed!) After such an edu-
cation, they suggest, “refusal to refrain from damaging behavior in the
face of scientific understanding could be seen as a ground for holding ir-
responsible individuals more culpable, not less so” (2000b, p. 154; their
emphasis).
This suggestion raises a host of questions. For instance: Since they em-
phasize that evolutionary theory is very complicated and difficult, how are
they planning to teach it in this minicourse?17 Also, since they know that
most people’s reaction to their view is to commit the naturalistic fallacy,
why assume that the instructees (or their instructors) would be any dif-
ferent, and would not also conclude that rape is natural and therefore
inevitable or acceptable? They do emphasize that teaching that the natu-
ralistic fallacy is a fallacy will be part of their suggested course (2000b,
pp. 179–180), but can we assume that it will be understood?
One very striking thing about Thornhill and Palmer’s discussion of rape
prevention and punishment is how many of their ideas are borrowed di-
rectly from the feminist accounts they deride. For instance, they note that
“rape has traditionally been defined and punished not from the victim’s
perspective but from a male perspective, and particularly from the per-
spective of the victim’s mate” (2000b, pp. 154–155; see Brownmiller
1975, pp. 14, 18–30, 376–377). They also note that rules and laws gener-
ally serve the interests of the powerful—for example, men as opposed to
women (2000b, p. 162; see Brownmiller 1975, p. 17). Furthermore, statu-
tory rape laws should be understood in the context that, in most societies,
“daughters have been viewed as their father’s property” (2000b, p. 162;
 Violence against Science 257

see Brownmiller 1975, pp. 17–18, 376). As far as rape prevention goes,
their suggestions are nearly all features that have been central to the femi-
nist revolution in rape counseling: advising caution about being alone in
isolated places; advocating self-defense training; urging women to exert
greater control over circumstances “in which they consent to be alone with
men” (2000b, p. 186). They differ from feminist advice in their recom-
mendation that women wear more concealing clothing (even though they
offer no evidence of a correlation between the amount of skin shown and
rape). But Thornhill and Palmer claim that all this follows only from the
evolutionary perspective, and that only the evolutionary perspective can
help direct research toward treatment that will alleviate the pain and suf-
fering caused by rape (2000b, pp. 187–188).
As far as legal punishment goes, Thornhill and Palmer do not propose
a specific program; they simply claim that any such program of punish-
ment should be informed by what is known about evolution. They do dis-
cuss one possible punishment in detail, though—chemical castration.
They defend chemical castration on the basis of evolution, claiming that
since rape is about reproductive sex, chemical castration might be an
effective preventative (2000b, pp. 165–166).18 They fail to address the
problem, however, that such an approach has a chance of reducing the
conviction rate of rapists, since juries may be more reluctant to interfere
with the suspect’s “manhood” than they are to sending him to prison for
a few years.
In sum, Thornhill and Palmer encourage their readers to see rape as
purely a sexual act, proximally motivated by an out-of-control male libido.
The public needs to decide if this reduced view of rape as sex alone really
represents the truth about rape. On the bases of the weaknesses in their
evolutionary biology alone, I think the answer is clear. When the data-
fudging and gross misrepresentation of other explanatory approaches are
added to the mix, I take it to be the responsibility of educated people to
resist Thornhill and Palmer’s conclusions about rape.

Notes

1. Thornhill and Palmer write: “Why have researchers attempting to discover the
evolutionary causes of rape been denied positions at universities? Why have or-
ganizers of scholarly conferences attempted to keep papers on evolutionary anal-
ysis of rape from being presented? Why have editors of scholarly journals refused
to publish papers treating rape in a Darwinian perspective?” (2000b, p. 105). And
258 Elisabeth A. Lloyd

later: “The choice between the social science explanation’s answers and the evolu-
tionarily informed answers provided in this book is essentially a choice between
ideology and knowledge” (2000b, p. 189).
2. “In the future, I anticipate, hopefully not the too distant future, that we’ll turn
this thing around in a sense that people will look back with horror at the kinds of
attitudes that Brownmiller is expressing today and, to a degree, Dr. Coyne. And the
horror will be in the fact that people did not understand that, in the Dark Ages,
the validity and importance of science for correcting our social problems. But
specifically in response to the kind of data that we have in there, it’s all scientific
approach . . .” (Randy Thornhill, appearing on “Talk of the Nation.” Penkava
2000; see also Goode 2000; Spohn 2000; Sandlin 2000).
3. This is a standard view among many biologists working in human and animal
evolution.
4. According to a 1998 U.S. study, about 302,1000 women and 92,700 men are
raped each year nationwide (“Men can’t help it,” 2000).
5. The phenotype of an organism is the particular collection and arrangement of
all its manifest physical and behavioral traits.
6. Thornhill and Palmer (2000b) make use of their mistaken view about mutation
on p. 57, in the context of dismissing the hypothesis that rape could have arisen as
a mutation balanced by selection.
7. Different “levels of explanation” appeal to different entities and laws, at dis-
tinct levels of the organization of life. See notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
8. Geoffrey Miller, an evolutionary psychologist at University College, London,
also challenges Thornhill and Palmer’s neglect of the psychopathology explana-
tion: “Psychopaths are discussed on only one page, though they account for a
substantial proportion of all rapists, and the majority of multiple rapists. . . .
[R]esearch shows that there are heritable genetic differences in many traits that
may predict the tendency to use sexual coercion, such as disagreeableness, psy-
choticism, low intelligence and alcoholism” (2000).
9. Despite Thornhill and Palmer’s approving citations of Wrangham and Dale
Peterson (1996), Wrangham notes there that feminists are right in seeing rape as
involved with power relations, not just as a conceptive strategy (personal commu-
nication, 2000).
10. This, in spite of their heavy usage of such contemporary evidence in other
contexts.
11. Sarah Blaffer Hrdy (1999) argues for the prevalence of abortion and infanti-
cide in human evolutionary history.
12. Thornhill to Brownmiller: “And that you’re saying now that rape is sex and so
forth is kind of amazing” (Penkava 2000).
13. Thornhill and Palmer chose this quote from the back cover of Brownmiller’s
book.
14. This example is due to Michael Dickson, History and Philosophy of Science
Department, Indiana University.
 Violence against Science 259

15. In criticizing social scientists, Thornhill and Palmer actually claim that
evolved cognition itself may interfere with evolutionary investigation into cultural
phenomena: “Evolved psychological intuitions about behavioral causation can
mislead individuals into believing that they know as much as experts do about
proximate human motivation” (2000b, p. 114; emphasis added). The experts on
social behavior here seem to be the evolutionists, rather than the social scientists.
16. A survey of the available published reviews, editorials and letters to the editor
involving this book shows that most readers, in fact, commit precisely this fallacy.
17. Thornhill himself argued in a radio appearance, “you know, evolutionary bi-
ology is complex. Science is complex. In fact, many have pointed out that the facts
and theory of evolution are the most complex set of ideas we have out there . . .”
(appearing on Penkava 2000).
18. According to Dani Robbins Zulich, Director of the Women’s Coalition at Case
Western Reserve University, experiments in treating rapists with surgical and
chemical castration have not proven effective (Sandstrom 2000, p. 111).

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Integrative and Cultural Models of Gender
and Rape
12
The Origins of Sex Differences in Human
Behavior: Evolved Dispositions versus
Social Roles
Alice H. Eagly and Wendy Wood

As more research psychologists have become willing to acknowledge that

some aspects of social behavior, personality, and abilities differ between
women and men (e.g., Eagly 1995; Halpern 1997), their attention has be-
gun to focus on the causes of these differences. Debates about causes cen-
ter, at least in part, on determining what can be considered the basic or
ultimate causes of sex differences. Theories of sex differences that address
causes at this level are termed in this article origin theories (Archer 1996).
In such theories, causation flows from a basic cause to sex-differentiated
behavior, and biological, psychological, and social processes mediate the
relation between the basic cause and behavior. In this article, we consider
two types of origin theories: One of these implicates evolved psychologi-
cal dispositions, and the other implicates social structure. Evolutionary
psychology, as illustrated in the work of Buss (1995a), Kenrick and Keefe
(1992), and Tooby and Cosmides (1992), thus represents the first type
of origin theory, and social psychological theories that emphasize social
structure represent the second type of origin theory (e.g., Eagly 1987;
Eagly, Wood, and Diekman, 2000; Lorenzi-Cioldi 1998; Ridgeway 1991;
West and Zimmerman 1987; Wiley 1995).
In the origin theory proposed by evolutionary psychologists, the critical
causal arrow points from evolutionary adaptations to psychological sex
differences. Because women and men possess sex-specific evolved mecha-
nisms, they differ psychologically and tend to occupy different social roles.
In contrast, in the social structural origin theory, the critical causal arrow
points from social structure to psychological sex differences. Because men
and women tend to occupy different social roles, they become psycholog-
ically different in ways that adjust them to these roles.
266 Alice H. Eagly and Wendy Wood

One important feature is shared by these two origin theories: Both offer
a functional analysis of behavior that emphasizes adjustment to environ-
mental conditions. However, the two schools of thought differ radically in
their analysis of the nature and timing of the adjustments that are most im-
portant to sex-differentiated behavior. Evolutionary psychologists believe
that females and males faced different pressures in primeval environments
and that the sexes’ differing reproductive status was the key feature of an-
cestral life that framed sex-typed adaptive problems. The resolutions of
these problems produced sex-specific evolved mechanisms that humans
carry with them as a species and that are held to be the root cause of sex-
differentiated behavior. Although evolutionary psychologists readily ac-
knowledge the abstract principle that environmental conditions can
influence the development and expression of evolved dispositions, they
have given limited attention to variation of sex differences in response to
individual, situational, and cultural conditions (e.g., Archer 1996; Buss
1995b; Buss and Kenrick 1998). For example, Buss (1998) emphasized
“universal or near-universal sex differences” (p. 421) in preferences for
long-term mates.
Social structuralists maintain that the situations faced by women and
men are quite variable across societies and historical periods as social or-
ganization changes in response to technological, ecological, and other
transformations. From a social structural perspective, a society’s division
of labor between the sexes is the engine of sex-differentiated behavior, be-
cause it summarizes the social constraints under which men and women
carry out their lives. Sex differences are viewed as accommodations to the
differing restrictions and opportunities that a society maintains for its men
and women, and sex-differentiated behavior is held to be contingent on a
range of individual, situational, and cultural conditions (see Deaux and
LaFrance 1998). Despite this emphasis on the social environment, social
structuralists typically acknowledge the importance of some genetically
mediated sex differences. Physical differences between the sexes, particu-
larly men’s greater size and strength and women’s childbearing and lacta-
tion, are very important because they interact with shared cultural beliefs,
social organization, and the demands of the economy to influence the role
assignments that constitute the sexual division of labor within a society
and produce psychological sex differences (Eagly 1987; Wood and Eagly
in press).
 The Origins of Sex Differences in Human Behavior 267

These thumbnail sketches of these two origin theories should make it

clear that this debate about the origins of sex differences cannot be re-
duced to a simple nature-versus-nurture dichotomy. Both evolutionary
psychology and social structural theory are interactionist in the sense that
they take both biological and environmental factors into account, but they
treat these factors quite differently. Evolutionary psychology views sex-
specific evolved dispositions as psychological tendencies that were built in
through genetically mediated adaptation to primeval conditions; the the-
ory treats contemporary environmental factors as cues that interact with
adaptations to yield sex-typed responses. Social structural theory views
sex-differentiated tendencies as built in through accommodation to the
contemporaneous sexual division of labor; in this approach, physical dif-
ferences between the sexes serve as one influence on role assignment.
Another caution is that these theories do not merely reflect different
levels of analysis. In some attempts to reconcile the two perspectives,
writers have proposed that social structural theories identify proximal, con-
temporaneous causes for the behavior of women and men, whereas evo-
lutionary analyses invoke more distal causes that arose early in human
history (e.g., Borkenau 1992; Jackson 1992; Schaller 1997). Although the
timing of the human adjustment to environmental conditions that is
deemed critical is indeed different in the two theories, they propose causes
that are similar in their position on the proximal versus distal continuum
of causality. Both theories thus identify psychological causes (i.e., evolved
dispositions, role expectations) that operate in the present and that exert
their impact through more proximal processes (e.g., emotions, percep-
tions). The social structural perspective is thus in stark contrast to evolu-
tionary psychology models that attribute sex differences in contemporary
society to sex-typed evolved mechanisms. The causes of sex differences in
evolutionary psychology involve these mechanisms, which are intended to
replace the social psychological mechanisms featured in theories that give
a key role to social structure.
It also would be inappropriate to conclude that the social structural ap-
proach is incompatible with the general perspective of evolutionary theo-
rizing. Social structural analyses suggest an evolved organism, but one in
which evolutionary pressures yielded a variety of dispositions, such as the
capacity for group living and for culture. These analyses do not imply that
people’s minds are blank slates, because humans possess facilities, such as
268 Alice H. Eagly and Wendy Wood

for language, that develop in certain ways, given appropriate environ-

ments. Moreover, our critique of theorizing in evolutionary psychology is
not meant to apply to evolutionary principles in general. Evolutionary rea-
soning pertaining to humans is diverse (Smith, 2000) and provides the ba-
sis, not only of evolutionary psychology, but also of models of the relation
between biology and culture (Janicki and Krebs 1998) and human behav-
ioral ecology approaches that emphasize behavioral variability in response
to socioecological conditions (Cronk 1991). The implications of these
other evolutionary theories for psychological processes have yet to be fully
developed and are not discussed in this article.
To illustrate the contrasting approaches of evolutionary psychology and
social structural theory, we first present and discuss each theory. Then we
examine their predictions concerning the criteria men and women use in
selecting mates. This domain of behavior has been central to evolutionary
theorizing about human sex differences (e.g., Buss and Schmitt 1993;
Kenrick and Keefe 1992), and the cross-cultural findings available in this
area provide an opportunity to examine empirically some of the predictions
of evolutionary and social structural analyses.

Evolutionary Psychology as an Origin Theory of Sex Differences

From the perspective of evolutionary psychology, human sex differences

reflect adaptations to the pressures of the differing physical and social en-
vironments that impinged on females and males during primeval times
(Buss 1995a; Tooby and Cosmides 1992). Evolutionary psychologists thus
label the environment that produced a species’ evolved tendencies as its
environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA; Cosmides, Tooby, and
Barkow 1992; Symons 1979, 1992; Tooby and Cosmides 1990b). They
loosely identify the Pleistocene era as the human EEA and generally as-
sume that it was populated by hunter-gatherer groups. To the extent that
males and females faced different adaptive problems as they evolved, the
two sexes developed different strategies to ensure their survival and to
maximize their reproductive success. The resolutions to these problems
produced evolved psychological mechanisms that are specific to each
problem domain and that differ between women and men.
Although humans’ evolved mechanisms developed in response to the
types of problems consistently encountered by their ancestors and thus
 The Origins of Sex Differences in Human Behavior 269

are presumed to be universal attributes of humans, environmental input

affects how these mechanisms develop in individuals and how they are
expressed in behavior (e.g., Buss and Kenrick 1998). Because culture in-
fluences developmental experiences and patterns current situational input,
culture is in principle important to the expression of adaptive mechanisms
(Tooby and Cosmides 1992). However, evolutionary psychologists have
devoted relatively little attention to the interaction between such broader
attributes of the social and cultural environment and the evolved mecha-
nisms that may underlie sex differences. The contextual factors that have
interested them generally relate directly to these hypothesized mecha-
nisms. For example, Buss and Schmitt (1993) maintained that the charac-
teristics that people seek in mates depend, not only on their sex, but also
on whether they are engaging in short-term or long-term mating. Because
of a relative neglect of broader social context, evolutionary psychologists
have generated little understanding of how variation in sex-differentiated
behavior arises from developmental factors and features of social structure
and culture (for an exception, see Draper and Harpending 1982).
The aspect of evolutionary theory that has been applied most exten-
sively to sex differences is the theory of sexual selection initially proposed
by Darwin (1871) and further developed by Trivers (1972). In the evo-
lutionary psychologists’ rendition of these views, sex-typed features of
human behavior evolved through male competition and female choice of
mates. Because women constituted the sex that devoted greater effort to
parental investment, they were a limited reproductive resource for men,
who were the less investing sex. Women were restricted in the number of
children they could propagate during their life span because of their in-
vestment through gestating, bearing, and nursing their children; men did
not have these restrictions. Men therefore competed for access to women,
and women chose their mates from among the available men. As the more
investing sex, women were selected for their wisdom in choosing mates
who could provide resources to support their parenting efforts. Women’s
preferences for such men, in turn, produced sexual selection pressures on
men to satisfy these criteria.
Proponents of sexual selection theory argue that sex differences in paren-
tal investment favored different strategies for reproductive success for men
and women and consequently established different adaptive mechanisms
governing mating behavior (Buss 1996; Kenrick, Trost, and Sheets 1996).
270 Alice H. Eagly and Wendy Wood

It was to men’s advantage in terms of fitness outcomes to “devote a larger

proportion of their total mating effort to short-term mating than do
women” (Buss and Schmitt 1993, p. 205)—that is, to be relatively promis-
cuous. Women, in contrast, benefited from devoting a smaller proportion
of their effort to short-term mating and a larger proportion to long-term
mating. Also, because of women’s concealed fertilization, men were unable
to determine easily which children could proffer the fitness gains that fol-
low from genetic relatedness. Men ostensibly adapted to this problem of
paternity uncertainty by exerting sexual control over women and devel-
oping sexual jealousy and a motive to control women’s sexuality (Daly and
Wilson 1998).
According to evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Buss 1995b; Buss and
Kenrick 1998), sex differences in numerous psychological dispositions
arose from differing fitness-related goals of women and men that followed
from their contrasting sexual strategies. Because men competed with other
men for sexual access to women, men’s evolved dispositions favor violence,
competition, and risk taking. Women in turn developed a proclivity to
nurture and a preference for long-term mates who could support a family.
As a result, men strived to acquire more resources than other men in order
to attract women, and women developed preferences for successful, ambi-
tious men who could provide resources.
Critical to some of evolutionary psychologists’ claims about sex differ-
ences is the assumption that ancestral humans living in the EEA had a
hunter-gatherer socioeconomic system (e.g., Buss 1995b; Cosmides et al.
1992; DeKay and Buss 1992). The idea of a division of labor in which men
hunted while women gathered suggests sex-differentiated pressures linked
to survival and reproduction. Such an ancestral division of labor might
have favored men who were psychologically specialized for hunting and
women who were specialized for gathering. For example, cognitive abili-
ties could have been affected, with men acquiring the superior spatial skills
that followed from ancestral hunting, and women acquiring the superior
spatial location memory that followed from ancestral gathering (e.g.,
Geary 1995; Silverman and Phillips 1998).
Various mediating processes are implied in evolutionary psychology
models of behavioral sex differences. The first and most important in-
volves some means of retaining effective adaptations in human design
 The Origins of Sex Differences in Human Behavior 271

and perpetuating them over time. Thus, sex-differentiated psychological

mechanisms and developmental programs, like other adaptations, are “ge-
netic, hereditary, or inherited in the sense that . . . their structured design
has its characteristic form because of the information in our DNA” (Tooby
and Cosmides 1990a, p. 37; see also Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske
and Wakefield 1998; Crawford 1998). Some evolutionary accounts also
emphasize that genetic factors trigger biochemical processes that mediate
psychological sex differences, especially by means of sex differences in
hormone production (e.g., Daly and Wilson 1983; Geary 1995, 1996). In
addition, sex-typed evolved mechanisms are translated into behavioral sex
differences by various cognitive and affective processes. Establishing these
links requires theoretical understanding and empirical documentation of
the range of processes by which the genetic factors implicated in innate
dispositions might affect human behavior (e.g., Collear and Hines 1995).
Buss and Kenrick (1998) described evolutionary psychology’s approach
to understanding sex differences as a “metatheory” and summarized it as
follows: “Men and women differ in domains where they faced different
adaptive problems over human evolutionary history” (p. 994). These the-
orists thus derive sex differences from heritable adaptations built into the
human species. Because these differences are assumed to follow from evo-
lutionary adaptations, they are predicted to occur as central tendencies of
male versus female behavior. Human behavior would thus be character-
ized by a deep structure of sex-differentiated dispositions, producing sim-
ilar, albeit not identical, behavioral sex differences in all human societies.

Critique of the Evolutionary Origin Theory

A number of questions can be raised about evolutionary psychology’s
account of the origins of sex differences. One consideration is that evolu-
tionary analyses have generally identified adaptations by relying on “in-
formal arguments as to whether a presumed function is served with
sufficient precision, economy, efficiency, etc. to rule out pure chance as an
adequate explanation” (Williams 1966, p. 10). Explanations that reflect
this approach consist of an analysis of the functional relations served by
a particular psychological mechanism, along with the construction of a
convincing story about how the adaptation might have made an efficient
contribution to genetic survival or to some other goal contributing to
272 Alice H. Eagly and Wendy Wood

reproduction in the EEA. These explanations serve as hypotheses that re-

quire additional validation and thus can be useful for initiating scientific
research.
In developing these analyses of the possible functions of behaviors, evo-
lutionary scientists face special challenges in distinguishing adaptations
from other possible products of evolution—for example, features that
were random or that had utility for one function but were subsequently
coopted to fulfill a new function (see Buss et al. 1998; Gould 1991;
Williams 1966). Moreover, the products of evolution must be distin-
guished from the products of cultural change. Behaviors that provide ef-
fective solutions to problems of reproduction and survival can arise from
inventive trial-and-error among individuals who are genetically indistin-
guishable from other members of their living groups; such beneficial be-
haviors are then imitated and transmitted culturally.
An understanding of humans’ primeval environment might help vali-
date evolutionary hypotheses because adaptations evolved as solutions to
past environmental challenges. Various bodies of science have some rele-
vance, including observational studies of other primates, the fossil record,
and ethnographic studies. However, models of human nature constructed
from the behavior of nonhuman primates do not yield a uniform picture
that reflects key features of sex differences in modern human societies (see
Fedigan 1986; Strier 1994; Travis and Yeager 1991). Similarly ambiguous
concerning sex differences are the models of early human social conditions
that paleontologists and paleoanthropologists have developed from fossil
evidence. Anthropologists continue to debate fundamental points—for
example, whether hunting of dangerous prey might have emerged during
the period that is usually identified as the human EEA (e.g., Potts 1984;
Rose and Marshall 1996). As a consequence, assumptions that certain
traits were adaptive and consequently are under genetic control cannot be
firmly supported from analyzing attributes of the EEA. Moreover, early
human societies likely took a wide variety of forms during the period when
the species was evolving toward its modern anatomical form (Foley 1996).
Variability in social organization is consistent with observations of more
contemporary hunter-gatherer societies, which show great diversity in
their social organization (Kelly 1995). For example, studies of power re-
lations between the sexes across diverse cultures show variability in the ex-
tent to which men control women’s sexuality (Whyte 1978), although
 The Origins of Sex Differences in Human Behavior 273

evolutionary psychologists have assumed that this control is a defining

feature of male-female relations. Therefore, because the EEA likely encom-
passed a variety of conditions, tracing humans’ evolution requires under-
standing of the timing, social organization, and ecological circumstances
of multiple periods of adaptation (Foley 1996). The ambiguity and com-
plexity of the relevant scientific findings leave room for evolutionary psy-
chologists to inadvertently transport relatively modern social conditions
to humans’ remote past by inappropriately assuming that the distinctive
characteristics of contemporary relations between the sexes were also typ-
ical of the EEA.
Given the difficulty of knowing the functions of behaviors and the at-
tributes of the EEA, other types of scientific evidence become especially
important to validating the claims of evolutionary psychologists. The
most convincing evidence that a behavioral pattern reflects an adaptation
would be that individuals who possessed the adaptation enjoyed a higher
rate of survival and reproduction than individuals who did not possess it.
However, such evidence is difficult, if not impossible, to produce. Because
humans’ evolved mechanisms emerged in relation to past selection pres-
sures, present reproductive advantage does not necessarily reflect past ad-
vantage, and evolutionary psychologists have warned against relying on
measures of current reproductive success to validate hypothesized adapta-
tions (Buss 1995a; Tooby and Cosmides 1992). In the absence of evidence
pertaining to reproductive success, scientists might document the genetic
inheritance of postulated mechanisms and the processes by which genetic
factors result in sex differences in behavior. However, for the psycho-
logical dispositions considered in this article, such evidence has not been
produced. Instead, the scientific case for these sex-differentiated evolved
dispositions rests on tests of evolutionary psychologists’ predictions con-
cerning the behavior of men and women in contemporary societies (e.g.,
Buss and Schmitt 1993; Kenrick and Keefe 1992). We evaluate some of
these predictions in this article.

Social Structural Theory as an Origin Theory of Sex Differences

A respected tradition in the social sciences locates the origins of sex dif-
ferences, not in evolved psychological dispositions that are built into the
human psyche, but in the contrasting social positions of women and men.
274 Alice H. Eagly and Wendy Wood

In contemporary American society, as in many world societies, women

have less power and status than men and control fewer resources. This fea-
ture of social structure is often labeled gender hierarchy, or in feminist
writing it may be called patriarchy. In addition, as the division of labor
is realized in the United States and many other nations, women perform
more domestic work than men and spend fewer hours in paid employment
(Shelton 1992). Although most women in the United States are employed
in the paid workforce, they have lower wages than men, are concentrated
in different occupations, and are thinly represented at the highest levels
of organizational hierarchies (Jacobs 1989; Reskin and Padavic 1994;
Tomaskovic-Devey 1995). From a social structural perspective, the under-
lying cause of sex-differentiated behavior is this concentration of men and
women in differing roles.
The determinants of the distribution of men and women into social
roles are many and include the biological endowment of women and men.
The sex-differentiated physical attributes that influence role occupancy in-
clude men’s greater size and strength, which gives them priority in jobs
demanding certain types of strenuous activity, especially activities involv-
ing upper body strength. These physical attributes of men are less impor-
tant in societies in which few occupational roles require these attributes,
such as postindustrial societies. Also important in relation to role distri-
butions are women’s childbearing and in many societies their activity of
suckling infants for long periods of time; these obligations give them pri-
ority in roles involving the care of very young children and cause conflict
with roles requiring extended absence from home and uninterrupted ac-
tivity. These reproductive activities of women are less important in soci-
eties with low birthrates, less reliance on lactation for feeding infants, and
greater reliance on nonmaternal care of young children.
In general, physical sex differences, in interaction with social and eco-
logical conditions, influence the roles held by men and women because
certain activities are more efficiently accomplished by one sex. The bene-
fits of this greater efficiency can be realized when women and men are al-
lied in cooperative relationships and establish a division of labor. The
particular character of the activities that each sex performs then deter-
mines its placement in the social structure (see Wood and Eagly in press).
As historians and anthropologists have argued (e.g., Ehrenberg 1989;
Harris 1993; Lerner 1986; Sanday 1981), men typically specialized in ac-
 The Origins of Sex Differences in Human Behavior 275

tivities (e.g., warfare, herding) that yielded greater status, wealth, and
power, especially as societies became more complex. Thus, when sex dif-
ferences in status emerged, they tended to favor men.
The differing distributions of men and women into social roles form the
basis for a social structural metatheory of sex differences, just as evolu-
tionary theory provides a metatheory. The major portion of this social
structural theory follows from the typical features of the roles of men and
women. Thus, the first metatheoretical principle derives from the greater
power and status that tends to be associated with male-dominated roles
and can be succinctly stated as follows: Men’s accommodation to roles
with greater power and status produces more dominant behavior, and
women’s accommodation to roles with lesser power and status produces
more subordinate behavior (Ridgeway and Diekema 1992). Dominant be-
havior is controlling, assertive, relatively directive and autocratic, and may
involve sexual control. Subordinate behavior is more compliant to social
influence, less overtly aggressive, more cooperative and conciliatory, and
may involve a lack of sexual autonomy.
The second metatheoretical principle follows from the differing balance
of activities associated with the typical roles of each sex. Women and men
seek to accommodate sex-typical roles by acquiring the specific skills and
resources linked to successful role performance and by adapting their so-
cial behavior to role requirements. A variety of sex-specific skills and
beliefs arise from the typical family and economic roles of men and
women, which in many societies can be described as resource provider
and homemaker. Women and men seek to accommodate to these roles by
acquiring role-related skills, for example, women learning domestic skills
such as cooking and men learning skills that are marketable in the paid
economy. The psychological attributes and social behaviors associated
with these roles have been characterized in terms of the distinction be-
tween communal and agentic characteristics (Bakan 1966; Eagly 1987).
Thus, women’s accommodation to the domestic role and to female-
dominated occupations favors a pattern of interpersonally facilitative and
friendly behaviors that can be termed communal. In particular, the as-
signment of the majority of child rearing to women encourages nurturant
behaviors that facilitate care for children and other individuals. The im-
portance of close relationships to women’s nurturing role favors the ac-
quisition of superior interpersonal skills and the ability to communicate
276 Alice H. Eagly and Wendy Wood

nonverbally. In contrast, men’s accommodation to the employment role,

especially to male-dominated occupations, favors a pattern of assertive
and independent behaviors that can be termed agentic (Eagly and Steffen
1984). This argument is not to deny that paid occupations show wide
variation in the extent to which they favor more masculine or feminine
qualities. In support of the idea that sex-differentiated behaviors are
shaped by paid occupations are demonstrations that to the extent that
occupations are male dominated, they are thought to require agentic per-
sonal qualities. In contrast, to the extent that occupations are female dom-
inated, they are thought to require communal personal qualities (Cejka
and Eagly 1999; Glick 1991).
In social structural theories, differential role occupancy affects behavior
through a variety of mediating processes. In social role theory (Eagly
1987; Eagly et al 2001) an important mediating process is the formation
of gender roles by which people of each sex are expected to have charac-
teristics that equip them for the tasks that they typically carry out. These
expectations encompass the preferred or desirable attributes of men and
women as well as their typical attributes. Gender roles are emergents from
the productive work of the sexes; the characteristics that are required to
perform sex-typical tasks become stereotypic of women or men. To the
extent that women more than men occupy roles that demand communal
behaviors, domestic behaviors, or subordinate behaviors for successful
role performance, such tendencies become stereotypic of women and are
incorporated into a female gender role. To the extent that men more than
women occupy roles that demand agentic behaviors, resource acquisition
behaviors, or dominant behaviors for successful role performance, such
tendencies become stereotypic of men and are incorporated into a male
gender role. Gender roles facilitate the activities typically carried out by
people of each sex. For example, the expectation that women be other-
oriented and compassionate facilitates their nurturing activities within the
family as well as their work in many female-dominated occupations (e.g.,
teacher, nurse, social worker).
People communicate gender-stereotypic expectations in social interac-
tion and can directly induce the targets of these expectations to engage
in behavior that confirms them (e.g., Skrypnek and Snyder 1982; Wood
and Karten 1986). Such effects of gender roles are congruent with theory
 The Origins of Sex Differences in Human Behavior 277

and research on the behavioral confirmation of stereotypes and other

expectancies (see Olson, Roese, and Zanna 1996). Gender-stereotypic ex-
pectations can also affect behavior by becoming internalized as part of in-
dividuals’ self-concepts and personalities (Feingold 1994). Under such
circumstances, gender roles affect behavior through self-regulatory pro-
cesses (Wood, Christensen, Hebl, and Rothgerber 1997). The individual
psychology that underlies these processes is assumed to be the maximiza-
tion of utilities. People perceive these utilities from the rewards and costs
that emerge in social interaction, which takes place within the constraints
of organizational and societal arrangements.
Gender roles coexist with specific roles based on factors such as family
relationships and occupation. These specific social roles contribute di-
rectly to sex-differentiated behavior when women and men are differently
distributed into them—for example, women into the homemaker role and
men into the provider role. In contrast, when men and women occupy the
same specific social role, sex differences would tend to erode because spe-
cific roles are constraining (e.g., Eagly and Johnson 1990). However, gen-
der roles ordinarily continue to have some impact on behavior, even in the
presence of specific roles (see Gutek and Morasch 1983; Moscowitz, Suh,
and Desaulniers 1994; Ridgeway 1997). Moreover, experimental evidence
(e.g., Hembroff 1982) suggests that people combine or average the expec-
tations associated with specific roles and more diffuse roles such as gender
roles in a manner that weights each set of expectations according to its rel-
evance to the task at hand.
The social structural perspective provides a broad theoretical outline
within which many social scientific theories of sex-differentiated behavior
can be placed. These theories focus on different aspects of the processes by
which societies produce sex-differentiated behavior, and many theories
have spawned detailed predictions and a substantial body of empirical re-
search (see Beall and Sternberg 1993; Canary and Dindia 1998; England
and Browne 1992). For example, developmental psychologists have stud-
ied socialization in the family, school, and peer group. Social psychologists
have examined the impact of gendered self-schemas, men’s greater status,
sex-differentiated expectations about behavior, and gendered patterns of
social interaction. Sociologists have implicated organizational factors
such as discriminatory employment practices, societal factors such as
278 Alice H. Eagly and Wendy Wood

men’s greater ownership of capital, and cultural factors such as the ide-
ologies that legitimize gender inequality. Social scientists have thus pro-
vided an array of interrelated theories, each of which illuminates certain
aspects of the processes by which sex-differentiated behavior is produced.
In summary, in social structural accounts, women and men are differ-
ently distributed into social roles, and these differing role assignments can
be broadly described in terms of a sexual division of labor and a gender
hierarchy. This division of labor and the patriarchal hierarchy that some-
times accompanies it provide the engine of sex-differentiated behavior be-
cause they trigger social and psychological processes by which men and
women seek somewhat different experiences to maximize their outcomes
within the constraints that societies establish for people of their sex. Sex
differences in behavior thus reflect contemporaneous social conditions.

Response to Critiques of the Social Structural Origin Theory

A number of criticisms have been leveled against the social structural the-
ory of sex differences and more specifically against social role theory (see
Archer 1996; Buss 1996). At least some evolutionary psychologists have
expressed skepticism that culture and social structure could have any in-
dependent causal role in relation to behavior. Instead, culture and social
structure are seen as reflecting the underlying logic of evolved dispositions,
and consequently they do not constitute the causal force underlying be-
havioral sex differences (Buss 1995a; Tooby and Cosmides 1992). How-
ever, from our perspective, culture and social structure can influence
behavior. Culture consists of knowledge, beliefs, and evaluations shared
among members of a society and reflects, not only the biological en-
dowment of humans, but also the constraints of their social and physical
environments. Social structure reflects culture and consists of “persisting
and bounded patterns of behavior and interaction among people or posi-
tions” (House 1995, p. 390). Gender roles and other social roles are
simultaneously aspects of culture, because they represent shared know-
ledge, and of social structure, because they represent bounded patterns of
interaction.
Another criticism is that in social structural theories, individuals are
treated as mere passive receptacles of the roles they are assigned (Buss
1996). Although social scientists often do refer to role assignment, this
term does not imply that people are typically assigned to roles arbitrarily,
 The Origins of Sex Differences in Human Behavior 279

as if they were passive actors in the social system. On the contrary, social
and organizational psychologists have demonstrated that the assumption
of roles in a complex and dynamic process (e.g., Kerckhoff 1995; Pfeffer
1998). In deciding whether to attempt to assume particular roles at all, in-
dividuals take their own attributes, skills, and personal preferences into
account, although in some cultural contexts some roles are imposed on
people regardless of their own preferences (e.g., the practice of early be-
trothal of girls). In general, social systems are arranged to shape people’s
self-concepts, skills, beliefs, and values so that the majority of people ac-
tively seek out experiences that help them to become appropriate occu-
pants of existing social roles by meeting the expectations of these roles.
Evolutionary psychologists also claim that sociocultural theorists view
gender roles as “essentially arbitrary” (Buss 1996, p. 19) or as arising by
“historical accident” (Archer 1996, p. 915). On the contrary, as we have
explained, the content of gender roles is not arbitrary but is embedded in
social structure and culture. Roles must thus facilitate the endeavors of a
society, if its members are to prosper and survive. Therefore, different
types of role systems become effective under differing circumstances. For
example, in industrial economies, many roles are organized by a market
pricing system that takes into account factors such as ownership of prop-
erty and contribution to production (see Fiske 1992). The analytical
frameworks for understanding how systems of social roles change over
time have been developed by scholars in other disciplines (e.g., Diamond
1997; Toynbee 1934–1961). Yet, understanding the principles by which
women and men distribute themselves into a society’s roles is part of the
agenda of social psychologists as well as other social scientists.
A related criticism is that from a social structural perspective, “dif-
ferences between cultures are random with respect to evolutionary hypo-
theses and therefore that, for example, sex differences should occur as
frequently in one direction as the other” (Tooby and Cosmides 1989,
p. 37). However, our theoretical perspective is not consistent with random
variation in sex differences across societies. Instead, societal variation in
the roles of men and women depends on multiple factors, including men’s
greater size and physical strength, women’s reproductive activities, and the
activities required by a society’s economy and social organization, which
in turn reflect technological developments and the current ecology. Be-
cause these factors are not randomly distributed, certain types of social
280 Alice H. Eagly and Wendy Wood

arrangements are more common than others, and sex differences appro-
priate to the common arrangements should be more frequent than rever-
sals of these differences.
The social structural approach has also been criticized for treating the
minds of women and men as identical except by virtue of the constraints
that follow from externally assigned roles (Buss 1996). We acknowledge
that the social structural perspective does imply that differences in the
minds of women and men arise primarily from experience and socializa-
tion, which reflect the physical attributes of women and men and the char-
acteristics of the social and physical environment. This assumption that
humans’ psychological attributes are minimally constrained by genetically
encoded sex differences is consistent with the diversity of behaviors and
skills exhibited by men and women across societies and within societies.
Yet, our perspective is fully compatible with the idea that people possess
evolved facilities, such as for language, that develop in predictable ways in
appropriate environments.

Sex Differences in Mate Selection Criteria Predicted from Evolutionary

Psychology and Social Structural Theory

One reasonable area for comparing the predictive power of the evolution-
ary and the social structural origin theories of sex differences is human
mating behavior, especially the criteria that people use for selecting
mates. Evolutionary predictions have been articulated especially clearly
for mating activities, and these behaviors can also be used to test a social
structural perspective. Furthermore, empirical findings concerning mate
selection preferences have been well-established for many years in the lit-
erature on the sociology of the family (e.g., Coombs and Kenkel 1966).
Powers’s (1971) summary of 30 years of research concluded that at least
in the United States, women generally prefer mates with good earning po-
tential, whereas men prefer mates who are physically attractive and pos-
sess good domestic skills. Furthermore, women typically prefer a mate
who is older then them, whereas men prefer a mate who is younger. Fein-
gold’s (1990, 1991, 1992a) meta-analyses of studies drawn from various
research paradigms established that the sex differences in valuing poten-
tial mates’ earning potential and physical attractiveness are robust, despite
 The Origins of Sex Differences in Human Behavior 281

sex similarity on most criteria for selecting mates. Subsequent research

based on a national probability sample of single adults provided further
confirmation of the sex differences in age preferences as well as in valuing
earning potential and physical attractiveness (Sprecher, Sullivan, and
Hatfield 1994).
Evolutionary psychologists have adopted mate preferences as signature
findings of their analysis. Women’s valuing of mates’ resources and men’s
valuing of mates’ youth and physical attractiveness are thought to arise
from the different parental investment of the sexes that was outlined in
Trivers’s (1972) sexual selection theory. It is commonly argued that women,
as the more investing sex, seek mates with attributes that can support their
parenting efforts. However, human mate selection does not follow a strict
version of Trivers’s males-compete-and-females-choose model, because
among humans, selection is a product of the behavior of both sexes, a pro-
cess Darwin (1871) called “dual selection.” In Buss’s (1989a) account, male
choice derives from women’s time-limited reproductive capacity and the
tendency for men to seek mates with attributes that suggest such capacity.
In Kenrick and Keefe’s (1992) account, men and women are both selective
about potential mates and both invest heavily in offspring but with differ-
ent kinds of resources. In particular, “males invest relatively more indirect
resources (food, money, protection, and security), and females invest rela-
tively more direct physiological resources (contributing their own bodily
nutrients to the fetus and nursing child)” (Kenrick and Keefe 1992, p. 78).
As a result, women prefer mates who can provide indirect resources, and
men prefer healthy mates with reproductive potential.1
In contrast, from a social structural perspective, the psychology of mate
selection reflects people’s effort to maximize their utilities with respect to
mating choices in an environment in which these utilities are constrained
by societal gender roles as well by as the more specific expectations as-
sociated with marital roles. Consistent with these ideas, Becker’s (1976)
economic analysis of mating decisions characterized marriage as occur-
ring between utility-maximizing men and women who can reach an equi-
librium with a variety of types of exchanges, including, for example, an
exchange between men’s wages and women’s household production and
other attributes such as education and beauty. This cost-benefit analysis of
mating appears even on occasion in the writings of evolutionary scientists.
282 Alice H. Eagly and Wendy Wood

For example, Tattersall (1998) maintained that behavioral regularities,

such as sex differences in mate selection criteria, are as likely to be due to
rational economic decisions as to inherited predispositions, and Hrdy
(1997) wrote that “a woman’s preferences for a wealthy man can be ex-
plained by the simple reality that . . . males monopolize ownership of pro-
ductive resources” (p. 29).
The outcomes that are perceived to follow from mating decisions de-
pend on marital and family arrangements. To the extent that women and
men occupy marital and family roles that entail different responsibilities
and obligations, they should select mates according to criteria that reflect
these divergent responsibilities and obligations. Consider, for example,
the family system based on a male provider and a female domestic worker.
This system became especially pronounced in industrial economies and is
still prevalent in many world societies. To the extent that societies have this
division of labor, women maximize their outcomes by seeking a mate who
is likely to be successful in the economic, wage-earning role. In turn, men
maximize their outcomes by seeking a mate who is likely to be successful
in the domestic role.
The sex differences in the preferred age of mates also can be understood
as part of the general tendency of men and women to seek partners likely
to provide a good fit to their society’s sexual division of labor and marital
roles. Specifically, the marital system based on a male breadwinner and a
female homemaker favors the age gap in marriage. Marriageable women
who are younger than their potential mates tend to have lesser wages,
social status, and education and knowledge than women who are the same
age as potential mates. With the combination of a younger, less experi-
enced woman and an older, more experienced man, it would be easier to
establish the power differential favoring men that is normative for marital
roles defined by a male breadwinner and a female domestic worker (Lips
1991; Steil 1997). Moreover, compared with somewhat older women,
young women lack independent resources and therefore are more likely
to perceive that their utilities are maximized in the domestic worker role.
In complementary fashion, older men are more likely to have acquired
the economic resources that make them good candidates for the pro-
vider role. The older man and younger woman thus fit more easily than
same-age partners into the culturally expected pattern of breadwinner
and homemaker.
 The Origins of Sex Differences in Human Behavior 283

Cross-Cultural Evidence for Sex Differences in Mate Preferences

Evolutionary psychologists’ predictions that women select for resources
and older age and men for attractiveness and younger age have been ex-
amined cross-culturally. Buss’s (1989a; Buss et al. 1990) impressive study
in 37 cultures of the characteristics that people desire in mates suggested
that consistent with evolutionary psychology, these sex differences in mate
preferences emerged cross-culturally. Similarly, Kenrick and Keefe (1992)
examined the preferred ages of mates in five countries and across various
time periods in the twentieth century and concluded that all provided evi-
dence of sex differences in these preferences. Specifically, for dating and
marriage, women preferred older men and men preferred younger women,
although men’s preferences were moderated by their age, with teenage
boys preferring girls of similar age.2
On the basis of these investigations, evolutionary accounts have em-
phasized the cross-cultural commonality in women’s preference for re-
sources and older age and men’s preference for attractiveness and younger
age. According to Buss (1989a) and Tooby and Cosmides (1989), unifor-
mity across diverse cultures and social circumstances suggests powerful
sex-differentiated evolved mechanisms that reflect an innate, universal hu-
man nature. Kenrick and Keefe (1992) also argued that “invariance across
cultures is evidence that supports a species-specific, rather than a culture-
specific, explanation” (p. 76).
Despite evidence for cross-cultural commonality in sex differences in
mate selection criteria, these investigations also yielded evidence for cul-
tural variation. For example, Kenrick and Keefe (1992) found that the
preference for younger wives was evident among Philippine men of all
ages, but only among older men (i.e., age 30 or over) in the United States.
However, the simple existence of uniformity or variability does not pro-
vide a definitive test of either the evolutionary or the social structural ori-
gin theory. Although evolutionary psychologists emphasize uniformity
and social structural theorists emphasize variability, both perspectives
have some power to explain both of these cross-cultural patterns. To ac-
count for uniformity, social structuralists can point to similarities in the
sexual division of labor in the studied societies and can argue that these
similarities produce these relatively invariant sex differences. As Buss
(1989a) noted, his 37 cultures, which were drawn from 33 nations, were
biased toward urbanized cash-economy cultures, with 54 percent from
284 Alice H. Eagly and Wendy Wood

Europe and North America. Furthermore, respondents selected from each

society tended to be young, comparatively well-educated, and of relatively
high socioeconomic status. To the extent that these societies similarly de-
fined the roles of women and men and that the respondents were similarly
placed in these societies’ social structures, commonality in the sex differ-
ences that follow from social structure should characterize these societies.
To account for cross-cultural variability, both evolutionary and social
structural origin theories recognize that developmental processes and so-
cial factors that are unique to each society direct behavior in ways that can
yield variability in sex differences across cultures. Beyond this insight that
some evidence of cross-cultural variability would not surprise theorists in
either camp, the particular pattern of cross-cultural variation provides an
informative test of the mechanisms underlying sex differences. Specifically,
the social structural argument that a society’s sexual division of labor and
associated gender hierarchy are responsible for sex differences in social
behavior yields predictions concerning cross-cultural variability in mate
preferences.
In the nations included in Buss et al.’s (1990) cross-cultural sample,
whose economies ranged from agrarian to postindustrial, some cultures
were still strongly marked by this division of labor between the provider
and domestic worker, whereas other cultures had departed from it. In ad-
vanced economies like the United States, women have entered the paid la-
bor force and spend a smaller proportion of their time in domestic labor
(Haas 1995; Shelton 1992). Although the tendency for men to increase
their hours of domestic work is much more modest, the lives of men and
women become more similar with greater gender equality. Therefore,
people of both sexes should lessen their emphasis on choosing mates
whose value is defined by their fit to the division between domestic work
and wage labor. Even in postindustrial economies such as the United
States, however, the sex-typed division of labor remains in modified form,
with men devoting longer hours than women to wage labor and women
devoting longer hours to domestic work (e.g., Ferree 1991; Presser 1994;
Shelton 1992). Therefore, the social structural prediction is that the sex
differences in mate selection criteria that follow from the male-female di-
vision of labor should be substantially weakened in societies characterized
by greater gender equality, albeit they should still be present to the extent
that complete equality has not been achieved.3
 The Origins of Sex Differences in Human Behavior 285

Reanalysis of Buss et al.’s (1990) 37 Cultures Data

To evaluate whether the division of labor within a society could explain
the mate preferences of men and women, we reanalyzed Buss et al.’s (1990)
37 cultures data. Our efforts focused on men’s tendencies to select wives
for domestic skill and younger age and women’s tendencies to select hus-
bands for earning capacity and older age. To test the hypothesis that a
higher level of gender equality lessens these sex differences, we represented
societies’ gender equality in terms of archival data available from the
United Nations (United Nations Development Programme 1995).
Buss et al. (1990) derived the data on criteria for selecting mates from
questionnaire measures of preferences for a wide range of characteris-
tics that might be desired in a mate: (a) One instrument obtained rankings
of a set of 13 characteristics according to “their desirability in someone
you might marry” (p. 11); (b) the other instrument obtained ratings on a
4-point scale of each of 18 characteristics on “how important or desirable
it would be in choosing a mate” (p. 11). Buss et al. represented each culture
by the male and female respondents’ mean ranking of each of the 13 mate
selection criteria and by their mean rating of each of the 18 criteria. A sep-
arate question inquired about preferences for a spouse’s age. The data that
we reanalyzed consisted of mean preferences for each culture.
Our reanalysis confirmed Buss et al.’s (1990) conclusion that women
placed more value than men on a mate’s wage-earning ability. Further-
more, consistent with the greater domestic responsibility of women than
men in most cultures, men valued good cook and housekeeper more than
women did, a sex difference that has received little attention from evolu-
tionary psychologists. When the sex differences in the mean preference
ratings were averaged across the cultures, this difference was of compa-
rable magnitude to those obtained on the attributes most strongly empha-
sized by evolutionary psychologists. Specifically, in both the rating and
ranking data, the criteria of good earning capacity, good housekeeper and
cook, and physically attractive produced the largest sex differences. The
appropriateness of focusing on the criteria pertaining to earning ability
and domestic skill within Buss et al.’s data was also supported by the good
agreement across the ranking and rating data sets for sex differences in the
valuation of the qualities of financial prospect, r(33) = .76, p < .001, and
domestic skill, r(33) = .68, p < .001, whereas the agreement in the valua-
tion of physical attractiveness was poorer, r(33) = .34, p < .05. In addition,
286 Alice H. Eagly and Wendy Wood

as Buss et al. reported, the sex difference in the preferred age of mates was
fully intact in the 37 cultures data.4
Additional evidence for the social structural predictions emerged
when we evaluated the pattern of sex differences in preferences across
societies. Consistent with the division of labor principle, a substantial rela-
tion emerged between the sex difference in valuing a spouse’s domestic
skills and the sex difference in valuing a spouse’s capacity to provide a
good income. Specifically, on the basis of the ranking measure, the sex dif-
ferences in the good earning capacity criterion and the good housekeeper
criterion were correlated across the cultures, r(33) = .67, p < .001. On the
basis of the rating measure, the sex differences in the financial prospect cri-
terion and the housekeeper-cook criterion were also correlated, r (35) = .38,
p < .05. These positive correlations indicate that to the extent that women
more than men reported seeking a mate who is a good breadwinner, men
more than women reported seeking a mate who is a good homemaker. In
addition, the sex difference in the preferred age of one’s spouse bore a
positive relation to the sex difference in preference for a good earner,
r(33) = .34, p < .05 for the ranking data, and r(35) = .32, p < .06 for the
rating data. Similarly, the sex difference in preferred age bore a positive re-
lation to the sex difference in preference for a good housekeeper and cook,
r(33) = .58, p < .001 for the ranking data, and r(35) = .60, p < .001 for
the rating data. These relationships show that to the extent that the sex-
difference in the preferred age of spouses was large, women more than
men preferred mates who were good providers and men more than women
preferred mates who were good domestic workers. The division of labor
provides the logic of all of these relationships: Women who serve in the do-
mestic role are the complement of men who serve as breadwinners, and the
combination of older husbands and younger wives facilitates this form of
marriage.

Analysis of gender equality To test our hypothesis that sex differences in

mate preferences erode to the extent that women and men are similarly
placed in the social structure, we sought cross-national indicators of gen-
der equality. Among the many such indicators compiled by United Nations
researchers, the most direct indicator of gender equality is the aggregate
Gender Empowerment Measure, which represents the extent to which
women participate equally with men in economic, political, and decision-
 The Origins of Sex Differences in Human Behavior 287

making roles (United Nations Development Programme 1995). This index

increases as (a) women’s percentage share of administrative and manage-
rial jobs and professional and technical jobs increases, (b) women’s per-
centage share of parliamentary seats rises, and (c) women’s proportional
share of earned income approaches parity with men’s.
The Gender-Related Development Index is another useful indicator of
societal-level gender equality provided by United Nations researchers. It
increases with a society’s basic capabilities to provide health (i.e., greater
life expectancy), educational attainment and literacy, and wealth, but im-
poses a penalty for gender inequality in these capabilities (United Nations
Development Programme, 1995). Whereas this measure reflects equality
in basic access to health care, education and knowledge, and income, the
Gender Empowerment Measure is a purer indicator of equal participation
in economic and political life.
In the set of 37 cultures, the Gender Empowerment Measure and the
Gender-Related Development Index were correlated, r(33) = .74, p < .001,
and both of these indexes were moderately correlated with general indexes
of human development and economic development. One limitation of the
indexes of gender equality is that they are based on data from the early
1990s. Because Buss et al.’s (1990) data were collected in the mid-1980s,
these indexes are from a slightly later time period, but the relative posi-
tions of the cultures should remain approximately the same.5
To examine the relation between societal gender equality and mate
preferences, we calculated the correlations of these indexes with the sex
differences in valuing a mate as a breadwinner and as a domestic worker—
the two criteria most relevant to the traditional division of labor. These
correlations for the ranking and the rating data, which appear in Table
12.1, are generally supportive of the social structural predictions. As
the Gender Empowerment Measure increased in value, the tendency de-
creased for women to place greater emphasis than men on a potential
spouse’s earning capacity, although the correlation with the rated criterion
was relatively weak. Also, as the Gender Empowerment Measure in-
creased, the tendency decreased for men to place greater emphasis than
women on a potential spouse’s domestic skills. As expected in terms of the
Gender-Related Development Index’s less direct representation of the sim-
ilarity of the roles of women and men, its correlations with these sex dif-
ferences were somewhat weaker.
Table 12.1
Correlations of mean rankings and ratings of mate selection criteria with United Nations Indexes of Gender Equality for Buss et al.’s
(1990) 37 cultures sample.

Ranked Criteria Rated criteria

Gender Gender-Related Gender Gender-Related

Empowerment Development Empowerment Development
Measure Index Measure Index
Mate selection criterion Rater (n = 33) (n = 34) (n = 35) (n = 36)

Good earning capacity Sex difference –.43* –.33† –.29† –.23

(financial prospect) Women –.29 –.18 –.49** –.42**
Men .24 .27 –.40* –.36*
Good housekeeper Sex difference –.62*** –.54** –.61*** –.54**
(and cook) Women .04 –.01 .11 –.07
Men –.46** –.42* –.60*** –.61***
Physically attractive Sex difference .13 –.12 .20 .18
(good looks) Women .14 .34† –.45** –.25
Men .20 .28 –.33† –.14
†
p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
Note: The criteria were described slightly differently in the ranking and the rating tasks: The ranking term is given first, with the
rating term following in parentheses. Higher values on the gender equality indexes indicate greater equality. For the preferences of
women or men, higher values of the mean rankings and ratings of mate selection criteria indicate greater desirability in a mate;
therefore, a positive correlation indicates an increase in the desirability of a criterion as gender equality increased, and a negative
correlation indicates a decrease. Sex differences in these preferences were calculated as female minus male means for good earning
capacity and male minus female means for good housekeeper and physically attractive. A positive correlation thus indicates an in-
crease in the sex difference as gender equality increased, and a negative correlation indicates a decrease in the sex difference.
 The Origins of Sex Differences in Human Behavior 289

The preference data for each sex reported in table 12.1 provide insight
into these sex-difference findings. For good housekeeper and cook, the
correlations for both the rating data and the ranking data indicated that
as gender equality increased, men decreased their interest in choosing
mates for their skill as domestic workers, and women showed no change
in this preference. In contrast, for good earning capacity, as gender equal-
ity increased, women decreased their emphasis on mates’ earning poten-
tial in the rating data (although nonsignificantly in the ranking data).
However, men’s preferences for good earning capacity are more difficult
to interpret because their relations to gender equality were inconsistent
across the ranking and rating measures. Inconsistencies between the two
measures may reflect that rankings are judgments of the relative impor-
tance of the criteria in relation to the others in the list, whereas ratings are
judgments of the absolute importance of the different criteria.
As shown in table 12.2, examination of preferences for a spouse’s age
showed that as gender equality increased, women expressed less prefer-
ence for older men, men expressed less preference for younger women,
and consequently the sex difference in the preferred age of mates became

Table 12.2
Correlations of mean preferred age difference between self and spouse with United
Nations Indexes of Gender Equality for Buss et al.’s (1990) 37 cultures sample.

Gender Empowerment Gender-Related

Measure Development Index
Rater (n = 35) (n = 36)

Sex difference –.73* –.70*

Women –.64* –.57*
Men .70* .70*

*p < .001.
Note. Higher values on the gender equality indexes indicate greater equality. Pos-
itive ages indicate preference for an older spouse, and negative ages indicate pref-
erence for a younger spouse. Therefore, for the preferences of women, a negative
correlation indicates a decrease in the tendency to prefer an older spouse as gen-
der equality increased, whereas for the preferences of men, a positive correlation
indicates a decrease in the tendency to prefer a younger spouse. Because the sex
difference in preferred age was calculated as female minus male mean preferred
spouse age in relation to self, a negative correlation indicates a decrease in the
sex difference in preferred age as gender equality increased.
290 Alice H. Eagly and Wendy Wood

smaller. These relations suggest that sex differences in age preferences re-
flect a sex-differentiated division of labor.6
Interpretation of the magnitudes of the correlations reported in tables
12.1 and 12.2 should take several considerations into account. One fea-
ture limiting the strength of these relationships is the assessment of the
mate selection preferences with one-item questionnaire measures. Also,
the indexes of gender equality imperfectly represented the critical concep-
tual variable, the extremity of the division of labor between male providers
and female homemakers. In addition, the sampling of respondents was not
uniformly implemented across the 37 cultures, nor would these samples
have corresponded to those that contributed to the indexes of gender
equality. Finally, there may be a time lag between the social and economic
changes reflected in these indexes and shifts in the individual preferences
that constitute the 37 cultures data. For these several reasons, it is plaus-
ible to conclude that the correlations we report underestimate the true
magnitude of the predicted relationships.

Preference for physical attractiveness As also shown in table 12.1, cor-

relations between the sex difference in valuing potential mates’ physical
attractiveness and the United Nations indexes of gender equality were
low and nonsignificant. These findings are not surprising, because this
mate selection criterion does not mirror the division between wage labor
and domestic labor in the manner that earning potential, domestic skill,
and age do. Nevertheless, under some circumstances, physical attractive-
ness may be part of what people exchange for partners’ earning capacity
and other attributes.
Assuming that attractiveness is sometimes exchanged for other gains,
the social structural perspective offers possibilities for understanding its
value. Research on the physical attractiveness stereotype has shown that
attractiveness in both sexes conveys several kinds of meaning—especially
social competence, including social skills, sociability, and popularity
(Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, and Longo 1991; Feingold 1992b). There-
fore, men’s greater valuing of attractiveness might follow from the greater
importance of this competence in women’s family and occupational roles,
including women’s paid occupations in postindustrial societies (Cejka and
Eagly 1999; Lippa 1998), and the consequent inclusion of this competence
in the female gender role. If women’s roles demand greater interpersonal
 The Origins of Sex Differences in Human Behavior 291

competence in societies with greater and lesser gender equality, the ten-
dency for men to place greater value on mates’ attractiveness would not
covary with indexes that assess equality.
Another possibility is that the value of attractiveness stems from its per-
ceived association with the ability to provide sexual pleasure. This idea
receives support from research showing that attractiveness conveys in-
formation about sexual warmth (Feingold 1992b). If so, men might seek
sexiness in a mate in all societies, in addition to attributes such as domes-
tic skill, whose importance varies with the society’s level of gender equal-
ity. Given that the female gender role often includes sexual restraint and
lack of sexual autonomy, women may place less emphasis on sexiness in
mates than men do.
It is less certain that physical attractiveness conveys information about
women’s fertility, as should be the case if men’s preference for attractive-
ness in mates developed because attractiveness was a cue to fertility (Buss
1989a; Jones 1995; Singh 1993). It seems reasonable that perceptions of
attractiveness and potential fertility would covary even in contemporary
data, but these relations have proven to be inconsistent (e.g., Cunningham
1986; Tassinary and Hansen 1998). Moreover, Singh’s (1993) research on
judgments of female figures that varied in weight and waist-to-hip ratio
suggested three somewhat independent groupings of attributes: health, at-
tractiveness, and sexiness; capacity and desire for children; and youth.
Although little is known about the relation between women’s attractive-
ness and their actual fecundity, Kalick, Zebrowitz, Langlois, and Johnson
(1998) found that facial attractiveness in early adulthood was unrelated to
number of children produced or to health across the life span. Although
the few participants in their sample who did not marry were less attractive
than those who did marry, once the nonmarried were excluded, physical
attractiveness was unrelated to the number of children produced by male
or female participants. Kalick et al. (1998) concluded that “any relation
between attractiveness and fecundity was due to mate-selection chances
rather than biological fertility” (p. 10). Of course, as we noted in our cri-
tique of evolutionary psychology in this article, proponents of the theory
do not predict that hypothesized evolved dispositions, such as men’s pref-
erence for physically attractive partners, would necessarily be related to
current reproductive success. Evolutionary psychologists argue instead
292 Alice H. Eagly and Wendy Wood

that actual fertility in modern societies may bear little relation to the fac-
tors indicative of reproductive success in the EEA.
In summary, several aspects of the findings from Buss et al.’s (1990) 37
cultures study are compatible with the social structural origin theory of
sex differences. The idea that the extremity of the division between male
providers and female homemakers is a major determinant of the criteria
that people seek in mates fits with the observed covariation between men
placing more emphasis than women on younger age and domestic skill and
women placing more emphasis than men on older age and earning poten-
tial. The lessening of these sex differences with increasing gender equality,
as represented by the United Nations indexes, is consistent with our claim
that these sex differences are by-products of a social and family structure
in which the man acts as a provider and the woman acts as a homemaker.
More ambiguous are the sex differences in valuing mates’ physical attrac-
tiveness. Without evidence that men’s greater valuing of attractiveness fol-
lows from one or more specific mechanisms, the simple absence of a
relation between gender equality and sex differences in valuing attractive-
ness in our reanalysis does not advance the claims of evolutionary psy-
chology or the social structural theory. Convincing evidence for either
interpretation has yet to be generated. However, with respect to the other
sex differences emphasized by evolutionary psychologists, their cross-
cultural patterning suggests that they arise from a particular economic and
social system.

Within-Society Effects of Social Position

As evidence that presumably counters the social structural interpretation
of sex differences in mate selection criteria, evolutionary psychologists
(e.g., Buss and Schmitt 1993) have sometimes cited studies that examined
the relation within a given culture between individuals’ mate preferences
and their economic resources (e.g., Buss 1989b; Kenrick and Keefe 1992;
Townsend 1989). In one of the most extensive of these studies, Wieder-
man and Allgeier (1992) assessed mate preferences and anticipated in-
come of undergraduate students from a midwestern university and of a
convenience sample of Ohio residents. Mate preference ratings from both
samples yielded the typical sex differences in ratings of good looks and
good financial prospect. The central finding was that women’s anticipated
income and their valuing of mates as a good financial prospect were posi-
 The Origins of Sex Differences in Human Behavior 293

tively related in the college sample, r(635) = .17, p < .001, and unrelated
in the community sample, r(165) = .04, ns. That women who expected to
earn higher incomes still valued financial resources in their mates was
taken as evidence in favor of the evolutionary theory of mate preferences.
On the basis of such data, any conclusions about the validity of the
evolutionary or the social structural origin theory are unwarranted be-
cause such studies confound women’s income with their socioeconomic
status. Women who themselves have higher incomes would tend to come
from higher socioeconomic groups and would anticipate selecting mates
from their own stratum of society. In the United States, both sexes’ homo-
gamous mating on the basis of education, occupation, and economic re-
sources is a well-established phenomenon (e.g., Kalmijn 1991, 1994; Mare
1991). Therefore, women’s socioeconomic status typically should be pos-
itively related to expectations concerning mates’ financial prospects.
An additional consideration is that, because societal gender roles coex-
ist with specific roles, achieving a high-paying job does not completely
neutralize the impact of broader gender role expectations. Therefore, con-
sistent with these broader norms, even women with higher-than-average
income commonly regard themselves as secondary wage earners in their
marriages (Ferree 1991) and often prefer to leave the labor force entirely
or to become employed part-time while raising a family (Herzog, Bach-
man, and Johnston 1983; Tittle 1981). Despite earning a substantial in-
come, most women likely anticipate being fully or partially dependent on
their husband’s income during a portion of their life span. Consequently,
within-society analyses of mate preferences that seek to draw conclusions
about the effects of women’s own economic resources must control for the
influences of expectations based on social class and education as well as
actual and anticipated marital roles.

Conclusion

Considered at the level of a general metatheory of sex differences, social

structural theories provide alternative explanations of the great majority
of the general predictions about sex-differentiated social behavior that
have been featured in evolutionary psychology. Because the central ten-
dencies of sex differences (see Eagly 1995; Halpern 1997; Hyde 1996) are
294 Alice H. Eagly and Wendy Wood

readily encompassed by both of these perspectives, neither the evolution-

ary metatheory nor the social structural metatheory is convincingly sub-
stantiated by a mere noting of the differences established in the research
literature. It is far too easy to make up sensible stories about how these dif-
ferences might be products of sex-differentiated evolved tendencies or the
differing placement of women and men in the social structure. This over-
lap in general main-effect predictions calls for more refined testing of the
two theoretical perspectives, and each perspective is associated with nu-
merous more detailed predictions and empirical tests.
Certainly there are many possibilities for distinguishing between the
two approaches with appropriate research designs (see Jackson 1992).
Evolutionary psychologists have been especially resourceful in obtaining
cross-cultural data intended to support their claims of invariance across
cultures in sex-differentiated behavior. To be maximally informative about
social structural factors, cross-cultural research should be systematically
designed to represent cultures with differing forms of social organization
and levels of gender equality. In addition, a variety of other research meth-
ods, including experiments and field studies, can yield tests of predictions
that emerge from evolutionary and social structural perspectives.
Although this article contrasts social structural explanations of sex dif-
ferences with those based on evolutionary psychology, social structural
analyses may be generally compatible with some evolutionary perspec-
tives, as we noted in the introductory section of this article. Our argument
that sex differences in behavior emerge primarily from physical sex dif-
ferences in conjunction with influences of the economy, social structure,
ecology, and cultural beliefs is potentially reconcilable with theories of
coevolution by genetic and cultural processes (Janicki and Krebs 1998).
Our position is also sympathetic to the interest that some evolutionary
biologists and behavioral ecologists have shown in the maintenance of
behavioral patterns from generation to generation through nongenetic,
cultural processes (e.g., Sork 1997). However, despite our acknowledge-
ment of the importance of some evolved genetic influences on the behav-
ior of women and men, an implicit assumption of our approach is that
social change emerges, not from individuals’ tendencies to maximize their
inclusive fitness, but instead from their efforts to maximize their personal
benefits and minimize their personal costs in their social and ecological
settings.
 The Origins of Sex Differences in Human Behavior 295

One test of the evolutionary psychology and social structural origin the-
ories of sex differences lies in the future—that is, in the emerging postin-
dustrial societies in which the division between men’s wage labor and
women’s domestic labor is breaking down. Notable is the increase in
women’s paid employment, education, and access to many formerly male-
dominated occupations. Accompanying these changes is a marked attitu-
dinal shift toward greater endorsement of equal opportunity for women in
the workplace and role-sharing in the home (e.g., Simon and Landis 1989;
Spence and Hahn 1997; Twenge 1997). Nonetheless, occupational sex
segregation is still prevalent with women concentrated in occupations that
are thought to require feminine qualities and with men in occupations
thought to require masculine qualities (Cekja and Eagly 1999; Glick
1991). Given that occupational distributions currently take this form and
that the homemaker-provider division of labor remains weakly in place,
social structuralists would not predict that sex differences in behavior
should have already disappeared. Instead, to the extent that the traditional
sexual division between wage labor and domestic labor disappears and
women and men become similarly distributed into paid occupations, men
and women should converge in their psychological attributes.

Acknowledgments

This article was completed while Alice H. Eagly was a Visiting Scholar at
the Murray Research Center of Radcliffe College and was supported by a
Sabbatical Award from the James McKeen Cattell Fund. The research re-
ceived support from Grants SBR-9729449 and SBR-9514537 from the
National Science Foundation.
Thanks are extended to David Buss for making available for reanalysis
data from his 37 cultures study (Buss, 1989b; Buss et al., 1990) and to
Michael Bailey, April Bleske, Judith S. Bridges, Galen Bodenhausen, David
Buss, Stephen M. Colaretti, Lee Cronk, Amanda Diekman, Steven W.
Gangestad, Patricia Adair Gowaty, Judith Hall, Martie Haselton, Sarah
Hrdy, Douglas T. Kenrick, Mary Kite, Richard Lippa, Dan McAdams, Anne
McGuire, Felicia Pratto, Radmila Prislin, Dean Pruitt, Eshkol Rafaeli, Neal
Roese, Alice Schlegel, and Jeffry Simpson for comments on a draft of the
article. Also, Crystal Toures and Heather Franzese provided assistance in
locating and entering relevant data.
296 Alice H. Eagly and Wendy Wood

Notes

1. Darwin (1871) expressed skepticism about the applicability of the processes of

sexual selection to modern human societies. He argued that sexual selection was
more powerful among early humans, who were guided by instinctive passions,
than among contemporary members of society, who show greater foresight and
reason in mating behavior. In fact, Darwin maintained that “civilized men are
largely attracted by the mental charms of women, by their wealth, and especially
by their social position” (Darwin 1871, p. 178).
2. Although Kenrick and Keefe (1992) showed that teenage boys prefer girls of
similar age, this tendency is most likely a product of the lower age limits that exist
for culturally and maturationally appropriate marital partners (Broude 1992).
3. Prior efforts to test social structural hypotheses within Buss et al.’s (1990) 37
cultures data produced mixed or nonsignificant findings (Buss 1989a; Glenn
1989).
4. We did not also focus on the criterion of ambition and industriousness because
it produced a substantially smaller sex difference in the 37 cultures data than the
criteria of good earning capacity, good housekeeper and cook, and physically at-
tractive. From the social structural perspective, industriousness is important for
performance of domestic work as well as wage labor, and therefore both men and
women should seek this quality in mates under the traditional division of labor be-
tween homemakers and providers.
5. Another compromise consisted of representing differing subsamples from the
same broader culture (e.g., mainland United States and Hawaiian United States)
with the same values of the United Nations indexes. For the Gender Empowerment
Measure and the Gender-Related Development Index, data for all represented na-
tions were published in 1995, with the exception of data for two nations published
in 1996 and one in 1997 (United Nations Development Programme 1995, 1996,
1997). For two cultures, ranking data for mate selection preferences were not
available.
6. The United Nations indexes of economic development and fertility showed re-
lationships to mate preferences that were similar to those displayed in tables 12.1
and 12.2. The magnitude of these relationships was in general nonsignificantly
smaller than those involving the Gender Empowerment Measure. These relation-
ships were expected, given that this measure increased with economic development
(real gross domestic product per capita), r(33) = .71, p < .001, and decreased with
fertility, r(33) = –.61, p < .001.

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13
The Evolutionary Value of the Man (to)
Child Affiliative Bond: Closer to Obligate
Than to Facultative
Wade C. Mackey

Rule #1: All politics are local.

—Rep. Tip O’Neill
Rule #2: All long-term politics are reproductive strategies.
Rule #3: All effective long-term politics camouflage Rule #2.
—Ipsoc Macquire

The Thornhill and Palmer Thesis

Thornhill and Palmer (2000) proffer the intriguing idea that human
“rape” represents a specialized neuro-hormonal—motivational—module
that is an evolutionarily successful adaptation. The adaptation could take
the form of either a specialized module or a generalized increase in men’s
sex drive or sexual assertiveness or overall aggression. For example, it
might have proven advantageous for men to maintain an increased inter-
est in sexuality across the woman’s menstrual cycle. If Thornhill and Pal-
mer are correct, and, if, as is traditional, the burden of scientific proof falls
on the shoulders of those stating the thesis, then Thornhill and Palmer
need to demonstrate the following:
When compared to the much more typical pattern of social fathers who
conceive and nurture their own children to effective adulthood, the bio-
cultural behavior of “rape” is, at least, competitive in terms of generating
grandchildren who generate grandchildren.
Thornhill and Palmer fail to offer any evidence—at all—that would in-
dicate that children conceived via “rape” survive, mate, and procreate in
greater or equal competence when compared to children conceived via on-
going social fathers.
306 Wade C. Mackey

The evidence presented by Thornhill and Palmer consists of the following:

During Rwanda’s recent civil war, as many as 35 percent of 304 rape victims sur-
veyed may have become pregnant, and a high percentage of the rape conceptions
resulted in offspring despite the fact that most of the women claimed not to want
the pregnancies. (p. 99)

“Estimates of rates of pregnancy resulting from rape in peacetime set-

tings vary from 1 percent to 33 percent” (p. 99). Quoting from Holmes
et al. (1996) they write: “the rape-related pregnancy rate was 5 percent
per rape, or 6 percent per victim” (p. 100). Because many of the pregnan-
cies after the rape were the result of impregnation by a consensual mate,
Thornhill and Palmer note that “[T]he figure reported by Holmes et al.
probably should be corrected to about 2 percent” (p. 100).
The Thornhill and Palmer evidence for a “rape” as a specialized moti-
vational module is restricted to an estimated 2 percent pregnancy rate per
rape. The fates of the pregnancies are totally unknown. The necessary data
for a substantiation of their thesis, namely grandchildren who have grand-
children, are not presented, nor do Thornhill and Palmer acknowledge the
singular necessity of such data for the support of their hypothesis.
Accordingly, their thesis becomes an intriguing idea or speculation. To
wit: “Children of rape are as competitive in achieving effective adulthood
as are children with on-going social fathers.” Thornhill and Palmer do not
provide evidence to advance this thesis, perhaps better labeled a hypothe-
sis, beyond the domain of the speculative.
The rest of this chapter argues that such equality of competitiveness is
unlikely.
Because counterindicative data are no more available than are indicative
data, no Popperian falsification is available. What is available is the clear
value of the ongoing social father to the well-being of the developing child
and that this value is very, very old. And it may be reiterated that “rape” is
a phenomenon that effectively precludes the biological father from being
the ongoing social father.
First, the argument is presented that there does exist, in fact, a man (to)
child affiliative bond that is independent of the man-woman bond and of
the woman (to) child bond.
Second, the very recent social experiment, in parts of the industrial-
ized world, of abrading or excluding the father from the mother-child
dyad is analyzed in terms of the consequences for the commonweal across
generations.
 The Man (to) Child Affiliative Bond 307

Social Fathering as a Human Trait

Fathering Is Neither a Thin Veneer Nor a Social Invention: The Cross-

cultural Theme of Marriage
Although there are a myriad of exotic and arcane variations on rituals of
marriage across the world’s community of cultures, an invariant is the
sheer existence of marriage. Leach (1955) has distilled a list of common-
alities that are universally aligned with “marriage.” Three of the common-
alities are germane here. Namely, marriage serves:
1. to give the husband a monopoly in the wife’s sexuality (“husbands” in
the case of polyandry);
2. to give the wife a monopoly in the husband’s sexuality (“wives” in the
case of polygyny); and
3. to establish the legal father of a woman’s children.

Point (3) is of special interest. A key component to marriage is the uni-

versal imprimatur or designation of legitimacy. Virtually all cultures have
the notion that children should be legitimized through marriage: A man—
the husband—has special responsibility for the nurturance and protection
of his children (Hartley 1975; Malinowski 1927; Stephens 1963; Van den
Berghe 1979). That is, the man—the husband—becomes a social father.
Because the presence of a social father is mandated, his presence is a con-
stant in the structure of virtually all societies. Accordingly, the function of
the social father is difficult to analyze as long as it remains a constant. Vari-
ation of cause is essential to evaluate variation of effect.
Framed a little differently, in the hurly-burly assemblage of very diverse
cultures with large differences in economic bases and cosmologies, a
constant that thematically emerges is the “social father” (Hewlett 1992;
Mackey 1985, 1986, 1996, 2001). Because it is difficult to explain a
“constant/consistent” with a variable, a second constant/consistency
would loom as a more attractive explicator. The most likely candidate to
explain the catholicity of the “social father” is the human genetic mosaic:
That is, fathering is a human trait. Phrased in a more prosaic manner: Men
are built to like their kids.

The man (to) child affiliative bond The question can then be legiti-
mately asked: “Why would such a male (to) child affiliative bond arise and
be competitive in our evolutionary trajectory or history?” The pongids
308 Wade C. Mackey

(chimpanzees, bonobos, and gorillas)—our closest genetic relatives—are

not predictive of such a bond. Pongid males and the males of other ter-
restrial primates generally tolerate the young of the troop (at least his
young), but leave nurturing to the mothers (Goodall 1986; McGinnis
1979; McGrew, Marchant, and Nishida 1996; Smuts et al. 1986; Smuts
and Guberick 1992; Taub 1984). Yet, across cultural boundaries, human
males—men—are clearly fond of their own children, nurture them, play
with them, and are quite willing to provision and protect them (Hewlett
1992; HRAF #22–#26 1949; Lamb 1987; Mackey 1976, 1985, 1996).

Men systematically provisioning their children A cross-cultural univer-

sal is that men will gather resources—food is an excellent example—from
outside the perimeter of their camp/village and then return to the camp/
village and share that resource with particular children (their children) as
well as with the men’s wives. The pattern is highly predictable (Hewlett
1992; HRAF #22–#26 1949; Lamb 1987; Mackey 1985, 1986, 1996) and
occurs across societal structures and across ecologies (Murdock 1957,
1967) such as the Yanomamo (Chagnon 1977), China (Chance 1984), Ti-
bet (Ekvall 1968), the Tiwi of Australia (Hart and Pilling 1960), the Dani
of New Guinea (Heider 1979), Eskimos (Chance 1966), Japan (Norbeck
1976), the Yuqui of Amazonia (Stearman 1989), Australian aborigines
(Tonkinson 1978), and the Dobe !Kung in southern Africa (Lee 1984).
The provisioning is not totally exclusive. Systematic food sharing has
been ritualized in many, if not all, societies. Rarely can a hunter claim a
large kill for only his own family (Coon 1971; Lee 1982; Tonkinson 1978;
Chance 1966). But, within these contexts, a man provides singular atten-
tion in terms of provisioning and protection to the legitimate children that
he has fathered and to his wife or wives (see HRAF 1949, #22–26, and see
Malinowski 1927 and Hendrix 1996 for theoretical discussions).
When resources are not forthcoming from a prospective groom, brides
are difficult to acquire (Cashdan 1993) and wives are difficult to keep (Bet-
zig 1989). When the pattern does break down across the overall society,
for example, the Ik (Turnbull 1972), the breakdown signals an overall so-
cietal disintegration and is a focused topic of the ethnographer’s analysis.
Adult males’ active and systematic food sharing is not a primate trait.
That is, men, but not other adult male primates, (i) procure food from out-
side of the group’s perimeter, and (ii) they then return to the group for the
sharing with females and their young. The adult male primates may allow
 The Man (to) Child Affiliative Bond 309

a shared feeding from the same source, or may relinquish food to a “beg-
ging” female, for example, as in the chimpanzee (Boesch 1994; Boesch
and Boesch 1989; de Waal 1997, 1998; de Waal and Lanting 1997;
Goodall 1986; Nishida and Hosaka 1996; Stanford 1996; Teleki 1973;
cf. Parish 1996); however, the adult males do not leave the perimeter of
the troop, obtain food, and then return to the troop to give the food to
adult females, who might then give it to their young.
Although not a primate characteristic, food sharing by adult males does
occur in many—if not most—bird species, especially if the species tends
toward monogamy (Kleiman 1977), and in the canids: wolves (Mech
1966; Mowat 1963; Murie 1944), coyotes (Dobie 1949; McMahan 1976;
Ryden 1974; Young and Jackson 1951), jackals (Lawick and Lawick-
Goodall 1971; Moehlman 1980), hunting dogs (Kuhme 1965), and foxes
(Alderton 1994). See King (1980), Mackey (1976, 1996), Schaller and
Lowther (1969), and Thompson (1978) for discussions (cf. Lovejoy 1981).
The canid analogue is of most interest to the argument being presented
here. For example, the adult male wolf will catch prey, return to the den
and give the food via regurgitation to the mother wolf and the pups for
their consumption (Mech 1970). Of further interest, these canids—paral-
lel with humans—also tend toward monogamy and toward minimal sex-
ual dimorphism (Kleiman 1977). As detailed below, this minimal sexual
dimorphism of Homo presents a problem for the Thornhill and Palmer
thesis. An argument can be made that convergent evolution has occurred
between adult male canids and adult male Homo (see Mackey 1976, 1996
for expanded discussion). A key difference between the canids (e.g., hunt-
ing dogs or wolves) and humans is that breeding within the canid pack is
often restricted to one (alpha) pair; whereas any and all men who “marry”
are expected to have offspring.

The problem of reduced sexual dimorphism Paternal provisioning is

aligned with reduced sexual dimorphism (Kleiman 1977). Accordingly,
the model presented here and the pressures for reduced sexual dimorphism
exerted on men who uniquely provisioned their wives and their (own) chil-
dren are mutually supportive concepts (cf. Foley and Lee 1989). In terms
of sexual dimorphism, there are three items Thornhill and Palmer need to
address. First, Homo’s predecessor Australopithecus did exhibit a large
degree of sexual dimorphism by size (Hall 1985; Plavcan and van Schaik
1997). Second, Homo, compared to Australopithecus, gradually increased
310 Wade C. Mackey

in size (Aiello 1994; Fleagle 1988; Hall 1985). Third, Homo became ex-
clusively terrestrial. From these three givens a not unreasonable inferred
assumption would be that Homo would follow the basic trend of main-
taining or increasing sexual dimorphism. However, sexual dimorphism
decreased (Aiello 1994; Arsuaga et al. 1997; Economist 1984; Lewin
1987; Lockwood et al. 1996; McHenry 1991; see Martin, Willner, and
Dettling 1994 for a discussion).
In terms of height, the sexual dimorphism of contemporary humans is
107 (s.d. 1.5; n = 93 [societies], that is, women are 94 percent the height
of men) (Alexander et al 1979). The human canine is virtually (sexually)
isomorphic, and piloerection is not a functional human trait. In terms of
weight, the sexual dimorphism of (U.S.) humans is 130.0. Since the linear
correlation between the weight of primate males and the sexual dimor-
phism of their species is significant (rp = .569; p < .01; two-tailed; n = 47)
(Hall 1985), then the sexual dimorphism of human males could be pre-
dicted from their weight. When the “sexual dimorphism ratio” is pre-
dicted from the average man’s weight, the predicted value is a sex ratio for
male-to-female of 187.4. This predicted value overestimates the actual
value of 130.0 by 1.55 standard deviations. (Using a similar method for
data from Plavcan and van Schaik 1997 resulted in a similar finding. The
correlation [rp of .389 was significant] [p < .01; 2-tailed; n = 86]. The pre-
dicted sexual dimorphism ratio was 155 or 1.15 standard deviations larger
than the actual male-to-female ratio.)
“Rape” is a behavior involving physical aggression. Large size is advan-
tageous in physical confrontations. If “rape” were a specific and adaptive
evolutionary strategy, then Thornhill and Palmer need to explain why hu-
man sexual dimorphism decreased when a “rape” strategy would predict
the reverse.

Synopsis It is argued here that those males, whether late Australop-

ithecines or early Homo, who did have a rudimentary affiliative bond to-
ward (their) children—“liked” them—would have a clear reproductive
advantage over those men who did not “like” (their/any) children. If sex-
ual exclusivity were becoming a norm, then the children of the wife also
tended to be the children of the husband. (See Fisher 1983 for a discussion
of the “sex contract.”) His nurturing of her children was also the nurtur-
ing of his children, that is, his genes, his inclusive fitness. Framed a little
 The Man (to) Child Affiliative Bond 311

differently, the father’s emotion of affection for his children would be the
drivewheel to allow paternal certainty to be a fruitful and effective strat-
egy. Just as a husband’s jealousy may reduce his wife’s straying, his nur-
turing of his own (very altricial) children would increase the man’s chances
of having his own grandchildren. A measure of intuition infers that it is
much more palatable for someone to nurture other people and to give
them treasure if those people were liked by the dispenser. Any other com-
bination of a giver-receiver relationship seems a nonviable competitor. In
times of scarcity, especially during an intense winter, systematic provi-
sioning by a man to his young would certainly enhance the survivability
quotient of those children. Children who survive are more likely to have
grandchildren than those children who do not. Children who did survive
became our ancestors. Children who did not survive did not.

Female Reproductive Calculus and the Paternalistic Man

From what was probably a fairly simple choice for her female ancestors, a
qualitatively different strategy would have unfolded for those females who
were in the transition period between mothering-only and co-parenting.
For eons, her ancestors merely had to notice which male out-tussled his
competitors. Such a winner would sire the females’ children.
Her descendants would have had a much more complex evaluation
to make. She, in competition, with other females, had to shift from what
the male’s physical dominance had achieved in the past—he had won the
tussle—to what a man would do in the future—would he be able and be
willing to share valuable resources with her (and her children).
Of the two traits, “able” and “willing,” “willing” would be much, much
harder to evaluate. She now had to evaluate the male’s psychology, his per-
sonality. Although the words “trust,” “honest,” “reliable” were undoubt-
edly not part of the woman’s worldview, the concepts, de facto, had to have
been. An incompetent read by her of the male would have left her hungry
and pregnant and the mother of incompetent offspring. A competent read
by her of the male would have left her sated and pregnant and the mother
of competent offspring. Thus, across millennia, as the women were slowly
biasing toward finding the qualities of “affiliation,” “reliability,” and “shar-
ing” to be attractive in mating partners, they were simultaneously sculpt-
ing male descendants who were “affectionate,” “reliable,” and “sharing”
312 Wade C. Mackey

toward the males’ own children. Such traits in a mate lent enhanced sur-
vivability to the woman and her (and his) children. The men who pos-
sessed such traits would have increased their proportion of the next
generation’s gene-pool, as did the women who found such men attractive.

Social context of fathering It is not known, nor will it ever be known,

when the biological “pair-bonding” slid into the cultural “marriage.”
However, whenever “marriage,” as a cultural institution, was devised as an
overlay to pair-bonding, it was a success. “Marriage” became a universal.
The individual woman’s choice of a mating partner, a.k.a. husband, was
now in the context of familial politics (Stephens 1963; Van den Berghe
1979). Some societies were content to let women maintain high levels of
discretion. But other societies had input from elders. The input would vary
from suggestion to veto to complete control, for example, preferential
cross-cousin marriage, arranged marriages. The dowry and brideprice
were invented. “Political” and alliance formation were inserted into the
mix. Again the “input” occurs independent of ecology or subsistence tech-
nique, as in the Yanomamo (Chagnon 1977), China (Chance 1984), Tibet
(Ekvall 1968), the Tiwi of Australia (Hart and Pilling 1960), the Dani of
New Guinea (Heider 1979), Eskimos (Chance 1966), Japan (Norbeck
1976), the Yuqui of Amazonia (Stearman 1989), Australian aborigines
(Tonkinson 1978) and the Dobe !Kung of southern Africa (Lee 1984).
Suitors who were handsome, virile, energetic, reliable, and trustworthy
would generally receive approval from the debutante as well as her family.
However, men who either portended to become or had become ineffectual
providers, that is, ineffectual fathers, threatened not only the/their wife
and their children, but also the extended family, and, to the extent that
such men were becoming more numerous, the entire commonweal. As the
irresponsibility of an effectual father becomes more and more self-evident,
the burdens of caring for the woman and her/his children are either ig-
nored by her/his kin or the kin must shift their resources to keep the
woman and her children viable. Any systematic ignoring of her by her/his
kin threatens the woman and her children’s very existence. Any shift in re-
sources weakens the corporate or extended family. The more ineffectual
fathers there are in the extended family, the more the extended family’s re-
sources are diluted.
 The Man (to) Child Affiliative Bond 313

Similarly, the more families that are faced with sustaining women-
child(ren) dyads that have an ineffectual husband/father, the weaker is
the overall society. In a very competitive world, weakened societies do
not enjoy prolonged longevity.
The preceding argument is not merely hypothetical. Given the social ex-
periment begun in the 1960s and the widespread availability of the “pill”
and other effective contraceptive techniques, it can be tested, that is, falsi-
fied. The “social experiment” is the systematic separation of the child from
his or her social father. The main locus of the separations is Western Eu-
rope and its extensions. The two mechanisms are out-of-wedlock births
(father preclusion) and divorce (father abrasion). We focus on out-of-
wedlock births in this exercise. The equation of an absent father with an
ineffectual father seems fairly intuitive. The basic question being addres-
sed is: “Does the systematic separation of children from their social and
biological fathers have negative consequences for the commonweal?”

Potential Costs to the Commonweal of Absent/Ineffectual Fathers

This section offers the notion that the early or total preclusion of a social
father from the mother-child dyad is aligned with dysfunctional conse-
quences for the child, both in childhood and in the child’s later adulthood.
These dysfunctional consequences can be exemplified (I) in rates of vio-
lent crime (for sons), (II) in sexually transmitted diseases (for daughters),
(III) in vulnerability to child abuse, plus (IV) in the differential access to
resources. Given that any children conceived by a “rape” would be sys-
tematically deprived of an ongoing social and biological father, the dys-
functions described below would be concentrated in this category of
children.

1 Sons and Violent Behavior

There is a tendency for children from fatherless homes to be overrepre-
sented in categories of unwanted behavior, and this tendency has been
known for decades (Adams, Milner, and Schrepf 1984; Anderson 1968;
Bereczkei and Csanaky 1996; Blau and Blau 1982; Chilton and Markle
1972; Coney and Mackey 1998; Monahan 1972; Mosher 1969; Robins
and Hill 1966; Stevenson and Black 1988). See Mischel (1961a,b) and
314 Wade C. Mackey

Mackey (1985, 1996) for theoretical orientations on the suggested link-

age. See Wilson and Herrnstein (1985), Draper and Harpending (1982),
Blankenhorn (1995), and Popenoe (1996) for reviews of the literature.

Cross-cultural data Three surveys of violent crime are presented. The first
survey is restricted to Nordic nations. The next two are more universal and
span the globe.
For these cross-cultural comparisons, the unit of analysis was “nation.”
It may be noted that nations represent coarse units of analysis, thereby
elevating the opportunity for false-negatives to occur. However, if a sig-
nal were to be found in all the potential noise, then the signal may repre-
sent an alignment of some potency. And, as presented below, patterns were
found.

Nordic out-of-wedlock births and levels of assault Percentages of out-

of-wedlock births and rates of assault per 100,000 population 15 years or
older (14 years for Norway) were available from Denmark, Finland, Nor-
way, and Sweden for the interval 1959 to 1990 (Nordic Statistical Secre-
tariat 1960–1992). The correlation between percentage of out-of-wedlock
births and levels of assault were significant for all four nations (Denmark,
[rp = .970; p < .001; n = 23], Finland [rp = .851; p < .001; n = 20]; Norway
[rp = .973; p < .001; n = 23], and Sweden [rp = .945; p < .001; n = 22]; be-
cause not all nations had indices for all years, the “ns” vary). All four
countries were ethnically homogeneous and relatively wealthy. Accord-
ingly, neither ethnic antagonisms nor absolute levels of poverty would
seem a likely variable in affecting the results.
If an interval of 19 years is used to separate the levels of out-of-wedlock
births and rates of assault, the correlations are still significant (the corre-
lations [rp] range from .889 to .949; p < 13). Of course, after 19 years the
sons are no longer infants and are quite capable of energetic behaviors.

Global sample 1: Murder and illegitimacy across cultures Cross-cultural

analyses are hampered by the problems of meaningful and comparable
units of analysis. (See Ford 1961 and Levinson and Malone 1980 for a dis-
cussion of cultural units.) Analyses on rates of crime are often problematic
because of the lack of consonance among countries in the definitions and
reporting of various crimes. However, one crime—murder—does seem to
 The Man (to) Child Affiliative Bond 315

be universally accepted as a crime with reasonably concordant definitions

(Archer and Gartner 1984; Daly and Wilson 1988). One may muse on the
high validity of the level of death as a dependent variable. Accordingly,
rates of murder were correlated with illegitimacy rates in each nation
(Smith-Morris 1990; United Nations 1985–1992).
There were usable data from the U.N. sources for 44 countries in which
murder rates and illegitimacy rates were both reported to the satisfac-
tion of the United Nations. The relationship was positive and significant
(rp = .443; p < .01; 2-tailed; df = 42).1 Across cultures, as murder rates
went up, so did the proportion of single-parent births. Nearly 20 percent
(.4432 = .196 = 19.6 percent) of the differences in murder rates could be
attributed to differences in rates of illegitimacy.

Global sample 2 In a wider sample of 60 nations (40 of these had data

useful for this inquiry) (INTERPOL 1990), rates of serious assault and
out-of-wedlock births were found to be related. As the percentage of all
live births that were out-of-wedlock increased, so did the rates of serious
assault (rp = .436; p < .05; 2-tailed; n = 38).
These data refer to father separation due to out-of-wedlock births
(father-preclusion). Although “divorce” also tends to separate the father
from his child (father-abrasion), the data described above are not easily gen-
eralizable from father-preclusion to father-abrasion. “Divorce” and “out-of-
wedlock births” are diagnostically separable phenomena.

2 Daughters and Promiscuity

Out-of-wedlock births and multiple partners As presented earlier, it is—

at base—women (as a class), compared to men (as a class), who tend to
control sexual interactions. (See Symons 1979 for a discussion.) A woman
could be more discerning in her selection of sexual partners or less dis-
cerning. Accordingly, the inclusion and patterning of multiple sexual part-
nerships, in the context of fatherlessness, were examined.
In the United States, as elsewhere, sexual activity is a secreted activity.
Accordingly, compiling data via naturalistic observation would be diffi-
cult, highly illegal, and unwelcomed by all. Thus, a proxy for multiple sex-
ual partners becomes necessary. It has been noted by several authors (e.g.,
Aral, Mosher, and Cates 1991; Brunham and Plummer 1990; Hunter et al.
316 Wade C. Mackey

1994; Laumann et al. 1997; Moore and Cates 1990; Weström and Mårdh
1990) that having multiple sexual partners is the best marker for acquir-
ing a sexually transmitted disease: an STD. The Division for STD Preven-
tion of the Centers for Disease Control compiles data by state (plus D.C.),
which enabled rates of gonorrhea and congenital syphilis to be used as
markers for multiple sexual partners.
Note that, if an individual contracts an STD, the infection does not ne-
cessitate that the individual has had multiple sexual partners. However, if
someone is infected with an STD, then it is highly likely that the individ-
ual either has had multiple partners or has chosen a mating partner who
has had multiple partners.

STDs and threat to the commonweal STDs are not benign occurrences.
Current problems related to human fertility that stem from contemporary
STDs involve a myriad of pathogenic agents. These organisms include bac-
teria, viruses, ectoparasites, fungi, and protozoa. The pathologies caused
by these organisms include, but are not limited to, infertility, chronic pel-
vic pain, copulatory pain, and ectopic pregnancy due to gonorrhea and
chlamydia; anal, cervical, penile and vulvar carcinoma due to human pa-
pilloma virus; acquired immunodeficiency due to HIV; hepatitis and he-
patic cancer due to hepatitis B virus; and life-threatening fetal, neonatal,
and infant infections (i.e., syphilis, HIV herpes simplex virus, hepatitis
B virus) (Aiken 1992; Allen et al. 1992; Brunham, Holmes, and Embree
1990; Holmes et al. 1990; McDermott, Steketee, and Wirima 1996; Mc-
Dermott et al. 1993; Schulz, Cates, and O’Mara 1987; Villa 1997; zur
Hausen 1996).
These contemporary STDs present a wide range of consequences that
can lower a woman’s fertility and neonatal viability. Important to this
chapter is that STDs would lower a community’s ability to replace itself
in proportion to the prevalence of the STDs within that community as
in, for example, the Sub-Saharan Africa’s epidemic of acquired immuno-
deficiency syndrome AIDS. For example, if syphilis is contracted by a
woman, the chances for miscarriage, infant death, still-births, and pre-
maturity are all increased (Newell et al. 1993; Schulz et al. 1990; Waugh
1990). Furthermore, if the mother is infected, then the chances are also
substantial that the fetus will contract syphilis from the mother, which
would decrease the child’s life chances: life chances that would include a
 The Man (to) Child Affiliative Bond 317

reproductive history. In addition, the proportions are not small. Untreated

syphilis during pregnancy is passed to virtually 100 percent of the infants:
50 percent resulting in prematurity or perinatal death (Schulz et al. 1990).
In a 1917 (pre-antibiotic) study of 1000 syphilitic pregnancies, 8 percent
ended in still-births, 23 percent infant deaths, and 21 percent of the infants
had contracted syphilis. The corresponding numbers for the controls (n =
826) were 2 percent, 11 percent, and 0 percent respectively (Schulz et al.
1990). Examples of sequelae following congenital syphilis to the neonate
include deafness, dental defects, bony lesions, eye lesions, and nervous sys-
tem lesions including mental retardation, obstructive hydrocephalus, and
seizure disorders. None of these conditions would seem to enhance an in-
dividual’s reproductive history or an individual’s desirability as a mate.
AIDS, of course, is a fatal disease and is also associated with higher
infant and children mortality (Taha et al. 1995). See Haldane (1949),
Barkow (1989), Graves and Duvall (1995), Hamilton and Zuk (1982),
and Ridley (1993) for complementary discussions and examples from non-
humans. Cf. Sheldon (1993).
The current leading cause of infertility is pelvic inflammatory disease
(PID) as caused by STDs (e.g., chlamydia, gonorrhea) (Aral, Mosher, and
Cates 1991; Weström and Mårdh 1990; Harrison and Alexander 1990;
Peterson, Galaid, and Cates 1990; Gutman and Wilfert 1990; Wolner-
Haussen, Kiviat and Holmes 1990; Moore and Cates 1990; Weström
1987, 1991; Moore and Spadoni 1984). Basically, these STDs can infect
(salpingitis) and scar the fallopian tubes and thereby impair uterine con-
ception. Consequently, such afflicted women can have impaired fertility or
have a tubal (ectopic) pregnancy. Note that ectopic pregnancies represent
the leading cause of maternal deaths during the first trimester in the United
States (Herbertson and Storey 1991; JAMA 1995; Joesoef et al. 1991).
Prior to effective and sterile surgical procedures, for example, in 1880, the
prognosis for an ectopic pregnancy was death (72 percent to 90 percent
death, 28 percent to 10 percent survival). The current prognosis is greater
than 99 percent survival and less than 1 percent death (Lurie 1992). A re-
cent study in Sweden (Weström et al. 1992) indicated that occluded fal-
lopian tubes significantly decreased the chances for a successful attempt
at becoming pregnant and, if pregnancy did occur, also (significantly)
increased the chances of an ectopic pregnancy by at least a factor of five.
318 Wade C. Mackey

Moore and Cates (1990) estimate that after a single episode of PID, infer-
tility resulted in 6 percent of the mild cases, 13 percent of the moderate
cases and 30 percent of the severe cases. (Note that these figures arose even
when effective treatment was available.)
Each successive bout of PID acts to double the chances of infertility
(Weström and Mårdh 1990). An analogous sequence occurs with succes-
sive pregnancies in a woman who has contracted syphilis.
It should be reiterated that these statistics arise in a time and a society
with readily available medical information, medical technology, and inex-
pensive antibiotics. In the pre-antibiotic era, after being infected with gon-
orrhea, up to 70 percent of the women had tubal obstruction (Moore and
Cates 1990). Holtz (1930) estimated that 1.3 percent of the PIDs were
lethal. Mosher and Aral (1985) calculated that PID accounted for a third
to a half of recent increases in infertility.
Similar sequelae result from infections of herpes simplex virus. For ex-
ample, a herpes simplex virus infection in an infant can spread to multiple
organs including the central nervous system, the lung, the liver, adrenals,
the eyes, the mouth, and the skin. When the virus affects multiple organs,
there is a 60 percent mortality rate at one year. Of the survivors, 44 per-
cent are left with permanent neurologic impairment (Stagno and Whitley
1990). Again, these statistics are from a time and a place that uses modern
medical techniques.
Although these pathologies, inter alia, are not necessarily lethal to the
nubile woman, the symptoms of these pathologies would tend to decrease
the afflicted individual’s level of competitiveness in attracting desirable
mates. To the extent that these infections affect skin texture, body odors,
genital secretions, general activity level, and romantic tendencies (see Buss
1989, 1994; Buss and Schmitt 1993; and Cashdan 1993 for examples), the
chances for a successful impregnation are similarly decreased. And, again,
if someone does not have children, then that someone will not have grand-
children. (See Mackey and Immerman in press for examples of how quickly
an epidemic of STDs can virtually eradicate a community.)

Method The rates of gonorrhea and congenital syphilis were analyzed,

across the 50 states plus D.C., for the three consecutive years of 1991,
1992, and 1993 (Division of STD Prevention 1996, 1999). The percentage
of all births that were out-of-wedlock was compiled across (available)
 The Man (to) Child Affiliative Bond 319

Table 13.1
Correlations (i) between the percentage of births that are out-of-wedlock and rates
of STDs (from the same time interval) and (ii) between percentage of births that
are out-of-wedlock (from a prior time interval) and rates of STDs (from a subse-
quent time interval).

Year of out-
of-wedlock Year of
births STD rates STD N rp

1991 1991 Gonorrhea 51 .835*

1992 1992 Gonorrhea 51 .786*
1993 1993 Gonorrhea 51 .791*
Mean 51 .804*
1991 1991 Congenital syphilis 51 .751*
1992 1992 Congenital syphilis 51 .722*
1993 1993 Congenital syphilis 51 .784*
Mean 51 .752*
1971 1991 Gonorrhea 39 .940*
1972 1992 Gonorrhea 39 .932*
1973 1993 Gonorrhea 39 .927*
Mean 39 .933*
1971 1991 Congenital syphilis 39 .858*
1972 1992 Congenital syphilis 39 .822*
1973 1993 Congenital syphilis 39 .858*
Mean 39 .846*

* p < .001

states plus D.C. for two intervals of three years each (U.S. Bureau of the
Census 1970–1996). The first interval of three years was the same interval
as the data on STDs: 1991 to 1993. The second interval of three years was
from a generation before the analyzed interval of the data on STDs.
Twenty years is used to index a generation. (Note that approximately
one-third of the cases of gonorrhea in females occurred in females 20 years
of age or less, and approximately 90 percent of the cases of primary and
secondary syphilis occur in women younger than 40 years of age; Divi-
sion of STD Prevention 1990, 1996.) Hence, the second interval was from
1971 to 1973.

Results: Out-of-wedlock births and (i) gonorrhea and (ii) congenital syph-
ilis (1991–1993) For all three years, 1991 to 1993, the percentage of all
births that were out-of-wedlock births were significantly and positively
320 Wade C. Mackey

related to rates of gonorrhea, as well as to rates of congenital syphilis. See

table 13.1. As would be expected, the mean correlation for the three-year
interval was also significant and positive for gonorrhea (rp = .804, p < .001,
df = 49) and for congenital syphilis (rp = .752, p < .001, df = 49).

Results: Out-of-wedlock births and (i) gonorrhea and (ii) congenital syph-
ilis (1971–1973) to (1991–1993) For all three years, the percentage of all
births that were out-of-wedlock births from the prior interval (1971–
1973) was significantly and positively correlated (i) to the rates of gonor-
rhea as well as (ii) to the rates of congenital syphilis in the subsequent in-
terval (1991–1993). The mean correlation was also significant and positive
for gonorrhea (rp = .933; p < .001; df = 37) and for congenital syphilis
(rp = .846; p < .001; df = 37). In fact, the mean correlation between the
prior interval (1971–1973) and the subsequent interval (1991–1993) of
(rp) .933 was higher (t = 5.803; p < .001; df = 36) than the mean correlation
between the out-of-wedlock births and gonorrhea from the same interval
(1991–1993): (rp) = .804. In a similar manner, the correlation (rp = .846) be-
tween out-of-wedlock births and congenital syphilis from the prior interval
(1971–1973) was higher (t = 3.701; p < .001; df = 36) than the relation-
ship between out-of-wedlock births and congenital syphilis from the same
time interval (1991–1993): rp = .752. See table 13.1. Again, “divorce” and
“out-of-wedlock births” should not be conflated. The interpretations here
are restricted to “out-of-wedlock births.”

3 Choice of Partner and Child Abuse

Although rarely phrased in such a way, a resident father is a reliable health
insurance policy for his children. As soon as any other domestic arrange-
ment occurs, that is, as soon as any other man other than the biological
and social father becomes proximate to children who are not his own, the
children are at increased risk to physical abuse (Daly and Wilson 1982,
1985, 1987; Gil 1970; Hegar, Zuravin, and Orme 1994; Lenington 1981;
Levine, Freeman, and Compaan 1994; Mann 1996; Widom 1992; see
Kasim, Shafie, and Cheah 1994 for an example outside of the U.S.; cf.
Hausfater and Hrdy 1984). If the child is a girl, then the increase in phys-
ical abuse risk is complemented with an increased risk to sexual abuse
(Gordon and Creighton 1988; Mynatt and Allgeier 1990; Russell 1986;
 The Man (to) Child Affiliative Bond 321

Tyler 1986). The sequelae of sexual abuse on prepubescent girls will be ex-
amined separately in the next section.
Hence, if a mother (i) chooses not to co-reside with the biological and
social father of her children, and (ii) chooses a lifestyle other than unre-
lenting chastity, then her choices elevate the chances that her children will
be physically or sexually abused. In the short-term, dead, maimed, and
traumatized children are probably not the best route to family cohesion
and effectiveness and certainly not to Darwinian success. The long-term
sequelae of physical abuse on either boys or girls is an unknown entity
(aside from death, which has a predictable future).
On the other hand, the long-term sequelae of sexual abuse on girls is
known and is extremely expensive to the violated-girl-grown-to-adult-
hood and to whatever social group in which she would find herself. See
Browne and Finkelhor (1986), Finkelhor (1979), Finkelhor and Dziuba-
Leatherman (1994), and Garnefski and Arends (1998) for reviews of the
literature.

Sequelae to sexual abuse of the girl That the (adult) woman suffers defi-
cits as a consequence of being raped has been well documented. Such
deficits include post-traumatic stress syndrome, or rape trauma syndrome
(Burgess and Holmstrom 1979; Clum, Calhoun, and Kimerling 2000;
Feeny, Zoellner, and Foa 2000; Nishith, Mechanic, and Resick 2000).
Here, the sequelae of unwanted sexual behavior coerced on the prepubes-
cent girl is the focus. Note that the psychopathologies aligned with inces-
tuous relationships are closely paralleled with those psychopathologies
aligned with instances of childhood sexual abuse that were not incestuous.
Hence, the frame of reference for this section is “sexual abuse”: both in-
cestuous and nonincestuous. It should be noted that methodological prob-
lems are clearly evident in generating a database. Problems in definitions,
validity, control groups, and sampling are nontrivial. See Green (1993)
for a review of the difficulties in teasing out sexual abuse from other vari-
ables (e.g., socioeconomic status) as a contributing variable to a psycho-
pathology, rather than as merely a correlative. Nevertheless, a number of
analyses from diverse perspectives do tend to converge and to point in
the direction that sexual abuse, itself, has a direct effect on elevating the
chances of the woman developing a psychopathology, even years after the
322 Wade C. Mackey

episodes had terminated. From the model presented in this chapter, it is the
violation of the female’s “choice” that is hypothesized to be the prepotent
dynamic.
Candidates of psychopathologies that are generated or intensified by
sexual abuse of prepubescents include (1) depression (see Sloman and
Price 1987 and de Catanzaro 1987 for a theoretical discussion), (2) anxi-
eties or negative self-image, (3) revictimization, (4) sexual dysfunctions/poor
relationships with men, and (5) poor parenting. Note that 40 percent of
the victims in Courtois’s (1979) sample had never married.
The factors that seem to intensify the psychopathology include (a) the
level of invasiveness (more invasive, more trauma); (b) level of force (more
force, more trauma); (c) sex of perpetrator (men are aligned with more
trauma than are women). The father-daughter or stepfather-daughter in-
cestuous relationship involving penetration seems to be aligned with the
most debilitating combination (Kluft 1990a; Russell 1986; Herman 1981;
Courtois 1979, 1988; Groth 1978).
Although the qualities that determine attractiveness in the selection of
spouses do vary across cultures, sequelae from childhood sexual abuse
would seem to diminish attractiveness in the woman regardless of cul-
tural expectations. For example, women who were victimized as children
were found to have higher rates of “fear” or “anxiety-related difficulties”
during sexual contact (Meiselman 1978) and higher levels of “pain” dur-
ing sexual intercourse with lower levels of “orgasms” experienced (Maltz
and Holman 1987). (Psycho)somatic difficulties in adult women that are
linked with childhood sexual violations include headaches, stomach pain,
asthma, bladder infections, and chronic pelvic pain (Cunningham,
Pearce, and Pearce 1988; Morrison 1989; Springs and Friedrich 1992).
Women who had been sexually abused as children have increased ten-
dencies for substance abuse (Briere and Runtz 1988), as well as increased
levels of promiscuous behavior, unintended pregnancies, and sexually
transmitted diseases (Wyatt et al. 1993). These women are also more likely
to be fearful of men (Briere and Runtz 1990). Accordingly, these traits
would not seem to auger well for a successful marital history, and, indeed,
these women are more likely to remain single, and—if married—more
likely to divorce or to separate (Briere and Runtz 1990). There is a certain
intuition that a depressed, anxious woman with poor personal habits and
 The Man (to) Child Affiliative Bond 323

poor interpersonal and romantic skills would seem to have a lowered pros-
pect for becoming a bride and for remaining a wife under virtually any
circumstance.
Note that these psychosocial conditions or reactions are somewhat out
of proportion to the physical event. If sexual intercourse, in and of itself,
were capable to creating psychological dysfunction, then prostitution and
honeymoons would be clearly the hotbeds of psychopathologies, and such
appears not to be the case. However, essentially the same act of sexual
intercourse that occurs in both “rape” and “(step)father-daughter incest”
can leave severe emotional scars far in excess of what the physical act itself
would warrant. The violation of a very old mating-strategy template—the
woman’s choice—on which hominid evolution depended for viability may
help explain the genesis of the trauma. And, again, the presence of a bio-
logical and social father minimizes the chances of the girl being abused.
The more the community maximizes the presence of the biological
and social father with the developing daughter, the greater the reproduc-
tive health of the community as the daughters mature to adulthood. Con-
versely, as the presence of biological and social fathers is minimized within
a community, the more risk that occurs to the reproductive health of the
community.

4 Choice of Mating Partner and Access to Resources

If a woman mates with a man, and both the man and the woman are vir-
tually oblivious to the level of resources that the man might bring to the
union, then such randomness ought to result in a number of mother-child
dyads with low levels of available resources. The feminization of poverty
(within the United States) is much more than a cliché. It is demographic
fact. Families headed by an unwed mother are easily the families that have
the least earned income available to them. Accordingly, as was mentioned
earlier, either other family members dilute their own resources to aid and
abet the otherwise isolated woman-child dyad, or they choose to ignore
them and allow the deficits attributed to reduced resources to occur. The
greater the prevalence of father absence within a community, the more that
the community is weakened and threatened with being supplanted or dis-
placed. This dynamic, found in contemporary societies, is expected to have
a very long history.
324 Wade C. Mackey

Summary

Obviously the above statistics do not constitute a Newtonian proof. None-

theless, the statistics are consonant with the notion that the early preclu-
sion of a social and biological father from the mother-child dyad is aligned
with dysfunctional events for the child, both in childhood and in the child’s
later adulthood. Current data in contemporary societies point out deficits
that occur when the social father is not consistent and ongoing in the lives
of (especially) very young children. The separation of the child from his or
her father is aligned with (i) increased tendencies of violent crime, specif-
ically murder, on the part of sons grown to adulthood; (ii) reduced levels
of reproductive health (as indexed by higher levels of STDs) on the part of
daughters grown to adulthood; (iii) an increased exposure to child abuse,
including psychopathologies on the part of sexually abused girls grown to
adulthood; and (iv) increased levels of poverty.
While each person who illustrates such dysfunctions will represent an
individual tragedy, the commonweal or community is also weakened to
the extent that the tragedies are pervasive and systematic. In any between-
group competition, those communities with less internal mayhem, better
reproductive health, physically and mentally healthier children (who
would grow into adulthood), better coping skills, and better access to re-
sources have an inherent advantage over those communities with excessive
internal violence, problematic reproductive health, abused children, less-
ened coping skills, and lower access to resources.
An ongoing social and biological father increases not just his own chil-
dren’s well-being, but also the well-being of his group, his community,
which, in turn, promises an enhanced opportunity for the community’s
longevity across generations. The absence of such fathers augurs just the
reverse.

Note

1. The two rates—for illegitimacy (6.7) and for murder (38.7)—were also avail-
able for the Philippines. However, the Philippines’ murder rate of 38.7 was over 8.5
standard deviations (s.d. = 4.09) over the sample mean of 3.62. Accordingly, the
Philippines was enough of an outlier to be excluded from the sample. If rankings
were used to generate the correlation coefficient (rs) and if the Philippines is in-
cluded in the sample, then the relationship between illegitimacy and murder rates
 The Man (to) Child Affiliative Bond 325

is significant (rs = .889; p < .01; 2-tailed; n = 45). If the Philippines is not included
in the sample, the correlation, based on ranks, is still significant (rs = .896; p < .01;
2-tailed; n = 44).

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14
Rape-Free versus Rape-Prone: How Culture
Makes a Difference
Peggy Reeves Sanday

Imagine a society in which rape is rare and women are respected as active
participants in the economic system and play a role with men in shaping
the processes of the public domain. Unlike U.S. society there is no con-
sumer culture commodifying sexual allure nor is there a masculine peer
culture shaping gender and sexual norms. In this society, older men and
women regulate and enforce these norms. The value placed on mutual re-
spect in personal relations extends to sexual relations. Sexually aggressive
or abusive men are shunned in what can amount to social death. This is
not a small, remote society but the fourth largest ethnic group in one of
the most populous nations in the world. I refer to the Minangkabau of
West Sumatra, Indonesia where I conducted anthropological field work.
Before embarking on field work in West Sumatra, I carried out a cross-
cultural study of the sociocultural context of rape in 95 band and tribal so-
cieties. The goal of this study was to account for variation in the reported
incidence of rape in these societies in light of related social factors. I found
that there was a significant correlation between rape and the overall posi-
tion of women. For example, in the more rape-free societies gender relations
were marked by respect for women as citizens, significant female power
and authority, and the near absence of interpersonal aggression in social
relations. In the more rape-prone societies, social relations were marked by
interpersonal violence in conjunction with an ideology of male dominance
enforced through the control and subordination of women. Faced with
such data the only reasonable conclusion by empirically minded social sci-
entists must be that culture plays a role in the expression of male sexual
aggression. The nature of that role is the subject of this chapter.
In the following, after contrasting my approach as a cultural anthropol-
ogist with that of Thornhill and Palmer, I summarize the results of my
338 Peggy Reeves Sanday

early cross-cultural study, which was first published in 1981. I then move
to a discussion of follow-up research in the United States and West Suma-
tra in the 1980s and ’90s on the sociocultural contexts promoting or in-
hibiting violence against women. I suggest that the near-absence of rape in
West Sumatra in contrast to the more rape-prone United States can be ex-
plained by the hegemony of human social values promoted by the adult
peer culture in West Sumatra in which males and females play equivalent
roles. Minangkabau values and worldview stand in sharp contrast to the
asymmetrical sexual values of the male peer culture in the United States. I
suggest that the difference is due to the central role that an ideology of
male sexual dominance plays in U.S. sexual culture as opposed to the cen-
tral role played by values attached to the mother-child bond, social equity,
and politesse in the Minangkabau system of values. These differences can
be attributed to cultural rather than natural selection.

Cultural versus Natural Selection

My approach of examining the sociocultural context in which violence

against women is accepted or condemned together with my argument that
cues for sexual behavior circulate as part of a pattern of cultural selection
departs significantly from Thornhill and Palmer’s “natural history” ap-
proach to the “biological bases of sexual coercion.” Thornhill and Palmer
present two basic arguments for why men rape, both of which refer to the
Darwinian doctrine of natural selection. The first argument is that rape is
an evolved adaptation “that was directly favored by selection because it
increased male reproductive success by way of increasing mate number.”
The second argument is that rape “may be only a by-product of other psy-
chological adaptations, especially those that function to produce the sex-
ual desires of males for multiple partners without commitment” (2000,
pp. 59–60).
In both of these arguments, rape is assumed to be a characteristic in hu-
man males that is directly (the first argument) or indirectly (the second) re-
lated to genetic traits that evolve by natural selection. Natural selection in
the Darwinian sense is the doctrine that in the struggle for existence evo-
lutionary progress is achieved by the inheritance of advantageous charac-
teristics that prosper at the expense of less advantageous ones. According
to Darwin, natural selection operates somewhat like an all-seeing force in
 Rape-Free versus Rape-Prone 339

nature that scrutinizes, “daily and hourly,” “throughout the world, every
variation, even the slightest; rejecting that which is bad, preserving and
adding up all that is good; silently and insensibly working. . . .” (Quoted
by Thornhill and Palmer 2000, p. 5.) Thornhill and Palmer quote this pas-
sage from Darwin in order to comment on what Darwin might have meant
by the statement that natural selection scrutinizes variation to reject the
“bad” and preserve the “good.” Citing the biologist George Williams,
Thornhill and Palmer claim that the “good” refers to traits “that promote
an individual’s [viz. the male’s] reproductive interests” irrespective of what
is “morally right or wrong” (ibid., pp. 5–6).
Reducing the causes of rape behavior to the individual male psyche or
to genes bypasses the facts of social and cultural life. Human beings do
not live in a world devoid of other human beings. Nor do they exist in a
cultural and social vacuum. Cultural anthropologists argue that without
culture patterns (i.e., “organized systems of significant symbols”) human
behavior would be shapeless and without direction, “a mere chaos of
pointless acts and exploding emotions” (Geertz 1973, p. 46). The rele-
vance of culture patterns applies as much to human needs with a strong
physiological component, such as sexual desire, hunger, thirst, and the ex-
perience of pain, as it does to the more metaphysical aspects of the hu-
man spirit.
Just as the food quest is managed by humans within a sociocultural con-
text, so is sexual behavior. The gratification of sexual desire is shaped by
cultural definitions of the erotic and social norms expressed between part-
ners who bond according to their understanding of the rights and duties
attendant to what they give and receive sexually. This means that sexual
behavior is channeled by social norms defining masculinity and feminin-
ity, ideas about appropriate sexual relations, cues for sexual arousal, and
a variety of social messages about the consequences of sexual expression
including punishments for breaking sexual taboos. Even the gang rapes de-
scribed below are filtered by a sociocultural apparatus.

Rape Cross-Culturally

My interest in the symbolic and social context of human sexual behavior

began in the 1970s with a study of the factors related to the sociocultural
context of rape cross-culturally. My primary motivation for conducting
340 Peggy Reeves Sanday

this study was not in establishing the presence or absence of rape, as

Thornhill and Palmer (2000, p. 141) imply in their criticism of my work,
but in examining the sociocultural context of variation in the incidence of
rape. In the opening paragraphs of the first article I published on this sub-
ject, my goals and rationale were clearly stated.
The research described in the present paper departs from the familiar assumption
that male nature is programmed for rape, and begins with another familiar, albeit
less popular, assumption that human sexual behavior, though based in a biologi-
cal need, “is rather a sociological and cultural force than a mere bodily relation
of two individuals” (Malinowski, 1929, p. xxiii). With this assumption in mind,
what follows is an examination of the socio-cultural context of sexual assault and
an attempt to interpret its meaning. . . . Two general hypotheses guided the re-
search: first, the incidence of rape varies cross-culturally; second, a high incidence
of rape is embedded in a distinguishably different cultural configuration than a low
incidence of rape. (Sanday 1981, p. 6)1

In this study, I used the standard cross-cultural sample of band and

tribal societies prepared by Murdock and White (1969).2 The same sample
was used by Broude and Greene (1976) for a study of rape cross-culturally.
Although we disagree on coding, our findings are similar in demonstrating
that the incidence of rape is not constant cross-culturally, but varies from
rare to commonplace when a number of societies are considered. Broude
and Greene (1976) found that rape was reported as absent or rare in 59
percent of the 34 societies they included in their sample. I found that rape
was reported as absent or rare in 47 percent of the 95 societies I included
in my sample (see Sanday 1981, pp. 7–9 for a comparison of the two
samples). In addition to the rape-free and rape-prone categories, I devel-
oped a third category for cases where rape is reported as present but fre-
quency is not mentioned. These categories, along with the number of
societies classified in each, are presented in table 14.1.3
The pattern of correlations between the rape variable illustrated in table
14.1 and the variables listed in table 14.2 reveal that rape is not randomly
distributed cross-culturally but is associated with interpersonal violence,
male social dominance, and the subordination of women. The importance
of male violence in rape-prone societies is seen in the fact that raiding other
groups for wives is significantly associated with the incidence of rape, as is
the intensity of interpersonal violence and the presence of an ideology that
encourages men to be tough and aggressive (see table 14.2). When warfare
is reported as frequent or endemic (as opposed to absent or occasional),
 Rape-Free versus Rape-Prone 341

Table 14.1
Cross-Cultural Incidence of Rape. From Sanday (1981:9)

N %

1. Rape Free. Rape is reported as rare or absent. 45 47%

2. Rape is reported as present, no report of frequency, 33 35%
or suggestion that rape is not atypical.
3. Rape Prone. Rape is an accepted practice used to 17 18%
punish women, as part of a ceremony, or is clearly
an act of moderate to high frequency carried out
against own women or women of other societies.
Total 95 100%

Table 14.2
Most Significant Correlates of Rape reported in Sanday (1981:23.)*

1. Raiding other groups for wives < r = .29; p = .004 >

2. Degree of Interpersonal violence < r = .47; p = .000 >
3. Ideology of male toughness < r = .42; p = .000 >
4. No female participation in political decision making < r = .33; p = .001 >
5. No respect for women as citizens < r = .28; p = .005 >

* This list represents the most significant results. For a list of additional variables
which were correlated with rape at lower probability levels see discussion in text.

rape is also more likely to be present (see Sanday 1981, p. 23 for the list
of variables that were associated at lower probability rates with the rape
variable).4
The other significant relationships reported in table 14.2 prompted me
to suggest that in rape-prone environments, violence against women is an
expression of a social ideology of male dominance (Sanday 1981, pp. 22–
24). Female power and authority are lower in rape-prone societies. Women
do not participate in public decision making in these societies, and males
express contempt for women as decision makers. In these cases, rape is the
playing out of a sociocultural script in which the expression of person-
hood for males is directed by, among other things, interpersonal violence
and an ideology of male toughness. If we see the sexual act as the ultimate
emotional expression of the self, then it comes as no surprise that male
sexuality is phrased in physically aggressive terms when other expressions
342 Peggy Reeves Sanday

of the self are phrased in these terms.5 Violence against women is the
means men use to express the power they are taught belongs to them ei-
ther by natural or by social right. For example, Murphy and Murphy
(1974) describe how Mundurucu men of the tropical forest of South Am-
erica are socialized for male dominance. According to them, in this society
“men . . . use the penis to dominate their women” (1974, p. 197). Some
may wish to infer from the above analysis that rape is a by-product of a
culture of violence and an ideology of male social dominance, but I be-
lieve that the focus is better placed on examining the cultural and social
mechanisms by which violence against women becomes part of a socio-
cultural script for masculine identity. I can’t address this issue fully in this
chapter, but some observations are in order (see Sanday 1996 for an
overview of cultural selection for rape in the American sexual culture).

Cultural Selection at Work: Denigrating the “Feminist Social Science”

Explanation for Rape

Illustrative of a troubling bias in the work of Thornhill and Palmer is their

tendency to denigrate all research that finds a functional relationship be-
tween male social dominance and rape. Thornhill and Palmer label such
research “the feminist social-science explanation of rape” (2000, p. 141).
Their argument against the functional theory stems from their disagree-
ment with assertions by “feminist social scientists” who claim that “sex-
ual coercion is motivated by power, not lust” (Thornhill and Palmer 2000,
p. 124). Since the linchpin of Thornhill and Palmer’s evolutionary argu-
ment for rape, in both of its versions, is in the claim that rape behavior pro-
motes an individual’s reproductive interests—which means that the
behavior must involve intercourse and insemination—it is not surprising
that they disagree so vehemently with the suggestion that rape is about
power and not lust.
I suggest that by seeing rape mainly as a product of human evolution,
the evolutionary argument provides scientific support for the well-known
popular belief in U.S. society that “boys will be boys” and “girls ask for
it.” Although Thornhill and Palmer neither condone rape nor see it as good
socially or psychologically, their arguments are nonetheless part of the
same cultural selection process that legitimizes a discourse that looks the
 Rape-Free versus Rape-Prone 343

other way when young males rape on the grounds that they are, after all,
only human.
The Minangkabau have quite a different approach. They argue that
whatever the natural basis of rape might be, culture exists to override these
tendencies. This point will become more apparent in light of the Mi-
nangkabau assertion, discussed below, that social norms and cultural val-
ues are responsible for the near absence of rape in their society. While our
norms and values treat rape as natural, the Minangkabau construct a so-
cial system that demonstrates zero tolerance for rape.
Thornhill and Palmer say that “[i]t is difficult to overestimate the power
the ‘not sex’ theory of rape continues to have” (2000, p. 125). They quote
a series of scholars, including me, who, they say, argue that “rape is caused
by supposedly patriarchal cultures where males are taught to dominate,
and hence rape, women” (ibid.). They chose the following quote from my
book Fraternity Gang Rape (1990) as an example of the “not sex” theory
of rape.
Sanday (1990, p. 10) states that during rape “the sexual act is not concerned with
sexual gratification but with the deployment of the penis as a concrete symbol of
masculine social power.” (ibid.)

I never use the word “patriarchy” or “patriarchal culture,” nor does my

work rule out sexual gratification in the deployment of the penis as a sym-
bol of masculine power. With respect to the issue of sexual gratification,
my research suggests that this is a secondary motivation, present in some
but not all males. For example, with respect to the incident of fraternity
gang rape to which the above quote pertains, one of the young men in-
volved confessed that “he could not get it up” when he faced the uncon-
scious body of the young woman who was “trained” (gang raped) by a
number of brothers in his fraternity.
From accounts of the incident and its aftermath by brothers and female
party goers who were present that night, whatever sexual gratification any
of the young men might have experienced was secondary to the celebra-
tion of fraternity bonding and group pride in the conquest of this young
woman’s body. In their house minutes for that week, the brothers referred
to the incident as the “XYZ [a pseudonym for the fraternity] Express.”
They pinned these minutes on their bulletin board and boasted all over
campus about the incident, calling it “interviewing for the little sister’s
344 Peggy Reeves Sanday

program.” Their boasting stopped only when they realized that they were
not getting good press in the campus newspaper.
Another case of campus gang rape of which I also had personal knowl-
edge confirms the conclusion that male social dominance is intimately in-
volved in such incidents (see Sanday 1996 for a lengthy description of this
case). On the witness stand in a Queens courtroom, the complainant and
several eyewitnesses to this event painted a vivid picture of what happened
in an off-campus house rented by members of the lacrosse team. It started
when Angela (a pseudonym) passed out after being given vodka to drink
(which may have included a drug).
When she woke, it seemed as if there were five or more boys in the room. There was
a guy sitting on the chair in front of the sofa and another sitting on the bed
[nearby]. These two were just watching. . . . They hit their penises against her face.
Walter put his penis in her mouth. When she gagged on Walter’s penis, she heard
him say, “Do it, choke on it.” She heard someone say, “She is dead. She is not do-
ing anything for me. I have to get a hard-on.”
They had propped her up to a sitting position, but her head wouldn’t stay up.
Walter held her cheeks to force her mouth open so his friends could put their
penises in her mouth. She tried to get up several times. Once her nails scratched
Walter. He slapped her hands. She passed out again. When she came to, she
screamed. Walter ordered her to stop, telling her it was a residential neighborhood
and she might alarm the neighbors. When Walter put his hand on her neck, she felt
that she had to be careful not to upset him. She didn’t know what he might do to
her. Dazed, she fell back on the couch.
[Later when she woke again] there were people wearing masks. One of the
masked figures really scared her. The eyes behind the mask were bulging out and
she couldn’t understand how these could be human eyes. There was another figure
wearing a Lone Ranger mask, which covered half his face. (Sanday 1996: 14–15)

It was clear from the testimony at the trial and from my interviews with
Angela that the boys who sexually abused her ranged from those who
found sexual pleasure in the act of abuse to those who didn’t take advan-
tage of her when they discovered that she was half conscious. Angela re-
membered that one of the guys present left the room when another
commented “Her pupils are dilated. She doesn’t know what’s going on.” It
seems that some of the guys present thought Angela had consented to
group sex when they were invited to the house where the incident took
place. Some left when they realized she was unconscious; others stayed and
watched. Others orally sodomized her in what amounted to a masturba-
tion party in front of their buddies.
The homoerotic nature of this and the other cases of gang rape that have
been described to me suggests that, whatever else might be at stake, estab-
 Rape-Free versus Rape-Prone 345

lishing a heterosexual identity in a heterosexist society is a key factor. All

the evidence suggests that gang rape in the U.S. adolescent male peer cul-
ture is primarily about power, homoerotic attraction, and heterosexual
identity. While lust is involved, the lust is related only indirectly to repro-
ductive interests. Even if we can assume that having established one’s po-
sition in the male heterosexual culture makes a young male more desirable
as a potential mate, thus promoting his reproductive interests according to
Thornhill and Palmer’s scheme, cultural selection is still the mechanism by
which such males are defined as desirable. As I will show below, a male in
West Sumatra who participates in a gang rape would be banished from vil-
lage society, perhaps killed. In the Minangkabau marriage system, young
men who display the kind of “macho” personality that seems to be the
goal of U.S. fraternity bonding rituals would find themselves at the ab-
solute bottom of the wish list of prospective mates.
To pursue the cultural selection argument a little further, in Fraternity
Gang Rape, I describe what one of the brothers involved in the case had to
say about sexual identity, dominance, and control.
Tom (pseudonym) told me that “sexual identity problems in both men
and women lead them to casual sex.” According to Tom,
male social dominance and sexual identity are frequently based on sexual perfor-
mance. . . . The male ego is built on sexual conquests because through sex men
gain respect from other men. (Sanday 1990, p. 72)

Tom also admitted that women are the objects of force in sex. Sex is the
way for men to dominate women, he said. He added that
[a] gang bang is an assertion of dominance because the woman is objectified and
dominated socially in a gang bang. Historically women are more subject to sexual
oppression and this is why psychologically it is more important for women to have
a commitment in sexual activity. (1990, pp. 72–73)

The pawns in such sexual socialization rituals include vulnerable young

men as well as young women. One of the unknown stories of rape is the
role it plays as a reaction to male-on-younger-male abuse. A masculine
peer culture in which status depends on dominance means that young men
are divided into three basic categories: the dominators, the dominated,
and the followers. The magnitude of the stakes in the game of male dom-
inance played by adolescent males is suggested by the school shooting
incidents in which those who are bullied turn the tables in the ultimate ex-
pression of dominance by murdering their assailants. The story is different
for boys who are abused in hazing only in the sense that they are given the
346 Peggy Reeves Sanday

license to turn on vulnerable young women as a reward for enduring abuse

in the initiation rite that glues them to the male social body.
This conclusion is prompted by the fact that models for masculinity and
male sexual aggression in some fraternity rituals and those of athletic
teams (such as mounting a “train” or donning masks when engaging in
group sex, described above) are almost always accompanied by hazing
abuses. The pledge who is abused as he enters the fraternity or the new ath-
lete who is abused by his teammates looks forward to the rewards of be-
ing a valued member and anxiously follows the pack in whatever they do.
Numerous hazing rituals described to me and reported by others are de-
vised to coerce pledges into obedience and cement them to the brother-
hood (see Sanday 1990; and Nuwer 1990, 1999). Another way of inducing
male bonding in the fraternal or athletic setting is the use of pornography
to bond under a common view of female sexuality and male prowess in
“getting sex.” Such behaviors, although not universal in all-male circles,
circulate widely and constitute an American sexual ethos promoting coer-
cive, adversarial male sexuality—a scenario that can easily lead to rape.
Getting back to the power and not lust argument, it is clear that not all
young males respond similarly to the sight of an exposed, vulnerable
woman. What the so-called feminist social science tries to do, at least as I
practice it, is to understand the difference between those who find sexual
pleasure in acts of sexual male bonding and those who are disgusted and
leave or who stay and try to perform for their buddies. The only conclu-
sion one can come to is that it is culture that makes the difference here.
Men who want to be accepted by their buddies and thereby gain entrance
into the culture of male dominance behave in ways that they don’t neces-
sarily feel drawn to. In the absence of peer support for sexual abuse and in
the presence of more oversight by adults, who don’t condone abusive be-
havior by conveying the message that “boys will be boys,” I am sure that
many young men would not engage in it.

The United States as a Rape-Prone Society

Socialization for male sexual dominance and control is suggested by nu-

merous studies on U.S. college campuses. In a study of a large southeast-
ern university, Boeringer (1996, pp. 137–39) reports that one-quarter of
the males reported using drugs or alcohol to obtain sex, and 9 percent re-
ported using or threatening force to obtain sex. Boeringer also found that
 Rape-Free versus Rape-Prone 347

56 percent of the men he interviewed used verbally coercive tactics to ob-

tain sex, such as threatening to end the relationship, falsely professing
love, or lying to render their partners more sexually receptive. He suggests
that such tactics present an “adversarial view of sexuality in which one
should use deceit and guile to win favors from a woman” (p. 140).
Sexually aggressive men in U.S. studies, from convicted rapists to college
males answering questions on social surveys, share a remarkably similar
set of attitudes. Most believe that sexual aggression is normal, that sexual
relationships involve game playing, that men should dominate women,
that women are responsible for rape, and that relations between the sexes
are adversarial and manipulative on both sides (Koss and Leonard 1984,
pp. 221, 223). Reanalyzing Koss’s data to pinpoint attitudes held by the
self-admitted sexually aggressive men of her study (i.e., those who admit-
ted to forcing a woman to have sex in Koss’s 1985 questionnaire discussed
below), I found that these men often expressed adversarial-like beliefs
(Sanday 1996, pp. 196–197). For example, many stated that they believe
that a woman’s “no” means “yes” and that women say no to intercourse
because they don’t want to seem loose but really hope the man will force
her. Compared with men who do not admit to forcing a woman, more of
these men also think that being roughed up by a man is sexually stimulat-
ing to women and that women have an unconscious wish to be raped. Few
of the women in Koss’s sample (described next) hold such attitudes.
Such attitudes are consistent with the prevalence of rape in U.S. society.
The first major study was conducted by Mary Koss in conjunction with
Ms. magazine in 1985. This study surveyed 6,159 students on 32 college
campuses. Koss found that 1 in 4 of the women surveyed indicated that
they had experienced rape or attempted rape due to force, threat, or the
use of drugs or alcohol. Since this study, many others confirm the same
basic statistic. Studying populations in communities across the nation,
researchers report rape prevalence figures of 24 percent in Minnesota;
24 percent in San Francisco; 28 percent among college-educated women
in Los Angeles; 25 percent for African-American and 20 percent for white
women in Los Angeles County; 23 percent in Charleston, South Carolina;
and 14 percent in a national sample (see Sanday 1996, p. 254 for citations
to these studies).
The repetition of similar results in so many samples speaks to the issue
of validity. In survey research, “validity” refers to conformity of the sur-
vey questions with the event being measured. Usually, this is tested by
348 Peggy Reeves Sanday

comparing the replies from independent samples. Based on this criterion,

Koss’s data are valid when compared with similar data collected in inde-
pendent studies. Koss’s results are supported by another national study of
sex in America, conducted in 1992 and published in 1994. With a staff of
220 interviewers, this study utilized a national sample of 3,432 individu-
als. They found that “22 percent of women were forced to do something
sexually at some time.” The authors say that while the forced sexual be-
havior reported by women in this study may not have involved rape, “it is
of considerable interest to find that as many as one in five women do con-
sider themselves to have been forced against their will to do something sex-
ually” (Sanday 1996, pp. 254–255, citing the study published by Michael,
Gagnon, and Laumann 1994, p. 335).

“Boys Will Be Boys”/“She Asked for It”: Cultural Selection and the
Discourse of Sexology

The discourse of male sexual and social dominance described so far circu-
lates widely in the United States, appearing in the media, the legal profes-
sion, and receiving the stamp of scientific truth in disquisitions on the
nature of human sexuality such as found not just in Thornhill and Palmer’s
evolutionary explanation for rape but in the scientific study of sex called
sexology as well. The Darwinian doctrine of sexual selection was cen-
tral to the theories produced by the first sexologists, Krafft-Ebing and
Havelock Ellis in the late nineteenth century. In his magnum opus,
Psychopathia Sexualis, first published in German in 1886, Krafft-Ebing
argued that “gratification of the sexual instinct [is] the primary motive in
man as well as in beast” (quoted by Sanday 1996, p. 125). Following
Krafft-Ebing, Havelock Ellis conceived of human sexual behavior as a
game of combat in the third volume of his Studies in the Psychology of Sex,
published in Philadelphia between 1897 and 1910. Ellis claimed that the
female conceals her sexual passion by playing the role of hunted animal
and adopting a demeanor of modesty in order that the male may be more
ardent and forceful. Ellis claims that as the hunt becomes more sexually
charged, “an element of real violence, of undisguised cruelty” is intro-
duced. Accepting the Darwinian theory of natural selection with its em-
phasis on competition and brute strength, Ellis claimed that a woman who
resisted “the assaults of the male” aided natural selection “by putting to
 Rape-Free versus Rape-Prone 349

the test man’s most important quality, force” (quoted by Sanday 1996,
pp. 127–128).
Ellis lived at a time when women were beginning to assert a female sex-
ual discourse in a manner that broke with the cult of “true womanhood,”
so popular among middle-class women earlier in the nineteenth century,
which required women to be sexually demur and chaste. In their search for
greater sexual freedom, women looked to the theories of Ellis, and, later,
those of Freud for scientific confirmation of female sexual desire. Unfor-
tunately for women, these early scientists of sex put women in a sexual
double bind by granting women sexual desire at the same time they
claimed that this desire should be passive and wholly responsive to male
desire. Freud gave the male sexual dominance hypothesis a new twist by
defining the sex instinct as a basic biological drive, which in its active form
was masculine and in its passive form was feminine. He claimed that for a
woman to reach femininity, she had to transform active into passive desire,
by which he meant transforming sensations from the clitoris to the vagina.
Another side of this argument was that the new woman would be one
who said no when she meant yes, not because of the desire to display Vic-
torian female purity but in obedience to her alleged (by Freud and Ellis)
desire to be dominated. Domination not only defined the masculine in
men, being dominated defined the feminine in women. Both Ellis and
Freud saw these attributes as basic to the biology of male and female.
Freud went further to suggest, however, that under a demur demeanor the
raging fires of desire still lurked in the female breast, giving her an overac-
tive sexual imagination that sometimes led to false accusations of rape.
Thus, whereas in the nineteenth century the woman who cried rape was
“fallen,” in the early twentieth she was a hysteric.
Such attitudes made it virtually impossible for a woman to make an
accusation of rape stick in the courtroom, unless it was accompanied by
evidence that she had resisted to the “utmost” to preserve her “honor.”
Freud’s ideas regarding female sexuality influenced rape law through the
most important and widely cited legal treatise on rape of the twentieth cen-
tury penned by the noted jurist John Henry Wigmore. Using Freudian ter-
minology, Wigmore cautioned the legal establishment to beware of the
female hysteric and the pathological liar and advised that all rape com-
plainants be examined by a psychiatrist for nefarious complexes of a
Freudian nature (Sanday 1996, pp. 121–139).
350 Peggy Reeves Sanday

Throughout the twentieth century, the sexual discourse reflected in the

theories of the sexologists functioned in popular culture to maintain a
community of males in opposition to and superior over females. Although
the details of the discourse changed granting sexual freedom to women, its
ability to maintain male bonding and male dominance remained unaf-
fected. To preserve her reputation and to show that she is not an aggres-
sive hussy, a woman had to say no so that a man could take pride in his
seduction and assure himself that she is not “loose.”
The sexual revolution of the 1960s began with the concept of sexual
freedom and ended with women seeking parity in sexual relationships. Al-
though the women of the ’60s were having sex in greater numbers than be-
fore, they were not seen as equal sexual partners with the enforceable right
to say no. Although the so-called sexual revolution freed women to have
sex, it was, once again, on male terms. The late twentieth-century feminist
movement was sparked by the soaring rape rates of the 1960s. Getting to-
gether in consciousness raising sessions, young women began to discover
the degree to which sexual expression for them was marked by either “giv-
ing in” or being forced. Few of them could say that they were in egalitar-
ian sexual relationships characterized by mutual consent.
The discovery of the ubiquity of acquaintance rape led to a significant
lobbying effort in the early to mid-1970s, which resulted in rape law re-
form in most of the states. “Earnest,” “sufficient,” or “utmost” resistance
was abolished as being necessary to indicate nonconsent in most states.
The legal reform was an attempt to equalize rape trials so that fear of false
accusers and examining a woman’s reputation no longer played a decisive
role.
The reform changed outmoded laws and practices that had remained on
the books since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For example, in
many states the death penalty for rape persisted up to the 1960s, making
convictions highly unlikely. Another hold-over from the seventeenth cen-
tury, abolished in the 1970s, was the practice of reading to the jury the
cautions of the seventeenth-century English judge Sir Matthew Hale. By
giving semilegal status to the fear of the false accuser, Hale’s instructions
to the jury read in many American courts created a prodefense bias (see
Sanday 1996, p. 58 for Hale’s cautions).
The anti-rape movement that got started in the 1970s was the first real
sexual revolution in the twentieth century, or any century for that matter,
 Rape-Free versus Rape-Prone 351

because it was based firmly on the notion of sexual parity. The basic
proposition was that a no means no and that sexual consent was to be es-
tablished through speech. Although articulated in the 1970s, these ideas
began to trickle down to large numbers of women only in the 1990s. To-
day, the anti-rape movement on many college campuses teaches men and
women the necessity of affirmative, verbal consent. The sexual equivalence
assumed by this development for male and female choice in sexual behav-
ior is joined with the call for sexual equality in all aspects of social life.
Whether this new, revolutionary discourse will expand and circulate more
widely in U.S. society remains to be seen (Sanday 1996, pp. 265–287). To
the extent that it replaces the current discourse of male sexual dominance,
we will see a reversal of one cultural selection process in favor of another,
one that is more respectful of women’s sexual and social rights.

The Case of the Minangkabau: Worldview or Natural Selection?

The Minangkabau present an interesting case of how social assumptions

regarding human nature inhibits violence against women. The social phi-
losophy of the Minangkabau of West Sumatra is reflected in an ethos and
worldview that makes matrilineal inheritance and preserving the mother-
child bond the foundational social form. The same ethos and worldview
explains why the Minangkabau are virtually rape free. Having said this, I
want to caution the reader not to jump to the conclusion that matrilineal
descent alone inhibits male violence against women. Most relevant is not
matrilineal descent per se but the philosophy that underpins the Minang-
kabau version of matriliny and the relationship of this philosophy to is-
sues of male violence. This point underscores once again my major point:
Behavior cannot be considered separately from the system of symbols,
rituals, and worldview that operate as models of and for behavior crafted
over time molding the cup of clay anthropologists call culture.
Numbering some eight million people, about half in the province of West
Sumatra—the traditional homeland of their culture—and another half in
other parts of Indonesia, the Minangkabau are the fourth largest ethnic
group in the archipelago. In Indonesia, the Minangkabau are famous for
their “matriarchal adat,” which they proudly proclaim by referring to
their society as a matriarchaat, using the Dutch term for matriarchy. By
this label, however, they don’t refer to female rule as we define matriarchy
352 Peggy Reeves Sanday

but to a host of maternal meanings giving women an unusually authorita-

tive role when compared to women’s role in other societies (see Sanday
2002).
By all measures, the Minangkabau can be called a modern society. They
are well known in Indonesia for their literary flair, democratic leanings,
and business acumen, making them among the most prosperous and bet-
ter known of Indonesia’s ethnic groups. Tradition and modernity live in
visible coexistence in the cities of West Sumatra. Malls, universities,
banks, and book stores share the same streets with traditional market-
places in the capital city of Padang. The colorful cities of the highlands at-
tract tourists from all over the world. Buses link most villages to the cities.
In the villages, satellite dishes beam CNN, Asian MTV, Indonesian soap
operas, and Japanese and Indian movies to TVs in homes and food stalls.
For eighteen years, beginning in 1981 and ending in 1999, I went to West
Sumatra nearly every year for summers and sabbaticals. The following
summarizes my findings with respect to questions regarding the implica-
tions of the Minangkabau discourse on the appropriate relationship be-
tween culture and nature.
It is fitting to begin with the Minangkabau version of natural selection,
because it is quite different from the Darwinian version presented by
Thornhill and Palmer in their arguments for why men rape. The Mi-
nangkabau also believe in an all-seeing force in nature. However, they
sacralize this force, seeing it as the will of the ancestors that works for the
common good, which means that it is eminently moral. The will of the an-
cestors represents the accumulated traditions passed down through the
generations. This body of customs is said to have been formed from choos-
ing the good and rejecting the bad of nature for the benefit and reproduc-
tive success of each generation.
Choosing the good and rejecting the bad of nature is at the core of Mi-
nangkabau philosophy and can be tied to the social arrangements related
to reproduction, including customs related to descent, residence, and mar-
riage, all of which are designed to protect the mother-child bond. The
dominant principle determining these customs is expressed in the follow-
ing proverb.
Take the small knife used for carving
Make a staff from the lintabuang tree
The cover of pinang flowers becomes a winnow
 Rape-Free versus Rape-Prone 353

A drop of water becomes the sea

A fist becomes a mountain
Growth in nature is our teacher.

This proverb means that people derive the rules of culture from observ-
ing the benign aspects of nature. The standard explanation of this proverb
goes something like this. Nature provides us with the wherewithal for
rudimentary implements for food and shelter (first three lines). Social well-
being is found in natural growth and fertility (second three lines) accord-
ing to the dictum that the unfurling, blooming, and expansion of growth
in nature is our teacher. As plants grow from seedlings, trees from trans-
planted branches, the sea from a trickle of water, and mountains from a
clump of earth, so do people. Like the seedlings of nature, people and emo-
tions must be fed patiently so that they will flower and grow to their full-
ness and strength. Thus nurture is the natural law that humans should
follow in devising social rules. This means that culture must focus on nur-
turing the weak and turn away from the desire to resort to brute strength.
The importance placed on nurturing the vulnerable emphasizes coop-
eration and elevates the moral and social authority of women. The con-
struction of social forms to nurture the vulnerable is evident in the
Minangkabau explanation for matrilineal descent.
In an interview, a well-known Minangkabau leader rationalized matri-
lineal descent as being “in accordance with the flora and fauna of nature
in which it can be seen that it is the mother who bears the next generation
and it is the mother who suckles the young and raises the child.” Elabo-
rating, he said:
As we all know, Minangkabau adat [custom] comes from nature according to the
proverb Alam takambang jadi guru [growth in nature is our teacher]. In nature all
that is born into the world is born from the mother, not from the father. Fathers
are only known by a confession from the mother. Adat knows that the mother is
the closest to her children and is therefore more dominant than the father in es-
tablishing the character of the generations. Thus, we must protect women and their
offspring because they are also weaker than men. Just as the weak becomes the
strong in nature, we must make the weaker the stronger in human life. If the
mother abandons or doesn’t recognize her own child, adat exists to recognize
the child’s descent line and to ensure the child’s worldly welfare.

Male and female leaders in many villages expressed similar ideas. For
example, one man explained to me that the matrilineal system was orig-
inally devised so that children would always have a family, food, and an-
cestral land. Speaking rhetorically he asked, “If a child is born without a
354 Peggy Reeves Sanday

father, or we don’t know who the father is, where can the child find pusaka
[land and ancestral home] and food? Like growth in nature, we always
know from whom the child descends: the mother.”
Such ideas cannot be reduced to ignorance about the father’s role in con-
ception as was commonly claimed in nineteenth-century discussions on
the subject of matriarchy. The Minangkabau understand the biological ba-
sis of paternity perfectly well, yet choose not to make protecting the blood
ties between a father and his children a social issue. To do so would be an-
tithetical to the conviction that the job of culture (adat) is to nurture and
care for the young. While the mother-child bond can always be counted on
to perform this task, the father-child link is not as reliable for the reasons
spelled out in the comments noted above. These comments suggest that
concerns about paternity deflect emphasis from a child’s well-being to con-
cerns about biological fatherhood that may raise extraneous social issues
inimical to the child’s welfare. This is not to say that Minangkabau fathers
don’t play an important role in the lives of their children. Indeed, they play
a key role; but, the connection of father to child is not tied to the trans-
mission of land and houses. It is more an emotional than a material bond.
Social rights are conceived so as to protect the weak. As I was told many
times:
Here we elevate the weak instead of the strong. Women must be given rights be-
cause they are weak. Young men must be sent away from the village to prove their
manhood so that there will be no competition between them and their sisters.

Protecting the mother-child bond is also the goal of customs related to

mate selection and postmarital residence. Males don’t chose marriage
partners and wives are not exchanged in Minangkabau society. This is one
of the few societies described by anthropologists in which husbands are
exchanged by women. Marriage partners are chosen by women for their
daughters in conjunction with family members, usually the mother’s
brothers and sisters. Certain types of men are more desirable than others.
The least desirable is a category of male who fits the image of what we
would call “macho.” No one wants their daughter to marry such a man,
because he is perceived as unreliable and a poor prospect for contributing
to the household economy. Mothers seek hardworking men who will con-
tribute to the agricultural labor on the matrilineal land their daughters
will inherit. Wealthy men are also in high demand, but few families can
afford a wealthy husband for their daughters. As a general rule all hus-
bands live in the households of their wives.
 Rape-Free versus Rape-Prone 355

The Minangkabau never speak directly about sexual abuse, domestic vi-
olence, or rape. Nor do they speak directly about preferred behavior.
Rather, they convey cultural expectations through proverbs. For example,
there are many proverbs about the importance of peacefulness in human
interaction and of maintaining good relations by resorting to consensus
deliberation rather than using power for social ends. In the relationships
of daily life people stress politesse and harmony in resolving disputes, by
speaking of how “where two or three sit together, the words seek truth,
round like the water that flows in the bamboo tube, seeking common agree-
ment.” The Minangkabau liken their customs and traditions “to growing
flowers,” saying that a marriage conducted according to the rule of custom
is like the planting of a seed that “will grow bearing flowers and fruit.”
Good and evil are conceived as two sides of the same lesson to be
learned from nature and the will of the ancestors. If human beings break
the rules of matrilineal descent, they can be destroyed by the curse of the
ancestors, shunned, or sent away from the village. A man who beats his
wife reflects the evil of nature, which is also punishable by the curse of the
ancestors. Such a man is separated from the household of his wife and sent
back to the household of his mother. A man who rapes is turned over to
the Indonesian state authorities for prosecution. The only case of rape I
knew of in the village where I lived occurred many years before my arrival.
This was a gang rape of a mentally retarded girl by a group of young males
in another village when they found her wandering alone through their vil-
lage. While in progress the rape was stopped by senior males. The next day
the leader of the rape committed suicide for fear of what he faced from
the senior males of the girl’s extended family. The remaining males were
turned over to the authorities.
After hearing about this case, I listened to the sexual gossip of the
women I knew, asking many questions about instances of sexual abuse. I
also studied the village sexual discourse. Just as the male peer culture in
the United States is characterized by a sexual discourse, usually abusive to
women, there is a sexual discourse that circulates in Minangkabau vil-
lages. However, its nature is completely different. First, it is a female sex-
ual discourse; second, it is a public discourse.
A female-defined sexual discourse is communicated in public spaces to
male and female audiences by female bards in songs sung in all-night per-
formances staged to entertain villagers in association with the celebration
356 Peggy Reeves Sanday

of marriage and birth. The singing, which begins around 9 P.M. and lasts
until 4:30 A.M., includes at minimum two female singers and one male
flute player brought to the village to entertain guests. The songs are about
love, sex, loss, joy, and sorrow. Many are funny songs about women and
men in various states of sexual desire. In all the performances I attended
and recorded, the theme of male sexual coercion was never voiced, even
though many sexual complaints were aired, including songs about male
sexual performance and songs likening unsatisfied female desire to a dried,
unwatered, unhoed rice field (see Sanday 2002 for the text of typical
songs). The Minangkabau can be classified as one exception to the general
statement made by Thornhill and Palmer (p. 160) that “people everywhere
understand sex to be something that women have and men want.” I am
sure that there are many anthropologists who could provide additional
exceptions.
It is clear that the Minangkabau have a concept of rape. Their under-
standing of rape is in part conditioned by the sexual abuse women experi-
enced during the occupation by the Japanese at the end of World War II.
It was during this time of general chaos that the gang rape mentioned
above took place. Today, the Minangkabau categorize rape behavior as
barbaric, the epitome of the uncivilized. Any form of violence against
women is not tolerated in village life. Reproductive success for men in
Minangkabau society is guaranteed to those who conform to the etiquette
expected in personal relationships. Men who follow this etiquette are in
more demand by mothers seeking husbands for their daughters than
young men who engage in rough, unseemly behavior. The latter type of
male finds it hard to find a wife and usually ends up migrating to other
parts of Indonesia.
Minangkabau thought and practices with respect to interpersonal vio-
lence is a timeless reminder of an old anthropological axiom. Although
human beings have the potential for aggression, it is culture (not biology)
that redirects, dampens, or activates that potential. When I talked to the
Minangkabau about the incidence of rape and wife abuse in the United
States they were always astounded. Interpersonal violence and rape are im-
possible in our society, I was told, because custom not power determines
the way people act. We need customs to temper behavior, I was informed.
Otherwise people would be like wild animals in the jungle in which the
strong would conquer the weak. This comment illustrates both an aware-
ness of raw physical power and the idea that such power can be regulated.
 Rape-Free versus Rape-Prone 357

With respect to the expression of individual reproductive interests in this

society, it is obvious that reproduction is highly social in the sense that
what counts is not so much sexual union as the context in which this union
takes place. The Minangkabau understand that their society is structured
to favor the vulnerable, namely women and children, through the practice
of matrilineal descent. Ancestral land and houses are inherited in the fe-
male line so that women and children will never be homeless. Husbands
go to live with their wives at marriage so that if there is a divorce mother
and child will not be in want. Providing for the vulnerable is seen as a
source of strength after the proverb “growth in nature is our teacher.” Ap-
plied to sex, the Minangkabau social philosophy teaches that aggression
weakens rather than strengthens the body’s tie to nature and society. This
explains why there is no discernible incidence of sexual abuse or domestic
violence in the village of my field work. In other parts of West Sumatra I
was able to document very few rapes either from police reports in the
cities, personal observation, or interviews. The assailants in the few cases
I identified were tried, convicted, and jailed. I conclude that this is a rape-
free society not because rape is entirely absent but because it is infrequent.

Conclusion

The incidence of rape is far lower among men raised in stable peaceful en-
vironments be it a family context in a complex society like the United
States or the intimate village communities of the Minangkabau people in
the province of West Sumatra where one finds an ethos of mutual respect
between the sexes. To say that at least some men rape in all societies and
to use this fact to make generalizations about the natural history of rape
and the biological bases for sexual coercion obfuscates the dramatic cul-
tural differences between a rape-free society like the Minangkabau and a
rape-prone society like the United States. Naturalizing and universalizing
rape as an adaptation related to male reproductive success may bring about
the very sexual culture one is trying to avoid by creating a lore that makes
sexual aggression inevitable to masculinity. Looking to the male psyche for
the rapelike structures of scorpion flies—as Thornhill and Palmer do in
one of their arguments for why men rape—is profoundly belittling to men
and boys, reducing them to biological material just as women are reduced
to their bodily attributes in the pornographic scenarios of rape cultures.6
358 Peggy Reeves Sanday

In contrast to the generalizations Thornhill and Palmer offer about the

evolved nature of male rape, other students of evolution suggest that the
primary selective pressure in human evolution was not for violent men but
for those who were able to cooperate with women and other males in or-
ganized food gathering. This viewpoint suggests that what happened over
time was cultural selection against violent males by means of the institu-
tion of socially determined forms of mate selection and reproductive prac-
tices. Some anthropologists believe that female selection of cooperative
males as mates in a foraging environment where food acquisition and chil-
drearing tasks had to be divided up was responsible for the evolution of
humans (Tanner 1981).
Keeping women in a state of fear with the threat of rape may increase
social bonding among young males for whatever reason (hunting or war-
fare) but it is unlikely to have contributed to the evolution of human soci-
ety and culture. Fear splits the sexes into ranked camps and reduces the
overall level of cooperation. By increasing levels of stress in females, fear
may reduce fertility rates and a female’s capability to bear children. It also
reduces the ability of the sexes to coordinate food-gathering activities. It is
hard to imagine how the combination of fearful, dependent females and
aggressive, belligerent males could have helped us through the many evo-
lutionary crises created by changing environmental circumstances and the
widespread extinctions on the long road toward humanity. Indeed, one
could easily argue that male aggression hastens extinction because of the
culture of violence it encourages, where death rather than life excites men.
The Minangkabau provide living proof of how cooperation and com-
plementary roles between the sexes work in a society that values the kinds
of nurturing males that anthropologist Nancy Tanner (1981) describes in
her book On Becoming Human. In light of the ever-increasing incidence
of life-threatening sexually transmitted diseases, rape can no longer be
viewed as contributing to reproductive success. Additionally, it has been
clear since the discovery of HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases
that giving boys free reign to pursue their “individual reproductive inter-
ests,” such as seen in the “boys will be boys” discourse, must now be
judged not only in moral but in criminal terms as well. Because males are
largely in charge of deciding to use force, be it sexually or in warfare, it will
be males who decide whether we continue down the path of violence
against women. With its emphasis on the role of culture, the “feminist
 Rape-Free versus Rape-Prone 359

social-science explanation of rape,” which Thornhill and Palmer denigrate

as bad science, has a better chance than the so-called natural history of
rape to light the way by demonstrating that because culture counts humans
have it in their power to produce a more equitable sexual culture.

Notes

1. See Vance (1984) and Caplan (1987) for more recent anthropological state-
ments on the variation of human sexual behavior cross-culturally.
2. This sample offers to scholars a representation of the world’s known and well-
described societies. The complete sample consists of 186 societies, each “pin-
pointed” to an identifiable subgroup of the society in question at a specific point
in time. The time period for the sample societies ranges from 1750 B.C. (Babyloni-
ans) to the late 1960s. The societies included in the standard sample are distrib-
uted relatively equally among the six major ethnographic regions of the world:
Sub-Saharan Africa, Circum-Mediterranean, East Eurasia, Insular Pacific, North
America, South and Central America. Information on the incidence of rape was
available in only 95 societies of the full sample. For more information on the
sample employed for the cross-cultural incidence of rape and related variables, see
Sanday (1981).
3. As part of their criticism of my “rape-free” category, Thornhill and Palmer
(2000, p. 141) claim that I misclassify the Mbuti Pygmies of the Ituri forest in
Africa. They point out that Turnbull’s description of the Mbuti is ambiguous, mak-
ing my “rape-free” categorization of the Mbuti suspicious. Thornhill and Palmer
(ibid.) quote Turnbull on the subject of Mbuti rape: “I know of no cases of rape,
though boys often talk about their intentions of forcing reluctant maidens to
their will.” Thornhill and Palmer could not know that I had a long talk with Turn-
bull regarding rape among the Mbuti, at which time he told me that rape was
“infrequent” in Mbuti society. If a girl lay down with a boy, Turnbull reported to
me, it was because she expected intercourse.
Quoting a number of authors, Thornhill and Palmer say that “there is no evi-
dence of a truly rape-free society” (2000, p. 142). By this they mean that there is
no evidence of any society in which rape is wholly absent. Once again, they twist
my words. My rape-free code was based on reporting by ethnographers that rape
is rare or absent. I did not take the ethnographers to mean that rape was literally
absent, only that they found no evidence that rape was commonplace. I assume
that an instance of sexually coercive behavior can be found in any society. Not ad-
mitting this would be like saying that there is absolutely no stealing in even the
most crime-free society. Such a conclusion, however, does not impute a genetic ba-
sis either to rape or stealing.
Thornhill and Palmer come close to my conclusions regarding variation in the
incidence of rape when they say that “[t]he ethnographic evidence indicates that
some frequency of rape is typical of Homo sapiens . . . (2000, p. 142; emphasis
mine). However, I disagree with their conclusion that “human males in all societies
360 Peggy Reeves Sanday

so far examined in the ethnographic record possess genes that can lead, by way of
ontogeny, to raping behavior . . .” (ibid.). If this were the case, we would expect a
much higher incidence of rape in societies like the United States where the neces-
sary environmental facts are present in the adolescent male peer culture. Yet, my
research demonstrates that not all adolescent males take advantage of a vulnera-
ble woman nor are they always able to perform sexually in environments marked
by group male sexual coercion (see discussion in section “Denigrating Feminist So-
cial Science,” to follow).
4. These variables, listed in table 3 of Sanday (1981, p. 23), include (1) presence
of war (p = .03); (2) distant proximity of father to care of infants (p = .08); (3) no
evidence of female power and authority (p = .03); (4) sexual segregation such as
seen in presence of special places for men (p = .01); and (5) presence of special
places for women (p = .08). All of these associations fit my general conclusions re-
garding the sociocultural context of rape that follows.
5. I could find no evidence (see Sanday 1981, p. 25) for the popular belief that sex-
ual repression explains the incidence of rape. Rape is not an instinct triggered by
celibacy, enforced for whatever reason.
6. In support of the first argument regarding why men rape, noted earlier in this
chapter, Thornhill and Palmer say it is necessary to identify “mechanisms involved
in rape that were designed by selection in the past specifically for reproduction by
means of rape” (2000, p. 62). Because such mechanisms exist in the morphology
of certain insects, they conclude that they must also exist in humans. To make this
case, the authors draw parallels with scorpion flies, an insect studied by Thornhill.
Male scorpion flies, it seems, have a physical adaptation for rape. This adaptation
consists of a specific organ they describe as “a pair of clamp-like structures, one on
either side of the penis,” that serves to keep unwilling females in a mating position
(ibid., p. 63). According to Thornhill and Palmer, this organ “functions to secure
a mating with an unwilling female to retain her in copulation for the period needed
for full insemination.” They view it as a “rape adaptation,” designed for increasing
“the mating and the reproductive success of males that raped relative to those that
did not rape” (ibid., p. 64). Admitting that there is no “conspicuous morphology
that might be a rape adaptation” in human males, Thornhill and Palmer (ibid.,
pp. 64–65) look “to the male psyche for candidates for rape adaptations.” They
propose (ibid., pp. 65–66) a number of “psychological mechanisms” as “adapta-
tions” that can be viewed as “analogous” to the rape adaptations observed in
“male insects.” They define an “analogous adaptation” as a product of the same
selection pressure, but one that “molds different phenotypic features to accom-
plish the same function.” Thus, the clamplike structures designed for rape in the
scorpion fly becomes a “psychological adaptation” for rape in human males. In the
human as well as the insect case, the ultimate benefit of these different adaptations
is the same, namely reproductive success in the “production of offspring” (ibid.,
pp. 64–65).
 Rape-Free versus Rape-Prone 361

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tudes and practices. Ethnology 15(4): 409–430.
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America: A Definitive Survey. Boston: Little, Brown.
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Nuwer, Hank (1999). Wrongs of Passage: Fraternities, Sororities, Hazing, and
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15
What Is “Rape”?—Toward a Historical,
Ethnographic Approach
Emily Martin

Since Hobbes, at least, the competitive and acquisitive characteristics of Western

man have been confounded with Nature, and the Nature thus fashioned in the hu-
man image has been in turn reapplied to the explanation of Western man. The ef-
fect of this dialectic has been to anchor the properties of human social action, as
we conceive them, in Nature, and the laws of Nature in our conceptions of human
social action. Human society is natural, and natural societies are curiously human.
—Marshall Sahlins, The Use and Abuse of Biology

As a cultural anthropologist, I found the most stunning thing about read-

ing Thornhill and Palmer’s A Natural History of Rape is how little the
authors engage with the large number of previously published critiques of
the assumptions on which their sociobiological (evolutionary psychologi-
cal) view of human behavior is based.1 The book contains a chapter called
“Why Have Social Scientists Failed to Darwinize?” but for the most part,
the authors dismiss opposing points of view as ideological, and they en-
gage in little substantive discussion of their claims (pp. 105–122). Faced
with the task of critiquing a view of human behavior espoused by authors
who are evidently not much interested in reexamination of any of their ba-
sic assumptions, my heart nearly went out of the effort. Surely, I thought,
further argument would be as futile as trying to argue a religious person
into discarding the tenets of his or her faith.2 So, to open a psychological
space where there is at least the possibility that some reader might listen,
I have not written this essay with the goal of dissuading Thornhill, Palmer,
and their colleagues in mind. Instead, my imagined audience is composed
of college or high school teachers and members of the general public, who
hear many stories constructed on sociobiological principles, from news-
paper accounts in the New York Times’ “Science Times,” through stan-
dard textbooks, to the Discovery channel, but who listen with a degree of
364 Emily Martin

unease and wonder how it would be possible (for the sake of themselves,
their students, or their children) to question the closed world of sociobio-
logical principles.
I will attempt this discussion by arguing that human acts involving in-
tentionality—rape as well as all others—can be understood only through
categories used to make sense of them in the cultural setting in which they
occur. This means that understanding what people do is complex, context-
dependant, and often changes through time and across space. This also
means that intentional actions cannot be separated from the contexts in
which they occur (rich and multifaceted as these may be) without losing
what gives them sense in the first place. I argue that Thornhill and Palmer,
assuming that there are “acts” out there in the world and also separate de-
scriptions that can be applied to them from a completely different context,
such as sociobiology, have, in making this move, lost exactly the qualities
that make acts like “rape” human actions in the first place. Ignoring the
way human actions are constituted by cultural meaning, their argument is
thus founded on fundamental mistakes about what sort of thing human
actions are.

Victorian Science

The principles animating the sociobiological view of the world arose out
of the specific historical context of Victorian England. On one side stood
the commitment to progressive reforms, the power of technology and the
“naturalizing of morals and man” displayed in the Crystal Palace (Des-
mond and Moore 1991, p. 392). On the other stood the brutality of the
struggle in the Crimean War. Darwin, himself a heavy investor in industry
and the railway companies that made industrial growth possible, accom-
plished an elaborate metaphoric extension from the dynamics of the Vic-
torian economy and Nature: “Nature was a self-improving ‘workshop,’
evolution the dynamic economy of life. The creation of wealth and the
production of species obeyed similar laws. Division of labor was nature’s
way as well as man’s” (ibid., pp. 420–421).
At about the same time, but in places outside Victorian England, images
of biological organisms (or their genetic components) as self-promoting
individuals acting on utilitarian economic principles, engaged in all-out
struggle for reproductive survival have not held sway.3 Daniel Todes has
 What Is “Rape”? 365

shown how in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Russian
biologists rejected Darwin’s major metaphor, the struggle for existence,
especially when it appeared in connection with Malthusian ideas about
overpopulation. In developing an alternative theory of mutual aid, Rus-
sian naturalists argued four tenets:
the central aspect of the struggle for existence is the organism’s struggle with abi-
otic conditions; organisms join forces to wage this struggle more effectively, and
such mutual aid is favored by natural selection; since cooperation, not competi-
tion, dominates intraspecific relations, Darwin’s Malthusian characterization of
those relations is false; and cooperation so vitiates intraspecific competition that
the latter cannot be the chief cause of the divergence of characters and the origin
of new species. (Todes 1989, p. 545)

In rejecting Darwin’s assumptions, Russians identified the idea of indi-

vidualized competitive struggle as a product of English culture and soci-
ety. Darwin’s use of this assumption was “the same as if Adam Smith had
taken it upon himself to write a course in zoology” (quoted in Todes 1987,
p. 541); a Russian expert on fisheries and population dynamics wrote that
the English “national type accepts [struggle] with all its consequences, de-
mands it as his right, tolerates no limits upon it” (quoted in Todes 1989,
p. 41).
This response to Darwin’s theory, common to Russian intellectuals of a
variety of philosophical and political viewpoints, derived, as Todes per-
suasively argues, from several factors:
Russia’s political economy lacked a dynamic, pro–laissez faire bourgeoisie and was
dominated by landowners and peasants. The leading political tendencies, monar-
chism and a socialist-oriented populism, shared a cooperative social ethos and a
distaste for the competitive individualism widely associated with Malthus and
Great Britain. Furthermore, Russia was an expansive, sparsely populated land
with a swiftly changing and often severe climate. It is difficult to imagine a setting
less consonant with Malthus’s notion that organisms were pressed constantly into
mutual conflict by population pressures on limited space and resources. (Todes
1989, p. 168)

Comparative historical material such as this allows us to begin to ques-

tion the universal applicability of the competitive, individualistic world so-
ciobiology imagines.
The cultural backdrop for the theories that fascinated Darwin, and
puzzled the Russians, continues to serve today as a backdrop for the theo-
ries that fascinate Thornhill and Palmer. As Robert Young puts it, “we find
366 Emily Martin

that levels and concepts intermingle and that it is from society that we de-
rive our conceptions of nature. These conceptions are in turn inextricably
intermingled with our conceptions of human nature” (1985, p. 626).
Young goes on to catalog the terms that are the basic “working vocabu-
lary” of the bible of modern sociobiology, E. O. Wilson’s Sociobiology:
The New Synthesis: “division of labor (sexual and task), hierarchy, com-
petitiveness, domination and submission, peck order, aggression, harem,
promiscuous, mob, combat, spite, bachelor, jealously, territoriality, lead-
ership, indoctrinability, élites” (p. 626). Similarly, in a somewhat more
popularly accessible presentation of sociobiology, Richard Dawkins’s The
Selfish Gene, the basic terms include “cheat, sucker, grudger” (p. 626) and
of course by the time we reach Thornhill and Palmer, we add “rape.”
Young comments, “What possible source except a society such as ours
can we consider for a conceptual vocabulary such as that? What possible
significance except the scientific underpinning of a competitive, fatalistic,
individualistic élitist, patriarchal, sexist society can be attached to the
following titles that have appeared recently around these questions: On
Aggression, The Naked Ape, The Territorial Imperative, The Imperial An-
imal, The Dominant Man, The Inevitability of Patriarchy, The Biological
Imperative . . . The Selfish Gene” (p. 626)?

How Sociobiologists Look at “Rape”

Moving to the specifics of A Natural History of Rape, how do Thornhill

and Palmer define rape? It is
copulation resisted to the best of the victim’s ability unless such resistance would
probably result in death or serious injury to the victim or in death or injury to
individuals the victim commonly protects. (p. 1)

They argue that this behavior occurs because in the course of human
evolution, it gave a selective advantage to those males who practiced it.
These males gained in the competition for sexual partners and hence in
their sexual fitness. Psychological mechanisms that promote male rape
developed in the human species that both enabled and ensured that the
behavior would continue to occur (pp. 65–66).
It is important to this argument that a behavior called rape exists, like a
thing, in the world, so that it can be observed, described, and then counted
 What Is “Rape”? 367

and mapped. If it turned out that on investigation the thing called rape was
not found very often around the world, Thornhill and Palmer’s argument
would be greatly weakened, because presumably traits that arise as a re-
sult of evolutionary processes would be found in all human populations.
The ethnographic evidence indicates that some frequency of rape is typical of
Homo Sapiens and that there is no evidence of a truly rape-free society. . . . [T]his
does not mean, of course, that rape is a genetically determined act unaffected by
learning and culture. It means only that human males in all societies so far exam-
ined in the ethnographic record possess genes that can lead, by way of ontogeny, to
raping behavior when the necessary environmental factors are present, and that the
necessary environmental factors are sometimes present in all societies studied to
date. (p. 142)

So everything hinges on there being a sense in which something called

rape can be found universally, and that things counted as rape meet the
minimum definition: “copulation resisted to the best of the victim’s ability
unless such resistance would probably result in death or serious injury to
the victim or in death or injury to individuals the victim commonly pro-
tects” (p. 142). The first problem we run into is that the minimum defini-
tion of the act depends on how the act is understood by those who are
engaging in it. Was I forced? Did I intend to force? Did I want to? Did she
(or he) want to? If questions like these cannot be answered unambiguously
and in ways that are exactly comparable across cultures and across settings
within them, our ability to count acts as rape is profoundly thwarted.

How Cultural Actions Are Constituted by Their Contextual Meaning

Let me give some examples of how tricky the answer to these deceptively
simple questions is in practice. In many forms of Chinese marriage, on a
traditional model, marital relationships gave the husband access to sexual
relations with his wife.4 No social or legal support (at least from the dom-
inant institutions in Chinese society) would be forthcoming if a wife at-
tempted to resist sex with her husband. More important, the institution of
marriage was traditionally one in which the consent of the wife, to the
marriage itself, let alone to sexual relations within it, was quite irrelevant.
Marriage was a contract between two families, involving exchange of
goods and the assumption of new kin obligations. The woman’s consent as
a choosing, deciding person with a will of her own was by and large irrel-
evant. Within such a context (in its broad outlines not an uncommon one
368 Emily Martin

worldwide), to segregate some acts as with the woman’s consent and oth-
ers without seems a crude misreading of what these acts mean in context.
We would be introducing elements into a cultural system that did not be-
long there, much as if we tried to understand a game we were unfamiliar
with and thought mistakenly that a strike was called on a batter in base-
ball only when he did not want to hit the ball. Whatever the batter’s state
of mind, his act only counts as a strike if certain socially determined con-
ditions are met. To introduce issues of volition into the definition of a
strike would be to make a category mistake of large proportions.
The difficulty knowing whether to categorize acts as “rape” exists just
as acutely in places such as the United States where individual will is al-
most always considered to be involved in the understanding of social acts.
In the United States, a woman’s consent is considered legally and socially
central to the classification of an act as rape, consistently outside marriage
and increasingly inside marriage. The United States is certainly one place
where Thornhill and Palmer’s definition of “rape” comes close to generally
accepted common sense understandings. Yet consider the complexities in-
volved in categorizing rape nonetheless. Thornhill and Palmer cite the fol-
lowing case as a clear example of rape:
A friend of ours once told us that after a movie she returned with her date to his
car in an isolated parking lot. Then, instead of taking her home, the man locked
the doors and physically forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. (p. 3)

But only slight contextualization of this scenario would make it much

more difficult to categorize: What if the couple had been engaged in heavy
making out just before entering the car? What if the couple mutually
agreed to have intercourse but, although the woman insisted and the man
agreed to withdraw before ejaculating, he ejaculates inside her? What if
the woman resists, but playfully, or momentarily in order to insert a di-
aphragm? What if the woman does not actively resist, as in the encounters
in Coetzee’s recent novel, Disgrace, between a 52-year-old university pro-
fessor and a 20-year-old student in his literature class:
Not rape, not quite that, but undesired nevertheless, undesired to the core. As
though she had decided to go slack, die within herself for the duration, like a rab-
bit when the jaws of the fox close on its neck. So that everything done to her might
be done, as it were, far away. (1999, p. 25)

And so on ad infinitum. In practice, intent and consent are more of-

ten than not anything but crystal clear: For this reason, a legal finding of
 What Is “Rape”? 369

rape, especially when the couple are acquainted, is complex and problem-
atic (Temkin 1986; Cowling 1998, pp. 81ff; Edwards 1987; MacKinnon
1989). This is not to say that a finding of rape is impossible to establish be-
yond a reasonable doubt. It is only to say that such a finding depends on
examining a whole, complex social and cultural context in which intent is
situated.
So one might ask whether the solution to this situation is to make the
definition of rape clearer, add conditions, clarify where they apply. Such a
move will only push the problem back a step. If we add the condition that
the woman must show a physical gesture of resistance, we are only further
led to the problem of what physical gestures count as meaning resistance.
As with the intent to rape, the intent to resist can be known only from ex-
amination of the complexities of the context. The problem is not one of in-
adequate definition; the problem is that Thornhill and Palmer have made
a category mistake.
They treat “rape” as if it were a thing in the world whose significance
were self-evident. They make an analogy between the eye and rape: Just as
the eye evolved “by natural selection because it increased our ancestors’
ability to detect light” (p. 5), so rape behavior evolved to increase “male
reproductive success by way of increasing mate number” (p. 59).5 In their
view, vision has a proximal cause and an distal cause: Its proximal cause
is the action of rods and cones in relaying visual information to the brain;
its distal cause is evolution through selection. Similarly, according to
Thornhill and Palmer, rape behavior has both proximal and distal causes:
Its proximal causes include such things as hormonal levels and learning;
its distal cause is evolution through selection (pp. 6–7). My point is that in
this analogy they are comparing things that belong in different categories.
The eye is a physical structure with a relatively clearly definable function.
In a great variety of different organisms, it would make sense to say the eye
is an organ whose function is to communicate visual information to the
brain. But “rape” is not a physical structure with a clearly definable func-
tion. It is a behavior whose very existence depends on the intentions and
reactions of at least two complex social beings in some particular cultural
context. It would be impossible to know from a description of behavior
alone whether the act amounted to rape.
The absurdity of the comparison between the eye and a rape is plain.
A better comparison would be between “insight” and “rape” because in
370 Emily Martin

both cases, no simple description of a “thing” in the world could tell us

whether they were present.
Throughout the book, Thornhill and Palmer are astonishingly tone deaf
to the nature of cultural meaning. Basic insights taught to undergraduates
in any introductory course in cultural anthropology seem to have passed
them by. The sense in which human acts are imbued with meaning through
layers of intentionality and complexly interrelated contexts—thereby
making simple descriptions of observed behavior inadequate to attribute
meaning—is missing. Clifford Geertz called the kind of description that
would be adequate “thick description,” and turned to Ryle’s account of
how intricate human intentionality is to get the point across. Ryle’s ac-
count is worth quoting at length to convey the irreducibility of human acts
to a single behavioral description:
Two boys fairly swiftly contract the eyelids of their right eyes. In the first boy this
is only an involuntary twitch; but the other is winking conspiratorially to an ac-
complice. At the lowest or the thinnest level of description the two contractions of
the eyelids may be exactly alike. From a cinematograph-film of the two faces there
might be no telling which contraction, if either, was a wink, or which, if either,
were a mere twitch. Yet there remains the immense but unphotographable differ-
ence between a twitch and a wink. For to wink is to try to signal to someone in
particular, without the cognisance of others, a definite message according to an
already understood code. It has very complex success-versus-failure conditions.
The wink is a failure if its intended recipient does not see it; or sees it but does not
know or forgets the code; or misconstrues it; or disobeys or disbelieves it; or if any
one else spots it. A mere twitch, on the other hand, is neither a failure nor a suc-
cess; it has no intended recipient; it is not meant to be unwitnessed by anybody; it
carries no message. It may be a symptom but it is not a signal. The winker could
not not know that he was winking; but the victim of the twitch might be quite un-
aware of his twitch. The winker can tell what he was trying to do; the twitcher will
deny that he was trying to do anything. So far we are on familiar ground. We are
just drawing the familiar distinction between a voluntary, intentional, and, in this
case, collusive and code-governed contraction of the eyelids from an involuntary
twitch. But already there is one element in the contrast that needs to be brought
out. The signaler himself, while acknowledging that he had not had an involuntary
twitch but (1) had deliberately winked, (2) to someone in particular, (3) in order to
impart a particular message, (4) according to an understood code, (5) without the
cognisance of the rest of the company, will rightly deny that he had thereby done
or tried to do five separately do-able things. He had not both tried to contract his
eyelids and also tried to do a second, synchronous thing or several synchronous
things. Unlike a person who both coughs and sneezes, or both greets his aunt and
pats her dog, he had not both contracted his eyelids and also done a piece of syn-
chronous signaling to his accomplice. True, he had contracted them not involun-
tarily but on purpose, but this feature of being on purpose is not an extra deed; he
 What Is “Rape”? 371

had contracted them at the moment when his accomplice was looking in his direc-
tion, but its being at this chosen moment is not an extra deed; he had contracted
them in accordance with an understood code, but this accordance is not an extra
deed. He had tried to do much more than contract his eyelids, but he had not tried
to do more things. He had done one thing the report of which embodies a lot of
subordinate clauses; he had not done what the report of would embody several
main verbs conjoined by “ands.” There are five or more ways in which his winking
attempt might have been a failure, but he was not attempting to do five things. If
he is successful, he has not got five successes to put on a list, but only one. . . .
Come back to our winker. Perhaps, being new to the art, he winks rather slowly,
contortedly and conspicuously. A third boy, to give malicious amusement to his
cronies, parodies this clumsy wink. How does he do this? Well, by contracting his
right eyelids in the ways in which the clumsy winker had winked. But the parodist
is not himself clumsily trying covertly to signal a message to an accomplice. He is
deftly trying conspicuously to exhibit something, and he fails if his cronies are not
looking, or are not amused, or mistakenly suppose him to be trying covertly to sig-
nal to an accomplice. There is only one thing that he is trying to do, namely to take
off the winker, and he does this just by contracting his right eyelids. Yet there is now
a threefold internal complexity in his own report of what he has been trying to do.
For he may say, “I was trying (1) to look like Tommy trying (2) to signal to his ac-
complice by trying (3) to contract his right eyelids.” There is, so to speak, the be-
ginning of a Chinese box of internal subordinate clauses in the parodist’s report of
what he was trying to do—for all that there was only one thing that he was trying
to do, namely to parody the winker; and for all that the cinematograph-film
records only the one eyelid-contraction. We can easily add to this nest of Chinese
boxes. For our parodist, to make sure of getting his parody pat, may in solitude
practise his facial mimicry. In so practising he is not yet trying to amuse anyone,
for he is alone. He is rehearsing for a subsequent public performance. So he could
report what he is now doing by, “I am trying (1) to get myself ready to try (2) to
amuse my cronies by grimacing like Tommy trying (3) to signal covertly to his ac-
complice by trying (4) to contract his eyelids.” Another box can easily be added.
For our winker himself might report that he had not, on this occasion, really been
trying covertly to signal something to his accomplice, but had been trying to gull
the grown-ups into the false belief that he was trying to do so. So now our paro-
dist, in practising his parody of this, would have to be described with the help of
five verbs of trying—and still there is only one thing he is trying to do, and still
there is only the one contraction of the eyelids that, at a given moment, the cine-
matograph film records. The thinnest description of what the rehearsing parodist
is doing is, roughly, the same as for the involuntary eyelid twitch; but its thick de-
scription is a many-layered sandwich, of which only the bottom slice is catered for
by that the thinnest description. (Ryle 1971, pp. 480–482)

As Geertz summarizes the point and brings home its relevance to culture:
The point is that between what Ryle calls the “thin description” of what the re-
hearser (parodist, winker, twitcher . . . ) is doing (“rapidly contracting his right eye-
lids”) and the “thick description” of what he is doing (“practicing a burlesque of
372 Emily Martin

a friend faking a wink to deceive an innocent into thinking a conspiracy is in

motion”) lies the object of ethnography: a stratified hierarchy of meaningful struc-
tures in terms of which twitches, winks, fake-winks, parodies, rehearsals of par-
odies are produced, perceived, and interpreted, and without which they would not
. . . in fact exist, no matter what anyone did or didn’t do with his eyelids. (Geertz
1973, p. 6)

The intentions of the people involved determine what description the ac-
tion should be given. One act is “rape” and another is not, even though as
recorded by video or audio means they might look and sound indistin-
guishable. This is not because the cultural meaning of behavior lies in a
hidden domain within the mind:6 The meaning of the behaviors lies in the
context (what are the social norms governing sexuality in this place and
time, what are the rights of women, the obligations of men, what is proper
conduct for women during sex, how is force exerted or resisted, and so
on). One could think of the acts, thoughts, utterances, explanations, facial
expressions, clothing, and so on as interrelated elements of a linguistic sys-
tem: The meaning of any one of them resides in how it is combined with
all the others.

Changes in Cultural Meaning of “Rape” Over Time

Apart from problems interpreting behavior in different cultural settings,

what rape consists in has changed profoundly over time, even within West-
ern history.
From Old Testament Jewish codes up to feudalism, rape was treated primarily as
theft, as a property offence, but one perpetuated against men. The crime was prin-
cipally that of stealing or abducting a woman from her rightful proprietors, nor-
mally her father or husband. (Porter 1986, p. 217)

Nor was the transition to the modern concept of rape sudden and clear.
In the early modern period, rape contained both the notion of property
theft and of violation of the woman’s will. “‘Rape’ descends from the Latin
‘rapere,’ which signifies theft or, if its object is a woman, abduction. This
definition of ‘rape’ as ‘abduction’ is still available in the early modern pe-
riod. Yet it also carries the meaning ‘violation’ which it signifies today. The
coexistence of these two definitions of the word accounts for much of the
complexity surrounding the issue of rape” (Catty 1999, p. 12). Some his-
torians of the early modern period suggest that “rape is the overpowering
of the female body by male force while seduction is its overpowering by
 What Is “Rape”? 373

desire. Both scenarios are located in the physical. . . . the destruction of the
woman’s (physical) chastity is often of greatest weight, rather than the role
of her (mental) volition in the sexual act” (ibid., p. 19). Subsequently,
Very gradually the law came round to its more modern form. Statutes and com-
mentators alike reiterated its gravity . . . , but opinion gradually came to stress that
the true injured party was the woman. Once abduction was made a distinct felony
in the sixteenth century, the crime of rape came to be seen essentially as that of sex-
ual ravishment, which in turn was viewed as the theft of chastity and virtue, rather
than of body and chattels. Yet since the law still saw wives and children as patri-
archal property, court room practice continued [into the 18th century] to treat rape
as a crime to be settled man-to-man. (ibid., p. 217) 7

But Thornhill and Palmer’s failure to grasp what kind of phenomenon

human culture is goes far beyond being tone deaf to the complexities of
how actions are imbued with meaning. Their understanding of culture is
so profoundly oversimplified as to be unbelievable. For them, understand-
ing culture is a matter of understanding how particular traits are copied
intact over the generations. From conception, genetic instructions allow
individuals to develop in interaction with the environment:
Genetic and environmental influences also construct the emotional and cognitive
adaptions of the brain, including those involved in the copying of behavior and
the highly specialized mechanisms designed to copy language. If the social learn-
ing (copying) involves English in parent and offspring generations, there will be
parent-offspring resemblance and the behavior of speaking English can be said to
have been inherited. (p. 26; emphasis added)

With this astonishingly impoverished view of cultural processes in place,

they can go on to argue that
There is no fundamental difference in the mechanisms of inheritance of cultural
and non-cultural behavior, nor is there a difference between the mechanisms of in-
heritance of cultural behavior and the mechanisms of inheritance of physiology
and morphology. Inheritance occurs—like begets like, traits breed true—when
and only when both genetic and environmental influences are repeated between
generations. (pp. 26–27)

As Tim Ingold recently expressed it, reading this kind of thing is like step-
ping into a time machine to return to the 1920s to 1950s when “analogies
and comparisons between cultural and biological evolution were com-
monplace” (2000, p. 1):
Over the last quarter of a century, sociocultural anthropologists have advanced
way beyond these rather elementary formulations. Where once they thought of
culture as a kind of content—whether conceived as clusters of traits, bundles of
374 Emily Martin

instructions, or compendia of rules and representations—which filled the capaci-

ties of the human mind, they are nowadays much more conscious of culture as pro-
cess. This process is an unfolding of relations among people and between people
and non-human components of the environment, out of which knowledge and
understanding is continually being generated or produced. Even within those situ-
ations we might label as “learning,” it is recognized that knowledge is not so much
transmitted ready-made as produced anew—that is, it is being reproduced rather
than replicated. And we now understand much better, too, how persons come
into being as centres of intentionality and awareness within fields of social rela-
tionships, which are in turn carried forward and transformed through their own
actions.

The picture Thornhill and Palmer wish to draw of rape as a definable ob-
ject in the world that could be selected for and then replicated over the
generations begins to fall apart at the seams. Ingold makes clear how mis-
guided is the supposition that culture is made up of traits that are passed
on like genes:
The idea of culture as consisting in transmissible and diffusible bundles of in-
structions is based on the false assumptions, firstly, that the meaning of each in-
struction can be specified independently of the particular environmental contexts
of its application, and secondly, stemming from this, that information is tanta-
mount to knowledge. For another thing, no known form of learning in human so-
ciety can reasonably be described as a simple process of replication. Moreover,
what people do is embedded in lifelong histories of engagement, as whole beings,
with their surroundings, and is not the mechanical output of interaction between
pre-replicated instructions (whether genetic or cultural) and prespecified environ-
mental conditions, as selectionists would have us believe. (p. 2) 8

Unexamined Assumptions in Sociobiology

Another approach to seeing what is wrong headed about Thornhill and

Palmer is to consider how unexamined their own cultural assumptions are.
Since these assumptions are unacknowledged and unexamined, they can
exist submerged in the subconscious and thence arise to inform explana-
tions of behavior in other cultures, times, and places (and even other
species) as if they were objective facts about the world rather than prod-
ucts of a particular, historically produced viewpoint. As Thornhill and
Palmer, as well as most who espouse the tenets of sociobiology, see the
world, it is made up of highly individualized agents bent on maximizing
their own advantage, defined as increasing their genetic stake in the next
 What Is “Rape”? 375

generation. Any means to that end, however ruthless, violent or aggres-

sive, will be looked for and justified as necessary to increasing fitness, so
defined. It may be that the strong resemblance to the kind of conduct that
seems to denizens of late capitalist social systems necessary for survival
in the ruthless employment and stock markets on every side is an acci-
dent, or it may be that the resemblance is a result of unconscious cultural
projection.
As we have come to expect since the day of early sociobiologists like
Edmund Wilson (1975), other species are written in the same language of
conquest and aggression that has been the hallmark of Western myth and
culture for millennia. Female dung flies
typically shake and struggle when grasped by a male. . . . The shaking and strug-
gling occur only at this time and in this context. In mating attempts, a male grasps
a female with elaborately modified forelegs that clamp the female’s wings at their
bases and allow the male to hold the struggling female. Struggling females some-
times prevent copulation, as do resisting female scorpionflies and waterstriders.
Thus female struggling acts to select mates that are capable of holding onto
them. . . . [F]emale struggling, and the resultant rape when their resistance is over-
come by certain males, may be a female adaptation that helps females mate with
males of superior phenotypic and genetic quality. (Thornhill and Palmer 2000,
pp. 82–83)

Males use force to overcome females; males rape when female resistance
can be overcome: Where does the license to interpret the insects’ behavior
this way come from? Is it not possible that the female is writhing from
pleasure or squirming from being tickled when having their wings held just
so? Is there any way to know for sure whether these flies are enacting a rape
scene, displaying helpless ticklishness, or enduring an agony of passion?
In another depiction of insect life, Thornhill and Palmer describe an or-
gan in scorpion flies they see as “designed specifically for rape” (p. 63).
The “notal organ” is a clamp used by the male to grasp the female fly by
force when he does not have a “nuptial gift” to present to the female,
which can be either a “hardened mass of saliva that he has produced, or a
dead insect” (ibid.). Although Thornhill and Palmer claim that experi-
ments have ruled out all other explanations of the function of the notal or-
gan other than rape, one must wonder whether, if the scientists explaining
this behavior lived in a society governed by different principles, different
insect scenarios would have been envisioned.
376 Emily Martin

For example, in a human society governed on principles of reciprocity,

where individuals and institutions were organized around the desirability
of social ties built by exchanging objects and services as evenly as possible
over time, men and women might prefer to mate when a gift exchange
could be made. Thornhill and Palmer note that among dung flies, females
do prefer males with gifts. If a male fly had no food offering and clasped
the female by her wing, would he be attempting to rape her? Or would he
be requesting her to engage in a social act in the absence of a gift, a request
that the female denies, according to Thornhill and Palmer, the vast major-
ity of the time (p. 79)? What Thornhill and Palmer see as a forceful grip
preparatory to rape might equally well be an effort to get her attention by
grasping her shoulder, a plea expressed by a gesture. If the grip is followed
by mating, is this “rape”? Do the movements of the female fly signify
“Rape!” or “You lousy bum!” (which would be a statement about his in-
appropriate preamble to sex)?
The matrilineal society described by Peggy Sanday as “rape-free,” the
Minangkabau of West Sumatra, value vulnerability, passivity, and kind-
heartedness. “All human behaviour should be non-aggressive and polite,
thinking first about the feelings of others. . . . There is an air of gracious-
ness that suffuses all human interaction” (1986, p. 95). A respected leader
of customary law (adat) in West Sumatra explained their ideals:
The main core of adat philosophy is good deeds and kindheartedness. Democracy
and thoughtfulness for the feelings of others is very important. Adat teaching is
orientated to human morals, the principle of which is kindheartedness. You do not
accuse someone directly. You do not criticize directly. You do so with proverbs. It
is very rude to point out mistakes directly. There should be no force in decision-
making. There should be mutual understanding. In Minangkabau democracy
there is no room for rivalries. Differences of opinion are regarded as normal—con-
sensus is arrived at through discussion. About differences of opinion there is a
proverb: Crossing wood in the hearth makes the fire glow. (ibid., p. 96)

Would a Minangkabau science of scorpion flies see them as doing their

best to express differences and resolve them according to appropriate so-
cial conventions?
Seeing the notal organ as a specific adaptation for rape in flies plays a
crucial role in the argument of Thornhill and Palmer’s book. By analogy,
just as selection pressures molded the notal organ in ancestral populations
of flies, increasing the “reproductive success of males that raped relative to
those that did not rape” (p. 64), so selection pressures on human ancestral
 What Is “Rape”? 377

populations molded adaptations that “influenced males in ancestral pop-

ulations to rape when the ultimate benefit (production of offspring) out-
weighed the ultimate costs (negative fitness consequences resulting from
injury, punishment, etc.)” (p. 65):
Men obviously don’t have a clamp designed specifically for rape, nor do they have
any other conspicuous morphology that might be a rape adaptation. We must
therefore look to the male psyche for candidates for rape adaptation. If found such
adaptations would be analogous to those in the male insects. (pp. 64–65)

If rape is a part of the natural history of flies, Thornhill and Palmer ar-
gue, then surely it is also part of the natural history of humans. But if we
can dislodge the assumptions that make rape seem obvious and natural
among flies, perhaps we would be less inclined to see the role of rape
among humans as obvious and natural.

Are Thornhill and Palmer Sad Bearers of the Bad News?

At this point my imaginary audience might begin to wonder about Thorn-

hill and Palmer’s motivation in writing such a book. There can be little
doubt that Thornhill and Palmer do not wish to increase the misery
women experience at the hands of raping men. Instead they present them-
selves as the sad but implacable bearers of the bad news: If we do not re-
alize rape is really the biological imperative of sexual competition, we will
continue to fail to stamp rape out and to alleviate the suffering of the raped
person. In this stance, I find them both disingenuous and insidious. They
are disingenuous because they elide to an astonishing degree the extent
to which efforts of feminists and others have had a major impact in the
United States on the legal system’s definition of rape, making it less ac-
ceptable to blame the victim for causing rape and more acceptable to ac-
knowledge that rape can occur within a marriage (Harvard Law Review
1986) and intimate relationships (Estrich 1987). They also elide the ex-
tensive system of support facilities (in the form of housing for abused
women, educational programs for police, special training for officers who
attend rape victims, and the development of more available technology to
detect evidence of a rape), much of which has resulted from energetic
political activism on the part of feminists in many quarters. Further, they
misunderstand, willfully or out of ignorance, the claim often made by fem-
inists that rape involves an act of exerting power over the victim (p. 124).
378 Emily Martin

Thornhill and Palmer are at pains to say that rape is not a matter of as-
serting superior power; rather it flows out of deep sexual urges to spread
one’s seed. How did Thornhill and Palmer miss the fact that feminists
have been arguing for over 100 years that in Euro-American cultures,
sexual interactions are always imbued with relations of power? To say that
power is involved is by no means to say that rape is not sexual in any way,
as much as it is to say that sexuality in Euro-America is virtually always
part and parcel of a relationship involving disparate power (Griffin 1975;
Bourque 1989, p. 286; Bell 1991; Cowling 1998, pp. 18–19).
Their stance is insidious because, their protestations to the contrary,
their account actually amounts to an incitement to rape. Thornhill and
Palmer take pains to avoid the naturalistic fallacy, to avoid implying that
because something happens “in nature” it is a good thing. But the natura-
listic fallacy is the least of our worries. The important worry is that when-
ever a form of human behavior appears to us to be written in nature, it
comes to seem among those behaviors that are most unchangeable. Even
though Thornhill and Palmer make numerous (and far from novel) sug-
gestions for changes in education, criminology, and psychiatry to reduce
the incidence of rape, they do not seriously consider the probable social ef-
fects of their message itself.

Notes

1. These are some classic and more recent critiques: Sahlins (1976); Travis and
White (2000); Ingold (2000); Hubbard (1990); Gould (1997); Dusek (1999);
Lewontin (1991); Kitcher (1987); Rose and Rose (2000).
2. Nelkin (2000) discusses at length the religious character of evolutionary
psychology.
3. Sahlins (1976) characterizes sociobiology as resting on utilitarian economic
principles enacted according to possessive individualism (pp. 73, 97–98).
4. For analyses of the position of women in Chinese marriage, see M. Wolf (1972);
A. Wolf and Huang (1980); Wolf and Witke (1975).
5. In the context of this statement, the authors introduce a controversy over
whether rape behavior is an adaptation that was directly favored by selection or a
by-product of other psychological adaptations (pp. 57–58).
6. Thornhill and Palmer make unnecessarily simple-minded divisions between
mental states and behavior (p. 25).
7. See also Paxton (1999), pp. 8–9.
8. See also Ingold (2000).
 What Is “Rape”? 379

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16
Understanding Rape: A Metatheoretical
Framework
Jacquelyn W. White and Lori A. Post

Until the women’s movement of the 1960s, rape was perceived to be a rare
and marginalized event and thus did not gain the attention of policymak-
ers and academics. Rape was seen as a sexual deviance (Amir 1971), and
research was conducted primarily by biologists, doctors, and therapists.
Hence, we see early explanations of sexual behavior from a Darwinian,
Freudian, or Kinseyian perspective (Tiefer 1988). In 1973, in response
to the growing concern over rape, Senator Charles Mathias introduced a
bill to establish the National Center for the Prevention and Control of
Rape (Largen 1985). Shortly thereafter, Susan Brownmiller published her
groundbreaking book Against Our Will (1975), which was one of the first
attempts to address rape as a nonbiological event. She conceptualized rape
as a cultural phenomenon with a political agenda. With the addition of
Koss’s important contribution on the pervasiveness of rape in American
society, the issue was exposed as a significant social problem (Koss,
Gidycz, and Wisniewski 1987). The etiology and prevalence of sexual vi-
olence have since been heavily debated topics with little consensus.
Theoretical development regarding violence against women evolved
within multiple disciplines. However, within each discipline, theory de-
velopment took the form of singular explanations with strong disciplin-
ary biases (Hiese 1998). More recent studies on violence against women
acknowledge the need to address gendered violence at multiple levels
(Crowell and Burgess 1996; Hiese 1998; Koss 2000; Miller 1994; White
and Kowalski 1998). Hiese (1998) noted that:
The task of theory building has been severely hampered by the narrowness of tra-
ditional academic disciplines and by the tendency of both academics and activists
to advance single-factor theories rather than explanations that reflect the full com-
plexity and messiness of real life. (p. 262)
384 Jacquelyn W. White and Lori A. Post

One such single-factor theory of rape was published by Thornhill and

Palmer (2000). They argue that rape can be understood in an evolutionary
framework as a behavioral adaptation molded by sexual selection. In
sum, Thornhill and Palmer see rape as a biological phenomenon with a re-
productive agenda. Other authors in this book respond to the merits (or
lack thereof) of Thornhill and Palmer’s work from a Darwinian or socio-
biological basis. Although it is possible to consider rape as having some bio-
logical foundation, Thornhill and Palmer present more of an ideological
basis for their theory rather than one grounded in empirical evidence. Ad-
ditionally, their work neglects the past 25 years of literature in the nascent
field of evolutionary psychology, as well as in social psychology and soci-
ology. Because critiques of Thornhill and Palmer’s work from biological
and evolutionary perspectives are addressed in other chapters in this book,
this chapter will focus on rape as a complex multifactor phenomenon and
argue for a theoretical approach and research methods that are sophisti-
cated enough to accommodate the complexities. Instead of conceptualiz-
ing rape within a singular theoretical framework, we posit rape should be
understood within a metatheoretical model that recognizes and integrates
factors across several levels of analysis.
This chapter will discuss empirical research on rape in the context of
the integrated contextual developmental model of violence against women
(White and Kowalski 1998). This approach provides a more compre-
hensive account of rape than any account that relies on just one level of
analysis (Koss 2000). The model recognizes commonalities across var-
ious forms of violence against women, argues for the multiply determined
nature of rape, and can readily account for variability in rape proclivity
among men. Prior to the discussion of the integrated contextual model, a
brief overview of current issues and findings in rape research is presented.
This is followed by a brief overview and critique of the traditional ac-
counts of rape. The inadequacies of these single-factor theories to account
for rape serve as a basis for the development of the integrated contextual
model.

A Complex Phenomenon Requires Complex Theorizing

A number of factors suggest the need for a theory of rape that recognizes
it as a complex phenomenon. As we discuss below, variations in definitions
 Understanding Rape 385

of sexual coercion and rape and variations in incidence and prevalence

rates, as well as differences among those more and less likely to be involved
in sexual assault, attest to the need for a theory that can account for these
variations.

Defining Sexual Assault

Recognizing the complexities associated with defining sexual assault and
rape underscores the need for a theoretical model that acknowledges and
accounts for these complexities. There are clear incongruities between le-
gal and social definitions of what constitutes “real rape” (see Martin, this
volume). Susan Brownmiller (1975) noted that
the question of “What is a rape?” is not answered by a powerful legal litmus test
but through a system of beliefs that drive from a misogynistic social context, the
“rape culture.” (p. 436)

Defining rape is difficult both legally and socially. The legal definition is
problematic as it varies from state to state. Furthermore, state definitions
are not consistent with federal definitions and vary over time. The FBI legal
definition of rape differs from state police agencies in that they do not
include same-sex rape and forms of sexual penetration outside of penile/
vaginal penetration (Kuecker 1999). Also, in many states consensual sex
between males is still considered a sexual crime. Many states such as
Michigan have updated their rape laws and are moving toward degrees of
criminal sexual conduct (Tomaselli and Porter 1986). On a positive note,
the new Criminal Sexual Conduct (CSC) codes are much improved; how-
ever, they place a hierarchy on crimes whereas murder trumps rape or CSC
first degree. The FBI’s indexing of serious crimes (also known as Uniform
Crime Reports) records crime and not motivation of crime; therefore, sex-
ually motivated homicides are solely recorded as homicides. Other crimes
trump lesser CSC degrees, that is, armed robbery trumps CSC third de-
gree. So, in defining the crime, many cases of sexual violence are “lost” by
definition.
Sexual assault, sexual coercion, and sexual aggression are all terms used
to refer to instances in which one person engages in sexual behavior
against another’s will. These terms encompass acts that range from un-
wanted sexual contact, such as forced kissing or the fondling of breasts
and/or genitals, to attempted rape and rape. Coercive tactics may range
from psychological pressure (i.e., threatening to end the relationship,
386 Jacquelyn W. White and Lori A. Post

saying things he does not mean, such as falsely professing love), verbal
persuasion (“if you loved me, you’d let me”; “you owe it to me”), verbal
threats of harm, use of alcohol and drugs, physical intimidation, mild
physical force (pushing, slapping, holding down), severe physical force
(beating, choking), to displaying or using a weapon.
The term rape has been shown to have different meanings for women
and men, as well as different segments of the community such as police of-
ficers and mental health counselors (see White and Humphrey 1991 for a
review). Some people are hesitant to label forced sex between acquain-
tances as rape, particularly if any of the following circumstances are pres-
ent: The man initiated the date; he spent a great deal of money; the couple
went to his place; there had been drinking, kissing, and petting; the couple
had been sexually intimate on previous occasions; the woman had sex with
other men (Goodchilds et al. 1989; Muehlenhard and Linton 1987); or
“no” was not explicitly verbalized (Sawyer, Pinciaro, and Jessell 1998).
College students in general, and sexually aggressive men in particular, be-
lieve that sexual precedence (i.e., a past history of sexual intercourse) re-
duces the legitimacy of sexual refusal (Shotland and Goodstein 1992).
The reluctance to use the label rape is apparent in recent criticisms ap-
pearing in the popular press (i.e., trade books, such as Roiphe 1993; news-
paper articles and magazine features, see Collison 1992) questioning the
veracity of rape statistics. These critics suggest that if young women do not
label their experiences as rape, then they are not victims (Gilbert 1993).
Of course, this is illogical. Although a woman may not realize that forced
sexual intercourse by an acquaintance during a date is rape, this does not
change the legal definition of the act as rape, nor does it reduce the culpa-
bility of the perpetrator (Koss 1994). Furthermore, whether or not a sex-
ual assault is labeled rape, it has serious consequences.

Variations in the Frequency of Sexual Assault

Estimates of the frequency of sexual assault vary across cultures (Rozee
1993), across ethnic groups (Marsh 1993; Sorenson and Siegel 1991), re-
gions (George, Winfield, and Blazer 1992; Wyatt 1992), and across defi-
nitions and research methods (Fisher 2000; Koss 1992), as well as being
affected by who reports assaults and under what circumstances. These var-
iations, in conjunction with different definitions of sexual assault and rape,
call for a theoretical perspective that can account for such complexities.
 Understanding Rape 387

Rape is the crime least likely to be reported and, if reported, the least
likely to result in a conviction, particularly if committed by an acquain-
tance. Not only do many women not report their assault to the authori-
ties, many never tell anyone. Thus, crime statistics greatly underestimate
the frequency of rape by as much as 50 to 90 percent (Gise and Paddison
1988). Researchers must rely on large-scale surveys of women to obtain
more accurate estimates of victimization rates. Women are asked about a
number of sexual experiences that may have involved force or threat of
force, some of which meet the legal criteria for rape, rather than being
asked directly “Have you ever been raped?” This is important because
many victimized women (73 percent) never label forced sexual intercourse
as rape. This approach has suggested that the actual rape victimization rate
is 10 to 15 times greater than corresponding FBI estimates (Koss 1992).
Because most of these unlabeled, unreported rape experiences are perpe-
trated by acquaintances, acquaintance rape has been labeled a “hidden”
crime (Koss 1985, 1989).
A comprehensive survey asked over 3,000 college women from 32 insti-
tutions of higher education across the United States about sexual experi-
ences since the age of 14 (Koss et al. 1987). Of those surveyed, over half
(53.7 percent) had experienced some form of sexual victimization; 15.4
percent had experienced acts by a man that met the legal definition of rape
(though only 27 percent labeled the experience rape), and 12.1 percent, at-
tempted rape. An additional 11.9 percent had been verbally pressured into
sexual intercourse, and the remaining 14.4 percent had experienced some
other form of unwanted sexual contact, such as forced kissing or fondling
with no attempted penetration. More recent studies confirm these high
numbers among Canadians (DeKeseredy 1997), as well as among a prob-
ability sample of 8,000 women in the United States (Tjaden and Thoennes
1998). Community-based surveys have found that 25 percent of African-
American women, 20 percent white women (Wyatt 1985), and 8 percent
Hispanic women (Sorenson and Siegel 1991) reported at least one sexual
assault experience in their lifetime. High school women also appear to be
at greater risk for rape than previously thought. A recent survey of 1569
entering college students found that 13 percent reported being raped be-
tween the ages of 14 and 18, and an additional 16 percent reported being
victims of an attempted rape (Humphrey and White 2000).
388 Jacquelyn W. White and Lori A. Post

Who Is at Risk?
Research confirms that not all women are equally likely to be sexually vic-
timized. Numerous studies have been conducted to identify risk factors for
sexual victimization, most with little success. The greatest risk factor is be-
ing female. Although men are also sexually victimized, the likelihood is
less than for women. Age is also a risk factor, with adolescence being the
period of greatest vulnerability; during adolescence the risk of first being
victimized increases steadily from age 14 to 18 and declines thereafter
(Humphrey and White 2000). Another risk factor is being a college stu-
dent; sexual victimization rates are about three times higher among college
students than in the general population (Aizenman and Kelley 1988; Koss
et al. 1987), although recently the opposite has been found (Zweig, Bar-
ber, and Eccles 1997). Other risk factors have been difficult to determine.
Several researchers have confirmed that the best predictor of victimization
is past victimization; typically childhood victimization increases the risk
of adolescent victimization, which in turn increases the risk of victimiza-
tion as a young adult (Collins 1998; Gidycz et al. 1993; Mills and Granoff
1992; Humphrey and White 2000; Wyatt, Guthrie, and Notgrass 1992).
Additionally, childhood victimization has been related to earlier age of
menarche and sexual activity (Vicary, Klingman, and Harkness 1995), as
well as alcohol use. It is likely that alcohol is implicated in several ways.
Women with a history of victimization may turn to alcohol as a means of
coping. Unfortunately, alcohol and other substance abuse put women at
increased risks of sexual victimization (Norris, Nurius, and Graham 1999;
Richardson and Hammock 1990).

Who Does This?

Not only are all women not equally likely to be victims of sexual assault,
all men are not prone to sexual assault and rape. The survey (Koss et al.
1987) described above also examined the sexual experiences of over 2900
college men. Of this group, 4.4 percent admitted to behaviors meeting the
legal definition of rape, 3.3 percent admitted to attempted rape, 7.2 per-
cent to sexual coercion, and 10.2 percent to forced or coerced sexual con-
tact, indicated that 25.1 percent of the college men admit to some form of
sexual aggression. Similar rates have been reported in community samples
(Calhoun et al. 1997) and in a community college sample (Lowdermilk,
Holland, Cameron, and White 1998).
 Understanding Rape 389

The typical acquaintance rapist appears to be a “normal” guy. He is not

a crazed psychopath, although he may display psychopathy-related traits
(Kosson, Kelly, and White 1997). Among college students, alcohol use
(Koss and Gaines 1993; White and Humphrey 1994), athletic affiliation
(Jackson 1991; Frintner and Rubinson 1993; Koss and Gaines 1993), and
fraternity membership (Frintner and Rubinson 1993, but cf. Koss and
Gaines 1993) have been associated with sexual aggression toward women.
Other significant correlates of sexual assault include a history of family vi-
olence; an early and varied sexual history, including many sexual partners;
a history of delinquency; acceptance of rape myths; sexual promiscuity;
hostility toward women; self-centeredness; low empathy; an impulsive per-
sonality; hedonistic and dominance motives for sex; lower than average
sense of self-worth; and lower religiosity; as well as peers who condone
and encourage sexual conquests (see White and Koss 1991 for a review).
Finally, sexually aggressive men are more likely to perceive a wider range
of behaviors as indicative of sexual interest than do non–sexually aggres-
sive men (Bondurant and Donat 1999) and are attracted to sexual aggres-
sion (Calhoun et al. 1997).

Theories of Aggression Applied to Rape

Ideally, a theory should address and be able to account for variation in def-
inition, incidence, and prevalence, as well as variation in characteristics of
victims and perpetrators. Unfortunately, most traditional theories do not
do this. These theories tend to address aggression and violence only at the
individual level and do not address gender as a central construct (White
and Kowalski 1998). Empirically, we have substantiated the pervasiveness
and variability of rape as well as risk factors. Singular explanations do not
suffice to explain rape. To this end, we will first discuss single-factor theo-
ries and then integrate them into a metatheoretical model to better capture
the complexities of rape.
Popular belief regarding aggression assumed that men have always been
aggressive because of God’s design and/or biological determinants; men’s
aggressiveness was seen as universal and natural (Lerner 1986). Lerner’s
historical analysis of the origins of patriarchy argues that male aggression
is rooted in a warrior culture. However, we must first consider human be-
havior across time. Humans have existed as the species genus Homo sapi-
ens for tens of thousands of years. Human activities have been recorded
390 Jacquelyn W. White and Lori A. Post

for less than 1 percent of that time; therefore, it is difficult to accurately as-
sess the presence and circumstances of violence, rape, and warrior cultures
in prerecorded history. Thus, it is not prudent to assess male aggression as
natural or universal with less than a 1 percent accounting of human his-
tory and significant evidence to the contrary on the remaining time spent
as foragers.
Anthropologists turn to modern day hunter-gatherers to shed light on
ancient humans as well as examine archeological findings for evidence of
ancient warring societies (Carman and Harding 1999). Hunter-gatherers
or foragers can be meaningfully referred to as the “human state of nature”
as humans have lived in this state for 99.5 percent of their existence (Gat
2000). “Available evidence contradicts the assumption that warfare was a
regular part of our ancestral environment of evolutionary adaptation”
(Ferguson 2000, p. 167). In modern-day hunter-gatherer groups, there is
evidence of more egalitarian male-female relationships, although there
exist gendered divisions of labor (Mascia-Lees and Black 2000; Shostak
1981; and Ward 1999). “It is generally agreed that the sexual division of
labor in foraging groups was relatively equalitarian” (Ward 1999; p. 25).
Women did not wait around the camp while the men were out hunt-
ing; rather, foraging for food required the participation of all members of
the social group, whose structure neared equality (Friedl 1975; Mascia-
Lees and Black 2000). Inequality appears to increase when resources are
stressed or nomads are forced into settlement (Gat 2000; Shostak 1981)
but not in all cases (Ferguson 2000). Focusing on gender inequality and
theories of aggression sheds light on the etiologies of rape; however, we
cannot infer that warring cultures or rape are inherent in the “human state
of nature.”
After early humans turned to land possession and agriculture, Blumberg
(1978) suggests the division of labor became more pronounced in these
horticultural societies. According to Vannoy (2001), gender stratification
became more severe over time as populations increased and economic/
political systems evolved into more complex forms with industrialism lead-
ing to the most pronounced forms of inequality between social groups.
Agrarian and industrial societies comprises less than 1 percent of human
history. Most social theories connect the origins of gender stratification
with the sexual division of labor and ownership of the means of produc-
tion (Chafetz 1988).
 Understanding Rape 391

Theories regarding gender inequality have been cataloged variously as

biological, social, cultural, anthropological, political, and psychological.
Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to review fully all the vari-
ous theories, several exemplars will be described.
Biological theories of aggression proposed that men are more aggressive
than women because of higher testosterone levels (Johnson 1972). Thus,
male violence is associated with their biologically based gender identity
(Balkan et al. 1980; see Salzman 1979 for a critique of the biologically
based accounts of gender differences in aggression). Sociobiological theo-
ries also suggest genetic or hormonal paths to sexual aggression (see Ellis
1991). Freud (1901) melded biological and instinctual factors with un-
conscious psychological processes to posit an early “modern” personality
theory of aggression. Male aggression was rooted in resolution of the
Oedipal complex. Aggression directed toward others was seen as normal
and a compensation for the frustration of childhood sexual instincts.
Some contemporary psychoanalysts have suggested that women and men
possess the same drives and impulses, but “differ exclusively in how drives
and aggressive impulses are worked through and expressed . . . [and] may
to a large extent be explained on the basis of forms and practices of child
rearing” (Mitscherlich 1987, p. 224). This results in men turning aggres-
sion outward and women turning aggression inward. Reinterpretation of
Freudian theory into learning terms led Dollard et al. (1939) to posit the
frustration-aggression hypothesis. In contrast, social learning theories
(Bandura 1973) stress the differential socialization experiences of men
and women. Gender socialization theories explain rape as rooted in the
dominant culture with its emphasis on masculinity and learned patterns
of aggression and domination (Andersen 1997). The mechanisms of social
learning (including rewards, punishments, and modeling) result in differ-
ent gender-related expectations and in different behavioral outcomes for
women and men.
Social disorganization theory is an exemplar of a sociological approach
to crime and deviancy. Emanating from Shaw and McKay’s research out of
the Chicago School (1942), Shaw and McKay hypothesized violence and
crime as symptomatic of communities disrupted by disorganizing factors
such as migration, divorce, and cultural heterogeneity. Baron extrapolates
crime and deviance to include rape: “To the extent that marital disruption
and migration are disorganizing factors, such conditions may reduce
392 Jacquelyn W. White and Lori A. Post

social constraints against rape” (Baron and Straus 1989, p. 10). Hirschi
(1969) further developed the social disorganizing theory to include “con-
trol” as a function of the connection an individual has to the greater social
structure. Control theory addresses linkages between the individual and
friends and family; time and energy invested in a future goal such as edu-
cation, a career or reputation; involvement in community activities such as
school or work; and commitment to the existing culture’s mores and val-
ues. When extrapolating macrosociological theories to rape, control the-
ory explains why men rape whereas social disorganization theory explains
why some communities have more rape than other communities. Social
disorganization, control, and psychological theories are based on de-
viances from mainstream society, whereas gender socialization theory
poses rape as an exaggeration of traditional gender roles. In sum, men rape
because they have learned that rape is acceptable and normal behavior
(Andersen 1997).
Currently, feminist models are being developed that acknowledge ex-
plicitly the socially constructed meanings of aggression, violence, and
rape (Bourque 1989; White and Humphrey 1991; White, Donat, and
Bondurant 2001). These meanings affect how and when forced sexual in-
tercourse is acknowledged and under what circumstances it is labeled
rape (Donat and White 2000). Feminist analyses of power relations indi-
cate that men have defined what constitutes rape, effectively silencing
women with regard to their experiences. Mitscherlich (1987) stated, “those
who dominate define what constitutes violence . . . those in power can alone
stipulate whose job it is to be maternal and gentle and when” (p. 10). What
remains is an androcentric rational means-ends analysis that fails to ac-
count fully for the contextualized nature of women’s experiences.
Feminist theories also emphasize the need to understand rape in terms
of the status of women in society—to reveal, acknowledge, and define it
from the woman’s perspective. The intersection of race, class, and gender
is of central importance to these theories. Feminists agree with the asser-
tions of social learning theorists regarding the effects of social arrange-
ments on the likelihood of rape. However, feminists push the analysis
further to bring to center stage patriarchy, with its attendant differential
status and power. The power differences between women and men, along
with women’s restricted opportunities and resources, contribute to an in-
 Understanding Rape 393

creased likelihood of female victimization, especially in interpersonal re-

lationships rather than in other contexts.

An Integrated Contextual Developmental Model

White and Kowalski (1998) proposed a model to integrate a wide range of

factors across various forms of gendered violence (see figure 16.1). The
model provides a metatheoretical framework within which to think about
violence against women. It is intended to guide researchers in the genera-
tion of substantive hypotheses derived from various theoretical perspec-
tives and argues for systematic research across levels of analysis. It is
derived from the ecological model of Bronfenbrenner (1979) (see also Dut-
ton 1988; Lerner 1991; Williams, Guerra, and Elliott 1999). The model
describes five levels of interacting factors: sociocultural (including histori-
cal, cultural, and community traditions and values), social networks, dy-
adic, situational, and intrapersonal. This perspective examines individual
behavior in context.
Time is a critical component of the model, based on the assumption that
effects change across time and are cumulative. The most distal influences

Figure 16.1
An integrative contextual developmental model of violence against women.
394 Jacquelyn W. White and Lori A. Post

are historical and sociocultural. Embedded in these are a number of inter-

connected relationships a person has (or may have at different points
across the lifespan) and includes family, social life, school, and work.
Within each network is embedded a relationship between two individuals,
the potential perpetrator and potential victim. These two individuals have
an interaction history that will influence their behaviors in any given situ-
ation; the situation provides the proximal cues for aggression and vio-
lence. All these factors coalesce to determine the particular behavioral
manifestation of aggression (i.e., direct, indirect; verbal, physical, sexual).
Certain situational factors will increase the likelihood of an aggressive
encounter.
This integrative contextual developmental perspective suggests that
intrapersonal variables are expressed within a cultural and social con-
text, while also reflecting the influences of personality, attitudes and be-
liefs, cognitive processes, and learning history. Thus, certain intrapersonal
variables predict violence, but only in specific situations (White and Hum-
phrey 1997).
The model assumes that patriarchy operating at the historical/sociocul-
tural level affects the power dynamics of all relationships. Shared patterns
of ideas and beliefs passed down from generation to generation define
one’s social networks. Historical and sociocultural factors create an envi-
ronment in which the growing child learns rules and expectations, first in
the family network, and later in peer, intimate, and work relationships.
Early experiences define the context for later experiences (Huesmann and
Eron 1992; Olweus 1993; White and Bondurant 1996). Embedded in
these social networks are characteristics of the personal relationships in
which individuals act violently. Power dynamics become enacted in social
networks and result in the internalization of gendered values, expecta-
tions, and behaviors. Thus, cultural norms governing the use of aggression
as a tool of the more powerful to subdue the weaker combine with gender
inequalities to create a climate conducive to violence. Violence is inextri-
cably bound to the social context of male domination and control. Rape
represents an extreme behavioral manifestation on the continuum of dom-
inance and control. The patriarchal view of society gives men a higher
value than women. Patriarchy takes it for granted that men should domi-
nate in politics, economics, and the social world including family life and
interpersonal relationships. This model can be applied specifically to an
understanding of rape as a particular type of violence against women.
 Understanding Rape 395

Sociocultural Level
The sociocultural level of analysis examines historical, cultural, social,
institutional, and community influences on behavior at the macrolevel of
analysis. In this context, history serves as a means of transmitting socio-
cultural attitudes and beliefs regarding gender and rape. Sexual violence is
perpetuated insofar as cultural traditions are reproduced and transmitted
from generation to generation (see Wyatt 1992 for a discussion of how
rape stories have been transmitted among African Americans from the
time of slavery to the present).
Modern histories tend to be ethnocentric, plagued with Western bias
and devoid of the histories of Asia, Africa, precolonial Americas, and Aus-
tralia. This Western bias extends to studies of feminism as well as violence
(Samarasinghe 1994; Young and Dickerson 1994). Additionally, historical
accounts of rape have been minimal until recently. It is only the recent
women’s movement and activism that has given rape a place in history
(Lerner 1986; Porter 1986). However, there are accounts of rape, patri-
archy, and the devaluation of females in ancient Hebrew, Greek, Roman,
and Christian societies (Holmes 1991).
A great deal of macrolevel research, especially in the sociological tradi-
tion, has documented the role that sociocultural factors play in rape
(Baron and Straus 1989; Rozee 1993; Sanday 1981). Baron and Straus
(1989) suggest that cultures with pervasive legitimate violence are more
conducive to sexual violence. Legitimate violence may be reflected in a va-
riety of cultural activities such as mass media violence saturation, and
government-sanctioned violence as in the death penalty, violent sports,
hunting, and so on. In sum, cultural support for rape is not limited to be-
liefs and attitudes regarding rape; various cultural elements also indirectly
support rape. This would be expected in cultures where violence is the
norm and where legitimate violence spills over to sexual expression.
Other sociocultural factors implicated in rape include sexual inequali-
ties, gender role prescriptions (including dating and sexual scripts), and
cultural norms and myths about women, men, children, family, sex, and
violence, as well as scripts for enacting relationships. Expectations about
the appropriate roles for men and women are communicated through var-
ious institutionalized practices of a society, including those of the legal sys-
tem, the church, schools, media, politics, and the military. All set the stage
for the evolution of cultural myths that perpetuate male violence against
396 Jacquelyn W. White and Lori A. Post

women. During adolescence, young men and women experience extreme

pressure to conform to traditional gender role expectations. It appears that
violence in adolescence is so prevalent, in part, because of the overall struc-
ture and meaning of maleness in our culture that encourages boys to feel
entitled to power at any cost. Scripts for being male or female are fairly
well defined and have not changed much over several decades. A script is
a set of rules to be followed. Dating and sexual scripts in particular afford
men greater power relative to women (Breines and Gordon 1983; La-
Plante, McCormick, and Brannigan 1990; Rose and Frieze 1993). Women
are assumed to be responsible for “how far things go,” and if things “get
out of hand,” it is their fault. Men who endorse traditional scripts are more
likely than men who do not to perceive force and coercion as acceptable
means of obtaining desired outcomes regardless of the circumstances
(Goodchilds et al. 1989).
Cultures in which less traditional gender roles are prescribed and in
which male dominance and female subordination are not encouraged
show fewer instances of male violence against women, supporting the idea
of sociocultural contributions to such violence (Rozee 1993). However, al-
though all men within a given culture are typically exposed to similar so-
ciocultural pressures to behave in accordance with their assigned gender
roles, not all men are violent, nor do they rape. One reason not all men are
violent lies in the multiply determined nature of violence. Embedded with-
in one’s culture are social, dyadic, situational, and individual influences
that may either increase the likelihood of violence or mitigate against it.

Social Network Level

The social network level of analysis focuses on one’s history of personal
experiences within various social institutions (family, peers, school, faith
community, and work settings). The gendered norms and expectations
that contribute to violence are transmitted through these institutions. Wit-
nessing and experiencing violence in the family of origin alters the likeli-
hood of later involvement in violent episodes. Men who either witnessed
or experienced violence as a child show a higher likelihood of delinquency,
as well as being sexually (Koss and Dinero 1989) and physically aggressive
in dating situations (Kalmuss 1984; Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz 1980).
As with the family unit, other social networks may promote a system of
values that reflects sociocultural understandings of gender inequality.
 Understanding Rape 397

Within these networks, the acceptance of interpersonal violence may be

encouraged and rewarded. For example, exposure to delinquent peer
groups, whether at school, work, or in the community at large, has been
shown to be related to delinquency in general (Ellickson and McGuigan
2000), as well as dating violence and sexual assault (Ageton 1983;
Gwartney-Gibbs, Stockard, and Brohmer 1983; White and Koss 1991).
The gender-related patterns learned in childhood are played out in ado-
lescent dating and committed relationships. Young people usually begin
dating in high school, although children as young as kindergartners talk
about having boyfriends and girlfriends. The idea of being paired with a
member of the other sex is pervasive in our society. Traditionally, it has
been assumed that children’s “playing house,” and later, dating provide a
context for socialization into later roles, including husband, wife, lover,
and confidante (Rice 1984). Dating also offers opportunities for compan-
ionship, status, sexual experimentation, and conflict resolution. However,
courtship has different meanings for young women and men (Lloyd 1991).
Whereas for men courtship involves themes of “staying in control,” for
women themes involve “dependence on the relationship.” Violence is one
of the tactics used to gain control in a relationship, as is discussed further
in the next section.

Dyadic Level
Whereas social networks focus attention on a perpetrator and victim’s his-
tory of interpersonal relationships, particularly within the family and peer
groups, the dyadic level focuses on the nature of one specific relation-
ship, the one between the perpetrator and victim. Crime statistics tell us
that individuals are more likely to be victimized by someone they know
than by a stranger; this is particularly true for women. Approximately 85
percent of all sexual assaults are perpetrated by someone at least casually
known to the victim. Romantic partners commit as many as 57 percent of
all assaults (Koss 1990). Several researchers have found that violence is
more likely to occur in serious than in casual relationships (Pedersen and
Thomas 1992), suggesting that violence in more committed relationships
may reflect the acceptance of violence as a legitimate mode of conflict res-
olution (Billingham 1983). On the other hand, violence in a developing
relationship may be a way of “testing the relative safety of a relationship
before movement to greater commitment is risked” (Billingham 1987,
398 Jacquelyn W. White and Lori A. Post

p. 288). Shotland (1992) has suggested that rape serves different functions
at different stages in a relationship. In the early stages of dating, rape
may actually be a strategy some men use to obtain sex. These men are
more likely to have antisocial tendencies and hold misogynist and rape-
supportive attitudes. However, during the later stages of dating, Shotland
suggests that a couples’ sexual ground rules have probably been estab-
lished; however, if they do not allow for the level of sexual intimacy desired
by the male he may experience anger, which, combined with his sexual
arousal, may contribute to the likelihood of rape. Finally, Shotland sug-
gests that some men may see sexual intimacy as a sign of a more intense
relationship and resort to force if his partner does not share that view.
Sexual and dating violence are more likely in relationships plagued by
problems, including jealousy, fighting, interference from friends, lack of
time together, breakdown of the relationship, and problems outside the
relationship (Riggs 1993), as well as disagreements about drinking and
sexual denial (Roscoe and Kelsey 1986). These are the conflicts young
people report most frequently leading to feelings of confusion and anger
and resulting in violence (Sugarman and Hotaling 1989). Malamuth et al.
(1995) have shown that relationship distress predicts verbal and physical
violence.
Nonverbal and verbal communication patterns between the members of
the dyad may set the stage for violent interactions. More specifically, men
and women do not always perceive behaviors in exactly the same way.
Some men interpret women’s behavior in more sexualized ways than it
was intended (Abbey 1991; Kowalski 1992, 1993), do not take her ver-
bal protestations seriously (Check and Malamuth 1983), and perceive the
woman’s rejection of sexual advances as a threat to their manhood (Beneke
1982). According to Kowalski (1993), men who endorse adversarial sex-
ual beliefs and interpersonal violence are more likely to misinterpret a
woman’s behavior as sexually connotative than men who do not hold such
beliefs. Similarly, women may enter dating relationships with a cognitive
set toward trust, companionship, and having a good time, and hence be
less alert to the warning signs of assault (Nurius and Norris 1996).
According to Thornhill and Palmer, when access to women via looks,
wealth, or status is not available, men are more likely to rape. However,
there are no data to support such a claim. In fact, Makepeace (1987) has
presented evidence that some men are more likely to assault women of
lower status than themselves. Furthermore, sexually aggressive men typi-
 Understanding Rape 399

cally have more consensual sexual partners than nonsexually aggressive

men (Koss and Dinero 1989; Makepeace 1989; White and Humphrey
1995).

Situational Level
The situational level of analysis focuses on situational variables that in-
crease or decrease the likelihood of interpersonal violence (Craig 1990).
For violence to occur, the situation must be conducive to the violence. Fea-
tures of the situation influence the likelihood that violence will occur by
affecting the opportunity for violent acts (i.e., times when privacy is avail-
able and detection minimal) and/or by contributing to the ambiguity of the
situation (White and Koss 1991). The routine activities model of crime
emphasizes the role of opportunity (Cohen and Felson 1979, 1981). Situ-
ations that include violent cues are likely to promote violence, especially
for men (Bettencourt and Kernahan 1997). A number of situational vari-
ables, including time of day, location, and the presence of social inhibitors
or disinhibitors, such as alcohol and drugs, are known to affect the likeli-
hood of crime differentially for women and men. According to the U.S. De-
partment of Justice (1997), women are more likely to be the victim of
crime during daylight hours (54 percent) than at dark, the more likely time
for men (47 percent). A private home is the most likely site of victimiza-
tion for women, or a private vehicle if they are traveling. Not surpris-
ingly then, courtship violence is most likely to occur in private settings
(Laner 1983; Roscoe and Kelsey 1986) and on weekends (Olday and Wes-
ley 1983). Alcohol and drugs are also related to incidents of rape (Pagelow
1984). Alcohol acts as a disinhibitor for the man, as an excuse for the rape
after it has occurred, and as a means of reducing the victim’s resistance
(Richardson and Hammock 1991). In cases of dating violence, alcohol use
is common (LeJeune and Follette 1994; Williams and Smith 1994). In
cases of acquaintance rape, alcohol may enhance ambiguity by increasing
the likelihood that men may misinterpret a woman’s friendly behaviors as
sexual (Abbey 1991). Some men may interpret a woman’s consumption of
alcohol as an indication that she is “loose.”

Individual Level
The most developed theories of violence occur at the individual level of
analysis. The focus at the individual level is on attitudinal, motivational,
and characterological features of the individual. However, it is recognized
400 Jacquelyn W. White and Lori A. Post

that individual attributes typically emerge as the result of experiences in

various social networks. Thus, there is a dynamic interplay between fac-
tors operating at these various levels. For example, the attitudinal under-
pinnings of rape, in particular, the endorsement of traditional sex-role
stereotypes and cultural myths about rape, often stem from being reared
in households where violence was considered normative. The extent to
which these specific individual variables influence the incidence of rape de-
pends on the degree to which cultural norms and the influence of social
groups affect individual mental representations of the situation and the re-
lationship with the victim.
Certain personality and behavioral variables have been identified in in-
dividuals with a history of rape and include antisocial tendencies (Mala-
muth 1986), nonconformity (Rapaport and Burkhart 1984), impulsivity
(Calhoun 1990), low socialization and responsibility (Barnett and Ham-
berger 1992; Rapaport and Burkhart 1984), hypermasculinity, delinquent
behavior, affective dysregulation (Hall and Hirschman 1991; Murphy,
Meyer, and O’Leary 1993) and self-centeredness coupled with insensitiv-
ity to others (Dean and Malamuth 1997).
Violence in intimate relationships has been associated with the en-
dorsement of traditional sex-role stereotypes and cultural myths about vi-
olence. Relative to non–sexually aggressive men, sexually aggressive men
more strongly subscribe to traditional gender stereotypes (Burt 1980;
Malamuth 1988; Mosher and Anderson 1986; Rapaport and Burkhart
1984). Similar findings have been obtained in studies examining the char-
acteristics of men who abuse their dating partners or spouses (Dutton
1988). A history of promiscuous-impersonal sex and hostile masculinity
(distrust of women combined with gratification from dominating women)
represent factors associated with sexual violence toward a female partner
(Malamuth et al. 1995; Malamuth 1996).
Furthermore, a man’s need for power, dominance, and control appears
to play a role in violent behavior. A man who feels threatened by a loss of
control, such as by being rejected, may attempt to regain that control by
behaving aggressively. A consideration of the components of the violent
acts perpetrated against women (i.e., intimidation, coercion, belittlement)
suggests that motives for power and dominance bear some relationship to
the incidence of violence. Men who are quick to react to anger, believe that
violence will aid in winning an argument, and have successfully used vio-
lence in other situations are likely to do so again (Riggs and Caufield 1997;
 Understanding Rape 401

White, Koss, and Kissling 1991). Similarities between men who engage in
courtship violence and wife-batterers have been found (Ryan 1995).

Conclusions

To understand violence we must first recognize that culturally based so-

cialization practices encourage men to be aggressors and women to be vic-
tims (Andersen 1997). In societies where there is no formal hierarchy that
privileges one group over another and in which women and men exercise
relatively equal power, general levels of aggression, male violence against
women, and rape are low (Lepowsky 1994; see also Sanday, this volume).
Gendered violence is learned early in life and continues across the lifespan
(Kaufman 1995). Data from numerous sources reveal the social influences
and overall patterns of gendered violence found in society (Andersen
1997). They reveal that women are the victims of intimate violence more
often than men at every stage of development, with the exception of early
childhood physical abuse. The data also demonstrate that not all women
are victims of violence nor are all men perpetrators (Andersen 1997).
These same patterns hold for rape as well.
Inequality in relationships, coupled with cultural values that embrace
domination of the weaker by the stronger, creates the potential for rape.
Both men and women learn that violence is a method people use to get
their way. When individuals use force and are successful, they are rein-
forced and thus more likely to use it in the future; however, men have his-
torically received greater rewards for aggression and violence than have
women.
In this chapter we argue that the integrative contextual developmental
model (White and Kowalski 1998) is useful for accounting for the com-
plexities associated with sexual assault and rape. The model can better
account for why some men rape and why some women are raped than a
singular explanation, such as that of Thornhill and Palmer. The model
suggests that a fuller understanding of rape can be achieved by examining
it systematically at several levels, cultural, social, interpersonal, situa-
tional, and intrapersonal. Dynamic factors at each level operate to affect
the likelihood of who will rape, who will be raped, and when rape is most
likely. The proposed metatheoretical model can also help understand the
various factors that affect when the term rape will and will not be used to
label acts of forced sexual intercourse.
402 Jacquelyn W. White and Lori A. Post

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17
Coming Full Circle: Refuting Biological
Determinism
Sue V. Rosser

In Evolution, Gender, and Rape anthropologists, evolutionary biologists,

ecologists, philosophers, primatologists, psychologists, sociologists, and
women’s studies scholars respond to Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer’s
book, A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion,
published in 2000. Although chapter authors express varying disciplinary,
professional, and personal reasons for laying aside their own significant
research agendas and pressing scholarly obligations to refute Thornhill
and Palmer, Michael Kimmel gives a most succinct answer to the question
of why scholars should respond to A Natural History of Rape. Kimmel’s
answer, that it must be addressed because the Thornhill and Palmer book
represents bad science, bad politics, and bad writing, is echoed by all respon-
dents from their different disciplinary or interdisciplinary perspectives.
A Natural History of Rape stands as a recent addition to the lengthy
tradition of biological determinism, in which biological differences among
races, sexes, classes, and species in anatomy, hormones, and genes are
studied to provide biological justifications for social, behavioral, and
psychological inequalities. The biological determinism tradition predates
the nineteenth century, and works by Gould (1981), Keller (1985), Rose
(1982), and Sayers (1982) elegantly trace the roots connecting the nine-
teenth-century tradition to its pre-nineteenth-century antecedents, as well
as its successors in the twentieth century.
Modern evolutionary biology is based on and has its roots in the
nineteenth-century theory proposed by Charles Darwin ([1859] 1967).
Although this theory seemed revolutionary at the time, scholars have sug-
gested that natural selection, as described by Darwin, was ultimately ac-
cepted by his contemporaries because it was a paradigm laden with the
414 Sue V. Rosser

values of nineteenth-century England. Rose and Rose (1980) underline the

congruence between the values expressed in Darwin’s theory and those of
the upper classes of Victorian England: “Its central metaphors drawn from
society and in their turn interacting with society were of the competition
of the species, the struggle for existence, the ecological niche, and the sur-
vival of the fittest” (p. 28). These metaphors reflect Victorian society and
were acceptable to it because they, and the “social Darwinism” quickly de-
rived from it, seemed to ground its norms solidly in a biological founda-
tion. When Darwin depicts the fittest as the individuals who pass on their
genes to the greatest number of offspring, one thinks of the importance of
passing on property in that society.
The upper class of Victorian England had self-serving reasons for find-
ing Darwin’s theory attractive: It gave a biological rationale for their po-
sition in society. Nor was Darwin’s own position a matter unrelated to
the acceptability of his theory. Even though Darwin himself was not ag-
gressive in advancing it, he had wealthy and influential friends such as
Thomas Henry Huxley, Sir Charles Lyell, and Sir Joseph Dalton Hooker
who championed the theory for him. Aside from noting its statement in
terms of upper-class Victorian values and decrying the misuse of his the-
ory of natural selection by social Darwinists, feminist scientists by and
large have not critiqued the theory of natural selection. As scientists, they
have recognized the significance of the theory for the foundations of mod-
ern biology.
In contrast to accepting his theory of natural selection, many feminist
scientists have critiqued Darwin’s theory of sexual selection for its andro-
centric bias. The theory of sexual selection reflected and reinforced Victo-
rian social norms regarding the sexes. By this theory Darwin set out to
explain a phenomenon still not fully understood, that of the existence of
secondary sex characteristics. He claimed that “when the males and
females of any animal have the same general habits of life, but differ in
structure, color, or ornament, such differences have been mainly caused by
sexual selection” (Darwin 1967, p. 89). Expanding considerably on the
theory first presented in the Origin, Darwin specified, in the Descent of
Man, how the process functions and what roles males and females play in
it: “The sexual struggle is of two kinds: in the one it is between the indi-
viduals of the same sex, generally the males, in order to drive away or kill
their rivals, the females remaining passive; whilst in the other, the struggle
 Refuting Biological Determinism 415

is likewise between the individuals of the same sex, in order to excite or

charm those of the opposite sex, generally the females, which no longer
remain passive, but select the more agreeable partners” (Darwin 1871,
p. 64). According to the theory, the males who triumph over their rivals
will win the more desirable females and will leave the most progeny, there-
by perpetuating and increasing, over numerous generations, those quali-
ties that afforded them victory. The females who succeed, by the seductive
means they employ, in being chosen will also procreate best and pass on
their characteristics. As a result, by the time evolution has produced mod-
ern man and modern woman, the two are considerably different, men
being superior to women both physically and mentally. Not only are they
“taller, heavier, and stronger than women, with squarer shoulders and
more plainly pronounced muscles,” but also they attain to a “higher emi-
nence” in whatever they take up (Darwin 1871, p. 564). The theory re-
flects the Victorian age, with its depiction of active males competing and
struggling with each other for passive females. That depiction of male-
female interaction would have seemed quite obvious to most segments of
Victorian society and its grounding in scientific fact most reassuring.
The process of selection involved in the theory of sexual selection en-
countered considerable resistance. Why, then, one wonders, did Darwin
insist on the theory so much? What role did it play in his total conception
of change in nature? Initially in the Origin, Darwin used the theory as a
secondary agent to explain the means by which evolution takes place:
“Amongst many animals, sexual selection will give its aid to ordinary se-
lection, by assuring to the most vigorous and best adapted males the great-
est number of offspring” (1967, p. 127). The reader understands readily
that sexual selection is a minor support to natural selection. But the reader
may be surprised to see that only males are mentioned as the bearers of the
desirable characteristics that are sexually selected. At this point in the text
Darwin adds a second benefit of sexual selection: “Sexual selection will
also give characters useful to the males alone, in their struggles with other
males.” Again, the focus is entirely on the male half of the species. The only
activity envisioned in this expression is bound up in a masculine world.
What seems to have struck Darwin most when he observed males and
females of species throughout the natural world was the tremendous dif-
ference between them: “How enormously these sometimes differ in the
most important characters is known to every naturalist” (1967, p. 424).
416 Sue V. Rosser

What amazed him was the fact that such different beings belong to the
same species. When viewing the human world in the light of other natural
realms, he was even surprised that even greater differences had not been
evolved. “It is, indeed, fortunate that the law of the equal transmission of
characters to both sexes prevails with mammals; otherwise it is probable
that man would have become as superior in mental endowment to woman,
as the peacock is in ornamental plumage to the peahen” (1871, p. 565).
At first view it may seem strange that Darwin stresses the differences
between the sexes. In the Origin he depicts the struggle for existence as a
mainly interspecific conflict, claiming that competition is fiercest among
those closest in the scale of nature (1967, p. 76). Yet when he comes to
those beings most closely related, namely the males and females of a given
species, he does not speak of competition at all but rather of an entirely
masculine struggle for females. Indeed, as he depicts male-female interac-
tion, it seems that the males constitute something like a separate group, in-
teracting mainly with each other in relation to another quite separate
group, the members of which have relatively fewer secondary sex charac-
teristics. To make the differentiation between males and females as strong
as possible, the theory of sexual selection is needed. The theory is the agent
of differentiation, that which assures an ever-increasing separation be-
tween the sexes and their operation in two quite distinct realms that touch
only for the purpose of procreation.
Social Darwinism, the nineteenth-century form of biological determin-
ism, used Darwin’s work on evolutionary biology to provide a biological
justification for social inequalities between people of different classes
(Rose and Rose 1980); like the nineteenth-century Social Darwinists
(Spencer 1892); Thornhill and Palmer rely on evolutionary biology as the
basis for their arguments about rape. In her chapter in this volume, “What
Is Rape?” Emily Martin underlines the significance of the cultural context
of Victorian England for Darwin’s theory and suggests that particular as-
pects of the twentieth century provide the context for Thornhill and
Palmer’s work to gain a foothold.
When sociobiology, the scholarly tradition with which A Natural
History of Rape overtly connects itself, emerged, critics (e.g., Lowe and
Hubbard 1979; Bleier 1979, 1984; Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin 1984)
immediately stamped it as a new form of biological determinism. Sociobi-
ology added genes to the nineteenth-century factors of anatomical and
 Refuting Biological Determinism 417

hormonal differences that might justify social inequalities between human

sexes, races, and classes.
In reviewing critiques of sociobiology literature in 1992, I wrote the
following:
Some sociobiologists, such as Barash (1977), Dawkins (1976), and Wilson (1975)
have based their new discipline on biological determinism in stating that behavior
is genetically determined and that differences between males and females in role,
status, and performance are biologically based. Sociobiology is the study of the bi-
ological basis of behavior. It attempts to show that human social institutions and
social behavior are the results of biological forces acting through prehuman and
human evolution. The theory is based on Darwin’s theory of evolution through
natural selection, which sociobiologists claim to extend and amplify (Lowe &
Hubbard, 1979). Sociobiologists describe human sex roles and behaviors as innate
and programmed into the genes. They base these roles and behaviors on examples
of social interaction in lower animals, which, not coincidentally, remind us in
their turn of the human world: “Aggression,” “selfishness,” “male dominance”
(Wilson, 1975).
Feminist critiques of sociobiology have centered around criticisms of the as-
sumption that behaviors such as aggression, homosexuality, promiscuity, selfish-
ness, and altruism are biologically determined and the problems involved with
anthropomorphism in animal behavior studies. The anthropomorphism occurs in
at least two forms: (1) the use of human language and frameworks to describe an-
imal behavior that is then used to “prove” that certain human behaviors are innate
as they are also found in animals; and (2) the selective choice of species for study
that mirror human society. The data from those selected species are then assumed
to be the universal behavior of all species. Some scientists have suggested that these
feminist critiques are obvious. However, the most renowned sociobiologists
(Dawkins, 1976; Trivers, 1972; Wilson, 1978) have continued to assume that
genes do determine behavior and that the behaviors described as aggression, ho-
mosexuality, rape, selfishness, and altruism in animals are equivalent to those be-
haviors in humans, even though more than one decade of criticism by feminists
(Bleier, 1976; Hubbard, 1990; Lowe, 1978; Lowe & Hubbard, 1983) has been lev-
eled against the “obvious” flaws in the sociobiological theories and assumptions.
(Rosser, 1992, p. 60)

Some critiques raised by authors of Evolution, Gender, and Rape to A

Natural History of Rape point out the continuing use of anthropomorphic
language and selective choice of species. Although many authors under-
line faulty use of language, particularly regarding the definition of rape,
Tobach and Reed detail the logical fallacies surrounding Thornhill and
Palmer’s use of rape, including the redefinition of rape in war. In his de-
tailed refutation of the scientific basis for Thornhill and Palmer’s claim that
human rape is an evolved adaptation, Jerry Coyne also points out that the
418 Sue V. Rosser

evolutionarily based social reforms proposed by Thornhill and Palmer are

easily derived from nonevolutionary views of rape.
In that same 1992 book where I reviewed sociobiology critiques, I wrote
the following:
Similarly, it was clear in the early primatology work (Yerkes, 1943) that particular
primate species, such as the baboon and chimpanzee, were chosen for study pri-
marily because their social organization was seen by the observers as closely re-
sembling that of human primates. However, subsequent researchers forgot the
“obvious” limitations imposed by such selection of species and proceeded to gen-
eralize the data to universal behavior patterns for all primates. It was not until a
significant number of women entered primatology that the concepts of the univer-
sality and male leadership of dominance hierarchies among primates (Lancaster,
1975; Leavitt, 1975; Leibowitz, 1975; Rowell, 1974) were questioned and shown
to be inaccurate for many primate species. The “evident” problems discussed by
feminist critics (Bleier, 1984) of studying nonhuman primates in an attempt to
discover what the true nature of humans would be without the overlay of culture,
have been largely ignored by many of the sociobiologists and scientists studying
animal behavior. Feminist critiques of animal behavior and sociobiology attack the
assumption of biological determinism: that biology (genes) determines behavior
and that those biological effects may be measured separately from those of culture.
(Rosser 1992, pp. 60–61)

In their respective chapters in this volume, both Drea and Wallen and
Gowaty provide numerous examples of variations among mammalian
species in rape behaviors and female control over male sexual behavior.
These many examples underline the fallacy of drawing conclusions as
Thornhill and Palmer have done based on selective choice of species. Go-
waty also brings attention to the significant role of variance within the
female population of the same species. Some females possess greater phys-
ical strength or more effective behavioral strategies for avoiding male
sexual coercion. Both among- and within-species variation among non-
human primates and other mammals emphasize the importance of using
extreme caution in drawing universal conclusions about behaviors such as
rape in humans by extrapolating data from behaviors that may be inap-
propriately anthropomorphized in species that may have been selectively
chosen because they reflect human society.
As Sanday reports in her chapter, her research on ninety-five band and
tribal societies documents that the incidence of rape varies considerably
cross-culturally and depends on a variety of social factors, particularly the
status of women within that society. Thus, human rape varies tremen-
 Refuting Biological Determinism 419

dously across cultures within the species, thereby refuting the notion of
Thornhill and Palmer that rape is universal and adaptive. The same cri-
tiques made of Thornhill and Palmer’s research—selective use of species,
anthropomorphic and vague language, universalizing and extrapolating
beyond the limits of data, and failure adequately to study female behav-
ior—represent recurrent arguments leveled by numerous scholars to reveal
flaws in some sociobiology claims in the 1970s and 1980s.
In 1984, Dagg outlined six ways in which bias, especially sexual bias,
entered the literature of social behavior of animals:
1. internal contradictions in reports, with generalizations contradicting primary
data;
2. inadequate experimental design in behavioural studies so that female behaviour
was largely ignored;
3. biased collection of data so that information showing females as sometimes
dominant, often aggressive, and active in mating (anti-stereotypes for women) was
not adequately collected;
4. misinterpretation of observations, with females seen as possessions of and in-
ferior to males;
5. misleading presentation of data in popular works and textbooks so that males
are seen as preeminent to females; and
6. misinformation, with sociobiologists actually changing observed field data so
that they would fit in with their theories of sociobiology. (p. 118)

In Evolution, Gender, and Rape, chapter authors uncover similar biases in

Thornhill and Palmer’s 2000 work to those outlined by Dagg for sociobi-
ology in 1984:

1. Generalizations contradicting primary data Although virtually all

chapter authors critique Thornhill and Palmer for drawing inappropriate
generalizations from primary data, Shields and Steinke directly confront
Thornhill and Palmer’s assertion of “identifying ultimate causes” (p. 4) be-
cause “an ultimate explanation of a biological phenomenon can account
for all proximate causes influencing the phenomenon, whether the phe-
nomenon is an adaptation or an incidental effect of an adaptation” (p. 12).
Shields and Steinke painstakingly uncover problems in using self-report
data on which Thornhill and Palmer’s arguments are based, as well as the
logical inconsistencies these introduce in the conclusions Thornhill and
Palmer draw about rape.
420 Sue V. Rosser

In his chapter, “The Evolutionary Value of the Man (to) Child Affilia-
tive Bond,” Mackey underlines that rape is not an adaptive behavior for
males because rape often precludes the biological father from becoming
the social father. Because rape produces offspring that are disadvantaged
adults, this contradicts the generalization drawn by Thornhill and Palmer
that rape is an effective evolutionary strategy.

2. Ignoring female behavior Several authors, particularly Gowaty, as

well as Drea and Wallen, underline Thornhill and Palmer’s failure to in-
clude experimental data, based on women’s behavior in primates and
other species, that contradicts their conclusions. Lloyd reveals additional
ignorance or overlooking by Thornhill and Palmer. Lloyd points out that
the main arguments for the evolutionary explanations for rape given by
Thornhill and Palmer rest on their “hypothesis about the evolution of sex
differences: that because women bear the brunt of the effort in reproduc-
tion—through pregnancy, nursing, and infant care—they have evolved to
be very selective about their mates” (this vol. p. xx). Although selection is
important, it is not the only mechanism accounting for evolution. Drift,
mutation, recombination, and gene flow, in addition to selection, all cause
evolution. As Lloyd underlines, not only do Thornhill and Palmer ignore
the contributions of these four factors, but they also fail to demonstrate
that rape is inheritable or adaptive.

3, 4. Data on females biased or misinterpreted As their chapter titles,

“Female Sexuality and the Myth of Male Control” and “Power Asymme-
tries between the Sexes, Mate Preferences, and Components of Fitness,”
announce, both Drea and Wallen and Gowaty in their respective chapters
document examples from animal behavior where females are dominant,
aggressive, and active in mating. These contradict the universal behaviors
and generalizations drawn by Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer. These
two chapters also provide counterevidence for the misinterpretation of ev-
idence where Thornhill and Palmer interpret females as inferior to males
because of evolutionary dispositions. In “The Origins of Sex Differences
in Human Behavior,” Eagly and Wood compare and contrast the argu-
ments for sex differences based on the evolutionary dispositions with
those based on social roles. They demonstrate that social structures pro-
 Refuting Biological Determinism 421

vide equally effective explanations to those of evolutionary psychology for

sex-differentiated social behaviors. Thornhill and Palmer have interpreted
data to privilege the evolutionary psychology explanations and ignore the
social structural causes for rape.

5. Misleading presentation in popular works A Natural History of

Rape itself targets a popular audience. In that sense, the entire volume be-
comes a misleading presentation of data in popular works and textbooks
so that males are seen as preeminent to females as documented by the
chapter authors in this volume. As their chapter title, “Pop Sociobiology
Reborn: The Evolutionary Psychology of Sex and Violence,” suggests,
Vickers and Kitcher carefully uncover the leaps in logic and scant solid sci-
ence, compounded by outright mistakes, that underpin the evidence
Thornhill and Palmer marshal for their evolutionary basis for rape.

6. Misinformation As Vickers and Kitcher spell out, the new pop so-
ciobiology, known as evolutionary psychology, is very appealing to popu-
lar audiences because it provides a simple, pseudoscientific explanation
for the complex phenomenon of sex and violence known as rape. Almost
all authors in Evolution, Gender, and Rape but most especially Kimmel,
Lloyd, Shields, and Steinke have uncovered the ways in which Thornhill
and Palmer’s work represents bad science and/or pseudoscience. In their
respective chapters, Travis, Koss, and White and Post demonstrate why a
unicausal, biological explanation is too simple for a complex psychologi-
cal, social, behavioral, and cultural phenomenon such as rape.
The reason the simple, pseudo-scientific biological explanation appeals
to the general public is understandable. First, it is simple. Social structural
explanations analyzing power, economic inequalities, stratification of the
labor market, and other social factors, as well as biological variance, are
complicated. Not only is it difficult to sort out the contribution of each, it
becomes almost impossible to convey the complex explanations simplisti-
cally with sound bites that appeal to the general public. Second, if rape is
based solely in biology, it removes guilt and responsibility. No one can be
said to cause it (and thus be blamed) and no one can do much to fix it (pay
for it with expensive social, educational programs to level inequalities).
Finally, it explains why this latest contribution to the lengthy tradition of
422 Sue V. Rosser

biological determinism, from its nineteenth-century antecedents, through

Social Darwinism, to animal behavior to sociobiology to evolutionary
psychology, receives attention.
A Natural History of Rape receives attention from the general public be-
cause it meshes with people’s desire to find a simple explanation for a
troubling, complex phenomenon. It draws the attention of part of the sci-
entific community, who are understandably excited about the promise of
evolutionary psychology because of the recent, fundamental advances
from the Human Genome Project.
Some good research in evolutionary psychology occurs when properly
designed experiments are used in a particular species to answer a focused
question. In the earlier work in sociobiology in the 1970s and 1980s, ex-
cellent animal behavior research carried out by well-known scientists on
insects, birds, and lower mammals, became problematic only when the re-
sults were extrapolated beyond what the data warranted and when inap-
propriate generalizations were made to human beings. For example, no
one questions the validity of E. O. Wilson’s entymological work on insect
behavior. The controversy arose when he extrapolated results from data on
insect behavior to mammals, particularly to human beings. To distinguish
the well-grounded excellent animal behavior research based on genetics in
insects or birds from the less-documented, over-generalized leap to human
behavior, the former began to be referred to as sociobiology (small “s”),
while the latter extrapolation to humans was designated as Sociobiology.
The capital letter distinction provides an immediate marker to distinguish
the well-done research from the pseudo-scientific extrapolations and con-
clusions for humans.
The reason A Natural History of Rape merits the attention of a refuta-
tion response from some of the most eminent anthropologists, evolution-
ary biologists, ecologists, philosophers, primatologists, psychologists,
sociologists, and women’s studies scholars is that the argument for the evo-
lutionary psychology of rape presented by Thornhill and Palmer repre-
sents the latest contribution to Sociobiology. All of the flaws and biases
identified as problems with Social Darwinism in the nineteenth century
and Sociobiology in the twentieth century, including anthropomorphic use
of language, selective use of species, ignoring female contributions, as-
suming male dominance, misinformation and misleading presentations of
 Refuting Biological Determinism 423

data, apply to Thornhill and Palmer’s twenty-first-century version of bio-

logical determinism focused on the evolutionary psychology of rape.

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Barash, D. (1977). Sociobiology and Behavior. New York: Elsevier.

Bleier, R. (1979). Social and political bias in science: An examination of animal
studies and their generalizations to human behavior and evolution. In R. Hub-
bard and M. Lowe, eds., Genes and Gender II, pp. 49–70. Staten Island, NY:
Gordian Press.
Bleier, R. (1984). Science and Gender: A Critique of Biology and Its Theories on
Women. New York: Pergamon Press.
Dagg, A. I. (1984). Sexual bias in the literature of social behaviour of mammals
and birds. International Journal of Women’s Studies 7(2): 118–135.
Darwin, C. (1871). Descent of Man. London: Murray.
Darwin, C. (1859 [1967]). On the Origin of Species: A Facsimile of the First Edi-
tion. New York: Atheneum.
Dawkins, R. (1976). The Selfish Gene. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gould, S. J. (1981). The Mismeasure of Man. New York: W. W. Norton.
Hubbard, R. (1990). Politics of Women’s Biology. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press.
Keller, E. F. (1985). Reflections on Gender and Science. New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
versity Press.
Lancaster, J. (1975). Primate Behavior and the Emergence of Human Culture.
New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
Leavitt, R. R. (1975). Peaceable Primates and Gentle People: Anthropological
Approaches to Women’s Studies. New York: Harper and Row.
Leibowitz, L. (1975). Perspectives in the evolution of sex differences. In R. R.
Reiter, ed., Toward an Anthropology of Women. New York: Monthly Review
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Lewontin, R. C., S. Rose, and L. Kamin (1984). Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ide-
ology, and Human Nature. New York: Pantheon Books.
Lowe, M. (1978). Sociobiology and sex differences. Signs: Journal of Women in
Culture and Society 4(1), 118–125.
Lowe, M. and R. Hubbard (1983) Women’s Nature: Rationalizations of Inequal-
ity. New York: Pergamon Press.
Rose, H. and S. Rose (1980). The myth of the neutrality of science. In R. Arditti,
P. Brennan, and S. Cavrak, eds., Science and Liberation. Boston: South End Press.
Rose, S. (1982). Against Biological Determinism. London: Allison and Busby.
Rosser, S. (1992). Biology and Feminism: A Dynamic Interaction. New York:
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Rowell, T. (1974). The concept of social dominance. Behavioral Biology 11: 131–
154.
Sayers, J. (1982). Biological Politics: Feminist and Anti-feminist Perspectives. Lon-
don: Tavistock.
Spencer, H. (1892). The Principles of Ethics. New York: D. Appleton.
Trivers, R. L. (1972). Parental investment and sexual selection. In B. Campbell,
ed., Sexual Selection and the Descent of Man. Chicago, IL: Aldine.
Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press.
Yerkes, R. M. (1943). Chimpanzees. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Index

Abortion. See also Embryo mortality Adaptive trait

risks; Infanticide difficulty in distinguishing from other
case for in early hominid evolution, products of evolution, 272
126, 127 the eye as a model of, 369–370
in cases of rape, 249–250, 258n.11, heritability of trait(s) crucial to defin-
306 ing, 236, 241
sperm ejection, 50, 51 importance of identifying and de-
spontaneous abortion, 50–51, 214 scribing, 240–241
Abortion laws, reporting of rapes af- rape-specific hypothesis assumes a
fected by, 126 specialized motivational module,
Absent father. See Paternal preclusion 156–158, 166n.1, 178, 179, 236,
Ache foragers, 226–227. See also 245, 306
Hunter-gatherer groups whether rape behavior can be
Acquaintance rape, 199, 224, 397–398 objectively defined as, 369–370,
date rape, 229, 399 374
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Adversarial view of sexuality
(AIDS). See AIDS as an attitude associated with sexual
Adaptation aggressiveness, 398
vs. amativeness, 98–99 in sexology, 348–350
complexity of through natural selec- Age preferences in mate selection
tion, 7–9, 108–109 criteria
defined, and standards for evaluating, cross-cultural variation in, 280–281,
237, 240–242 282, 286, 289t., 289
difficulty in distinguishing from other sex differences in inversely related
products of evolution, 272, 273 gender equality indicators, 289t.,
example of bipedalism, 240 289–290
exaptation, 110–111 (see also Pheno- Ages of rape victims. See also Infertil-
typic plasticity) ity in reproductive-aged women;
and maladaptation, 176 Trauma from rape
in rape hypothesis, assumed rather many are children, 180, 195
than defined, 163, 240, 242 many are of postreproductive age,
Adaptationism, 98–99, 244–246 180, 215
existence of phyletic inertia as a refu- most are not of reproductive age, 32–
tation of, 244–246 33, 37, 43, 240–241
426 Index

Ages of rape victims (cont.) Alternative evolutionary models. See

reflecting opportunity or normal pref- Evolution-based alternative models
erences rather than special prefer- Altruism, and inclusive fitness, 7. See
ences of rapist, 214–215, 228 also Mutualism
results reported by Thornhill and American Psychological Association,
Palmer based on invalid use of data, task force on male violence against
90, 228–229 women, 201–202
as women of reproductive age (pre- Ancestral environment. See Environ-
dicted in the rape-specific hypothe- ment of evolutionary adaptation
sis), 177, 180, 227–229, 237 (EEA); Hunter-gatherer groups
Aggression. See also Female aggres- Androcentrism
sion; Male aggression in evolutionary psychology, 17–18,
control theory of, 392 29, 339
in females, 391 in primate studies, 29–31
psychological theories of, 391 in sexual selection theory, 29–31,
social disorganization theory of, 392 414, 415–416
theories of, 112–113, 114, 389–393 Angier, Natalie, 151
Aggression-dominance model of rape. Animal ethology, 422. See also Birds;
See also Aggression; Gang rape; Primate studies
Gender asymmetry; Male-on-male studies with insects, 139–140
rape; Sexual violence; Violence Antagonistic selection pressures, 62,
against women; War rape 63–68, 81–82
aggression-related behaviors in ani- Anthropoids, 43. See also Bonobos;
mals involve sexual behaviors, 32 Chimpanzees
in Brownmiller, 3, 211, 383, 385 disappearance of estrus among, 37,
efficacy of the model, 164, 200–201, 42, 44
230, 258n.8 forced copulation rarely observed
role of gender inequality in, 11 among, 37
opposed or dismissed in Thornhill Anthropomorphism. See also Zoo-
and Palmer, 161, 192, 193, 247, morphism
251–253, 342, 377–378 in the rape-evolutionary model/
sexual aspect is not excluded in, 162, hypothesis, 18, 89, 112, 225
167n.5, 201–202, 224, 251–253, 343 in sociobiology, 417
social and gender relations mediate Anti-male aspects of the rape-
the expression of sexual behaviors, evolution hypothesis, 221–222, 231.
21, 337, 339, 340 (see also Cultural See also Hypersexual model of male
models of rape) sexuality
support for within evolutionary psy- implies that all men are potential
chology, 249, 258n.9 rapists, 197–198, 221–222
view that the by-product hypothesis Archer, J., 265
would support, 175–176 Attractiveness in women, 141, 285
violent aspects of sexual assault, cross-cultural variation in, impor-
180–181, 211–212 tance of to males, 285, 288t., 290–
AIDS, 7, 316–317. See also Sexually 292
transmitted diseases reduction in may result from the
Alexander, Richard, 77 sequelae of STDs, 318, 322–323
 Index 427

waist-to-hip ratio as signifying fecun- misrepresented by Thornhill and

dity, 99–100, 291 Palmer, 251–253
whether attractiveness is related to on rape as an economic tool in slav-
fecundity, 291 ery, 126–127
Brownmiller, Susan and Barbara
Baboons, 41 Mehrhof, 252
Banishment, in cases of rape, 9, 337 Buller, D. and V. G. Hardcastle, 245
Barash, D., 417 Burdekin, Catherine, Swastika Night,
Barron, Larry and M. A. Straus, 391– 65, 82n.1
392 Bureau of Justice Statistics, 215
study of cross-cultural variation in Buss, David M., critique of social
rape, 218 structural theory, 278
Beach, F. A., 30–31, 42 Buss, David M. and D. P. Schmitt, on
Becker, G. S., 281 mate selection, 269
Behavioral ecology, 18, 268 Buss, David M. and D. T. Kenrick, 271
Biological defense for rape, 232 Buss, David M. et al.
Biological determinism. See also Social cross-cultural study of mate prefer-
Darwinism ences, 148–149, 283–284, 292
cultural models of gender subsumed reanalysis of data by Eagly and Wood,
within biological realm, 247, 416 285–287, 288t., 289t., 289–292
genetic determinism, 144–145 on sexual attraction, 141, 154, 166–
history of, 105–106, 413 167n.3, 266
reinforcing gender stereotypes, 10–12 By-product hypothesis of rape, 156,
(Thornhill and Palmer’s) critique of 158–159, 175–177, 192, 237, 249.
the social sciences, 178, 191–192, See also Hypersexual model of male
254 sexuality; Male aggression
Birds, monogamous behavior in, 75, as credible but lacking originality and
78, 80 verifiability, 175–177
Blaffer Hrdy. See Hrdy, Sarah Blaffer requiring a hypersexual model of
Boeringer, S. G., 346 males, 208, 236
Bohner, G. and N. Schwartz, 96 would support a sexual-violence
Bonobos model, 175–176
rape not observed among, 248–249
sexuality as social exchange among, Canids, male-to-child affiliative bond
6, 226 in, 217, 309
Bosnian war, 131, 230 Castration. See Chemical castration
Boyd, Robert, 143 Causality
and R. J. Richardson, 246 causal inferences from data, 128–130
Brain studies and gender stereotypes, proximate vs. ultimate causes of rape,
12–17 87–88, 210, 419
Bronfenbrenner, U., 393 self-report data problematic in deter-
Broude, G. J. and S. J. Greene, 340 mining, 87, 88
Brownmiller, Susan, Against Rape, 3. Census Bureau, U.S., 319
See also Aggression-dominance Centers for Disease Control (CDC),
model of rape data on sexually transmitted dis-
aggression-dominance model of sex- eases, 316
ual assault in, 211, 383, 385 Chemical castration, 101, 200–201
428 Index

Child abuse, 320–323 mate selection and offspring fitness

Child sexual abuse consequences, 66–70
of boys associated with delinquency within-population variation, 78–82
and sexual aggression in later life, Concealed fertilization, 270
396 Conflict or dominance behavior,
frequency of unreported, 180 among males, 38–40, 44–45, 46,
of girls associated with promiscuous 46–47, 67, 174
behavior in later life, 337 Conflict or dominance behavior, female
of girls as a risk factor for later rape- intrasexual competition, 67
victimization, 199, 337, 388 Congenital syphilis, 316–317, 319t.
may result in sexual dysfunction, Consent. See also Cultural meaning;
321–323 Intentionality and subjectivity
more likely to be committed by a as an issue in defining rape, 89, 225
nonbiological father, 320–321 coercion as the violation of, 155–156
rape of children, 180, 195 intentionality and subjectivity in de-
trauma from severe, 195, 321–322 termining, 366, 368–369
Chimpanzees, 40, 248. See also Pri- issue of consent in legal statutes by
mates state, 118–119t.
Clitoris sexual autonomy issue at the heart
human, 225 of, 116–117
peniform, 35 Constitution, U.S., freedom of move-
Codominance, 40 ment and association in, 199
Coevolution of genes and culture, Contextual meaning of actions, 367–
143–144, 153, 246–247 368, 370. See also Cultural meaning
Coevolution of sexual reproductive Continuities, and discontinuities in
strategies, 63–65, 69, 214–215 evolution, 111–112, 130
Communitarian norms, 352–354, 357. Control theory, 392
See also Mutualism Convergent evolution
Competition between males. See also male-to-child affiliative bond an ex-
Male aggression ample of, 217, 309
conflict or dominance behavior, 38– in monogamous behaviors, 78, 311
40, 44–45, 46, 46–47, 67, 174 Conviction rate for rape, 387
cultural expressions of, 78 Cooperation. See Mutualism
display features and behaviors, 45, Cost-benefit analysis
46, 72, 174, 414 cost-benefit ratio of rape, 215, 241–
elite male power (alpha males), 76f., 242 (see also Offspring viability;
76–78, 172 Risk factors incurred by rapists)
intrasexual reproductive asymme- emerging in the social science, 281
tries, 77–78 in mate preferences, 281–283
sexual selection theory and, 174, in rape as a conditional strategy
269–270, 414 (Thornhill and Palmer), 130, 177–
Components of fitness 178, 242
analysis of, 71–75 Courtois, C., 322
between-population variation in, 75– Courtship violence, 399
78 Coyne, Jerry A.
female reproductive autonomy and, on the by-product hypothesis of rape,
73–74, 75–78, 76f., 80 175–177
 Index 429

evolutionary evaluation of Thornhill Cultural meaning. See also Intention-

and Palmer, 19, 247 ality and subjectivity; Social struc-
on the rape-reduction program of tural gender theory
Thornhill and Palmer, 172–173, actions are contextually defined, 367–
417–418 368, 370
scientific evaluation of the rape- meanings of rape are socially con-
evolution hypothesis, 172–173, 182, structed, 115–117, 392
184–185 thick vs. thin descriptions and, 371–
on sexual selection theory, 174–176 372
Crews, David, 6 Cultural models of gender. See also So-
Criminal Sexual Conduct (CSC) cial structural gender theory
codes, 385 cultural transmission of gendered be-
Cross-cultural variation in mate haviors, 140, 143–144, 272, 276–
selection criteria, 286, 288t., 289t., 277, 278
289–292. See also Mating prefer- environmental and learning factors
ences ignored, 254
Buss et al.’s 37 countries study, 283– social construction of sex and sexual-
284 ity, 5–6, 210, 401
Buss et al.’s data analyzed in terms of Cultural models of rape. See also
gender equality indicators, 285, Cross-cultural variation in rape inci-
289t. dence; Social structural gender theory
female attractiveness, 285, 288t., rape occurs in a sociocultural con-
290–292 text, 339, 340, 341t.14.1, 359–
female domestic skills, 285, 286 360n.3
male economic resources (see Men’s sociocultural factors act on physio-
earning capacity) logical behaviors, 337, 339, 340,
preferred age (see Age preferences in 358–359
mate selection criteria) sociocultural factors correlate with
Cross-cultural variation in rape inci- high rape incidence, 218, 340–342,
dence, 218, 230, 241–242, 341t., 341t.
357, 386–387. See also Aggression- Culture
dominance model of rape learning factors, 70, 254, 373–374
categories of cultures based on preva- as subsumed within biological realm
lence, 340, 341t.14.1, 359–360n.3 (Thornhill and Palmer), 247
rape-free/atypical societies, 337–338, transgenerational commitment as
358–359, 376–377 part of, 352–354
rape-prone societies, 22–23, 337, Culture and genes. See Genes and
340–342, 341t.14.2, 385 culture
Cross-species comparisons, 6, 22, 418.
See also Convergent evolution; Pri- Dagg, A. I., 419
mate behavior; Sexual dimorphism Darwin, Charles, 185
in closely related species may confirm on dual selection in humans, 281,
adaptation, 242 296n.1
of offspring viability, 73–74 Victorian context of theory of his
tendency to select species mirroring a sexual selection, 364–366, 414–
view of society, 248–249, 417 415, 416
430 Index

Date rape, 229, 399 risks involved in, 72

Dating and sexual scripts, 396 Division of labor, 265–266, 273, 278.
Daughters of absent fathers See also Domestic skills; Men’s earn-
fertility and offspring viability at risk ing capacity; Social structural gen-
from STDs, 316–318 der theory
may be more likely to incur STDs, cross-cultural variation in, 284,
315–316, 319t., 319–320 296n.4
sexual abuse of may result in sexual gender differences in skills related to,
dysfunction, 321–323 275–276, 285, 286
Daughters of nonbiological fathers, in hunter-gatherer groups, 268–269,
more likely to be abused and sexu- 270, 390
ally abused, 320–321 in postindustrial societies, 295
Dawkins, Richard, 208–209, 366, predicting cultural variation in mate
417 selection criteria, 287, 288t., 289–
Defining rape. See also Intentionality 292
and subjectivity; Legal statutes on Division of STD Prevention, 318, 319
rape Domestic skills, as preferred in a mate
actions are defined by their cultural by men, 285, 286
meaning, 22, 115–117, 392 Domestic violence, 401
issue of consent (see Consent) Dominance. See Social dominance
gender affecting definitions of rape, Double standard, 40
386, 387, 388 Drea, Christine M. and Kim Wallen
historical changes in meaning of, on an androcentric focus in evolu-
372–374 tionary psychology, 17–18
intentionality as central to, 22, 232, on female physiological reproductive
364, 366, 368–372, 386, 387, 388 defenses, 31, 34–37, 42, 43, 45, 47–
legal vs. subjective definitions, 386– 49, 48, 50
387 on the female as sexual selector, 17–
meanings are socially constructed, 18, 29–30
115–117, 392 on mutualism, 40–42
narrowly vs. multidimensionally de- on proactive sexual behavior in fe-
fined, 125, 225 males, 418, 420
as an objective trait (Thornhill and Drift (evolutionary), 239, 243
Palmer), 369–370, 374 Drosophila genomics experiments,
by Thornhill and Palmer (see Rape- 63–64, 65, 68
evolution hypothesis) Dual selection, human sexual selection
Delinquency, 396–397 as, 281, 296n.1
Desertion (male), incurring adaptive Dyadic relationships
costs, 209 mother-child dyad, 306, 323, 324
Developmental approaches, in evolu- rape investigated at the dyadic level,
tion theory, 109–110, 268–269 397–399
Direct-selection hypothesis. See Rape- vs. social networking, 40–41
specific hypothesis
Discontinuities in evolution, 111–112, Eagly, Alice H. and Wendy Wood. See
130 also Cross-cultural variation in rape
Display features and behavior in incidence; Origin theories of sex dif-
males, 45, 46, 174, 414 ferences
 Index 431

comparative analysis of origin theories Epigenetic landscape. See Environment

re: mate selection criteria, 273–280 of evolutionary adaptation (EEA)
on evolutionary psychology as an ori- Epiphenomena, 244. See also By-
gin theory, 273–280 product hypothesis of rape
on origin theories of sex differences, Estrus
266–268, 420–421 disappearance of among anthropoids,
reanalysis of Buss cross-cultural data 37, 42, 44
on mate preferences, 218, 285–287, limited duration of fertility in, 34–35,
288t., 289t., 289–292 47–49
on the sexual division of labor, 265– resulting in shift to female dominance
266, 273, 275–276, 278 in chimpanzees, 40
on sociocultural origin theory (see Ethnographic historical approach, 22,
Social structural gender theory) 363, 416
Ecology, mathematical modeling in, 18 Evolution. See also Coevolution; Con-
Economic resources (human). See Di- vergent evolution; Darwin, Charles;
vision of labor Human evolution
Ehrenreich, Barbara, 227 continuities and discontinuities in,
Ejaculation, effective, many rapes do 111–112, 130
not involve, 32–33, 37, 43, 46, 180, developmental approaches in evolu-
184 tionary theory, 109–110
Elite male power (alpha males), 76f., factors involved in, 6–8, 17–18, 239–
76–78, 172 240, 243, 271, 420
Ellis, Havelock, 348–349, 391 gene-environment interaction in, 8–9,
Embryo mortality risks, 49, 50, 51 40, 61, 70–71 (see also Genetic pro-
selective fetal investment, 50–51 cesses)
selective fetal resorption, 50 self-organizational concept of, 109
spontaneous abortion or natural theory of natural selection, 338–339,
abortifacients, 50–51, 214 412–414 (see also Natural selection)
Environment of evolutionary adapta- variation within species critical to, 6,
tion (EEA), 18, 68, 110, 242, 270– 18, 144, 152–153
271, 272. See also Hunter-gatherer Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), 8
groups Evolutionary biology, 243. See also
vs. contemporary societies, 273 Cross-species comparisons
decreasing sexual dimorphism during standards of evaluating an adaptive
period of, 309–310 trait in, 240–242
estimate of lactation amenorrhea Evolutionary critiques of the rape-
during, 48 evolution hypothesis, 19, 172–173,
human behavior in prehistoric times 175–177, 247, 416–417, 418. See
largely unknown, 389–390 also Anthropomorphism; Pop socio-
Pleistocene era posited as, 68, 268, biology; Reductionism; Zoomor-
270 phism
pregnancy regulation may have oc- based on a fringe version of the the-
curred in, 126 ory of evolution, 243, 245 (see also
simplistic reconstructions of, 146– Adaptationism)
147, 150–151, 153 comparative evidence from distant
variation in early hominid groups species unfeasible, 249 (see also
posited, 272–273 Scorpion flies)
432 Index

Evolutionary critiques of the rape- defining the problems of early ho-

evolution hypothesis (cont.) minids, 141–143
comparisons with closely related evidence from field of not represented
species absent, 248–249 (see also in the rape-evolution hypothesis,
Bonobos; Chimpanzees) 112–113, 115, 166n.2, 211–212,
does not meet standards for defining 258n.8
an adaptive trait, 237, 240–242 evolution as the distal cause of behav-
gap between standards and practice, ior in, 267
163, 165–166 explanatory limits of, 186–188
ignores or misrepresents existing re- gene-to-behavior links mediated by
search in the field, 102, 112–113, complex processes in, 145, 146,
115, 166n.2, 211–212, 258n.8 272
ignores the range and interplay of Evolutionary psychology (critical
evolutionary factors, 6–8, 17–18, view of)
239–240, 243, 271, 420 androcentric focus in, 17–18, 29, 339
lacks evidence on reproductive ad- inadequate experimental design, 419
vantages of a rape adaptation, 163, lending itself to pop-biological inter-
212, 305, 306 (see also Offspring pretations (see Pop-sociobiology)
viability; Risk factors incurred by misinformation or misinterpretation
rapists) of data in, 419
male selective adaptations narrowly neglecting social constructions of be-
conceived in, 305 (see also Male havior, 5–6
psychology) oversimplification in, 74, 145–146,
not responsive to peer criticisms, 223–224
192–193 selective inclusion of species, 418,
Evolutionary hypothesis of rape. See 419
Rape-evolution hypothesis selective use of cultural data, 294
Evolutionary model of sex differences, unconscious cultural projections in,
100, 140, 210, 271–273 374–375, 378n.2
accepting that culture influences de- Evolution-based alternative models.
velopmental experiences, 109–110, See also Adaptation; Evolution;
268–269 Population genetics; Reproductive
based in differences in reproductive decisions
status, 265–266 coevolution of genes and culture,
predicting overall trends in mate pref- 143–144, 153, 246–247
erences, 283–284 evolutionary value of the man-child
problem of identifying functions in, affiliative bond, 21–22, 227, 305,
271–273 306–307, 313 (see also Paternal in-
as universal or trans-social, 175, 266, vestment; Social fatherhood)
283 the female as sexual selector (see Fe-
use of self-report data in, 88–89 male as sexual selector; Female re-
Evolutionary psychology. See also En- productive strategies)
vironment of evolutionary adapta- focusing on offspring viability (see
tion (EEA); Sexual selection theory Components of fitness approach; In-
careful work is elided by pop inter- clusive fitness)
pretations, 18, 140, 171–172, 202, low frequency mutation behaviors,
422 239, 243
 Index 433

maladaptation or evolutionary dis- networking behavior, 40–41

continuity, 112–113, 130 reverse sexual dimorphism, 35–36,
principle of variation with species, 39, 40
18, 144, 152–153 species in which females are domi-
sexually antagonistic coevolution, nant though males are larger, 39–40
63–65, 69, 214–215 Female parental investment. See Ma-
Exile, in cases of rape, 9, 337 ternal investment
Eye, as a model of an adaptive trait Female philopatry, 40–41
complex, 369–370 Female promiscuity. See Promiscuity in
females
Family, 277. See also Family rape; Female reproductive autonomy, 75–78,
Marriage 76f. See also Female as sexual selec-
familial politics, 305, 312–313 tor; Mating preferences
family systems, 282 at the heart of the consent issue, 116–
matrilineal family, 354, 357 117
Family of the rape victim, reproductive impeded with vulnerability to male
success lowered by rape (rape- dominance, 79f., 80–81
evolution hypothesis), 238 maternal power associated with off-
Family rape, 228 spring viability, 73–74
brother-sister forced copulations in Female reproductive strategies. See
primates, 248 also Female dominance strategies;
father-daughter incest, 33, 321, 322 Female as sexual selector
stepfather-daughter incest, 320–321, association behaviors, 46–47
322 avoidance behaviors, 43, 151
Fatherhood. See Paternal investment; favoring mutualism over aggressive
Social fatherhood traits in males, 22, 310–311, 358
Fecundity. See also Infertility in female counterstrategies, 64, 65
reproductive-aged women garnering resources from males, 40,
behavior during intercourse can af- 78–79, 79f., 147 (see also Paternal
fect, 50 investment)
in females (supposedly) signified by physical defenses against impregna-
waist-to-hip ratio, 99–100, 291 tion (see Physiological reproductive
fertility at risk from STDs, 316–318 defenses of females)
whether female attractiveness is re- preferential association with certain
lated to, 291 males, 46–47
Feingold, A., meta-analysis of mate se- promiscuity (with resulting paternal
lection studies, 280–281 uncertainty) may be strategic, 44,
Female aggression, 41, 49, 391. See 49–50, 224, 226
also Female dominance strategies Female sexuality
intrasexual competition, 67 active and selective components of,
Female attractiveness. See Attractive- 17–18, 418, 420
ness in women role of clitoris in human, 225
Female dominance strategies. See also hormonal mediation of desire, 42–43
Female aggression; Female as sexual initiation behavior, 43, 213, 226
selector as proactive, 30–31, 418, 420
estrus resulting in shift to dominance, promiscuous among female primates,
40 44, 224, 226–227
434 Index

Female as sexual selector. See also Fe- Thornhill and Palmer pit themselves
male reproductive autonomy; Fe- against, 20, 101, 132–133
male sexuality; Physiological Feminist anti-rape movement, 132,
reproductive defenses of females 186–187, 350–351, 395
in animal behavior, 17–18, 46–47, Feminist critique of the rape-evolution
418, 420 hypothesis
assuming posture of anatomical re- biological determinism elides social
ceptivity, 36–37, 38 improvement, 231
behavior during intercourse can af- legitimizes discourse that rape is
fect fecundity, 50 “natural,” 207, 342–343, 348
choices in mate selection enhancing refocuses blame on the victim, 101,
offspring fitness, 66–70, 79f., 79–80 199–200, 257
choices in mate selection favoring af- Feminists as scientists, 132–133
filiation and reliability in males, 22, Fertility, adversely affected by STDs,
310–311, 358 316–318
in Darwin’s sexual selection theory, Fetus. See also Abortion; Embryo mor-
269 tality risks
favoring resource-sharing traits in selective fetal investment, 50–51
males, 40, 311–312 selective fetal resorption, 50, 51
protective value of intrasexual net- Figueredo, A. J. et al., study of adoles-
works, 40–41 cent rapists, 247–248
reproductive control vested in the Fitness. See Inclusive fitness
female, 29, 31–32 Fodor, Jerry, 166n.1
Female variation within population, Founder effects, 8
67, 82 Freedom of movement and associa-
will impact on male reproductive tion, 199
strategies, 68, 74 Freud, Sigmund, 172, 391
Female vulnerability Fruit fly genomics experiments, 63–64,
ability to detect as a rape-related skill 65, 68
(Thornhill and Palmer), 212–213,
237, 247 “Galileo defense” in Thornhill and
ability to detect vulnerability as a Palmer. See also Scientific credibility
general skill, 247 of the rape-evolution hypothesis;
Feminist account of rape. See also Social construction in science
Aggression-dominance model of concealing an ideological agenda,
rape; Male dominance; Prevention 191–192
of rape pitting the purity of science against
cultural norms govern the ways sex- ideology, 173, 191–192, 235, 257–
ual behavior is expressed, 337, 339, 258n.1
340, 358–359 used against feminist account of rape,
misrepresented (by Thornhill and 20, 101, 132–133
Palmer), 184, 251–253, 342, used against social sciences, 186–
377–378 188, 191–192
resulting in a shift in legal treatment Gang rape
and consciousness, 187, 349–350, abuse of younger males in, 224, 345,
377, 395 346
 Index 435

adolescent male peer culture and, Gender stereotypes

338, 345 cultural norms and needs reinforcing,
homoerotic aspects of, 344–345 16–17, 175, 276–277
influence of male peer culture in, 23, dating and sexual scripts followed,
230, 343–346 396
instance of in a low-rape society, 355 the gendered brain, 12–17
producing paternal uncertainty, 215 reinforced in biological determinist
Geertz, Clifford, 370, 371–372 arguments, 10–12, 175
Gender asymmetry, 274, 378, 391, Genes and culture
392. See also Male dominance; Sex- genetics not to confused with class
ual dimorphism dynamics, 182
cross-cultural variability in, 207, interaction of, 112, 246–247
272–273 theory of coevolution, 143–144, 153,
gender-related factors in rape-prone 246–247
societies, 22–23, 337, 340–342, Genetic determinism, 144–145. See
341t.14.2, 385 also Biological determinism
inequality indicators associated with Genetic processes, 110, 119
prevalence of rape, 23, 207, 218, difficulty in constructing gene-to-
231 behavior links, 129–130, 145, 146,
power asymmetries, 61, 75, 392, 394 272
in reproductive investment, 174, 193, gene-environment interaction, 8–9,
282 40, 61, 70–71
thought to increase with complexity genetic drift, 6
of civilization, 390 Genital inspection, 32
Gender differences. See Gender stereo- Genotypic variation, 70, 241
types; Origin theories of sex differ- Gibbons, codominance among, 40
ence; Sexual dimorphism Gonorrhea, 317, 318, 319t.
Gendered violence, integrative model Goodall, Jane and Barbara Smuts, 226
of, 383, 384, 393, 398 Gould, Stephen Jay, 5
Gender equality. See also Monomor- Gowaty, Patricia Adair. See also Re-
phism productive decisions
anti-rape movement based in idea of, analysis of the components of fitness,
350–351 71–75
evidence of in hunter-gatherer groups on antagonistic selection pressures,
(contemporary), 390 62, 63–68, 81–82
indicators of associated with lower on the environment of evolutionary
rate of violence against women, 396 adaptation (EEA), 18, 62, 68
indicators of inversely related to sex on female reproductive autonomy,
differences in preferred age of 73–78, 76f.
spouse, 289t., 289–290 on mating behavior, 61, 66–71, 72–74
U.N. Gender Empowerment Measure on power asymmetries (and symme-
as a measure of, 285, 286–287, tries) between the sexes, 61, 418
296n.5 on reproductive asymmetries in
Gender inequality. See Gender asym- males, 77–78
metry Gowaty, Patricia Adair and S. P.
Gender socialization theories. See So- Hubbell, 67, 69, 73
cial structural gender theory Griffiths, P. E., 98–99
436 Index

Group competition, 324 case for abortion among early hom-

Group reproductive strategies, 8, 40– inids, 126, 127
42, 67, 77 efforts to define the problems of early
Group selection, 110 hominids, 141–143
Gur, Ruben, 14–16 human behavior in prehistoric times
Gynarchy, 29, 31, 32. See also Female largely unknown, 389–390
reproductive strategies; Female as Pleistocene era posited as the period
sexual selector of, 68, 268, 270
sexual dimorphism decreasing dur-
Hale, Matthew, 350 ing, 309–310
Hamilton, W. D., 7 variation in early hominid groups
Hamilton, W. D. and M. Zuk, 67 posited, 272–273
Heritability of traits, 158n.8, 271 Hunter-gatherer groups, 226–227. See
crucial to natural selection, 236, 241 also Environment of evolutionary
Herpes simplex virus, 7, 318. See also adaptation (EEA)
Sexually transmitted diseases contemporary studies of, 390
Heterozygosity, 67 division of labor in, 268–269, 270,
Hiese, L. L., 383 390
High-status females, reproductive suc- role of social father in, 217, 270
cess enhanced in, 209 Hypersexual model of male sexuality,
High-status males. See also War rape 164, 210. See also Rapists; Sexual-
elite (alpha males), 76f., 76–78, 172 reproductive model of rape
evidence of rape behaviors in, 213, adaptive costs would result from,
248 209–210
raping women of lower status, 398 based in parental investment theory,
seignorial rights, 229 146, 208–209
Hirschi, T., 392 biological and adaptive limits to, 152,
Ho, Mae-Wan and P. T. Saunders, 107 209–210
Homosocial aspects of rape. See also human “hyper males,” 65
Gang rape; Male-on-male rape; War “hyper male” fruit flies, 63–65
rape implication that all men are potential
homoerotic aspects, 344–345 rapists, 197–198, 221–222
influence of male peer culture, 23, noted in the by-product hypothesis,
230, 343–346 208, 236
Hormonal masculinization of females,
35–36 Illegitimacy
Hrdy, Sarah Blaffer, 20, 258n.11, 282 rates compared to rates of sexually
on female counterstrategies, 65 transmitted diseases, 316–320,
on promiscuity in female primates, 319t.
224 rates compared to rates of violent
Human agency. See Intentionality and crime, 314–315, 324–325n.1
subjectivity viability of offspring associated with
Human behavioral ecology, 18, 268 female reproductive autonomy, 79f.,
Human evolution. See also Anthro- 80–81
poids; Environment of evolutionary Immune-related mate preferences,
adaptation (EEA) 67, 71
 Index 437

Impulsivity, 159–160, 162 Intelligence studies, an emphasis on

Incest gender stereotypes in reporting stud-
father-daughter, 33, 321, 322 ies, 14–17
stepfather-daughter, 320–321, 322 Intentionality and subjectivity. See also
Inclusive fitness. See also Components Consent
of fitness as central to defining rape, 22, 232,
adequate treatment of absent in the 364, 369–370
rape-evolution hypothesis, 6–7 gendered meanings of rape, 386, 387,
components of and trade offs, 71–74 388
descendants’ viability (see Offspring intricacy of human acts, 370, 371–372
viability) involved in determining the issue of
factors affecting, 6–7, 71–72 consent, 366, 368–369
individual viability (see Risk factors self-blame and subjective denial of
incurred by rapists) rape by victims, 124
vs. personal utility optimization, 294 subjectivity of self-report data, 90,
may result indirectly from group 92, 94–95
membership (see Mutualism) Intention and subjectivity, how actions
reproductive success, 71–72 (see also are contextually defined, 22, 367–
Reproductive efficacy of rape evalu- 368, 370
ated) INTERPOL, 315
selection pressures on, 72–73 Intersexual competition. See Female
Infanticide, 65, 227, 258n.11 reproductive strategies; Male repro-
possibly an ancestral practice, 250 ductive strategies
Infertility, risks of incurred by rapists, Intrasexual competition. See also
47 Competition between males
Infertility in reproductive-aged female aggression, 67
women. See also Embryo mortality Intrasexual/intersexual cooperation.
risks; Ovulation; Reproductive effi- See Mutualism
cacy of rape evaluated Intrasexual networks, female, 40–41,
embryonic mortality, 49, 50, 51 44
lactation amenorrhea, 48 Intrasexual variability, 11
limited duration of periods of fertil- Intraspecific variability, 6, 18, 144,
ity, 34–35, 47–49 152–153
risk of from sexually transmitted dis- female within-group differences, 67,
eases, 316–318 68, 74, 82
sexual dysfunction may result from Investigative methods. See Method-
child sexual abuse, 321–323 ological criticisms of Thornhill and
spontaneous abortion or natural Palmer
abortifacients, 50–51, 214
Ingold, Tim, 373–374 Jones, O. D., 200
Inheritance. See Heritability of traits Justice Department, U.S., 399
Inhibitory mechanisms, absence of,
159–160, 162 Kalick, S. M. et al., 291
Integrative development model, 23, Kaufman, S. A., 110
383–385, 384, 401. See also Vio- Kenrick, D. T. and R. C. Keefe, 281,
lence against women 283, 296n.2
438 Index

Kimmel, Michael, 221 types of penetration covered by state,

on anti-male aspects of the rape- 120–122t.
evolution hypothesis, 221–222, Lemurs, 40
231 Literacy
ethnohistorical view of rape preva- in females inversely related to birth
lence in, 229–230 rates, 73–74
evaluation of the notion that rapists gender asymmetry related to differ-
target fertile women, 214–215, 227– ences in rates of, 75–76
229 Lloyd, Elizabeth A., 20, 254, 256. See
on male and female sexual strategies, also Scientific credibility of the rape-
20, 224–227 evolution hypothesis
a multidimensional perspective on on adaptive traits, 236–237, 240–
rape in, 224–225 242, 244–246, 306
on primatology, 226–227 on the assumptions of the rape-
on reductionism in evolutionary the- evolutionary hypothesis, 20, 235–
ory, 223–224 239, 240
Kin recognition, 23n.1 Lordosis posture, 36–37
Kin selection, 7 Low-status females
preferences for male resources shar- anovulatory cycles in (animal), 209
ing, 312 “comfort women” (World War II),
Koss, Mary P., 19 131, 181
on the Galileo defense of Thornhill cases of rape by higher-status males,
and Palmer, 186–188, 191–192 229, 398
on the prevalence of rape, 346–348, use of slaves as “breeder women,”
383 112, 126–127
on trauma from rape, 193–196 Low-status male rapist model. See also
on whether rape is sex only or sexual Cost-benefits analysis; High-status
violence, 192, 193, 197–202 males
Kowalski, R. M., 398 confusing social class dynamics with
Krafft-Ebing, 348 genetics, 182
Krueger, Mary M., 126 contradicted by evidence of rape by
high-status males (see High-status
Lactation amenorrhea, 48 males)
Learning factors, 70, 254, 373–374 contradicted by rape behaviors in
Legal prosecution of rape. See also high-status males, 213
Nonreporting of sexual offenses contradicted by rape behaviors high-
credibility of complaints subject to status males, 248
doubt, 163, 178, 349, 350 in examples from primate ethology
improvement in, 187, 349, 350 efficacy of questioned, 45–47
low conviction rate, 387 lacks comparative data to verify,
Thornhill and Palmer’s thesis raising 212–213
possibility of a biological defense,
232 Macguire, Ipsoc, 305
Legal statutes on rape, 117, 123, 368– Mackey, Wade C. See also Paternal in-
369 vestment; Social fatherhood
issue of consent by state, 118–119t. on the evolutionary value of social
legal definitions varying, 385 fatherhood, 227, 305, 306, 307
 Index 439

on the male-to-child affiliative bond, as part of war rape, 131

21–22, 305, 309–311 prevalence of, 240, 388
claim that rape usually precludes the prison rapes, 181, 224
biological father from becoming the rape trauma in cases of, 182
social father, 306–307, 324, 420 victims unlikely to report, 124
on risks involved in paternal preclu- Male parental investment. See Paternal
sion, 313–320 investment; Paternal uncertainty
Makepiece, J., 398–399 Male peer culture. See Youth peer cul-
Malamuth, Neil, 159–160, 201–202, ture
211–212 Male psychology, 22, 391
Male aggression. See also Competition on male aggression, 22, 391
between males; Sexual aggression; paternal investment favoring mutual-
Violence against women ist over aggressive traits, 22, 310–
vs. cooperation (see Mutualism) 311, 358
culturally based theories of, 383, psychopathologies associated with
396, 398, 401 male sexual offenders, 114–115, 248
delinquency in boys and associated very few men identify as potential
factors, 396–397 rapists, 198–199
relationship distress contributing to, Male psychology as predicted by the
398–399 rape-evolution hypothesis
social structural factors contributing all men are potential rapists, 197–
to, 276 (see also Division of labor) 198, 221–222
sociobiological account of, 197–198, involving specific rape-related herita-
391 ble traits, 22, 245, 360n.6, 366–367
Male-bashing. See Anti-male aspects Male reproductive strategies. See also
of the rape-evolution hypothesis Competition between males; Hyper-
Male dispersal, 40–41 sexual model of male sexuality;
Male dominance. See also Female dom- Low-status male rapist model
inance strategies; Social dominance adaptive costs to a hypersexual strat-
animal ethology containing many egy, 209–210
counterexamples, 40 dominance behaviors can be costly, 70
elite male power (alpha males), 76f., female selection as a major factor in
76–78, 172 (see Female as sexual selector)
high-sexual dimorphism associated female variation within population
with, 38–40 will impact on, 68, 74
ideologies of, 23, 343, 350, 394 forming social relationships with fe-
as a reproductive strategy costly to males and female groups, 62
breeder’s survival, 70 mating with nonoptimal partners, 66
resource sharing with females elides, reproductive asymmetries within
40 (see also Male reproductive males, 77–78
strategies; Paternal investment) resource brokering or sharing (see
women’s vulnerability to impeding re- Male resource sharing)
productive autonomy, 79f., 80–81 skillful sexual behaviors, 227
Male-male competition. See Competi- Male resource sharing. See also Men’s
tion between males earning capacity
Male-on-male rape, 155 females gaining from in animal ethol-
no reproductive benefit, 215 ogy, 40, 78–79, 79f., 147
440 Index

Male resource sharing (cont.) on the issue of consent, 366,

kin preferences for in hunter-gather 368–369
groups, 312 on the popular reception to the rape-
as a reproductive strategy, 40, 74, evolution hypothesis, 363–364, 378
78–81 sociocultural perspective on the rape-
selective preferences for posited for evolution hypothesis, 363, 373–378
early human groups, 307, 309–311, on thick vs. thin descriptions, 371–
312 372
Male sexuality. See also Hypersexual Material fallacy, 128–130
model of male sexuality Maternal health, 7. See also Maternal
hypersexual model of, 63–65, 164, productivity; Pregnancy; Sexually
210 transmitted diseases
impulsivity in, 159–160, 162 of daughters of nonbiological fathers,
as involving greater tolerance for ca- 320–321
sual sex, 21, 149–152 offspring viability at risk from STDs,
self-control and, 210 316–318
social structural account of, 211 Maternal investment
Male-to-child affiliative bond, 21–22 childbearing and suckling of infants,
common among birds and canids, 274
217, 309 role-related skills involved in nurtur-
convergent evolution expressed in, ing and communicating behavior,
217, 309 275–276
cultural expressions of (see Social fa- social rank affecting the reproductive
therhood) success of females, 209
importance of to offspring viability, variability among primate females in
227, 305, 306, 307, 310–311, 324 degree of, 209
monogamy (paternal certainty) asso- Maternal productivity. See also Female
ciated with, 311 reproductive autonomy
in primates conflicting evidence of affected by health of mother (see
male caretaking, 217, 308 Maternal health)
Malinowski, Bronislaw, 340 offspring viability associated with
Malthusianism, 365–366 power of the mother, 73–74
Mammals, 39, 174. See also Canids; reproductive success enhanced in
Primates high-status females, 209
Marital rape, 228 risk-factors for poor mothering skills,
Marriage 322
as an overlay of biological pair- sexual dysfunction or secondary in-
bonding, 312–313 fertility, 321–323
cross-cultural existence of, 307 Mate selection criteria. See Cross-
Martin, Emily cultural variation in mate selection
on the context of Darwin’s theory of criteria
sexual selection, 364–366 Mathematical modeling, 18, 143
ethnographic historical approach of, Mathias, Charles, 383
22, 363, 416 Mating preferences, 269. See also Fe-
on intentionality as central to defin- male reproductive autonomy
ing rape, 364, 366, 368–372, 386, cost-benefits analysis involved in,
387, 388 281–283
 Index 441

evolutionary vs. social structural assumptions and definitions exam-

models of, 280–282, 283–284 ined, 20, 151–152, 224–225, 235,
greater in democratic systems, 76f., 239–241
76–77 disregards existing data on rape, 117–
kin selection may be involved in, 7 123
and offspring viability, 66–71, 72–74 does not meet standards of the field,
offspring viability and, 66–71, 72–72 240–242
as self-referential, 67 ignoring or misrepresenting research
Matrilineal social organization, 351– in the field, 246–247
352, 353–354, 376 improper combining of heteroge-
in animal ethology, 40–41, 44 neous data, 183–184
Maynard Smith, John, 8, 143, 209 indirect or contradictory aspects of
Mayr, Ernst, 110 data sources unacknowledged,
McCahill, T. W. et al., study of rape 97–98
survivors, 19, 183, 188–189n.3, 194 misapplication of self-report data,
Media 95–97 (see also Self-report data)
an emphasis on gender stereotypes in reliability and measurement of con-
reporting studies, 12–17 structs questioned, 194
and the popular reception to the rape- Military rape. See War rape
evolution hypothesis, 363–364, 378 Miller, Geoffrey, 258n.8
reception to Thornhill and Palmer, 9, Minangkabau of West Sumatra, 23, 337
17, 172–173, 421 banishment of rapists in, 345
Men. See Male sexuality; Paternal in- gender relations in, 353–355, 358
vestment matrilineality among, 351–352
Men’s earning capacity. See also Male sexual discourse in, 355
resource sharing transgenerational commitment
commonality across cultures as a among, 352–353
female preference for in mating, worldview of, 352–353, 357, 376–
280–281, 282, 285 377
cross-cultural variation found in zero tolerance for rape in culture of,
the degree of emphasis on, 283–284, 343
288t. Mischel, Walter, 149
intrasocietal (U.S.) data on female Mitscherlich, 392
preferences not conclusive, 292–293 Molestation (child). See Child sexual
Metaphysical experience, 339 abuse
Metatheoretical model, 23, 383–385, Monkeys, 37, 40, 41, 44–45
384, 401. See also Violence against rhesus monkeys and macaques, 37–
women 38, 41
Methodological criticisms of Thornhill Monogamy
and Palmer, 18, 87, 90, 100, 106. advantages to males of, 224
See also Scientific credibility of the (as paternal certainty) associated
rape-evolution hypothesis with social fathering, 80–81, 311
alternative explanations misrepre- in birds, 75, 78, 80
sented or ignored, 243–244, 252– constraints on women of institution-
253, 258n.8 alized, 78–81
ancestral tendencies inferred from convergent evolution in monogamous
contemporary data, 142, 153, 273 behaviors, 78, 311
442 Index

Monogamy (cont.) group reproductive strategies, 8, 40–

lowering paternal uncertainty, 75, 79, 42, 67, 77
80 may result in inclusive fitness of
male desertion incurring adaptive group members, 7
costs, 209 reproductive strategies involving, 365
as a trade off, 78–79
Monomorphism, 39 National Center for the Prevention
rape rarely found in association with, and Control of Rape, 383
226 National Crime Victimization Survey,
tendency toward in human evolution, 123
309–310 National Survey of Adolescents, 123
Morality, in perspectives on gender National Violence Against Women
relations, 339, 352, 355 survey, 123, 195
Mother-child dyad National Violence Research Center,
paternal investment in, 306, 323, 324 117
social/communitarian investment in, Naturalistic fallacy, 78, 185, 255–
351–352, 353–354, 357 257, 363, 378. See also Social
Motherhood. See Maternal health; Darwinism
Maternal investment; Maternal pro- Natural selection. See also Adaptation;
ductivity Sexual selection theory
Mounting behavior, 32 analysis of the components of fitness,
Multidisciplinary framework. See 71–74 (see also Inclusive fitness)
Multivariate framework on rape Darwin’s theory of, 338–339, 412–
Multivariate framework on rape, 23, 414
383–385. See also Violence against heritability of trait(s) crucial to, 241
women metaphor of struggle for existence,
not excluding biological factors, 384 365–366
Mundurucu tribe, 342 range of mechanisms and processes
Murdock, George P. and D. White, involved in, 7–8, 108–109, 273
cross-cultural sample of band and theory of sexual selection, 281,
tribal societies, 340–342, 359n.2 296n.1, 348
Murphy, Dwight C., 253 Neo-Darwinism, 107, 110. See also
Murphy, Yolanda and R. Murphy, 342 Evolutionary model of sex differ-
Mutation (evolutionary), 40, 243 ences; Evolutionary psychology
Mutation, low frequency, 239, 243 Neurophysiology, 245
Mutualism Nonbiological father, more likely to
altruism and inclusive fitness, 7 commit child abuse, 320–323
communitarian cultural norms pro- Nonhuman primates. See Primate
moting, 352–354, 357 behavior; Primate sexual behavior
female sexual selection favoring affili- Nonreporting of sexual offenses
ation and reliability in males, 22, frequency of unreported child sexual
310–311, 358 abuse, 123–124, 180
female sexual selection favoring re- low report rate for rape, 387
source sharing traits in males, 40, male victims unlikely to report, 124
310–311 victims’ names available to media, 124
in group may result in inclusive fit- war rape not recognized as a crime by
ness of members, 8, 324 some nations, 131–132
 Index 443

Nonreproductive sexual behaviors, 32, as socially constructed and variable,

49, 127 272–273, 280 (see Social structural
Nordic nations, study of violence and gender theory)
out-of-wedlock births, 314 Out-of-wedlock births. See Illegiti-
Notal organs. See Scorpion flies macy
Ovulation
Offspring viability anovulatory cycles in low-status fe-
associated with maternal status and male animals, 209
power, 73–74 concealed ovulation, 34, 45, 47, 48
cross-species studies of, 73–74 limited duration of, 34–35
enhanced by paternal investment,
216–217, 305, 307, 311–313 (see Parental investment. See Maternal in-
also Paternal investment; Social vestment; Paternal investment; Re-
fathering) productive investment
enhanced by selection choices, 61, Parker, G. A., 69
66–71, 72–74 (see also Reproduc- Parsons, Talcott, 223
tive autonomy) Patas monkeys, 41
fitness of offspring of rape is assumed Paternal investment. See also Male
by Thornhill and Palmer, 305, 306 resource sharing; Male-to-child
(see also Inclusive fitness) affiliative bond; Offspring viability;
male-to-child affiliative bond impor- Paternal uncertainty; Social father-
tant to, 227, 305, 306, 307, 310– hood
311, 324 absence of incurring risks in inclusive
mother’s health affecting (see Mater- fitness of offspring, 315–320, 319t.,
nal health; Maternal productivity) 320, 321–323 (see also Paternal
as part of inclusive fitness, 71–74, preclusion)
108–109 at risk in cases of rape, 306–307,
questions on the reproductive fitness 324, 420
of offspring of rape, 156, 179, 305, biological fathers less likely to abuse
306 children, 320–323
risks to incurred when biological fa- the evolutionary value of, 21–22,
ther is not the social father (see Pa- 227, 306–307, 313
ternal preclusion; Male-to-child favoring mutualist over aggressive
affiliative bond) traits in males, 22, 310–311, 358
Orangutans, forced copulation found increase in associated with low-
among, 45–47 sexual dimorphism, 22, 309–310
Origin theories of sex differences lower investment related to sexual
comparative analysis of, 266, 269, impulsivity, 159–160, 162
420–421 male resource investment, 281, 308–
as evolved and universal, 271–273 309, 311, 323–324
(see also Evolutionary model of sex monogamy (paternal certainty) asso-
differences) ciated with, 311
incompatibility view of origins sim- offspring viability enhanced by, 216–
plistic, 269, 280 217, 305, 307, 311–313
predictive capabilities of compared, Paternal preclusion. See also Illegiti-
277–278, 280, 288t., 293–295, macy; Paternal investment; Social
299t. fatherhood
444 Index

Paternal preclusion (cont.) as biological determinism, 416–417

potential liabilities incurred in daugh- eliding careful work in evolutionary
ters, 315–320, 319t., 321–323 research, 18, 140, 171, 202, 422
potential liabilities incurred in sons, grandiose extrapolations of evolu-
313–315 tionary theory in, 4–5, 9, 107, 178,
Paternal uncertainty, 44–45, 178, 270 419
concealed fertilization, 270 ideological aspects of, 105–106
less in cases of monogamy, 75, 79, 80 as poor science (see Scientific credi-
posited in the EEA, 146 bility of the rape-evolution hypothe-
socioeconomic factors associated sis)
with, 21 rape-evolution hypothesis as a revival
Pathogens, 7, 70. See also Sexually of, 141–146
transmitted diseases Population genetics, 243–244
Patriarchy, 175, 392–393 Pornography, 346, 357
Pelvic inflammatory disease, 7, 317– Postcopulatory mechanisms to avoid
318. See also Sexually transmitted fertilization, 49
diseases Postindustrial societies, division of la-
Personal utility optimization, 294 bor in, 295
Phenotypic variation, 70–71, 241, Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
258n.5 195–196
environmental factors affecting, 254 Poverty, 323
phenotypic plasticity, 110–111 Power asymmetries between the sexes.
Phyletic inertia See Gender asymmetry
as a refutation of adaptationist as- Powers, E. A., 280
sumptions, 244–246 Pregnancy. See also Maternal health;
vertebrate phalanges as an example Offspring viability
of, 244–246 ectopic pregnancies, 318
Physiological reproductive defenses of estimates of rapes resulting in, 19–20,
females, 31, 50, 274 47, 125–126, 157, 213–215, 306
concealed fertilization, 270 from rape incurring risk of infanti-
concealed ovulation, 34, 45, 47, 48 cide, 65, 227, 250, 258n.11
limited duration of fertility, 34–35, placing women at risk of physical and
47–49 sexual abuse, 125–126
physical barriers, 31, 42 risk of abortion of spontaneous abor-
postcopulatory mechanisms to avoid tion (see Abortion; Embryo mortal-
fertilization, 49 ity risks)
postural constraints, 36–37 Prevalence of rape. See also Cross-
reverse sexual dimorphism, 35–36 cultural variation in rape incidence
vaginal closure, 31, 35, 43 associated with gender inequality, 23,
Pleistocene era, posited as the EEA for 207, 218, 231
hominid evolution, 68, 268, 270. data on, 117, 123
See also Environment of evolution- historical view of, 229–230
ary adaptation (EEA) rape behaviors reported by men (in
Pop sociobiology. See also Biological the U.S.), 388
determinism; Zoomorphism rape behaviors reported by women
appeal to the general public, 101– (in the U.S.), 387
102, 172, 421 in the U.S., 4, 346–348
 Index 445

Prevention of rape. See also Rape- in animals resulting paternal uncer-

reduction program of Thornhill and tainty may benefit the female, 45,
Palmer 49–50, 224, 226
anti-rape efforts have resulted in a in human women associated with
shift in legal and popular conscious- childhood sexual abuse, 337
ness, 349–350, 377 sexually transmitted disease associ-
male role in prevention, 101, 232 ated with, 337
Primate behavior Prosimians, 39, 43
codominance found in, 40 vaginal closure among, 43
evidence (conflicts) of male caretak- Psychological theories of aggression,
ing in, 217, 308 391
females dominant among monkeys, Psychological traits as adaptations
40 (Thornhill and Palmer)
gender relations, 29, 39–40 rape trauma in females, 19, 178,
offspring of low-status females incur 239–239
risks, 217 specialized motivational module in
social fathering minimal in, 308 men to rape, 156–158, 166n.1, 178,
Primates. See also Anthropoids; 179, 245, 306
Prosimians Psychological traits as situation-
baboons, 41 specific, 149–151
bonobos, 6, 226, 248–249 Psychopathology models
chimpanzees, 40, 248 predicting poor parenting by sur-
gibbons, 40 vivors of child abuse, 322–323
lemurs, 40 pyschopathologies of sexual offend-
monkeys, 37, 40, 41, 44–45 ers, 241, 247–248, 258n.8
orangutans, 45–47 Psychosocial traits associated with
rhesus monkeys and macaques, 37– rape behavior, 248, 258n.8
38, 41
Primate sexual behavior, 32, 37–38 Rada, Richard T., 115
disappearance of estrus among an- Rape. See also Cross-cultural variation
thropoids, 37, 42 in rape incidence; Rape-evolution
female reproductive decisions in, 31– hypothesis; Rapists
32 (see also Female as sexual selector) alternative evolutionary perspective
forced copulation found but rare, 33, on (see Evolution-based alternative
41, 43–44, 226 models)
genital inspection, 32 attempted rape, 347 (see also Sexual
involved in dominance and aggres- aggression)
sion behaviors, 32 cultural perspectives on (see Cultural
Primate sexual morphology models of rape)
monomorphism, 39 definitions of (see Defining rape)
sexual dimorphism, 41, 45–46 female resistance to, 47, 68, 70
Primate studies, having an androcen- having different meanings for men
tric focus, 29–31 and women, 386 (see also Intention-
Proceptivity, 30–31 ality and subjectivity)
Promiscuity in females. See also Hy- incidence of (see Prevalence of rape)
persexual model of male sexuality involving multivariate behaviors,
among primates, 44, 224, 226–227 224–225, 383–385
446 Index

Rape (cont.) basis of categories, 340, 341t.14.1,

often precludes the biological father 359–360n.3
from becoming the social father, Rape-free species among primates,
306–307, 324, 420 (see also Pater- 248–249
nal investment; Social fatherhood) Rape in America national survey, 195
prevents female from mate selection Rape incidence. See Prevalence of rape
(see Female reproductive autonomy; Rape prevention or reduction. See Pre-
Reproductive decisions) vention of rape
as sexual violence (see Aggression- Rape-prone societies, 22–23, 337,
dominance model of rape) 340–342, 341t.14.2, 385
whether reproductive advantages Rape-reduction program of Thornhill
could accrue from (see Reproductive and Palmer, 20, 172–173. See also
efficacy of rape evaluated) Prevention of rape
Rape as sex. See Sexual-reproductive as bioprevention problematic, 200–
model of rape 201
Rape behaviors and contexts. See also teach women to dress modestly and
Family rape; Gang rape; Male-on- stay in public on dates, 165, 186,
male rape; War rape 194, 198–199, 229, 257
acquaintance rape, 199, 224, 397–398 teach young men that they are po-
alcohol and drug consumption asso- tential rapists, 164, 185–186, 197–
ciated with, 399 198
date rape, 229, 399 as unoriginal and simplistic, 20, 256–
Rape-evolution hypothesis. See also 257
By-product hypothesis; Rape- Rape-specific hypothesis. See also
specific hypothesis; Scientific credi- Low-status male rapist model;
bility of the rape-evolution Reproductive benefits thesis of rape
hypothesis assumes a specialized motivational
anthropomorphism in, 18, 89, 112, module, 156–158, 166n.1, 178,
225 179, 245, 306
the hypothesis summarized, 81–82, rape as adaptive behavior that
154, 193–194, 235–236, 305–306, evolved in males, 191, 207, 236 (see
338 also Adaptive trait)
on proximate vs. ultimate causes of specific rape-related heritable traits
rape, 87–88, 210, 419 evolved in men, 22, 245, 360n.6,
rape as a conditional strategy based 366–367 (see also Adaptive trait;
in costs-benefits analysis, 130, 177– Male psychology)
178, 242 Rape trauma. See Trauma from rape
rape as universal behavior, 22–23, Rape victims. See Victims of rape
218, 241–242, 357, 367, 419 Rapists
as sexual rather than aggressive be- attitudes associated with rape behav-
havior (see Sexual-reproductive iors, 114, 160–161, 162, 347,
model of rape) 399–401
Rape-free/atypical societies, 226, 337– contributing psychosocial factors,
338, 358–359, 376–377. See also 389, 399
Minangkabau of West Sumatra demographic data on, 388
 Index 447

psychopathologies associated with in case of gang rape less chance of pa-

sexual offenders, 114–115, 248 ternity resulting from, 180–181
Rapists as characterized in the rape- live births resulting from may be min-
evolution hypothesis. See also Re- imal (see Pregnancy from rape; Off-
productive benefits thesis of rape spring viability)
as able to evaluate female vulnerabil- many rapes do not involve women of
ity, 212–213, 237, 247 reproductive age (see Ages of rape
being primarily sexually motivated, victims)
96–97 (see also Sexual-reproductive many rapes do not involve women
model of rape) (see Male-on-male rape)
as having a preference for raping many rapes of women do not involve
women at peak fertility, 237 effective ejaculation into the vagina,
using rape to punish infidelity, 237– 32–33, 37, 44, 46, 180, 184
238 no evidence comparing the reproduc-
Recreational sex, men as having a tive success of rapists to nonrapists,
greater tolerance for, 21, 149–152 212–213, 241–242, 249, 305, 306
Reductionism offspring viability at risk, 179, 305,
or oversimplification in evolutionary 306 (see also Maternal productivity;
psychology, 74, 145–146, 223–224 Offspring viability; Paternal invest-
in the rape-evolution hypothesis, ment)
223–224 physiological defenses against “rape”
Reduction of rape. See Prevention of among animals (see Physiological
rape reproductive defenses of females)
Reipe, Mathias, 13–14 women of reproductive age are infer-
Reproduction as a motivation for rape. tile most of the time (see Infertility
See Sexual-reproductive model of in reproductive-aged women)
rape Reproductive fitness of rape victims,
Reproductive benefits thesis of rape. 291. See also Ages of rape victims;
See also Cost-benefits analysis; Re- Maternal health; Pregnancy
productive efficacy of rape evaluated evidence of higher rate of abortions,
as central to the rape-evolution hy- 249–250, 258n.11
pothesis, 193, 240–241, 247 incurring an overall loss in reproduc-
relies on defining rape as sex (see tive success, 238
Sexual-reproductive model of rape) mate and family reproductive success
Reproductive decisions. See also Fe- may be lowered, 238
male reproductive autonomy; Mat- Reproductive investment. See also Ma-
ing preferences ternal investment; Maternal produc-
importance of mate choice, 67–68 tivity; Paternal investment;
involving sexually antagonistic selec- Reproductive decisions
tion pressures, 62, 68, 81–82 gender asymmetry in, 174, 193, 282
and offspring viability, 66–71 gender symmetry in (see Reproduc-
of one gender affecting the other, 63, tive decisions)
64–65, 66–68 male hypersexuality posited in theory
Reproductive efficacy of rape evalu- of, 208–210
ated, 47–49, 51–52, 125, 181. See parental investment theory, 208–210
also Risk factors incurred by rapists selection pressures, 6, 64–66
448 Index

Reproductive investment (cont.) Risk-factors related to the offspring of

sexual selection theory based in, 193, rape. See Embryo mortality risks;
223, 282 Offspring viability
Reproductive strategies. See also Risk-factors related to victimization
Female reproductive strategies; Male being female, 388
reproductive strategies; Reproduc- historical view of, 229–230
tive decisions; Reproductive invest- sexual abuse in childhood, 199, 388
ment Rosser, Sue V.
among a range of adaptive mecha- on biological determinism, 413, 416–
nisms in natural selection, 7–8 417
coevolutionary character of, 214–215 on the social context of Darwin’s sex-
group reproductive strategies, 8–9, ual selection theory, 414–415, 416
365 (see also Mutualism) summary of objections to the rape-
sexually antagonistic coevolution, evolution hypothesis, 417–422
63–65 Rowell, T. E., 38, 40
sneak copulations (rather than rape), Russian biology (late 19th to early
213 20th c.), rejecting metaphor of
Reproductive success. See Offspring struggle for existence, 365–366
viability; Reproductive investment; Ryle, G., 370–372
Reproductive strategies; Sexual se-
lection theory Sahlins, Marshall, 363
Research methods. See Methodologi- Sanday, Peggy Reeves. See also Cross-
cal criticisms of Thornhill and cultural variation in rape incidence
Palmer misrepresented in Thornhill and
Resource sharing. See Male resource Palmer, 343
sharing on sociocultural variables associated
Reverse sexual dimorphism, 35–36, with high rape incidence, 231, 340–
39, 40 342, 341t.14.2
Rhesus macaques, 41 on variation in rape incidence across
Rhesus monkeys and macaques, 37– cultures, 22–23, 218, 337, 341t.,
38, 41 349–342, 357, 359–360n.3, 418
Rice, fruit fly genomics experiments Science, social construction in. See
with, 63–66 Social construction in science
Richerson, Peter, 143 Scientific credibility of the rape-
Right-of-first-night, 229 evolution hypothesis, 173, 182,
Risk-factors incurred by rapists, 71, 184–185, 417–418, 421. See also
179–180 “Galileo defense” in Thornhill and
exclusion from the breeding group, 9, Palmer; Methodological criticisms
337 of Thornhill and Palmer
female resistance, 47, 68 based on a fringe version of the the-
future infertility, 47 ory of evolution, 243, 245 (see also
incarceration or death, 47 Adaptationism)
retaliation by mate or family mem- causal inferences are not sufficient,
bers, 47 128–130
Risk-factors leading to rape behavior. criticized from the perspective of
See Rapists evolutionary theory (see Evolution-
 Index 449

ary critiques of the rape-evolution Selective resorption, 50

hypothesis) Self-report data, 18
criticized from the perspective of appropriate uses of, 90–91, 93–95
social science (see Sociocultural cannot be validated internally, 91–92
critiques of the rape-evolution as a measure of beliefs, 90, 92, 94–95
hypothesis) misapplication of by Thornhill and
data and logistics relevant to assess- Palmer, 95–97, 99–101
ing, 207–208 misuse of in evolutionary psychology,
demographic predictions are unveri- 88–89
fied, 228–229 not necessarily consistent with behav-
evidence detrimental to conclusions ior, 92–93
can be drawn from current circum- problems in determining causality
stances, 249–250 from, 87, 88, 90
explanatory power of alternative Thornhill and Palmer’s arguments
models (see Evolution-based alter- based upon, 87–88, 419
native models; Cultural models of Sexology, adversarial view of sexuality
rape) in, 348–350
lacks criterion of falsifiability, 176– Sex (rape as). See Sexual-reproductive
177, 223, 306 model of rape
no comparative evidence in support Sexual abuse. See Child sexual abuse
of central premise (see Reproductive Sexual aggression. See also
efficacy of rape evaluated) Aggression-dominance model of
as a single-factor theory, 225, 384, rape; Rape
421 attitudes associated with, 343, 398
Scorpion flies coercive tactics to obtain sex, 33,
notal organs may serve different func- 347, 385–386, 396–399
tions, 375, 376–377 in interpersonal relationships, 397–
“rape” mechanisms as analogous to 398
male psychological adaptations levels of, 385–386
(Thornhill and Palmer), 249, 357, Sexual attraction. See also Attractive-
360n.6, 375, 376–377 ness in women
Secondary infertility, may result from effort to define, 141, 154, 166–
child sexual abuse, 321–323 167n.3, 266
Secondary sexual characteristics. See reciprocity a feature of, 155
also Attractiveness in women; Sex- Sexual behavior. See also Primate sex-
ual dimorphism; Sexual selection ual behavior; Reproductive strategies
theory adversarial view of human, 348–350
display features and behavior in commodity view of human, 226
males, 45, 46, 72, 174, 414 cross-species comparisons of, 6
male attractiveness, 141 cultural norms acting upon human,
sexual skin in female primates, 44–45 21, 337, 339, 340, 351
Selection pressures involvement of central nervous sys-
antagonistic, 62, 63–65, 81–82 tem in, 113–114
on inclusive fitness, 72–73 maladaptive traits in, 176–178
not clearly defined in the rape- nonreproductive functions in, 32, 49,
evolution hypothesis, 163 127, 149, 151
in reproductive investment, 6, 64–66 precopulatory behavior, 113–114
450 Index

Sexual behavior (cont.) violent aspects of sexual assault dis-

religious and social taboos mediating, counted, 161, 251–253, 342, 377–
29–30 378 (see also Aggression-dominance
structural-functional relationships model of rape)
with aggressive behavior, 113–114 Sexual selection theory, 153–154,
Sexual dimorphism. See also Mono- 174–176, 269–270. See also Com-
morphism petition between males; Female as
cross-species comparisons, 22 sexual selector
decreasing during in hominid evolu- adversarial view of sexuality in, 348–
tion, 309–310 349
exceptions of male dominance in androcentric focus in, 29–31, 414,
cases of, 39–40 415–416
high levels associated with social assuming gender asymmetry in repro-
dominance, 38–40 ductive investment, 174, 193, 282
in humans, 174–175 based on differences in parental in-
inversely associated with paternal in- vestment, 282
vestment, 22, 309–310 constraints in sexual selection, 72–
rape as an adaptation would not pre- 73, 75
dict a decrease in, 310 in Darwin, 348
rape is rarely found in species with developed within a Victorian context,
low, 226 364–366
reverse, 35–36, 39, 40 male competition in, 174, 269–270,
in sexual selection theory, 414–417 414
Sexual division of labor. See Division sexual dimorphism in, 414–417
of labor Trivers’s theory as reductionist, 223–
Sexual dysfunction, as a sequelae of 224
child sexual abuse, 321–323 Sexual violence. See also Child sexual
Sexual intercourse, 43 abuse; Male-on-male rape; Rape; Vi-
Sexually antagonistic coevolution, 63– olence against women
65 sexually motivated homicide rates
oscillatory cycles of sexual conflict, 69 unknown, 385
Sexually transmitted diseases, 7 Sexual violence model of rape. See
affecting fertility and offspring viabil- Aggression-dominance model of
ity, 316–318 rape; Violence against women
promiscuity related to, 337 Shaw, C. and H. McKay, 391
rates of compared to illegitimacy Shields, Stephanie A. and Pamela
rates, 7, 315–316, 319t. Steinke. See also Self-report data
sexual control in response to, 358 on the investigative methods of
Sexual receptivity, 36–37, 38 Thornhill and Palmer, 18, 87–90,
Sexual-reproductive model of rape, 21, 419
31, 224, 247, 257, 366–367, 369 on misapplication of self-report data
claim that rapists do not injure their by Thornhill and Palmer, 95–97,
victims, 193, 196 (see also Victims 99–101
of rape) on uses and misuses of self-report
as critical to the rape-evolution hy- data, 90–95
pothesis, 89, 101, 116–117, 125, Shifting Balance theory, 243
225 Shotland, R. L., 398
 Index 451

Seignorial rights, 229 Social structural gender theory. See

Single-factor theory, the rape-evolution also Cultural meaning; Cultural
hypothesis as, 225, 384, 421 models of rape
Single-parent births. See Illegitimacy cultural transmission of gendered be-
Slaves and lower-caste women haviors, 140, 143–144, 272, 276–
breeder women, 112 277, 278
rape of, 126–127, 181, 229, 398 gender roles arising from the division
Small, Meredith, 226 of labor, 265–266, 273, 278
Smuts, Barbara, 81 internalization of social roles, 277
Social construction in science, 19, not incompatible with genetically-
364. See also “Galileo defense” in mediated factors, 266, 267–268,
Thornhill and Palmer 274, 279–280, 294
premise that science is value-free ig- power asymmetries may reinforce
nores, 192 roles, 274, 277–278
unconscious cultural projections, 95, predictive potential of, 277–278, 287,
374–375 289t., 293–295
Social Darwinism, 21, 365–366, 373– role assumption a dynamic and per-
374, 414, 416 sonalized process, 278–279
Social disorganization theory, 391– role-related behavior embedded in so-
392 cial structure, 265–266, 273, 278
Social dominance. See also Gender role-related skills and associated be-
asymmetry; Male dominance havior, 275–276
acquired through networking behav- social role theory, 276–277
ior, 40–41, 44 variation in gender asymmetry
codominance in gender relations, 40 across societies and groups, 272–
male display characteristics and, 46 273, 280
shift in gender dominance among Social structural origin theory
chimpanzees, 40 stereotypes reinforced by cultural
social rank affecting the reproductive norms and desire for ordered inter-
success of females, 209 action, 16–17, 276–277
Social ethics Sociobiology. See Evolutionary psy-
familial politics, 305, 312–313 chology; Pop sociobiology
issue of morality and selection theory, Sociocultural critiques of the rape-
339 evolution hypothesis
metaphysical experience, 339 biological causation of rape would re-
Social exclusion, in cases of rape, 9, quire biological solutions, 101,
337 200–201
Social fatherhood, 217, 226–227. See by appearing to confirm a “natural”
also Male-to-child affiliative bond behavior the model has damaging
coexisting with matrilineage, 354, 357 social effects, 197, 207, 232, 256,
cross-cultural existence of, 307–309 378
evolutionary value of, 227, 305, 306, containing unconscious cultural pro-
307, 310–311, 324 jections, 374–377
Social inequality, 417. See also Gender integrative social and evolutionary
asymmetry perspectives more productive,
social class, 182 201–202
452 Index

Sociocultural critiques of the rape- pothesis; Rape-reduction program

evolution hypothesis (cont.) of Thornhill and Palmer
lacking knowledgeable consideration media reception to, 9, 17, 172–173,
social and cultural factors, 363, 421
373–374, 421 claim that culture is subsumed within
as reductionist, 107, 267 biological realm, 254
social constructions in science ig- criticism of other models of rape as
nored, 19, 364–366 “nonfundamental,” 178, 191–192,
subsumes culture within the biologi- 253–254
cal realm, 178, 191–192, 254 misrepresentation of data and litera-
unable to account for cross-cultural ture to support thesis, 182–184,
variation in rape, 226–227, 271–273 250–251
Sons of absent fathers, potential liabil- misrepresenting the feminist account
ities incurred in, 313–315 of rape, 184, 251–253, 342, 377–
Species comparisons. See Cross- 378
species comparisons pitting “science” against “ideology”
Sperm competition, 49–50 (see “Galileo defense” of Thornhill
Sperm ejection, 50, 51. See also Spon- and Palmer)
taneous abortion self-valorized as a “new” movement,
Spirituality, metaphysical experiences, 243
339 sociocultural models of rape criti-
Spontaneous abortion, 50–51, 214, cized in, 161, 184, 259n.15, 363–
249 364
Status of women, 392–393 Thornhill, Randy and Nancy Thorn-
literacy in females inversely related to hill, 183, 252
birth rates, 73–74 Tobach, Ethel and Rachel Reed, 18,
in societies where status is high sex 105
differences are smaller in preferred on biological determinism, 105–106
age of spouse, 289t., 289–290 on factors associated with rape be-
societies where status is low have a havior, 114–115
incidence of rape, 23, 207, 218, 231 theories of, 112–113, 114
STDs. See Sexually transmitted diseases Todes, Daniel, 364–365
Structural functionalism, 223 Tooby, J. and L. Cosmides, critique of
Subjectivity. See Intentionality and social structural theory, 279
subjectivity Transgenerational commitment, 352–
Symons, Donald, 156, 159 354
Syphilis, 7, 316–317, 319t. See also Trauma from rape. See also Victims of
Sexually transmitted diseases rape
in cases of male-on-male rape, 182
Tang-Martinez, Z., 99 in infants and children (as reported in
Tanner, Nancy, 358 Thornhill and Palmer) derived indi-
Tattersall, I., 282 rectly, 184, 188–189n.3
Thornhill, Nancy, 194, 252 more severe when rape is more vio-
Thornhill, Randy and Craig T. Palmer, lent, 195–196
A Natural History of Rape. See also occurs across all age levels regardless
Methodological criticisms of Thorn- of childbearing potential, 195,
hill and Palmer; Rape-evolution hy- 196
 Index 453

postmenopausal/older women report prevalence of rape in, 4, 346–348,

same extent of trauma, 183 387, 388
in sexually abused children may be Utility optimization, 294
most severe, 195, 321–322
Trauma from rape as predicted in Vaginal closure, 31, 35, 43
Thornhill and Palmer Vaginal intercourse, 32–33, 37, 43,
confirmation of the model obtained 46, 180, 184
by improper combining of heteroge- Vaginal orientation, 36
neous data, 183–184 Variation within species. See Intra-
as more severe in reproductive-aged specific variability
women, 193–194, 238 Venereal disease, 7, 317, 319t. See also
as more severe in women with mates, Sexually transmitted diseases
96, 97–98, 193–194 Vertebrate phalanges, as an example
as a psychological adaptation in fe- of phyletic inertia, 244–246
males, 19, 178, 239–239 Vickers, A. Leah and Philip Kitcher
that reproductive-age victims will ex- on the coevolution of genes and cul-
perience more trauma, 238 ture, 143–144, 153
that trauma will decrease as violence critique of evolutionary psychology,
of attack increases, 193, 238–239 140–141, 144–146, 150–151,
that vaginal penetration will produce 163
more trauma, 193 on cultural transmission, 18, 139,
Travis, Cheryl Brown 140, 143–144
on evolutionary factors, 6–8, 17–18 on the gap between standards and
on inclusive fitness, 6–8, 23n.1, practice in Thornhill-Palmer study,
212–213 163, 165–166
on the media reception to Thornhill on intraspecific variability, 18, 139,
and Palmer thesis, 9, 17 144, 152–153
on paternal investment, 216–217 on model building in evolutionary re-
on pop sociobiology and alternative search, 18, 139
models of gender, 3–8, 218 Victim counseling. See also Rape-
on prevalence of rape, 18, 207, 218 reduction program of Thornhill and
Trivers, Robert Palmer
on parental investment differences, trauma as due to reproductive con-
282 sequences (Thornhill and Palmer),
reductionism in evolutionary theory 194
of, 223–224 Victims of rape. See also Ages of rape
victims; Family of the rape victim;
Uniform Crime Reports, 117, 123, Nonreporting of sexual offenses;
385 Reproductive fitness of rape victims;
United Nations Trauma from rape
statistics on murder rates, 315 credibility of complaints subject to
statistics on single parent births, 315 doubt, 163, 178, 349, 350
United Nations Development Pro- McCahill et al. study of, 19, 183,
gramme, gender equality measure 188–189n.3, 194
of, 285, 286–287 risk-factors related to, 198–200
United States self-blame and subjective denial of
constitutional freedoms in, 199 rape in, 124, 196
454 Index

Victorian era, as the context of Dar- Wiederman, M. W. and E. R. Allgeier,

win’s theory of sexual selection, 292
364–366, 414–415, 416 Wigmore, John Henry, 349
Violence against women. See also Williams, George, 339
Child sexual abuse; Domestic vio- Wilson, E. O., Sociobiology, 187, 366,
lence; Rape 417
dyadic-level analysis of, 397–399 Wilson, Margo, 246
individual-level analysis of, 399–401 Women
integrative analysis of, 384, 393f., attractiveness in (see Attractiveness in
393–394 women)
network-level analysis of, 394, 396– status of (see Gender equality; Gen-
397 der asymmetry; Status of women)
situational-level analysis of, 399 Worldview and gender-related factors,
sociocultural level-analysis of, 394– in rape-free/atypical societies, 337–
396 338, 358–359, 376–377
theory of, 383, 396, 398 Wrangham, R., 258
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Wright, Sewall, and population genet-
200 ics, 243–244
Violence in rape, level of does not dif- Wylie, A., 100
fer in cases of adult victims, 183
Violent crime, rates of compared to il- Young, Robert, 365
legitimacy rates, 314–315 Youth peer culture. See also Gang
Vulnerability. See Female vulnerability rape
adolescent culture (U.S.), 338, 345
Waal, Frans de, 6, 226 homosocial bonding and sexual ag-
Waddington, C. H., 109, 110 gression, 358
Waist-to-hip ratio, as signifying female
fecundity, 99–100, 291 Zoomorphism, 18, 111–113, 140–
War rape, 130–132, 224, 230 141, 179
male-on-male rapes, 131
Warrior societies, rape in, 229
Wedekind, C., 67
West Sumatra. See Minangkabau of
West Sumatra
“What if” accounts. See Self report
data
White, Jacquelyn W. and Lori A. Post.
See also Violence against women
integrative analysis of violence
against women, 23, 383–385, 401
on social development, 23, 401
on theory of violence against women,
383, 396, 398
White, Jacquelyn W. and R. M.
Kowalski, integrative model of gen-
dered violence, 383, 384, 393, 398