Risk Management Series

Building Design
for Homeland Security
Student Manual
January 2004

FEMA E 155
 E155/ January 2004

RISK MANAGEMENT SERIES

Building Design for

Homeland Security
PROVIDING PROTECTION TO PEOPLE AND BUILDINGS

Student Manual

[Link]
Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations
expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of
FEMA. Additionally, neither FEMA or any of its employees makes
any warrantee, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability
or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of
any information, product, or process included in this publication.
Users of information from this publication assume all liability
arising from such use.
 BACKGROUND AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

BACKGROUND
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) developed
the Building Design for Homeland Security Course (E155), to provide
needed information on how to mitigate the effects of potential
terrorist attacks.

The purpose of E155 is to familiarize students with assessment

methodologies available to identify the relative level of risk for
various threats, including blast and chemical, biological, or
radiological. The students will be introduced to FEMA 426 and
will be asked to provide cost-effective mitigation measures for a
range of manmade hazards. The primary target audience for this
course includes engineers, architects, and building officials.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Principal Authors:

Michael Chipley, UTD, Inc.

Michael Kaminskas, UTD, Inc.

Contributors:

Milagros Kennett, FEMA, Project Officer, Risk Management

Series Publications
Dan Bondroff, EMI Training Specialist
Eric Letvin, Greenhorne & O’Mara, Inc., Consultant
Project Manager
Christopher Arnold, Building Systems Development, Inc.
Dwight Johnson, All About Training Instruction System
Designer
Gina Wightman, All About Training Instruction System
Designer
Deb Daly, Greenhorne & O’Mara, Inc.
Wanda Rizer, Greenhorne & O’Mara, Inc.
Julie Liptak, Greenhorne & O’Mara, Inc.

BACKGROUND AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS i

 This course was prepared under contract to FEMA. It will be
revised periodically, and comments and feedback to improve
future editions are welcome. Please send comments and feedback
by e-mail to riskmanagementseriespubs@[Link]

ii BACKGROUND AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

 Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

AGENDA

Day 1 Instructor

8:30 a.m. Unit I – Introduction and Course Michael Chipley, Ph.D.

Overview

10:00 a.m. Break Eric Letvin, Esq.

10:15 a.m. Unit II – Asset Value Assessment Eric Letvin, Esq.

11:30 a.m. Lunch Eric Letvin, Esq.

12:30 p.m. Unit III – Threat/Hazard Assessment Michael Chipley, Ph.D.

1:45 p.m. Break Eric Letvin, Esq.

2:00 p.m. Unit IV – Vulnerability Assessment Michael Kaminskas, P.E.

3:45 p.m. Break Eric Letvin, Esq.

4:00 p.m. Unit V – Risk Assessment/Risk Eric Letvin, Esq.

Management

4:45 p.m. Day 1 Wrap-up and Day 2 Forecast Eric Letvin, Esq.

5:00 p.m. Dinner Eric Letvin, Esq.

 Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

AGENDA

Day 2 Instructor

8:30 a.m. Day 1 Review and Day 2 Overview Eric Letvin, Esq.

8:45 a.m. Unit V – Risk Assessment/Risk Michael Chipley, Ph.D.

Management (continued)

9:15 a.m. Unit VI – Explosive Blast Michael Kaminskas, P.E.

10:15 a.m. Break Eric Letvin, Esq.

10:30 a.m. Unit VII – Chemical, Biological, and Michael Chipley, Ph.D.
Radiological Measures

11:30 a.m. Lunch Eric Letvin, Esq.

12:30 p.m. Written Exam Michael Chipley, Ph.D.

Michael Kaminskas, P.E.

1:00 p.m. Written Exam Review Michael Chipley, Ph.D.

Michael Kaminskas, P.E.

1:30 p.m. Break Eric Letvin, Esq.

1:45 p.m. Unit VIII – Site and Layout Design Chris Arnold, FAIA
Guidance

3:30 p.m. Break Eric Letvin, Esq.

3:45 p.m. Unit VIII – Site and Layout Design Chris Arnold, FAIA
Guidance (continued)

4:30 p.m. Day 2 Wrap-up and Day 3 Forecast Eric Letvin, Esq.

5:00 p.m. Dinner Eric Letvin, Esq.

 Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

AGENDA

Day 3 Instructor

8:30 a.m. Day 2 Review and Day 3 Overview Eric Letvin, Esq.

8:45 a.m. Unit IX – Building Design Guidance Michael Kaminskas, P.E.

10:15 a.m. Break Eric Letvin, Esq.

10:30 a.m. Unit IX – Building Design Guidance Michael Kaminskas, P.E.

(continued)

11:30 a.m. Lunch Eric Letvin, Esq.

12:30 p.m. Unit X – Electronic Security Systems Eric Letvin, Esq.

1:15 p.m. Break Eric Letvin, Esq.

1:30 p.m. Unit XI – Finalization of Case Study Michael Chipley, Ph.D.

Results [Goal is to brief building owner on Michael Kaminskas, P.E.
prioritized recommendations and
justifications for security work.]

2:15 p.m. Break Eric Letvin, Esq.

2:30 p.m. Unit XI – Presentation of Group Case Michael Chipley, Ph.D.

Study Results and Discussion (continued) Michael Kaminskas, P.E.
[Assumes 6 teams and 10 minutes per team
to present and 5 minutes per team to
discuss.]

4:00 p.m. Unit XII – Course Wrap-up Eric Letvin, Esq.

5:00 p.m. Adjourn Eric Letvin, Esq.

Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview

Unit I

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security

UNIT TITLE Introduction and Course Overview

OBJECTIVES 1. Describe the goal, objectives, and agenda for the course
2. Describe and find material in the course reference manual and
student activity handout

SCOPE This unit will cover the following topics:

1. Welcome and Opening Remarks
2. Instructor Introductions
3. Administrative Information
4. Student Introductions
5. Course Overview
6. Course Materials
7. Activity: Become familiar with Case Study materials

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist

Attacks Against Buildings
2. Case Study, Hazardville Information Company (HIC)

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview

UNIT I CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:

HAZARDVILLE INFORMATION COMPANY (HIC)
CASE STUDY OVERVIEW

Requirements

Turn to the Appendix A Case Study materials in the Student Manual and briefly peruse the
document. Read the “familiarization” questions on the following worksheet, and as a group,
complete the worksheet. Use only the Case Study data to answer worksheet questions.
Information has been limited in an effort to focus the activity.

Page # in Case
Question Answer Study
A major interstate highway is A-3, A-28 – A-30
1. What are the major
located within ¼ mile of the HIC
transportation nodes in the
Headquarters.
surrounding area?
CSX Transportation and
Norfolk-Southern Railway
maintain a transportation
corridor about ½ mile from HIC.
There appear to be no
restrictions on the material
carried along these rail lines.

Two airports are in the vicinity

of HIC. One is a major
international airport
approximately 8 miles away.
The other is a small, but busy
general aviation airport
approximately 2 miles away.

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview

Page # in Case
Question Answer Study
A-16, A-17, A-27
2. What life safety assets are
available, and what are their
response times?

A-1, A-2
3. Who are the building’s primary
occupants and visitors?

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview

Page # in Case
Question Answer Study
A-5, A-6,
4. What hazards may affect HIC?
A-28 – A-30

A-6
5. What are the prevalent
weather/wind conditions at HIC?

A-21 – 24
6. What are the critical functions of
HIC?

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview

Page # in Case
Question Answer Study
A-12 – A-19
7. What are the components of
HIC’s critical utility
infrastructure?

A-11, A-12, A-16

8. What are the components of
HIC’s critical building
infrastructure?

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview

Page # in Case
Question Answer Study
A-2
9. What personnel are key to the
operation of HIC?

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Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit II: Asset Value Assessment

Unit II

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security

UNIT TITLE Asset Value Assessment

OBJECTIVES 1. Identify the assets of a building or site that can be affected by a

threat or hazard
2. Explain the components used to determine the value of an asset
3. Determine the critical assets of a building or site
4. Provide a numerical rating for the asset and justify the basis for the
rating

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit:

1. The core functions and critical infrastructure listed on the threat-

vulnerability matrix.
2. Various approaches to determine asset value – Federal Emergency
Management Agency, Department of Defense, Department of
Justice, and Veterans Affairs.
3. A rating scale and how to use it to determine an asset value.
4. Activity: Identify the assets to consider in the case study and
determine the asset value for each asset of interest.

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist

Attacks Against Buildings, pages 1-10 to 1-14
2. Case Study – Hazardville Information Company

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit II: Asset Value Assessment

UNIT II CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:

ASSET VALUE RATINGS

Asset value is the degree of debilitating impact that would be caused by the incapacity or
destruction of a building’s assets. Page 1-13 of FEMA 426 provides an Asset Value Scale
(Table 1-1) to quantify asset value, as well as definitions of the ratings. Table 1-2 on page 1-14
of FEMA 426 provides a format to summarize the value of the major categories of a building’s
assets.

Requirements

Referring to the HIC Case Study, answer the following questions:

Identifying Building Core Functions

1. What are HIC’s primary services or outputs?

2. What critical activities take place at HIC?

3. Who are the building’s primary occupants and visitors?

4. What inputs from external organizations are required for HIC’s success?

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit II: Asset Value Assessment

Identifying Building Assets and Quantifying Asset Values

Refer to Table 1-2 in FEMA 426 and use the descriptions of these asset categories in the HIC
Case Study. Consider the questions on page 1-11 in FEMA 426 and rate HIC’s assets as:

• Very High (10)

• High (8-9)
• Medium High (7)
• Medium (5-6)
• Medium Low (4)
• Low (2-3)
• Very Low (1)

HIC Critical Functions Asset Rating

Asset Value Numeric Value Rationale

1. Administrative Medium Low 4 Redundancy and staff
skills that can be
replaced. Senior
managers and financial
systems in the same
area make the function
a key area to protect.
Low to medium
economic cost to
replace.
2. Engineering/IT Medium 5 Staff skills that can be
Technicians replaced, but require
specialized expertise.
Key equipment and
resources may not be
replaceable. High
economic cost to
replace.
3. Loading
Dock/Warehouse

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit II: Asset Value Assessment

Asset Value Numeric Value Rationale

4. Data Center

5. Communications

6. Security

7. Housekeeping

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit II: Asset Value Assessment

HIC Critical Infrastructure Asset Rating

Asset Value Numeric Value Rationale

1. Site

2. Architectural

3. Structural Systems

4. Envelope Systems

5. Utility Systems

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit II: Asset Value Assessment

Asset Value Numeric Value Rationale

6. Mechanical Systems

7. Plumbing and Gas

Systems

8. Electrical Systems

9. Fire Alarm Systems

10. IT/Communications
Systems

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Unit II: Asset Value Assessment

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment

Unit III

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security

UNIT TITLE Threat/Hazard Assessment

OBJECTIVES 1. Identify the threats and hazards that may impact a building or site
2. Define each threat and hazard using the Department of Defense
methodology
3. Provide a numerical rating for the threat or hazard and justify the
basis for the rating
4. Define the Design Basis Threat and Levels of Protection

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit:

1. From what offices is threat and hazard information available.

2. The spectrum of event profiles for terrorism and technological
hazards from FEMA 386-7.
3. The five components used by DoD to define a threat and how it can
be applied to the Homeland Security Advisory System.
4. Various approaches to determine threat rating – Federal Emergency
Management Agency, Department of Defense, Department of
Justice, and Veterans Affairs.
5. A rating scale and how to use it to determine a threat rating.
6. Activity: Identify the threats and hazards to consider in the Case
Study. As an absolute minimum, consider explosive blast and agents
(chemical, biological, and radiological). Determine the threat rating
for the minimum threat/hazards.

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist

Attacks Against Buildings, pages 1-1 to 1-18
2. Case Study – Hazardville Information Company

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment

UNIT III CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:

THREAT/HAZARD RATINGS

After assets that need to be protected are determined, an assessment is performed to identify the
threats and hazards that could cause harm to the building and the inhabitants of the building.
Hazards are categorized into two groups: natural and manmade. While natural hazards could
logically be expected to affect the HIC, the Case Study only describes the threat from explosive
blast and from chemical, biological, and/or radiological “agents.”

The result of this assessment is a “Threat Rating.” The threat rating is a subjective judgment of a
threat based on existence, capability, history, intentions, and targeting. The rating scale is a scale
of 1 to 10, with 1 a very low probability of a terrorist attack and 10 a very high probability.

Requirements

Refer to the HIC Case Study data and GIS portfolio and complete the following worksheets.
Each student will interpret the HIC threat information and should have a number close to the
value shown. Any function with key IT systems connected to the Internet should get high cyber
values. Functions that are susceptible to blast should get high numbers. A CBR attack will
impact the entire facility.

HIC Critical Functions Threat Rating

Function Cyber Armed Vehicle CBR Rationale

Attack Attack Bomb Attack
1. Administration 6 3 6 4 Local and
international
groups with
the
capability,
intentions,
and targeting
expertise are
known to be
in the area.
2. Engineering/IT 5 3 6 4 Local and
Technicians international
groups with
the
capability,
intentions,
and targeting
expertise are
known to be

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment

Function Cyber Armed Vehicle CBR Rationale

Attack Attack Bomb Attack
in the area.

3. Loading
Dock/Warehousing

4. Data Center

5. Communications

6. Security

7. Housekeeping

HIC Infrastructure Threat Rating

Function Cyber Armed Vehicle CBR Rationale

Attack Attack Bomb Attack
1. Site

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment

Function Cyber Armed Vehicle CBR Rationale

Attack Attack Bomb Attack
2. Architectural

3. Structural

4. Envelope Systems

5. Utility Systems

6. Mechanical
Systems

7. Plumbing and Gas

Systems

8. Electrical Systems

9. Fire Alarm Systems

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment

Function Cyber Armed Vehicle CBR Rationale

Attack Attack Bomb Attack
10. IT/Communications
Systems

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Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment

Unit IV

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security

UNIT TITLE Vulnerability Assessment

OBJECTIVES 1. Explain what constitutes a vulnerability

2. Identify vulnerabilities using the Building Vulnerability Assessment
Checklist
3. Understand that an identified vulnerability may indicate that an asset
is vulnerable to more than one threat or hazard and that mitigation
measures may reduce vulnerability to one or more threats or hazards
4. Provide a numerical rating for the vulnerability and justify the basis
for the rating

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit:

1. Review types of vulnerabilities, especially single-point

vulnerabilities and tactics possible under threats/hazards for which
there are no mitigation measures.
2. Various approaches and considerations to determine vulnerabilities –
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Defense,
Department of Justice, and Veterans Affairs.
3. A rating scale and how to use it to determine a vulnerability rating.
4. Activity: Identify the vulnerabilities present in the Case Study. As an
absolute minimum, consider threats/hazards associated with
explosive blast and agents (chemical, biological, and radiological).
Determine the vulnerability rating for each asset – threat/hazard
pairs of interest.

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist

Attacks Against Buildings, Chapter 1
2. Case Study – Hazardville Information Company

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment

UNIT IV CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:

VULNERABILITY RATING

Vulnerability is any weakness that can be exploited by an aggressor or, in a non-terrorist threat
environment, make an asset susceptible to hazard damage. Vulnerabilities may include:

• Critical functions or systems that lack redundancy and if damaged would result in immediate
organization disruption or loss of capability (“Single-Point Vulnerability”)
• Redundant systems feeding into a single critical node
• Critical components of redundant systems collocated
• Inadequate capacity or endurance in post-attack environment

Vulnerability rating requires identifying and rating the vulnerability of each asset-threat pair. In-
depth vulnerability assessment of a building evaluates specific design and architectural features
and identifies all vulnerabilities of the building functions and building systems.

Requirement

For an example of how a specific asset is assessed, answer the following questions and record
relevant observations on the following table regarding the HIC site and building. Determine
what, if any, vulnerability exists:

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

1.16 Does adjacent surface The specific stand-off distance There is no adjacent
parking on site maintain a needed is based upon the design parking per se, but
basis threat bomb size and the there is one parking lot
minimum stand-off distance? building construction. For initial or area that any tenant
screening, consider using 25 or visitor to the office
meters (82 feet) as a minimum, park can use. Stand-off
with more distance needed for distance to the front
unreinforced masonry or wooden parking lot is less than
walls. the 82 feet screening
Reference: GSA PBS-100 value. Cars or trucks
can drive up to the
loading dock in the
rear.

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

1.19 Do site landscaping and Minimize concealment
street furniture provide opportunities by keeping landscape
plantings (hedges, shrubbery, and
hiding places? large plants with heavy ground
cover) and street furniture (bus
shelters, benches, trash receptacles,
mailboxes, newspaper vending
machines) away from the building
to permit observation of intruders
and prevent hiding of packages.

If mail or express boxes are used,

the size of the openings should be
restricted to prohibit the insertion
of packages.
Reference: GSA PBS-100

2.15 Are critical assets (people, Critical building components

activities, building systems include: emergency generator,
including fuel systems, day tank,
and components) located fire sprinkler, and water supply;
close to any main entrance, normal fuel storage; main
vehicle circulation, parking, switchgear; telephone distribution
maintenance area, loading and main switchgear; fire pumps;
dock, or interior parking? building control centers;
uninterruptible power supply
(UPS) systems controlling critical
Are the critical building functions; main refrigeration and
systems and components ventilation systems if critical to
hardened? building operation; elevator
machinery and controls; shafts for
stairs, elevators, and utilities; and
critical distribution feeders for
emergency power. Evacuation and
rescue require emergency systems
to remain operational during a
disaster and they should be located
away from attack locations.
Primary and back-up systems
should be separated to reduce the
risk of both being impacted by a
single incident if collocated. Utility
systems should be located at least
50 feet from loading docks, front
entrances, and parking areas.

One way to harden critical building

systems and components is to
enclose them within hardened
walls, floors, and ceilings. Do not
place them near high risk areas
where they can receive collateral
damage.
Reference: GSA PBS-100

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

2.16 Are high value or critical Critical assets, such as people and
assets located as far into the activities, are more vulnerable to
hazards when on an exterior
interior of the building as building wall or adjacent to
possible and separated from uncontrolled public areas inside the
the public areas of the building.
building? Reference: GSA PBS-100

4.2 Is there less than 40 percent The performance of the glass will
fenestration openings per similarly depend on the materials.
Glazing may be single pane or
structural bay? double pane, monolithic or
laminated, annealed, heat
Is the window system design strengthened, or fully tempered.
on the exterior façade
balanced to mitigate the The percent fenestration is a
balance between protection level,
hazardous effects of flying cost, the architectural look of the
glazing following an building within its surroundings,
explosive event? and building codes. One goal is to
(glazing, frames, anchorage keep fenestration to below 40
to supporting walls, etc.) percent of the building envelope
vertical surface area, but the
process must balance differing
requirements. A blast engineer may
prefer no windows; an architect
may favor window curtain walls;
building codes require so much
fenestration per square footage of
floor area; fire codes require a
prescribed window opening area if
the window is a designated escape
route; and the building owner has
cost concerns.

Ideally, an owner would want 100

percent of the glazed area to
provide the design protection level
against the postulated explosive
threat (design basis threat –
weapon size at the expected stand-
off distance). However, economics
and geometry may allow 80
percent to 90 percent due to the
statistical differences in the
manufacturing process for glass or

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Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

the angle of incidence of the blast
wave upon upper story windows
(4th floor and higher).
Reference: GSA PBS-100

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Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment

HIC Critical Functions Vulnerability Rating

Requirement

Refer to the HIC Case Study and rate the vulnerability of the following asset-threat/hazard pairs.

Function Cyber Attack Armed Attack Vehicle Bomb CBR Attack

1. Administration 8 8 10 8

2. Engineering/IT 8 8 8 8
Technicians

3. Loading Dock/
Warehousing
4. Data Center

5. Communications

6. Security

7. Housekeeping

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment

HIC Infrastructure Vulnerability Rating

Refer to the HIC Case Study and rate the vulnerability of the following asset-threat/hazard pairs.

Function Cyber Attack Armed Attack Vehicle Bomb CBR Attack

1. Site

2. Architectural

3. Structural Systems

4. Envelope Systems

5. Utility Systems

6. Mechanical Systems

7. Plumbing and Gas

Systems

8. Electrical Systems

9. Fire Alarm Systems

10. IT/Communications
Systems

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Unit V: Risk Assessment/Risk Management

Unit V

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security

UNIT TITLE Risk Assessment/Risk Management

OBJECTIVES 1. Explain what constitutes risk

2. Evaluate risk using the Threat-Vulnerability Matrix to capture
assessment information
3. Provide a numerical rating for risk and justify the basis for the rating
4. Identify top risks for asset – threat/hazard pairs that should receive
measures to mitigate vulnerabilities and reduce risk

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit:

1. Definition of risk and the various components to determine a risk

rating.
2. The FEMA 426 approach to determining risk.
3. A rating scale and how to use it to determine a risk rating. One or
more specific examples will be used to focus students on the
following activity.
4. The relationships between high risk, the need for mitigation
measures, and the need to identify a Design Basis Threat and Level
of Protection.
5. Activity: Determine the risk rating for the asset – threat/hazard pairs
of interest. Identify the top three risk ratings for the Case Study.

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist

Attacks Against Buildings, Chapter 1
2. Case Study – Hazardville Information Company

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Unit V: Risk Assessment/Risk Management

UNIT V CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:

RISK RATING

One approach to conducting a risk assessment is to assemble the results of the asset value
assessment, the threat assessment, and the vulnerability assessment, and determine a numeric
value of risk for each asset-threat/hazard pair using the following formula:

Risk = Asset Value x Threat Rating x Vulnerability Rating

Requirement

Use the following tables to summarize the HIC asset, threat, and vulnerability assessments
conducted in the previous three unit activities. Then use the formula above to determine the risk
rating for each asset-threat/hazard pair identified under Critical Functions and under Critical
Infrastructure. Using Figure 1-13 of FEMA 426, make a determination of the available risk
management options.

Critical Functions

Function Cyber Attack Armed Attack Vehicle Bomb CBR Attack

1. Administration 192 96 192 128
Risk Rating
Asset Value 4 4 4 4
Threat Rating 6 3 6 4
Vulnerability 8 8 8 8
Rating
2. Engineering/IT 200 120 240 160
Technicians
Risk Rating
Asset Value 5 5 5 5
Threat Rating 5 3 6 4
Vulnerability 8 8 8 8
Rating
3. Loading Dock/
Warehouse
Risk Rating
Asset Value
Threat Rating
Vulnerability
Rating

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Unit V: Risk Assessment/Risk Management

4. Data Center
Risk Rating
Asset Value
Threat Rating
Vulnerability
Rating
5. Communications
Risk Rating
Asset Value
Threat Rating
Vulnerability
Rating
6. Security
Risk Rating
Asset Value
Threat Rating
Vulnerability
Rating
7. Housekeeping
Risk Rating
Asset Value
Threat Rating
Vulnerability
Rating

Critical Infrastructure

Infrastructure Cyber Attack Armed Attack Vehicle Bomb CBR Attack

1. Site
Risk Rating
Asset Value
Threat Rating
Vulnerability Rating
2. Architectural
Risk Rating
Asset Value
Threat Rating
Vulnerability Rating
3. Structural Systems
Risk Rating
Asset Value
Threat Rating
Vulnerability Rating

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit V: Risk Assessment/Risk Management

Infrastructure Cyber Attack Armed Attack Vehicle Bomb CBR Attack

4. Envelope Systems
Risk Rating
Asset Value
Threat Rating
Vulnerability Rating
5. Utility Systems
Risk Rating
Asset Value
Threat Rating
Vulnerability Rating
6. Mechanical Systems
Risk Rating
Asset Value
Threat Rating
Vulnerability Rating
7. Plumbing and Gas
Systems
Risk Rating
Asset Value
Threat Rating
Vulnerability Rating
8. Electrical Systems
Risk Rating
Asset Value
Threat Rating
Vulnerability Rating
9. Fire Alarm Systems
Risk Rating
Asset Value
Threat Rating
Vulnerability Rating
10. IT/Communications
Systems
Risk Rating
Asset Value
Threat Rating
Vulnerability Rating

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Unit V: Risk Assessment/Risk Management

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Unit VI: Explosive Blast

Unit VI

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security

UNIT TITLE Explosive Blast

OBJECTIVES 1. Explain the basic physics involved during an explosive blast event,
whether by terrorism or technological accident
2. Explain building damage and personnel injury resulting from the
blast effects upon a building
3. Perform an initial prediction of blast loading and effects based upon
incident pressure

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit:

1. Time-pressure regions of a blast event and how these change with

distance from the blast
2. Difference between incident pressure and reflected pressure
3. Differences between peak pressure and peak impulse and how these
differences affect building components
4. Building damage and personal injuries generated by blast wave
effects
5. Levels of protection used by the Department of Defense and the
General Services Administration
6. The nominal range-to-effect chart [minimum stand-off in feet versus
weapon yield in pounds of TNT-equivalent] for an identified level of
damage or injury
7. The benefits of stand-off distance
8. Approaches to predicting blast loads and effects, including one using
incident pressure

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist

Attacks Against Buildings
2. Case Study – Hazardville Information Company

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SM VI - 2
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VI: Explosive Blast

UNIT VI CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:

EXPLOSIVES ENVIRONMENT AND STAND-OFF DISTANCE AND THE EFFECTS
OF BLAST

The requirements in this Unit’s activity are intended to provide a check on learning about
explosive blast.

Requirement

1. In the empty cells in the table below, identify whether the adjacent description defines
incident pressure or reflected pressure.

Definition Type of Pressure

Characterized by an almost instantaneous rise
from atmospheric pressure to peak
overpressure.
When it impinges on a structure that is not
parallel to the direction of the wave’s travel,
the pressure wave is reflected and reinforced.

2. Refer to Figure 4-5 in FEMA 426 (page 4-11) to answer the following questions regarding
the explosives environment:

• What is the minimum stand-off distance from a 100-pound bomb explosion to eliminate
the danger of glass breakage and severe wounds (without fragment retention film)?

• What damage will be sustained at 400 feet from a 5,000-pound bomb explosion?

3. Refer to Figure 4-10 and Table 4-3 in FEMA 426 (pages 4-17 and 4-19, respectively) to
answer the following questions regarding the explosives environment.

• What is the minimum stand-off required to limit the incident pressure to under 0.5 psi for
a 100-pound bomb?

• What incident pressure would be expected at 500 feet from a 500-pound bomb and what
is the approximate damage?

SM VI - 3
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VI: Explosive Blast

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SM VI - 4
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Measures

Unit VII

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security

UNIT TITLE Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures

OBJECTIVES 1. Explain the five possible protective actions for a building and its
occupants
2. Compare filtration and collection mechanisms and applicability to
the particles present in chemical, biological, and radiological agents
3. Explain the key issues with CBR detection
4. Identify the indications of CBR contamination

SCOPE This unit will cover the following topics:

1. Five protective actions for a building and its occupants:

evacuation; sheltering in place; personal protective equipment; air
filtration and pressurization; and exhausting and purging
2. Air filtration and cleaning principles and its application
3. CBR detection technology currently available
4. Indications of CBR contamination that do not use technology

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist

Attacks Against Buildings, pages 5-1 to 5-36
2. FEMA 426, Appendix C, Chemical, Biological, and Radiological
Glossary
3. Case Study – Hazardville Information Company

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SM VII - 2
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures

UNIT VII CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) CONSIDERATIONS

The requirements in this Unit’s activity are intended to provide a check on learning about
the nature of chemical, biological, and radiological agents.

Requirement

1. Review the HIC case study and name the prevalent CBR threat(s) to the HIC.

Refer to Table 5-1 on page 5-12 of FEMA 426 and answer the following questions:

2. What size filtration unit (MERV) is required to filter out 75 percent of Legionella and
dust particulates (1 to 3 microns) inside the HIC?

3. What range of MERV is required to remove 85 percent of smoke particles greater

than 0.3 micron in size?

4. What mitigation measure can be used in the HVAC systems to destroy bacteria and
viruses?

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SM VII - 4
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance

Unit VIII

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security

UNIT TITLE Site and Layout Design Guidance

OBJECTIVES 1. Explain the concerns of land use as applied to threats and hazards
due to terrorism and technological accidents
2. Identify site planning concerns that can create, reduce, or eliminate
vulnerabilities and understand the concept of “Layers of Defense”
3. Compare the pros and cons of barrier mitigation measures that
increase stand-off or create controlled access zones
4. Identify the positive and negative aspects of mitigation approaches
for entry control and vehicle access, signage, parking, loading docks,
lighting, and site utilities
5. Explain the basic concepts of Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design (CPTED) and its applicability to building
security against terrorism
6. Apply these concepts to an existing site or building and identify
mitigation measures needed to reduce vulnerabilities

SCOPE This unit will cover the following topics:

1. Land use considerations both outside and inside the property line
2. Site planning issues to include site design, layout and form,
vehicular and pedestrian circulation, and landscape and urban design
3. Creating stand-off distance using perimeter controls, non-exclusive
zones, and exclusive zones along with the design concepts and
technology to consider
4. Design considerations and mitigation measures for building security

REFERENCES 1. Course Goal and Objectives

2. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist
Attacks Against Buildings Chapter 2
3. Unit VIII Visuals

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SM VIII - 2
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance

UNIT VIII CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 can be used as a screening tool
for preliminary design vulnerability assessment. The checklist includes questions that determine
if critical systems will continue to function to enhance deterrence, detection, denial, and damage
limitation, and emergency systems function during a threat or hazard situation.

Requirement

Assign sections of the checklist to the group member who is most knowledgeable and qualified
to perform an assessment of the assigned area. Refer to the HIC case study and to the GIS
portfolio to determine answers to the questions. Then review results to identify vulnerabilities
and possible mitigation measures.

1. Complete the following components of the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist

which address site and layout.

2. Upon completion of these portions of the checklist, refer back to the site risk rating
determined in Unit V Case Study Activity and, based on this detailed analysis, decide if the
rating is accurate.

3. Select mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and associated risk from the site and
layout perspective.

4. Estimate the new risk ratings for high risk asset-threat pairs based on the recommended
mitigation measures.

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

1.1 What major structures Critical infrastructure to
surround the facility (site consider includes:
Telecommunications
or building(s))? infrastructure
Facilities for broadcast TV, cable
What critical infrastructure, TV; cellular networks;
government, military, or newspaper offices, production,
recreation facilities are in and distribution; radio stations;
satellite base stations; telephone
the local area that impact trunking and switching stations,
transportation, utilities, and including critical cable routes
collateral damage (attack at and major rights-of-way
this facility impacting the Electric power systems
other major structures or Power plants, especially nuclear
facilities; transmission and
attack on the major distribution system components;
structures impacting this fuel distribution, delivery, and
facility)? storage

SM VIII - 3
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

Gas and oil facilities
Hazardous material facilities,
oil/gas pipelines, and storage
facilities
Banking and finance
institutions
Financial institutions (banks,
credit unions) and the business
district; note schedule
business/financial district may
follow; armored car services
Transportation networks
Airports: carriers, flight paths,
and airport layout; location of air
traffic control towers, runways,
passenger terminals, and parking
areas
Bus Stations:
Pipelines: oil; gas
Trains/Subways: rails and lines,
railheads/rail yards,
interchanges, tunnels, and
cargo/passenger terminals; note
hazardous material transported
Traffic: interstate
highways/roads/tunnels/ bridges
carrying large volumes; points of
congestion; note time of day and
day of week
Trucking: hazardous materials
cargo loading/unloading
facilities; truck terminals, weigh
stations, and rest areas
Waterways: dams; levees; berths
and ports for cruise ships, ferries,
roll-on/roll-off cargo vessels, and
container ships; international
(foreign) flagged vessels (and
cargo)
Water supply systems
Pipelines and process/treatment
facilities, dams for water
collection; wastewater treatment
Government services
Federal/state/local government
offices – post offices, law
enforcement stations, fire/rescue,
town/city hall, local
mayor’s/governor’s residences,
judicial offices and courts,
military installations (include
type-active, Reserves, National
Guard)

SM VIII - 4
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

Emergency services
Backup facilities,
communications centers,
Emergency Operations Centers
(EOCs), fire/Emergency Medical
Service (EMS) facilities,
Emergency Medical Centers
(EMCs), law enforcement
facilities

The following are not critical

infrastructure, but have
collateral damage potential to
consider:
Agricultural facilities:
chemical distribution, storage,
and application sites; crop
spraying services; farms and
ranches; food processing,
storage, and distribution facilities
Commercial/manufacturing/in
d-ustrial facilities: apartment
buildings; business/corporate
centers; chemical plants
(especially those with Section
302 Extremely Hazardous
Substances); factories; fuel
production, distribution, and
storage facilities; hotels and
convention centers; industrial
plants; raw material production,
distribution, and storage
facilities; research facilities and
laboratories; shipping,
warehousing, transfer, and
logistical centers
Events and attractions:
festivals and celebrations; open-
air markets; parades; rallies,
demonstrations, and marches;
religious services; scenic tours;
theme parks
Health care system
components: family planning
clinics; health department
offices; hospitals; radiological
material and medical waste
transportation, storage, and
disposal; research facilities and
laboratories, walk-in clinics
Political or symbolically
significant sites: embassies,
consulates, landmarks,
monuments, political party and

SM VIII - 5
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

special interest groups offices,
religious sites

Public/private institutions:
academic institutions, cultural
centers, libraries, museums,
research facilities and
laboratories, schools
Recreation facilities:
auditoriums, casinos, concert
halls and pavilions, parks,
restaurants and clubs (frequented
by potential target populations),
sports arenas, stadiums, theaters,
malls, and special interest group
facilities; note congestion date
and times for shopping centers
References: FEMA 386-7,
FEMA SLG 101, DOJ
NCJ181200
1.2 Does the terrain place the Depressions or low areas can
building in a depression or trap heavy vapors, inhibit natural
decontamination by prevailing
low area? winds, and reduce the
effectiveness of in-place
sheltering.
Reference: USAF Installation
Force Protection Guide
1.3 In dense, urban areas, does Where distance from the
curb lane parking place building to the nearest curb
provides insufficient setback,
uncontrolled parked restrict parking in the curb lane.
vehicles unacceptably For typical city streets, this may
close to a building in require negotiating to close the
public rights-of-way? curb lane. Setback is common
terminology for the distance
between a building and its
associated roadway or parking. It
is analogous to stand-off
between a vehicle bomb and the
building. The benefit per foot of
increased stand-off between a
potential vehicle bomb and a
building is very high when close
to a building and decreases
rapidly as the distance increases.
Note that the July 1, 1994,
Americans with Disabilities Act
Standards for Accessible Design
states that required handicapped
parking shall be located on the
shortest accessible route of travel
from adjacent parking to an
accessible entrance.

SM VIII - 6
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.4 Is a perimeter fence or The intent is to channel
other types of barrier pedestrian traffic onto a site with
multiple buildings through
controls in place? known access control points. For
a single building, the intent is to
have a single visitor entrance.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.5 What are the site access The goal is to have at least two
points to the site or access points – one for passenger
vehicles and one for delivery
building? trucks due to the different
procedures needed for each.
Having two access points also
helps if one of the access points
becomes unusable, then traffic
can be routed through the other
access point.
Reference: USAF Installation
Force Protection Guide
1.6 Is vehicle traffic separated Pedestrian access should not be
from pedestrian traffic on endangered by car traffic.
Pedestrian access, especially
the site? from public transportation,
should not cross vehicle traffic if
possible.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 and
FEMA 386-7
1.7 Is there vehicle and Vehicle and pedestrian access
pedestrian access control at control and inspection should
occur as far from facilities as
the perimeter of the site? possible (preferably at the site
perimeter) with the ability to
regulate the flow of people and
vehicles one at a time.

Control on-site parking with

identification checks, security
personnel, and access control
systems.
Reference: FEMA 386-7
1.8 Is there space for Design features for the vehicular
inspection at the curb line inspection point include: vehicle
arrest devices that prevent
or outside the protected vehicles from leaving the
perimeter? vehicular inspection area and
prevent tailgating.
What is the minimum
distance from the If screening space cannot be
provided, consider other design
inspection location to the features such as: hardening and
building? alternative location for vehicle
search/ inspection.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

SM VIII - 7
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

1.9 Is there any potential Eliminate potential site access Unknown without a more
access to the site or through utility tunnels, corridors, detailed on-site
manholes, stormwater runoff assessment.
building through utility culverts, etc. Ensure covers to
paths or water runoff? these access points are secured.
Reference: USAF Installation
Force Protection Guide
1.10 What are the existing types Passive barriers include bollards,
of vehicle anti-ram devices walls, hardened fences (steel
cable interlaced), trenches,
for the site or building? ponds/basins, concrete planters,
street furniture, plantings, trees,
Are these devices at the sculptures, and fountains. Active
property boundary or at the barriers include pop-up bollards,
building? swing arm gates, and rotating
plates and drums, etc.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.11 What is the anti-ram buffer If the recommended distance for
zone stand-off distance the postulated threat is not
available, consider reducing the
from the building to stand-off required through
unscreened vehicles or structural hardening or
parking? manufacturing additional stand-
off through barriers and parking
restrictions. Also consider
relocation of vulnerable
functions within the building or
to a more hazard-resistant
building. More stand-off should
be used for unscreened vehicles
than for screened vehicles that
are searched.
Reference: GSA PBS P-100
1.12 Are perimeter barriers Anti-ram protection may be
capable of stopping provided by adequately
designed: bollards, street
vehicles? furniture, sculpture, landscaping,
walls, and fences. The anti-ram
Will the vehicle barriers at protection must be able to stop
the perimeter and building the threat vehicle size (weight) at
maintain access for the speed attainable by that
vehicle at impact. If the anti-ram
emergency responders, protection cannot absorb the
including large fire desired kinetic energy, consider
apparatus? adding speed controls
(serpentines or speed bumps) to
limit the speed at impact. If the
resultant speed is still too great,
the anti-ram protection should be
improved.
Reference: Military Handbook
1013/14 and GSA PBS P-100
1.13 Does site circulation The intent is to use site
circulation to minimize vehicle

SM VIII - 8
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

prevent high-speed speeds and eliminate direct
approaches by vehicles? approaches to structures.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.14 Are there offsetting vehicle Single or double 90-degree turns
entrances from the effectively reduce vehicle
approach speed.
direction of a vehicle’s Reference: GSA PBS-P100
approach to force a
reduction of speed?
1.15 Is there a minimum setback Adjacent public parking should
distance between the be directed to more distant or
better-protected areas, segregated
building and parked from employee parking and
vehicles? away from the building. Some
publications use the term setback
in lieu of the term stand-off.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.16 Does adjacent surface The specific stand-off distance
parking on-site maintain a needed is based upon the design
basis threat bomb size and the
minimum stand-off building construction. For initial
distance? screening, consider using 25
meters (82 feet) as a minimum
with more distance needed for
unreinforced masonry or wooden
walls.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.17 Do stand-alone, above Pedestrian paths should be
ground parking garages planned to concentrate activity to
the extent possible.
provide adequate visibility
across as well as into and Limiting vehicular entry/exits to
out of the parking garage? a minimum number of locations
is beneficial.

Stair tower and elevator lobby

design shall be as open as code
permits. Stair and/or elevator
waiting areas should be as open
to the exterior and/or the parking
areas as possible and well
lighted. Impact-resistant,
laminated glass for stair towers
and elevators is a way to provide
visual openness.

Potential hiding places below

stairs should be closed off; nooks
and crannies should be avoided,
and dead-end parking areas
should be eliminated.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.18 Are garage or service area Control internal building
parking, underground parking

SM VIII - 9
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

entrances for employee- garages, and access to service
permitted vehicles areas and loading docks in this
manner with proper access
protected by suitable anti- control or eliminate the parking
ram devices? altogether.

Coordinate this protection The anti-ram device must be

with other anti-ram capable of arresting a vehicle of
the designated threat size at the
devices, such as on the speed attainable at the location.
perimeter or property Reference: GSA PBS-P100
boundary to avoid
duplication of arresting
capability.

1.19 Do site landscaping and Minimize concealment

street furniture provide opportunities by keeping
landscape plantings (hedges,
hiding places? shrubbery, and large plants with
heavy ground cover) and street
furniture (bus shelters, benches,
trash receptacles, mailboxes,
newspaper vending machines)
away from the building to permit
observation of intruders and
prevent hiding of packages.

If mail or express boxes are used,

the size of the openings should
be restricted to prohibit the
insertion of packages.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.20 Is the site lighting adequate Security protection can be
from a security perspective successfully addressed through
adequate lighting. The type and
in roadway access and design of lighting, including
parking areas? illumination levels, is critical.
Illuminating Engineering Society
of North America (IESNA)
guidelines can be used. The site
lighting should be coordinated
with the CCTV system.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.21 Are line-of-sight The goal is to prevent the
perspectives from outside observation of critical assets by
persons outside the secure
the secured boundary to the boundary of the site. For
building and on the individual buildings in an urban
property along pedestrian environment, this could mean
and vehicle routes appropriate window treatments
integrated with landscaping or no windows for portions of
the building.
and green space?

SM VIII - 10
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

Once on the site, the concern is
to ensure observation by a
general workforce aware of any
pedestrians and vehicles outside
normal circulation routes or
attempting to approach the
building unobserved.
Reference: USAF Installation
Force Protection Guide
1.22 Do signs provide control of The signage should be simple
vehicles and people? and have the necessary level of
clarity. However, signs that
identify sensitive areas should
generally not be provided.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.23 Are all existing fire Just as vehicle access points to
hydrants on the site the site must be able to transit
emergency vehicles, so too must
accessible? the emergency vehicles have
access to the buildings and, in
the case of fire trucks, the fire
hydrants. Thus, security
considerations must
accommodate emergency
response requirements.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
2 Architectural
2.1 Does the site and The focus of CPTED is on
architectural design creating defensible space by
employing:
incorporate strategies from 1. Natural access controls:
a Crime Prevention Design streets, sidewalks, and
Through Environmental building entrances to clearly
Design (CPTED) indicate public routes and direct
perspective? people away from
private/restricted areas
Discourage access to private
areas with structural elements
and limit access (no cut-through
streets)
Loading zones should be
separate from public parking
2. Natural surveillance:
Design that maximizes visibility
of people, parking areas, and
building entrances: doors and
windows that look out on to
streets and parking areas
Shrubbery under 2 feet in height
for visibility
Lower branches of existing trees
kept at least 10 feet off ground
Pedestrian-friendly sidewalks

SM VIII - 11
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

and streets to control pedestrian
and vehicle circulation
Adequate nighttime lighting,
especially at exterior doorways
3. Territorial reinforcement:
Design that defines property
lines
Design that distinguishes
private/restricted spaces from
public spaces using separation,
landscape plantings; pavement
designs (pathway and roadway
placement); gateway treatments
at lobbies, corridors, and door
placement; walls, barriers,
signage, lighting, and “CPTED"
fences
“Traffic-calming” devices for
vehicle speed control
4. Target hardening:
Prohibit entry or access: window
locks, deadbolts for doors,
interior door hinges
Access control (building and
employee/visitor parking) and
intrusion detection systems
5. Closed circuit television
cameras:
Prevent crime and influence positive
behavior, while enhancing the
intended uses of space. In other
words, design that eliminates or
reduces criminal behavior and at the
same time encourages people to
"keep an eye out" for each other.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 and
FEMA 386-7
2.2 Is it a mixed-tenant Separate high-risk tenants from
building? low-risk tenants and from
publicly accessible areas. Mixed
uses may be accommodated
through such means as
separating entryways, controlling
access, and hardening shared
partitions, as well as through
special security operational
countermeasures.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
2.3 Are pedestrian paths Site planning and landscape
planned to concentrate design can provide natural
surveillance by concentrating
activity to aid in detection? pedestrian activity, limiting
entrances/exits, and eliminating
concealment opportunities. Also,
prevent pedestrian access to

SM VIII - 12
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

parking areas other than via
established entrances.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100.
2.4 Are there trash receptacles The size of the trash receptacles
and mailboxes in close and mailbox openings should be
restricted to prohibit insertion of
proximity to the building packages. Street furniture, such
that can be used to hide as newspaper vending machines,
explosive devices? should be kept sufficient distance
(10 meters or 33 feet) from the
building, or brought inside to a
secure area.
References: USAF Installation
Force Protection Guide, DoD
Minimum Antiterrorism
Standards for Buildings
5 Utility Systems
5.1 What is the source of Domestic water is critical for Unknown without a more
domestic water? continued building operation. detailed on-site
Although bottled water can assessment.
(utility, municipal, wells, satisfy requirements for drinking
lake, river, storage tank) water and minimal sanitation,
domestic water meets many
Is there a secure alternate other needs – flushing toilets,
drinking water supply? building heating and cooling
system operation, cooling of
emergency generators,
humidification, etc.
Reference: FEMA 386-7
5.2 Are there multiple entry If the building or site has only Unknown without a more
points for the water one source of water entering at detailed on-site
one location, the entry point assessment.
supply? should be secure.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
5.3 Is the incoming water Ensure that only authorized Unknown without a more
supply in a secure personnel have access to the detailed on-site
water supply and its components. assessment.
location? Reference: FEMA 386-7
5.4 Does the building or site Operational facilities will require Unknown without a more
have storage capacity for reliance on adequate domestic detailed assessment.
water supply. Storage capacity
domestic water? can meet short-term needs and
use water trucks to replenish for
How many gallons and extended outages.
how long will it allow Reference: Physical Security
operations to continue? Assessment for Department of
Veterans Affairs Facilities.
5.5 What is the source of water The fire suppression system Unknown without a more
for the fire suppression water may be supplied from the detailed on-site
domestic water or it may have a assessment.
system? separate source, separate storage,
(local utility company or nonpotable alternate sources.
lines, storage tanks with

SM VIII - 13
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

utility company backup, For a site with multiple
lake, or river) buildings, the concern is that the
supply should be adequate to
fight the worst case situation
Are there alternate water according to the fire codes.
supplies for fire Recent major construction may
suppression? change that requirement.
Reference: FEMA 386-7
5.6 Is the fire suppression Standpipes, water supply control
system adequate, code- valves, and other system
components should be secure or
compliant, and protected supervised.
(secure location)? Reference: FEMA 386-7
5.7 Do the sprinkler/standpipe The incoming fire protection Unknown without a more
interior controls (risers) water line should be encased, detailed on-site
buried, or located 50 feet from assessment.
have fire- and blast- high risk areas. The interior
resistant separation? mains should be looped and
sectionalized.
Are the sprinkler and Reference: GSA PBS-P100
standpipe connections
adequate and redundant?

Are there fire hydrant and

water supply connections
near the
sprinkler/standpipe
connections?

5.8 Are there redundant fire Collocating fire water pumps Unknown without a more
water pumps (e.g., one puts them at risk for a single detailed on-site
incident to disable the fire assessment.
electric, one diesel)? suppression system.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 and
Are the pumps located FEMA 386-7
apart from each other?

5.9 Are sewer systems Sanitary and stormwater sewers Unknown without a more
accessible? should be protected from detailed on-site
unauthorized access. The main assessment.
concerns are backup or flooding
Are they protected or into the building, causing a
secured? health risk, shorting out electrical
equipment, and loss of building
use.
Reference: Physical Security
Assessment for the Department
of Veterans Affairs Facilities
5.10 What fuel supplies do the Typically, natural gas, propane,
building rely upon for or fuel oil are required for
continued operation.
critical operation?

SM VIII - 14
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

Reference: Physical Security
Assessment for the Department
of Veterans Affairs Facilities
5.11 How much fuel is stored on Fuel storage protection is
the site or at the building essential for continued operation.
and how long can this Main fuel storage should be
quantity support critical located away from loading
operations? docks, entrances, and parking.
Access should be restricted and
How is it stored? protected (e.g., locks on caps and
seals).
References: GSA PBS-P100 and
How is it secured? Physical Security Assessment for
the Department of Veterans
Affairs Facilities
5.12 Where is the fuel supply The supply of fuel is dependent
obtained? on the reliability of the supplier.
Reference: Physical Security
Assessment for the Department
How is it delivered? of Veterans Affairs Facilities
5.13 Are there alternate sources Critical functions may be served
of fuel? by alternate methods if normal
fuel supply is interrupted.
Reference: Physical Security
Can alternate fuels be Assessment for the Department
used? of Veterans Affairs Facilities
5.14 What is the normal source Utilities are the general source
of electrical service for the unless co-generation or a private
energy provider is available.
site or building? Reference: Physical Security
Assessment for the Department
of Veterans Affairs Facilities
5.15 Is there a redundant The utility may have only one Unknown without a more
electrical service source? source of power from a single detailed on-site
substation. There may be only assessment.
single feeders from the main
Can the site or buildings be substation.
fed from more than one Reference: Physical Security
utility substation? Assessment for the Department
of Veterans Affairs Facilities
5.16 How may service entry Electrical supply at one location Unknown without a more
points does the site or creates a vulnerable situation detailed on-site
unless an alternate source is assessment.
building have for available.
electricity?
Ensure disconnecting
requirements according to NFPA
70 (National Fire Protection
Association, National Electric
Code) are met for multiple
service entrances.
Reference: Physical Security

SM VIII - 15
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

Assessment for the Department
of Veterans Affairs Facilities
5.17 Is the incoming electric Typically, the service entrance is Unknown without a more
service to the building a locked room, inaccessible to detailed on-site
the public. assessment.
secure? Reference: Physical Security
Assessment for the Department
of Veterans Affairs Facilities
5.18 What provisions for Besides installed generators to
emergency power exist? supply emergency power,
portable generators or rental
What systems receive generators available under
emergency power and have emergency contract can be
capacity requirements been quickly connected to a building
tested? with an exterior quick disconnect
already installed.
Is the emergency power Testing under actual loading and
co-located with the operational conditions ensures
commercial electric the critical systems requiring
service? emergency power receive it with
a high assurance of reliability.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
Is there an exterior
connection for emergency
power?

5.19 By what means does the Typically communication ducts

main telephone and data or other conduits are available.
Overhead service is more
communications interface identifiable and vulnerable
the site or building? Reference: Physical Security
Assessment for the Department
of Veterans Affairs Facilities
5.20 Are there multiple or Secure locations of Unknown without a more
redundant locations for the communications wiring entry to detailed on-site
the site or building are required. assessment.
telephone and Reference: Physical Security
communication service? Assessment for the Department
of Veterans Affairs Facilities
5.21 Does the fire alarm system Typically, the local fire
require communication department responds to an alarm
that sounds at the station or is
with external sources? transmitted over phone lines by
an auto dialer.
By what method is the
alarm signal sent to the An intermediary control center

SM VIII - 16
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

responding agency: for fire, security, and/or building
telephone, radio, etc? system alarms may receive the
initial notification at an on-site or
off-site location. This center may
Is there an intermediary then determine the necessary
alarm monitoring center? response and inform the
responding agency.

Reference: Physical Security

Assessment for the Department
of Veterans Affairs Facilities
5.22 Are utility lifelines Utility lifelines (water, power,
aboveground, underground, communications, etc.) can be
protected by concealing, burying,
or direct buried? or encasing.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 and
FEMA 386-7

SM VIII - 17
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security: Resident Course

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

Unit IX

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security

UNIT TITLE Building Design Guidance

OBJECTIVES 1. Explain architectural considerations to mitigate impacts from blast

effects and transmission of chemical, biological, and radiological
agents from exterior and interior incidents
2. Identify key elements of building structural and non-structural
systems for mitigation of blast effects
3. Compare and contrast the benefit of building envelope, mechanical
system, electrical system, fire protection system, and communication
system mitigation measures, including synergies and conflicts
4. Apply these concepts to an existing building or building conceptual
design and identify mitigation measures needed to reduce
vulnerabilities

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit:

1. Architectural considerations, including building configuration, space

design, and special situations
2. Building structural and nonstructural considerations with emphasis
on progressive collapse, loads and stresses, and good engineering
practices
3. Design issues for the building envelope, including wall design,
window design, door design, and roof system design with
approaches to define levels of protection
4. Mechanical system design issues, including interfacing with
operational procedures, emergency plans, and training
5. Other building systems design consideration for electrical, fire
protection, communications, electronic security, entry control, and
physical security that mitigate the effects of a threat or hazard
6. Do an Activity that encompasses identified high risk pairs (asset –
threat/hazard) in the threat-vulnerability matrix developed for the
Case Study and select mitigation measures that reduce vulnerability
and associated risk from the building perspective

SM IX-1
REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist
Attacks Against Buildings, pages 3-1 to 3-46 and 3-48 to 3-52;
Checklist at end of Chapter 1
2. FEMA 427, Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate
Terrorist Attacks
3. FEMA 430, Primer for Incorporating Building Security
Components in Architectural Design
4. Case Study – Hazardville Information Company

SM IX-2
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security: Resident Course

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

UNIT IX CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:

BUILDING DESIGN GUIDANCE

In this Unit, the emphasis will be upon providing a balanced building envelope that is a
defensive layer against the terrorist tactic of interest and avoiding situations where one incident
affects more than one building system. The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in
FEMA 426 can be used as a screening tool for preliminary building design vulnerability
assessment.

Requirement

Assign sections of the checklist to the group member who is most knowledgeable and qualified
to perform an assessment of the assigned area. Refer to the HIC Case Study and to the
vulnerability portfolio to determine answers to the questions. Then review results to identify
vulnerabilities and possible mitigation measures.

1. Complete the following components of the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist that
address building design.

2. Upon completion of these portions of the checklist, refer back to the risk ratings determined
in Unit V Case Study Activity and, based on this more detailed analysis, decide if the rating
is accurate.

3. Select mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and associated risk from building design.

4. Estimate the new risk ratings for high risk asset-threat pairs based on the recommended
mitigation measures.

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

2.5 Do entrances avoid If queuing will occur within the
significant queuing? building footprint, the area should
be enclosed in blast-resistant
construction. If queuing is
expected outside the building, a
rain cover should be provided.
For manpower and equipment
requirements, collocate or
combine staff and visitor
entrances.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
2.6 Does security screening Retail activities should be Unknown without a
cover all public and prohibited in non-secured areas. more detailed on-site
However, the Public Building assessment.
private areas? Cooperative Use Act of 1976
encourages retail and mixed uses
Are public and private to create open and inviting

SM IX-3
Course Title: Building Design For Homeland Security

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

activities separated? buildings. Consider separating
entryways, controlling access,
hardening shared partitions, and
Are public toilets, service special security operational
spaces, or access to stairs countermeasures.
or elevators located in any References: GSA PBS-P100 and
non-secure areas, FEMA 386-7
including the queuing area
before screening at the
public entrance?

2.7 Is access control provided Reference: Physical Security

through main entrance Assessment for the Department of
Veterans Affairs Facilities
points for employees and
visitors?
(lobby receptionist, sign-
in, staff escorts, issue of
visitor badges, checking
forms of personal
identification, electronic
access control systems)

2.8 Is access to private and Finishes and signage should be

public space or restricted designed for visual simplicity.
Reference: Physical Security
area space clearly defined Assessment for the Department of
through the design of the Veterans Affairs Facilities
space, signage, use of
electronic security
devices, etc.?

2.9 Is access to elevators Reference: Physical Security

distinguished as to those Assessment for the Department of
Veterans Affairs Facilities
that are designated only
for employees and
visitors?

2.10 Do public and employee These include walk-through metal

entrances include space detectors and x-ray devices,
identification check, electronic
for possible future access card, search stations, and
installation of access turnstiles.

SM IX-4
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security: Resident Course

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

control and screening Reference: GSA PBS-P100
equipment?

2.11 Do foyers have reinforced Consider for exterior entrances to

concrete walls and offset the building or to access critical
areas within the building if
interior and exterior doors explosive blast hazard must be
from each other? mitigated.
Reference: U.S. Army TM 5-853
2.12 Do doors and walls along If the postulated threat in Unknown without a
the line of security designing entrance access control more detailed on-site
includes rifles, pistols, or assessment.
screening meet shotguns, then the screening area
requirements of UL752 should have bullet-resistance to
"Standard for Safety: protect security personnel and
Bullet-Resisting uninvolved bystanders. Glass, if
Equipment"? present, should also be bullet-
resistant.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
2.13 Do circulation routes have This applies to building entrances
unobstructed views of and to critical areas within the
building.
people approaching References: USAF Installation
controlled access points? Force Protection Guide and DoD
UFC 4-010-01
2.14 Is roof access limited to References: GSA PBS-P100 and Unknown without a
authorized personnel by CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 more detailed on-site
assessment.
means of locking
mechanisms?

2.15 Are critical assets (people, Critical building components

activities, building include: Emergency generator
including fuel systems, day tank,
systems and components) fire sprinkler, and water supply;
located close to any main Normal fuel storage; Main
entrance, vehicle switchgear; Telephone
circulation, parking, distribution and main switchgear;
maintenance area, loading Fire pumps; Building control
centers; Uninterruptible Power
dock, or interior parking? Supply (UPS) systems controlling
critical functions; Main
Are the critical building refrigeration and ventilation
systems and components systems if critical to building
hardened? operation; Elevator machinery
and controls; Shafts for stairs,
elevators, and utilities; Critical
distribution feeders for
emergency power. Evacuation
and rescue require emergency
systems to remain operational
during a disaster and they should

SM IX-5
Course Title: Building Design For Homeland Security

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

be located away from attack
locations. Primary and backup
systems should be separated to
reduce the risk of both being
impacted by a single incident if
collocated. Utility systems
should be located at least 50 feet
from loading docks, front
entrances, and parking areas.

One way to harden critical

building systems and components
is to enclose them within
hardened walls, floors, and
ceilings. Do not place them near
high-risk areas where they can
receive collateral damage.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
2.16 Are high-value or critical Critical assets, such as people and
assets located as far into activities, are more vulnerable to
hazards when on an exterior
the interior of the building building wall or adjacent to
as possible and separated uncontrolled public areas inside
from the public areas of the building.
the building? Reference: GSA PBS-P100
2.17 Is high visitor activity High-risk activities should also be
away from critical assets? separated from low-risk activities.
Also, visitor activities should be
separated from daily activities.
Reference: USAF Installation
Force Protection Guide
2.18 Are critical assets located Reference: USAF Installation Unknown without a
in spaces that are occupied Force Protection Guide more detailed on-site
assessment.
24 hours per day?

Are assets located in areas

where they are visible to
more than one person?

2.19 Are loading docks and Loading docks should be

receiving and shipping designed to keep vehicles from
driving into or parking under the
areas separated in any building. If loading docks are in
direction from utility close proximity to critical
rooms, utility mains, and equipment, consider hardening
service entrances the equipment and service against
including electrical, explosive blast. Consider a 50-
foot separation distance in all
telephone/data, fire directions.
detection/alarm systems, Reference: GSA PBS-P100
fire suppression water

SM IX-6
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security: Resident Course

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

mains, cooling and heating
mains, etc.?

2.20 Are mailrooms located The mailroom should be located

away from building main at the perimeter of the building
with an outside wall or window
entrances, areas designed for pressure relief.
containing critical
services, utilities, By separating the mailroom and
distribution systems, and the loading dock, the collateral
important assets? damage of an incident at one has
less impact upon the other.
However, this may be the
Is the mailroom located preferred mailroom location.
near the loading dock?
Off-site screening stations or a
separate delivery processing
building on site may be cost-
effective, particularly if several
buildings may share one
mailroom. A separate delivery
processing building reduces risk
and simplifies protection
measures.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
2.21 Does the mailroom have Screening of all deliveries to the
adequate space available building, including U.S. mail,
commercial package delivery
for equipment to examine services, delivery of office
incoming packages and supplies, etc.
for an explosive disposal Reference: GSA PBS-P100
container?

2.22 Are areas of refuge Areas of refuge can be safe

identified, with special havens, shelters, or protected
spaces for use during specified
consideration given to hazards.
egress? Reference: FEMA 386-7
2.23 Are stairwells required for Consider designing stairs so that Unknown without a
emergency egress located they discharge into other than more detailed on-site
lobbies, parking, or loading areas. assessment
as remotely as possible
from high-risk areas Maintaining positive pressure .
where blast events might from a clean source of air (may
occur? require special filtering) aids in
egress by keeping smoke, heat,
toxic fumes, etc. out of the
Are stairways maintained stairway. Pressurize exit
with positive pressure or stairways in accordance with the
are there other smoke National Model Building Code.
control systems? References: GSA PBS-P100 and
CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139

SM IX-7
Course Title: Building Design For Homeland Security

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

2.24 Are enclosures for Egress pathways should be Unknown without a
emergency egress hardened and discharge into safe more detailed on-site
areas. assessment.
hardened to limit the Reference: FEMA 386-7
extent of debris that might
otherwise impede safe
passage and reduce the
flow of evacuees?
2.25 Do interior barriers Reference: USAF Installation
differentiate level of Force Protection Guide
security within a building?

2.26 Are emergency systems The intent is to keep the

located away from high- emergency systems out of harm’s
way, such that one incident takes
risk areas? out all capability – both the
regular systems and their
backups.
Reference: FEMA 386-7
2.27 Is interior glazing near Interior glazing should be Unknown without
high-threat areas minimized where a threat exists more detailed on-site
and should be avoided in assessment.
minimized? enclosures of critical functions
next to high-risk areas.
Is interior glazing in other Reference: GSA PBS-P100
areas shatter resistant?
2.28 Are ceiling and lighting When an explosive blast shatters Unknown without a
systems designed to a window, the blast wave enters more detailed on-site
the interior space, putting assessment.
remain in place during structural and nonstructural
hazard events? building components under loads
not considered in standard
building codes. It has been shown
that connection criteria for these
systems in high seismic activity
areas resulted in much less falling
debris that could injure building
occupants.

Mount all overhead utilities and

other fixtures weighing 14
kilograms (31 pounds) or more to
minimize the likelihood that they
will fall and injure building
occupants. Design all equipment
mountings to resist forces of 0.5
times the equipment weight in
any direction and 1.5 times the
equipment weight in the
downward direction. This

SM IX-8
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security: Resident Course

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

standard does not preclude the
need to design equipment
mountings for forces required by
other criteria, such as seismic
standards.
Reference: DoD Minimum
Antiterrorism Standards for
Buildings
3 Structural Systems
3.1 What type of The type of construction provides
construction? an indication of the robustness to
abnormal loading and load
reversals. A reinforced concrete
What type of concrete & moment-resisting frame provides
reinforcing steel? greater ductility and redundancy
than a flat-slab or flat-plate
What type of steel? construction. The ductility of
steel frame with metal deck
depends on the connection details
What type of foundation? and pre-tensioned or post-
tensioned construction provides
little capacity for abnormal
loading patterns and load
reversals. The resistance of load-
bearing wall structures varies to a
great extent, depending on
whether the walls are reinforced
or un-reinforced. A rapid
screening process developed by
FEMA for assessing structural
hazards identifies the following
types of construction with a
structural score ranging from 1.0
to 8.5. A higher score indicates a
greater capacity to sustain load
reversals.
Wood buildings of all types - 4.5
to 8.5
Steel moment-resisting frames -
3.5 to 4.5
Braced steel frames - 2.5 to 3.0
Light metal buildings - 5.5 to 6.5
Steel frames with cast-in-place
concrete
shear walls - 3.5 to 4.5
Steel frames with unreinforced
masonry
infill walls - 1.5 to 3.0
Concrete moment-resisting
frames - 2.0 to 4.0
Concrete shear wall buildings -
3.0 to 4.0

SM IX-9
Course Title: Building Design For Homeland Security

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

Concrete frames with
unreinforced masonry
infill walls - 1.5 to 3.0
Tilt-up buildings - 2.0 to 3.5
Precast concrete frame buildings -
1.5 to 2.5
Reinforced masonry - 3.0 to 4.0
Unreinforced masonry - 1.0 to 2.5
References: FEMA 154 and
Physical Security Assessment for
the Department of Veterans
Affairs Facilities

3.2 Do the reinforced concrete Reference: GSA PBS-P100 Unknown without a

structures contain more detailed on-site
assessment.
symmetric steel
reinforcement (positive
and negative faces) in all
floor slabs, roof slabs,
walls, beams and girders
that may be subjected to
rebound, uplift and suction
pressures?
Do the lap splices fully
develop the capacity of the
reinforcement?
Are lap splices and other
discontinuities staggered?
Do the connections
possess ductile details?
Is special shear
reinforcement, including
ties and stirrups, available
to allow large post-elastic
behavior?
3.3 Are the steel frame A practical upper level for Unknown without a
connections moment column spacing is generally 30 more detailed on-site
feet. Unless there is an assessment.
connections? overriding architectural
requirement, a practical limit for
Is the column spacing floor-to-floor heights is generally
minimized so that less than or equal to 16 feet.
reasonably sized members Reference: GSA PBS-P100
will resist the design loads
and increase the
redundancy of the system?

SM IX-10
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security: Resident Course

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

What are the floor-to-floor
heights?

3.4 Are critical elements The priority for upgrades should Unknown without a
vulnerable to failure? be based on the relative more detailed on-site
importance of structural or non- assessment.
structural elements that are
essential to mitigating the extent
of collapse and minimizing injury
and damage.

Primary Structural Elements

provide the essential parts of the
building’s resistance to
catastrophic blast loads and
progressive collapse. These
include columns, girders, roof
beams, and the main lateral
resistance system.

Secondary Structural Elements

consist of all other load bearing
members, such as floor beams,
slabs, etc.

Primary Nonstructural Elements

consist of elements (including
their attachments) which are
essential for life safety systems or
elements which can cause
substantial injury if failure
occurs, including ceilings or
heavy suspended mechanical
units.

Secondary Nonstructural
Elements consist of all elements
not covered in primary
nonstructural elements, such as
partitions, furniture, and light
fixtures.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
3.5 Will the structure suffer an The extent of damage to the
unacceptable level of structure and exterior wall
systems from the bomb threat
damage resulting from the may be related to a protection
postulated threat (blast level. The following is for new
loading or weapon buildings:
impact)?
Level of Protection Below
Antiterrorism
Standards – Severe damage.

SM IX-11
Course Title: Building Design For Homeland Security

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

Frame collapse/massive
destruction. Little left standing.
Doors and windows fail and
result in lethal hazards. Majority
of personnel suffer fatalities.
Very Low Level Protection –
Heavy damage. Onset of
structural collapse. Major
deformation of primary and
secondary structural members,
but progressive collapse is
unlikely. Collapse of non-
structural elements. Glazing will
break and is likely to be propelled
into the building, resulting in
serious glazing fragment injuries,
but fragments will be reduced.
Doors may be propelled into
rooms, presenting serious
hazards. Majority of personnel
suffer serious injuries. There are
likely to be a limited number (10
percent to 25 percent) of
fatalities.
Low Level of Protection –
Moderate damage, unrepairable.
Major deformation of non-
structural elements and secondary
structural members and minor
deformation of primary structural
members, but progressive
collapse is unlikely. Glazing will
break, but fall within 1 meter of
the wall or otherwise not present
a significant fragment hazard.
Doors may fail, but they will
rebound out of their frames,
presenting minimal hazards.
Majority of personnel suffer
significant injuries. There may be
a few (<10 percent) fatalities.
Medium Level Protection –
Minor damage, repairable. Minor
deformations of non-structural
elements and secondary structural
members and no permanent
deformation in primary structural
members. Glazing will break, but
will remain in the window frame.
Doors will stay in frames, but will
not be reusable. Some minor

SM IX-12
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security: Resident Course

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

injuries, but fatalities are unlikely.
High Level Protection – Minimal
damage, repairable. No
permanent deformation of
primary and secondary structural
members or non-structural
elements. Glazing will not break.
Doors will be reusable. Only
superficial injuries are likely.
Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01

3.6 Is the structure vulnerable Design to mitigate progressive Unknown without a

to progressive collapse? collapse is an independent more detailed on-site
analysis to determine a system’s assessment.
ability to resist structural collapse
Is the building capable of upon the loss of a major structural
sustaining the removal of a element or the system’s ability to
column for one floor resist the loss of a major
above grade at the structural element. Design to
mitigate progressive collapse may
building perimeter without be based on the methods outlined
progressive collapse? in ASCE 7-98 (now 7-02).
Designers may apply static and/or
In the event of an internal dynamic methods of analysis to
explosion in an meet this requirement and
ultimate load capacities may be
uncontrolled public assumed in the analyses.
ground floor area does the Combine structural upgrades for
design prevent progressive retrofits to existing buildings,
collapse due to the loss of such as seismic and progressive
one primary column? collapse, into a single project due
to the economic synergies and
other cross benefits. Existing
Do architectural or facilities may be retrofitted to
structural features provide withstand the design level threat
a minimum 6-inch stand- or to accept the loss of a column
off to the internal columns for one floor above grade at the
building perimeter without
(primary vertical load progressive collapse. Note that
carrying members)? collapse of floors or roof must not
be permitted.
Are the columns in the Reference: GSA PBS-P100
unscreened internal spaces
designed for an unbraced
length equal to two floors,
or three floors where there
are two levels of parking?

SM IX-13
Course Title: Building Design For Homeland Security

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

3.7 Are there adequate Special consideration should be Unknown without a

redundant load paths in the given to materials that have more detailed on-site
inherent ductility and that are assessment.
structure? better able to respond to load
reversals, such as cast in place
reinforced concrete, reinforced
masonry, and steel construction.
Careful detailing is required for
material such as pre-stressed
concrete, pre-cast concrete, and
masonry to adequately respond to
the design loads. Primary vertical
load carrying members should be
protected where parking is inside
a facility and the building
superstructure is supported by the
parking structure.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

3.8 Are there transfer girders Transfer girders allow Unknown without a
supported by columns discontinuities in columns more detailed on-site
between the roof and foundation. assessment.
within unscreened public This design has inherent difficulty
spaces or at the exterior of in transferring load to redundant
the building? paths upon loss of a column or
the girder. Transfer beams and
girders that, if lost, may cause
progressive collapse are highly
discouraged.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

3.9 What is the grouting and Avoid unreinforced masonry Unknown without a
reinforcement of masonry exterior walls. Reinforcement can more detailed on-site
run the range of light to heavy, assessment.
(brick and/or concrete depending upon the stand-off
masonry unit (CMU)) distance available and postulated
exterior walls? design threat.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
recommends fully grouted and
reinforced CMU construction
where CMU is selected.
Reference: DoD Minimum Antiterrorism
Standards for Buildings states
“Unreinforced masonry walls are
prohibited for the exterior walls
of new buildings. A minimum of
0.05 percent vertical
reinforcement with a maximum
spacing of 1,200 mm (48 in) will
be provided. For existing
buildings, implement mitigating
measures to provide an equivalent
level of protection.” [This is light

SM IX-14
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security: Resident Course

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

reinforcement and based upon the

recommended stand-off distance
for the situation.]

3.10 Will the loading dock Design the floor of the loading
design limit damage to dock for blast resistance if the
area below is occupied or
adjacent areas and vent contains critical utilities.
explosive force to the Reference: GSA PBS-P100
exterior of the building?

3.11 Are mailrooms, where Where mailrooms and unscreened

packages are received and retail spaces are located in
occupied areas or adjacent to
opened for inspection, and critical utilities, walls, ceilings,
unscreened retail spaces and floors, they should be blast-
designed to mitigate the and fragment- resistant.
effects of a blast on Methods to facilitate the venting
primary vertical or lateral of explosive forces and gases
from the interior spaces to the
bracing members? outside of the structure may
include blow-out panels and
window system designs that
provide protection from blast
pressure applied to the outside,
but that readily fail and vent if
exposed to blast pressure on the
inside.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

4 Building Envelope
4.1 What is the designed or The performance of the façade
estimated protection level varies to a great extent on the
materials. Different construction
of the exterior walls includes brick or stone with block
against the postulated backup, steel stud walls, precast
explosive threat? panels, or curtain wall with glass,
stone, or metal panel elements.
Shear walls that are essential to
the lateral and vertical load
bearing system and that also
function as exterior walls should
be considered primary structures
and should resist the actual blast
loads predicted from the threats
specified. Where exterior walls
are not designed for the full
design loads, special
consideration should be given to
construction types that reduce the
potential for injury.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

SM IX-15
Course Title: Building Design For Homeland Security

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

4.2 Is there less than 40 % The performance of the glass will

fenestration openings per similarly depend on the materials.
Glazing may be single pane or
structural bay? double pane, monolithic or
laminated, annealed, heat
Is the window system strengthened or fully tempered.
design on the exterior The percent fenestration is a
façade balanced to balance between protection level,
cost, the architectural look of the
mitigate the hazardous building within its surroundings,
effects of flying glazing and building codes. One goal is to
following an explosive keep fenestration to below 40
event? percent of the building envelope
(glazing, frames, vertical surface area, but the
process must balance differing
anchorage to supporting requirements. A blast engineer
walls, etc.) may prefer no windows; an
architect may favor window
Do the glazing systems curtain walls; building codes
with a ½-inch (3/4-inch require so much fenestration per
square footage of floor area; fire
better) bite contain an codes require a prescribed
application of structural window opening area if the
silicone? window is a designated escape
route; and the building owner has
Is the glazing laminated or cost concerns.
Ideally, an owner would want 100
is it protected with an anti- percent of the glazed area to
shatter (fragment provide the design protection
retention) film? level against the postulated
explosive threat (design basis
If an anti-shatter film is threat– weapon size at the
expected stand-off distance).
used, is it a minimum of a However, economics and
7-mil thick film, or geometry may allow 80 percent to
specially manufactured 4- 90 percent due to the statistical
mil thick film? differences in the manufacturing
process for glass or the angle of
incidence of the blast wave upon
upper story windows (4th floor
and higher).
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

4.3 Do the walls, anchorage, Government produced and Unknown without a

and window framing fully sponsored computer programs more detailed on-site
coupled with test data and assessment.
develop the capacity of the recognized dynamic structural
glazing material selected? analysis techniques may be used
to determine whether the glazing
Are the walls capable of either survives the specified
withstanding the dynamic threats or the post damage
performance of the glazing
reactions from the protects the occupants. A

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Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

windows? breakage probability no higher

than 750 breaks per 1,000 may be
used when calculating loads to
Will the anchorage remain frames and anchorage.
attached to the walls of the The intent is to ensure the
building during an building envelope provides
explosive event without relatively equal protection against
failure? the postulated explosive threat for
the walls and window systems for
the safety of the occupants,
Is the façade connected to especially in rooms with exterior
back-up block or to the walls.
structural frame? Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Are non-bearing masonry

walls reinforced?

4.4 Does the building contain Glass-clad polycarbonate or Unknown without a

ballistic glazing? laminated polycarbonate are two more detailed on-site
types of acceptable glazing assessment.
material.
Does the ballistic glazing If windows are upgraded to
meet the requirements of bullet-resistant, burglar-resistant,
UL 752 Bullet-Resistant or forced entry-resistant, ensure
Glazing? that doors, ceilings, and floors, as
applicable, can resist the same for
the areas of concern.
Does the building contain Reference: GSA PBS-P100
security-glazing?

Does the security-glazing

meet the requirements of
ASTM F1233 or UL 972,
Burglary Resistant
Glazing Material?

Do the window assemblies

containing forced entry
resistant glazing
(excluding the glazing)
meet the requirements of
ASTM F 588?

4.5 Do non-window openings, In-filling of blast over-pressures Unknown without a

such as mechanical vents must be considered through non- more detailed on-site
window openings such that assessment.
and exposed plenums, structural members and all
provide the same level of mechanical system mountings
protection required for the and attachments should resist
exterior wall? these interior fill pressures.

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Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

These non-window openings

should also be as secure as the
rest of the building envelope
against forced entry.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

6 Mechanical Systems (HVAC and CBR)

6.1 Where are the air intakes Air intakes should be located on
and exhaust louvers for the roof or as high as possible.
Otherwise secure within CPTED-
the building? compliant fencing or enclosure.
(low, high, or midpoint of The fencing or enclosure should
the building structure) have a sloped roof to prevent the
throwing of anything into the
Are the intakes and enclosure near the intakes.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 states that
exhausts accessible to the
air intakes should be on the fourth
public? floor or higher and, on buildings
with three floors or less, they
should be on the roof or as high
as practical. Locating intakes high
on a wall is preferred over a roof
location.
Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 states
that, for all new inhabited
buildings covered by this
document, all air intakes should
be located at least 3 meters (10
feet) above the ground.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139
states: “An extension height of 12
feet (3.7 m) will place the intake
out of reach of individuals
without some assistance. Also,
the entrance to the intake should
be covered with a sloped metal
mesh to reduce the threat of
objects being tossed into the
intake. A minimum slope of 45°
is generally adequate. Extension
height should be increased where
existing platforms or building
features (i.e., loading docks,
retaining walls) might provide
access to the outdoor air intakes”.
Reference: LBNL PUB-51959: Exhausts
are also a concer n during an
outdoor release, especially if
exhaust fans are not in continuous
operation, due to wind effects and
chimney effects (air movement
due to differential temperature).

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6.2 Is roof access limited to Roofs are like entrances to the Unknown without a
authorized personnel by building and are like mechanical more detailed on-site
rooms when HVAC is installed. assessment.
means of locking Adjacent structures or
mechanisms? landscaping should not allow
access to the roof.
Is access to mechanical References: GSA PBS-P100,
areas similarly controlled? CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139, and
LBNL Pub 51959

6.3 Are there multiple air Single air intakes may feed
intake locations? several air handling units.
Indicate if the air intakes are
localized or separated. Installing
low-leakage dampers is one way
to provide the system separation
when necessary.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment
for the Department of Veterans
Affairs Facilities

6.4 What are the types of air MERV – Minimum Efficiency

filtration? Include the Reporting Value
HEPA – High Efficiency
efficiency and number of Particulate Air
filter modules for each of Activated charcoal for gases
the main air handling Ultraviolet C for biologicals
systems. Consider mix of approaches for
optimum protection and cost-
effectiveness.
Is there any collective Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub
protection for chemical, 2002-139
biological, and
radiological
contamination designed
into the building?

6.5 Is there space for larger Air handling units serving critical Unknown without a
filter assemblies on functions during continued more detailed on-site
operation may be retrofitted to assessment.
critical air handling provide enhanced protection
systems? during emergencies. However,
upgraded filtration may have
negative effects upon the overall
air handling system operation,
such as increased pressure drop.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub
2002-139

6.6 Are there provisions for Duct mounted sensors are usually Unknown without a
air monitors or sensors for found in limited cases in more detailed on-site
laboratory areas. Sensors assessment.

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Course Title: Building Design For Homeland Security

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

chemical or biological generally have a limited spectrum

agents? of high reliability and are costly.
Many different technologies are
undergoing research to provide
capability.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub
2002-139

6.7 By what method are air Motorized (low-leakage, fast- Unknown without a
intakes and exhausts acting) dampers are the preferred more detailed on-site
method for closure with fail-safe assessment.
closed when not to the closed position so as to
operational? support in-place sheltering.
References: CDC/NIOSH Pub
2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

6.8 How are air handling Understanding the critical areas Unknown without a
systems zoned? of the building that must continue more detailed on-site
functioning focuses security and assessment.
hazard mitigation measures.
What areas and functions Applying HVAC zones that
do each of the primary air isolate lobbies, mailrooms,
handling systems serve? loading docks, and other entry
and storage areas from the rest of
the building HVAC zones and
maintaining negative pressure
within these areas will contain
CBR releases. Identify common
return systems that service more
than one zone, effectively making
a large single zone.
Conversely, emergency egress
routes should receive positive
pressurization to ensure
contamination does not hinder
egress. Consider filtering of the
pressurization air.
References: CDC/NIOSH Pub
2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

6.9 Are there large central air Independent units can continue to
handling units or are there operate if damage occurs to
limited areas of the building.
multiple units serving Reference: Physical Security
separate zones? Assessment for the Department of
Veterans Affairs Facilities

6.10 Are there any Redundancy reduces the security Unknown without a
redundancies in the air measures required compared to a more detailed on-site
non-redundant situation. assessment.
handling system? Reference: Physical Security
Assessment for the Department of
Can critical areas be Veterans Affairs Facilities
served from other units if

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Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

a major system is
disabled?

6.11 Is the air supply to critical During chemical, biological, and Unknown without a
areas compartmentalized? radiological situations, the intent more detailed on-site
is to either keep the assessment.
contamination localized in the
Similarly, are the critical critical area or prevent its entry
areas or the building as a into other critical, non-critical, or
whole, considered tight public areas. Systems can be
with little or no inleakage? cross-connected through building
openings (doorways, ceilings,
partial wall), ductwork leakage,
or pressure differences in air
handling system. In standard
practice, there is almost always
some air carried between
ventilation zones by pressure
imbalances, due to elevator piston
action, chimney effect, and wind
effects.
Smoke testing of the air supply to
critical areas may be necessary.
References: CDC/NIOSH Pub
2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

6.12 Are supply, return, and The air systems to critical areas Unknown without a
exhaust air systems for should be inaccessible to the more detailed on-site
public, especially if the ductwork assessment.
critical areas secure? runs through the public areas of
the building. It is also more
Are all supply and return secure to have a ducted air
ducts completely handling system versus sharing
connected to their grilles hallways and plenums above drop
ceilings for return air. Non-ducted
and registers and secure? systems provide greater
opportunity for introducing
Is the return air not contaminants.
ducted? References: CDC/NIOSH Pub
2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

6.13 What is the method of Central systems can range from

temperature and humidity monitoring only to full control.
Local control may be available to
control? override central operation.
Of greatest concern are systems
Is it localized or needed before, during, and after
centralized? an incident that may be
unavailable due to temperature
and humidity exceeding
operational limits (e.g., main
telephone switch room).
Reference: DOC CIAO

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Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

Vulnerability Assessment
Framework 1.1

6.14 Where are the building Access to any component of the Unknown without a
automation control centers building automation and control more detailed on-site
system could compromise the assessment.
and cabinets located? functioning of the system,
increasing vulnerability to a
Are they in secure areas? hazard or precluding their proper
operation during a hazard
How is the control wiring incident.
The HVAC and exhaust system
routed? controls should be in a secure
area that allows rapid shutdown
or other activation based upon
location and type of attack.
References: FEMA 386-7, DOC
CIAO Vulnerability Assessment
Framework 1.1 and LBNL Pub
51959

6.15 Does the control of air The micro-meteorological effects Unknown without a
handling systems support of buildings and terrain can alter more detailed on-site
travel and duration of chemical assessment.
plans for sheltering in agents and hazardous material
place or other protective releases. Shielding in the form of
approach? sheltering in place can protect
people and property from harmful
effects.
To support in-place sheltering,
the air handling systems require
the ability for authorized
personnel to rapidly turn off all
systems. However, if the system
is properly filtered, then keeping
the system operating will provide
protection as long as the air
handling system does not
distribute an internal release to
other portions of the building.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub
2002-139

6.16 Are there any smoke For an internal blast, a smoke

evacuation systems removal system may be essential,
particularly in large, open spaces.
installed? The equipment should be located
away from high-risk areas, the
Does it have purge system controls and wiring should
capability? be protected, and it should be
connected to emergency power.
This exhaust capability can be
built into areas with significant
risk on internal events, such as

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Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

lobbies, loading docks, and

mailrooms. Consider filtering of
the exhaust to capture CBR
contaminants.
References: GSA PBS-P100,
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139, and
LBNL Pub 51959

6.17 Where is roof-mounted Roof-mounted equipment should Unknown without a

equipment located on the be kept away from the building more detailed on-site
perimeter. assessment.
roof? Reference: U.S. Army TM 5-853
(near perimeter, at center
of roof)

6.18 Are fire dampers installed All dampers (fire, smoke, outdoor
at all fire barriers? air, return air, bypass) must be
functional for proper protection
within the building during an
Are all dampers functional incident.
and seal well when Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub
closed? 2002-139

6.19 Do fire walls and fire The tightness of the building Unknown without a
doors maintain their (both exterior, by weatherization more detailed on-site
to seal cracks around doors and assessment.
integrity? windows, and internal, by zone
ducting, fire walls, fire stops, and
fire doors) provides energy
conservation benefits and
functional benefits during a CBR
incident.
Reference: LBNL Pub 51959

6.20 Do elevators have recall Although a life-safety code and

capability and elevator fire response requirement, the
control of elevators also has
emergency message benefit during a CBR incident.
capability? The elevators generate a piston
effect, causing pressure
differentials in the elevator shaft
and associated floors that can
force contamination to flow up or
down.
Reference: LBNL Pub 51959

6.21 Is access to building Information on building

information restricted? operations, schematics,
procedures, plans, and
specifications should be strictly
controlled and available only to
authorized personnel.
References: CDC/NIOSH Pub
2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

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Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

6.22 Does the HVAC Functional equipment must Unknown without a

maintenance staff have the interface with operational more detailed on-site
procedures in an emergency plan assessment.
proper training, to ensure the equipment is
procedures, and properly operated to provide the
preventive maintenance protection desired.
schedule to ensure CBR The HVAC system can be
equipment is functional? operated in different ways,
depending upon an external or
internal release and where in the
building an internal release
occurs. Thus maintenance and
security staff must have the
training to properly operate the
HVAC system under different
circumstances, even if the
procedure is to turn off all air
movement equipment.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub
2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

7 Plumbing and Gas Systems

7.1 What is the method of Central shaft locations for piping Unknown without a
water distribution? are more vulnerable than more detailed on-site
multiple riser locations. assessment.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment
for the Department of Veterans
Affairs Facilities

7.2 What is the method of gas Reference: Physical Security Unknown without a
distribution? Assessment for the Department more detailed on-site
of Veterans Affairs Facilities assessment.
(heating, cooking,
medical, process)

7.3 Is there redundancy to the Looping of piping and use of Unknown without a
main piping distribution? section valves provide more detailed on-site
redundancies in the event assessment.
sections of the system are
damaged.
Reference: Physical Security
Assessment for the Department of
Veterans Affairs Facilities

7.4 What is the method of Single source of hot water with Unknown without a
heating domestic water? one fuel source is more more detailed on-site
vulnerable than multiple sources assessment.
and multiple fuel types.
What fuel(s) is used? Domestic hot water availability
is an operational concern for
many building occupancies.
Reference: Physical Security

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Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

Assessment for the Department

of Veterans Affairs Facilities

7.5 Where are gas storage The concern is that the tanks and Unknown without a
tanks located? piping could be vulnerable to a more detailed on-site
moving vehicle or a bomb blast assessment.
(heating, cooking, either directly or by collateral
medical, process) damage due to proximity to a
higher-risk area.
How are they piped to the Reference: Physical Security
distribution system? Assessment for the Department
of Veterans Affairs Facilities
(above or below ground)

7.6 Are there reserve supplies Localized gas cylinders could be Unknown without a
of critical gases? available in the event of damage more detailed on-site
to the central tank system. assessment.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment
for the Department of Veterans
Affairs Facilities

8 Electrical Systems
8.1 Are there any transformers Reference: Physical Security
or switchgears located Assessment for the Department of
Veterans Affairs Facilities
outside the building or
accessible from the
building exterior?

Are they vulnerable to

public access?

Are they secured?

8.2 What is the extent of the Reference: Physical Security Unknown without a
external building lighting Assessment for the Department of more detailed on-site
Veterans Affairs Facilities assessment.
in utility and service areas
and at normal entryways
used by the building
occupants?

8.3 How are the electrical Reference: Physical Security Unknown without a
rooms secured and where Assessment for the Department of more detailed on-site
Veterans Affairs Facilities assessment.
are they located relative to
other higher risk areas,
starting with the main
electrical distribution
room at the service
entrance?

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Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

8.4 Are critical electrical Collocation concerns include

systems co-located with rooms, ceilings, raceways,
conduits, panels, and risers.
other building systems? Reference: Physical Security
Assessment for the Department of
Are critical electrical Veterans Affairs Facilities
systems located in areas
outside of secured
electrical areas?

Is security system wiring

located separately from
electrical and other service
systems?

8.5 How are electrical Reference: Physical Security Unknown without a

distribution panels serving Assessment for the Department of more detailed on-site
Veterans Affairs Facilities assessment.
branch circuits secured or
are they in secure
locations?

8.6 Does emergency backup There should be no single critical

power exist for all areas node that allows both the normal
electrical service and the
within the building or for emergency backup power to be
critical areas only? affected by a single incident.
Automatic transfer switches and
How is the emergency interconnecting switchgear are
power distributed? the initial concerns.

Emergency and normal electrical

Is the emergency power equipment should be installed
system independent from separately, at different locations,
the normal electrical and as far apart as possible.
service, particularly in Reference: GSA PBS-P100
critical areas?

8.7 How is the primary Central utility shafts may be Unknown without a
electrical system wiring subject to damage, especially if more detailed on-site
there is only one for the building. assessment.
distributed? Reference: Physical Security
Assessment for the Department of
Is it co-located with other Veterans Affairs Facilities
major utilities?

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Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

Is there redundancy of
distribution to critical
areas?
9 Fire Alarm Systems
9.1 Is the building fire alarm Fire alarm systems must first
system centralized or warn building occupants to
evacuate for life safety. Then they
localized? must inform the responding
agency to dispatch fire equipment
How are alarms and personnel.
annunciated, both locally Reference: Physical Security
and centrally? Assessment for the Department of
Veterans Affairs Facilities

Are critical documents and

control systems located in
a secure yet accessible
location?

9.2 Where are the fire alarm Reference: Physical Security

panels located? Assessment for the Department of
Veterans Affairs Facilities

Do they allow access to

unauthorized personnel?

9.3 Is the fire alarm system Reference: Physical Security

stand-alone or integrated Assessment for the Department of
Veterans Affairs Facilities
with other functions such
as security and
environmental or building
management systems?

What is the interface?

9.4 Do key fire alarm system This is especially necessary for Unknown without a
components have fire- and the fire command center or fire more detailed on-site
alarm control center. The concern assessment.
blast-resistant separation? is to similarly protect critical
components as described in Items
2.19, 5.7, and 10.3.

9.5 Is there redundant off- Fire alarms can ring at a fire

premises fire alarm station, at an intermediary alarm
monitoring center, or autodial
reporting?

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Course Title: Building Design For Homeland Security

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

someone else. See Items 5.21 and

10.5.

10 Communications and IT Systems

10.1 Where is the main One can expect to find voice,
telephone distribution data, signal, and alarm systems to
be routed through the main
room and where is it in telephone distribution room.
relation to higher risk Reference: FEMA 386-7
areas?

Is the main telephone

distribution room secure?

10.2 Does the telephone system Many telephone systems are now Unknown without a
have an UPS computerized and need a UPS to more detailed on-site
ensure reliability during power assessment.
(uninterruptible power fluctuations. The UPS is also
supply)? needed to await any emergency
power coming on line or allow
What is its type, power orderly shutdown.
rating, operational Reference: DOC CIAO
Vulnerability Assessment
duration under load, and Framework 1.1
location?
(battery, on-line, filtered)

10.3 Where are communication Concern is to have separation Unknown without a

systems wiring closets distance from other utilities and more detailed on-site
higher-risk areas to avoid assessment.
located? collateral damage.
(voice, data, signal, alarm) Security approaches on the
closets include door alarms,
Are they co-located with closed circuit television, swipe
other utilities? cards, or other logging
notifications to ensure only
authorized personnel have access
Are they in secure areas? to these closets.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

10.4 How is communications The intent is to prevent tampering Unknown without a

system wiring distributed? with the systems. more detailed on-site
Reference: Physical Security assessment.
(secure chases and risers, Assessment for the Department of
accessible public areas) Veterans Affairs Facilities

10.5 Are there redundant Critical areas should be supplied

communications systems with multiple or redundant means
of communications. Power outage
available? phones can provide redundancy

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security: Resident Course

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

as they connect directly to the

local commercial telephone
switch off site and not through the
building telephone switch in the
main telephone distribution room.
A base radio communication
system with antenna can be
installed in stairwells, and
portable sets distributed to floors.
References: GSA PBS-P100 and
FEMA 386-7

10.6 Where are the main Concern is collateral damage

distribution facility, data from manmade hazards and
redundancy of critical functions.
centers, routers, firewalls, Reference: DOC CIAO
and servers located and Vulnerability Assessment
are they secure? Framework 1.1

Where are the secondary

and/or intermediate
distribution facilities and
are they secure?

10.7 What type and where are Critical facilities should have two Unknown without a
the WAN (wide area Minimum-Points-of-Presence more detailed on-site
(MPOPs) where the telephone assessment.
network) connections? company’s outside cable
terminates inside the building. It
is functionally a service entrance
connection that demarcates where
the telephone company’s property
stops and the building owner’s
property begins. The MPOPs
should not be collocated and they
should connect to different
telephone company central
offices so that the loss of one
cable or central office does not
reduce capability.
Reference: Physical Security
Assessment for the Department of
Veterans Affairs Facilities

10.8 What type, power rating, Consider that UPS should be

and location of the UPS found at all computerized points
from the main distribution facility
(uninterruptible power to individual data closets and at
supply)? (battery, on-line, critical personal
filtered) computers/terminals.

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Course Title: Building Design For Homeland Security

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

Critical LAN sections should also

Are the UPS also be on backup power.
Reference: DOC CIAO
connected to emergency Vulnerability Assessment
power? Framework 1.1

10.9 What type of LAN (local The physical topology of a Unknown without a
area network) cabling and network is the way in which the more detailed on-site
cables and computers are assessment.
physical topology is used? connected to each other. The
(Category (Cat) 5, Gigabit main types of physical topologies
Ethernet, Ethernet, Token are:
Ring) Bus (single radial where any
damage on the bus affects the
whole system, but especially all
portions downstream)
Star (several computes are
connected to a hub and many
hubs can be in the network – the
hubs can be critical nodes, but the
other hubs continue to function if
one fails)
Ring (a bus with a continuous
connection - least used, but can
tolerate some damage because if
the ring fails at a single point it
can be rerouted much like a
looped electric or water system)
The configuration and the
availability of surplus cable or
spare capacity on individual
cables can reduce vulnerability to
hazard incidents.
Reference: Physical Security
Assessment for the Department of
Veterans Affairs Facilities

10.10 For installed Depending upon the function of Unknown without a

radio/wireless systems, the wireless system, it could be more detailed on-site
susceptible to accidental or assessment.
what are their types and intended jamming or collateral
where are they located? damage.
(RF (radio frequency), HF Reference: Physical Security
(high frequency), VHF Assessment for the Department of
(very high frequency), Veterans Affairs Facilities
MW (medium wave)

10.11 Do the IT (Information Ensure access to terminals and

Technology – computer) equipment for authorized
personnel only and ensure system
systems meet up-time to meet operational
requirements of needs.
confidentiality, integrity, Reference: DOC CIAO

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Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

and availability? Vulnerability Assessment

Framework 1.1

10.12 Where is the disaster A site with suitable equipment

recovery/mirroring site? that allows continuation of
operations or that mirrors
(operates in parallel to) the
existing operation is beneficial if
equipment is lost during a natural
or manmade disaster. The need is
based upon the criticality of the
operation and how quickly
replacement equipment can be put
in place and operated.
Reference: DOC CIAO
Vulnerability Assessment
Framework 1.1

10.13 Where is the back-up If equipment is lost, data are most Unknown without a
tape/file storage site and likely lost, too. Backups are more detailed on-site
needed to continue operations at assessment.
what is the type of safe the disaster recovery site or when
environment? equipment can be delivered and
(safe, vault, underground) installed.
Reference: DOC CIAO
Is there redundant Vulnerability Assessment
Framework 1.1
refrigeration in the site?

10.14 Are there any SATCOM SATCOM links can serve as Unknown without a
(satellite communications) redundant communications for more detailed on-site
voice and data if configured to assessment.
links? support required capability after a
(location, power, UPS, hazard incident.
emergency power, spare Reference: DOC CIAO
capacity/capability) Vulnerability Assessment
Framework 1.1

10.15 Is there a mass notification Depending upon building size, a

system that reaches all mass notification system will
provide warning and alert
building occupants? information, along with actions to
(public address, pager, cell take before and after an incident
phone, computer override, if there is redundancy and power.
etc.) Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01

Will one or more of these

systems be operational
under hazard conditions?
(UPS, emergency power)

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10.16 Do control centers and Reference: GSA PBS-P100

their designated alternate
locations have equivalent
or reduced capability for
voice, data, mass
notification, etc.?
(emergency operations,
security, fire alarms,
building automation)

Do the alternate locations

also have access to backup
systems, including
emergency power?

11 Equipment Operations and Maintenance

11.1 Are there composite Within critical infrastructure Unknown without a
drawings indicating protection at the building level, more detailed on-site
the current configuration and assessment.
location and capacities of capacity of all critical systems
major systems and are must be understood to ensure they
they current? meet emergency needs. Manuals
(electrical, mechanical, must also be current to ensure
and fire protection; and operations and maintenance keeps
these systems properly
date of last update) functioning. The system must
function during an emergency
Do updated O&M unless directly affected by the
(operation and hazard incident.
maintenance) manuals Reference: Physical Security
Assessment for the Department of
exist? Veterans Affairs Facilities

11.2 Have critical air systems Although the system may Unknown without a
been rebalanced? function, it must be tested more detailed on-site
periodically to ensure it is assessment.
performing as designed.
If so, when and how Balancing is also critical after
often? initial construction to set
equipment to proper performance
per the design.
Rebalancing may only occur
during renovation.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub
2002-139

11.3 Is air pressurization Some areas require positive or Unknown without a

monitored regularly? negative pressure to function more detailed on-site
properly. Pressurization is critical assessment.
in a hazardous environment or

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Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

emergency situation.
Measuring pressure drop across
filters is an indication when filters
should be changed, but also may
indicate that low pressures are
developing downstream and
could result in loss of expected
protection.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub
2002-139

11.4 Does the building have a Recommissioning involves Unknown without a

policy or procedure for testing and balancing of systems more detailed on-site
to ascertain their capability to assessment.
periodic recommissioning perform as described.
of major M/E/P Reference: Physical Security
(Mechanical/Electrical/Plu Assessment for the Department of
mbing) systems? Veterans Affairs Facilities

11.5 Is there an adequate If O&M of critical systems is Unknown without a

operations and done with in-house personnel, more detailed on-site
management must know what assessment.
maintenance program needs to be done and the
including training of workforce must have the
facilities management necessary training to ensure
staff? systems reliability.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub
2002-139

11.6 What maintenance and When an in-house facility Unknown without a

service agreements exist maintenance work force does not more detailed on-site
exist or does not have the assessment.
for M/E/P systems? capability to perform the work,
maintenance and service contracts
are the alternative to ensure
critical systems will work under
all conditions. The facility
management staff requires the
same knowledge to oversee these
contracts as if the work was being
done by in-house personnel.
Reference: Physical Security
Assessment for the Department of
Veterans Affairs Facilities

11.7 Are backup power systems Loading should be at or above Unknown without a
periodically tested under maximum connected load to more detailed on-site
ensure available capacity and assessment.
load? automatic sensors should be
tested at least once per year.
Periodically (once a year as a
minimum) check the duration of
capacity of backup systems by

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Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

running them for the expected

emergency duration or estimating
operational duration through fuel
consumption, water consumption,
or voltage loss.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

11.8 Is stairway and exit sign The maintenance program for

lighting operational? stairway and exit sign lighting (all
egress lighting) should ensure
functioning under normal and
emergency power conditions.
Expect building codes to be
updated as emergency egress
lighting is moved from upper
walls and over doorways to floor
level as heat and smoke drive
occupants to crawl along the floor
to get out of the building. Signs
and lights mounted high have
limited or no benefit when
obscured.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

13 Security Master Plan

13.1 Does a written security The development and
plan exist for this site or implementation of a security
master plan provides a roadmap
building? that outlines the strategic
direction and vision, operational,
When was the initial managerial, and technological
security plan written and mission, goals, and objectives of
last revised? the organization’s security
program.
Reference: DOC CIAO
Who is responsible for Vulnerability Assessment
preparing and reviewing Framework 1.1
the security plan?

13.2 Has the security plan been The security plan should be part Unknown without a
communicated and of the building design so that the more detailed on-site
construction or renovation of the assessment.
disseminated to key structure integrates with the
management personnel security procedures to be used
and departments? during daily operations.
Reference: Physical Security
Assessment for the Department of
Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.3 Has the security plan been Reference: Physical Security Unknown without a
Assessment for the Department of more detailed on-site

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Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

benchmarked or compared Veterans Affairs Facilities assessment.

against related
organizations and
operational entities?

13.4 Has the security plan ever Reference: Physical Security Unknown without a
been tested and evaluated Assessment for the Department of more detailed on-site
Veterans Affairs Facilities assessment.
from a cost-benefit and
operational efficiency and
effectiveness perspective?

13.5 Does it define mission, Reference: Physical Security Unknown without a

vision, short-long term Assessment for the Department of more detailed on-site
Veterans Affairs Facilities assessment.
security program goals
and objectives?

13.6 Are threats, Reference: DOC CIAO Unknown without a

vulnerabilities, risks Vulnerability Assessment more detailed on-site
Framework 1.1 assessment.
adequately defined and
security countermeasures
addressed and prioritized
relevant to their criticality
and probability of
occurrence?

13.7 Has a security Reference: Physical Security Unknown without a

implementation schedule Assessment for the Department of more detailed on-site
Veterans Affairs Facilities assessment.
been established to
address recommended
security solutions?

13.8 Have security operating Reference: Physical Security Unknown without a

and capital budgets been Assessment for the Department of more detailed on-site
Veterans Affairs Facilities assessment.
addressed, approved and
established to support the
plan?
13.9 What regulatory or Reference: Physical Security Unknown without a
industry Assessment for the Department of more detailed on-site
Veterans Affairs Facilities assessment.
guidelines/standards were
followed in the
preparation of the security
plan?

13.10 Does the security plan Reference: Physical Security Unknown without a
address existing security Assessment for the Department of more detailed on-site

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Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

conditions from an Veterans Affairs Facilities assessment.

administrative,
operational, managerial
and technical security
systems perspective?

13.11 Does the security plan Reference: Physical Security Unknown without a
address the protection of Assessment for the Department of more detailed on-site
Veterans Affairs Facilities assessment.
people, property, assets,
and information?

13.12 Does the security plan Reference: Physical Security Unknown without a
address the following Assessment for the Department of more detailed on-site
Veterans Affairs Facilities assessment.
major components: access
control, surveillance,
response, building
hardening and protection
against biological,
chemical, radiological and
cyber-network attacks?

13.13 Has the level of risk been Reference: Physical Security Unknown without a
identified and Assessment for the Department of more detailed on-site
Veterans Affairs Facilities assessment.
communicated in the
security plan through the
performance of a physical
security assessment?

13.14 When was the last security Reference: DOC CIAO Unknown without a
assessment performed? Vulnerability Assessment more detailed on-site
Framework 1.1 assessment.

Who performed the

security risk assessment?

13.15 Were the following areas This process is the input to the Unknown without a
of security analysis building design and what more detailed on-site
mitigation measures will be assessment.
addressed in the security included in the facility project to
master plan: reduce risk and increase safety of
the building and people.
Asset Analysis: Does the Reference: USA TM 5-853,
security plan identify and Security Engineering
prioritize the assets to be
protected in accordance to
their location, control,
current value, and

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Unit IX: Building Design Guidance

replacement value?

Threat Analysis: Does the

security plan address
potential threats; causes of
potential harm in the form
of death, injury,
destruction, disclosure,
interruption of operations,
or denial of services?
(possible criminal acts
(documented and review
of police/security incident
reports) associated with
forced entry, bombs,
ballistic assault,
biochemical and related
terrorist tactics, attacks
against utility systems
infrastructure and
buildings)

Vulnerability Analysis:
Does the security plan
address other areas and
anything else associated
with a site or building and
its operations that can be
taken advantage of to
carry out a threat?
(architectural design and
construction of new and
existing buildings,
technological support
systems (e.g. heating, air
conditioning, power,
lighting and security
systems, etc.) and
operational procedures,
policies and controls)

Risk Analysis: Does the

security plan address the
findings from the asset,
threat, and vulnerability

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analyses to develop,
recommend and consider
implementation of
appropriate security
countermeasures?

Building Design Mitigation Measures

Asset- Current Suggested Mitigation Measure Revised

Threat/Hazard Risk Risk
Pair Rating Rating

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Unit X: Electronic Security Systems

Unit X

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security

UNIT TITLE Electronic Security Systems

OBJECTIVES 1. Use the assessment process to identify electronic security system

requirements that are needed to mitigate vulnerabilities
2. Describe the electronic security system concepts and practices that
warrant special attention to enhance public safety
3. Explain the basic concepts of electronic security system
components, their capabilities, and their interaction with other
systems
4. Justify selection of electronic security systems to mitigate
vulnerabilities

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit:

1. Control centers and building management systems

2. Perimeter layout and zoning of sensors
3. Intrusion detection systems and sensor technologies
4. Entry-control systems and electronic entry control technologies
5. Closed circuit television and data-transmission media
6. Definitions of the degree of security and control

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist

Attacks Against Buildings, pages 3-47 to 3-50; Appendix D; and
Security Systems and Security Master Plan sections of Checklist at
end of Chapter 1 (pages 1-81 and 1-92)
2. Case Study – Hazardville Information Company

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Unit X: Electronic Security Systems

UNIT X CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:

ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEMS

In this Unit, the emphasis will be upon the various components and technology available for use
in electronic security systems. The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA
426 can be used as a screening tool for preliminary building design vulnerability assessment.

Requirement

Refer to the HIC case study and to the GIS portfolio to determine answers to the questions. Then
review results to identify vulnerabilities and possible mitigation measures.

1. Complete the following components of the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist that
address security systems

2. Upon completion of these portions of the checklist, refer back to the risk ratings determined
in Unit VI Case Study Activity and, based on this detailed analysis, decide if the rating is
accurate.

3. Select mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and associated risk from security system
design.

4. Estimate the new risk ratings for high risk asset-threat pairs based on the recommended
mitigation measures.

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

12.1 Are black/white or color
CCTV (closed circuit Security technology is frequently CCTV systems are used in
television) cameras used? considered to complement or the back parking area,
supplement security personnel including the loading dock
forces and to provide a wider area area. The HIC security
Are they monitored and
of coverage. Typically, these officer monitors the
recorded 24 hours/7 days a physical security elements provide cameras from his desk.
week? By whom? the first line of defense in deterring, There is a VHS recorder.
detecting, and responding to threats It is an older generation
Are they analog or digital and reducing vulnerabilities. They analog system.
by design? must be viewed as an integral
component of the overall security
What are the number of program. Their design, engineering,
fixed, wireless and pan-tilt- installation, operation, and
zoom cameras used? management must be able to meet
daily security challenges from a
cost-effective and efficiency Unknown without a more
Who are the manufacturers perspective. During and after an detailed on-site
of the CCTV cameras? incident, the system, or its backups, assessment.
should be functional per the planned
What is the age of the design.
CCTV cameras in use?

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Unit X: Electronic Security Systems

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

Consider color CCTV cameras to

view and record activity at the
perimeter of the building,
particularly at primary entrances
and exits. A mix of monochrome
cameras should be considered for
areas that lack adequate illumination
for color cameras.
Reference: GSA PBS P-100
12.2 Are the cameras Unknown without a more
programmed to respond detailed on-site
automatically to perimeter assessment.
building alarm events?

Do they have built-in video

motion capabilities?
12.3 What type of camera
housings are used and are
they environmental in
design to protect against
exposure to heat and cold
weather elements?
12.4 Are panic/duress alarm
buttons or sensors used,
where are they located, and
are they hardwired or
portable?
12.5 Are intercom call boxes
used in parking areas or
along the building
perimeter?
12.6 What is the transmission
media used to transmit
camera video signals: fiber,
wire line, telephone wire,
coaxial, wireless?
12.7 Who monitors the CCTV
system?
12.8 What is the quality of video
images both during the day
and hours of darkness?

Are infrared camera

illuminators used?
12.9 Are the perimeter cameras
supported by an
uninterruptible power
supply, battery, or building

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Unit X: Electronic Security Systems

Section Vulnerability Questions Guidance Observations

emergency power?
12.10 What type of exterior
Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) sensors are used?
(electromagnetic; fiber
optic; active infrared;
bistatic microwave;
seismic; photoelectric;
ground; fence; glass break
(vibration/shock); single,
double, and roll-up door
magnetic contacts or
switches)
12.11 Is a global positioning
satellite system (GPS) used
to monitor vehicles and
asset movements?

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Unit X: Electronic Security Systems

Security System Mitigation Measures

Asset-Threat/Hazard Current Risk Suggested Mitigation Revised Risk

Pair Rating Measure Rating

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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit XI: Case Study

Unit XI

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security

UNIT TITLE Case Study

OBJECTIVES 1. Explain building security design issues to a building owner for

consideration prior to a renovation or new construction.
2. Explain the identification process to arrive at the high risk asset –
threat/hazard pairs.
3. Justify the recommended mitigation measures, explaining the
benefits in reducing the risk for the high risk situations of interest.

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit:

1. Activity: Preparation and presentation of the top three risks

identified by the group, the vulnerabilities identified for these risks,
and top three recommended mitigation measures to reduce
vulnerability and risk. The top three risks will be prioritized as well
as the top three recommended mitigation measures with rationale
and justification.

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist

Attacks Against Buildings
2. Case Study – Hazardville Information Company

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Unit XI: Case Study

UNIT XI CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:

FINALIZATION AND PRESENTATION OF GROUP RESULTS

In this activity, students work with their groups to finalize their assessments, decide on
high priority risk concerns, determine appropriate mitigation measures and present
findings to the class.

Requirement

1. Based on findings from the previous activities completed in the previous ten units,
complete the following table.

2. Be prepared to present conclusions and to justify decisions to the class in a 5-7 minute
presentation.

Prioritized Asset- Requirements to Mitigate Rationale

Threat/Hazard Pair

Car Bomb Blast/Site and Protect front entrance from DoD Standard 1
Building car bomb blast – 82-foot
stand-off DoD Standard 6

Use planters, plinth walls, DoD Standard 8

landscaping

FRF film on windows or

replace with laminated glass

Consider closing in overhang

area

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Unit XI: Case Study

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Unit XI: Case Study

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Unit XI: Case Study

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Appendix A: Case Study

APPENDIX A: CASE STUDY

HAZARDVILLE INFORMATION COMPANY (HIC)

INTRODUCTION

The Hazardville Information Company (HIC) is a state-of-the art information technology (IT)
services company located in a major metropolitan city in a typical suburban business office park.
The company’s mission is to provide information technology and services support to include
hosting servers, databases, applications, and other hardware and software; develop, install, and
maintain software applications; provide field support IT technicians; and provide 24-hour help
desk support.

Figure 1. Hazardville Information Company (HIC)

The Hazardville Information Company has over 20 clients and supports approximately 1,000
users and 100 applications as a primary data center and as a disaster recovery backup site. HIC
clients include local and regional government offices and commercial entities. Many clients
depend on HIC’s ability to provide real time IT support, on a 24 x 7 basis. Others rely on the
company’s IT backup services. Major clients and support contracts include:

• Fortune 500 companies

• National and regional banks and credit unions
• A major airline
• Large prime defense contractors
• Government agencies, including one classified client

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Appendix A: Case Study

HIC is certified to provide IT support and storage to government clients at Top Secret levels,
using dedicated classified equipment and networks. HIC’s technology ranges from leading edge
mainframe and desktop computers and optical mass storage devices to wired and wireless
networks. HIC has over 130 employees and approximately 80 to 100 employees are in the
building at any given time.

The Hazardville Information Company has a number of key staff that support the various
projects. The president, chief executive officer, security officer, and several division managers
possess high level government security clearances. Approximately half of the technical staff hold
mid-level government security clearances. All company employees sign confidentiality
agreements for the commercial clients and have access to a number of company’s proprietary
data. The IT division manager and his staff of database administrators have full administrative
privileges on all systems. The company has a robust recall system and staff notification process
in the event of an emergency and/or surge support requirement.

The HIC building is strategically located near many of HIC’s clients and management does not
want to move from the facility or location.

GENERAL SITE DATA

The Hazardville Information Company is located approximately 15 miles outside of a major

urban city in the suburbs, and adjacent to a major interstate highway. There are several
commercial iconic properties, one military installation, and several government offices within a
5-mile radius of the HIC building.

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Figure 2. HIC Corporate Business Park 5-Mile Radius

The office building is part of a corporate business park. HIC does not control the front parking
area, signage, or other general site conditions such as stormwater drainage, lighting, or vehicle
and pedestrian traffic flow and movement. Front parking spots are approximately 44 feet from
the main HIC lobby entrance. The business park is responsible for grounds maintenance,
including cutting the grass, planting flowers, trimming trees, sweeping the parking lot, and
towing unauthorized vehicles. Trash service is the responsibility of tenants. HIC has a large
dumpster located at the rear of the loading dock area approximately 50 feet from the building.
HIC receives the mail and packages at the front office lobby desk. Large packages and
equipment are delivered to the rear loading dock. HIC does not have a separate mail room, but
does have an internal administrative space with copiers, printers, supplies, and staff mailboxes.
The front desk receptionist is responsible for sorting and screening all mail.

The business park is adjacent to a major interstate highway and there are a number of storage
tanks, manufacturing and production facilities, and other commercial properties across the
interstate.

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Figure 3. HIC Business Park Perimeter and Surrounding Buildings

The HIC office space has client and staff parking in the front and a rear parking and loading
dock area for supply trucks, vendors, and trash.

The front parking area is unrestricted, but the back parking area is fully enclosed with chain link
fencing on the perimeter of the property. There is no gate or means to prevent vehicles from
transiting around the rear of the business park.

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Figure 4. HIC Office Location

There are a significant number of hazardous waste sites in near proximity to the HIC building.
The vast majority are small generators such as gas stations, dry cleaning, and other commercial
businesses. Large generators include the petroleum storage and production facility located across
the interstate.

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Figure 5. HAZMAT Sites Near the HIC Building

The prevailing weather pattern in the summer and fall is from the south Atlantic and the Gulf
of Mexico. Warm, moist air brings thunderstorms and higher humidity. In the fall, cooler air
from the north and west returns. Winter weather blasts across the state from the northern or
central part of the continent. With no other weather activity, the prevailing wind is normally
from the west-northwest.

The local emergency response capabilities include primary police, fire, and medical facilities
approximately 8 to 10 miles away. There are multiple means of ingress and egress to the HIC
building complex and the site is served by fire mains with a hydrant located approximately 200
feet from the HIC office.

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Figure 6. Emergency Response Capability Near the HIC Building

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Figure 7. HIC Functions and Building Layout

The nominal range to effects chart radius of influence of a small car bomb detonation at the front
entrance indicates that the building would experience significant damage, but likely not suffer
progressive collapse. The front façade of the building is approximately 75 percent annealed glass
and has an 8-foot overhang. The terrain slopes upward from the parking lot to the main entrance,
and is landscaped with flower beds and trees. Key staff would probably be killed and
administrative functions destroyed, but the Computer Center and Communications functions
would likely survive relatively intact.

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Figure 8. Car Bomb Blast Effects (Front Entrance Parking)

A truck bomb detonation on the interstate would also significantly damage the HIC building,
primarily glass breakage and potentially some structural damage. If the truck bomb were to
detonate near the tank farm, the ensuing explosion, fire, and plume would have significant
impact on the HIC building.

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Figure 9. Truck Bomb Blast Effects (Interstate Highway)

A truck bomb detonation at the rear of the HIC building at the loading dock would result in
significant structural damage and potentially progressive collapse. The Computer Center,
Communications, and other critical functions would be destroyed. Critical infrastructure that
would be destroyed includes the mechanical/electrical room.

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Figure 10. Truck Bomb Blast Effects (Loading Dock)

BUILDING DATA

The HIC Headquarters building was built in the 1980s using conventional construction
techniques. The building has a 22,000-square foot main floor for offices and computers, and a
3,300-square foot executive mezzanine (a second floor over the front part of the office).

Occupancy B, S-1
Construction Type 2C
No. of Floors 1 floor and mezzanine, high bay in rear
High Rise Code No
Fire Suppression Fully sprinklered, wet pipe
Floor Area
First Floor 19,157 SF
Mezzanine 3,380 SF
Total 22,537 SF
Number of Exits 6
Exits from Mezzanine 3
Occupancy Load
First Floor 102 occupants
Mezzanine 31 occupants

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Area Separation No
Fire Alarm System No
Monitored Sprinkler Yes
Fence 4 feet high, rear only, to keep people from falling into a valley

Applicable Codes
Building 1996 BOCA National Building Code
w/ 2000 VUSBC amendments
Electric 1996 VUSBC, 1996 NEC
Plumbing 1995 IPC w/1996 supplement
Mechanical 1996 International Mechanical Code
Fire 1996 BOCA National Fire Prevention Code
Accessible 1996 BOCA, 1992 CABO/ANSI 117.1

BOCA - Building Officials and Code Administrators International, Inc

USBC – Uniform Statewide Building Code
NEC – National Electric Code
IPC - International Plumbing
CABO/ANSI 117.1 – Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards

BUILDING STRUCTURE

The walls are made of concrete masonry units (CMUs) with a brick veneer on the outside. Steel
framework supports the structure, and exposed columns are enclosed in gypsum wallboard. The
roof is a metal deck with gravel on top and insulation underneath. It is slightly angled to allow
water to drain. The roof overhangs the front entrance by 8 feet. This provides a covered area for
employees to stay dry on rainy days. Cylindrical columns support the overhang.

Windows are double glazed, ¼-inch thick annealed glass.

With a loading dock on the west side, it is possible for vehicles to park right next to the building.
Normal parking for employees is in front; the closest row is 44 feet from the front door.

The company does not have a mailroom; incoming mail is normally processed by the receptionist
just inside the front door. Large packages shipped to the company (computers, etc.) are delivered
to the loading dock in the rear and handled by the Computer Center staff.

MECHANICAL SYSTEMS

Heating for the HIC building is provided by a combination of natural gas and electricity. This
provides a regulated environment for the sensitive computer and communications equipment,
and a comfortable environment for employees.

The main heater sends hot air into the heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) room,
next to the mechanical and electrical (M&E) room. From here it is distributed throughout the
building. Offices, restrooms and the employee’s lounge are directly heated by this warm air. The

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Computer Center and the Communications Center use Digital Environmental Managers (DEMs)
to direct the warm air where it is needed, add or remove humidity from the air, or even cool
some areas while warming others.

The air used to heat or cool the HIC Headquarters building is filtered in the HVAC room using
standard industrial grade MERV 8 filters. Outside make-up air is brought in through a vent in the
wall located approximately 10 feet above ground level. The vent is alarmed to prevent intruder
access. A screened exhaust duct is on the roof. Airflow throughout the building is through a
series of ducts hidden in the ceiling of each area. The ducts are divided in half to allow them to
serve as supply and return headers. The divider is insulated to minimize heat transfer from one
side to the other.

The Computer Data Center has two additional air cooling units located in the data center and
uses the main chill water supply. The Data Center maintains a slight net positive pressure
compared to the main office areas.

Figure 11. HVAC Supply

The return air for the main office space has sufficient room inside the ductwork and mechanical
room area to incorporate additional filters and equipment.

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Figure 12. HVAC Return

Cooling (or heat removal) is done by two chillers in the M&E room. Three Trane 100-ton
chillers are available; normally only two are needed to cover all heat loads. The chillers remove
heat from the chilled water system, and use the condenser water system to send the waste heat to
two rooftop cooling towers. The chilled water is then routed from the chillers to air handlers for
the majority of the building; cooling for the Computer Center and the Communications Center is
done by directing chilled water to the DEMs. Chiller operation along with chilled water and
condenser water flow are managed from a single control unit in the M&E room. A single chilled
water pump provides adequate flow for all cooling situations; a backup pump is available at the
push of a button. The same is true for the condenser water pumps.

The air intake is exposed and of typical louver construction.

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Figure 13. Air Intake

Figure 14. Chilled Water System

The DEMs in the Computer Center and the Communications Center use airflow to transfer heat
from electronic equipment to the chilled water, and return cool air to the equipment. Humidity is
raised or lowered as necessary for each area of the room. The DEMs operate without the need for
frequent monitoring by technicians; parameters and flowrates are controlled from a central
station based on the needs of individual pieces of equipment.

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Natural gas enters the building through two meters under the loading dock staircase and goes
through the overhead to the M&E room at the building’s southwest corner. Branches split off for
two gas powered space heaters in the high-bay area by the loading dock. The main gas line goes
to the main heater in the M&E room.

Figure 15. Loading Dock Area Figure 16. Gas Meters Under Stairs

The chillers, pumps, cooling towers, fans, etc., are all powered from the Support Bus (SB). The
DEMs and all of the building thermostats receive power from the Computer Center Bus (CCB).

Fire Protection and Life Safety

A key concern for HIC is fire. The building has been designed to meet the latest National Fire
Prevention and Life Safety Codes. Sprinklers are located throughout the building, along with
hand-held portable fire extinguishers. There are six exits that can be used for evacuation.

The fire protection and life safety systems consist of a “wet-pipe” single stage sprinkler system
throughout the building, ceiling mounted automatic fire and smoke detectors connected to the
central business park fire enunciator panel located in the next building and HVAC fire and
smoke dampers in the M&E room air handling unit (AHU). There are no manual fire pulls, and
the sprinkler system header is continuously pressurized, with water being held back by the
temperature actuated valve on the sprinkler head. Each sprinkler head is individually activated by
heat; any valve reaching 130º F would open. This system would allow a kitchen or office space
fire to be extinguished, without unnecessarily dousing critical computer equipment with water.
However, the sprinkler heads are exposed in the overhead of each room, and can be accidentally
activated if bumped by a ladder, pole, etc. None of the ingress or egress doors have the new
generation illuminating markings, only the standard door or ceiling mounted exit signs and
emergency lighting. Should a fire occur, other than the fire detector flashing lights, there is not a
mass notification system.

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Figure 17. Sprinkler Head

There are 20 hand-held dry chemical fire extinguishers located throughout the building, 5 on the
mezzanine level, and 15 on the first floor. Filled with monoammonium phosphate under
approximately 200-250 pounds pressure, these extinguishers are designed to combat Class A, B
and C fires. The fire extinguishers are visually inspected to make sure pressure is in the
allowable band on a monthly basis by a local company.

The Computer Center and the Communications Center are equipped like the rest of the building.
HIC has a long-term plan to install a clean agent extinguishing system in the electronic spaces,
but construction has not started.

The Security Officer maintains the fire evacuation and response plan, has posted fire evacuation
routes in key office hallways and break areas, and has a key to the building that has the main fire
panel. The main fire panel is located in the lobby area, which is open to unrestricted access
during normal business hours. In the event of a fire, the panel alerts the local fire department and
the security company.

ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS

Main power for the HIC office is provided by Hazardville Electric Power Company through two
transformers outside the building. Two sets of buried transmission lines deliver 12,470 volt
(12.47KV) power to the building from a nearby substation.

The two 12.47KV feeders lead to two separate transformers outside the building, one near the
north side, and the other near the south side. The two “mini-mite” pad-mounted transformers are
rated at 2500KVA, and they reduce the 12.47KV power to 480/277 volts for distribution around
the building.

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Figure 18. One of Two Transformers

Both transformers are continuously on line, and feed separate loads. Neither is loaded above 50
percent, and a tie breaker allows either transformer to support all building loads, except during
the peak cooling months when three chillers are operating.

Backup power for HIC is provided by a single diesel generator, located in a shed in the rear
parking lot. Specs for this Detroit Diesel Model 1250DS-4 Spectrum unit follow:

Model 12V4000 Engine Model 7M4052 Generator

4-Cycle Voltage 480/277 VAC

Turbocharged, Intercooled 3 Phase/60 Hz
V-12 Cylinder Configuration 1250KW/1563KVA
2975 Cubic Inch Displacement 1879 Amps
1800 RPM Sustained Short Circuit Current up to
Max Power 1380 KW/1850 BHP 300 Percent of Rated for 10 Seconds
Exhaust Temperature 402º C/755º F Brushless, Rotating-Field
Water Cooled, Electric Start Pilot Excited
319 GPH Fuel Flow at 100 Percent Load
240 GPH Fuel Flow at 75 Percent Load 1 Year Limited Warranty
165 GPH Fuel Flow at 50 Percent Load

The backup generator is equipped with a 50-gallon day tank, normally kept at least 80 percent
full. The day tank draws fuel from a 2,000-gallon main fuel tank, buried under the parking lot
near the diesel generator shed. A small electric pump is used to fill the day tank when necessary.

The day tank’s level is measured using a sightglass. The level of the main fuel tank is measured
with a probe each quarter by a visiting Detroit Diesel representative, who also starts the engine to
run unloaded for about 20 minutes. Fuel is delivered by a local contractor, who normally
responds the day after being called.

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The diesel generator is configured to automatically start upon loss of commercial power to the
CCB. This happens about twice a year due to electrical storms or utility maintenance in the
neighborhood. An automatic bus transfer switch aligns the generator to the CCB as soon as the
generator is ready to support the bus loads. This normally takes less than 5 seconds. In addition,
a manually operated tie breaker is available to supply backup power to the SB via the CCB;
however, the SB cannot receive backup power by itself. The backup diesel generator has never
had to support HIC’s power demands for longer than about 2 hours, and never with more than
one chiller operating. It has never been tested for an extended period under heavy load.

An uninterruptible power supply (UPS) is located inside the building’s “high-bay” area. Rated at
1000KVA, it is designed to support all loads on the CCB for up to 60 minutes. The diesel
generator has never taken more than 30 seconds to start and assume the bus loads. If the diesel
generator did not start on a loss of commercial power, 60 minutes would be ample time for HIC
personnel to conduct an orderly shutdown of Computer Center equipment.

The batteries to support the UPS are in a small room next to the UPS room. The only
instrumentation in the room is a thermometer. The 50 lead-acid batteries are inspected semi-
annually by the manufacturer’s representative. A capacity test discharge was conducted when the
batteries were installed 2 years ago. The 60-minute endurance was calculated from that test.

HIC’s electrical loads are divided between two main electrical buses, the CCB and the SB. They
are located in separate “closets” of the building. A tie breaker allows the buses to be connected,
so they can be powered by a single main transformer, or to allow SB loads to be carried by the
backup diesel generator. The system is monitored by a digital energy management system, which
provides indications, alarms, and instructions.

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Figure 19. Electrical “One-Line” Diagram

Typical of many commercial office buildings, the mechanical and electrical systems share
common utility penetrations and floor space. There are no redundant utility feeds to the building
from different directions.

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Figure 20. Mechanical and Electrical Room

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

The Computer Center is the heart of HIC’s operations. The rest of HIC exists to support the
Computer Center.

Hardware

The Computer Center is composed of several interconnected systems and one independent
system for classified data processing. The systems run VMS, Unix, or Windows. Although the
equipment list changes almost monthly as systems are upgraded and new clients’ needs are being
met, as of April 2003, the computers included the following:

• One 4-processor Silicon Graphics Power Challenge

• Three dual-processor Silicon Graphics Origin 200 servers
• One dual-processor Silicon Graphics Octane
• Five Microway Dec Alpha 500 MHz systems (four Unix, one VMS)
• Three DEC Alpha 600 5/266 systems
• Two IBM RISC 6000/560 systems with 160 and 128 Megabytes (MB) of memory
• One Stardent 3000 with 128 MB of memory, triple scalar & vector processors

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• One DEC Alpha-based (RISC) Model 3000/400 VMS workstation

• One DEC Vaxstation 4000/90 system with 128 MB of memory
• Sixteen Windows based workstations

Figure 21. Computer Center

All computers have access to large-capacity disk storage units, with shared mounting of major
disk units throughout the complex. The VMS systems are configured as a Vax cluster; the Unix
systems have common user accounts and files. The major systems are reachable from throughout
the center and also through an Ethernet. The networks interface to the company-wide network
and through it to the Internet.

Because some customers rely on HIC to support their data storage needs, the Computer Center
also contains a massive data storage “jukebox.” A StoreAll Model 5500 provides fully automated
storage, using robot arms to provide rapid retrieval. Its capabilities include:

• 3.0 Terabyte Total Capacity

• 2.5 Megabyte Per Second (MBps) Transfer Rate
• 500 CD Per Hour Change Rate
• 10,000 CD Storage Rack

Client data is backed up as requested by the clients, as frequently as once per day. The Back-O-
Matic digital backup system manages the backup process, selecting which data are backed up on
which day. All backups are done to CD; these are stored in the StoreAll Model 5500. HIC
maintains an off-site storage location for clients that require backup data to be stored at a
separate site. Classified backup data for certain government clients are stored in a special
fireproof safe in the Secure Space.

Backup procedures for HIC’s computer operating systems, digital telephones and other company
systems are similar as for their clients. Most of HIC’s computer systems can be used to backup
another system. For those systems without in-house backups, replacement sources are identified.
In most cases, replacement hardware can be delivered and setup within 2 days.

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COMMUNICATIONS

Data

HIC has two T1 lines and one T3 line connected at the demark to ATT’s high performance
backbone network. The ATT fiber connectivity provides more than enough bandwidth for HIC’s
current needs and planned future expansion.

Telecom and Network Connections

• Two T1 lines (1.544 MBps)

• One T3 (45 MBps)
• Frame Relay
• Narrowband ISDN (64/128 KBps)

Figure 22. Telecom and Network Connections

Figure 23. Telecom and Network Connections

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The Cisco powered network features multiple 7500 VXR+ routers. Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP) reroutes traffic between the routers and to the Internet. A variety of switches in the
Communications Center and at client sites are used to ensure connectivity. Some clients use Hot
Standby Routing Protocol (HSRP), which provides additional redundancy.

A variety of firewalls and other security systems are in place to protect the company and its
clients. The firewall solution is based on the Cisco PIX to provide highly resilient firewall
protection. Other security systems include reporting and analysis tools and network detection
devices, which help protect the company’s computers from hacking.

Communications to support HIC’s classified government clients cannot be discussed in detail.

Nevertheless, they used leased lines for point-to-point connectivity, and they are robust, with
diversity and redundancy built in.

Voice

Although HIC does not provide voice communications services to customers, the need to
communicate with them quickly and reliably is important. Therefore, the company has invested
in NEC DS2000 telephone systems, which come with 8-slot cabinets that can handle 32 lines
from 48 stations. The system’s digital processor provides reliability, speed, and features to keep
HIC staff members in touch with their customers.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

Much of the company’s guidance for security comes from the National Industrial Security
Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), the government’s guide to protecting contractor
facilities. The NISPOM is promulgated by the Defense Security Service (DSS) and is available
on the World Wide Web at: [Link]

HIC’s Security Officer uses a layered approach to physical security. The outermost physical
security layer is provided by a contract security firm and the Defense Protective Service (DPS).

The contract security firm periodically patrols the parking lots in marked vehicles. The security
officers are not armed, but they carry cellular phones to contact the local police. These officers
do not have security clearances, and are not allowed to enter the HIC Headquarters if no
employees are present.

The DPS officers patrol the entire National Capital Region (NCR) and are tasked to respond to
emergencies at Defense Department or contractor facilities. DPS officers are armed and have law
enforcement authority. They are allowed to enter the HIC building, but normally do not as part of
their rounds.

The parking lot behind the HIC office is well lit and monitored by older generation analog
CCTV cameras using telephone wires that are connected to video displays in the HIC Security
Officer’s office and recorded on standard VHS tape. The CCTVs are commercial grade black

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and white with a 180-degree field of view that the security officer can control via the display
panel. The front parking lot is lit, but not monitored.

HIC’s middle layer of security is the building envelope. The building is monitored by door and
window alarms, which connect to ADT, the nationwide alarm company. Unauthorized opening
of any door or window will immediately notify ADT via telephone. ADT will normally call the
HIC Security Office prior to contacting the police and DPS. HIC employees have proximity
cards to allow them to enter the front and loading dock doors without activating the alarm.

Figure 24. Proximity Cards Readers and Alarms

Figure 25. Security Lighting

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Figure 26. Electronic Badge Reader

Figure 27. Motion Detector

The innermost layer of physical security involves the Computer Center and the Communications
Center. Equipped with locked doors, these two rooms meet the government’s requirements for
handling classified material. Only authorized employees possess the necessary proximity cards
and PINs to gain access. Unauthorized access to either space will sound sirens, flash lights, and
notify the HIC Security Officer and DPS. The access doors are not manned or monitored with
cameras. The crawl spaces created by the raised floor in the Computer Center are barricaded by a
wire fence in the three locations where it can be accessed from other parts of the building.

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EMERGENCY RESPONSE

In the event of an emergency, HIC senior management use the large conference room as an
Emergency Operations Center. The room is equipped with network and telephone connections
and cell phones are able to receive a signal.

Figure 28. Large Conference Room, Emergency Operations

The nearest fire station is approximately 2½ miles north of the HIC Headquarters. Seven other
fire stations are within 5 miles of the site. Firefighters are trained as Emergency Medical
Technicians (EMTs) and Hazardous Material Technicians. Many are also skilled in technical
rescue (high places, confined spaces, etc.). Ambulances are also dispatched from these stations.
Emergency response time for emergencies is estimated to be 8-10 minutes. Fire hydrants are
available in the office park.

The nearest hospital with an emergency room is 5 miles away. Other emergency response
information includes:

• Exit signs: Located above each exit.

• Battery operated emergency lights: Strategically placed throughout the building.
• Emergency exits: Normally closed and locked doors have “panic bars” for use in
emergencies.
• Announcing system: The telephone system has a building-wide announcing feature that
can be activated by pressing one button at any phone.
• Evacuation plan and escape ladders for the mezzanine: None.
• Emergency stairway: Located far from main stairs.

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NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS

Natural Disasters Hazards

The county’s Local Emergency Planning Committee provided the following information
regarding natural disasters:

• The state experiences an average of 7 tornadoes/hurricanes per year.

• The area’s earthquake risk is 1 (Scale 0-4).
• The state experiences 80-100 days per year with one or more lightning strikes.

Technological Disasters Hazards

HIC is surrounded by a number of commercial activities and key national critical infrastructure
to include HAZMAT facilities, HAZMAT being transported on the roads and rails, a nearby fuel
tank farm, and an airport.

Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Facilities

There are two large manufacturing plants with large quantities of hazardous materials stored on
site within 2 miles of the HIC Headquarters, one to the north and the other to the southwest. In
addition, there are more than a dozen Tier II HAZMAT Facilities within 3 miles of the building
(in all directions).

The prevailing weather pattern for the area in the summer and fall is from the south Atlantic and
the Gulf of Mexico. Warm, moist air brings thunderstorms and higher humidity. In the fall,
cooler air from the north and west returns. Winter weather blasts across the state from the
northern or central part of the continent. With no other weather activity, the prevailing wind is
normally from the south in the Summer and from the north-northwest in the Winter.

None of the nearby facilities were contacted during this analysis. There is no information
available regarding accidents or incidents involving these facilities.

Highway Movement of Hazardous Material (HAZMAT)

A major interstate highway is located within ¼ mile of the HIC Headquarters. Approximately
5,000 trucks per day pass the HIC office on the nearby interstate highway. About 30 percent of
these trucks (1,500 trucks/day) carry placards indicating that HAZMAT is aboard, but only about
5 percent (250 trucks/day) carry sufficient HAZMAT to warrant placarding.

Approximately 50 percent of the HAZMAT passing the HIC office is Class 3 (flammable and
combustible liquids). Class 2 (gases) and Class 8 (corrosives) each constitute about 15 percent.
Approximately 10 percent of the trucks carry more than one class of HAZMAT.

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Figure 29. HAZMAT Truck on Interstate Highway

The State Police Department inspects 5-10 percent of the HAZMAT carrying trucks on interstate
highways.

Approximately 476 incidents involving the transportation of HAZMAT occur each year in the
county in which HIC is located. Most of these involve flammable gas and liquids. Only one
HAZMAT incident took place on a highway within 2 miles of HIC in the period 1995 to 2002.

Rail Movement of Hazardous Material

CSX Transportation and Norfolk-Southern Railway maintain a transportation corridor

approximately ½ mile from HIC. There appear to be no restrictions on the material carried along
these rail lines. Neither company was available for interviews.

Nevertheless, rail traffic has been informally monitored in this area. It is estimated that
approximately 10,000 railcars of HAZMAT move through this area each year. Hazardous
materials range from liquid petroleum products to chlorine to anhydrous ammonia.

There are no recent records of any HAZMAT spills or incidents involving rail transportation in
the county in which HIC is located.

Liquid Fuels

A leg of the Piedmont Petroleum Pipeline (PPP) runs underneath the office park in the vicinity of
HIC Headquarters. Part of Piedmont’s regional network, this portion of the pipeline normally
carries a variety of refined products, including commercial and military jet fuels, diesel and three
grades of gasoline, home heating fuels, etc. Four buried pipes carry approximately 20 million
gallons per day.

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There is no available information regarding any pipeline ruptures or incidents in the vicinity of
HIC.

Connected to the pipeline, less than 1 mile from HIC, is a 20-million gallon capacity fuel farm.
Operated by the Shellexxico Company, this tank farm stores a variety of petroleum products,
primarily gasoline. Although representatives of Shellexxico were unavailable for an interview,
their operations appear to conform to industry standards. Thirteen tank trucks were observed
leaving the tank farm in a 1- hour period, indicating a calculated movement rate of
approximately 300 trucks per day (about 3 million gallons of fuel).

Figure 30. Shellexxico Tank Farm

Based on terrain elevation data, the ground level of the tank farm is 6 feet higher than the ground
level at HIC. Only some of the fuel tanks are bermed, but leaking fuel is not likely to reach
HIC’s office park; the interstate highway between the two is 10 feet lower than the tank farm.

Air Traffic

Two airports are in the vicinity of HIC. One is a major international airport approximately 8
miles away. The other is a small, but busy general aviation airport less than 2 miles away. The
office park in which HIC is located is in direct line with one of the approach and departure paths
of this regional airport.

The website for the regional airport indicates it is capable of handling business jets, providing jet
fuel and high octane aviation gasoline and other services.

The airport is tower controlled and handles approximately 100,000 flights per year.

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THREAT ANALYSIS

The following information was obtained from the regional office of the FBI and the State Police:

Terrorist Threat

Since September 11, 2001, the terrorist threat in the area has been Yellow or Orange. Yellow has
been the norm, except for the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks and during the recent war in Iraq.

Yellow Definition: Elevated risk of terrorist attack, but a specific region of the United States or
target has not been identified

Orange Definition: Credible intelligence indicates that there is a high risk of a local terrorist
attack, but a specific target has not been identified.

The elevated and high threat condition is not due to any specific information or threat to the area
in which the HIC office is located, but rather due to the proximity to the metropolitan area,
nearby military installations, etc.

There is no known threat to HIC Incorporated, any of its officers or employees. There are no
known threats to any of the companies within the office park. Nearby commercial entities that
are likely terrorist targets include the Shellexxico tank farm, two rail lines, the busy interstate
highway, and the transformer substation.

Although HIC is probably not a primary target, there is a military installation within 10 miles,
two large prime contractors and one federal agency office in the business park, and potential
collateral damage or targeting of HIC as an alternate if those organizations are targeted and
attacked.

Intelligence Threat

The HIC Security Officer maintains close coordination with government security officers and
law enforcement agents as part of his normal duties. All HIC employees hold security clearances,
Secret or higher. This makes them targets for foreign intelligence services. Although there has
been no known case of an HIC employee being approached by a foreign intelligence agent, this
is certainly a possibility. The company follows counterintelligence guidance and procedures
from the Defense Security Service (DSS) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) regarding:

• Risk management of classified programs in industry

• Threat awareness
• Deterrence of illegal technology transfers
• Facilitating the prevention of economic espionage in defense contractor facilities

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Criminal Threat

Gangs and Drugs

There are several gangs operating in the metropolitan area and they have been responsible for a
number of gang related murders. Drug activity continues to be a problem in the metropolitan
area, but less so in the suburbs. There has not been any gang or drug activity near the HIC
building.

Violent Crime

The 2002 Crime Index, which is composed of murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft, was relatively unchanged from 2001 figures. In
2002, a woman waiting at a bus stop near HIC’s office complex was assaulted; there have been
no other reported crimes in the “neighborhood.”

Year 2000 Area Crime Comparison (Rates per 100,000 population)

Crime County State United States

Murder 1.30 5.7 5.5

Rape 10.74 22.8 32.0

Robbery 41.32 88.9 144.9

Aggravated Assault 40.02 164.3 323.6

Burglary 155.95 429.9 728.4

Larceny 1950.84 2064.8 2457.3

Vehicle Theft 197.27 251.6 414.2

Other Crimes: Employee Fraud and Identity Theft have become a growing problem in the state
in which HIC is located. County crime statistics indicate these problems are prevalent nearby,
and a nearby business lost $11,000 to “trusted employees” in 2001, but there have been no
indications of such problems at HIC.

DESIGN BASIS THREAT

The senior management of HIC reviewed the site, building, and threat information collected, and
determined the Design Basis Threat to be:

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Explosive Blast: Car Bomb - approximately 250 lb. TNT equivalent. Truck Bomb -
approximately 5,000 lb. TNT equivalent (Murrah Federal Building class weapon)

Chemical: Large quantity gasoline spill and toxic plume from the adjacent tank farm, small
quantity (tanker truck and rail car size) spills of HAZMAT materials (chlorine).

Biological: Anthrax delivered by mail or in packages, smallpox distributed by spray mechanism

mounted on truck or aircraft around metropolitan area.

Radiological: Small “dirty” bomb detonation within the 10-mile radius of the HIC building.

Criminal Activity/Armed Attack: High powered rifle or handgun exterior shooting (sniper
attack or direct assault on key staff, damage to infrastructure [i.e., transformers, chillers, etc.]).

Cyber Attack: Focus on IT and building systems infrastructure (SCADA, alarms, etc.)
accessible via internet access. Computer Data Center and Communications Center supporting
infrastructure (e.g., firewalls, routers, main distribution rooms, backup tapes storage, etc.)
location, redundancy, and power supply meet NIST and industry standards for physical access
and protection. The analysis is not to include information assurance assessment activities (e.g.,
password, network monitoring, host and intrusion detection, etc.).

LEVEL OF PROTECTION

Based on the Design Basis Threat and after reviewing the General Services Administration
(GSA) and Department of Defense (DoD) standards, senior management selected preliminary
Levels of Protection most applicable to HIC, with the guidance that adoption of any
recommendations would be to the most stringent standard and would be in compliance with life
safety codes. After the vulnerability and risk assessments were complete and mitigation options
developed, final selection of mitigation options would be made by senior management and
determined on a benefit-cost and risk reduction basis. The Levels of Protection to be used as the
basis for the vulnerability and risk assessments are:

GSA Level II

A Level II facility has between 11 and 150 employees and from 2,500 to 80,000 square feet.

1. Perimeter Security

a. Security control for parking (surface lots, adjacent structures, underground

garages under the Lessor's control) is solely limited to the assignment (marked
"reserved") of authorized Government parking spaces and vehicles.

b. Adequate lighting, with emergency power backup, for the exterior of the
building is required. Parking areas shall also be adequately lighted.

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c. 24-hour CCTV surveillance cameras with time-lapse video recording may be

required as deemed necessary by a Security Specialist.

d. Application of shatter-resistant material shall be applied on exterior windows.

2. Entry Security

a. Security Guards may be required, as deemed necessary by a Security

Specialist.

b. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) with central monitoring capability may be

required, as deemed necessary by a Security Specialist, for the building exterior.

c. Peepholes in exterior doors may be required, as deemed necessary by a

Security Specialist, when an IDS is not appropriate.

d. An intercom system, used in conjunction with a peephole, may be required as

deemed necessary by a Security Specialist.

e. Entry control with CCTV and door strikes may be required to allow employees
to view and communicate remotely with visitors before allowing access, as
deemed necessary by a Security Specialist.

f. Exterior entrances shall have high security locks.

3. Interior Security

a. A visitor control/screening system is not required for these levels.

b. Utility areas shall be secured and only authorized personnel shall have access.

c. Emergency power sources to critical systems (i.e., alarm systems, radio

communications, computer facilities, CCTV monitoring, fire detection, entry
control devices, etc.) are required.

d. The following requirements pertain to the added protection of the building

environment from airborne chemical, biological, or radiological attacks.

(1) Access to mechanical areas and building roofs shall be strictly

controlled.

(2) Access to building information, including mechanical, electrical,

vertical transport, fire and life safety, security system plans and
schematics, computer automation systems, and emergency operations
procedures shall be required. Such information shall be released to

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authorized personnel only. Names and locations of Government tenants

shall not be disclosed within any publicly accessed document or record.

(3) Procedures (should airborne hazards be suspected or found) are

required for the notification of the lessor's building manager, building
security guard desk, local emergency personnel, or other Government
emergency personnel, for the possible shutdown of air handling units
serving any possibly affected areas.

4. Administrative Procedures

a. Building managers and owners are required to cooperate with and participate in
the development and implementation of Government Occupant Emergency Plans
(OEPs).

b. Conduct background security checks and/or establish security control

procedures for contract service personnel as deemed necessary.

c. The Government reserves the right, at it's own expense and manpower, to
temporarily upgrade security during heightened security conditions due to
emergency situations such as terrorist attacks, natural disaster and civil unrest.
The measures shall be in accordance with the latest version of the Homeland
Security Advisory System.

5. Blast/Setback Standards

a. The following blast/setback standards shall be met:

1. For Level II, a 20 foot setback1 guideline with appropriate window glazing, as
prescribed by WINGARD 3.15 or later or WINLAC 4.3 software, to achieve a
glazing performance condition of 3b2 and a façade protection level of "medium"3
given a blast load standard of 4 psi/28 psi-msec is required.
1
Setback refers to the distance from the face of the building's exterior to the
protected/defended perimeter (i.e., any potential point of explosion). This would mean
the distance from the building to the curb or other boundary protected by bollards,
planters, or other street furniture. Such potential points of explosion may be, but not
limited to, such areas that could be accessible by any motorized vehicle (i.e., street, alley,
sidewalk, driveway, parking lot).
2
Glazing Performance Condition 3b provides for a high protection level and a low
hazard level. For a blast of 4psi/28psi-msec, the glazing cracks and fragments enter the
space and land on the floor not further than 10 feet from the window.

3
A "Medium Level Protection" to the facade will result in moderate, but repairable
damage. The facility or protected space will sustain a significant degree of damage, but
the structure should be reusable. Some casualties may occur and assets may be damaged.
Building elements other than major structural members may require replacement.

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DoD Standards

HIC senior management evaluated the DoD standards and determined that they would attempt to
meet the intent and objective of as many of the recommendations as possible. Of particular
concern are blast, CBR, and associated operations/locations of functions and equipment such as
mailrooms, dumpsters, loading docks, and emergency shut down.

The DoD level of protection selected is “low”, and the building category is “Inhabited Building”.

UFC 4-010-01 APPENDIX B

DoD MINIMUM ANTITERRORISM STANDARDS FOR NEW AND EXISTING

BUILDINGS

Standard 1 Minimum Standoff Distances

Standard 2 Unobstructed Space

Standard 3 Drive-Up/Drop-Off Areas

Standard 4 Access Roads

Standard 5 Parking Beneath Buildings or on Rooftops

Standard 6 Progressive Collapse Avoidance

Standard 7 Structural Isolation

Standard 8 Building Overhangs

Standard 9 Exterior Masonry Walls

Standard 10 Windows and Glazed Doors

Standard 11 Building Entrance Layout

Standard 12 Exterior Doors

Standard 13 Mailrooms

Standard 14 Roof Access

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Standard 15 Overhead Mounted Architectural Features

Standard 16 Air Intakes

Standard 17 Mailroom Ventilation

Standard 18 Emergency Air Distribution Shutoff

Standard 19 Utility Distribution and Installation

Standard 20 Equipment Bracing

Standard 21 Under Building Access

Standard 22 Mass Notification

Recommendation 1 Vehicle Access Points

Recommendation 2 High-Speed Vehicle Approaches

Recommendation 3 Vantage Points

Recommendation 4 Drive-Up/Drop-Off

Recommendation 5 Building Location

Recommendation 6 Railroad Location

Recommendation 7 Access Control for Family Housing

Recommendation 8 Standoff for Family Housing

Recommendation 9 Minimize Secondary Debris

Recommendation 10 Structural Redundancy

Recommendation 11 Internal Circulation

Recommendation 12 Visitor Control

Recommendation 13 Asset Location

Recommendation 14 Room Layout

Recommendation 15 External Hallways

Recommendation 16 Windows

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Appendix A: Case Study

Level of Potential Structural Potential Door and Potential Injury

Protection Damage Glazing
Hazards
Low Damaged – unrepairable. Glazing will break, Majority of
Major deformation of but fall within 1 personnel suffer
nonstructural elements meter of the wall or significant injuries.
and secondary structural otherwise not present There may be a few
members and minor a significant fragment (<10%) fatalities
deformation of primary hazard. Doors may
structural members, but fail, but they will
progressive collapse is rebound out of their
unlikely. frames, presenting
minimal hazards.

Location Building Standoff Distance or Separation Requirements

Category
Applicable Conventional Effective Applicable
Level of Construction Stand-off Explosives
Protection Stand-off Distance Weight
Distance
Controlled Inhabited Very Low 25 M 10 M Approx
Perimeter or Building 82 ft 33 ft 250 lbs
Parking and
Roadways without
a Controlled
Perimeter

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Appendix A: Case Study

Figure 31. DoD Stand-off Distance

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