Dimacisil, Mhumar Khaleeh M.

Admin and Election Laws 2-B

FRIVALDO VS COMELEC [G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]

FACTS:
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul
R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying
that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of
not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On
May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the petition.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate
of Votes dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the Frivaldo garnering the highest votes obtained
for the position of Governor of Sorsogon. Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995,
Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment of the
proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in
the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines. As such, when "the
said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on
June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the
proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x."

ISSUE:Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it
be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?

HELD:
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one
year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of
age on election day).

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and
the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien shall govern
our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship
on June 30, 1995,the very day the term of office of governor began he was therefore already
qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities
thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon.
This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on
qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a
literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates.

Mercado vs Manzano [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The results of the election were
Manzano being the highest voted [Link] its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second
Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under
40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running
for any elective position. In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent
admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate
of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955
of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco,
California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But
notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and
a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.

Issue: Whether or not Dual citizens are disqualified

Held:
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with
him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has
command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local
elective office.

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis
is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.

Clearly, in including section5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional

Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual
citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to
dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process
with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice
if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

Poe-Llamanzares vs Comelec G.R. No. 221697

Facts:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant
in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968.
Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano
Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and
registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-
Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name
"Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar."

When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando
Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their
petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe."

On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question
"Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013." Petitioner obtained the highest
number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In
her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from 24 May 2005. The petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming
Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon
City on 14 October 2015. Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections
triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these
consolidated cases.

ISSUE:Whether as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Citizen

HELD:

Foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language that would exclude them either.
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relation to the Conflict of Nationality laws (that a
foundling is presumed to have the nationality of the country of birth)2.

Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (foundling is presumed born of citizens of the

country where he is found)bind the Philippines although we are not signatory to these
[Link] we are not a signatory to the Hague Convention, we are a signatory to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which affirms Article 14 of the Hague
Convention. Likewise,the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness affirms Article 15 of the
UDHR. By analogy,although the Philippines has not signed the International Convention for the
Protection of Persons from Enforced Disappearance, we (the Supreme Court) ruled that the
proscription against enforced disappearance was nonetheless binding as a generally accepted
principle of international law.
Poe’s evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia, North and South America and Europe have
passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizens. 166 out of 189 countries accept that
foundlings are recognized as citizens. Hence, there is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as having been born and a national of the country in which
it is [Link], as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Filipino citizen.

Sabili vs COMELEC G. R. No. 193261

Facts: When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated
therein that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Prior to the
2010 elections, he had been twice elected (in 1995 and in 1998) as Provincial Board Member
representing the 4th District of Batangas. During the 2007 elections, petitioner ran for the position
of Representative of the 4th District of Batangas, but lost. However, it is undisputed that when
petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at his
ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.
Private respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and
to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds
for Disqualification against him before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 09-047 (DC). Citing
Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, private respondent alleged that
petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the latters COC and likewise failed to
comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.
Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident of
Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections.

Issue : Whether or not Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement
for local elective officials

Held:

In the present case, the parties are in agreement that the domicile of origin of Sabili was
Brgy. Sico, San Juan, Batangas. He claims that he abandoned his domicile of origin and established
his domicile of choice in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, thereby making him qualified to run for
Lipa City mayor. On the other hand, respondent COMELEC held that no such change in domicile
or residence took place and, hence, the entry in his Certificate of Candidacy showing that he was
a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City constituted a misrepresentation that disqualified him
from running for Lipa City mayor.

To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with
conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode. As in all
administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary in election cases is substantial evidence, or
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Whatever the nature of the transaction might be, this point is immaterial for the purpose of
ascertaining petitioners residence. We have long held that it is not required that a candidate should
have his own house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a place. It is enough that he
should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. What is of central
concern then is that petitioner identified and established a place in Lipa City where he intended to
live in and return to for an indefinite period of time.

Morales vs CA G.R. Nos. 217126-27

Facts:
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching"
Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and
employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder and
violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the
Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).
As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities
attending the procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project,
committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati

Issues: Whether or not local officials can also be held administratively guilty

Held:
For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an elective
local official from office are stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160,292 otherwise known
as the "Local Government Code of 1991”.

Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that those removed from office
as a result of an administrative case shall be disqualified from running for any elective local
position.

In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the
unexpired term of the elective local official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he
meets the qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that the provision only pertains to
the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official's candidacy. Nothing therein states that the
administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of
accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of
office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense,
and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that
an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from
an offense done during a prior term.

Guzman vs board of canvassers G.R. No. L-24721

Facts:
It is alleged that the respondent provincial board of canvassers met on June 22, 1925, for the
purpose of counting the votes cast in the election for provincial officers and certifying the result
of the count, and after gathering all the election returns, it found that the petitioner had obtained
7,662 votes and the respondent Juan T. Lucero, 8,771 votes; that the original of the certificate of
candidacy of the respondent Juan T. Lucero, a certified copy of which is Exhibit A, was not duly
sworn to, as required by law, while the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner Tomas de Guzman,
the original of which is Exhibit B, was prepared and filed in accordance with the requirements of
the law; that notwithstanding that Juan T. Lucero did not file a certificate of candidacy duly sworn
to, as provided in section 404 of the Election Law, the respondent provincial board of canvassers
willfully and illegally adjudicated the 8,771 votes to the respondent, and afterwards illegally
proclaimed and certified him as governor-elect of the Province of La Union; that in view of these
facts the respondent Juan T. Lucero has not, and could not have, been a legal candidate for the
office in question, and could not have been certified elected for the office of provincial governor.
To this complaint the respondent filed a demurrer on the ground: (a) That the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter in litigation; (b) that the court had no jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendant members of the extinguished provincial board of canvassers of La Union;
and (c) that the facts alleged in the complaint did not constitute a cause of action.

Issues: whether or not the respondent has filed a certificate of candidacy in accordance with the
law, and in case he has not, whether the writ applied for should be issued.

Held:
In the instant case, according to the allegations of the petitioner the respondent Juan T. Lucero
filed his certificate of candidacy in the office of the secretary of the provincial board of La Union
on April 15, 1925, the provincial secretary having issued the proper receipt for the filing of said
certificate, together with a statement of the expenses attached thereto (Exhibit 2). It, therefore,
seems clear that the respondent filed his certificate in accordance with the Spanish text of section
404 of the Election Law, as amended by section 3 of act No. 3030.

We hold that the legal provision here in question is mandatory and non-compliance therewith
before the election would have been fatal to the recognition of the status of Juan T. Lucero as
candidate. But after the people have expressed their will honestly, the result of the election cannot
be defeated by the fact that the respondent who was certified by the provincial secretary to be a
legal candidate for the office of provincial governor, has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy.
The situation is somewhat like that of a voter placing his ballot in the box. There are certain
requirements of the law, affecting the vote, which have been considered by this court as of a
mandatory character until the ballot is placed in the ballot box; but we have held that the validity
of the count cannot be questioned, nor the vote stricken out after the ballots had been placed in the
ballot boxes, simply for non-compliance with such provisions. After the termination of the
election, public interest must be made to prevail over that of the defeated candidate, and we cannot
declare that the election of the respondent Juan T. Lucero was illegal, and that he should quit the
office for which he was elected, simply by reason of a defect in his certificate of candidacy, which
defect could have been corrected before the election, but which cannot be cured after its
termination, and after the result of the election was published by the provincial board of canvassers,
respondents herein.

Sinaca vs Mula [G.R. No. 135691. September 27, 1999]

Facts:
In the 11 May 1998 elections, the two opposing factions of the ruling party LAKAS-NUCD-
UMPD (hereafter LAKAS) filled in separate candidates for the position of mayor of the
Municipality of Malimano, Surigao del Norte. One faction headed by Robert Z. Barbers (hereafter
BARBERS Wing) nominated Grachil G. Canoy (hereafter CANOY), while the other group lead
by Francisco T. MATUGAS (hereafter MATUGAS Wing) endorsed the candidacy of Teodoro F.
Sinaca, Jr. (hereafter TEODORO).
Miguel H. Mula (hereafter MULA), a candidate for vice-mayor and belonging to the BARBERS
Wing, filed before the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against TEODORO which was
docketed as SPA 98-021. On 8 May 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a
resolution disqualifying TEODORO as candidate for mayor of the Municipality of Malimono,
Surigao del Norte and ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy because of prior
conviction of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude.
On even date, herein petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca, (hereafter EMMANUEL), an independent
candidate, withdrew his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member, joined and
became a member of the LAKAS party and was nominated by the LAKAS MATUGAS Wing as
the substitute mayoralty candidate for the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte. On the
basis of said nomination, EMMANUEL filed his certificate of candidacy attached thereto is his
certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty candidate signed by Governor Francisco T.
MATUGAS (hereafter MATUGAS), as party provincial chairman together with EMMANUEl’s
written acceptance of the party’s nomination.

Issues: whether respondent is disqualified as a substitute candidate.

Held:
We sustain petitioners position. We declare that the substitution of disqualified mayoralty
candidate Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. by respondent Emmanuel D. Sinaca was not valid because the
latter was an independent candidate for councilor prior to his nomination as substitute candidate
in place of the withdrawing candidate who was a Lakas party member.

If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered
or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace
the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the
political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance
with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death,
withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of
election day, said certificate maybe filed with any board of election inspectors in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire
electorate of the country, with the Commission.

In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the above said requirements.
EMMANUEL was properly nominated as substitute candidate by the LAKAS party MATUGAS
wing to which TEODORO, the disqualified candidate, belongs, as evidenced by the Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance signed by MATUGAS, the Party’s provincial chairman. That
EMMANUEL is a bona fide member of the LAKAS party is shown not only by the certificate of
membership, which is being controverted for having been presented as new evidence for the first
time before this court, but more importantly by his certificate of candidacy filed before the
COMELEC stating therein that he belongs to the LAKAS party.

Miranda vs Abaya [G.R. No. 136351. July 28, 1999]

Facts:
On March 24, 1998, Jose Pempe Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed
his certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998
elections.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to
and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy , which was docketed as SPA No. 98-019. The petition
was GRANTED by the Comelec in its resolution dated May 5, 1998. The Comelec further ruled
to DISQUALIFY Jose Pempe Miranda.
On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner Joel G.
Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his
father, Jose Pempe Miranda.
On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with
Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, which
was docketed as SPA No. 98-288. He prayed for the nullification of petitioners certificate of
candidacy for being void ab initio because the certificate of candidacy of Jose Pempe Miranda,
whom petitioner was supposed to substitute, had already been cancelled and denied due course.
Issues: Whether or not there was a valid substitution

Held:
Under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code, not just any person, but only an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party may be substituted. In Bautista vs. Comelec
(G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998) this Court explicitly ruled that a cancelled certificate does
not give rise to a valid candidacy .
A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the
same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch
of the imagination, be a candidate at all.

Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a
substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the
place of somebody who does not exist or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule
that in all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election code, the existence of
a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.
All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy
in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed
certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he
cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called
substitute to file a new and original certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof,
it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.

Codilla vs De Venecia [G.R. No. 150605. December 10, 2002]

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte during the May 14, 2001 elections. At that time, petitioner was the
Mayor of Ormoc City while respondent Locsin was the sitting Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte. On May 8, 2001, one Josephine de la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte,
filed directly with the COMELEC main office a Petition for Disqualification against the petitioner
for indirectly soliciting votes from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in
violation of Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. It was alleged that the petitioner used
the equipments and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and
distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of
inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the
disqualification case. Consequently, petitioner was included in the list of candidates for district
representative and was voted for. The initial results showed that petitioner was the winning
candidate.
On June 15, 2001, respondent Locsin was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte.
On June 20, 2001, petitioner seasonably filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for
Reconsideration.
n June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Proclamation, docketed as SPC No. 01-324, assailing the validity of the proclamation of
respondent Locsin who garnered only the second highest number of votes. Respondent Locsin
filed her Answer alleging that: (1) the Commission lost jurisdiction to hear and decide the case
because of the proclamation of Locsin and that any question on the election, returns, and
qualification of Locsin can only be taken cognizance of by the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) among others.

Issues: Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin divested the COMELEC en banc of
jurisdiction to review its validity.

Held: The court rejects respondents contention.

The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been
resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution
of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for
Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc
to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of the petitioner is to file a petition for quo
warranto with the HRET.
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor
her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified
to run, and if she won, to assume office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and
proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at
the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo
warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her
proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the
respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto
proceeding.