Organizational Commitment: Clarifying the Concept and

Simplifying the Existing Construct Typology

Randall B. Brown

School of Business Administration, California State University, Stanislaus

This paper examines popular concepts and types of organizational commitment in light of the definition of
commitment and common factors that pertain to all commitments. It argues that a particular commitment is best
conceptualized as a unitary concept that varies according to differences in focus, terms, and time-specific evaluation.
Analysis of affective commitment measures indicate that certain measures contain more than one set of terms and
make assumptions about evaluation that add constraints to the basic meaning of commitment. Recommendations
include the argument that commitment measures address one set of terms and avoid evaluative phraseology.

Organizational commitment has been a popular research topic during the past two
decades, in part because of the powerful motivational implications of commitment (Allen &
Meyer, 1990; Becker, 1992, Mowday, Porter, & Steers, 1982). Despite progress in understanding
the concept, theoretical disputes persist as to the nature of the concept and how it should be
applied in an organizational context (Hunt & Morgan, 1994; Mathieu & Zajac, 1990; Morrow,
1983; Reichers, 1986). The purpose of the paper is: (1) to examine and clarify differences in
current descriptions of organizational commitment, (2) to reverse the multidimensional trend of
defining multiple "types" of commitment, and (3) to offer an approach to understanding and
measuring organizational commitment that is grounded in the basic meaning of the word
"commitment".
In commitment research, two common distinctions have been that between an
"attitudinal" and a "behavioral" approach to commitment, and that between an "affective" and a
"continuance" (or "calculative") commitment concept (Meyer & Allen, 1984; Mowday et al.,
1982; Stevens, Beyer, & Trice, 1978). The former distinction pertains primarily to the process of
commitment development but has implications for how the concept is described and
operationalized.
According to the attitudinal approach, commitment develops as a result of some
combination of work experiences, perceptions of the organization, and personal characteristics,
which lead to positive feelings about an organization which in turn becomes commitment
(Mowday et al., 1982). Further explanation is offered under the guise of exchange theory in
which persons with positive attitudes are pre-disposed to offer commitment in exchange for
anticipated future rewards (Angle & Perry, 1983).
In the behavioral approach, a person attains a state or position of commitment as a result
of engaging in committing behaviors - behaviors that, in effect, make it costly to subsequently
reverse a position or disengage from some line of activity (Salancik 1977). Committing acts
could include: a non-transferable retirement program, accrual of vacation time, academic tenure,
or statements in support of some issue or objective.
Links have been suggested between these two approaches and "affective" and
"continuance" commitment (Mowday et al., 1982), although debate exists as to how the two
typologies are connected (Angle & Lawson, 1993). Affective commitment has been described as
a set of strong, positive attitudes toward the organization manifested by dedication to goals and a
shared sense of values. Mowday, Steers, and Porter (1979) defined commitment as "the relative
strength of an individual's identification with and involvement in a particular organization".
Their "organizational commitment questionnaire", or "OCQ", has since become the most popular
measure of commitment. Affective commitment is believed to emerge from the kinds of positive
experiences associated with the attitudinal process of development.
Becker (1960) originally described continuance commitment as one associated with
"side-bets" or investments that a person accrues over time while working for an organization. In
his words, "Commitments come into being when a person, by making a 'side-bet', links
extraneous interest with a consistent line of activity" (p.33). Accordingly, commitment is the
tendency to remain a member of the organization because of the perceived costs of doing
otherwise. While Becker's focus was primarily on material costs (non-vested retirement benefits,
job security, accrued vacation), Salancik (1977) drew attention to "costs" associated with
contradicting or reversing a previously expressed position.
Organizational commitment, therefore, can describe both a state of positive obligation to
an organization and a state of obligation developed as a by-product of past actions. This state of
commitment, in turn, obliges an individual to some range of actions that fulfills the terms of the
commitment, which raises the question, just what are the terms of the commitment in an
organizational setting? Mowday et al. (1979) believe that terms include a willingness to
maintain membership in the organization, a promise of support for an organization's goals and
interests, and a willingness to expend effort in support of those goals through job-related
behaviors. In research, the link between commitment and membership is well documented while
that between commitment and performance is less so (Allen & Meyer 1990; Mathieu & Zajac
1990).
Continuance commitment is linked primarily to ongoing membership. The reasoning is
that persons will maintain commitment largely out of self-interest associated with the perceived
"costs" of not keeping the commitment. The "behavioral approach", at times associated with
continuance commitment, is more inclusive, implying that commitment terms be a willingness to
continue in a chosen course of action, vis a vis some focal party, whatever that course may be.
Terms are whatever the parties agree upon, which would suggest that a behavioral approach
could help establish both affective and continuance commitment.
In addition to the affective-continuance distinction, Weiner (1982) and Allen and Meyer
(1990) described "normative commitment" in which a sense of obligation binds a person to a
certain course of action. Angle and Lawson (1993) suggested that this normative inclination
more accurately represents a personal value associated with reciprocity and may act as an
antecedent to commitment. The Allen and Meyer scale, which reflects a moral obligation to
remain a member, would seem to support this view. A distinction may need to be drawn between
a normative force that can cause someone to become committed (e.g. personal values and
feelings of reciprocity for something given) and a normative component of all commitments
which is simply that one ought to fulfill his/her commitments.
Reichers (1985) introduced the notion that people form "multiple commitments" to
distinct entities or coalitions within organizations rather than to the "organization" per se.
Morrow (1983) drew attention to competing foci of commitment, such as one's profession or
union. Much research on organizational commitment, however, has continued to center on the
affective-continuance typology with an organizational focus perhaps because it has received so
much attention and usage. This paper will attempt to resolve this distinction by arguing that
commitment to some entity is a unitary construct, albeit a complex one, that may differ
depending upon how certain factors, pertinent to all commitments, are perceived and evaluated
by an individual.

DEFINING COMMITMENT

This argument begins with an understanding of the basic meaning of "commitment".

Webster's defines commitment as a pledge or promise, an obligation of some sort. A common
usage of commitment refers to the condition of someone who has made a firm agreement with
some other party connected to some future event. A related usage is one of commitment as a
pledge to some valued cause or goal, as in a commitment to smaller government. The
commitment acts as an "insurance" to both the committed and the focal party that short-term
fluctuations in attitude or feeling on behalf of the committed will not lead to sudden changes in
behaviors related to the terms of the obligation.
Websters also defines commitment as, "the state of being obligated or bound (as by
intellectual conviction or emotional ties)" - what Random House defines as the "state of being
committed" or "engagement, involvement". Therefore, in addition to being a pledge or promise,
commitment is also the state one arrives at having made a pledge or promise. Organizational
commitment appears to fit this definition.
A variation of this usage can describe a state in which a person has passed some "point of
no return" in some course of action and must go forward due to costs of backing out, even when
going forward no longer seems like the best choice. Whereas any state of commitment implies
an absence of choice associated with an obligation, this latter condition includes the idea that
commitment can represent a state that is only recognized after the fact. How a commitment
develops, therefore, has implications for how it is subsequently recognized.

Commitment Focus and Terms

Along with concept meaning, all commitments have an object or focus - a party to which
the commitment is made. This may be a person, a group of persons, an entity made up of people
(as in organization), or an idea or cause. All commitments also include some idea of terms - an
understanding of what must be done by a committed party to uphold the commitment. The first
element allows us, for the time being, to direct discussion to an organizational focus, as opposed
to other foci such as those used by Hunt and Morgan (1994) in their comparative study of the
outcome effects of "global organizational commitment", "commitment to supervisor", and
"commitment to top management".
The second element, terms, both clarifies the agreement and allows that someone can
make more than one commitment to a particular party. For example, a sports team member may
make one commitment to membership (as in a written job contract) and also make (or withhold)
a commitment to performance, and possibly one to be a team player by not holding independent
press conferences.
Terms are a fundamental part of commitment by virtue of its definition as a pledge or
agreement, whether these terms be stated or implied. Oliver (1990) suggests "....it is virtually
impossible to describe commitment in any terms other than one's inclination to act in a given
way towards a particular commitment target" (p.30). Brown (1990) reported that subjects
interviewed on what commitment at work meant to them used descriptions such as, "a
willingness to go the extra mile for the department", "doing whatever it takes to get the job
done", and "doing what one says he or she will do, no matter what".
 Reports of outcome behaviors found through research to be related to commitment reflect
less an effect of commitment on behavior than the degree to which persons who are committed
actually keep their commitments. Explanations for the absence of strong links between
commitment and performance include: (1) the fact that commitment is associated with effort
whereas performance is affected by other factors as well, including a subjective appraisal by
some third party, (2) that fact that because terms are rarely formally stated, not all committed
persons may interpret the terms of their commitment as requiring extra job effort, and (3) popular
commitment measures, like the OCQ, measure less of a sense of pledged commitment than a
strong liking for an organization - a condition that may affect a person's intentions but doesn't
carry the kinds of penalties associated with not keeping a commitment.

Commitment Evaluation and Development

In addition to foci and terms, two other factors, germane to all commitments, contribute
to differences in how the term gets described. Foremost is a person's interpretation and
evaluation of a commitment - whether the person sees it largely in positive, neutral, or negative
terms. Affecting this evaluation process are: (1) current attitudes and circumstances, and (2) the
"history" of the commitment - its development process, the reasons driving the development, and
the degree to which a person was aware, at the time, of forming a commitment. Together, these
forces impact the way in which a commitment is evaluated and acted upon. Figure 1 offers a
longitudinal model of the process.
Evaluating one's commitments, in light of competing demands and options for
involvement, is a natural and continuous process. A person's current circumstances and feelings,
influenced by recall of the development process, affect how that person evaluates a commitment.
Many factors affect attitudes and feelings which in turn affect a person's evaluation of a
commitment, but the "bottom line" will be an ongoing subjective appraisal of the worthiness of
the commitment, in light of other options. This evaluation will affect the "relative strength" of
the commitment and the actions a person takes with regards to the terms. Logically speaking,
positive attitudes will lead to positive evaluations, supportive behaviors, and quite possibly an
enhancement of the understood terms. Persistent doubts and negative attitudes will, in most
cases, lead to unfavorable evaluation, a desire to minimize the terms, and possibly an attempt to
dissolve or withdraw from the commitment.
For illustration sake, consider two managers, Jane and John, who simultaneously
volunteer to head similar projects within their units, with an understanding of what is involved
and expected. Let us say that both undertake the role for similar reasons related to a mix of
enthusiasm for the project and its goals, a desire to be involved in something significant, and a
desire to demonstrate their effectiveness as leaders. As is the case with most new commitments,
self-interest and the possibility of reciprocal or "two-way" benefits encourage commitment
formation (Brickman, 1987). In accepting the assignment, both Jane and John consciously make
a commitment to a superior with a similar understanding of terms.
As the projects proceed, let us assume that difficulties and delays occur, as is often the
case, and "political" considerations intrude that threaten to alter the scope of the projects and
project outcomes. Let us say that Jane views the changes as somewhat inevitable and elects to
treat them as opportunities for a richer "product". She increases the time she is putting into the
project, using weekends and after hours to work on the changes and days to deal with outside
interference in a positive way, seeking compromise and consensus where possible. In contrast,
John gets discouraged at the way events go and finds himself wishing he hadn't accepted the
assignment in the first place. He distances himself from the project, playing down its
significance and when feasible delegating duties to those who seem interested in the outcomes.
He focuses on meeting deadlines. Ultimately both Jane and John steer the projects to
completion, Jane with a sense of accomplishment and John with one of relief. Given the contrast
between their two emergent styles, do we say that two different "types" of commitment were in
evidence or do we allow that what began as similar commitments later may have seemed
different due to some combination of changed circumstances, a divergence in outlook and
attitude by the parties, and a contrast in the way each party interpreted and fulfilled the terms of
the commitment.
In organizations, there are people committed to their organizations who feel good about it
and others who feel stuck in situations from which escape carries penalties. It would be a
mistake, however, to automatically assume that the two states are unrelated and resulted from
different origins or development processes. Two persons may develop similar, positive senses of
commitment, but due to subsequent experiences come to evaluate the commitments differently.
Or, two persons committed through the "side-bet" process may subsequently evaluate their
situations differently, one feeling stuck and the other experiencing unexpected meaning. (As an
illustration of the latter process, consider the case of the manager Arthur Schindler in Schindler's
List, his initial exploitative venture, his gradual awareness of commitment to his Jewish
employees, and his subsequent devotion to saving them from certain death). Giving different
names to different evaluations of commitment makes unwarranted assumptions about the
development process and ignores the process by which people, over time, evaluate and re-
evaluate commitments in light of changing circumstances and attitudes. At any point in time, an
observer could assess a particular commitment and label it "affective", "continuance", or
something else, but such a process seeks to rigidify a naturally fluid concept.
A central argument of this paper is that rather than there being different "types" of
organizational commitment, there is an underlying commitment to some party along with some
understanding of terms. Then there is the strength of the commitment associated with a person's
ongoing evaluation of that commitment, affected in turn by the history and reasons behind the
commitment and current feelings and attitudes about the commitment. This approach to
commitment allows both that commitments can change and that more than one commitment to
an organization can be made and evaluated differently (e.g. one related to membership, one
related to job effort, and others related perhaps to support of people or to promoting the company
image outside of work). A person may become committed to the goals and values of an
organization but subsequently elect to support similar goals at a different organization. Such
commitment would be different from membership commitment; something like it is encouraged
at certain organizations in industries like software and advertising which thrive on "new blood"
and do not discourage leaving.

The Commitment Development Process

The development process not only affects focus and terms of a commitment, it also, as
mentioned, has strong implications for the evaluation process (see figure 1). Multiple reasons
may exist for making a commitment most of which have been covered in commitment literature
(Mowday et al. 1982). These driving forces have been classified into attitudinal, behavioral, and
normative categories. Becker (1992) used the term "bases of commitment" to explore the
reasoning behind a person making and keeping a commitment. These forces are important in
that they most likely will impact the forces that cause a person to keep a commitment; however,
the two are not necessarily the same. A person may, for example, make a commitment to do a
joint project with another person out of a sense of belief in the value of the project, but later keep
the commitment out of a sense of responsibility and desire to preserve a relationship. Being the
more salient of the two, time-wise, the latter justification for keeping the commitment should
have the greater effect on the manner in which that commitment is experienced and kept.
To the extent that a person has recall of the process or act of making a commitment - is
conscious, at the time, of making the commitment - reasons must exist for doing so. It follows
that in most cases the person will subsequently uphold the commitment willingly. If a person
comes to a belated awareness that he or she is committed due to past actions or choices -
committed by reason of circumstance as in the case of "side-bets" - reactions are more difficult to
predict. The commitment could be evaluated positively and enthusiastically upheld or it could be
viewed as an imposition and minimally kept. Cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) has been
suggested as a force that might induce a person to subsequently evaluate a "discovered"
commitment in a positive light (i.e. I must like this agreed upon arrangement or I wouldn't have
made it).
An additional development factor pertains to the attitudinal-behavioral distinction and the
strength of a commitment resulting from these different processes. From the behavioral
perspective, two ways to make a pledge or commitment are through overt statements of
agreement and/or through actions and behaviors that indicate where one stands and binds one to
a specified future course of action. Kiesler writes that "commitment represents the binding of
the individual to behavioral acts" (Kiesler & Sakumura, 1966). The pledge could be purely
internal, as in a person making a private commitment to some valued cause, but a purely internal
commitment would, in most cases, represent a weaker state because the costs of backing out
would be primarily self-imposed. Proponents of the attitudinal approach have stressed the
role of work experience and role factors in commitment development (Mathieu & Zajac, 1990).
Positive experiences, role factors, structural elements, and personal factors combine, in a "black
box" psychological process, to create commitment among persons who are positively impacted.
Mowday et al. (1982) described attitudinal commitment as..."a mind-set in which individuals
consider the extent to which their own values and goals are congruent with those of the
organization" (p.26). In this model, a person can become committed without making an overt
pledge; if a person develops sufficient positive attitudes or sense of goal congruence, then at
some point that person is committed.
A resolution of two approaches may lie in the recognition that both attitudes and
behaviors play a role in development. Behaviors - binding acts - probably work to seal a
commitment, since a person, by definition, becomes committed by virtue of having taken some
action or made some pledge. In the case of an internal pledge, behaviors in support of the
commitment, particularly public behaviors, would act to strengthen it.
Salancik (1977) argued that behavior is the key to all variations of commitment. By his
reasoning, "affective" obligations must also emerge through a behavioral process aided perhaps
by positive inclinations. The resulting commitment - what Oliver (1990) refers to as a state of
"post hoc self-justification (of prior actions)" - may subsequently be described in positive,
negative, or neutral terms, depending upon how the person later interprets and evaluates it.
Salancik (1977) also argued that commitments have strength to the extent that they are
public, voluntary, significant, and non-retractable. Behavioral commitments would seem to meet
more of these requirements than do purely attitudinal commitments. Attitudinal commitments
may be voluntary and significant (e.g. organizational commitment), but being private they are
more easily retractable which, according to Salancik, means less binding effect.
The antecedent factors cited in the attitudinal approach - work experiences, role factors,
and organizational and personal factors - probably do a great deal to predispose people to make
commitments, and that may be their primary role in commitment development. From the
rationale of exchange theory, people are more likely to initiate commitments when the
subsequent state of commitment is perceived to include certain anticipated rewards that justify
the added obligations. Positive factors are likely to contribute to such a perception.
However, a more significant effect of "antecedent factors" may be on a person's
subsequent evaluation of a commitment. Once a state of commitment has been established, if the
job itself or other experiences should loose appeal, a rational person can be expected to re-
evaluate the commitment, be it to organizational goals, membership, or people. Should
organizational experiences remain positive, then it follows that evaluation would remain positive
(and be reported as such in a survey on an affective commitment scale). Given the expected
relationship here between organizational factors and commitment evaluation, it is not surprising
that most cross-sectional studies showed positive correlations between the OCQ and certain
"antecedent factors" cited by Mowday et al. (1982).

ELABORATION OF COMMITMENT AS A UNITARY CONSTRUCT

From the perspective of social-psychology, Brickman (1987) described "two faces" of

commitment. He suggested that the very nature of commitment is such that all commitments
contain both a positive, "want to" element and a negative, "have to" element and a bond between
the two. Positive commitments have a negative element to them - the loss of time needed for
other obligations or desires. And negative commitments have a positive element - the knowledge
that one has remained consistent and/or protected one's "investments". The following passage
illustrates his description of the process by which commitments are evaluated.
"In looking back people either say that
they really wanted to or they really had
no choice. Each of these represents a form
of commitment....The former represents a
commitment to the activity as an end in
itself; the latter, a commitment to the
activity as a means to some other end. Each
is also a form of illusion since there is
usually both some element of choice and
some element of coercion or external force
in all behavior. What happens is that one of
these elements comes to dominate the
psychological field in which the activity is
experienced, and the activity is thus felt as
entirely free or entirely coerced." (p. 173)

Brickman adds that when positive elements dominate one's perspective, the resulting
commitment is characterized by "enthusiasm". At its best, commitment can describe "an
experience of 'flow' in one's work", "flow" being the sensation people experience when they act
with total involvement in some activity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). On the other hand when
negative elements dominate, the commitment is characterized by "persistence". A person acts so
as to maintain the activity but without enthusiasm.
All commitments involve pressure on a person to engage in behaviors that uphold the
commitment. In "Commitment and Consistency: Hobgoblins of the Mind" (1985), Cialdini
argues that having made a commitment, people will alter their subsequent attitudes and behaviors
so as to appear consistent with that commitment. The key is the commitment itself. "If I can get
you to make a commitment (that is, to take a stand, to go on record), I will have set the stage for
your automatic and ill-considered consistency with that earlier commitment" (p.60).
A central strength of any commitment is that it requires that a person honor it, even in the
face of fluctuating attitudes and whims. However, persistent attitudes in one direction or the
other will likely affect the strength of the commitment and the effort that an individual puts forth
in meeting these terms. Positive evaluations will incline a person to engage in behaviors
consistent with an expansive interpretation of the terms, while negative evaluations can lead to
someone meeting the "letter of" the terms, and, when persistent, a move to renegotiate the terms
or terminate the commitment.
The remainder of the discussion will examine popular commitment measures in light of
the preceding elements - terms and evaluation.

MEASUREMENT IMPLICATIONS

The Issue of Terms

This issue presents the least potential problem for researchers. They only need describe
the terms that they feel are relevant, and they will have described and operationalized a particular
commitment that a person can make to an organization. The issue is more problematic when
researchers label a phenomenon "organizational commitment" and assign to it more than one set
of terms. Mowday et al. (1979) included as terms: "(1) a strong belief in and acceptance of the
organization's goals and values; (2) a willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the
organization; and (3) a strong desire to maintain membership in the organization" (p.226).
Factor analysis of a sample of 1244 respondents by Angle and Perry (1981) indicated two factors
which they labelled "value commitment" (or "commitment to support the goals of the
organization") and "commitment to stay". Other studies have reported a single factor solution
(Dunham, Grube, & Castaneda 1994).
This composite construct can be seen as logically derived both from the definition of
commitment and the idea of what it means to be committed to an organization. However, the
latter component, involving terms, is a problematic assumption in many of today's organizations,
particularly private ones, where long-term membership is largely a thing of the past. Brickman
(1987) posited that commitments generally begin as part of an exchange process. This would
suggest that the composite constructs would be relevant in organizations that had a reputation for
reciprocity in supporting loyal members both through rewards and long-term employment. But,
would even dedicated employees be membership-loyal to organizations that used cut-backs and
staff reductions as a common practice?
A second potential problem with a dual-term measure is in interpreting the scores.
Assuming that the measure captures both sets of terms, in order for someone to rate high on the
scale, that person must feel committed both to goal support and continued membership. A
person who expressed strong commitment to one set of terms, goals for example, but not the
other would end up with a score similar to that of someone expressing moderate commitment to
both sets of terms. In other words, different response patterns can produce similar, but
misleading results.
A third problem with this dual-term approach pertains to actions taken to fulfill
commitment terms. It implies that a committed person must meet both sets of terms. This
constraint creates a conceptual problem in the case, for example, of a person willing to commit to
the values and goals of an organization but on the lookout for opportunities at other
organizations. A related problem would exist in the case of a person committed to membership
but focused on goals other than organizational ones - unit goals, personal goals, or the goals of a
powerful manager.
Since organizations differ in values and practices related to membership, it may make
more sense to use subscale scores for distinct components of organizational commitment, with
components related to specific terms. This approach would allow for term-specific measurement
as well as an additive or combined assessment of "global" organizational commitment in
organizations where it is relevant.
The continuance commitment scale (CCS) developed by Meyer and Allen (1984)
addressed membership terms only, using items that pertained primarily to a person's assessment
of freedom of movement to other jobs. In an attempt to exclude affect from the measure and
confirm continuance commitment as a separate construct, Meyer and Allen directed scale items
to the reasons behind a persons intent to remain. McGee and Ford (1987) and Dunham et al.
(1994) both reported two factors in the scale labelled "high sacrifice" and "low alternatives".
The first pertained to costs associated with leaving and the second to a lack of alternatives that
might pressure someone to stay. The CCS seemed to measure reasons why a person might stay
rather than membership commitment per se.
Directly assessing intent to remain was the approach taken by both Ritzer and Trice
(1969) and Hrebiniak and Alutto (1972) who developed scales that queried members about future
membership intentions. Stebbins (1971) argued that such measures actually measured affective
rather than continuance commitment, and Meyer and Allen (1984) stated that the two scales are
"saturated with affective commitment...". In actuality, these measures probably captured
elements of both affective and continuance commitment because they were directed at
membership commitment - a term associated with both definitions. Ferris and Aranya (1983)
reported a correlation of r=.39 between the Hrebiniak and Alutto scale and the OCQ - a logical
finding, less because the Hrebiniak and Alutto scale was riddled with affective commitment than
because both scales contained elements pertaining to membership.
One problem with this "membership" method of measuring commitment is that it
assumes that commitment is the only driving force behind "intent to remain" a member. It would
count as committed someone who intended to remain a member of an organization solely out of
self-interest - good pay, for example, or opportunity for control. A strength of both the CCS and
the OCQ is that both scales try to capture a pledge to membership apart from instrumental
motivations.

The Issue of Evaluation

Because all commitments are dynamic aspects of people's lives subject to ongoing
evaluation, the probability exists that persons, if asked, will respond differently about particular
commitments as circumstances and attitudes change. Both the OCQ and the ACS emphasize
positive feeling, such that they capture commitment about which a person feels favorably at the
time of survey. Both measures have been used in research and exhibit good psychometric
properties.
Three conditions would seem to produce a high score on the OCQ: (1) a person supports
the goals of the organization, (2) the person intends to remain a long-term member of the
organization, and (3) the person holds positive attitudes towards the organization. This third
element adds the constraint that organizational commitment be positively evaluated at the time of
assessment, which leads to a fourth problem related to score interpretation. Is a person with a
low score someone with no commitment to either set of terms, or someone who has made the
commitment but who evaluates it unfavorably and so reports with low scores on a survey?
Provided that a researcher is only interested in a positive evaluation or condition,
affective measures are useful. For example, they can be used, in longitudinal designs, to explore
antecedents that will induce persons to consciously make commitments. Part of their
effectiveness as measures in recent research may be attributable to a consistency that exists
between commitment that is positively evaluated and an expansive interpretation of terms by the
committed. But this affective description of organizational commitment still seems rather
proprietary. Can we say with confidence that members of organizations today must be
committed to both goals and membership, and evaluate both commitments favorably, in order to
be considered committed?
Continuance commitment, in contrast, has come to be associated with a lack of positive
motivation and support, hence has acquired negative connotations (Angle & Perry, 1981; Meyer,
Paunonen, Gellatly, Goffin, & Johnson, 1989). More likely continuance commitment, as
measured in the CCS, describes membership commitment apart from attitudes. It is this
understanding that those advocating a behavioral approach (Becker, 1960; Kiesler & Sakumura,
1969; Salancik, 1977) were describing: commitment simply as an engagement or a pledge to a
future course of action.
The behavioral approach deals with the general idea of commitment and puts no
constraints on what the obligation is or how a person feels about it. Because Becker (1960) felt
that the obligation was to protect "side-bets" (material self-interests), what logically followed
was the idea of a need to remain a member of an organization, hence continuance commitment.
In developing the CCS, Meyer and Allen attempted to weed out the affective factor said
to contaminate the Hrebiniak and Alutto scale by measuring continuance commitment without
reference to membership intentions. Initially, they found no correlation between the CCS and the
ACS in a 350 person sample of university faculty, providing support for their contention that
affective commitment and continuance commitment were separate constructs representing
distinct types of commitment. The two factors uncovered by McGee and Ford (1987), however,
were each correlated with the ACS, but in opposite directions.
The "low alternatives" factor showed a negative correlation (r=-.21) with the ACS. First
and foremost, this factor should be interpreted for what the questions ask: an assessment of the
availability of alternative jobs. A perception of a lack of alternative work may bind someone to a
job - a situation with which they may or may not be happy - but this is different from
commitment and may be perceived to exist the very day a person joins an organization (i.e the
"only game in town" phenomenon). If other jobs became available, a person would have more
choice and be free to leave.
That said, it should be noted that a characteristic of persons with "negative" commitment
- persons who feel stuck in a work situation - is to see themselves as having no choice but to stay
where they are. In rationalizing their behavior, it is likely that they will describe themselves as
having no alternatives or none that will make up "investments" linked to their current jobs.
 To some extent then, the "low alternatives" factor acts as a surrogate measure of negative
commitment. The negative correlation (r=-.21) between this factor and the eight item affective
(ACS) factor now makes sense. If in fact the two "types" of commitment are related but
differentiated by evaluation - "two sides of the same coin", so to speak - an inverse relationship
is to be expected.
Of equal interest is the "high sacrifice" factor which pertains to losses associated with
leaving the organization (i.e. breaking the commitment). This factor appears to offer an
appropriate method of examining the degree to which investments or "side-bets" affect
membership commitment - a question that still commands considerable research attention
(Dunham et al., 1994; Cohen & Lowenberg, 1990). While the three items here refer to costs and
disruptions associated with leaving, they don't necessarily imply that someone facing such costs
feels negatively about the organization. Someone with a positive sense of attachment would also
perceive costs and disruptions associated with leaving, such as loss of future job satisfaction, loss
of good working relationships, or loss of opportunity for personal and career growth.
The "high sacrifice" factor, therefore, appears to target commitment apart from
evaluation. In retrospect, it is not surprising that McGee and Ford found a positive correlation
(r=.34) between this factor and the ACS factor. Both, after all, measured commitment, but the
ACS, like the OCQ, included the constraint that commitment be evaluated in a positive light,
thus limiting the magnitude of the correlation.
One of the consequences of the juxtaposition of affective and continuance commitment in
research has been that continuance commitment has often been likened to commitment with a
negative cast to it. It is better described as attitude neutral and related to membership, which
would explain a low but significant correlation (r=.20) found between continuance and the OCQ
by Angle & Lawson (1993). The fact that people don't often view their commitments in a neutral
light has contributed to the belief in a multi-construct typology. The lack of an inverse
relationship between affective and continuance commitment measures is due to the fact that
continuance commitment was never intended to be a measure of negatively evaluated
commitment.
Together, the issues of "terms" and "evaluation" have been incorporated differently into
the commitment constructs, creating an illusion of at least two distinct types of commitment - an
illusion that has been nurtured and reified through dozens of studies on commitment. Individual
commitments certainly differ, depending upon both terms and evaluation, but it becomes a
misleading presumption when individual differences get lumped together into supposedly
distinct and rigid types of organizational commitment - "types" more accurately perceived as two
outlooks on a single phenomenon.

RESEARCH STRATEGY IMPLICATIONS

The multidimensional approach to organizational commitment (Dunham et al, 1994,

Allen and Meyer, 1990), valuable from the point of view of identifying correlates of varying
outlooks on a commitment, essentially defines separate types of commitment that a person may
or may not hold towards an organization. Presumably, a person may be committed in multiple
ways towards a particular focus. In the alternative perspective discussed herein, a person is (or is
not) committed to a particular focus, and if committed is seen as capable of evaluating that
commitment differently over time and adjusting effort and behavior to fit a changing evaluation.
Under this perspective, "affective commitment" represents positively evaluated
commitment with terms pertaining to membership and goal/value support. "Continuance
commitment" deals with membership terms only and excludes evaluation considerations.
"Normative commitment" appears to be a combination of personal values and a redundancy of
terms, since the idea that one ought to keep a commitment is true by definition. The high
correlations between normative commitment and both affective and continuance commitment
(r=.37, r=.40 respectively) reported by Angle and Lawson (1993) should come as no surprise.
For research purposes, useful commitment measures must have a focus, they must specify
terms, and they must include a sense of pledge or obligation. In this article, the focus has been
the organization. This focus seems straightforward enough until one asks the question, just what
does "organization" mean to an average member and how does someone make a pledge to an
organization? Mowday et al. (1982) drew attention to the values and goals of the organization
and suggested that committed persons develop a sense of value and goal congruence with the
organization. Kanter (1968) added the idea of "cohesion commitment" in which the obligation is
to other organizational members. In addition, then, to the term "organization", other references -
"goals and values", "people" - may help define and clarify focus in commitment measures.
With regards to obligation and terms, it is suggested here that measures include items that
tap attitudes and behavioral intentions pertaining to prescribed terms. Use of term-specific
component measures will help avoid problems with score interpretation. One component
measure can address terms related to support of goals and values and willingness to expend effort
on their behalf. A second component measure can address terms related to continued
membership. A third component measure can address terms related to support of people in the
organization. The use of component measures allows for the possibility of patterns of change in
component or subscale scores which could be used in an additive fashion to assess "global
organizational commitment" if so desired. All measures must include a sense of obligation and
engagement, the essence of commitment. In addition, it is suggested that measures avoid
affective slants that would tend to exclude persons who might be committed but who do not hold
highly favorable evaluations of their commitments. Table 1 contains sample commitment
measures.
The CCS scale, which its high-sacrifice and low alternatives factors, appears to be an
appropriate scale for measuring membership commitment without reference to evaluation. Use
of the OCQ and ACS is feasible to the extent that one recognizes that a difference exists between
commitment and "affective commitment" and one feels a dual-term construct is appropriate to
the situation.

CONCLUSION

A person's commitment to an organization - or to any object, person, cause, etc. - is a

complex phenomenon subject to changing influences both internal (psychological) and external
(circumstantial) that affect both how a person views a commitment and goes about meeting the
terms. Within this complexity is an underlying notion about what "commitment" means,
grounded in its basic definition. Perhaps the essence of this concept is the idea of continuity of
action even in the face of fluctuating circumstances and feelings.
This definition of commitment, as a pledge of involvement, should serve as a building
block for knowledge of commitment in organizations. It should tie commitment research
together, rather than serve as a launch pad for different types of commitment. Certainly
commitments differ depending upon the focus and the terms involved (Morrow, 1983). Beyond
that they will appear to differ depending upon how persons form and later evaluate them. But to
allow differing evaluations to describe types of commitment is to ignore the point that the
obligation in a commitment precedes or "outranks" evaluation. The strength of the phenomenon
is that it binds a person to a course of action, regardless of evaluation. That is what makes it
such a valuable component of so many relationships and desirable from the point of view of
parties in a business relationship.
Of interest to practitioners may be how organizations could develop commitment to one
set of terms but not necessarily some other set. Indications are that the goal component of
commitment is linked to desirable, job-related outcomes (Meyer et al. 1989). Membership
commitment, even favorably evaluated, is not necessarily a positive for the organization.
Computer software firms, consulting firms, and media firms among others, sometimes referred to
as "revolving door" companies, often seek goal commitment without membership commitment
and find it to their benefit to draw a distinction.
One strategy for developing commitment would be to induce persons to make pledges, or
to engage in behaviors with committing implications. In organizations, most if not all of what a
person does will be perceived as role-related behavior linked to job expectations. If not
voluntary, it has lower potential "committing power". Inducing employees to act beyond normal
role expectations, without requiring them to do so, has the power to build goal commitment.
Examples may be found in the kinds of minor, helpful acts which O'Reilly and Chatman (1986)
labeled "pro-social behavior" and Smith, Organ, and Near (1983) described as "organizational
citizenship behaviors" - acts of cooperation, altruism, and spontaneous unrewarded help. Such
seemingly minor acts can have the effect of declaring a person's position towards job, place of
work, or co-workers, thereby initiating commitment. In O'Reilly and Chatman's two-part study
of the relationship among dimensions of commitment and pro-social behavior, links were found
between both an internalization of and identification with organizational values and pro-social
behavior. But, whereas O'Reilly and Chatman saw pro-social behavior as an outcome of
commitment, the behavioral approach suggests that it is as apt to generate commitment. O'Reilly
and Chatman acknowledge that "respondents... having once engaged in extrarole activities (may)
cognitively re-evaluate or justify these behaviors by reporting increased identification and
internalization" (p.497).
Perhaps as challenging as developing the kinds of programs and policies that encourage
commitment development in the first place is finding ways to help ensure that members sustain a
positive, enthusiastic outlook towards organizational goals and pursuits. As suggested herein, it
is the evaluation of a commitment that most impacts the manner in which the terms of the
commitment are met. Failure to sustain enthusiasm and involvement could not only lead to loss
of goal-committed members, it could also contribute to a body of dissatisfied employees with
little inclination either to be productive or look elsewhere for employment.
 Appendix 1: COMMITMENT SCALES

A. Goal Commitment

1. This organization actively pursues goals that I can believe in and support.
2. As part of being a member here, I feel a sense of obligation to support and advance the goals
of this organization.
3. As far as I'm concerned, my personal goals come before company or departmental goals. (R)
4. I frequently find myself at odds with the plans, goals, and policies of my unit/department. (R)
5. I am generally willing to put my self-interest aside when it comes to furthering the actual goals
and objectives of my unit/department.
6. I am dedicated to my job at this organization.

B. Membership Commitment

1. I anticipate staying with this organization for at least the next several years (or until retirement
if that comes first).
2. I have no plans to actively search for job alternatives in the near future.
3. If I were offered a similar job at a different organization in the same area, with slightly higher
pay, I would probably accept it. (R)
4. If an organization in the same geographic area were to offer me a more appealing job at
current salary, I would probably accept it. (R)
5. If I had the chance to move to a similar job at about the same pay but in a more dynamic,
growth-oriented organization, I would probably take it. (R)
6. For better or for worse, I am with this organization as long as there's a job for me here.

C. People Commitment

1. When asked, I am generally willing to take time to help other people get tasks accomplished.
2. I take an interest in helping others perform to the best of their abilities.
3. I am generally willing to listen to other people's problems and issues concerning their jobs
here.
4. I feel a sense of obligation to help certain people in this organization put in a good
performance.

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