PRESUMPTIVE DEATH

The Family Code clearly provides that a court declaration of presumptive

death of a spouse is indispensable before the other spouse may marry
again. Failure to comply with this requirement results not only in a void
second marriage, but also opens the guilty spouse to a criminal charge
of bigamy. Article 41 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a

previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration
of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the

preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance
of the absent spouse.
In other words, an absence of 4 years, it being unknown whether the
other spouse is still alive and the present spouse has a well-founded
belief that the missing spouse is already dead, is a ground to ask the
court for a declaration of presumptive death (this is a summary
proceeding, not a special proceeding). The 4-year period, however, is
reduced to 2 years in the following circumstances:

1. A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane

which is missing, who has not been heard of for [two] years since the
loss of the vessel or aeroplane.

2. A person in the armed forces who has taken part in a war, and has
been missing for [two] years.

3. A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances

and his existence has not been known for [two] years.
There are 4 requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years,
or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is
danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
Code.

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry.

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee
is dead.
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

As mentioned above, failure to seek a judicial declaration of

presumptive death opens a party who contracts a second marriage to a
charge of bigamy. The reason is this –

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two
willing spouses and an approving State. On marriage, the parties
assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on
every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage
to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious that
the law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of
the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse after the lapse of the period
provided for under the law. One such means is the requirement of the
declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent
spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent
marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse.
Indeed, “men readily believe what they wish to be true,” is a maxim of
the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first
because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make
the existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain
extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but
by the subjective condition of individuals. Only with such proof can
marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages.
Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of
marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but
upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial
cognizance, namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent
spouse.
To be sure, this appears to be a relatively easier way of contracting
another marriage. The problem, however, is that the second marriage is
easily voided by the appearance of the “absentee” spouse (void ab
initio or void from the beginning if both parties to the second marriage
contracted the marriage in “bad faith”). The Family Code provides:

Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article

shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of
reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall

be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due
notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without
prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in
case such fact is disputed.
So, is a judicial declaration of presumptive death better than seeking an
annulment or a declaration of nullity of the second marriage? There are
no hard and fast rules. Suffice it to state that “the automatic
termination of the second marriage upon the reappearance of the
absent or missing spouse is a risk that the paties to said marriage
knew they were taking when they entered into such marriage, so that if
it does happen, they have no reason to complain” (Justice Alicia
Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines).

Can the future spouses agree on the property relations during

marriage?

Yes. A man and a woman who are planning to get married may enter
into a contract defining or providing for their property relations during
marriage. This is called a prenuptial agreement” or “marriage
settlement.”

In the absense of a marriage settlement or prenuptial agreement, what

governs the property relations between the spouses?
In the absence of a marriage settlement (or when the regime agreed
upon is void), the property relations between the spouses shall be
governed by the system of absolute community of property. In other
words, the absolute community of property is the default system under
the Family Code. Prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (3 August 1988),
the default system is the conjugal partnership of gains, oftentimes
referred to as CPG by law students and lawyers.
When should a marriage settlement be executed?

The marriage settlement or prenuptial agreement, or any modication

thereof, must be made BEFORE the celebration of the marriage.

Could we just agree and sign a prenup document after the marriage?
It is called a “prenuptial” agreement because it must be executed
BEFORE marriage. Agreements or changes after the marriage
ceremony, except in cases of judicial separation of property during the
marriage, are not valid. This means that the spouses could not simply
agree later on to change their property relations, except upon a petition
filed in court.
What is the form of the marriage settlement?

The marriage settlement and any modification thereof shall be in

writing, signed by the parties and executed before the celebration of
the marriage. Also, before the marriage settlement may prejudice third
persons, like creditors, the marriage settlement must be registered in
the local civil registry where the marriage contract is recorded, as well
as in the proper registries of properties.

What about minors who enter into marriage or persons sentenced with
civil interdiction?

The law generally speaks of “minors” as those who are under 18 years
old. For purposes of the provisions on marriage settlement, however, a
“minor” refers to those at least 18 years old but below 21, who needs
parental consent to get married. Those who are designated by law to
give consent, primarily the parents, must also sign the marriage
settlement in order for it to be valid.

On the other hand, for the validity of marriage settlements executed by

persons on whom the sentence of civil interdiction has been
pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, the guardian
appointed by a competent court must be made a party.

What happens if the marriage ceremony is called off?

A marriage settlement, including any donations by reason of marriage
(donations propter nuptias, which will be discussed later in Part 5), is
rendered void if the marriage does not take place. An exception to this
rule are those stipulations that do not depend on the celebration of the
marriages, such as the recognition of an illegitimate child.
What are the property relations that the future spouses may provide in
a marriage settlement?

The future spouses may agree to the following: (1) System of absolute
community; (2) Conjugal partnership of gains; (3) Complete separation
of property; or (4) any other regime or system, so long as it is not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
There’s no sense entering into a marriage settlement when the future
spouses prefer the system of absolute community, as it is the default
system in the absence of a valid agreement between the spouses. The
spouses may, however, want to provide for certain modifications to any
of the regimes or system stated above.

What law governs the property relations of the spouses?

In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the

property relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws,
regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage and their
residence. This rule shall not apply: (1) Where both spouses are aliens;
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property
not situated in the Philippines and executed in the country where the
property is located; and (3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of
contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting property situated
in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its
extrinsic validity.

What is the system of absolute community?

This is one of the regimes or systems of property relations between the

spouses and the default system in the absence of a prenuptial
agreement or when the agreed system is null and void. This system
commences at the precise moment that the marriage is celebrated, and
any stipulation for the commencement of the community regime at any
other time is void.

In a nutshell, the husband and the wife are considered as co-owners of

all properties they bring into the marriage (those that they owned
before the marriage), as well as the properties acquired during the
marriage, except for certain properties express excluded by law (listed
below). The rules on co-ownership applies in all matters not provided
under the Family Code.

What constitutes community property?

Unless otherwise provided by law or in the marriage settlements, the

community property shall consist of all the property owned by the
spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired
thereafter. Property acquired during the marriage is PRESUMED to
belong to the community, unless it is proved that it is one of those
excluded therefrom.

What properties are excluded from the community

property?

(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title (by

donation and by testate/intestate succession) by either spouse, and the
fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly
provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of
the community property;

(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However,
jewelry shall form part of the community property;

(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has
legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as
the income, if any, of such property.

Can a spouse waive his/her share in the community

property during marriage?

No. Except in case of judicial separation of property, any waiver of

rights, shares and effects of the absolute community of property during
the marriage can be made.

What are the charges and obligations of the absolute

community?

The absolute community of property shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate
children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children
shall be governed by the provisions of the Family Code on Support;

(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by
both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other;

(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the

consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited;

(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor
repairs, upon the community property;

(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage
upon the separate property of either spouse used by the family;

(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a

professional or vocational course, or other activity for self-
improvement;

(7) Ante-nuptial debts (debts contracted before the marriage) of either

spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;

(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of

their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of
commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other
activity for self-improvement;

(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under
No. 7 above, the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-
delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of
the debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall be considered as
advances to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon
liquidation of the community; and

(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found
to be groundless.

If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing

liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.

If a spouse incurs gambling loses in a casino, can

he/she charge the amount to the community
property?
No. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance,
betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling, whether permitted
or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be
charged to the community but any winnings therefrom shall form part of
the community property.

Who administers and enjoys the community property?

Both spouses jointly enjoy the administration and enjoyment of the

community property. In case of disagreement, however, the husband’s
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date
of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one
spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration.

These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without

authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

What is the rule on disposition of properties of the

spouses?

Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in the

community property. This is possible because the will takes effect only
upon the death. However, neither spouse may donate any community
property without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may,
without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the
community property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or
family distress.

When is the absolute community terminated?

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage.

What happens if the spouses separate in fact?

The separation in fact or separation de facto (as opposed to legal
separation), between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of
absolute community, except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein,
without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;

(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is
required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary
proceeding;

(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate

property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the
family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary
proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any
specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or
proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share.

Is separation de facto different from abandonment?

Yes. In a separation de facto, the spouses may still be complying with
their duty to support each other and their children. The rule in case of
abandonment is provided below.
What if a spouse abandons the other?

If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply

with his or her obligations to the family (“obligations to the family” refer
to marital, parental or property relations), the aggrieved spouse may
petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or
for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community,
subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.

A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has
left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse
who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has
failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of
returning to the conjugal dwelling.
What is the procedure after the dissolution of the
absolute community regime?

(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties

of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.

(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid
out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph
of Article 94 of the Family Code.

(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall

thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall
constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between
husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed
upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary
waiver of such share provided in the Family Code. For purpose of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with
Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase
in value between the market value of the community property at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time
of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered
upon partition, in accordance with Article 51 of the Family Code.

(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the
properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated
shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven
years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has
decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall
decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.

If a spouse dies, how is the community property

liquidated?

Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property

shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is
instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the community property
either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of
the deceased spouse.

What happens if the foregoing procedure in the

immediately preceding paragraph is not carried
out?

If the procedure on liquidation, as outlined above, is not followed: (a)

any disposition or encumbrance involving community property by the
surviving spouse shall be void; and (b) any subsequent marriage shall
be governed by the mandatory regime of complete separation of
property.

What is the conjugal partnership of gains?

Oftentimes referred to as the CPG, it is one of the property relations
between the spouses, under which the husband and wife place in a
common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their
separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses
through their efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage
or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or
both spouses shall be divided equally between them, unless otherwise
agreed in the marriage settlements. In other words, the following are
placed in a common fund:

1. the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate

properties; and
2. those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by
chance.

In what instances shall the regime of CPG apply?

It applies only when the future spouses agree to it in the marriage
settlement, if any. It also applies to conjugal partnerships of gains
already established between spouses before the effectivity of the Family
Code, without prejudice to vested rights. This is the default property
relationship under the Civil Code, which was changed to that of
absolute community of property under the Family Code.
When does the CPG begin?

It begins at the precise moment when the marriage is celebrated,

exactly like in absolute community of property.

Can a spouse waive his/her share in the community property during

marriage?

No. Except in case of judicial separation of property, any waiver of

rights, shares and effects of the absolute community of property during
the marriage can be made.

Are the rules on ordinary partnership applicable to the conjugal

partnership of gains?
As a rule, yes, but only if not in what is expressly provided in the
pertinent provisions of the Family Code or by the spouses in their marriage
settlements.
What are the exclusive property of each spouse?

(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;

(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title
(through pure liberality, as in donation and testate/intestate
succession);

(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by

exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouses; and
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the
husband.

What is the significance of having an exclusive property?

The spouses retain the ownership, possession, administration and

enjoyment of their exclusive properties. A spouse may also mortgage,
encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive
property, without the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in
court to litigate with regard to the same.

Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the administration of

his or her exclusive property to the other by means of a public
instrument, which shall be recorded in the registry of property of the
place the property is located. However, the alienation of any exclusive
property of a spouse administered by the other automatically
terminates the administration over such property and the proceeds of
the alienation shall be turned over to the owner-spouse.

What properties belong to the conjugal partnership?

(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense
of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or
for only one of the spouses;

(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either
or both of the spouses;

(3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the
marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits from the
exclusive property of each spouse;

(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law
awards to the finder or owner of the property where the treasure is
found;

(5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting;

(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess

of the number of each kind brought to the marriage by either spouse;
and

(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from

gambling or betting. However, losses therefrom shall be borne
exclusively by the loser-spouse.

What is the presumption regarding properties acquired during

marriage?
All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one
or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is
proved.

What is the rule in case of purchase by installment?

Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds of

either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the
buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to
the conjugal partnership if such ownership was vested during the
marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by
either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon
liquidation of the partnership.

What is the rule in case a spouse has a credit payable to him over time?

Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period of time belongs

to one of the spouses, the sums which may be collected during the
marriage in partial payments or by installments on the principal shall be
the exclusive property of the spouse. However, interests falling due
during the marriage on the principal shall belong to the conjugal
partnership.

What is the rule if improvements are made on that exclusive property

using conjugal funds or through the acts or efforts of either or both
spouses?

The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made

on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the
partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses shall
pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to the original owner-spouse,
subject to the following rules:

1. When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership

and any resulting increase in value are MORE than the value of the
property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of
the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership.

2. When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership

and any resulting increase in value are LESS than the value of the
property at the time of the improvement, the entire property shall
remain with the owner-spouse.

3. In either case, the owner-spouse or the conjugal partnership, as the

case may be, is entitled to reimbursement for the value of the principal
property or the improvement, as the case may be.

4. It doesn’t matter if the improvements are for utility or adornment.

What are the charges upon and obligations of the conjugal partnership?

The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate
children shall be governed by the provisions of the Family Code on
Support;

(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the
consent of the other;

(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the

consent of the other to the extent that the family may have benefited;

(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor
repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;

(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the
marriage upon the separate property of either spouse;

(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a

professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;

(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded

to the benefit of the family;

(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of

their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of
commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other
activity for self-improvement; and

(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found
to groundless.

If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing

liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance
with their separate properties.

What are the rules concerning personal debts contracted before or

during the marriage?

1. As a rule, the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband

or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership properties.

2. However, these debts shall be charged to the conjugal partnership

properties insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
3. If the spouse has no exclusive property, it may be charged to the
conjugal partnership, subject to the provisions below.

What are the rules concerning fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed
on each spouse?

These cannot be charged to the partnership. However, the payment of

personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of
fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of
illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the
partnership assets after the charges/obligations enumerated in above
have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation
of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid
for the purpose above-mentioned.

What is the rule in case of winnings or losses in gambling?

Any loss incurred by a spouse during the marriage in any game of

chance or in betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling
whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by that spouse,
and shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership. Any winnings, on
the other hand, shall form part of the conjugal partnership property.

Who has the authority to administer the conjugal partnership property?

The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall

belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date
of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to

participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or
the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.

Can either spouse make donations of conjugal partnership property?

As a rule, neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property

without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without
the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the conjugal
partnership property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or
family distress.

When does the conjugal partnership terminate?

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or

(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage.

Does the separation in fact or de facto separation between the spouses

affect the conjugal partnership?

No. However, the following are the effects:

(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein,
without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;

(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is
required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary
proceeding;

(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the

separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or
encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use
the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share.

What is the rule if a spouse abandons the other?

If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply

with his or her obligation to the family (referring to marital, parental or
property relations), the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for
receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be
the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to
such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.

A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has

left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse
who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has
failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of
returning to the conjugal dwelling.

What is the applicable procedure in the event of dissolution of the

conjugal partnership regime?
The following procedure shall apply:

(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties

of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.

(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of

personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the
conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.

(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive
funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her
exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in
the conjugal partnership.

(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid
out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties.

(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall

thereafter be delivered to each of them.

(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the
loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family,
belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to
said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.

(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall

constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband
and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in
the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver
or forfeiture of such share as provided in the Family Code.

(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered

upon partition.

(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot
on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the
parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven
years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has
decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall
decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.

If a spouse dies, how is the conjugal partnership liquidated?

Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership

property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is
instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership
property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the
death of the deceased spouse.

What happens if the foregoing procedure in the immediately preceding

paragraph is not carried out?

If the procedure on liquidation, as outlined above, is not followed: (a)

any disposition or encumbrance involving conjugal partnership property
by the surviving spouse shall be void; and (b) any subsequent marriage
shall be governed by the mandatory regime of complete separation of
property.
How is support charged during the liquidation?

From the common mass of property support shall be given to the

surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the
inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but
from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which
exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.

COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIPS

Money is [one of] the root[s] of all kinds of relationship problems, says
an article at the Family Relationships site. In my modest years of law
practice, I can say that among the most bitter confrontations (in and
out of court) relate to property/money/inheritance issues between
members of the family.
Under the Family Code of the Philippines , property matters between the
husband and wife are set forth in relative detail, e.g., the forms and
requisites of a marriage settlement or ante-nuptial agreement,
donations by reason of marriage, the “default” property regime of
absolute community of property (vis-a-vis separation of property, and
conjugal partnership of gains), support for the spouse and the children,
and the effects of legal separation and annulment of marriage on the
spouses’ properties. I’m still trying to decide if I should further discuss
any of these topics (also, the rules on succession/inheritance are
treated in other laws/issuances, and may be discussed separately in
other entries).
For this entry, allow me to focus on something that appears to be
increasingly common nowadays — the “live-in” relationship, also called
“common-law marriage“. This is governed by Article 147 of the Family
Code, which reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or
all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share
shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
The Family Code (Art. 147) recognizes, and expressly governs the property
relations in, the relationship where a man and a woman live exclusively
with each other just like a husband and wife, but without the benefit of
marriage (or when the marriage is void). It is required, however, that
both must be capacitated, or has no legal impediment, to marry each
other (for instance, couples under a “live-in” relationship will not be
covered under this provision if one or both has a prior existing
marriage). In this situation, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-
ownership. Any property acquired during the union is presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts. As to the homemaker, or the
one who cared for and maintained the family household, he/she is still
considered to have jointly contributed to the acquisition of a property,
even if he/she did not directly participate in the property’s acquisition.
How about if one or both partners are not capacitated to marry, as
when one (or both) has an existing or prior marriage which has not been
annulled/declared void? This is covered under Art. 148 of the Family Code,
which reads:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the
co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
parties are in bad faith.

In other words, under Art. 148, only the properties acquired through
their ACTUAL JOINT contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned by them in common (in proportion to their actual contributions).
There is no presumption that properties were acquired through the
partners’ joint effort. Please also note that if one has a prior marriage,
his/her share shall be forfeited in favor of that previous marriage (as an
aside, the children under the second relationship shall be considered as
illegitimate).

So, as previously stated in this Forum, put your (first) house in order
first. No need to rush; love is patient. It can wait.
Would it make any difference if I marry abroad where divorce is
allowed?
No. Filipinos are covered by this prohibition based on the “nationality
principle”, regardless of wherever they get married (and regardless
where they get a decree of divorce). Discussions relating to Overseas
Filipinos or OFWs are transferred in Part V.
Is “annulment” different from a “declaration of nullity” of marriage?

Yes. In essence, “annulment” applies to a marriage that is considered

valid, but there are grounds to nullify it. A “declaration of nullity” of
marriage, on the other hand, applies to marriages that are void or
invalid from the very beginning. In other words, it was never valid in the
first place.

Also, an action for annulment of voidable marriages may prescribe,

while an action for declaration of nullity of marriage does not prescribe.

So, if a marriage is void from the very beginning (void ab initio), there’s
no need to file anything in court?
For purposes of remarriage, there must be a court order declaring the
marriage as null and void. Entering into a subsequent marriage without
such court declaration means that: (a) the subsequent marriage is void;
and (b) the parties open themselves to a possible charge of bigamy.
What if no marriage certificate could be found?
Justice Sempio-Dy, in the “Handbook of on the Family Code of the
Philippines” (p. 26, 1997 reprint), says: “The marriage certificate is not
an essential or formal requisite of marriage without which the marriage
will be void. An oral marriage is, therefore, valid, and failure of a party
to sign the marriage certificate or the omission of the solemnizing
officer to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the proper local
civil registrar, does not invalidate the marriage. Also the mere fact that
no record of marriage can be found, does not invalidate the marriage
provided all the requisites for its validity are present.” (Citations
omitted)
Can I file a petition (annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage) even if I am in a foreign country?
Yes, the rules recognize and allow the filing of the petition by Filipinos
who are overseas.
What are the grounds for annulment?
1. Lack of parental consent in certain cases . If a party is 18 years or
over, but below 21, and the marriage was solemnized without the
consent of the parents/guardian. However, the marriage is validated if,
upon reaching 21, the spouses freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband and wife.
2. Insanity. A marriage may be annulled if, at the time of marriage,
either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife.
3. Fraud. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such
party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the
fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. Fraud
includes: (i) non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of
the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude; (ii) concealment by
the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant
by a man other than her husband; (iii) concealment of sexually
transmissible disease or STD, regardless of its nature, existing at the
time of the marriage; or (iv) concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the
marriage. However, no other misrepresentation or deceit as to
character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud
as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
4. Force, intimidation or undue influence . If the consent of either party
was obtained by any of these means, except in cases wherein the force,
intimidation or undue influence having disappeared or ceased, the
complaining party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife.
5. Impotence. At the time of marriage, either party was physically
incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable. Impotence is
different from being infertile.
6. STD. If, at the time of marriage, either party was afflicted with a
sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be
incurable. If the STD is not serious or is curable, it may still constitute
fraud (see No. 3 above).
What if a spouse discovers that his/her spouse is a homosexual or is
violent, can he/she ask for annulment?

Homosexuality or physical violence, by themselves, are not sufficient to

nullify a marriage. At the very least, however, these grounds may be
used as basis for legal separation.

How is “legal separation” different from annulment?

The basic difference is this – in legal separation, the spouses are still
considered married to each other, and, thus, may not remarry.
Is legal separation faster than annulment?

Not necessarily. The petitioner in a legal separation, just like in an

annulment, is still required to prove the allegations contained in the
petition. More important is the mandatory 6-month “cooling off” period
in legal separation cases. This is not required in annulment or
declaration of nullity cases. The court is required to schedule the pre-
trial conference not earlier than six (6) months from the filing of the
petition. This period is meant to give the spouses an opportunity for
reconciliation.

What are the grounds for legal separation?

1. Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed

against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner.

2. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to

change religious or political affiliation.

3. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common

child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or
connivance in such corruption or inducement.

4. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more

than six years, even if pardoned.

5. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent.

6. Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent.

7. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage,

whether in the Philippines or abroad.

8. Sexual infidelity or perversion.

9. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner.

10. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause

for more than one year.

The term “child” shall include a child by nature or by adoption.

Should I file a petition for legal separation, can I use my own sexual
infidelity as a ground?

It is interesting to note that among the grounds for legal separation, as

listed above, only “sexual infidelity or perversion” is not qualified by the
phrase “of the respondent” or “by respondent”. This may give the
impression that the sexual infidelity of the petitioner, or the one who
filed the petition, may be used as a ground in legal separation. We must
consider, however, that legal separation is filed by the innocent spouse
or the “aggrieved party” against the guilty spouse.

What happens if after learning that your husband (or wife) is unfaithful
(No. 8 above), you still co-habitate with him/her?
This may be construed as condonation, which is a defense in actions for
legal separation. In addition to condonation, the following are the
defenses in legal separation:

1. Consent.
2. Connivance (in the commission of the offense or act constituting the
ground for legal separation).
3. Mutual guilt (both parties have given ground for legal separation).
4. Collusion (to obtain decree of legal separation).
5. Prescription (5 years from the occurence of the cause for legal
separation).

If you’re separated from your spouse for 4 years, is that a sufficient

ground for annulment?
No. De facto separation is not a ground for annulment. However, the
absence of 2 or 4 years, depending on the circumstances, may be
enough to ask the court for a declaration of presumptive death of the
“absent spouse”, in which case the petitioner may again re-marry.
See Can someone remarry without going to court due to absence or
separation?
What are the grounds for declaration of nullity of marriage?
1. Minority (those contracted by any party below 18 years of age even
with the consent of parents or guardians).
2. Lack of authority of solemnizing officer (those solemnized by any
person not legally authorized to perform marriages, unless such
marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good
faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so).
3. Absence of marriage license (except in certain cases).
4. Bigamous or polygamous marriages (except in cases where the other
spouse is declared as presumptively dead).
5. Mistake in identity (those contracted through mistake of one
contracting party as to the identity of the other).

6. After securing a judgement of annulment or of asolute nullity of

mariage, the parties, before entering into the subsequent marriage,
failed to record with the appropriate registry the: (i) partition and
distribute the properties of the first marriage; and (ii) delivery of the
children’s presumptive legitime.

7. Incestous marriages (between ascendants and descendants of any

degree, between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood).
8. Void by reason of public policy. Marriages between (i) collateral blood
relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
degree; (ii) step-parents and step-children; (iii) parents-in-law and
children-in-law; (iv) adopting parent and the adopted child; (v) surviving
spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child; (vi) surviving
spouse of the adopted child and the adopter; (vii) an adopted child and
a legitimate child of the adopter; (viii) adopted children of the same
adopter; and (ix) parties where one, with the intention to marry the
other, killed that other person’s spouse, or his or her own spouse.
9. Psychological Incapacity. Psychological incapacity, which a ground
for annulment of marriage, contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will,
on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment,
by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity. We already discussed the guidelines and illustrations of
psychological incapacity, including a case involving habitual lying, as
well as the steps and procedure in filing a petition.

Please note, however, that there are still other grounds to declare a
marriage as null and void.

——————

Browse through the comments below to check if your questions are

similar to that of others. Other common issues are consolidated in Part
II, Part III, Part IV, Part V, Costs in seeking an Annulment, and other
related posts. You can check the Related Posts at the bottom of each
post.
Could someone automatically remarry after being separated, or when
the other spouse had been “absent”, for several years? There are a
number of questions along this line that were posted in the Forum.
While there’s already an initial discussion on this, the question keeps
cropping up, so let’s put this issue to rest once and for all.

The confusion appears to be based on Article 83 of the Civil Code,

which reads:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any other person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
xxx

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of
the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent
for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed
to be so by the spouse present at the time of the contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any
of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
If you stumbled on this provision, you may have this idea that a spouse
can remarry even without securing a judicial declaration of presumptive
death. In other words, there is NO need to go to court and it’s enough
that any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there be no news
that such absentee is still alive; (b) the absentee is generally
considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present; and
(c) the absentee is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code.

This understanding would have been correct, except that Article 83 of

the Civil Code was superseded by the Family Code, which now provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of

a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the

preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance
of the absent spouse.

As the law now stands, a married person must, for purposes of

remarriage, file the necessary action in court and ask for a declaration
of presumptive death of the “absent” spouse. The crucial differences
under the Civil Code and Family Code provisions are:

1. Under the Family Code, the time required for the presumption to arise
has been shortened to 4 years.

2. Under the Family Code, there is need for a judicial declaration of

presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry.

3. Under the Family Code, a stricter standard is imposed: there must be

a “well founded belief” that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. A married
person must conduct a search for his missing spouse with such
diligence as to give rise to a “well-founded belief” that he/she is dead.
If you need an extended discussion on declaration of presumptive
death, please click here to read the previous article entitled:
“Presumptive death of a spouse for subsequent marriage.” On the other
hand, just to be clear: no matter how long a spouse is “absent”, the
present spouse CANNOT remarry unless there is a judicial declaration
of presumptive death. (Reference: Republic vs. Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053,
17 March 1993)
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Psychological incapacity, which a ground for annulment of marriage

(which is different from divorce), contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will,
on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment,
by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity.

Among the grounds for annulment of marriage, psychological incapacity

is the more (if not the most) commonly used. It is also one of the more
controversial provisions of the Family Code (Article 36). The guidelines
(shortened here) in the interpretation and application of Article 36 were
handed down by the Supreme Court in Molina:

1. The plaintiff (the spouse who filed the petition in court) has burden of
showing the nullity of the marriage. Our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family, so any doubt is resolved in favor of the
existence/continuation of the marriage.

2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically

or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological –
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.

3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the

celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job.

5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal

of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

Let’s examine some recent Supreme Court cases on what constitutes

or doesn’t constitute psychological incapacity.

In Antonio vs. Reyes (G.R. No. 155800, 10 March 2006), the Supreme
Court sustained the nullity of the marriage based on the psychological
incapacity of the wife (respondent). As concluded by the psychiatrist,
the wife’s repeated lying is abnormal and pathological, and amounts to
psychological incapacity (for the “digest” or a more detailed discussion
of the case, click here).
On the other hand, in Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano (G.R. No. 149498,
20 May 2004), the wife alleged taht her husband, a Japanese, failed to
meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He
abandoned them a month after the marriage. The wife sent him several
letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did
not care at all to see his family. However, while the husband’s act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible, it was never alleged nor
proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Aside from the
abandonment, no other evidence was presented showing that the
husband’s behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. It’s not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty
as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.

Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical

examination, it would have greatly helped the wife’s case had she
presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness.
This could have been done through an expert witness.

Just recently, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision ( Antonio vs.

Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, 10 March 2006) in connection with a petition for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 (psychological incapacity) of
the Family Code. The Supreme Court sustained the nullity of the marriage
based on the psychological incapacity of the wife (respondent). As
concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated
lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological
incapacity.
The discussion below is, in the parlance of law students, a “ digest” (a
shortened/edited version of the case). It might be a little boring (at
least you’ve been forewarned).

In that petition, the petitioner-husband claimed that respondent

persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things, including:
(1) she introduced her illegitimate child to her petitioner-husband as an
adopted child of her family; (2) she misrepresented herself as a
psychiatrist, with a degree in psychology; (3) she falsely claimed to be a
singer or a free-lance voice talent; (4) she invented friends and, under
the names of those imaginary friends, sent lengthy letters to petitioner-
husband touting her as the “number one moneymaker” in the
commercial industry worth 2 million; and (5) she represented herself as
a person of greater means, altering her payslip to make it appear that
she earned a higher income.

The Supreme Court decided the petition using the guidelines (click
here) set forth in Molina, thus:
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. The petitioner must be able to
establish the cause of action with preponderance of evidence (however,
any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate
such proofs). The petitioner-husband, apart from his own testimony,
presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s
behavior. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of
psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was
tantamount to psychological incapacity.
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has
been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s
decision. It was shown that respondent has that propensity for telling
lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her
singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent
and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world
of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning
and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and
constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets
of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and
respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such
repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to
psychological incapacity.
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have
clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of
marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious
characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept
petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage as she
only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their
marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is
sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only
a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left
his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance
of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s
psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent
that any prolonged marital life was dubitable. It should be noted that
the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in
order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate
a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at
least abide by the truth. A person unable to distinguish between fantasy
and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of
the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding
obligations attached to marriage, including parenting.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential
marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code.
Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate
pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by
the Catholic Church. Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of
Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that
such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. In this case, while respondent’s psychosis is
quite grave, the expert witnesses did not explicitly state that the
psychological incapacity was incurable. However, there was a good
reason for such silence.
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the
trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events
transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made
explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other
provision of the Family Code. On the other hand, in Santos (decided in
January 1995), the Supreme Court omitted any reference to incurability
as a characteristic of psychological incapacity. Certainly, Santos did
not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity
be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was
no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the
subsequent promulgation of the trial court’s decision that required a
medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in
1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the
reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca vs. Pesca, the Court countered an argument
that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively with the
observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts
of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in
enacted. Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical
considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that
necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this
case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses
that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable
simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a
declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly
propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there
would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos,
especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the
respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen
the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those
cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is
actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court
level.
Other note-worthy matters:
* The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of
marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has
long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
* The requirement in Molina that the Solicitor General must issue a
certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the
petition was dispensed with in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages). Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the
appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and
to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
* As held in Marcos vs. Marcos, an expert witness need not personally
examine the other spouse in order for the latter to be declared
psychologically incapacitated.
* Article 36, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically
incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of
this constitutional protection of marriage. Void ab initio marriages
under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning
marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for
reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
* The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to
understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability
to comply with them, was affirmed in Molina.
* The definition of psychological incapacity is not cast in intractable
specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be
informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of
each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought,
and experience. The Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear
legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each
situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding
of Article 36.
* The citation of interpretations by canon law experts is unavoidable,
considering that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived
from canon law. It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of
Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent
understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged
that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
* In denying similar petitions, courts favorably cite Sections 1 and 2,
Article XV of the Constitution. While it may appear that the judicial
denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely
enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally
ordained decree of what marriage is. The Constitution itself does not
establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social
institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of
the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the
strategy and the modalities to protect it.

“SC relaxes rules on psychological incapacity as ground to annul

marriages,” says the news title in a popular newspaper. While the news
article does not mention the title of the case, it’s clearly abundant that
it refers to the 2015 case of Valerio E. Kalaw vs. Ma. Elena
Fernandez (G.R. No. 166357, 14 January 2015). Did the Supreme Court, in
the case of Kalaw, “relax” the rules on petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity? Let’s
discuss this question and, at the same time, highlight ten matters that
may be of interest to those seeking answers.
1. The rules provided in Molina remain valid
Practitioners refer to the guidelines for the interpretation and
application of Article 36 as the Molina Doctrine, considering that the set
of guidelines were first compiled in the 1997 case of Republic vs. Court
of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina (G.R. No. 108763). There are
eight guidelines: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity; (2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the
decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time
of the celebration” of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) Such
illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6) The essential marital
obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children; (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts; and, (8) The
trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
In Kalaw, the Supreme Court reiterated its categorical statement, made
in a 2009 case, that “we are not suggesting the abandonment
of Molina in this case.” The set of guidelines in Molina, therefore, stays.
The pronouncement in Kalaw that is closest to “relaxation” of the
guidelines is its reiteration that the “foregoing guidelines have turned
out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically
condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain
rejection.” There is no doubt that the Molina Doctrine is strict, but there
is also no doubt that countless petitions have been granted pursuant to
its guidelines.
The Court did not “relax” the rules when it reconsidered
the Kalaw ruling. On the contrary, the ruling falls under the ambit of
the Molina guidelines. The first time the Supreme Court
decided Kalaw in 2011, with Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo as the
ponente, the Court dismissed the petition for insufficiency of evidence.
There was no sufficient evidence to prove the alleged acts of the
respondent wife — “constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.”
While it was shown that the respondent-wife played mahjong (bringing
the kids with her), the petitioner-husband failed to show the
FREQUENCY of the mahjong sessions. There is no proof that the
“mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her
family.” In other words, the “allegations, which served as the bases or
underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually
proven.”
In 2015, with Justice Lucas Bersamin as ponente, the Supreme Court
reconsidered its earlier decision. The Supreme Court, “lest it be
misunderstood,” explicitly stated that it’s not abandoning Molina. The
Court, bound by the same set of proven facts, clarified that the failure to
show the frequency of mahjong sessions does not preclude a finding of
psychological incapacity. It’s not the FREQUENCY of the mahjong
sessions; it’s the fact that the respondent-wife should “have known that
bringing her children along her children of very tender ages to her
mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and
other vices that would erode their moral fiber.” This, based on the
totality of facts in the case, supports the finding of psychological
incapacity. This ruling is very much consistent with the Molina Doctrine.
There is no “relaxation” of the rules in this respect.
The label that the Court “relaxed” the rules is most likely derived from
the Court’s statement that the rules set forth in Molina are rigid. This is
bolstered by the apparent expression of regret, also reiterated in Kalaw,
that “in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to
impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity.” In my opinion, and as discussed below, the
term “rigid” should not be understood along the lines of “relaxed” as an
antonym.

2. Expert testimony is decisive

If there’s anything in Kalaw that can be construed as a “relaxation” or
departure from the Molina Doctrine, it’s the rule on expert witnesses.
Guideline No. 2 in Molina provides that the “root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly
explained in the decision.” However, it has been established in previous
cases that expert testimony is not a requisite in psychological
incapacity cases. In other words, the absence of an expert witness
does not automatically result to a denial of the petition. In a number of
cases, including the case of Mendoza vs. Republic (G.R. No. 157649, 12
November 2012), the Supreme Court had the occasion to state that “the
expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the
granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,” although the
Court added that “the actual medical examination…was to be dispensed
with only if the totality of evidence presented was enough to support a
finding of his psychological incapacity.” The requirement of the “totality
of evidence” is also not new, having been discussed in similar cases
prior to Kalaw.
Going back to the value of expert testimonies, the Supreme Court
in Kalaw restated the rule that “in the task of ascertaining the presence
of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the
courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of
psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to
inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive
at an intelligent and judicious judgment.” There is no “relaxation” of the
rules in this respect.

Incidentally, in one of our cases, the judge noted that it is for the court
— not the psychologist — to conclude that one or both parties is/are
psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the existence of psychological
incapacity is a legal conclusion, which is within the exclusive province
of the court, but this does not preclude the expert witness from
expressing a similar “opinion,” pointing to the exact condition or
personality disorder of the spouse/s.

3. The psychologist need not personally examine the

incapacitated spouse
The usual objection raised against the testimony of the expert witness,
especially when the services of the expert witness has been obtained
by the petitioner-spouse and there is a conclusion that the respondent-
spouse is psychologically incapacitated, is the usual inability of the
psychologist to examine or interview the respondent spouse. In Kalaw,
the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that “the lack of personal
examination and interview of the person diagnosed with personality
disorder…did not per se invalidate the findings of the experts.” There is
no “relaxation” of the rules in this respect.

The opinion of the expert opinion should not be lightly brushed aside in
the presence of the “totality of evidence” in the case. This is the reason
why, in the cases we are handling, we require the client to present
other witnesses to corroborate the client’s testimony on the facts
which constitute the basis for the finding of the personality disorder
and, ultimately, psychological incapacity. While clients initially
complain about the presentation of other witnesses, we make it a point
to carefully explain that this is needed to avoid an outright denial of the
petition.

4. Article 36 is patterned after Church doctrines

It has been said that the Philippines is the only country in the whole
world that does not have divorce. This, of course, did not deter the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to make, in the language of the
Supreme Court, an “exaggeration” in Molina that Article 36 is the “most
liberal divorce procedure in the world.” In Kalaw, the Supreme Court
noted that it was sensitive to the “exaggeration” of the OSG when it
enunciated the “rigid” rules in Molina. “The unintended consequences
of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by
the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.”
Article 36 is patterned after Church rules. As noted in Molina: “Since the
purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize
our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason
that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be
given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our
law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also
be decreed civilly void.”

5. Article 36 protects the family

The first guideline under Molina provides that “any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.” Marriage is protected under the
Constitution and existing laws. In case of DOUBT in petitions for nullity
cases, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage. In
other words, the petition must be examined strictly in favor of the
validity of marriage. If the issue can be resolved both ways — for or
against declaration of nullity — the issue must be resolved in favor of
marriage, which means that petition must be dismissed.
This Constitutional protection of marriage, however, does not apply to
void marriages. As reiterated by the Supreme Court in Kalaw, Article 36
protects the institution of marriage — “the fulfillment of the
constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No
protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void ab initio,
because such a marriage has no legal existence.”

“Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages

contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of
marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the
foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the
nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against
marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages
under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning
marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for
reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.”

Here’s the dilemma that I see: the determination whether the marriage
is void (in which case it loses any protection under the Constitution) is
done at the latter part of the trial (the decision), while the application
of the presumption of the validity of marriage (as well as the strict
interpretation in favor of validity) exists at the time of filing of the very
same petition.

In my opinion, there is no inconsistency, and there is no “relaxation” of

the rules. A presumption can always be overturned by contrary
evidence. Once contrary evidence is admitted and the marriage is
declared void, then the presumption loses any value and the marriage
cease to be constitutionally protected. Under this scenario, it does not
help to be saddled with presumptions (or assumptions, predilections or
generalizations) at the start of the petition. The task is to examine the
evidence and look at the “totality of the case.” In the words of the
Supreme Court, “we reiterate once more the principle that each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own facts.” There should be no
rigid application of Molina and “Article 36 of the Family Code must not
be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear
intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of less
specificity obviously to enable some resiliency in its application.”

6. Article 36 has no definition

Psychological incapacity is characterized as “as a ground for the nullity

of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of
the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was
about to assume.”

However, the Family Code has not defined the term psychological
incapacity. The committee that drafted the Family Code decided to
adopt a provision “with less specificity than expected” in order to have
the law “allow some resiliency in its application.” The intent of the
commitee is to give courts sufficient leeway to “interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of
church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision
itself having been taken from the Canon Law.”

The intended resiliency of Article 36 “had, somehow, been rendered

ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,” yet
the Supreme Court still maintains that it is not abandoning Molina.

7. One or both spouses can be psychologically

incapacitated
In the Kalaw case, the petitioner-husband alleges that the respondent-
wife is psychologically incapacitated. The wife, in her answer, denies
her psychological incapacity and alleges that the husband is the one
psychologically incapacitated. Both spouses presented expert
witnesses to support each other’s allegation that the other spouse is
psychologically incapacitated.
In the original Kalaw case, the Court focused solely on the
psychological incapacity of the wife, concluding that there was
insufficient evidence; the Court did not discuss the incapacity of the
husband. This appears to be consistent with the first guideline
in Molina — the “burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff.”
In the reconsidered Kalaw case, the Court declared BOTH spouses as
psychologically incapacitated. While it can be argued that this is a
deviation, or “relaxation,” of the rule that was followed in the
original Kalaw case, there is no basis for such argument.

As a rule, the burden of proving the existence of psychological

incapacity is with the petitioner. This is based on the basic rule that he
who alleges must prove the allegation. This basic rule, stated in another
manner, simply means that the person who alleges psychological
incapacity must prove such psychological incapacity.

Under the circumstances, the court has three options: (a) declare the
WIFE as psychologically incapacitated; (b) declare the HUSBAND as
psychologically incapacitated; or (c) declare BOTH spouses as
psychologically incapacitated. It doesn’t matter who raised the
allegation of psychological incapacity. In the words of the Supreme
Court in the reconsidered decision: “The courts are justified in
declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code
regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes
the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is
fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may
exist in one party alone or in both of them, and if psychological
incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be
deemed null and void.”

As far as remarriage is concerned, it doesn’t really matter who between

the spouses is psychologically incapacitated — there is absolutely no
prohibition for the psychologically incapacitated spouse to marry again.

Let’s consider a number of scenarios. What if, in another case, the

husband alleges that the wife is psychologically incapacitated and the
wife simply denies such allegation, without replying that the husband is
the one psychologically incapacitated? What if the husband alleges that
wife is psychologically incapacitated and the wife fails to answer? If,
for one reason or another, evidence shows that there is no basis for
finding that the wife is psychologically incapacitated, but sufficient
evidence exists to support a finding of psychological incapacity on the
part of the husband, can the court still declare the existence of the
psychological incapacity, albeit on the part of the husband?

8. Trial court decision is binding

In the original Kalaw case, the Supreme Court concluded that there is
“no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity…The
trial court’s Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies,
and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess
the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and
the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings
which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological
incapacity.
In reconsidering its earlier decision in Kalaw, the Supreme Court cited
the general rule that “findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the
existence or non-existence of a party’s psychological incapacity should
be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the
testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be
clearly and manifestly erroneous. In every situation where the findings
of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence
presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from
substituting its own judgment.”

9. There are sufficient safeguards to protect marriage

Without a divorce law, and with the perceived “relaxation” of the rules
on petitions for declaration of nullity, it’s normal to be apprehensive
about the deluge of cases that will choke court dockets. This possible
onslaught might also be interpreted as an attack on the institution of
marriage.
In EACH and EVERY petition for annulment or declaration of nullity, the
State (through the OSG and the public prosecutors) is mandated by law
to participate and ensure that the institution of marriage is amply
protected. According to the Supreme Court, it “need not worry about the
possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention
by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion
between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should
rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital
abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.”

10. Other perspectives for Article 36

The Supreme Court took pains to stress in Kalaw, again pointing to an
earlier case, that it is “not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in
this case.” It is not accurate to say that the Supreme Court “relaxed”
the psychological incapacity guidelines in Kalaw. Matters that can be
interpreted in Kalaw as a “relaxation” of the rules have been taken up in
previous cases. Kalaw simply reiterates those principles.
What the Supreme Court again pointed out in Kalaw is the need to
emphasize “other perspectives” that should guide courts in dealing with
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

What are the “other perspectives”? The Supreme Court noted that
Article 36 cases should not be decided based on “a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations” and emphasized that “courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals.”

This, in my opinion, means that “other perspectives” can run parallel to

the Molina guidelines. In other words, the Molina Doctrine is not the be-
all and end-all of Article 36 interpretation. The intention not to define
Article 36 simply means that the provision should not be static; it is
intended to be a “living” provision, with courts “guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals.”
Cases that don’t fall squarely under the Molina guidelines should not be
dismissed outright. A “rigid” interpretation of Molina means that
petitions must be strictly construed in favor of the validity of marriage
and any deviation from the guidelines, no matter how reasonable, must
lead to the dismissal of the petition. But it should be remembered that a
void marriage enjoys no protection and not entitled to any presumption
of regularity, which means that even if a particular case does not fall
squarely under the Molina principles, the court must still examine the
“totality of evidence” and must apply “other perspectives.” This way,
“diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists
and the like” will not be allowed to “continuously debase and pervert
the sanctity of marriage.”
[This is the full text of the Supreme Court’s Resolution in the case
of Valerio E. Kalaw vs. Ma. Elena Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, 14 January
2015, with Justice Bersamin as ponente. This is reproduced for
academic reasons, for those who seek a more thorough understanding
of the case. See also: The “Relaxation” of Rules in Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage Based on Psychological Incapacity.]

RESOLUTION
In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,[1] the Court
dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage of the
parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in

setting aside the trial court’s Decision for lack of legal and factual
basis.

xxxx

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent)
suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of
two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses
were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had
not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on
petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions,
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect
of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged
habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and
quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a
psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying

premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In
fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations
of the petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played

mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent
admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in
mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a
wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to
five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a
week and always with the permission of her husband and without
abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying
that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their
relative’s home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own
testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent
neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated
the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s
mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the
frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these
two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there
is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating
frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged
constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and
obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was
presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying
with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of
respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent
had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that
respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even
assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent
had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual
infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention
from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation,
but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in

the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for
concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed,
the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair
assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally
remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and
parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were
neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took
care of them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food
they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts to see and take
care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. There
was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of
familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and
Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors,
there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Malyn’s actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual
basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in
the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there was psychological
incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely summarized the
allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it
did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility
of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not
make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion
of psychological incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps,

infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of
themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds
for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that
voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of

Appeals’ May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[2]

In his Motion for Reconsideration,[3] the petitioner implores the Court

to take a thorough second look into what constitutes psychological
incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by the
testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find that
the respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically incapacitated
to perform their respective essential marital obligation.

Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the

petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

I
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is
permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume.
Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological
incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing
the deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight
on the provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code
Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the
end they decided to adopt the provision “with less specificity than
expected” in order to have the law “allow some resiliency in its
application.”[4] Illustrative of the “less specificity than expected” has
been the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give any
examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited the
applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem
generis, because the Committee desired that the courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of
the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.[5]
On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of
Appeals,[6] the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
and the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a ground for
the nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious that the
term psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the Family Code
“has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances,” and
could not be taken and construed independently of “but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage.” Thus
correlated:-

x x x “psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental

(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the
other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be “legitimate.”[7]

In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[8] the Court set some

guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation
of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological —
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one
of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the

celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by

Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal

of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:

“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are

unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.”
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands
to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally —
subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose
of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation
is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall
walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting
and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[9]
The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their
application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for
declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of
the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and
applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted
version of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in its
application.” Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity
“not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the
verity that no case would be on “all fours” with the next one in the field
of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage;
hence, every “trial judge must take pains in examining the factual
milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.”[10]

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as

a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly
not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity
rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the
matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being
grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by
experts.[11]
 II
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-
existence of a party’s psychological incapacity should be final and
binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of
witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and
manifestly erroneous.[12] In every situation where the findings of the
trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence
presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from
substituting its own judgment.[13] It is not enough reason to ignore the
findings and evaluation by the trial court and substitute our own as an
appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code
regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress
that the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution[14] only relates to a valid
marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and
void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.[15]
In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts
really assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of marriage as an
inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is thereby
made all the more strong and solid.

Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved
credence because it was in the better position to view and examine the
demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying.[16] The position
and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing
the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be
accorded due importance and respect.

Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the
opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates, a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard
Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely based on the
petitioner’s version of the events.

After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and

unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized
consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as
inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage.
Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently
described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the
standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions
reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn
from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be
disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the
petitioner’s factual premises.[17]

Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the

petitioner’s testimony, as well as on her interviews of the petitioner, his
sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would seem to
be unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to disregard
the findings on that basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into
consideration other factors extant in the records, including the own
opinions of another expert who had analyzed the issue from the side of
the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts
must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and
mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of
marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the
courts, “despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making,
must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties.”[18]
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to
enable the trial court to properly determine the issue of psychological
incapacity of the respondent (if not also of the petitioner).
Consequently, the lack of personal examination and interview of the
person diagnosed with personality disorder, like the respondent, did
not per se invalidate the findings of the experts. The Court has stressed
in Marcos v. Marcos[19] that there is no requirement for one to be
declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a
physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that
adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.”[20]

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain
condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed
in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed
as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the
causation.[21] Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity
should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any
probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish
causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not
constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.[22]
This is so, considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and
technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should
be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been
based on the parties’ upbringing and psychodynamics.[23]

In that context, Dr. Gates’ expert opinion should be considered not in

isolation but along with the other evidence presented here.

Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity,

the trial court was expected to compare the expert findings and opinion
of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondent’s own witness, and those of Dr.
Gates.
In her Psychological Evaluation Report,[24] Dr. Dayan impressed that
the respondent had “compulsive and dependent tendencies” to the
extent of being “relationship dependent.” Based from the respondent’s
psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:

In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and

seemingly detached in her ways. Although she likes to be around
people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her
relationship but she may not be that demonstrative of her affections.
Intimacy may be quite difficult for her since she tries to maintain a
certain distance to minimize opportunities for rejection. To others,
Malyne may appear, critical and demanding in her ways. She can be
assertive when opinions contrary to those of her own are expressed.
And yet, she is apt to be a dependent person. At a less conscious level,
Malyne fears that others will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit
lonely, placed an enormous value on having significant others would
depend on most times.

xxxx

But the minute she started to care, she became a different person—
clingy and immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding
reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She
became relationship-dependent.[25]

Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical
Multiaxial Inventory test[26] conducted on the respondent, observing
that the respondent obtained high scores on dependency, narcissism
and compulsiveness, to wit:

Atty. Bretania

Q: How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?

A: Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73

percental round and there are several scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw
obtained very high score and these are on the score of dependency,
narcissism and compulsion.

Q: Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the

acceptable score?

A: When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very

significant. So, if 72 and below, it will be considered as acceptable.

Q: In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?

A: Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under

compulsiveness, it is 84.[27]
It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not contradict but
corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to the effect that the respondent
had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as with
Anti- Social Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly testified:

ATTY. GONONG

Q: Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar
with psychology terms. So, more or less, could you please tell me in
more layman’s terms how you arrived at your findings that the
respondent is self-centered or narcissistic?

A: I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her
childhood background, her father died in a vehicular accident when she
was in her teens and thereafter she was prompted to look for a job to
partly assume the breadwinner’s role in her family. I gathered that
paternal grandmother partly took care of her and her siblings against
the fact that her own mother was unable to carry out her respective
duties and responsibilities towards Elena Fernandez and her siblings
considering that the husband died prematurely. And there was an
indication that Elena Fernandez on several occasions ever told
petitioner that he cannot blame her for being negligent as a mother
because she herself never experienced the care and affection of her
own mother herself. So, there is a precedent in her background, in her
childhood, and indeed this seems to indicate a particular script, we call
it in psychology a script, the tendency to repeat some kind of
experience or the lack of care, let’s say some kind of deprivation, there
is a tendency to sustain it even on to your own life when you have your
own family. I did interview the son because I was not satisfied with
what I gathered from both Trinidad and Valerio and even though as a
young son at the age of fourteen already expressed the he could not
see, according to the child, the sincerity of maternal care on the part of
Elena and that he preferred to live with the father actually.

Q: Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is
self-centered and narcissistic?

A: Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a

deprived childhood and she is still in search of this. In her several
boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one boyfriend to another.
There is this need for attention, this need for love on other people.

Q: And that led you to conclude?

A: And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of

neglecting her duty as a wife and as a mother.[28]

The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere
statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she
can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for
her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is
founded.[29] Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value
of the findings of the expert witnesses vis-à-vis the other evidence
available.

The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an
advocate before the Manila Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and
a consultant of the Family Code Revision Committee. Regarding Father
Healy’s expert testimony, we have once declared that judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity could be informed by
evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, by
current trends in psychological and even by canonical thought, and by
experience.[30] It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of
psychological incapacity adopted under Article 36 of the Family Code
was derived from Canon Law.

Father Healy tendered his opinion on whether or not the respondent’s

level of immaturity and irresponsibility with regard to her own children
and to her husband constituted psychological incapacity, testifying
thusly:

ATTY. MADRID: Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is
not psychologically incapacitated. On the facts as you read it based on
the records of this case before this Honorable Court, what can you say
to that claim of respondent?

A: I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of

her immaturity and traumatic irresponsibility with regards to her own
children.

Q: So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is
not psychologically incapacitated is not true?

A: Yes. It should be rejected.

Q: Why do you say so?

A: Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle,

inconsistent pattern has been manifested running through their life
made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility because her
family was dysfunctional and then her being a model in her early life
and being the breadwinner of the family put her in an unusual position
of prominence and then begun to inflate her own ego and she begun to
concentrate her own beauty and that became an obsession and that led
to her few responsibility of subordinating to her children to this lifestyle
that she had embraced.

Q: You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact.
How about the impact on the relationship of the respondent with her
husband?
A: Also the same thing. It just did not fit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her
obligation to her husband and to her children. She had her own
priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong and
associating with friends. They were the priorities of her life.

Q: And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?
Secondary. And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?

A: That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of

marriage which everybody takes for granted. The concentration on the
husband and the children before everything else would be subordinated
to the marriage with her. It’s the other way around. Her beauty, her
going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities
in her life.

Q: And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call

this?

A: That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from
a myt[h]ical case in Roman history.

Q: Could you please define to us what narcissism is?

A: It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a
dear friend as in the case of Narcissus, the myth, and then that became
known in clinical terminology as narcissism. When a person is so
concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and protecting it, then
it becomes the top priority in her life.

xxxx

Q: And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How
do you consider this narcissism afflicting respondent, it is grave, slight
or ….?

A: I would say it’s grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family
and that causes serious obligations which she has ignored and not
properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with herself in her
own lifestyle. Very serious.

Q: And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting

respondent was already existing at the time or marriage or even
thereafter?

xxxx

A: When you get married you don’t develop narcissism or psychological

incapacity. You bring with you into the marriage and then it becomes
manifested because in marriage you accept these responsibilities. And
now you show that you don’t accept them and you are not capable of
fulfilling them and you don’t care about them.

Q: Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or

what?

A: No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the
family was depended [sic] upon her and she was a model at Hyatt and
then Rustan’s, it began to inflate her ego so much that this became the
top priority in her life. It’s her lifestyle.

Q: What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even

expanded after the marriage?

A: That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the
marriage because she was neglecting such fundamental obligations.

Q: And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically

curable, this narcissism that you mentioned?

A: Let’s say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found
in her family background situation. Say, almost for sure would be
incurable now.

Q: What specific background are you referring to?

A: Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and
her beauty was so important to give in her job and money and influence
and so on. But this is a very unusual situation for a young girl and her
position in the family was exalted in a very very unusual manner and
therefore she had that pressure on her and in her accepting the
pressure, in going along with it and putting it in top priority.[31]

Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father

Healy’s opinions and findings commanded respect. The contribution
that his opinions and findings could add to the judicial determination of
the parties’ psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive.
He could thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of the malady
that would warrant the nullity of marriage, and he could as well thereby
provide to the trial court an analytical insight upon a subject as
esoteric to the courts as psychological incapacity has been. We could
not justly disregard his opinions and findings. Appreciating them
together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more the
cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:[32]
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task
and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological
and mental temperaments of the parties.
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases.
Data about the person’s entire life, both before and after the ceremony,
were presented to these experts and they were asked to give
professional opinions about a party’s mental capacity at the time of the
wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area
did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather
was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in
psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage
breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from
that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was
that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person
who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could
necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and
assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now
considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
psychological incapacity, “not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds
of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses
from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to
each other’s body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right
to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing
lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as
presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the
capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept
the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be ‘other oriented’
since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and
that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationshipbecause marriage is more than just a physical reality but
involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the
strength of this interpersonal relationship . A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to
the mature marital relationship:

“The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital

commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage
partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the
ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.”
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions
that might lead to the failure of a marriage:

“At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal

communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual
choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses
consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.

xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who
doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other
terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional
categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting

a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties’
inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack
of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties’ incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and
obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to
using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the
marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family
almost always is proof of someone’s failure to carry out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into.”
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting
expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party’s
psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement
that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the
acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that

the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.[33]

Ngo Te also emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of

strictly applying the standards set in Molina,[34] the courts should
consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, viz:
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-
to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so
intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the
imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:

xxxx

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s

membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later
Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred “in the
result” and another three–including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero–took
pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice
Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that “each case must be judged,
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case. The trial
judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate
court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court.”
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has
applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the law’s
clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as “courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.”
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a
rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed
by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was
sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of Article 36 as the “most liberal
divorce procedure in the world.” The unintended consequences
of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by
the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy
provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the
public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the
rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic
violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological

incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but
it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to
allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot
comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of
physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations
of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36,
there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void
from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity
under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn
marriage.

xxxx

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment

of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice
Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions
for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant,
we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged,
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for
emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.[35]

III

In the decision of September 19, 2011, the Court declared as follows:

Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she
engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a
mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she
played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to
three times a week and always with the permission of her husband and
without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated
this, saying that they were with their mother when she played mahjong
in their relatives home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than
his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that
respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his
sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to
respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was
to prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the
years when these two children were in second grade. This was not
done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong,
its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children
were not proven.[36] (Emphasis supplied)

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have

delimited our determination of the presence or absence of
psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her
obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of
parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully
appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known
that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong
sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices
that would erode their moral fiber.

Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive

mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her
very young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures made by
Valerio Teodoro Kalaw[37] – the parties’ eldest son – in his deposition,
whereby the son confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had
been hooked on playing mahjong, viz:

ATTY. PISON: From the time…before your parent’s separation, do you

remember any habit or activity or practice which your mother engaged
in, before the separation?

WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play
mahjong a lot, and I can’t remember.

xxxx

ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How
frequent, do you remember?

WITNESS: Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I can’t, I can’t…

ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one
session?

WITNESS: Really long cuz’ we would go to my aunt’s house in White

Plains and I think we would get there by lunch then leave, we fall
asleep. I think it was like one in the morning.

ATTY. PISON: You, you went there? She brought you?

WITNESS: Yeah, to play with my cousins, yeah and my brothers &

sisters.

ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?

WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess she’d go out
by herself.[38]

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her
mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties,
but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of
gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling
on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and
serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the
gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This was the
observation of Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr.
Dayan both explained that the current psychological state of the
respondent had been rooted on her own childhood experience.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral
and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to
safeguard and protect her children, as expressly defined under Article
209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:

Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the
person and property of their unemancipated children, parental authority
and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing of such
children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of
their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.

Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall
have with respect to their unemancipated children or wards the
following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct

them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their
upbringing in keeping with their means;

(2) x x x x

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them
honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift,
stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance
with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and
mental health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials,
supervise their activities, recreation and association with
others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from
acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;

(6) x x x x

(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x

(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)

The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into
consideration the findings of the RTC to the effect that both the
petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically incapacitated,
and thus could not assume the essential obligations of marriage. The
RTC would not have found so without the allegation to that effect by the
respondent in her answer,[39] whereby she averred that it was not she
but the petitioner who had suffered from psychological incapacity.

The allegation of the petitioner’s psychological incapacity was

substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:

ATTY. BRETAÑA:

Q: You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?

Yes,sir.

Q: And that the marriage was a mistake?

A: Yes,sir.

Q: What is your basis for your statement that respondent was

behaviorally immature?

A: Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed
already some of those short temper of the petitioner but she was very
much in love and so she lived-in with him and even the time that they
were together, that they were living in, she also had noticed some of his
psychological deficits if we may say so. But as I said, because she is
also dependent and she was one who determined to make the
relationship work, she was denying even those kinds of problems that
she had seen.

Q: To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m talking here of the petitioner,

Mr. Kalaw. What led you to conclude that Mr. Kalaw was behaviorally
immature?

A: I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly
stable then. He was not really thinking of marriage except that his wife
got pregnant and so he thought that he had to marry her. And even that
time he was not also a monogamous person.

Q: Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry
lied on the petitioner?

A: I think so, Sir.

Q: Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the
petitioner admitted to you that in his younger years he was often out
seeking other women. I’m referring specifically to page 18. He also
admitted to you that the thought of commitment scared him, the
petitioner. Now, given these admissions by petitioner to you, my
questions is, is it possible for such a person to enter into marriage
despite

3. She specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 5, 6

and 7 of the Petition alleging that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations to the marriage
and that such incapacity manifested itself only after the marriage, the
truth of the matter being that it is the petitioner who is psychologically
incapacitated.

Q: this fear of commitment and given his admission that he was a

womanizer? Is it possible for this person to stop his womanizing ways
during the marriage?

A: Sir, it’s difficult.

Q: It would be difficult for that person?

A: Yes,Sir.

Q: What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after

marriage?

A: Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.

Q: So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his

marriage with the respondent?

A: Yes,Sir.

Q: What is the bearing of this fear of commitment on the part of the

petitioner insofar as his psychological capacity to perform his duties as
a husband is concerned?

A: Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be
fully committed to the role of husband to Malyn.

Q: Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether

the petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to perform his duty as
a husband. You only said that the petitioner was behaviorally immature
and that the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that
question again and request you to answer that directly?

A: Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.[40]

Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the
nullity of the marriage, the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could
establish the psychological incapacity of her husband because she
raised the matter in her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a
marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of
whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the
psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully
substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in
one party alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of
either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed null and
void.

More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways.
By now, they must have already accepted and come to terms with the
awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in the eyes of the
law, was already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so much
damage not only to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their
own children. It would be a greater injustice should we insist on still
recognizing their void marriage, and then force them and their children
to endure some more damage. This was the very same injustice that
Justice Romero decried in her erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v.
Court of Appeals:[41]

It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give

a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the
petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of
fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to
exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the
Court makes today. It is not, in effect, directly or indirectly, facilitating
the transformation of petitioner into a “habitual tryster” or one forced to
maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging
problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by
private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love
which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a

sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict
it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like
petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his
marriage a nullity by reason of his wife’s psychological incapacity to
perform an essential marital obligation.

In this case, the marriage never existed from the beginning because the
respondent was afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior to
the time of the marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate to
declare the nullity of the marriage between the parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the
basic foundation of our society does not preclude striking down a
marital union that is “ill-equipped to promote family life,” thus:

Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal

guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity in
the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of
the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the
Constitution, which respectively state that “[t]he State recognizes the
Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development[t],”
and that [m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State.” These provisions
highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection
accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state
protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the
family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal
aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to
protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper,
and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative
enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This
being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has
been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family
Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married
and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of
nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the
judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely
enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally
ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant,
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages

contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of
marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the
foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the
nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against
marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages
under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning
marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for
reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.[42] (Emphasis
supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for
Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDEthe decision promulgated
on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and
the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due
to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

———

Footnotes:

[1] 657 SCRA 822.

[2] Id. at 836-839.
[3] Rollo, pp. 689-704.
[4] See Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240
SCRA 20, 31.
[5] See Salita v. Magtolis, G.R No. 106429, June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA 100,
107-108.
[6] Supra note 4.
[7] Id. at 34.
[8] G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
[9] Id. at 209-213.
[10] Separate Statement of Justice Teodoro Padilla in Republic v. Court
of Appeals, supra, note 8, at 214.
[11] Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999,
320 SCRA 76; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20,
2004, 428 SCRA 735.
[12] Tuason v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996, 256
SCRA 158, 170.
[13] Separate Statement of Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in Republic v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 10.
[14] Article XV of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation

of the family and shall be protected by the State.

[15] Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010, 628
SCRA 461 (“[B]lind adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the
Constitution and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social
institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite
convincing proof of psychological incapacity, trenches on the very
reason why a marriage is doomed from its inception should not be
forcibly inflicted upon its hapless partners for life.”).
[16] Collado v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72780, February
13, 1992, 206 SCRA 206, 212; People v. Basmayor, G.R. No. 182791,
February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 369, 382-383.
[17] Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353,
379.
[18] Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193,
228.
[19] G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755, 757.
[20] Id. at 764.
[21] Herrera, Remedial Law, Volume V (1999), pp. 804-805.
[22] Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, supra, note 15, at 487.
[23] Carcereny, et al., Annulment in the Philippines: Clinical and Legal
Issues (2010), p. 16.
[24] Records Volume II, pp. 87-105.
[25] Id. at 100, 103.
[26] A psychological test used to find personality disorders based on
the respondent’s answers to 175 true/false questions (Ng, et al., Legal
and Clinical Bases of Psychological Incapacity [2006], p. 109).
[27] TSN dated January 30, 1996, p. 13.
[28] TSN dated February 15, 1995, pp. 8-10.
[29] Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, G.R. No. 176464, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA
569, 585.
[30] Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 17, at 370.
[31] TSN dated June 17, 1998, pp. 24-28.
[32] Supra note 18.
[33] Id. at 229-232.
[34] Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 8.
[35] Supra note 18, at 220-228.
[36] Decision, pp. 837-838.
[37 Records, pp. 354-391.
[38] Id. at 363.
[39] Paragraph 3 (Records, Vol. I, p. 20) of which runs:

3. She specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 5, 6

and 7 of the Petition alleging that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations to the marriage
and that such incapacity manifested itself only after the marriage, the
truth of the matter being that it is the petitioner who is psychologically
incapacitated.

[40] TSN dated March 14, 1996, pp. 10-12.

[41] Supra note 4, at 38.
[42] Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 17, at 371-373.