Government College University Faisalabad

Session 2017-19

Deterrence
Submitted by:
Arslan Ashiq

Supervised by:
Bilal Bin Liaqat

Department of Political Science

(International Relations)
Deterrence theory

is the idea that an inferior force, by the destructive power of the force's weapons,
could deter a more powerful adversary, provided that this force could be protected
against destruction by a surprise attack. This doctrine gained increased prominence
as a military strategy during the Wraith regard to the use of nuclear weapons and is
related to, but distinct from, the concept of Mutual assured destruction, which
asserts that a full-scale nuclear attack should be prevented to avoid total
destruction of both the attacker and the defender otherwise ensuing. Deterrence is a
strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet started by
means of threat of reprisal[1], or to prevent them from doing something that another
state desires. The strategy is based on the psychological concept of the same name.
A credible nuclear deterrent, Bernard Brodie wrote in 1959, must be always at the
ready, yet never used.
In Thomas Schelling's (1966) classic work on deterrence, the concept that
military strategy can no longer be defined as the science of military victory is
presented. Instead, it is argued that military strategy was now equally, if not more,
the art of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence. Schelling says the capacity to
harm another state is now used as a motivating factor for other states to avoid it
and influence another state's behavior. To be coercive or deter another state,
violence must be anticipated and avoidable by accommodation. It can therefore be
summarized that the use of the power to hurt as bargaining power is the foundation
of deterrence theory and is most successful when it is held in reserve.
The risk of accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches, they argued, was
growing more acute in a world of rivalries between relatively new nuclear states
that lacked the security safeguards developed over many years by America and the
Soviet Union. The emergence of pariah states, such as North Korea (possibly soon
to be joined by Iran), armed with nuclear weapons was adding to the fear as was
the declared ambition of terrorists to steal, buy or build a nuclear device.
The use of military threats as a means to deter international crises and war has been
a central topic of international security research for at least 200 years. Research has
predominantly focused on the theory of rational deterrence to analyze the
conditions under which conventional deterrence is likely to succeed or fail.
Alternative theories however have challenged the rational deterrence theory and
have focused on organizational theory and cognitive psychology.
The concept of deterrence can be defined as the use of threats by one party to
convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action. A threat
serves as a deterrent to the extent that it convinces its target not to carry out the
intended action because of the costs and losses that target would incur. In
international security, a policy of deterrence generally refers to threats of military
retaliation directed by the leaders of one state to the leaders of another to prevent
the other state from resorting to the threat of use of military force in pursuit of its
foreign policy goals.
As outlined by Huth, a policy of deterrence can fit into two broad categories being
(I) preventing an armed attack against a state's own territory (known as direct
deterrence) or (ii) preventing an armed attack against another state (known as
extended deterrence). Situations of direct deterrence often occur when there is
a territorial dispute between neighboring states in which major powers like the
United States do not directly intervene. On the other hand, situations of extended
deterrence often occur when a great power becomes involved. It is the latter that
has generated most of the interest in academic literature. Building on these two
broad categories, Huth goes on to outline that deterrence policies may be
implemented in response to a pressing short-term threat (known as immediate
deterrence) or as strategy to prevent a military conflict or short-term threat from
arising (known as general deterrence).
A successful deterrence policy must be considered in not only military terms, but
also in political terms; specifically, International Relations (IR), foreign policy and
diplomacy. In military terms, deterrence success refers to preventing state leaders
from issuing military threats and actions that escalate peacetime diplomatic and
military cooperation into a crisis or militarized confrontation which threatens
armed conflict and possibly war. The prevention of crises of wars however is not
the only aim of deterrence. In addition, defending states must be able to resist the
political and military demands of a potential attacking nation. If armed conflict is
avoided at the price of diplomatic concessions to the maximum demands of the
potential attacking nation under the threat of war, then it cannot be claimed that
deterrence has succeeded.
Furthermore, as Jentleson et al. argue, two key sets of factors for successful
deterrence are important being (i) a defending state strategy that firstly balances
credible coercion and deft diplomacy consistent with the three criteria of
proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility, and secondly minimizes
international and domestic constraints; and (ii) the extent of an attacking state's
vulnerability as shaped by its domestic political and economic conditions. In broad
terms, a state wishing to implement a strategy of deterrence is most likely to
succeed if the costs of non-compliance it can impose on, and the benefits of
compliance it can offer to, another state are greater than the benefits of
noncompliance and the costs of compliance.
Deterrence theory holds that nuclear weapons are intended to deter other states
from attacking with their nuclear weapons, through the promise of retaliation and
possibly mutually assured destruction(MAD). Nuclear deterrence can also be
applied to an attack by conventional forces; for example, the doctrine of massive
retaliation threatened to launch US nuclear weapons in response to Soviet attacks.
A successful nuclear deterrent requires that a country preserve its ability to
retaliate, either by responding before its own weapons are destroyed or by ensuring
a second strike capability. A nuclear deterrent is sometimes composed of a nuclear
triad, as in the case of the nuclear weapons owned by the United States, Russia,
the People's Republic of China and India. Other countries, such as the United
Kingdom and France, have only sea- and air-based nuclear weapons.

HOW DETERRENCE CAN BE ANOTHER MEANS

OF DIPLOMACY?
The question left here how deterrence can be a player or an actor in international
relations and diplomacy. It is fascinating subject to examine the role of deterrence
as diplomacy means. In answering the questions, we need to refer on the paper’s
previous discussion which what deterrence is and how it’s carry-out. The adaption
of deterrence in international relations is to ensure State B will not take an action
that could threat State A. If the State B wishes to do so, State B will bear
devastating consequences. This circumstance shows that State A attempts to
warning and avert any pre-emptive action towards State A. By way of this
statement, it represents that deterrence can be adapted as diplomacy instrument
which is known as diplomatic bargaining in relationship of the state and the state
action in international relations.

Psychology tactic and strategy are the finest way to describe the threat that created
from deterrence. Deterrence crafted a threat without any physical demolition when
deterrence proposed by the state is succeeded. The ambiguity of deterrence as
another means of diplomacy still exists. Negotiation and discussion are among the
significant elements in diplomacy. But how negotiation is present in deterrence? It
is questionable question on this argument. The threat through deterrence is the
negotiation. The deterrence represents and delegate the state to let the other state
consider or think wisely is it worth to attack the state. In this situation, the other
state has a chance to take further action on the state or else.

Generally, state will not take an action that it detrimental its people, politic position
and economy. The succeed deterrence capable to protect its national interest
because its politic goals achieved.

“Deterrence is the means to convince the other party (opponents) not to initiate a
war toward the state”. (Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Witt Kopf, 1989).

The capacity and the capability of nuclear weapon such as the development of
ICBM which is leaving the impact of destruction has been assessed or as a value
toward head of the state in making decision concerning on action towards another
state. As it concerned, deterrence is effective in preventing a nuclear war from
occur in international system until today. The capability of nuclear can activate or
enhance the deterrence. After the discussion, the paper will confer on the using of
deterrence in Cuban Missile Crisis.

Types of Deterrence
There are two main types of deterrence: (1) specific deterrence, and (2) general
deterrence. Specific deterrence is a type of deterrence that is aimed at the specific
individual being charged with a crime. General deterrence is a type of deterrence
that is used to discourage the public at large from committing the same crime, or a
similar one, to that which was committed by the person being sentenced.
The objective of deterrence is to make the punishment harsh enough that the public
will fear receiving a similar punishment and will be dissuaded from engaging in
similar criminal behavior in the future. Retributivism is a form of punishment that
differs from deterrence. Instead, retributivism focuses on handing down a
punishment that is appropriate to the crime that was committed.

Specific Deterrence

The idea of specific deterrence is that, if an offender receives a severe punishment

for his wrongdoings, then he will not be tempted to commit a similar crime in the
future. For example, specific deterrence dictates that, if an armed robber receives a
harsh sentence of eight years in prison, he will be less likely to commit armed
robbery again when he eventually gets out. However, research has shown that the
effectiveness of specific deterrence varies on a case-by-case basis. On a related
note, the three strikes law is effective as a deterrent in that courts are permitted to
give out harsher sentences to offenders who have been convicted of three or more
serious crimes.

General Deterrence

General deterrence focuses more on teaching the public a lesson, rather than just
the individual being charged with the crime. The idea is that, if the individual is
punished harshly, the public will see that harsh punishment and be dissuaded from
engaging in the same or similar activity. A good example of this is the death
penalty. When a criminal is sentenced to death for his crime, such a sentence may
dissuade the public from committing the same or similar crime.

Retributivism

Retributivism is a legal theory that deals with assigning a punishment to an

offender that fits his crime. Retributivism differs from deterrence in that, while
deterrence aims at preventing crime, retributivism is more concerned about
punishing people for the crimes they have already committed. Some punishments
can be both deterrents and retributive. For instance, an armed robber may receive a
prison sentence of six to eight years, which is a sentence that works to deter him
from committing a similar crime in the future and is also an appropriate
punishment to fit the crime.