The South China Sea: A Geopolitical Analysis

Since 1945 the South China Sea and the western Pacific has functioned as an uncontested global common
patrolled by overwhelming U.S. naval and air power projected from a series of peripheral and over the
horizon bases. The dramatic rise of China alters this situation and has transformed the South China Sea
into a frontier of control as China seeks to morph this maritime theater into a landward extension of the
Chinese coast where it can deploy land-based tactics into an arena previously dominated by maritime
power and tactics to secure the South China Sea as a de facto territorial water that serves multiple Chinese
strategic interests. Hence, the attempt by a land-based Eurasian power (China) to carve a permanent
bridgehead into Spykman’s Eurasian maritime periphery. Against, this trend the United States has
countered with President Obama’s Asian Pivot. However, the implementation of the Asian Pivot is limited
by several post-Cold War developments and certain constraints inherent in the geographic setting of the
South China Sea. Beyond the South China Sea, the geographic setting favors the U.S. and its allies.
Consequently, American options acting singly or in coalition with other nations, most notably Japan and
Australia, remain more flexible and able to serve as a long term counterweight to Chinese force projection
capabilities into the western Pacific proper.

Introduction

At the close of the 19th century, the Royal Navy ruled the world's oceans, or in the words of Alfred Thar
Mahon, the global commons (Mahon, 1890). Beset by the Boar War in South Africa and a rapidly
industrializing Germany, the British withdrew from the greater Caribbean basin to concentrate their forces
on containing Germany (Spykman, 1942). Consequently, the U.S. Navy effectively became the chief agency
for enforcing the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary during the early 20th century. For the
United States, its Pacific possessions acquired in the late 1800s, mostly through the Spanish-American
War and the antecedent purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867, laid a foundation for a series of bases
that functioned as a network of nodes for projecting military force throughout much of the Pacific basin.
Following World War II, a victorious but fatigued United Kingdom effectively handed over the global naval
baton to the United States. Possessing similar cultures and strategic outlooks, such a "passing" occurred
rather smoothly. This situation meant the U.S. Navy became the chief agency for patrolling one of the
world's most strategic thoroughfares, namely the Strait of Malacca, which joins the Indian and Pacific
Oceans and is bordered by Indonesia and the Malaysian Peninsula (Mahon, 1890). Compounding this
transition, the United States, by vanquishing Japan in World War II: (1) recaptured its previous bases and
added the home islands of Japan and the Ryukyu Islands to its network of Pacific bases; and (2) acquired
additional basing rights in Australia. As such, the U.S. Navy was able to contain the Soviet Naval expansion
and pin the Chinese military to its immediate coastline during the Cold War (1945-1991).

Theoretical Framework: Geopolitics Defined & Applied Geopolitics combines an analysis of geographic
setting relative to the economic, political, military and cultural conditions of a single nation or coalition
pursuant to their evolving strategic interests and tactical ability to execute such interests. Indeed, a
combination of first hand visits to the region, various academic and public policy articles and non-classified
reports documenting force projection capabilities comprise the data for [Link] Journal of
Geography and Geology Vol. 8, No. 3; 2016 15 analyzing developments in the South China Sea relative to
the conceptual framework stated below

Geographic setting remains a more constant variable (Kaplan, 2012), while economic, political, military
and cultural conditions prove more dynamic and can change greatly over time. Although Cohen (2015)
argues geographic setting is not deterministic, it still provides certain inherent advantages or challenges
for various countries attempting to: (1) Secure certain areas for themselves; and/or (2) Pre-empt,
minimize or evict an existent nation's presence or ability to control a said area. Cohen (2015) stresses the
idea of places as bounded settings. Such settings utilize a variety of physical and cultural variables in fixing
borders. As Lea (1909) noted, borders are transitory and always in a state of flux, which includes
peacetime. While Lea's statement can be applied to legal or statutory borders, his intention was focused
on boundaries of influence and control. Such boundaries are influenced by: (1) Geographic setting, and
(2) A nation's ability and willingness to project hard and soft power. Defined as the application of military
force often in concert with coercive economic policies, hard power is often paralleled by soft power, a
term coined by Nye (2004), which consists of a nation's ability to attract or influence another nation
through cultural and non-coercive economic policies. This flux in borders and particularly the jockeying
for strategic position often occurs in peacetime so as to enhance a nation's ability to deploy hard power
to its advantage in any future conflict (Mahon, 1890; Lea, 1909). In tandem with geographic setting and
shifting borders, Mackinder (1904), Fairgrieve (1924) and Spykman (1942) wrote extensively about the
Eurasian heartland dominated by a land power (Russia and/or China) with its surrounding maritime
periphery being dominated by sea power, most notably British and later American naval power.
Consequently, force projection by a land power into the Eurasian maritime periphery proved difficult, as
did landward penetration into Asia by a peripheral or external maritime power. As the forthcoming
examples illustrate, this geographic setting effectively set the stage for long-term managed tension
between the Eurasian heartland and its maritime periphery, a situation that applies aptly to present
economic, political and military developments pursuant to the South China Sea.

Russia's failures in the Russo-Japanese War and Japan's defeat in World War II with its consequent
withdrawal from the Asian Mainland (Korea and Manchuria) serve as examples from the first half of the
20th century. Later, American advances onto the Asian mainland were limited to the southern half of the
Korean peninsula, mostly because of Chinese intervention with ground forces during the Korean War.
During the 1960s and 1970s, Chinese and Soviet backed land-based Asiatic movements (North Vietnam's
communist party, the Viet Cong, Pathet Lao and Khmer Rouge) prevented the United States from
establishing a landward penetration into southeast Asia through its own interventions combined with
economic/military support for South Vietnam's government, the Lon Nol regime in Cambodia and the
CIA's secret Hmong army in Laos. Although the Soviets had access to Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay from 1975
through 1991, a global network of American bases located along the Eurasia's maritime periphery
thwarted Soviet advances into the Pacific and Indian Ocean basins during the Cold War. Relative to China,
the U.S. Navy intervened twice in the 1950s to preempt Chinese invasion of Taiwan and a planned re-
conquest of the Mainland by Kuomintang (KMT) forces based on the near shore islands of Matsu and
Quemoy (Manthorpe, 2005). A subsequent U.S. intervention occurred in 1996 when the Nimitz carrier
battle group cruised through the Taiwan Strait, and then with an additional carrier task force, took up
positions east of Taiwan to provide security cover for Taiwan's democratic transition (Yoshihara & Holmes,
2010; Haddick, 2014). Opposed by China, which had fired a series of ballistic missiles into waters near
Taiwan to intimidate Taiwanese electorate, the U.S. deployment frustrated China while reassuring the
Taiwanese (Gargan, 1996). This frustration resulted in a Chinese focus on projecting force into its Near
Seas to counter future U.S. deployments and thwart any attempt by Taiwan to declare independence.
Indeed, by 2005, China had positioned over 700 ballistic missiles along its shore aimed at Taiwan (Pan,
2005).
1.3 South China Sea: Setting and Spatial Context The South China Sea encompasses roughly 3.625 million
sq. km (1.4 million sq. mi). Its northwest shore abuts the southeast Chinese coast and its western margins
front Vietnam and the Malay Peninsula (Figures 1 and 2). To the south, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore
and Brunei comprise its southern coastline, near the eastern terminus of the Straight of Malacca.
Meanwhile, northern Australia lies over the horizon. To the east, the Philippines, most notably Luzon,
Mindoro and Palawan form the South China Sea's eastern margins. Finally, Taiwan caps its northern
extent. The Luzon strait, separating Taiwan from Luzon, comprises an open channel into the western
Pacific proper. The South China Sea contains two sets of hotly contested island groups, i.e. the Spratly and
Paracels. The Paracel Islands are contested by China and Vietnam. About half the islands are located within
370 km or 200 nautical miles (n.m.) of Vietnam, whereas all of them are within 370 Km (200 n.m.) of
China's Hainan Island. Various parts of the Spratly Islands are claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam,
Indonesia, Taiwan, Malaysia