DFA VS.

NLRC
G.R. No. 113191, September 18 1996

FACTS:
Private respondent NLRC initiated NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-01-0690-93 for his
alleged illegal dismissal by Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the latter's violation of
the "labor-only" contracting law. Two summonses were served, one sent
directly to the ADB and the other through the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA), both with a copy of the complaint. Forthwith, the ADB and
the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its
President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process
except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to
Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian
Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44
of the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of The
Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters
Agreement").

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression

The ADB did not appeal the decision but instead, the DFA referred the
matter to the National Labor Relations Commission seeking a formal
vacation of the void judgment.

Dissatisfied by the NLRC’s response, the DFA lodged the instant petition
for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Asian Development Bank enjoys a diplomatic immunity
from suit.

HELD:
Yes. The petition for certiorari is granted, and the decision of the Labor
Arbiter is vacated for being null and void. The provisions stipulated by
both the Charter and Headquarters Agreement should be able to establish
that, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee
operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities,
the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form. The Bank’s
officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by
them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters
Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants
and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government
which must be respected. Being an international organization that has
been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the
municipal law.
Vidad v. RTC
GR NOs.98084, 98922, and 100300-03 October 18, 1993

FACTS

A group of public school teachers in Negros Oriental held, starting September 19, 1990 and lasting until
September 21, 1990, a must action, or a strike from their school classes, to demand the release of their
salaries by the Department of Budget. The teachers also assailed alleged corruption in the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) A return-to-work order was promptly issued by DECS Regional
Director Teofilo Gomez with a warning that if the "striking" school teachers were not to resume their
classes within twenty-four hours, administrative charges will be filed. The return order wasn’t heeded,
which resulted in the filing of administrative complaints against the teachers The teachers were each
given five days from receipt of said complaints within which to submit their respective answers and
supporting documents. An investigation panel composed of DECS lawyers was assigned to look at their
cases, namely Marcelo Baclaso, Nieva Montes and Generoso Capuyan. A group of teachers who were
administratively filed against, filed with RTC Dumaguete a complaint for injunction, prohibition and
damages, with a prayer for preliminary injunction, against the aforenamed DECS officials. RTC issued a
temporary restraining order, prohibiting the defendants from continuing with the administrative
investigation. The DECS officials filed their answer with a motion to dismiss. The teachers filed a motion
to strike out the appearance of the Office of the Solicitor General and to declare the DECS officials in
default. The RTC denied both motions for lack of merit. Both parties, in response to this denial, filed with
the SC petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. These
cases were consolidated. Four other cases, raising like issues, were later also filed with the court below
by other public school teachers concerned. The DECS officials, again represented by the Solicitor
General, filed motions to dismiss, which the court similarly denied. A joint petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus was thence filed with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 100300-03. This Court
later resolved the petition to be likewise consolidated with G.R. No. 98084 and G.R. No. 98922 in its
Resolution of 04 July 1991.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Office of the Solicitor General may properly represent the DECS officials in the trial
court cases.

Whether or not he RTC should have dismissed outright the said cases.
Held

[Link]. Presidential Decree 478, in part, provides:

1) Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President of head of office concerned, it shall
also represent government-owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall
constitute the law office of the Government, and as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of
a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:

a) Represent the government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings
represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other
courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer
thereof in his official capacity is a party (stress supplied).

2. The various complaints filed by the public school teachers allege bad faith on the part of the DECS
officials. It cannot be pretended this early that the same could be impossible of proof. On the
assumption that the plaintiffs are able to establish their allegations of bad faith, a judgment for damages
can be warranted.

Public officials are certainly not immune from damages in their personal capacities arising from the acts
done in bad faith; in these and similar cases, the public officials may not be said to have acted within the
scope of their official authority, and no longer are they protected by the mantle of immunity for official
actions.

BUT it was wrong for the RTC to issue the TRO.

The DECS Regional Director has the authority to issue the return to work memorandum, to initiate the
administrative charges and to constitute the investigating panel.

We see the court cases and the administrative matters to be closely interrelated, if not, indeed,
interlinked. While no prejudicial question strictly arises where one is a civil case and the other is an
administrative proceeding, in the interest of good order, it behooves the court to suspend its action on
the cases before it pending the final outcome of the administrative proceedings.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. We see, in these petitions before us, no cogent reason to deviate from the rule.

REPUBLIC VS FELICIANO
G.R. No. 70853 148 SCRA 424 March 12, 1987

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,

PABLO FELICIANO and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents-appellants

Facts:

The appeal was filed by 86 settlers of Barrio of Salvacion, representing the Republic of the Philippines to
dismiss the complaint filed by Feliciano, on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be
sued without its consent.

Prior to this appeal, respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land consisting of four lots. The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No.
1 to be the private property of Feliciano and the rest of the property, Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted to the
public domain.
The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside the decision
of the trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for more than 20
years under claim of ownership. The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they
did not appear at the day of presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional
evidence. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision and the trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano.

The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration. The case was reopened to allow them to
present their evidence. But before this motion was acted upon, Feliciano filed a motion for execution
with the Appellate Court but it was denied.

The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued
without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.
Discussions:

A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the
State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language
too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the
proceedings.

Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed
in strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of
the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made
by an act of the legislative body.

Ruling/s:

No. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff has
impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to
be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action
in personam. It is an action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds
only such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed
against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency
created by Republic Act No. 3844.

The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted,
except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication
through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the
instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent.