This is a chapter excerpt from Guilford Publications.

Interpersonal Cognition, Mark W. Baldwin, Ed.

Copyright © 2005

INTERPERSONAL
Rejection Sensitivity COGNITION
as an Interpersonal Vulnerability

Rejection Sensitivity
as an Interpersonal Vulnerability

JANINA PIETRZAK, GERALDINE DOWNEY, and OZLEM AYDUK

The rejection sensitivity (RS) model posits that hypersensitivity to rejection

cues, with its subsequent overreactions, is fallout from a normal learning
process; rejection sensitivity is born of early, prolonged, or acute rejection
experiences with caregivers and significant others. Through such experi-
ences, children learn to expect rejection in situations involving close others,
and because the relationships are significant, these expectations are emotion-
laden. Thus, anxious expectations of rejection characterize the departure
point of the RS dynamic. What follows are a lowered threshold for percep-
tion of negativity, an increased propensity for personalizing negative cues,
and intense affective reactions. Such cognitions and affects can then lead to
expressions of distress in the form of hostility or depression, creating the
potential for a feedback loop that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. This
dynamic, once acquired, can guide interpersonal perceptions and behavior
throughout the life course.
The RS model was introduced to explain why some individuals appear
more vulnerable to maladaptive responses to rejection experiences than do
others (Downey & Feldman, 1996). In this chapter, we first describe the
historical backdrop of social cognition and personality in which rejection
sensitivity evolved. These two fields of research, along with research on
personal relationships, intersect where cognitive and affective constructs
are identified and the process by which they affect relationship behavior is
delineated. The RS dynamic is one illustration of the marriage of these
fields. We then describe how the recent incorporation of psychophys-

62
 Rejection Sensitivity as an Interpersonal Vulnerability 63

iological approaches to the study of social-psychological phenomena has

shaped our view of RS, and provide an in-depth description of the RS
model, outlining its unique contribution to work on personal relationships,
and exposing the sometimes paradoxical ways in which high RS individu-
als cope with imminent self-threat. Finally, we take a look down avenues of
current and future research.
The idea that early traumatic experiences can lead to later relationship
difficulties is not novel; clinicians starting with Freud, and personality the-
orists starting with Horney (1937), Erikson (1950), and Sullivan (1953)
proposed that interactions with parents lead to later patterns of interper-
sonal behavior or personality traits. Theories of why people encountered
difficulties in their relationships focused on individual differences in per-
sonality attributes such as global self-esteem, attributional bias (e.g.,
Bradbury & Fincham, 1990; Holtzworth-Munroe & Hutchinson, 1993),
and attachment style (Hazan & Shaver, 1987) as predictors of relationship
success or failure. The introduction of social-cognitive paradigms provided
a framework in which to examine these ideas and opened up avenues of
relationship research that could be identified as psychodynamic in
approach—looking at unconscious, automatic processes that led to partic-
ular relationship outcomes (Reis & Downey, 1999). Social information se-
lection and processing began to be studied, and social phenomena gained a
cognitive spin: accessibility, memory errors, and attributional biases all be-
came valid areas of study. Drawing on notions borrowed from theories of
the structure of long-term memory, interest arose in the chronically accessi-
ble scripts and processing dispositions that were activated and imple-
mented in particular situations—for example, in close relationships. The
high accessibility and availability of scripts and schemas coming from early
relationships shed light on the mechanism by which previous relationships
dictated new relationships.
At the same time, social cognition was affecting research in individual
differences. Theorists were moving away from viewing the individual as a
combination of global and consistently activated traits and toward a more
dynamic vision of the individual as driven by stable cognitive–affective
processing dynamics that result in systematic and coherent variability of
affect, cognition, and behavior across situations (Mischel & Shoda, 1995).
Emerging conceptualizations of personality drew on cognitive as well as af-
fective phenomena to get at the unconscious processes of social informa-
tion processing that underlie relationship behavior. This shift from individ-
ual differences to intraindividual processing dynamics brought a focus on
the mechanisms that lead to behavior: beliefs, expectations, desires, and
motivations. The strategy adopted by some researchers at the time was to
observe intraindividual stability in patterns of behavior across various situ-
ations (Mischel & Shoda, 1995). This led to a focus on the cognitive and
affective processing that was taking place when an individual made sense
64 INTERPERSONAL COGNITION

of a particular situation and decided on a course of action. Such cognitive–

affective units were used to explain what made the same person behave in
such different ways at different times.
Though our conceptualization of RS is rooted in attributional and at-
tachment theories and in interpersonal approaches to personality, notably
the work of Karen Horney, our approach departs from these traditional
approaches in several respects. It has adopted the developments of social
cognition to delineate the immediate cognitive and affective antecedents of
behavior in specific situations, rather than to describe global orientations
to relationships. This approach lets us look at parenting history as a deter-
minant of personal dispositions based in mechanisms of information pro-
cessing and memory, and can help us to understand the development of per-
sonality and its effects on current relationships, including cross-situational
inconsistency in relationship behavior. RS can be viewed as delineating
some of the key cognitive and affective subprocesses incorporated in peo-
ple’s working model of attachment. The RS model provides a process ac-
count of how anxious expectations of rejection lead to attributional biases
and then to maladjustment through specific physiological, perceptual, and
cognitive mechanisms.
This new ability to map the development of relationships through
social-cognitive variables can be applied not only in a long-term sense,
over an individual’s lifetime, but also within a relationship, and even
within a particular interaction. This approach deconstructs dispositional
terms into concrete cognitions and affects, which can be independently ob-
served, described, and then perhaps changed. Because RS is more specific
and precise in its definition of the content, structure, and dynamics of inse-
cure attachment, in our studies we have typically found it to be a better
predictor of how people cope with rejection in specific situations than tra-
ditional measures of insecure attachment (for a detailed discussion of the
distinction between RS and attachment style, see Ayduk, Downey, & Kim,
2000, and Downey & Feldman, 1996).
The unique contribution that the RS model makes in the context of re-
lationship cognition is its account of the processes linking the individual’s
social learning history with an unfolding social situation. It is a model that
embraces the social-cognitive approach and exploits its merits—focusing
on dynamic processing of both cognitive and affective information—to
demonstrate how these invisible factors shape relationship behavior within
a specific interpersonal situation. The model focuses on the psychological
(cognitive and affective) mediators of anxious expectations of rejection
that lead to a hypervigilance for rejection cues, which can then affect per-
ceptions of, attributions for, and responses to others’ ambiguous behavior.
Some other constructs have similar social-cognitive roots and emphases
but are not as specific (e.g., transference; see Andersen & Chen, 2002),
while other, more global constructs (e.g., self-esteem) lack the transparency
 Rejection Sensitivity as an Interpersonal Vulnerability 65

of mechanism that leads to clear and testable predictions—as well as to

viable interventions. The outcome of an interpersonal situation must in-
volve the confluence of intermediary processes, which combine to increase
the likelihood of a benign or a malevolent response. Understanding the
mechanisms through which anxious attachment style, self-esteem, and
other dispositions yield relationship behaviors can greatly facilitate the de-
velopment of more effective intervention intended to reduce the negative
consequences of interpersonal vulnerabilities (Freitas & Downey, 1998).

THE REJECTION SENSITIVITY MODEL

Extensive evidence links child maltreatment with a variety of negative out-

comes (Downey, Feldman, Khouri, & Friedman, 1994; Manly, Kim,
Rogosch, & Cicchetti, 2001; Widom, 1989). Researchers have long pro-
claimed early experiences as formative because they affect all relationships
that follow. The relationships of children with parents, then with peers and
teachers, form a framework of understanding and expectations for all fu-
ture interactions (Sroufe, 1990). Acceptance/rejection schemas begin to de-
velop as soon as a child is born; all human contact becomes a field for
learning the rules of social interaction (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall,
1978; Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980). This framework, if confirmed time and
again through interpersonal experiences, can grow stronger as the individ-
ual grows older. If a child is rejected repeatedly, close interpersonal situa-
tions in the future can essentially serve as primes for rejection: strong men-
tal associations exist between the relevant situational cues and rejection
experiences. The RS model posits that such associations, formed of pro-
longed or acute rejecting experiences with significant others, lead to the de-
velopment of anxious expectations of rejection (Feldman & Downey,
1994; Downey, Khouri, & Feldman, 1997). Such expectations can affect
the way social information is processed in later life because the perceptions
and attributions people make are driven in a top-down processing manner
by the expectations with which people enter an interaction (Olson, Roese,
& Zanna, 1996). Anxious expectations are thus carried from one relation-
ship to the next, and can form a stable pattern of interaction with future
partners.
Because close interpersonal contexts are likely to follow automatic,
routinized sequences (Berscheid, 1994) and have significance for goal at-
tainment, they are likely to be dominated by “hot” processing. This unin-
tentional, unconscious processing is contrasted with a rational “cool” pro-
cessing system that drives deliberate action (Epstein, 1994; Metcalfe &
Mischel, 1999). This “hot” processing system relies on the mental schemas
and frameworks that are (chronically or temporarily) accessible, guiding
perceptions and interpretations of new situations. Both Baldwin and col-
66 INTERPERSONAL COGNITION

leagues (1992; Baldwin & Keelan, 1999; Baldwin, Keelan, Fehr, Enns, &
Koh-Rangarajoo, 1996) and Andersen and colleagues (e.g., Andersen &
Chen, 2002; Andersen, Reznik, & Chen, 1997) use a dual processing ap-
proach to uncover the balance of cognitive and affective processes that are
activated in response to threat. The idea that cognitive responses can regu-
late and interact with affective responses to threat allows psychologists to
draw on findings in affective neuroscience and bend the constraints of tra-
ditional methodologies, which emphasized cognitions or affects, but not
their interaction.
This approach also allows us to reconcile the differences in behavioral
patterns exhibited by individuals with similar social-cognitive histories of
maltreatment. Why does parental maltreatment in some people lead to
aggression, while in others it leads to social withdrawal? Why do some
people respond to rejection with anger while others reveal anxiety? Why
do some people cope with rejection through self-silencing and others with
violence? These are issues that go beyond gross distinctions in developmen-
tal context, and are best answered through an uncovering of the social-
cognitive processes that make individuals respond uniquely to particular
interpersonal situations.
In view of the dynamic as one in which expectations of rejection are
accompanied by intense affect, the questionnaire used to measure RS in
adults is composed of 18 items depicting interpersonal situations wherein
the respondent imagines him- or herself expressing need to a close other.
To each such situation, the respondent must indicate on two separate 1–6
scales the extent to which he or she expects rejection (the need will not be
met) and to what extent he or she feels anxious or concerned about this
possibility. These situations were chosen through focus group interviews
and extensive piloting. They demonstrate the unique trigger situations hy-
pothesized to activate anxious expectations of rejection. The content of the
request is not impersonal (the respondent is not asking the close other
about the weather); rather, the respondent is requesting something, and
thereby exposing him- or herself to the possibility of rejection. This rejec-
tion, if it occurred, could be interpreted in many ways, and the anxiety re-
sponse is some indication of how personally important it is that it not
come. Therefore, within each situation, the rating on the expectations of
rejection is weighted by the anxiety rating and the product terms are then
averaged over the 18 items.

Conceptualizing Rejection Sensitivity as a Defensive

Motivational System
As new physiological and social-cognitive neuroscience paradigms have
been introduced, the implicit nonconscious processing that occurs in rela-
tionship contexts has become more “observable.” Accordingly, we have
 Rejection Sensitivity as an Interpersonal Vulnerability 67

extended our social-cognitive approach to studying this dynamic into the

realm of physiological and neurological underpinnings. Many aspects of
an interaction with another person can determine one’s comfort during
and after it. Because the need for belonging/affiliation is so dominant in
humans, because of the evolutionary validity of this need, it seems that as-
sessing the basic valence of a social interaction may be the first and crucial
step to take. For this reason, we have posited that acceptance–rejection is a
privileged dimension of information processing, and RS has been explicitly
reconceptualized as a defensive motivational system (DMS), a physiologi-
cally based mechanism that is triggered in response to threat from the envi-
ronment.
In the context of RS, the DMS system is hypothesized to get activated
specifically in response to acceptance–rejection cues and to function to
provide a quick and effective response to threat in the environment, shel-
tering the self from the feared rejection. This conceptualization is rooted in
work on the neurobiology of motivational systems. The understanding of
how organisms defend themselves against threats in general has increased
tremendously over the past decade as researchers have brought develop-
ments in cognitive, behavioral, and affective neuroscience to bear on the
issue. Converging evidence from neurological and behavioral research sug-
gests that two primary affective-motivational systems organize behavior:
an appetitive system that responds to positive stimuli (i.e., rewards), moti-
vating approach and consummatory behavior, and a defensive system that
responds to negative, aversive stimuli (i.e., punishments, threat), disposing
the individual toward active avoidance, and fight-or-flight (Cacioppo &
Gardner, 1999; Gray, 1987; Lang, 1995; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990,
1995; LeDoux, 1995, 1996; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Drawing from
this literature, Lang and colleagues (1990) proposed a model that views
human emotions as action dispositions that organize behavior along an
appetitive–aversive dimension. According to this model, when negatively
valenced and highly arousing stimuli are encountered, the DMS becomes
activated to prepare for rapid execution of a set of automatic behaviors
aimed at self-protection. What constitutes a threat can be biologically
based (e.g., an inherent threat reaction to seeing a snake) or socially
learned (e.g., people can learn through direct or vicarious rejection experi-
ences to expect rejection in certain situations). Valence directs the system
(i.e., approach vs. avoidance), but level of arousal determines the intensity
of response.
Research on both animals and humans suggests that when this high-
arousal negative-valence system is activated by the potential of danger,
there is an amplification of physiological responses to newly encountered
threat-congruent cues and an attenuation of physiological response to
threat-incongruent cues. Thus, the organism is oriented to detect cues that
are congruent with a state of threat (see LeDoux, 1996, LeDoux & Phelps,
68 INTERPERSONAL COGNITION

2000, and Ohman, 2000, for reviews). The high level of arousal and nega-
tive valence also readies the organism to act when cues confirming that the
threatened outcome has occurred are detected (e.g., Lang et al., 1995;
LeDoux, Iwata, Cicchetti, & Reis, 1988). Gray (1987) has argued that
threat also activates inhibitory behaviors reflected in vigorous efforts to
freeze and remain silent. The defensive motivation that underlies this in-
hibitory behavioral set is to be inconspicuous, to become part of the exist-
ing context, to go “unnoticed” as a way to prevent threat from being
directed at the self. This behavioral “freeze” must be highly vigilant to
maintain a high state of readiness for action in case prevention efforts fail
(Gray, 1987, 2000). This framework thus suggests that a shift is likely to
occur from prevention-focused inhibitory tactics to intense fight-or-flight
reactions if and when a threatened outcome is perceived to be inevitable or
to have already occurred (see Figure 3.1).
Our phenomenological description of the operation of the RS system
closely parallels the operation of the DMS. According to our conceptual-
ization of RS, in situations where rejection is a possibility (e.g., meeting a
prospective dating partner, asking one’s friend to do favor), people who are
high in RS are uncertain about whether they will be accepted or rejected,
but the outcome is of critical importance to them. This view leads to
hypotheses surrounding physiological correlates of being in a rejection-
relevant situation. As mentioned above, situations where one anxiously ex-
pects rejection are threatening. The DMS should be activated, leading to a
heightened focus on and advantaged processing of threat cues (LeDoux,
1996; Ohman, 2000). Ambiguous stimuli will be more likely then to be in-
terpreted in line with these expectations—in order to ensure survival, it is
safer to overreact than to fail to react to mild cues that might turn out to
be life-threatening. The high RS individual, then, prefers a “better safe

FIGURE 3.1. Rejection sensitivity as a defensive motivational system.

 Rejection Sensitivity as an Interpersonal Vulnerability 69

than sorry” strategy to protect from rejection, whereas the low RS individ-
ual might risk not detecting mild rejection cues, because such cues are less
subjectively threatening to the low RS individual. Thus, for high RS indi-
viduals, situations where they anxiously expect rejection incorporate cog-
nitive appraisals of threat under conditions of uncertainty—these are the
very conditions that research in affective neuroscience as well as stress and
coping suggest are likely to activate the DMS (Davis, 1992; Fanselow,
1994; Lazarus, Averill, & Opton, 1970; LeDoux, 1995; Metcalfe &
Mischel, 1999; Zillman, 1993). In contrast to high RS individuals, the RS
model suggests that, in the same situations, those low in RS take accep-
tance more for granted and are less concerned with the threat of rejection,
and are thus less likely to experience heightened activation of the DMS.
We propose that, when activated, the DMS facilitates the monitoring
and detection of threat-relevant cues and prepares the individual for swift
response when cues of danger are detected. In situations where rejection is
expected, this system is automatically activated in high RS individuals. The
activation of this system can help account for the readiness with which
high RS individuals perceive rejection in others’ behavior and contributes
to the intensity of their responses to the perceived rejection.
A recent study conducted by Downey, Mougois, Ayduk, London, and
Shoda (2004) tested the hypothesis that ambiguous interpersonal situa-
tions would induce a sense of threat in high RS individuals, and activation
of the DMS, wherein they would experience high negative arousal. High
negative arousal can be determined in humans by measuring the startle re-
flex, the amplitude of the eye-blink response to a sudden extreme stimulus,
like a burst of white noise. In this study, participants were exposed to such
a stimulus while viewing various artworks depicting four kinds of themes:
rejection, acceptance, noninterpersonal positivity, or noninterpersonal neg-
ativity. High RS individuals who were viewing rejection images showed a
potentiation of the startle reflex; no other condition showed such an in-
crease. This study demonstrated that indeed negative interpersonal situa-
tions put high RS people into a state of threat, wherein they responded
more intensely to stimuli that could communicate interpersonal rejection.
Behavioral studies demonstrate the further links in the model. Because
people are likely to interpret events in accordance with their expectations—
stimuli are attended to, processed, and remembered in ways that confirm
expectations—negative or ambiguous interpersonal interactions are per-
ceived by high RS individuals to be personal affronts, attributed to others’
intentional rejection of them. Accordingly, the link between anxious expec-
tations of rejection and perceptions of intentional rejection in the negative
or ambiguous behavior of close or newly encountered others was tested by
Downey and Feldman (1996, Study 2). High RS individuals, when not
given an alternative explanation for a negative interpersonal outcome
(such as time constraints limiting a social interaction) were more likely to
70 INTERPERSONAL COGNITION

construe this outcome as personally motivated and intentionally rejecting.

Likewise, high RS individuals reported perceiving intentional rejection in
the aloof behavior of their dating partners (Downey & Feldman, 1996,
Study 3). For high RS individuals, alternative explanations for seemingly
rejecting behaviors are not considered; displays of acceptance might be
misinterpreted or undervalued. Because of this top-down processing (i.e.,
processing driven more by preexisting knowledge than by proximal stim-
uli), and the strong affective response it engenders, reactive behavior often
follows perceived rejection.
Though perceptions of rejection are likely to lead to some kind of re-
action in everyone, for high RS individuals they lead to reactions that are
inappropriately intense and highly defensive. For example, in a priming
study, participants were asked to pronounce as quickly as they could target
words that appeared on the screen following a masked prime. For high RS
women, rejection primes facilitated pronunciation of hostility targets that
followed. This suggests an automatic association between rejection and
hostility (Ayduk, Downey, Testa, Yen, & Shoda, 1999, Study 1). Further-
more, in a daily diary study of dating couples, feelings of rejection from
their romantic partners on one day elicited hostility from high RS women
on the next day (Ayduk et al., 1999, Study 2). In contrast, low RS women’s
likelihood of getting into conflicts with their partners was not contingent
on their feelings of rejection. Consistently, when discussing an unresolved
relationship conflict in a lab situation, women high in RS were shown to
behave more negatively and aggressively, both in terms of their verbal and
this nonverbal behavior (Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, & Khouri, 1998,
Study 3).
Because their partners may be surprised by strong reactions to seem-
ingly neutral behavior, high RS people can be perceived (and responded to)
as excessively sensitive and difficult, which leads to relationship dissatisfac-
tion on both ends. Personal attributions for rejection were shown to under-
mine romantic relationships by increasing jealous behavior among men
and increasing hostile behavior among women (Downey & Feldman,
1996, Study 4). Because intent is usually invisible and must be inferred, it
is open to misinterpretation; high RS people, by overestimating the likeli-
hood of rejection, may overestimate their partners’ intent to do them harm.
Partners of high RS individuals, meanwhile, may have trouble recognizing
their own neutral, ambiguous, or even nonpersonally negative behavior as
potentially conveying rejection.
In a daily diary study including committed dating couples, Downey,
Freitas, and colleagues (1998, Study 1) showed that in days following a
conflict, high RS women perceived their partners as less accepting and
more withdrawn than did low RS women. High RS women’s partners,
meanwhile, were more likely to express relationship dissatisfaction than
were low RS women’s partners. Partial mediation points to partner satis-
faction as the link between RS and perceptions of partner acceptance after
 Rejection Sensitivity as an Interpersonal Vulnerability 71

conflict. A lab study of videotaped interactions showed that high RS

women’s negative behavior during conflict evoked postconflict anger in
both the women and their partners (Downey, Freitas, et al., 1998, Study 2).
These two studies suggest that the dynamic acts as a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy, wherein expectations of rejection increase the probability of its occur-
rence (Merton, 1948; Rosenthal, 2002; Sroufe, 1990). High RS individuals
are responding to rejection cues that, to them, appear all too real, in ways
that a significant other may find aversive. Thus, the rejection that high RS
people expect occurs, validating their cognitions and cementing them
afresh. In this way, the expectations that a person brings into an interac-
tion shape that interaction, and can create stable and destructive patterns
of relational behavior. These patterns can diminish a partner’s satisfaction
in and commitment to the relationship, leading to breakup and a confirma-
tion of the high RS individual’s rejection expectations.
The consequences of RS are not limited to adult relationships. The dy-
namic is acquired early; evidence of its functioning has been observed in
children as young as fifth grade. Studies conducted with middle-school
children have shown that high RS children experience interpersonal diffi-
culties including aggressive and antisocial behavior, troubled relationships
with peers and teachers, and disciplinary problems leading to suspensions
(Downey, Lebolt, Rincon, & Freitas, 1998).
Our findings within a social-cognitive approach provide support for
the view that RS operates within a vicious cycle with rejection expecta-
tions, setting in motion actions that lead to their fulfillment. Thus, at first
glance, RS appears to be a dysfunctional system that perpetuates personal
and interpersonal difficulties. An alternative viewpoint is that the RS dy-
namic functions to defend the self against rejection by significant others
and social groups. To the extent that the individual has been exposed to
the pain of rejection, protecting the self from rejection while maintaining
close relationships will become an important goal and a protective system
such as RS will develop to serve it. The adaptive value of the DMS comes
from its ability to trigger quick defensive responses under threat conditions
without needing time to think (e.g., LeDoux, 1996; Metcalfe & Mischel,
1999; Ohman, 2000). Such an emergency system can become maladaptive,
however, if activated indiscriminately in situations that require reflective
strategic behavior, when the threat is minimal, or when efforts to prevent
the realization of the threat occur at the expense of other personal goals.
We propose that the initial self-protective function of the RS system does
sometimes turn into this maladaptive pattern.
Though we suggest that the RS dynamic develops over time as a mech-
anism to protect the self, we clearly distinguish rejection expectations in
the model from coping strategies. In attachment theory, beliefs and coping
orientations are seen as part of an amalgamated “attachment style”
consisting of cognitions and affects about the likelihood of acceptance/
rejection and strategies to cope with potential rejection. There is an as-
72 INTERPERSONAL COGNITION

sumption inherent in this approach that if you identify some aspect of a

person’s attachment style (e.g., what beliefs a person holds), then you
know a great deal about other aspects of the person (e.g., how the person
behaves and feels). Though these might be related empirically (indeed, it is
common for stress and a response to stress to go hand-in-hand), it is im-
portant for our understanding of underlying mechanisms (and of high RS
individuals) to separate rejection expectations from responses to them. The
RS dynamic does not inevitably lead to the maladaptive behaviors de-
scribed above; there is quite a bit of variability in how the expectations
(and, as follows, perceptions) play out in interpersonal situations. How
particular people deal with rejection expectations depends on a variety of
other factors. We have looked at one of these factors, general self-regulatory
abilities, which may reduce the likelihood of responding intensely and hos-
tilely to an ambiguous behavior. In this case, responses to perceived rejec-
tion are not driven by an activated DMS alone. The more illuminating
approach, then, is studying important components of processing disposi-
tions as theoretically independent, though empirically correlated. Doing
so, we can investigate how they combine together in individuals to influ-
ence behavior.

COPING WITH THE THREAT OF REJECTION VERSUS COPING WITH REJECTION

The model exposes how normal cognitive functions can develop with expe-
rience into maladaptive stable patterns of processing. In uncovering the
mental steps leading to a hostile behavioral response to a seemingly innoc-
uous comment, such as one that a distracted boyfriend might make, we
seek to isolate potentially fruitful avenues of intervention. Indeed, we sug-
gest that the dynamic can be disrupted at one of the model’s links: between
history and expectation, between expectation and perception, or between
perception and response. Since we posit that, most commonly, the process
is swift and automatic, it may seem difficult to avert the negative affective
and interpersonal outcomes of RS. However, there are points that are par-
ticularly ripe for disruption. We suggest that the detection of threat cues
triggers not only the RS dynamic, but also strategies designed to protect
the self from the potential rejection. These strategies, however, can appear
just as unmitigated and extreme as would the hostile reactions that are in-
hibited.
One way in which the RS process can be interrupted is through tar-
geted behaviors intended to prevent rejection from occurring, even in the
presence of threatening trigger cues—that is, when rejection is recognized
as a possibility but before it occurs. Another way is through conscious and
controlled efforts to self-regulate responses to rejection once it has oc-
curred. Both of these coping strategies involve highly regulated behavior in
the service of the activated DMS. We describe them more fully below.
 Rejection Sensitivity as an Interpersonal Vulnerability 73

Rejection Prevention

In addition to heightening the individual’s acuity for detecting rejection

cues, when activated, the DMS should trigger efforts to prevent rejection
from occurring. Rejection can be prevented by avoiding social situations or
fleeing from them (if rejection expectations are high, perhaps affiliation
needs have to be fulfilled otherwise). However, when the desired outcome
is to maintain connection with the threat source—a significant other—such
avoidance is not a preferred option. Rather, anxiety about rejection can
fuel efforts to prevent the loss of that relationship. Rejection-prevention ef-
forts are therefore likely to take the form of inhibiting the actions that
might elicit rejection (e.g., going “unnoticed” by keeping silent about opin-
ions that might lead to disagreement with a partner) or active efforts to
please (e.g., solicitousness and ingratiation). These activities can lead to a
“loss of self”—where one’s own goals, interests, and tendencies are subju-
gated in the interests of maintaining a relationship.
Recently, we have been examining the point in the unfolding of the RS
dynamic when rejection expectations are triggered, but the irrevocable re-
jection is not yet perceived—for example, you’ve approached the girl to
ask her out, but she hasn’t yet said no. At such a moment, hope still exists
for acceptance, and attempts can become more feverish to attain it.
Efforts to prevent rejection can involve negotiation of such dangerous
turf by accommodating the self to the partner. Whereas the ability to ac-
commodate in a relationship may be adaptive (Rusbult, Verette, Whitney,
Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991), it can also become maladaptive when it occurs to
the extent of subverting other important personal goals or engaging in so-
cially harmful behavior. Indeed, Helgeson’s work on communion and un-
mitigated communion highlights this difference (e.g., Helgeson & Fritz,
2000). While communion is seen as a healthy focus on and involvement in
others’ needs and goals, unmitigated communion implies a subjugation of
one’s own goals and needs in the service of others and predicts many of the
same results as RS: negative interpersonal and physiological outcomes such
as depression, self-neglect, anxiety, and poor health (Fritz & Helgeson,
1998; Fritz, Nagurney, & Helgeson, 2003; Helgeson & Fritz, 1998, 2000).
Whereas the underlying motive of individuals high in unmitigated
communion is theorized to be helping partners to achieve their goals and
enhancing partners’ self-views, the underlying motive of high RS individu-
als is attaining (or maintaining) acceptance from close others (i.e., avoiding
rejection). In this way, RS really is a focus on one’s own goals and needs,
and the activities implemented on the path toward achieving those per-
sonal goals are similar to the activities implemented by high-unmitigated-
communion individuals on the path toward others’ goals—leading to com-
mon affective consequences.
To date we have linked RS with two types of potentially self-defeating
behavior patterns enacted to prevent rejection. First, we have shown a link
74 INTERPERSONAL COGNITION

between RS and risk of engagement in self- or other harmful behavior in

order to maintain the relationship. A prospective study of early adolescents
(Purdie & Downey, 2000) showed that, to the extent that girls were high in
RS in fifth–seventh grade, they were more likely 2 years later to agree with
a statement indicating that they would be willing to do things that they
knew were wrong to maintain their current dating relationship (e.g., “I
would do anything to keep my boyfriend with me even if it’s things that I
know are wrong.”). Similarly, in a cross-sectional pilot study of college
women, RS was associated with a heightened likelihood of reporting
having actually done things that felt wrong or uncomfortable to maintain a
relationship (Downey & Ayduk, 2002). Second, we have shown a link be-
tween RS and self-silencing (Jack & Dill, 1992) which is enacted to
preserve a relationship (Ayduk, May, Downey, & Higgins, 2003; Downey
& Ayduk, 2002). In addition, in a study of college women, RS was associ-
ated with having avoided disclosing things about one’s self or one’s past to
prevent rejection (Downey & Ayduk, 2002). In this study, RS was also re-
lated to an unstable sense of self, consistent with the hypothesis that people
who are chronically concerned with actively preventing rejection may have
self-schemas that are highly contingent on perceived evaluation by im-
portant others (Downey & Ayduk, 2002). That is, in their attempts to
prevent rejection, these people may align their preferences, goals, and be-
liefs with those of important others because they see this as a way to estab-
lish a firm interpersonal connection. When they come into contact with
various important others, then, their preferences, goals, and beliefs must
change with the company, and their “true” but unspoken needs are never
met.
Further evidence of this tendency comes from studies involving poten-
tial rejection from Internet groups formed on the basis of attitudes that are
highly salient for college students. Romero and Downey (2004) gave par-
ticipants attitude questionnaires purportedly to aid in assigning them to
appropriate (fictitious) established Internet groups. Participants who were
high in RS were more likely to agree to do menial tasks for a group after
receiving a lukewarm set of e-mails from its members than after receiving
clearly rejecting messages. That is, when acceptance was still a possibility,
high RS participants were more likely to perform unpleasant tasks for the
group, possibly because they saw this as a strategy to ensure acceptance. In
a follow-up study, Romero and Downey investigated if this strategy of sub-
jugating one’s own needs for the group’s needs would translate into self-
presentation of attitudes. Participants were asked to fill out a set of ques-
tionnaires designed to assess their preferences and values, allegedly to fit
them into an appropriate Internet group. They then wrote a message to
and received several (fictitious) replies from their group members, who
either matched or mismatched with the participants’ political affiliation.
Participants who were high in RS actually changed their attitudes (from
 Rejection Sensitivity as an Interpersonal Vulnerability 75

their background responses) in an attempt to fit better with the group

norm. Thus, when acceptance was seen as possible, high RS individuals
tried to change their selves in ways that they perceived would likely maxi-
mize their chance of being eventually accepted.
We argue, in line with the RS model, that such attempts to meet the
needs of others are attempts to maintain relationships, and that dismissing
one’s own needs may be seen by individuals who are high in RS as a neces-
sary sacrifice. In the RS model, unmitigated communion can be thought of
as a behavioral strategy motivated by a desire to prevent rejection. We
would argue that this strategy is implemented only under certain circum-
stances, when the individual believes acceptance is still possible. Although
such overaccommodation may help reduce the threat of immediate rejec-
tion by the partner, it may in the long run be harmful both to self and to
the relationship (e.g., Allan & Gilbert, 1997; Jack, 1991, 1999, 2003; Jack
& Dill, 1992). The negative effects of overaccommodation may be direct,
such that these behaviors take a toll on mood and self-concept as one
makes undue sacrifices. They may also be indirect, fueling maladaptive re-
actions to the perception of rejection, which indicates that prevention ef-
forts have proved futile despite one’s best efforts. This is evidenced by hos-
tile responses to rejection among high RS individuals in both lab and diary
studies (Downey & Feldman, 1996; Downey, Feldman, & Ayduk, 2000;
Downey, Freitas, et al., 1998).
This shift from ingratiation before rejection to hostility after rejection
can be more global: it can take place over the course of a relationship.
High RS individuals are presumed to come into relationships eager and en-
thusiastic, though anxious. In order to ensure continued acceptance from
their new partner, these individuals are ready to engage in self-silencing
and ingratiation, subverting their own needs and goals in the interest of
maintaining the relationship they are so anxious about losing. Over time,
however, as minor (or ambiguously negative) cues build up, there may be a
shift toward hostile overreactions. These can be all the more surprising and
apparently unmotivated, if they are made in response to behaviors that
have not elicited hostility in the past (before the shift, when the high RS in-
dividual was still vying for acceptance).
If one defines one’s self solely relationally, in interaction with another
person (or several people, if there is more than one “relational self” to go
with more than one significant other), then the self exists only to the extent
that the relationship does. In this case, what does rejection signal? Does RS
come from a fear of loss of self should the relationship end? Do high RS
people see relationships as a source of identity that then must be discarded
when the relationship ends? This inconsistent self-presentation, leading po-
tentially to a lack of self-concept clarity, is one of the dangers of the RS dy-
namic that we have not yet studied thoroughly. Together, these findings
suggest that high RS individuals are vulnerable to engaging in potentially
76 INTERPERSONAL COGNITION

self-defeating behavior in order to prevent the realization of threats to their

sense of self.

Self-Regulation
The kinds of hostile and unrestrained reactions to rejection that we have
found to be associated with RS may suggest the absence of effective self-
control, or dysfunctional emotional regulatory systems. However, not all
people who fear and expect rejection experience its negative consequences
to the same degree. Though these individuals show similar physiological
responses in trigger situations, indicating an activation of the DMS, they
are able either to inhibit maladaptive responses or to access a repertoire of
adaptive ones. How do these individuals differ from the high RS reactors?
In some of our recent work, we have started to examine possible mecha-
nisms that might moderate effect of RS on interpersonal difficulties and
maladaptive personal outcomes. As we described earlier, high RS people
typically overreact both in anticipation of and in reaction to rejection. At
the anticipation stage, rejection cues automatically activate the DMS, lead-
ing to vigilance for rejection and making individuals susceptible to perceiv-
ing and magnifying intentional rejection even with minimally ambiguous
cues. High RS people also overreact to perceived rejection because this
heightened anticipatory stress appears to accentuate already active fight-
or-flight or affiliation-seeking response mechanisms. The challenge for
high RS individuals in rejection-related situations, then, seems to be regu-
lating themselves so that they can restrict and modulate their automatic
DMS reactivity. This conceptualization suggests that people who have the
competencies to strategically down-regulate “hot” DMS activation associ-
ated with RS may be better able to cope more rationally and reflectively
with rejection, and to behave in accordance with their long-term relation-
ship goals rather than their defensive impulses, thus avoiding characteristic
patterns of maladjustment.
Converging evidence from delay-of-gratification studies (Metcalfe &
Mischel, 1999; Mischel, 1973, 1996) and developmental research shows
that flexible and strategic attention deployment is crucial for distress and
impulse inhibition (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Derryberry & Rothbart,
1997; Thompson, 1994; Wilson & Gottman, 1996). Experimental studies
of delay of gratification, for example, have shown that the child’s ability to
forgo immediate gratification for a delayed but preferred reward is medi-
ated by effective attention deployment in the service of arousal reduction
(Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). Attention deployment strategies
used to successfully delay gratification include purposeful self-distraction
and cognitive reframing operations that “cool” the frustrating “hot” as-
pects of the delay situation (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).
Despite surface differences, regulation of behavior in the appetitive
domain (delay of gratification) and in the defensive domain (fight-or-flight
 Rejection Sensitivity as an Interpersonal Vulnerability 77

and anxiety-driven support seeking) appear to hinge on the ability to atten-

uate arousal by cooling the “hot” arousing and impulse-eliciting features
of the situation. Maintaining the frustration inherent in these seemingly
different regulatory tasks at manageable levels then enables individuals to
inhibit impulsive reactions and access reflective processes that facilitate the
attainment of long-term goals. Vigilance, or narrowing of attentional focus
on rejection cues, adaptive in the short term (see, e.g., Ohman, 2000) but
maladaptive in the long term, may mediate the relationship between anx-
ious rejection expectations and deleterious responses.
The prototypical RS dynamic that we have described so far may char-
acterize primarily those high RS individuals with self-regulatory difficul-
ties. These difficulties may play out both at the rejection-anticipation phase
and the reaction-to-rejection phase. In the anticipation phase, an inability
to divert attention away from rejection features and from one’s own inter-
nal emotional states in the face of possible rejection may hinder high RS
individuals from encoding contextual information that may provide alter-
native explanations for others’ behaviors (Arriaga & Rusbult, 1998;
Dodge, 1980; Dodge & Somberg, 1987; Downey & Feldman, 1996;
Holtzworth-Munroe & Hutchinson, 1993). The absence of alternative ex-
planations may foster a readiness to perceive intentional rejection in a per-
petrator’s behavior (Dodge, 1980). When rejection is perceived, lack of
self-regulatory ability may make high RS individuals susceptible to the
“here-and-now” focus that would make them respond destructively to be-
havior that they perceive to be hurtful without considering the long-term
impact on valued goals (Rusbult et al., 1991).
Conversely, through strategic attention deployment (i.e., purposeful
avoidance of rejection cues), high RS individuals with high self-regulatory
ability can dampen the activation of vigilance, better attend to situational
information, and generate alternative explanations to that of intentional
rejection. By making finer distinctions between intentional rejection and
ambiguous behavior that may be benignly intended, they may be less sus-
ceptible to false alarms and a rapid generation of a fight-or-flight or an
anxiety-driven reassurance-seeking response. Individuals high in delay-of-
gratification ability also may be better at using cognitive reappraisal strate-
gies (Gross, 1998; Kelly, 1955; Lazarus, 1999; Mischel, 1973) that trans-
form the subjective meaning of a threatening situation (e.g., a partner’s
negative behavior) in such a way that it is less threatening. For example,
rather than encoding an argument with a romantic partner as a globally
negative event with irreversible consequences (e.g., breakup of the relation-
ship), rejection-sensitive people high in self-regulation may be able to con-
strue the event as simply a difference of opinions, restricting the event’s
negativity to the here-and-now rather than catastrophizing it. Likewise, a
partner’s currently negative behavior can be understood as transitory and
situationally induced (e.g., due to stress), and its importance or centrality
for the person’s long-term goals can be attenuated by placing such behav-
78 INTERPERSONAL COGNITION

ior in a broader context. Furthermore, high RS people with greater self-

regulatory ability may be better able to keep themselves focused on their
long-term relationship goals. Together, these regulatory mechanisms
should help high RS people to inhibit impulsive destructive behavior driven
by the DMS and to activate instead reflective and effective coping strate-
gies, thus furthering the likelihood of long-term goal attainment.
In support of these ideas, we have shown in recent work that self-
regulatory competencies assessed in the delay-of-gratification paradigm
(Mischel et al., 1989) moderates the link between RS and such maladaptive
outcomes as aggression and low self-worth (Ayduk et al., 2000). We found
that those high RS individuals who displayed an ability to delay gratifica-
tion suffered relatively few of the negative outcomes (e.g., interpersonal
difficulties, lower mental and physical well-being) that were experienced
by high RS individuals who were unable to implement self-control strate-
gies. This effect held true in diverse samples that differed in age, ethnicity,
and socioeconomic status, suggesting that the protective role self-regulatory
competencies play against RS may be relatively robust. In ongoing work,
we are further investigating the mechanisms that may underlie the protec-
tive effect of self-regulatory competencies that was demonstrated in this
study. Of particular interest to us is the way flexible attention shifting in
the early stages of processing may affect high RS individuals’ likelihood of
perceiving rejection.
Although supportive of our hypothesis, these data did not clarify ex-
actly which processes mediated the effect of delay ability (or, more gener-
ally, self-regulatory competencies) on high RS individuals’ resiliency. As we
suggested above, we see attentional control as a key mediator between risk
and psychopathology, organizing cognitive, attributional, physiological,
and motivational systems that operate for or against RS. It awaits further
experimental and longitudinal research, however, to test this hypothesis
more definitively.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have discussed rejection sensitivity, a social-cognitive

model of personal relationship behavior describing a processing dynamic
whereby certain interpersonal situations trigger anxious expectations of re-
jection. Thanks to a defensive motivational system, these expectations
lower the threshold for perceiving rejection by directing attention to and
personalizing negative cues. We posit that before rejection is perceived, or
while rejection is still evitable, this defensive motivational system prompts
increased efforts of rejection prevention, leading to the suppression of per-
sonal goals in the interests of maintaining acceptance. After rejection is
perceived, the DMS can lead to intense reactions to it, unless self-regulatory
competencies are sufficient to inhibit such maladaptive “overreactions.”
 Rejection Sensitivity as an Interpersonal Vulnerability 79

We hope that avenues currently under investigation will lead us to

implementable interventions for high RS individuals, whose relationship
behaviors can turn their rejection expectations into reality (Downey,
Freitas, et al., 1998).
Many researchers have taken advantage of developments in social
cognition and personality, creating a field of relationship science that
delves beyond broad categorizations and global descriptions. Viewing per-
sonality as a set of processing dispositions, triggered by cues acquired from
an individual’s social-cognitive learning history, can demystify the personality–
relationship link. This focus on psychological mediators is shared by other
models that incorporate in their conceptualization some version of the
notion of “mental representations” of relationships (e.g., Andersen &
Chen, 2002; Baldwin, 1992). A number of attempts have been made to ex-
plain the link between relationship behavior and global personality traits
through investigations of the self. While the “self” remains an elusive con-
cept in psychology, various theories about self processes have appeared to
unravel the links between, for example, low self-esteem and unsuccessful
relationship histories (e.g., self-discrepancy theory; see Higgins, 1987).
Many, or most, of the existing theories of individual differences in interper-
sonal relationships can be interpreted as social-cognitive, with at least a
recognition (though not always clearly defined) of the dynamics that lead
to relationship behavior. These models share a few key components.
First, though not all theories explicitly outline the process whereby
cognitive–affective mediators link experience with behavior, the emphasis
on them, born of new paradigms and research methodologies, is almost
ubiquitous. The age of global, pan situational, stable trait characteriza-
tions is over; the tools that psychology has available to it today are leading
to a more precise and more dynamic investigation of people’s cognitions,
affects, and behavior. One key contribution that new approaches in psy-
chology make is to assess more definitely how theoretically and empirically
related constructs (e.g., self-esteem, RS, and attachment style) differ from
each other—if at all. Overall, relatively little attention has been paid to
comparing the psychophysiological correlates of conceptually and empiri-
cally related personality dispositions. Yet the burgeoning interest in the
neurobiological bases of psychological processes suggests the importance
of this line of research. Are RS and self-esteem driven by the same neuro-
logical correlates? The new paradigms allow us to establish whether the
profile of psychophysiological reactions to rejection and acceptance associ-
ated with each of these relevant constructs is similar to or different from
that associated with RS.
A related idea common to current models of relationships is that indi-
vidual differences in relationship behavior develop due to a social-cogni-
tive learning history, beginning with parental interactions and developing
over time. Mental representations of, and expectations and beliefs about,
relationships are generated quickly and early. The contingencies of the
80 INTERPERSONAL COGNITION

mother–child relationship must be mastered to maintain contact (e.g., se-

curity, food) and so ensure survival. These early representations of how a
relationship works affect perceptions and behavior in future relationships,
potentially leading to a repeating cycle of relationship behaviors and out-
comes that may appear dispositional. Though relationship cognitions are
not immutable, they can be reinforced through a self-fulfilling system of
attributions and inferences. This deglobalization of relationship styles
mimics the decreasing popularity of using personality traits to describe in-
dividuals in favor of cognitive–affective processing dispositions (Mischel &
Shoda, 1995) that are contextualized and dynamic.
Finally, the RS model, along with attachment theory and other social-
cognitive models of relationships, emphasizes the dimension of acceptance–
rejection in interpersonal interactions. Specifically, the focus is on interper-
sonal rejection as a threat, and acceptance as necessary for emotional (and
possibly physical) health and well-being. Though much research has gone
into exploring the causes and consequences of rejection, this unasked, un-
answered question remains: Why is rejection so threatening? There is no
explication in existing theories of relationships of why rejection itself is to
be avoided, and why the possibility elicits such extreme and maladaptive
responses. Particularly in the context of personality disorders such as bor-
derline personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder, and avoidant
or dependent personality disorder, it is worth considering the self systems
that enter into play when threat to the self is perceived. These self systems
(e.g., the evaluative self, the narcissistic self, the other-directed self) differ
in the meaning or implications of rejection, in the cues that convey it, and
in the reactions that are likely to arise. An explanation of relationship be-
havior cannot be complete without an explication of the factors that con-
vey rejection and the meaning rejection conveys and a discussion of the
motivational systems that are activated to prevent or cope with it. These
important issues await theoretical and empirical elaboration.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This research was supported by Grant No. R01-MH069703-01 from the National
Institute of Mental Health.

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