DYNAMIC POSITIONING

&
THRUSTER ASSISTED MOORINGS

Chris Jenman BSc. MRINA, FNI, MRIN

[Link]@[Link]
DP FOR EVERYTHING

CONSTRUCTION,
OFFTAKE,
PRODUCTION,
EXPLORATION, PIPELAY,
ACCOMMODATION,
SUPPLY, ETC………
 DP EQUIPMENT CLASSES 1, 2 & 3

DOES THIS STAND FOR GOOD, BETTER & BEST?

NO
ARE THEY THE SAME FOR ALL CLASS
SOCIETIES?
NO
IS A DP 3 VESSEL SAFER THAN A DP 2 VESSEL?
NOT ALWAYS
IS DP CLASS INDEPENDENT OF THE WEATHER?
NO
DOES DP CLASS INCLUDE THE WORK THE VESSEL
PERFORMS?
NO
 OperationWHAT ISDP

Voith
GPS Schneider
Propeller

Azimuth
Gyrocompass Thruster

Laser Positioning CP Propellers

Rudder
Hydroacoustic Positioning DP Control System
Symmetry’s IDP System (Brazil)
 DP2 & DP 3 REQUIREMENTS/ASSUMPTIONS

NO LOSS OF POSITION IF ONE THING GOES

WRONG (Including fire & flood for DP3)
REDUNDANCY OF POWER AND THRUST
REDUNDANCY OF CONTROLLERS AND
SENSORS
EVERYTHING WORKING ALL THE TIME
ZERO CHANCE OF BLACKOUT
INCIDENTS REPORTED, INVESTIGATED &
CLOSED OUT
PERSONNEL COMPETENT IF CERTIFIED
 CLASS DP UNDERSTANDING

MOST DP VESSELS WITH DNV SO THEY HAVE

BEST DEPTH OF KNOWLEDGE
ABS HAS VESSELS BUT MOSTLY BECAUSE
OF US OWNERS OR GOM OPERATIONS
LLOYDS REGISTER HAS ENOUGH TO
MANAGE THE SUBJECT
BV & GL DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH VESSELS TO
GET TO GRIPS WITH THE SUBJECT EASILY
All vary depending on personnel and location
 DP Basic Control Loop
WIND SENSOR
FEED FORWARD Wind
WANTED Model
POSITION

Thruster
Controller Thrusters Vessel
Transform
POSITION REFERENCE
FEEDBACK

Position & Heading

Measurement
Pipe Lay Vessel Solitaire
 REPORTED DP INCIDENTS 2009

• 75 DP Incidents of which 33 have a loss of position

• 4 Environmental forces (A couple of these the operator should have avoided by
earlier action)
• 2 Loss of all gyro compasses (This should never have been possible)
• 3 Fault on one diesel generator (These were serious incidents and could all be
blamed on the set up)
• 5 Fault on one thruster (The reports do not state whether they were all CPPs)
• 3 Loss of all DGPS (No other position references so set up can be blamed)
• 2 DP software (No close out to confirm this and no detailed information)
• 2 Design Worst Case Single Failures (Position excursion assumed to have happened)
• 12 caused directly by Operator Error
Comments
This incident exceeded the red
alert limit

Initiating Event
Generator 6 failed from internal
short circuit

Main Cause
Power – Under voltage until faulty
generator cleared resulted in loss
of all online thrusters and loss of
position
 REPORTED CONSEQUENCES

COLLISION WITH OFFSHORE INSTALLATION

(Fixed platform or FPSO) $5m to $1bn
BOP PULLED OVER AND WELL OPEN TO SEA
$50m to Deepwater Horizon
RISER LOST ON SEA BED $7m - $70m
PIPE BENT OR BUCKLED $3m - $30m
DIVER KILLED OR INJURED ………
SIGNIFICANT DOWNTIME 20 days
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION $5m - $500m….
BIGGEST RISK???
Thialf 200m x 88m 200,000t
Displacement 2x7,000t cranes
DP Shuttle tanker approaching turret moored FPSO
DP Shuttle tanker forced to abort: no heading control on FPSO
 USING THRUSTERS DYNAMICALLY TO
ASSIST MOORINGS
• THE VESSEL IS MOORED
• ANY SUGGESTION OF THRUSTERS MEANS
•The moorings are inadequate and/or
•They enable more uptime
•There is a trade off of Cost vs. Risk
• THE THRUSTERS SHOULD ONLY IMPROVE
THE STATION KEEPING PERFORMANCE
• THRUSTERS INSTALLED CAN BE
•Insufficient for DP but adequate for ATA
•Adequate for DP but dangerous for ATA
(Automatic Thruster Assist)
 RULES FOR ATA

WRITTEN FOR DRILLING RIGS AND FLOTELS TO

HELP THEM GET LOCATION APPROVAL FOR
MOORINGS
FAILURE OF ONE MOORING LINE OR FAILURE OF
THRUSTER ASSIST
IF REDUNDANCY WITH THRUSTERS FMEA NEEDED
70% OF THRUST IF MANUAL
100% OF THRUST IF AUTOMATIC
TURRET MOORED MUST CONSIDER BLACKOUT IF
PART OF ESD (Emergency Shutdown)
 PRESENT SITUATION

5TH & 6TH GENERATION DEEPWATER DP 3 RIGS

WITH POWERFUL THRUSTERS BUT WEAK
MOORINGS ARE BEING USED IN SHALLOW
WATER (100 – 500m)
THE RULES WERE NOT WRITTEN FOR THIS
SITUATION
THEY CAN MEET THE RULES FOR MOORING
BECAUSE THE THRUSTERS ARE ENOUGH
FOR APPROVAL UP TO 6 OUT OF 8 AT 100% CAN
BE USED
USING THRUST THIS WAY ATTACTS ALL THE
SAME FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS OF DP
EIRIK RAUDE
West PhoenixWEST PHOENIX
 THRUSTER ASSIST INCIDENTS

1. Flotel had false line break detection and all

thrust used to combat a non existent tension
causing gangway to concertina
2. FPSO experienced multiple line failure and
loss of position: The thrusters were meant to
stop high environmental loads on the beam.
3. Drilling rig experienced all thrusters giving full
thrust adding >600t to the mooring line
tensions
4. Drilling rig had all thrusters operational and
using significantly more fuel than if on DP
ESSENTIAL ACTIONS BY THE ASSURED

• TAKE OVER SHIPYARD FMEA/FMECA &

MAKE IT OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE
• UPDATE FMEA/FMECA WITH CHANGES
• CARRY OUT ANNUAL DP TRIALS WITH
INDEPENDENT 3rd PARTY WITNESS
• RECORD, INVESTIGATE & CLOSE OUT
INCIDENTS
• WSOG FOR DRILLING UNITS
• MAINTAIN & TRAIN EXPERIENCED
PERSONNEL
 QUESTIONS FOR UNDERWRITERS TO ASK

DP:
WHAT CLASS? WHO DID THE FMEA? WHEN
WERE THE LAST TRIALS?
WHO WITNESSED THEM?
HOW MANY DP INCIDENTS REPORTED LAST
YEAR?
TAM: (Thruster Assisted Moorings)
WHY ARE THRUSTERS NEEDED?
WHAT HAPPENS AFTER BLACKOUT?
HAVE YOU ALLOWED FOR A DRIVE OFF?
 CONCLUDING REMARKS

THERE HAVE BEEN AND THERE CONTINUES TO BE

MANY CATASTROPHIC DP INCIDENTS BUT LUCKILY
NO CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES YET
THE TESTING OF DP VESSELS AND THE TRAINING
OF KEY DP PERSONNEL IS VERY DIFFERENT
BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT OPERATORS OF THESE
VESSELS
THRUSTERS ARE NOT A SIMPLE ANSWER TO
INADEQUATE MOORINGS
SOME THRUST CAN ASSIST A MOORING IN BAD
WEATHER BUT THEN DP PRINCIPLES MUST APPLY
 1
Mooring Systems – Risks & Integrity Management

David Brown CEng, BPP-TECH London

• Introduction
• Expanding FPSO Market
• Hardware
• Codes
• Vulnerability
• Losses
• Integrity Management
• Key Questions for Underwriters
 COMPANY OVERVIEW
2
Established 1981
Sectors: Oil & Gas, Renewables, Insurance

Specialist Project Services & Design Consultancy:

 Concept & feasibility studies for floating systems

 Procurement support for subsea systems (SURF), water column

& seabed equipment (trees etc)

 Engineering for insured risk reduction & claims

 Offshore monitoring and instrumentation

 Power cable risks and failures

 Mooring Systems
FPSO Expanding market
3

FPSO drivers:

• increased global oil demand

• Middle East/N Africa supply
disruption
• ~$100/bbl oil
• new deep water drilling rigs
boost fleet (150 new rigs
since 2005)
• pre-salt discoveries offshore
Brazil

(ref IMA rpt – 3/11, Upstream 5/11, Rigzone

5/12)
 Mooring Systems
FPSO Expanding market
4

Source [Link]
 Mooring Systems
FPSO Expanding market
5

194 new units:

55 - current bids
or final design
(next 18 months)

139 – planning
stage

Source: Upstream 5/11

 Mooring Systems
FPSO Expanding market
6
Prelude FLNG:

• 488m by 74m hull

• 600,000 tonne weight
• Kizomba A FPSO is 285m
by 63m
• 90m high turret
• 250m water depth
• Cat 5 cyclones (>156 mph)

Source: The Engineer 09 & ship

[Link]

7-8 additional Asia-Pacific

FLNG projects proposed
Source: Upstream 5/11
Mooring Systems
Hardware
7
 Mooring Systems
Hardware
8

Single point mooring - external Spread mooring

turret
Source: API RP 2SK
 Mooring Systems
Hardware
9

Catenary anchor leg mooring – hawsers & fixed yoke (Source API RP 2SK)
 Mooring Systems
Hardware
10

Most permanent moorings use studless chain

- diameter up to 6”
- studs loosen, weld cracks & fracture, fatigue issues
- single link weighs 0.5T
- studless ~10% lighter, same Tbreak
- 1 link 0.9m length
DNV-OS-E301, Oct 2010
Mooring Systems
Hardware
11

4” Kenter shackle

not used for long term

moorings (DnV) - poor
fatigue, corrosion

still exists in legacy

systems
(DNV-OS-E301, 2010)
 Mooring Systems
Hardware
12

Typical wire rope & permanent mooring socket

• Six strand & spiral strand wires are common
• Galvanized jacketed spin resistant is good
• 30-35 year life expectancy
• Ability to inspect? (API RP 2SK)
 Mooring Systems
Codes
Various documents on mooring initial design, eg: 13

• API RP 2SK (Oct 2005), GoM 2008 addendum & DNV E301 (Oct 2010)
• ISO 19901-7 (2005) - new standard being developed by industry

Little guidance on installation, operation. Some inspection/retirement criteria in:

• API RP 2I 3rd ed.(Apr 2008) & API RP 2SM (synthetic fibre lines)
• Intl Assoc. of Class Socs (IACS) No 38, Oct 2010

Issues:

• Differences in technical standards between Societies

• Regional differences within Societies – how good is the surveyor?
• Standards only periodically updated (behind the curve, eg new failure modes)
• Many Societies recognise that existing rules do not ensure FPSO mooring integrity
Source: Oil & Gas UK Report OP023 (2008)
 Mooring Systems
Vulnerability
14
• Class Rules evolving from seafaring background

• Existing developments: Class - Ageing, many legacy systems in place (eg SPMs &
offloading tankers). Equipment replacement considered as repairs, obsolete Class codes
utilized

• Tanker conversions to FPSOs, change in duty

• New developments – Speedier developments, smaller operators, remote & unpredictable

environments, deeper water, more subsea assets, increased asset values

• Limited redundancy in mooring system, chain as strong as its weakest link

• Difficult to inspect & maintain, degradation & retirement issues

• Rapid incident escalation (eg cascading failure) in hostile environments

• Consequences lead to major loss including damage to subsea architecture

 Mooring Systems
Vulnerability - environment
15
 Mooring Systems
Vulnerability – mooring legs
16

Terminations:

• Hawse tubes - highest tension with

additional bending, twisting
stresses & link contact wear

• Touchdown - heavy contact with

sea floor containing rock of
comparable hardness to steel ->
severe localized wear

Main Factors Influencing Long-Term • Touchdown - accelerated corrosion

Mooring Integrity (aerobic), chain moves above &
Also inspection and maintenance, mooring jewellery
below mudline, parent metal
exposure
Source: HSE 2006 study
 Mooring Systems
Vulnerability – physical damage
Manufacturing, Installation 17
Wire rope:
& Operation - breakages & wear
- diameter change
Chain: - loss of lubrication
- welds - distortion - kinking,
- link deformations bending, scrubbing,
crushing, birdcaging
- interlink contact zones
- thermal damage
- wear marks/cracks etc
- corrosion
- corrosion
 Mooring Systems
Vulnerability - fatigue
18
Mooring-accelerated
degradation

• Disconnectable
units ‘riding-out’
storms

• Permanent units in
severe storms

• Moorings operating
beyond design life

• Moorings designed
to out-dated codes
 Mooring Systems
Vulnerability – awareness & response
For North Sea FPSO fleet 19

• 50% of units cannot monitor line tensions in real time, many not calibrated

• 33% of units cannot measure offsets from the no-load equilibrium position

• 78% of units do not have line failure alarms

• 67% of units do not have mooring line spares available

• 50% of units cannot adjust line lengths

Source: HSE 2006 study

Worldwide?
 Mooring Systems
Losses
20
Mooring Failure Profile

• Classic bathtub curve

• Early life failures during

‘bedding-in’ due to poor
design, manufacture
and/or installation,
inexperienced operation

• Late life failures caused

by ageing assets,
corrosion, fatigue etc
Reliability Curve (Klutke, Kiessler, & M.A., 2003)
 Mooring Systems
Losses
21
Cascade Chinook - loss 3/11

• 6.25” chain
• Faulty weld repair causes
fracture in single chain link
• 440T air can supporting hybrid
riser released
• Chain vulnerable to hydrogen
induced stress cracking – post
heat treatment

• Upstream 5/11
• Pictures: [Link]
 Mooring Systems
Losses
22
Gryphon - loss 2/11

• winds > 55 kn, ~12m waves,

10 leg mooring, 18 year old
chain

• Leading leg fails below

design load

• DP loses heading, FPSO

turns beam on

• 21 deg roll, 3 more legs lost

• 180m movement damaging
subsea kit (Maersk, 9/11)
Retrieved subsea arches (Upstream 9/11)
 Mooring Systems
Integrity Management
23

In 2008, Oil & Gas UK released international report “Mooring Integrity

Guidance” for the design of new moorings and integrity management of
existing moorings.

International participants:

 Bluewater  Noble Denton  TTI

 BP  OLF  TWI
 BV  SBM  Ugland Stena
 DNV  Shell  Vicinay
 HSE  Stena Ugland  Vryhof
 Lloyds Register  Synectica  Welaptega
 Maersk Contractors  Talisman  Wood Group
 Maersk Oil UK  TSC
 Mooring Systems
Integrity Management
24
Mooring Integrity Management System:

• Part of Operator Safety Management System

• Developed, owned & administered by Operator

• Recognition that Moorings are Safety Critical

• Key components:

– System Description. Design, Manufacturing & Deployment activities

– System Performance Standards (specific, measurable, agreed, realistic & timed)
– Normal & Damaged Operational Procedures
– Component Risk Review (ALARP)
– Monitoring & Inspection driven by Risk Review process
– Feedback into Performance Standards
– Suitable Tracking Systems to close out anomalies
Source: Oil & Gas UK Report OP023 (2008)
 Mooring Systems
Integrity Management
25
Risk Review – Good Practice:

• Carried out at design stage,

but for whole lifecycle
• Level of risk review?
• Component level?
• Hazard identification, failure
modes for each hazard
• Risk estimation: combination
of consequence & probability
give risk rating
 Mooring Systems
Integrity Management
26
Risk Rating Matrix (for each
failure mode) :

Eliminate or minimise unacceptable risks

by design, prevention, detection, control,
Source: Oil & Gas UK Report OP023 (2008)
and/or consequence mitigation
 Mooring Systems
Integrity Management
27
Benefits :

• Safer mooring systems less prone to failures

• Better early warning of degradation, through meaningful monitoring & inspection

• More efficient response to failure by on-board staff

• Minimisation of consequences of mooring failure

• Improved insurance terms

• Increased shareholder value

• Improved reputation
 Mooring Systems
Key Questions
28
Questions for Underwriters to Assured:

1. Are Oil & Gas UK Mooring Integrity Guidance (2008) procedures or similar followed?
(No – lower standard)

2. Are mooring line tensions and offsets appropriately monitored, stored and fed back to
re-evaluate the design assumptions? (No – lower standard)

3. Are there functioning line failure alarms on board? (No – lower standard)

4. What is the present day condition of the mooring system in terms of fatigue damage
and how is this established? (If unknown – lower standard)

5. Is meaningful fit-for-purpose periodic & post-incident inspection to establish corrosion,

wear & physical damage carried out and how is this used? (No – lower standard)

6. What is the policy on retirement of ageing mooring assets? (None – lower standard)
 Mooring Systems

29
For more info please contact:

David Brown

[Link]
Mooring Inspection Overview
Joint Rig Committee
London, July 13 2012
 Today’s agenda

Brief Company Introduction

Mooring System - Failure History
Consequences of failure
Industry response – Rules, guidance and regulation
Operator Philosophy – a review of experience
Inspection capabilities – technology overview
Suggested Inspection Methodology – a future plan?
Conclusions/Questions

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

 Welaptega Marine - What do we do?

Underwater Inspection of offshore

mooring systems
Regulatory compliance
Class requirements
Assure uninterrupted production
Maintain asset value
Manage Insurance Risk
Emergency incident response
Provide immediate, high value
intelligence
Define geometry
Enable options

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

 Where do we do it? Who do we do it for?

Full Operating Base Sales Base Project Area

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

 Recent Failure History

Haewene Brim FPSO

Volve FSU 70% of UK Fleet
Banff FPU – 2 line failure 3 have had multiple incidents
Apollo Spirit FSU – wire break 4 have had multi-line failures
Northern Producer – 2 line failure Mean time to failure
Dalia FPSO – 4 line chain failure = 7.6 years
Captain FPSO – Chain run out Systems designed for
Nan Hai Sheng Li – 7 lines/3 Risers 25+ years with safety factor
Balder – Fairlead notching
Nan Hai Fa Xian – 4 Lines
Etc .................

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

 Deteriorative Mechanisms –
Mooring Systems

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

 Consequences of failure

Production loss
Insurance Claims ($$)
Cost of situation recovery
Increased operational exposure
Increased insurance premiums (30-60%?)
Increased risk to personnel
Increased environmental risk exposure
Decreased shareholder value and confidence

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

 Regulatory Players

National and Regional Bodies

UK – HSE (Heath and Safety Executive)
Norway – PSA (Petroleum Safety Authority)
GoM – (BOEMRE ex MMS) Bureau of Offshore Energy Management
Regulation and Enforcement
Australia – NOPSA (National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority)
Mainly legislative enforcement capability
Limited ongoing oversight
Challenges to Recruit and Retain Experienced Personnel

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

Classification Societies – Who are they?
What do they do? Are they relevant here?

Four lead in the offshore

ABS – American Bureau of Shipping
BV – Bureau Veritas
DNV – Det Norske Veritas
LR – Lloyds Registry
IACS (International Assoc Certification Societies) mandate
API (American Petroleum Institute) reliance

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

Classification Societies – Who are they?
What do they do? Are they relevant here?
Not for profit, but compete for clients
Differentials in technical standards between class societies
Regional differences in adherence standards within societies
Safety case-based (non-prescriptive)
No mandate to integrate best practice
Occasional review and updating of guidelines
Certification of suppliers of goods and service
CLASS IS FAR BELOW BEST PRACTICE

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

 Mooring Systems and Industry
Practice

Most OPERATORS rely on Class as maximum standard

Class Standards fall far below Industry Best Practice

> 90% of Global floating production conduct no DETAILED
INSPECTION of mooring systems DESPITE:
Mooring systems are considered to be SAFETY CRITICAL

The Incidence of Failures is INCREASING

Broad acknowledgement that moorings need to be inspected
more RIGOUROUSLY

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

Class Documents Relating to Moorings

•API-RP-2I In-Service Inspection of Mooring Hardware for

Floating Structures

•DNV-OSS-102 Rules for Classification of Floating Production, Storage

and Offloading Units
•ABS Guide for Building and Classing Floating Production
Installations
•LR Rules and Regulations for the Classification of a Floating
Offshore Installation at a Fixed Location
•ISO 19901-7 Stationkeeping Systems for Floating Offshore Structures
and Mobile Offshore Units

•Other documents issued by MMS, Oil & Gas UK, and various JIPs
 Renewal/Special Survey Requirements

API API RP 2I ABS Guide for Building and Classing

Sections 2.4; 3.4; 4.6 Floating Production Installations
• GVI of all moorings Part 7, Chapter 6, Section 2
• Chain diameter measurements • 100% GVI
• Connectors, shackles • Chain sections gauged for wear
• Focus on splash zone, TD, fairlead • Chain/Cable end connections
zone • NDT on areas of high stress, low fatigue
• Fairleads, hawse pipes, bending • Scour around anchors
shoes • Close inspection of high stress/wear
• Wire: broken strands, rope areas
diameter, etc
• Clump weights, MDBs, jewelry
• Corrosion and pitting
Renewal/Special Survey Requirements

DNV DNV-OSS-102 LR RR for the Class of a Floating

Chapter 3, Section 6, Offshore Installation at a Fixed Location
• 100% GVI apter 3, Section 5.6
• Chain diameter measurements • GVI of chain/rope, fittings, connections
• Wire: broken strands, deformation, • Chain diameter measurements
etc • Ship interface: fairleads, stoppers, etc
• Wear/Scouring of TD • Attention to chain in splash zone and TD
• Chain/Rope attachments • Wire strands: broken, corroded, bird
• Shackles, connectors, jewelry caged
• Ship interface: fairleads, bell • Extent of marine growth
mouths, etc • Performance of corrosion protection
• Corrosion and pitting • No standard for Link Length
• Refers to API RP 2I for link
length
 Types of Surveys
• As-Built/Installation Survey
•API recommends baseline measurements, Class requires specifically
• Annual Hull Survey
• Intermediate Survey
• Renewal/Special Survey (5 year maximum)
• UWILD (Underwater Inspection in Lieu of Dry-docking)
• Special Event Survey (severe storm, dropped object, collision, etc)
• Continuous Survey
•Surveys typically conducted each year
•The full inspection scope to be fulfilled within the 5 years
• Re-activation Survey
•Condition on case by case, consideration given to survey status at
time of layup, length of layup, and maintenance over that period
 KEY Elements of Inspections

General Visual Inspection (HD 3D Video)

Focus on areas of known issues –inspection history
Cleaning
Target areas of chain and wire – measurement areas
Measurement
Chain Measurement in groups
Rope Measurement selected lines
Modeling
Capture 3D Modelling data (2D Stills) noted
anomalies
Create 3D computer models of anomalies

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

 Mooring Inspection Best Practice

Qualitative
3 Dimensional Video – General Visual Inspection of all components
Quantitative
Rope Measurement
360 video record of rope surface and OD measurements
Chain Measurement
Link length and double diameter dimensional checking
Geometric Reality
3 Dimensional Modeling to assess condition of damaged components

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

 Real-time HD 3D Video

Real-time HD 3 Dimensional Video

Cameras rated to 4000m
Provides high quality visual record
Identify:
Pitting
Wear
Corrosion
Bending

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

 Chain Measuring Systems

OPTICAL CALIPER
w CAMERA VIEWS

MECHANICAL
CALIPER

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

 Rope Measuring System (RMS)

Continuous automated cleaning,

inspection and measurement of
WIRE and FIBRE mooring rope

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

 Geometric Reality – 3D Modelling

Dual high resolution

digital stills cameras

Synchronous triggering

Variable LED Lighting

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

 3D Modelling
Mooring Components

Biologically corroded
chain
Significant loss of
material
Analysis of changes in
stress distributions is
critical

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

 3D Modelling
Mooring Components

Multiple overlapping high-

resolution digital photographs

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

 3D Modelling
Mooring Components

What are the stress distributions

using an FEA (finite element
analysis)?
 Analysis of Chain Anomalies

Misalignment
Narrowing

Cosmetic
Flat Spot
 Installation damage to Fibre Rope

GoM Semi-sub FPU

WROV Lift wire caused
abrasion of sheathing
10 days before first oil!!

Construct geometrically accurate

3D model of damage
Measurement and assessment of
damage
BOEMRE and USCG agreed
approval of first oil schedule
$20-$30 Million saving to operator

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

 ROI Comparison of Costs

Five year costs of inspection

5 Year Mooring Integrity Program $2-3m

Cost of failures
Single line failure $5-7m replacement cost
Multi-line failure
Replacement Cost $500 - $700m
Lost Production Cost $500- $700m
Reduced share price $?

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

 Five Questions to Ask

1. Is the vessel classed?

2. Is there an Annual General Visual Inspection (GVI)?

3. Is wear and corrosion of CHAINS and WIRE measured?

4. Is there detailed inspection of other MOORING

COMPONENTS?

5. IF NOT, WHY NOT?

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

 Conclusions

Deterioration of moorings is INEVITABLE

Technologies DO EXIST to monitor in-service condition

Lifecycle Management gives HIGH ROI

Risk exposure is increasing

Aging infrastructure
Changing climate

Risk exposure can be minimized by inspection

QUESTIONS NEED TO BE ASKED

(c) Copyright – Welaptega Marine Limited – All rights reserved 2012

[Link]