Note by the President of the Security Council

The attached report of the Panel of Experts established by resolution 1306 (2000) was
presented to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997)
concerning Sierra Leone, in accordance with paragraph 19 of section B of resolution 1306
(2000). The report is being circulated for the information of the Members of the United Nations.
Consideration of the report in the resolution 1132 (1997) Sanctions Committee is beginning,
after which the Committee will officially present the report to the Security Council.

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Annex
Letter dated 19 December 2000 from the Chairman of
the Security Council Committee established pursuant
to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone
addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132

(1997) concerning Sierra Leone, and in accordance with paragraph 19 of section B of resolution
1306 (2000), I have the honour to submit, as agreed at the 19th meeting of the Committee held
today, the report of the Panel of Experts concerning the collection of information on possible
violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of resolution 1171 (1998) and the link
between trade in diamonds and trade in arms and related materiél as well as the adequacy of
air traffic control systems in the region.
In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if this letter together with its
enclosure were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as
a document of the Council.

(Signed) Anwarul Karim Chowdhury

Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant
to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone

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Enclosure

Letter dated 14 December 2000 from the Chairman and the members of
the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone Diamonds
and Arms, appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution
1306 (2000), addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning
Sierra Leone

On behalf of the members of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone Diamonds and Arms,
I have the honour to enclose the report in accordance with paragraph 19 of section B of
Security Council resolution 1306 (2000).

(Signed) Martin Chungong Ayafor

Chairman
Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone Diamonds and Arms
Security Council resolution 1306 (2000)
(Signed) Atabou Bodian
(Signed) Johan Peleman
(Signed) Harjit Singh Sandhu
(Signed) Ian Smillie

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Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to

Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19,
in relation to Sierra Leone

December 2000

Contents
Paragraphs Page
Acronyms 7
Executive summary
1–50 8
Introduction
51–64 14
A. General
51–57 14
B. The work of the panel
58–62 14
C. Standards of verification
63 15
D. A reminder
64 15
Part one
Diamonds
I. Sierra Leone diamonds
65–111 16
A. Background
65–66 16
B. Diamonds in the RUF 67–77 16
C. Estimated volume of diamonds mined by the RUF
78–80 17
D. How the RUF move diamonds out of Sierra Leone
81–89 18
E. Foday Sankoh’s post-Lomé diamond business 90–98 19
F. Sierra Leone’s new diamond certification system 99–109 20
G. Conclusions on Sierra Leone diamonds
110–111 22
II. International diamond statistics and transit countries 112–143 22
A. General
112–114 22
B. Provenance and origin
115–121 23
C. Case studies: Liberia, Gambia, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire 122–140 24
D. Conclusions on statistics and transit countries 141–143 26
III. “Conflict” diamonds and “illicit” diamonds 144–150 27
A. The issue
144–149 27

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 B. Conclusion on conflict versus illicit diamonds 28
150
IV. A final note on diamonds 151–154 28
A. Some recommendations from Sierra Leone 151–152 28
B. Further research
153–154 29
V. Recommendations on diamonds 155–166 29
Part two
Weapons
I. Weapons and the RUF
167–179 31
A. Background
167–176 31
B. Sources of RUF weaponry within Sierra Leone 177–179 32
II. Liberian support to the RUF
180–193 32
A. General
180–182 32
B. Training
183–191 33
C. Safe haven
192 34
D. Weapons and related materiél
193 34
III. The role of other countries 194–197 34
IV. The role of aircraft in supplying the RUF 198–217 35
A. Direct flights into RUF territory 198–201 35
B. Weapons flights into Liberia
202–211 35
C. The inner circle of the Taylor regime 212–217 36
V. Liberia and international transport networks
218–236 37
A. General
218–220 37
B. Aircraft registered in Liberia
221–223 38
C. Key individuals in Liberia’s aviation registry
224–234 38
D. Offices in the United Arab Emirates 235–236 40
VI. Other issues
237–251 40
A. The role of customs in exporting and transit countries 237–239 40
B. The role of airport authorities and inspectors
240–242 40
C. The non-observance of moratoria and embargoes
243–245 41
D. Further research
246–251 41
VII. Conclusions regarding weapons and the RUF
252–254 42
VIII. Recommendations on weapons, transport and air traffic control 255–269 42

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IX. Concluding recommendations 44

270–273
Part three
Technical note on air traffic control systems in West Africa
I. Background
274–277 45
II. Air traffic systems in West Africa
278–294 45
A. Air traffic management
278–280 45
B. Communications
281–285 45
C. Navigation
286–287 46
D. Surveillance
288–294 46
III. The Roberts Flight Information Region
295–313 47
A. General
295–303 47
B. Guinea
304–308 47
C. Sierra Leone
309–310 48
D. Liberia
311–313 48
IV. Conclusions
314–315 49
Annexes
1. Letter on the appointment of the expert panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2. Meetings and consultations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3. Key figures in the RUF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4. Sample communication on aircraft from Guinea 61
5. Note from the Sierra Leone airports authority 63

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Acronyms

AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Sierra Leone)

ASECNA Agency for the Safety of Air Navigation in Africa and Madagascar
ATU Anti-Terrorist Unit (Liberia)
CMRRD Commission for the Management of Strategic Mineral Resources
(Sierra Leone)
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation Programme
(Sierra Leone)
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
FIR Flight Information Region
GGDO Government Gold and Diamond Office (Sierra Leone)
IATA International Air Transport Association
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IWETS International Weapons and Explosives Tracking System
LISCR Liberian International Ship and Corporate Registry
LKI Lazare Kaplan International
NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia
PCASED Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and
Development
RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade
RUF Revolutionary United Front
RUFP RUF Party
SITA Société internationale de télécommunications aéronautiques
SLA Sierra Leone Army
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNITA Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola
WCO World Customs Organization

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Executive summary

A. Diamonds record diamond imports and exports. One issue has to do with
the general availability of statistics. Another has to do with a
distinction made between ‘country of origin’ and ‘country of
provenance’. Country of provenance refers to the country
1. Diamonds have become an important resource for Sierra from which diamonds were last imported; country of origin
Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in sustaining and indicates where they were mined. Until recently, little serious
advancing its military ambitions. Estimates of the volume of attention was paid anywhere to the issue of where diamonds
RUF diamonds vary widely, from as little as $25 million per were actually mined. The result is a wide range of anomalies.
annum to as much as $125 million. Whatever the total, it For example, 41 per cent of British rough diamond imports in
represents a major and primary source of income for the RUF, 1999 were said to originate in Switzerland, while Switzerland
and is more than enough to sustain its military activities. officially imports almost no rough diamonds at all. This is a
consequence of diamonds passing through Swiss free trade
2. A certain volume of RUF diamonds are traded in areas, until recently without record and without serious
Kenema and elsewhere in Sierra Leone. These are most likely government oversight.
smuggled out of the country. Some RUF diamonds have also
been traded informally in Guinea. But the bulk of the RUF 6. In its search for conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone,
diamonds leave Sierra Leone through Liberia. The diamonds the Panel discovered that there is a much greater volume of
are carried by RUF commanders and trusted Liberian couriers ‘illicit’ diamonds, and that distinguishing between the two is
to Foya-Kama or Voinjama, and then to Monrovia. Such trade extremely difficult. A large volume of diamonds entering
cannot be conducted without the permission and the Europe is disguised as Liberian, Guinean and Gambian in
involvement of Liberian government officials at the highest order to evade taxation and launder money. The report
level. Very little Liberian trade, in fact, whether formal or describes flagrant examples in Belgium of fraudulent
informal, takes place without the knowledge and involvement commercial reporting. A country like Liberia, whose name has
of key government officials. This is true of all imports, and been used with or without its knowledge by illicit traders, can
where exports are concerned, it is especially true of diamonds. thus conceal its own very real trade in illicit and conflict
diamonds behind larger rackets being perpetrated by others.
3. The Lomé Peace Agreement appointed Foday Sankoh
Chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic
Mineral Resources (CMRRD). Between the time he returned
to Sierra Leone in 1999 and the resumption of hostilities in
B. Recommendations on diamonds
May 2000, the Commission never actually functioned, but
Foday Sankoh spent money lavishly, without an obvious
source of income. Sankoh was, in fact, encouraging a wide
variety of potential foreign investors, many thinking they 7. In order to better regulate the flow of rough diamonds
would reap exclusive benefits from the same things. A picture fromproducing countries, a global certification scheme based
emerges of a double-dealing leader, clutching at financial on the system now adopted in Sierra Leone is imperative. It
opportunities for personal and political gain, outside of the will give added impetus to current discussions on this subject
governmental framework in which he was ostensibly working. if the Security Council endorses the concept of a global
Most of this related to the diamond trade. system.
4. The report comments on Sierra Leone’s new 8. In the short run, and in the absence of a global system,
certification system. Where the RUF’s conflict diamonds are it is recommended that certification systems similar to that
concerned, the legitimate export system is largely irrelevant. adopted by Sierra Leone, be required of all diamond exporting
As long as there are no controls in neighbouring countries, countries in West Africa, with special and immediate reference
the RUF will continue to move their diamonds out with to Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, as a protective measure for their
impunity. For this reason, it is imperative that a standardized indigenous industries and to prevent their exposure to
global certification scheme be introduced as soon as possible. conflict diamonds. If this has not been completed within a
period of six months, the Security Council should impose an
5. A major difficulty in tracking the movement of rough
international embargo on diamonds from these countries.
diamonds, whether conflict or otherwise, is the inconsistent
manner in which the governments of major trading centres 9. The Panel further recommends a complete embargo on

8
all diamonds from Liberia until Liberia demonstrates central annual report, compiled by the World Diamond
convincingly that it is no longer involved in the trafficking of Council and/or by the certification body that is expected to
arms to, or diamonds from, Sierra Leone. The ban should not emerge from the ‘Kimberly Process’ of intergovernmental
be lifted until this condition has been met, and until Liberia negotiation. Countries of origin must be distinguished from
too has joined the proposed standardized certification system. countries of provenance.
10. The Security Council should place an immediate 16. If diamonds are mixed and/or re-invoiced in a free trade
embargo on trade in all so-called Gambian diamonds until zone, it is imperative that the government of that country take
such time as its exports of diamonds can be reconciled with responsibility for verifying the bona fides of the diamonds
imports. before they are re-exported. This is especially important with
regard to Switzerland because of the large volumes that pass
11. Other diamond exporting countries in the region have
through its Freiläger, losing their identity in the process. The
been designated by the Belgian government as ‘sensitive’
same is true of the United Arab Emirates. In other words, all
countries, where special attention to imports is required. In
countries importing rough diamonds must be part of the
addition to the three countries suffering directly from conflict
anticipated ‘rough controls’ system.
diamonds and those mentioned above, these include Uganda,
Central African Republic, Ghana, Namibia, Congo 17. Throughout its work, the Panel was struck by the
(Brazzaville), Mali, Zambia and Burkina Faso. This list is widespread breaking of Security Council sanctions on both
commended to other major importing countries, including weapons and diamonds. If existing and future sanctions are
Switzerland, South Africa, India, Israel, the United Kingdom to be effective, the Security Council will require an ongoing
and the United States. Invoices from these countries need to capacity to monitor their observance and conduct research.
be thoroughly checked, and where there is doubt about either Where diamonds are concerned, there have been three Expert
provenance or origin, parcels should be seized until the Panels examining many of the same issues concurrently.
authorities have checked the facts. Delays in processing will There has been useful collaboration, but there has also been
increase the cost of doing business and will encourage better overlap and duplication. Considering the complexity and the
paper work. Forfeiture of improperly labelled goods will changing nature of the conflict diamond issue the Panel
discourage the habit decisively.1 recommends that in future, it would serve the Security Council
better to have an ongoing focal point within the United
12. Urgent attention should be given to extending a Sierra
Nations to monitor adherence to sanctions, as well as
Leone-style certification system to these countries as soon as
progress towards the goals stated in the 1 December 2000
possible.
General Assembly resolution on conflict diamonds.
13. The United Nations, the World Diamond Council and
18. The attention of the Security Council, the Government
the import control authorities of all rough diamond importing
of Sierra Leone, donor agencies and other interested parties
countries should be vigilant for other exporting countries, or
is drawn to observations contained in the report about the
for countries in the future, where trade in diamonds has little
need for probity and transparency. Without serious reform
to do with domestic production or legitimate trading.
and due diligence within government and government
14. It is essential, and a matter of urgency, that major agencies in Sierra Leone, international efforts to assist will be
trading centres (Belgium, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, wasted.
South Africa, India, the United States and Israel) come to a
common agreement on the recording and public
documentation of rough diamond imports that is consistent
from one country to another, and that clearly designates the C. Weapons and air traffic control
country of origin in addition to country of provenance.
15. An annual statistical production report should be
compiled by each exporting country and gathered into a 19. Despite an ECOWAS-Moratorium on arms shipments to
West Africa, the region is awash with small arms. Guerrilla
armies receive weapons through interlinked networks of
1
traders, criminals and insurgents moving across borders.
Note: the term ‘sensitive country’ is not used in this report to
suggest wrongdoing. It is taken from a Belgian government
Systematic information on weapons smuggling in the region
report which seeks to protect these countries, Belgium and is non-existent, and information that could be used to combat
the industry from problems to which they are all clearly the problem on a regional scale - through ECOWAS or
vulnerable. Namibia, for example, is one of the leaders in the through bilateral exchanges - is generally not available. Few
fight against conflict diamonds.

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States in the region have the resources or the infrastructure to provide the owners of ships and aircraft with maximum
tackle smuggling. discretion and cover, and with minimal regulatory interference.
A schedule of Liberian-registered aircraft provided to the
20. In Sierra Leone, the RUF depends almost exclusively on
Panel by the government listed only 7 planes. No
light weaponry, although it does have access to more
documentation was available on more than 15 other aircraft
sophisticated equipment. It has captured many weapons
identified by the Panel. Many aircraft flying under the Liberian
during confrontations with the Sierra Leone Army, ECOMOG
flag, therefore, are apparently unknown to Liberian
and UNAMSIL forces. The Panel, however, found
authorities, and are never inspected or seen in the country.
unequivocal and overwhelming evidence that Liberia has
been actively supporting the RUF at all levels, in providing 26. In November 1999, a Kenyan national named Sanjivan
training, weapons and related matériel, logistical support, a Ruprah was authorized by the Liberian Minister of Transport
staging ground for attacks and a safe haven for retreat and to act as the ‘Global Civil Aviation agent worldwide’ for the
recuperation, and for public relations activities. Liberian Civil Aviation Regulatory Authority, and to
‘investigate and regularize the ... Liberian Civil Aviation
21. There is also conclusive evidence of supply lines to
register’. During its visit to Liberia the Panel asked the
Liberia through Burkina Faso. Weapons supplied to Burkina
Transport Ministry, the Ministry of Justice and police
Faso by governments or private arms merchants have been
authorities about Ruprah and his work, but was told that he
systematically diverted for use in the conflict in Sierra Leone.
was not known to them. Ruprah is, in fact, a well-known
For example, a shipment of 68 tons of weapons arrived at
weapons dealer. He travels using a Liberian diplomatic
Ouagadougou on 13 March 1999. They were temporarily off-
passport in the name of Samir M. Nasr, and carries additional
loaded in Ouagadougou and some were trucked to Bobo
authorization from the Liberian International Ship and
Dioulasso. The bulk of them were then trans-shipped within
Corporate Registry.
a matter of days to Liberia. Most were flown aboard a BAC-
111 owned by an Israeli businessman of Ukrainian origin, 27. Victor Bout is a well-known supplier of embargoed non-
Leonid Minin. Details of the flights and dates are included in State actors - in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the
the report. Congo and elsewhere. He oversees a complex network of over
50 planes and multiple cargo charter and freight-forwarding
22. The role of aircraft in the RUF’s supply chain is vital,
companies, many of which are involved in shipping illicit
especially over the past two years as their sphere of influence
cargo. Bout has used the Liberian aviation register
in Sierra Leone has widened. It is known that the RUF were
extensively, operating mainly out of the United Arab Emirates.
supplied by helicopter on a sporadic basis before 1997, and
Sharjah Airport is used as an ‘airport of convenience’ for
on a regular basis since then. Helicopters originating in
planes registered in many other countries. One of Bout’s
Liberia land at Buedu, Kailahun, Makeni, Yengema, Tumbudu
aircraft, an Ilyushin 76, was used in July and August 2000 for
and elsewhere in Kono District.
arms deliveries from eastern Europe to Liberia. This aircraft
23. President Charles Taylor is actively involved in fuelling and an Antonov made four deliveries, on 4 and 27 July, and
the violence in Sierra Leone, and many businessmen close to 1 and 23 August 2000. The cargo included military helicopters,
his inner-circle operate on an international scale, sourcing spare rotors, anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems, missiles,
their weaponry mainly in eastern Europe. One key individual armoured vehicles, machine guns and ammunition.
is a wealthy Lebanese businessman named Talal El-Ndine. El-
28. It is difficult to conceal something the size of an Mi-17
Ndine is the inner-circle’s paymaster. Liberians fighting in
military helicopter, and the supply of such items to Liberia
Sierra Leone alongside the RUF, and those bringing diamonds
cannot go undetected by customs authorities in originating
out of Sierra Leone are paid by him personally. The pilots and
countries unless there are false flight plans and end-user
crew of the aircraft used for clandestine shipments into or out
certificates, or unless customs officials at points of exit are
of Liberia are also paid by El-Ndine.
paid to look the other way. The constant involvement of
24. Regional air surveillance capacities are weak or totally Bout’s aircraft in arms shipments from eastern Europe into
inadequate in detecting, or in acting as a deterrent to the arms African war zones suggests the latter.
merchants supplying Liberia and the RUF. Weak airspace
29. In addition, there have been few significant cases of
surveillance in the region in general, and abusive practices
aircraft with weapons being grounded at important fuelling
with regard to aircraft registration, create a climate in which
points such as Cairo, Nairobi or Entebbe, or anywhere in
arms traffickers operate with impunity.
West Africa. Although some countries have temporarily or
25. Because of its lax licence and tax laws, Liberia has for permanently stopped aircraft registered in Liberia from
many years been a flag of convenience for the fringe air cargo entering their airspace, the Liberian register continues to be
industry. Liberia also has lax maritime and aviation laws that used fraudulently. The practice has clearly been organised

10
fromLiberia in cooperation with shrewd businessmen abroad, over the past five years be investigated. The Panel further
and Liberian-registered planes remain prominent in many recommends that any State having exported weapons during
African countries, particularly in countries at war. this period to Burkina Faso should investigate the actual end-
use of these weapons, and report their findings to the
30. In short, Liberia is actively breaking Security Council
Security Council and to the Programme for Coordination and
embargoes regarding weapons imports into its own territory
Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED)
and into Sierra Leone. It is being actively assisted by Burkina
established under the ECOWAS Moratorium.
Faso. It is being tacitly assisted by countries allowing
weapons to pass through or over their territory without 36. In view of the sanctions-breaking cases investigated by
question, and by those countries that provide a base for the the Panel and the information gathered in the region, it is
aircraft used in such operations. recommended that the Security Council encourage the
reinforcement of the ECOWAS Programme for Coordination
31. The report concludes with a full technical report on the
and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) with
adequacy of air traffic control and surveillance systems within
support from Interpol and the World Customs Organization.
the region.
PCASED should have an active capacity to monitor
compliance with arms embargoes and the circulation of illicit
weapons in the region.
D. Recommendations on weapons and air
traffic control 37. The Security Council should encourage ECOWAS
member States to enter into binding bilateral arrangements
between States with common frontier zones, to initiate an
effective, common and internationally agreed system of
32. The Panel strongly recommends that all aircraft control that includes the recording, licensing, collection and
operating with an EL-registration number and based at destruction of small arms and light weapons. These bilateral
airports other than in Liberia, should be grounded immediately arrangements can be promoted and facilitated through
and until the provisions in the following recommendation are ECOWAS and through the Programme for Coordination and
met. This includes planes based in Sharjah and other airports Assistance for Security and Development. A common
in the United Arab Emirates, in Congo (Brazzaville), in the standard and the management of a database on significant
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Angola, Rwanda cases of smuggling and sanctions busting in the region could
and Kenya. Airport authorities and operators of planes be developed by Interpol. The IWETS (International
registered in Liberia over the past five years should be Weapons and Explosives Tracking System) programme of
advised to keep all their documentation, log books, operating Interpol could be used by all States and the United Nations
licences, way bills and cargo manifests for inspection. for the purpose of tracking the origin of the weaponry.
33. It is further recommended that all operators of aircraft 38. In this report, the Panel has identified certain arms
on the Liberian register, wherever they are based, be required brokers and intermediaries responsible for supplying weapons
to file their airworthiness and operating licences and their to the RUF. A project should be developed to profile these
insurance documents with the International Civil Aviation arms brokers with the cooperation of Interpol. Similarly,
Organization’s headquarters in Montreal, Canada, including considering the importance of air transport in the sanctions
documentation on inspections carried out during the past five busting, profiles of major cargo companies involved in such
years. The aircraft of all operators failing to do so should be practices should be developed, with a view to exploring ways
grounded permanently. Aircraft that do not meet ICAO and means of further strengthening the implementation of
standards should be grounded permanently. sanctions.
34. The Security Council, through ICAO, IATA and the 39. Responsibility for the flood of weapons into West
WCO should create a centralized information bulletin, making Africa lies with producing countries as well as those that
the list of grounded Liberian aircraft known to all airports in trans-ship and use them. The Security Council must find ways
the world. of restricting the export of weapons, especially from eastern
35. Burkina Faso has recently recommended that the Europe, into conflict areas under regional or United Nations
Security Council supervise a proposed mechanism that would embargoes. ‘Naming and shaming’ is a first step, but
monitor all arms imports into its territory, and their use, for a consideration could be given to placing an embargo on
period of three years. The Panel endorses this proposal. The weapons exports from specific producer countries, just as
Panel also recommends that under such a mechanism, all diamonds have been embargoed from producer countries,
imports of weapons and related matériel into Burkina Faso until internationally acceptable certification schemes have
been developed.

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40. An analysis of the firearms recovered from rebels board or to be equipped with avionics which could
should be undertaken in cooperation with Interpol, and its enable controllers on the ground to identify any traffic,
International Weapons and Explosives Tracking System. This anywhere and at any time in their sector;
would help in further identifying those involved in the RUF
• encouraging ICAO and other interested agencies to
supply line.
assist states in reinforcing the financial autonomy of
41. The World Customs Organization should be asked to bodies established for the management of air navigation
share with the Security Council its views on creating adequate services.
measures for better monitoring and detection of weapons or
related matériel to non-State actors or countries under an
Other recommendations
arms embargo.
42. Current Security Council arms embargoes should be 47. In this report, the Panel makes a variety of specific
amended to include a clear ban on the provision of military recommendations that deal with diamonds, weapons and the
and paramilitary training. use of aircraft for sanctions-busting and the movement of
illicit weapons. Many of these recommendations and the
43. Countries in West Africa that have not signed the 1989
problems they address are related to the primary supporter of
United Nations Convention on the Recruitment, Use, Training
the RUF, Liberia - its President, its government and the
and Financing of Mercenaries should be encouraged to do so.
individuals and companies it does business with. The Panel
44. Consideration should be given to the development of notes with concern that Security Council resolutions on
special training programmes on sanctions monitoring for diamonds and weapons are being broken with impunity. In
national law enforcement and security agencies, as well as addition to the foregoing, the Panel offers the following
airport and customs personnel in West Africa, and the recommendations with a view to making the message of this
development of a manual or manuals on the monitoring of report more clear, and to ensuring that there is better follow-
sanctions at airports for worldwide use by airport authorities up to Security Council decisions in future.
and law enforcement services.
48. A travel ban similar to that already imposed on senior
45. Consideration should be given to placing specialized Liberian officials and diplomats by the United States should
United Nations monitors at major airports in the region (and be considered for application by all United Nations member
perhaps further afield), focusing on sensitive areas and nations until such time as Liberia’s support to the RUF and its
coordinating their findings with other airports. This would breaking of other United Nations sanctions ends
enable better identification of suspect aircraft. It would also conclusively.
create a deterrent against illicit trafficking, and would generate
49. The principals in Liberia’s timber industry are involved
the information needed to identify planes, owners and
in a variety of illicit activities, and large amounts of the
operators violating United Nations sanctions and arms
proceeds are used to pay for extrabudgetary activities,
embargoes.
including the acquisition of weapons. Consideration should
46. The Security Council should consider ways in which air be given to placing a temporary embargo on Liberian timber
traffic control and surveillance in West Africa can be exports, until Liberia demonstrates convincingly that it is no
improved, with a view to curtailing the illicit movement of longer involved in the trafficking of arms to, or diamonds
weapons. Possibilities include: from, Sierra Leone.
• encouraging the installation of primary radar at all major 50. Consideration should be given to creating capacity
West African airports, and finding the financial support within the United Nations Secretariat for ongoing monitoring
to do so. Only primary radar can independently detect of Security Council sanctions and embargoes. This is
the movement of aircraft; imperative to the building of an in-house knowledge base on
current issues such as conflict diamonds, as noted in
• an alternative could be ‘pseudo radar’ which creates a
paragraph 17 above, but it is even more important to creating
radar environment with the use of powerful means of
greater awareness of, and capacity to deal with problems,
transmission of air/ground data through satellite;
which are not likely to be solved in the near future, such as
• requiring the use in the region of a Global Positioning the illicit trade in weapons and related matériel.
System and requiring aircraft to be equipped with the
appropriate avionics, with installation of the
corresponding equipment on the ground. This would
entail requiring aircraft flying in West Africa to have on

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Introduction

A. General Sanctions Committee informed the President of the Security

Council that his Committee had agreed to exempt the export of
diamonds controlled by the Government of Sierra Leone
through a new Certificate of Origin regime from the measures
51. On 2 August 2000, in reference to Security Council imposed by paragraph 1 of the resolution.
resolution 1306 (2000) concerning Sierra Leone, adopted by
the Council on 5 July 2000, the Secretary-General of the 56. The Panel of Experts consisted of Mr. Martin Chungong
United Nations appointed a Panel of Experts to collect Ayafor (Cameroon - Chairman), Mr. Atabou Bodian (Senegal -
information on possible violations of the measures imposed Expert from the International Civil Aviation Organization), Mr.
by paragraph 2 of resolution 1171 (1998) and the link between Johan Peleman (Belgium - Arms and Transportation Expert),
trade in diamonds and trade in arms and related matériel, and Mr. Harjit S. Sandhu (India - Expert from Interpol), and Mr. Ian
to consider the adequacy of air traffic control systems in the Smillie (Canada - Diamond Expert). The letter appointing the
region. Panel is included in annex 1.

52. Paragraph 2 of resolution 1171 (1998) states that 57. The Panel first met at United Nations Headquarters in
New York on 21 August, and it was subsequently agreed with
The Security Council ... decides, with a view to the Security Council Sanctions Committee on Sierra Leone
prohibiting the sale and supply of arms and related that its report would be submitted on 8 December 2000. This
matériel to non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone, was subsequently rescheduled to mid-December 2000.
that all States shall prevent the sale or supply, by their
nations or from their territories, or using their flag
vessels or aircraft, of arms and related matériel of all
types, including weapons and ammunition, military
B. The work of the panel
vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and
spare parts for the aforementioned, to Sierra Leone
other than to the Government of Sierra Leone through
named points of entry on a list to be supplied by that 58. The Panel received a great deal of logistical and moral
Government to the Secretary-General who shall then support from the United Nations Secretariat, from United
promptly notify all Member States of the United Nations Resident Coordinators and UNDP officials in almost
Nations of the list. every country it visited. Many governments helped with
detailed information and advice, and many individuals and
53. In connection with this resolution, the Panel took
companies in the diamond industry provided helpful
cognizance of paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 788
information. The Security Council exploratory hearings on
(1992), which remains in force:
Sierra Leone diamonds held in New York on 31 July and 1
The Security Council ... decides, under Chapter VII of August 2000 were also very helpful in setting the stage for the
the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, Panel.
for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in
59. The Panel was able to coordinate some of its work with
Liberia, immediately implement a general and complete
the concurrent Angola Panel. In addition, Panel members were
embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military
able to attend an important intergovernmental conference on
equipment to Liberia until the Security Council decides
conflict diamonds held in Pretoria in September 2000.
otherwise.
60. The Panel travelled widely to countries involved in the
54. The Panel also noted paragraphs 1 to 7 of Security
diamond trade, and to countries involved, or said to be
Council resolution 1306 (2000), which dealt with the issue of
involved in the trafficking of weapons and related matériel to
Sierra Leone’s diamonds, and in which the Security Council
Sierra Leone in contravention of Security Council embargoes.
decided that ‘all States shall take the necessary measures to
The entire panel visited Sierra Leone twice, and some Panel
prohibit the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds
members visited three times. In addition to Freetown, trips
from Sierra Leone to their territory’.
were made to Daru and to the diamond trading centre of
55. On 6 October 2000, the Chairman of the Sierra Leone Kenema. In Guinea, Panel members visited Conakry and

14
Nzerekore. The entire Panel also visited Liberia, South Africa substantiate a finding. Wherever possible, the Panel also
and United Nations Headquarters in New York. Travel was agreed to put allegations to those concerned in order to allow
undertaken by one or several of the Panel members to them the right of reply. In the past, allegations against various
Belgium, Burkina Faso, Canada, Ghana, France, India, Israel, parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone have been denied with
the question, ‘Where is the evidence?’ An example of this is
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United
the standard response to charges that weapons have been
Kingdom, the United States and the United Arab Emirates. channelled to Liberia through Burkina Faso. In the report that
Stopover visits were made to Abidjan, but because of follows, we have dealt in detail with this particular allegation.
elections and subsequent civil unrest, only a limited number It might still be asked, ‘Where is the evidence?’ On this
of telephone conversations were possible. charge and others, full details of the sources will not be
revealed, but the evidence is incontrovertible. The Panel
61. In each country Panel members met with government
examined the flight records maintained at the offices of
authorities, and where relevant, with diplomatic missions, civil Roberts Flight Information Region (FIR) in Conakry for all
society organizations, aid agencies, private sector firms and aircraft movement in West Africa during the period in
journalists. The Panel had access to a wide range of public question. It saw photographs of the aircraft being loaded in
and confidential information provided by official sources, Burkina Faso. It examined flight plans. It spoke to
including law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The eyewitnesses of aircraft movement in Burkina Faso and
Panel also contacted a number of key individuals and Liberia, and it spoke to individuals who were on board the
informants whose names have been a subject of interest and aircraft in question. In addition to its own detailed verification,
controversy in recent months in connection with the Sierra the Panel received corroborating information from
Leone crisis. A full list of those contacted is contained in international intelligence agencies and police sources
annex 2. Given the sensitive nature of the subjects operating at international as well as national levels. The
assistance of Interpol specialists was also taken as and when
investigated by the Panel, however, it should be noted that
required. This is an example of one of the more difficult issues
many individuals spoke under conditions of confidentiality. examined by the Panel. All issues have been judged and
Several meetings held in various countries have therefore not reported using the same standard.
been listed.
62. In August 2000, the Panel requested detailed statistics
dating back to 1987 on diamond exports from major producing
countries, and imports to countries with significant trading, D. A reminder
cutting and polishing industries. The reason for going back
to 1987 was to determine what trends might have prevailed
before the wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In September, the 64. The Panel’s mandate is described in section A above.
Panel sent reminders to all governments that had not yet The Panel was reminded of the background to its mandate,
provided the requested statistics. In the end, most of the data however, during its visits to Sierra Leone. There, thousands
requested was provided by most governments. Three of civilians, many of them child victims of unspeakable
exceptions stand out, despite reminders: no statistics were brutality, face a future without hands or feet. Tens of
received from the Gambia, Côte d’Ivoire and the United Arab thousands of Sierra Leoneans have lost their lives, half a
Emirates. million have become refugees and three or four times that
number has been displaced. As the Panel concluded its
report, much of Sierra Leone remained in rebel hands, where
people lived without access to medical assistance, education
or the means to a secure livelihood. The Panel remained
C. Standards of verification cognizant, throughout its work, of its role and its
responsibility in helping to end the suffering of the people of
Sierra Leone, and this decade-long tragedy.
63. The Panel agreed at the outset of its work to use high
evidentiary standards in its investigations. This required at
least two credible and independent sources of information to

15
 S/2000/1195

Part one
Diamonds

I. Sierra Leone diamonds Field, the two most valuable diamond areas in Sierra Leone. It
is borne out in the written and oral testimony of current and
past RUF leaders. It is supported by the testimony of Chiefs
and elders from Kono District who are in daily communication
A. Background with travellers from their areas. It is borne out in written
reports made by RUF field commanders to Foday Sankoh.
And it is supported by current internal communications
65. Each year, over 250 million carats of diamonds are mined between RUF leaders inside Sierra Leone, and between RUF
worldwide. Even in its peak years of production during the leaders in Sierra Leone and in Liberia.
1960s, Sierra Leone never produced more than 2 million carats 69. At first, RUF fighters did their own mining, or used
annually. But a high proportion of Sierra Leone’s diamonds forced labour. More recently they have developed a modified
are gemstones of very high quality and value, and they are form of forced labour, allowing local diggers to keep a certain
much sought after. During the 1970s and 1980s the Sierra amount of what they find. One system is to make a group of
Leone diamond industry fell prey to corruption and diggers work for the RUF for four days, and allow them to
mismanagement and many of the country’s diamonds were work for themselves for two, with one day off. More common
exported illegally. Between 1992 and 1996, average annual is what is known as the ‘two pile system’, in which diggers
exports were less than 200,000 carats and the per carat value create one pile of diamondiferous gravel for the RUF and
was significantly less than the country’s known run-of-mine another for themselves. The idea is that diggers can then
average. Not only were the bulk of the country’s diamonds retain what they find in their own pile, although all the
being smuggled out, but the emphasis in smuggling seemed washing is watched, and any sizeable diamonds found in a
to be on higher value diamonds. digger’s pile are also taken by the RUF.
66. Between 1997 and 1999 the situation worsened because 70. Once the Kono diamond fields were secured by the
of the war. In those three years a total of only 36,384 carats RUF, they created a mining unit under ‘Lt. Col. Kennedy’. The
were exported officially. RUF have since organized something they refer to today as
‘RUFP Mining Ltd.’ As of October 2000, the ‘Chairman’ was
‘Lt. Col. Abdul Razak’ and the Deputy Chairman was ‘Lt. Col.
Victor’.
B. Diamonds in the RUF
71. In addition to being a source of revenue, diamonds
have also been a source of constant friction and confusion
within the RUF. In 1999, Sam ‘Mosquito’ Bockarie, a former
67. The Revolutionary United Front initiated the war in diamond digger who became the RUF’s ‘Battle Group
1991. Until 1995, RUF diamond mining and digging was Commander’ and ‘High Command’, complained to Foday
probably done on a sporadic and individual basis. By 1995, Sankoh that during the AFRC/RUF ‘marriage’ in 19972 Dennis
however, the RUF and its patrons were clearly taking a much Mingo (‘Col. Superman’) had sold a diamond to a Lebanese
greater interest in the diamond fields of Kono District, and businessman. A portion of the proceeds had gone to the
had to be removed forcefully at that time by the private AFRC government and the balance, Le 9 million, was intended
military company, Executive Outcomes. From then on, the for the RUF. Instead, however, Superman embezzled the
RUF interest in diamonds became more focused, especially
with the 1997 imprisonment of Foday Sankoh in Nigeria.
During his imprisonment and subsequently, the diamond
2
areas of Kono and Tongo Field became a primary military Following a coup in May 1997, the Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council, headed by Johnny Paul Koroma took
focus of the RUF, and diamond mining became a major fund-
power. The AFRC invited the RUF to share power with them.
raising exercise. A period of violence and anarchy ensued. In February 1999
68. This finding is supported by the tenacious military hold the West African peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, forced the
AFRC from power and returned Tejan Kabbah to the
that the RUF has maintained on Kono District and Tongo
Presidency.

16
money, according to Bockarie. (A list of RUF leaders and their 77. Diamonds continue to cause friction. In September 2000,
pseudonyms is included as annex 3.) a dispute arose between Lt. Col. Victor, the Deputy Chairman
of RUFP Mining Ltd. and some of his associates: Major Bob
72. Late in 1998, after the AFRC had been forced out of
Vandy, Staff Captain Koroma and Major Morry Gebaru. RUFP
Freetown by ECOMOG, RUF forces led by Issa Sesay and
Mining Chairman Abdul Razak undertook an investigation,
under orders from Sam Bockarie (then referred to as Chief of
which uncovered stories of diamond embezzlement by ‘Capt.
Defence Staff for both the RUF and the AFRC), undertook a
Prince Khan’ and others who were in conflict with the Deputy
mission to move former AFRC Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma
Chairman, including ‘Lt. Col. Mustafa Sherrif’. This in turn
to the safety of RUF headquarters in Buedu. While they were
raised the concern of Issa Sesay, who was at the time carrying
there, Sesay discovered that Koroma was in possession of a
out a wider investigation into all RUF financial affairs in
parcel of diamonds, and that he was planning to escape to
Liberia.
Ghana with his family. Sesay and Brigadier Mike Lamin
confronted Koroma, finding it hard to believe that while they
were trying to regroup, Koroma would keep diamonds for his
own use and flee, leaving them with a problem he had created.
The diamonds were subsequently handed over to the RUF
C. Estimated volume of diamonds mined by
leadership. According to internal RUF reports, the diamonds the RUF
were then given to Ibrahim Bah and ‘Sister Memuna’ and
taken to Liberian President Charles Taylor.
73. The name of ‘Ibrahim Bah’ arises frequently in the RUF 78. Estimates of the volume of diamonds mined by the RUF
diamond story. He is said to be a Burkinabe military officer. He vary widely, from as little as $25 million per annum to as much
is also known as Ibrahima Baldé and Baldé Ibrahima. He was as $125 million. De Beers has estimated that the total was
a key player in the RUF-AFRC axis, and has been instrumental likely $70 million in 1999. Part of the difficulty in estimating
in the movement of RUF diamonds from Sierra Leone into what is available to the RUF is the fact that years of illicit
Liberia and from there to Burkina Faso. mining and export have served to reduce all official historical
production figures, providing no reliable statistics for at least
74. Issa Sesay, the current RUF leader, has had his own two decades on what has actually been mined in Sierra Leone.
problems with diamonds. Late in 1998, Captain Michael In the late 1960s, Sierra Leone exported 2 million carats per
Comber of the RUF Mining Unit brought a parcel of diamonds annum. The RUF holds the richest diamond areas in the
from Kono to the RUF headquarters at Buedu. Sam Bockarie country. If 1999 RUF production was one eighth of Sierra
gave the diamonds to Sesay who took them to Liberia where Leone’s best year (i.e. 250,000 carats), the value would be
he was to meet Ibrahim Bah. Together they were then to meet upwards of $50 million. If it was half of the official average
a business associate of Foday Sankoh to make arrangements exports in the early 1990s (i.e. 100,000 carats), it would be in
for the procurement of military equipment. Sesay lost the the neighbourhood of $20 million.
diamonds somewhere in Liberia, claiming he had accidentally
dropped the parcel in the mud. This led to a major 79. There are arguments in favour of lower estimates: the
contretemps between Sesay and Bockarie, although Sesay RUF does not have access to heavy equipment and is thus
was eventually forgiven. limited to artisanal mining; many former RUF combatants
today live very modest lives and say they never saw
75. Dennis ‘Superman’ Mingo, however, still smarting over diamonds. Arguments favouring higher estimates include the
the allegation that he had embezzled Le 9 million from a 1997 fact that the RUF has been able to support 3,500-5,000 armed
diamond sale, played up Sesay’s loss, fomenting contention combatants and as many camp followers for several years,
within the RUF ranks. In October 1999, he wrote to Foday and internal RUF communications regularly refer to the
Sankoh from Liberia, warning him that Sam Bockarie could not importance of diamonds. Knowledgeable diamantaires believe
be trusted and that Sankoh’s life was in danger. He also said that a very high proportion of the diamonds being exported
that Bockarie and his men had been squandering funds from from the Gambia (which mines no diamonds of its own)
diamond sales and that Bockarie had bought a house in originate in Sierra Leone, some travelling there via a third
Liberia and one in France. country such as Liberia. Imports into Belgium of ‘Gambian’
76. Shortly thereafter, a military confrontation occurred rough averaged over $100 million per annum between 1996
between forces loyal to Foday Sankoh and those loyal to Sam and 1999.
Bockarie. Several combatants were killed. Sam Bockarie 80. While the total generated by the RUF, whether it is $25
subsequently went into exile in Liberia, where he remains million, $70 million or $125 million, is very small in relation to
close to President Charles Taylor. the global annual output of diamonds, it nevertheless

17
 S/2000/1195

represents a major and primary source of income to the RUF, diamonds at all.
and is more than enough to sustain its military effort.
85. As noted in paragraphs 67 through 77, however, the
bulk of the RUF trade in diamonds leaves Sierra Leone
through Liberia. The diamonds are carried by RUF
commanders and trusted Liberian couriers to Foya-Kama or
D. How the RUF move diamonds out Voinjama, and then to Monrovia.
of Sierra Leone
86. A Liberian is said to be President Taylor’s
representative in Kono, with a mandate to supervise diamond
operations. On the RUF side, during much of 1998, Dennis
81. Diamonds have always been smuggled out of Sierra ‘Superman’ Mingo was in charge of the diamond operations
Leone, the bulk through Liberia. This historical fact is not in in Kono. He regularly took diamonds to the RUF headquarters
dispute. There have been a variety of reasons for smuggling: at Buedu and from there they were transferred to Liberia. At
to avoid taxes; to avoid the higher cost of corruption in one various times, diamonds were taken to Monrovia by Eddie
country over another; to gain access to hard currency; to Kaneh, Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay. As noted in paragraphs
launder money. Historically, Liberia was the route of choice 71 to 77, there have been frequent disputes over the
primarily because of its use of the United States dollar as its diamonds, and RUF couriers travel in fear of being robbed by
official currency. Other diamonds found their way to Guinea rogue Liberian NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia)
where they would more likely have been traded for rice and fighters. At RUF headquarters in Buedu, concerns have
other foodstuffs. And diamonds also travelled further afield occasionally arisen that diamonds said to be held in
to other countries in the region, carried by Madingo and safekeeping by President Taylor might actually have been
Senegalese traders, known as marakas. sold. On one occasion in 1998, Sam Bockarie went to
82. Some RUF diamonds have been traded in Guinea. There Monrovia to see Taylor about this concern, and when he
are reports of one-off deals in which RUF commanders have returned, he reported that he had seen the diamonds.
traded diamonds for supplies, and sometimes for weapons, 87. Because of time constraints, the Panel could not go into
dealing with individual, mid-level Guinean military officers the details of ways and means through which RUF diamonds
acting on their own account. One such arrangement in mid- are moved out of Liberia, however there is sufficient evidence
2000 is said to have gone sour, resulting in an RUF attack on to prove that this trade cannot be conducted in Liberia
the Guinean border town of Pamelap when promised Guinean without the permission and the involvement of government
supplies were not forthcoming. There is no evidence, officials at the highest level. In Liberia, uncorroborated stories
however, of any official Guinean collusion in such trade. refer to high-level go-betweens, senior government officials,
83. A certain volume of RUF diamonds are being traded in and financial transactions made in Burkina Faso, South Africa,
Kenema and elsewhere in Sierra Leone. It is an open secret the United States and Lebanon. (This subject is covered from
that RUF traders bring diamonds to Kenema from Tongo a different perspective in the Liberia case study, below.)
Field, only 28 miles away, on a regular basis, and exchange 88. Liberian officials thrive on their country’s reputation for
them for food and other supplies. This would account for the weak administration, its crippled infrastructure and its ‘porous
continued presence in Kenema of more than 40 separate border’. In fact, however, very little trade, whether formal or
diamond dealers, many of them Lebanese, even though their informal, takes place without the knowledge and involvement
main source of supply has officially been out of reach for of key government officials. This is true of all imports, and
several years. It is possible that these diamonds could enter where exports are concerned, it is especially true of diamonds
the official export system if there is a lack of probity and and timber. Liberia’s own official diamond exports were said
vigilance in the Government Gold and Diamond Office to be only 8,500 carats in 1999, valued at $900,000.3 Liberia’s
(GGDO), the Ministry of Mineral Resources and its branches. Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy estimates that this
84. It is more likely, however, that these diamonds are being represents only 20 per cent of what is actually leaving the
smuggled out to neighbouring countries. Many of Sierra country, and the Ministry of Revenue suggests that it might
Leone’s diamond dealers are also major importers of food and be as little as 10 per cent of the total.
consumer goods. The steep mark-up on these goods yields
high profits which require a hard currency or its equivalent in
order to be repatriated. Diamonds serve this purpose. Many 3
Liberia’s estimated production capacity varies between
prominent exporters from Sierra Leone are also exporters of 100,000 and 150,000 carats per annum. In 1988 and 1989,
diamonds from the Gambia, a country that produces no Liberia officially exported approximately 150,000 carats,
valued at an average of $8.7 million per annum.

18
89. In a country where most of the diamond traders are discussions currently going on in the interest of the RUFP’.
foreigners and where the movement of foreigners, money and And they exchanged test messages in a code which would
supplies is as carefully watched, as is the case in Liberia, it is allow them to disguise names - words like ‘diamonds’ and
not conceivable that so much of Liberia’s own diamond ‘gold’, and expressions such as ‘everything is OK’, and
production could avoid the detection of government. Nor is ‘things are bad’. In December 1999, Sankoh ordered 14
it conceivable that the significantly greater volumes of high- vehicles from Izegbu with the logo of the RUF Party painted
value Sierra Leone diamonds moving through Liberia could on the side of each.
avoid detection by government.
94. In March 2000, Damian Gagnon of the U.S. company,
Lazare Kaplan International (LKI), visited Foday Sankoh, and
in a subsequent letter to Sankoh, LKI Chairman Maurice
Tempelsman said that Gagnon had reported ‘a commonality of
E. Foday Sankoh’s post-Lomé views between you and this company on the possibilities of
diamond business LKI re-entering the Sierra Leone diamond business in a
manner beneficial to all the people of that country as well as
our company’.
90. The Lomé Peace Agreement appointed Foday Sankoh 95. Much of the correspondence suggests that Sankoh was
Chairman of a Commission for the Management of Strategic encouraging a wide variety of potential investors, many
Mineral Resources (CMRRD). Between the time Foday thinking they would reap exclusive benefits from the same
Sankoh returned to Sierra Leone late in 1999 and the things. One much-circulated April 2000 letter from ‘Michel’ to
resumption of hostilities in May 2000, members of the ‘The Leader’ talks about how Sankoh should try to get all of
Commission never actually met, and the Commission did not the diamonds mined in Kono, rather than the 10 per cent
function. During his time in Freetown, Foday Sankoh spent which the author said was the case - the rest being filtered off
money lavishly, although he had no obvious source of to Liberia. ‘Michel’ proposed that his Belgian partner
income. He imported vehicles, satellite phones and other ‘Charles’ could hire a private jet to take the diamonds out
expensive equipment. directly from Kono, avoiding ‘the Lebanese’ and Monrovia -
91. In 1999, before Foday Sankoh’s appearance in ‘We cannot trust those people’, he wrote.
Freetown, Sam Bockarie wrote a ‘To Whom It May Concern’ 96. Michel Desaedeleer, a U.S.-based, self-employed
letter on RUF stationery, appointing Mohamed Hijazi, a long- Belgian, made contact with the RUF in Togo during the
time diamond miner and dealer, as the RUF’s agent ‘to summer of 1999 while he was doing business with the son of
negotiate with any person or company within or outside President Eyadema. By October, he and John Caldwell,
S/Leone for the prospecting, mining, buying and selling of President of the Washington-based U.S. Trading &
diamonds’. Investment Company, had worked up an arrangement with
92. After his arrival in Freetown, Foday Sankoh signed Foday Sankoh which would give them authority to broker
numerous agreements with international business firms and rights to all of Sierra Leone’s diamond and gold resources for
solicited financial favours from others making enquiries in his a ten-year period. Although refused a visa by Sierra Leone’s
own name, in the name of the Commission, and in the name of U.S. embassy, Caldwell and Desaedeleer went to Sierra Leone
the RUF. His own business files, found in his office after the and Liberia anyway, and signed the agreement between
May 2000 resumption of hostilities, contain correspondence Desaedeleer’s BECA Company and the RUF (not with the
relating to business opportunities he was actively promoting. Government of Sierra Leone or the Commission for the
Management of Strategic Mineral Resources). While they
93. In November 1999, for example, Foday Sankoh received were in Liberia, Desaedeleer was given diamonds by Ibrahim
a visit from Chudi Izegbu, President of the Integrated Group Bah (a.k.a. Ibrahima Baldé), which Desaedeleer later
of Companies based in McLean, Virginia. Izegbu had discovered in Antwerp were worth much less than he had
chartered an aircraft to Freetown from Abidjan, and together been told. He also claimed to have been shown ‘perhaps
he and Sankoh discussed a range of investment possibilities hundreds’ of diamonds by Sankoh’s wife, Fatou, during a
for the Integrated Group, which includes a company called 1999 meeting in New York.
Integrated Mining, registered in the Cayman Islands. They
discussed possible investments in civilian aircraft services, 97. In February 2000, Foday Sankoh, his wife and other
petroleum imports and a major investment in the Koidu RUF officials travelled to South Africa. Sankoh was in
diamond kimberlites. Subsequently, Izegbu and Sankoh contravention of a United Nations travel ban prohibiting him
exchanged correspondence about ‘negotiations and from leaving Sierra Leone. The trip was sponsored and
partially financed by South African businessman Raymond

19
 S/2000/1195

Kramer, who earlier the same month had signed an agreement Government Gold and Diamond Office to ensure, therefore,
with Sankoh to ‘represent the Commission [the CMRRD, of that only diamonds mined in government-controlled areas are
which Sankoh was Chairman] in all areas relating to mining actually certified. This is especially important, given efforts by
and mineral resources, including but not limited to strategic the RUF to trade diamonds for food and other supplies in
minerals and precious stones’. When Sankoh’s presence in Kenema (see also paragraph 83 above).
South Africa was made public, he was forced to return to
103. It is perhaps more important to consider the value of the
Sierra Leone and curtail his dealings with Kramer. Fatou
system beyond conflict diamonds, once the war ends. Then
Sankoh, who travels on a U.S. passport, visited South Africa
the issue for Sierra Leone will focus more on smuggling and
again in May 2000, and was again deported.
other forms of illicit behaviour. In the end, the certification
98. The correspondence presents an image of a double- system can only work to its fullest potential if the government
dealing Leader, clutching at financial opportunities for is willing and able to track and audit dealers in Sierra Leone,
personal and political gain, outside of the governmental and if it is able to develop systems of support for the artisanal
framework in which he was ostensibly working. Much of this miners who, for the better part of 50 years, have worked
related to the diamond trade. It also suggests dissension outside the diamond industry.
within the RUF ranks, and an attempt by Sankoh to gain
104. There is more to be said about the certification scheme,
control over diamonds that remained effectively in the hands
however. There was never a serious problem with diamonds
of his fractious field commanders and their Liberian mentors.
being exported officially from Sierra Leone. The problem was
the illicit and conflict diamonds which avoided the formal
system. In 1999, Sierra Leone officially exported only 9,320
carats, a demonstration, if one was needed, that the formal
F. Sierra Leone’s new diamond certification system was being ignored by the RUF and smugglers. This
system had changed in the first half of 2000, when concern about the
country’s conflict diamonds was noted in the world press and
in diamond-buying centres. The consequence was a sudden
99. By resolution 1306 (2000) adopted on 5 July 2000, the influx of diamonds into the formal system, offered by dealers
Security Council imposed an embargo on the direct and wanting at last to ‘go straight’ and avoid charges of illicit
indirect import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone until a trading. While the 26,300 carats exported officially during this
new mining, export and monitoring regime could be period did not represent a landslide, it was a significant step
developed. With technical assistance from Belgium’s in the right direction.
Diamond High Council and financial assistance from the 105. The United Nations embargo effectively stopped this
United Kingdom and the United States, a certificate of origin legitimizing trend for several months, and pushed traders back
system was developed between July and October 2000, into their old and time-tested smuggling routes. Because there
including a numbered confirmation certificate printed on was no embargo on diamonds from any of Sierra Leone’s
security paper, new detailed electronic databases of exports neighbouring countries, the ban actually punished the victim
with electronic confirmation at destination, and electronic and rewarded its enemies. This has now changed, and it is to
transmission of digital photographs of the packages being be hoped that the new system will attract a significant volume
exported. of diamonds back into legitimate channels.
100. In October, after considering the new measures and 106. Where the RUF’s conflict diamonds are concerned, the
ensuring that information about them had been disseminated legitimate export system, whether it was foolproof or not, was
to importing countries, the Security Council lifted the embargo irrelevant, and it will remain so. As long as there are no
on official Sierra Leone exports. The first diamonds exported controls in neighbouring countries, the RUF will continue to
under the new arrangements reached Antwerp at the end of be able to move their diamonds out with impunity.
October.
107. For this reason, it is imperative that a standardized
101. The embargo and the new certification system were global certification scheme be introduced as soon as possible.
peripheral to the mandate of the Panel, but during our travel The issue of conflict diamonds has now been addressed at
it was the subject of much discussion in Sierra Leone, in other four intergovernmental meetings in the ‘Kimberley Process’
African exporting countries, and in all the major diamond and at a further meeting in London in October 2000. On 1
importing centres. December 2000, the General Assembly passed a resolution on
102. The new system is indeed foolproof once diamonds the role of diamonds in fuelling conflict (A/RES/55/56), and
enter the formal system. It will be important for Sierra Leone’s expressed ‘the need to give urgent and careful consideration

20
to ... the creation and implementation of a simple and workable governments and some members of the industry may be
international certification scheme for rough diamonds’. The approaching the idea of international ‘rough controls’ with
resolution stated that this scheme should meet internationally reluctance or antipathy, urging a minimalist approach and a
agreed minimum standards, it should secure the widest lengthy period of study and negotiation. The Panel believes
possible participation, and that diamond exporting, that any international system must be developed carefully,
processing and importing States should act in concert. The and that it must be appropriate to the need. But the Panel is in
resolution also noted the need for transparency and for no doubt about the urgency or the importance of the
arrangements to help ensure compliance. proposal. Despite all the meetings of the past year, despite the
work of the United Nations and many governments, the wars
108. This resolution is strongly endorsed by the Panel. It is
in Sierra Leone, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the
a major step forward in recognizing the need for what the
Congo continue; diamonds continue to serve as fuel for these
diamond industry calls ‘rough controls’. If implemented, it
wars and as a catalyst for the continuing misery of hundreds
could go a long way in solving some of the problems
of thousands of people.
identified in this report. The Government of Namibia will
convene a workshop early in 2001 to consider technical
aspects pertaining to the envisaged certification scheme. The
Panel very much welcomes the Namibian offer to help move
the process forward.
109. The Panel notes with concern, however, that some

Case study: diamond identification and certification

A diamantaire in London showed the Panel six diamonds, for which the
owner was asking $1 million. The diamonds had been brought to London on
approval from Antwerp, and were accompanied by all the necessary paper work.
They were said to have originated in South Africa, and the South African export
documents were also available.
The diamantaire and his colleagues, however, believed that the diamonds
were not South African. One or two might have been Angolan or even Sierra
Leonean, but they were fairly certain that all six had come from Namibia.
The South African Diamond Board scrutinizes all official diamond imports,
but as with other countries, diamonds can be smuggled into, as well as out of the
country. Panel members visited the Diamond Board and examined the available
documentation on a sample import from Zambia. Along with the South African
paper work, the importer had supplied a Zambian export certificate. The fact that
Zambia mines few diamonds notwithstanding, the ‘certificate’ was a document
that could have been created in five minutes with a rubber stamp and a laptop.
Facilities for checking back with Zambian authorities as to its authenticity, or the
authenticity of the information contained in it were minimal.

G. Conclusions on Sierra Leone diamonds International Rough Diamond Export and Import Controls’,
which should be an excellent basis for intergovernmental
discussions.
111. At the beginning of 1999, the industry denied the
110. The issue of Sierra Leone’s conflict diamonds is problem of conflict diamonds, and governments appeared to
complex, but it is not unfathomable. As will be noted later in be taking decisive action. The situation has now changed,
this report, it is tied to the wider issue of illicit diamonds, and with the most specific initiatives coming from industry.
this has been recognized in a forthright manner by the Despite the 1 December 2000 passage of General Assembly
diamond industry in WDC documentation. A detailed resolution 55/56 on the need for a global system of ‘rough
proposal has also been made by the WDC for a ‘System for

21
 S/2000/1195

controls’, the intergovernmental process may take several 52.1 million carats in 1990-91 to 187.2 million in 1998-99,
more months of negotiation. For this reason, where Sierra tapering off at 178.4 million carats in 1999-00 and
Leone is concerned, it will be imperative for the Security averaging $28 per carat. On average over the past five
Council to take early steps on broadening the existing Sierra years, 80 per cent has been imported from Belgium and
Leonean certification system throughout West Africa at least. 15 per cent from the United Kingdom. A tiny volume is
imported from the United Arab Emirates and virtually
nothing from Africa.
Israel:
II. International diamond statistics Has traditionally imported a small amount of rough - on
and transit countries average less than 12 million carats annually between
1997 and 1999. A tiny fraction of this has come from
‘sensitive’ countries - about 4,000 carats per annum. On
average, 89 per cent of all rough imported into Israel
A. General between 1997 and 1999 was from three countries:
Belgium, the United Kingdom and Switzerland. This is
changing because one Israeli firm, IDI Diamonds, has
112. The Panel sought to determine how illicit diamonds from made proprietorial diamond arrangements with the
Sierra Leone find their way into the legitimate trade. One line government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
of enquiry was to compare diamond export statistics of Between January and October 2000, Israeli imports of
neighbouring producer countries with their known mining rough from Belgium, the United Kingdom and
production capacity, to see if exports significantly exceed Switzerland had declined to 77 per cent of the total.
production capacity. Another was to review the import Imports of Angolan rough accounted for 10 per cent of
statistics of major trading centres for anomalies. One such the total by weight, and 3.6 per cent by value.
anomaly is the 33.6 million carats said to be of Liberian origin South Africa:
that were imported into Belgium in the five years between
1995 and 1999. This volume is far beyond Liberian production Imports very little rough - approximately 70,000 carats in
capacity, and exceeds official Liberian exports by so much, 1999, valued at $2.2 million. The imports originate in
that investigation was clearly warranted (see also paragraphs several countries in the region, with a very small
122 to 130 below). amount from West Africa. About half of the total
originates in Zambia, a country with very little diamond
113. A major difficulty in tracking the movement of rough production of its own.
diamonds, however, is the inconsistent manner in which the
governments of major trading centres record diamond imports Switzerland:
and exports. The first issue has to do with the general Imports very little rough. Total value in 1999 was only
availability of statistics. Belgian authorities expressed concern Sw F 1.5 million, of which most was of British
to the Panel that Belgium had been unfairly criticized in the provenance. None was from ‘sensitive’ countries. The
past because it has been so open with its statistics. It was United Kingdom, however, recorded 41 per cent of its
suggested to the Panel that other countries have escaped rough imports, valued at £44.8 million in 1999, as having
criticismfor importing rough from ‘sensitive’ countries - either come from Switzerland. The contradiction is explained
as countries of origin or provenance - simply because they by the unrecorded flow of large amounts of rough
produce no public statistics at all. diamonds through Swiss Freiläger (see paragraphs
116-119 below).
114. The Panel went to considerable lengths to obtain rough
diamond import statistics from all the major trading centres for United Arab Emirates:
the years between 1987 and 1999. With the exception of the No data supplied. Belgium recorded imports from the
Gambia, Côte d’Ivoire and the United Arab Emirates, the Panel United Arab Emirates of 5 million carats in 1999, up from
was largely successful. We found the following: only 500 carats in 1996. The average value of the
Belgium: diamonds in 1999 was $2.94 per carat.
Imports a great deal of rough - 183 million carats in 1999, United Kingdom:
valued at $7,185 million, averaging $39 per carat.
Imports large volumes of rough, about half from South
India: Africa and 40 per cent from Switzerland. Imports very
Imports a growing volume of rough, increasing from little from ‘sensitive’ countries - 2,387 carats in 1999.

22
United States: the Freiläger maintain facilities expressly for this purpose,
including secure areas with diamond scales and sorting
Imports a small amount of rough - approximately 8.7
equipment. This sorting and re-invoicing serves to further
million carats in 1999. The bulk was from the Russian
obscure the origin of diamonds.
Federation, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Very
little from sensitive countries, although imports from 119. Origins become even more obscure once diamonds
Sierra Leone totalled about 5,000 carats in 1999, roughly have been sorted and/or partially treated in the United
54 per cent of what was officially exported. Kingdom. Under this heading (code 71023100), the United
Kingdom became the origin of 96.7 per cent of all Swiss
imports in 1999. Having become ‘Swiss’ on the way to the
United Kingdom, a huge proportion then becomes ‘British’ on
B. Provenance and origin the way back to Switzerland. Because 96.4 per cent of Swiss
diamond exports in 1999 went to Israel, most of these same
diamonds thus became ‘Swiss’ again as far as Israeli import
statistics are concerned.
115. Although the Panel received detailed import statistics
from each of the major trading centres, there are a number of 120. India notes the fact that it does not trade in conflict
key differences that make the tracking of rough diamonds diamonds because 80 per cent of its rough imports come from
extremely difficult. The first has to do with a distinction made Belgiumand virtually none come directly from Africa. As with
between ‘country of origin’ and ‘country of provenance’. the United Kingdom and the United States, however, the
Country of provenance refers to the country from which operative word is ‘directly’. The lack of scrutiny throughout
diamonds were last imported; country of origin indicates the delivery chain and the stops along the way allow most
where they were mined. Statistics on country of provenance importing countries to say that they do not import anything
are important in the calculation of national trade statistics, and from Africa, conflict or otherwise.
until recently, little serious attention was paid anywhere to the 121. These examples explain why it is so difficult to
issue of where diamonds were actually mined. determine where diamonds - still in their rough state and
116. This leads to major anomalies. For example in 1999, moving from one trading or polishing centre to another - are
British imports of rough unsorted diamonds (code 71021000) actually mined. It does not explain, however, why the huge
totalled £107 million (down from £347 million in 1998). Of this, volume of diamonds entering Belgium, noted in paragraph 112
Switzerland was recorded as the ‘country of origin’ for 41 per above, would have been labelled ‘Liberian’. The superficial
cent or £44.2 million. Switzerland, as a non-producer of explanation is that they were of Liberian ‘provenance’, as
diamonds, could only have been the country of provenance, clearly they could not have been mined in Liberia. According
importing the diamonds from another country. Switzerland, to this explanation, they would have transited Liberia and
however, records the importation of virtually no rough, become ‘Liberian’, just as other diamonds transit Switzerland,
unsorted diamonds. The total in 1999 was valued at only Sw Belgium or the United Kingdom, becoming ‘Swiss’, ‘Belgian’
F 1.5 million, up from Sw F 295,000 in 1998. or ‘British’ in the process.

117. The difference is explained by the fact that Switzerland

has not in the past recorded statistics on diamonds passing
through its free trade areas, or Freiläger, at Zurich and
C. Case studies: Liberia, Gambia, Guinea and
Geneva airports. The volume of these flows is so great that it Côte d’Ivoire
would skew national trade statistics, and since no value is
added to these diamonds as they pass through Swiss airports,
there has, until recently, been no felt need to record the Liberia
statistics. Those diamonds bound for the United Kingdom
thus become ‘Swiss’ simply by virtue of having passed 122. The highest estimates of current Liberian production
through a Freiläger. The country of origin, which might have capacity do not exceed 150,000 carats per year. In 1987, the
been recorded in Switzerland, and passed on to British country exported a record high 295,000 carats, at an average
customs authorities, is thus lost. value of $37 per carat. The Liberian Ministry of Lands, Mines
118. It should be noted that parcels of rough diamonds and Energy informed the Panel that 1998 official diamond
passing through a Freiläger can be opened, mixed with other exports totalled only 8,000 carats, valued at $800,000 (i.e. $100
diamonds, repackaged for a variety of destinations, and per carat). In the same year, Belgium recorded imports from
exported as mixed diamonds. Private sector firms working in Liberia by 26 companies, totalling 2.56 million carats, valued

23
 S/2000/1195

at $217 million (i.e. $85 per carat). One company alone, Diminco, Fink Diam, Hardwill Diamonds, I.D.H. Diamonds,
‘Company A’, imported 168,456 carats, estimated at $87 Korn & Partners, Krishna Dimon, Lewy-Friedrich, Marjan
million, or $516 per carat. Diamonds, Omega Diamonds, Orion, Samir Gems, Sana Diam,
Shainydiam, Shallop Diamonds, Shour, Siddhi Gems, Sima
123. In 1999, official Liberian exports grew slightly, to 8,500
Diamond, Soradiam, Starough, Sunshine Gems, Sygma
carats, at an average value of $105 per carat. ‘Liberian’ imports
Diamonds, Symphony Gems, Vijaydimon, Vitraag and
into Belgium declined to 1.75 million carats, but the stated
Widawski.
value increased to $247 million, or $140 per carat. Company
A’s imports declined to 75,000 carats, valued at $57 million. 129. Companies supposedly exporting diamonds from
This represented a significantly higher per carat value, Liberia, which are not on the Government list of licencees and
however, of $760. which do not have a physical presence in Liberia include
Alcorta Trading, Barnet Trading Co., Diamond Trading
124. Up to mid-August 2000, ‘Liberian’ imports into Belgium
Associates, Fairlib Enterprises Inc., Kamal Daoud S.A.,
were 340,000 carats, valued at $50 million, or $147 per carat.
Nybelgo Company, and Pier Enterprises S.A. There are
Company A, however, which told the Panel at the end of
undoubtedly more. While the diamonds listed on the invoices
October that it had not imported anything from Liberia for six
of these companies are not necessarily conflict diamonds,
months, showed imports of only 6,696 carats. But valued at
companies with a genuine physical presence in Liberia have
$12.88 million, this represented a remarkable $1,923 per carat.
also provided invoices to Belgian importers. Without further
125. Belgiumhas recently changed the data requirements on investigation, it is difficult to say whether they are exporting
the import licences that it requires for each shipment. It now genuine Liberian diamonds, or smuggled Sierra Leonean
requires that each import shipment state the country of diamonds. Whatever the case, they are engaged in illicit
provenance, as well as the country of origin. A review of behaviour, because they do not have Liberian export licences
selected Company A import licences, however, showed that and because their exports far exceed official Liberian exports.
diamonds far in excess of the quality or quantity available in
130. Much has been made in recent months about the need
Liberi a had been imported as Liberian in provenance and
to make a clearer distinction between ‘country of origin’ and
origin. Invoices from ‘Liberian’ firms - none on the list of
‘country of provenance’. The volumes in question regarding
licencees provided by the Liberian government - accompanied
Liberia, however, taken in conjunction with Liberia’s own
the Belgian import licence.
figures and its limited capacity to act as a trading centre,
126. A physical check of the Monrovia street addresses indicate that a large proportion of the diamonds entering
given by most of these firms revealed that there were no such Belgium under the Liberian label represent neither country of
comp anies, and no such addresses. Courier firms in origin nor country of provenance. Most are illicit diamonds
Monrovia, however, have in the past been instructed to route from other countries, taking advantage of Liberia’s own
correspondence for these addresses to the International Trust involvement in the illicit diamond trade, its inability or
Company (ITC), which in January 2000 changed its name to unwillingness to monitor the use of its name internationally,
the International Bank of Liberia Ltd. Since then, mail and the improper use of its maritime registry. The larger illicit
addressed to the companies in question has been forwarded trade provides Liberia with a convenient cover for the export
to the newly established Liberian International Ship and of conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone.
Corporate Registry (LISCR) which now handles the Liberian
maritime registry. This means that if the companies in
The Gambia
question are more than shells, they are not physically present
in Liberia, and none of the diamonds in question were either
131. The Gambia produces no diamonds, but in recent years
mined in, or passed through, Liberia. It also means, however,
it has become a diamond-exporting nation. In 1998, Belgium
that there is an intimate Liberian connection with these
recorded imports from the Gambia of 449,000 carats valued at
deceptive diamond transactions.
$78.3 million, an average value of $174 per carat. The volume
127. The name of retired U.S. Army General Robert A. Yerks declined the following year to 206,000 carats, with an average
occurs frequently in discussions about Liberian diamond per carat value of $234. Up to mid-August 2000, there was a
transfers. He was involved with ITC and is currently a senior more significant decline: 82,000 carats valued at $17.6 million
official in LISCR. ($214/ct).
128. Companies and individuals in Belgium importing 132. All of the Belgian importers of ‘Gambian’ rough also
‘Liberian’ diamonds in 1999 and/or 2000 include (but may not import from one or more of the producing countries in the
be limited to) the following: Abadiam, Afrostars Diamonds, region: Sierra Leone, Guinea and/or Liberia. ‘Company B’
Ankur Diamonds, Arslanian, Cukrowicz, Diam 2000, Diambel, explains its importation of $50 million in ‘Gambian’ diamonds

24
between 1 January 1998 and mid-August 2000 as follows: third possibility is that it is a combination of the first two.
There are many traders - ‘marakas’ - moving up and down the
138. United States statistics show a different problem, if they
coast with diamonds. The Gambia has become a ‘mini-
have been correctly presented to the Panel. They record a
Antwerp’, and reputable companies are simply buying what
very small volume of Guinean imports by weight, but the
is available on the open market. When pressed, however,
value is over $1,300 per carat. This is a major anomaly in the
Company B acknowledges that these diamonds have entered
sense that it is roughly 14 times higher than the average per
Gambia for one of two reasons: either to evade taxes in the
carat value exported from Guinea. This statistic requires
countries where they have been mined, or to avoid detection
further investigation if it is to make sense (United States
as conflict diamonds. Knowledgeable diamantaires say that 90
officials are currently reviewing the matter).
per cent of ‘Gambian’ diamonds are from Sierra Leone.
133. The Gambia did not respond to the Panel’s repeated
Côte d’Ivoire
requests for information on diamond imports and exports, so
the Panel does not know whether exports from the Gambia are
139. A problem similar to that of Guinea exists in relation to
consistent in any way with official Gambian imports.
Côte d’Ivoire. According to the authoritative United States
Geological Survey, Côte d’Ivoire exported approximately
Guinea 75,000 carats per annum in the mid-1990s. Very little rough is
imported into the United Kingdom, the United States or Israel
134. Official Guinean exports were consistent over the 1990s, from Côte d’Ivoire. Belgium, however, imported 6 million
averaging 380,000 carats per annum, at $96 per carat. The carats between 1994 and 1999, about 13 times more than was
panel examined Belgian, United States, British, Swiss and apparently produced in the country. The average per carat
Israeli import statistics, and found that the only significant was $92.
imports were into Belgium. This is consistent with information
140. Export figures for Côte d’Ivoire have been taken from
provided by the Government of Guinea.
the United States Geological Survey because Côte d’Ivoire
135. Belgian trade statistics, however, record average did not respond to the Panel’s request for information.
imports over the same period of 687,000 carats per annum,
with an average value of $167 per carat (see table 1). In other
words, Belgium appears to import almost double the volume
that is exported from Guinea, and the per carat value is almost D. Conclusions on statistics and
75 per cent higher than what leaves Guinea. transit countries
136. It is unlikely that the difference between Guinean
exports and Belgian imports could be explained by the
‘country of provenance’ issue, because Guinea does not 141. The statistical anomalies surrounding the Liberian
officially import diamonds, and any official Sierra Leone example demonstrate that the Liberian name, and most likely
diamonds in transit through Conakry do not enter Guinean the names of other countries, has been widely used by
trade statistics. individuals and companies wishing to disguise the origin of
137. There are three possible explanations. The first is that rough diamonds. These diamonds could include conflict
the difference is made up of diamonds exported unofficially diamonds from Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the
from Guinea. These could be either Guinean diamonds, or Congo and/or Angola, but the volumes are such that
diamonds smuggled in from Sierra Leone and elsewhere (as in additional explanations are required. These include the
the Gambian case). Such diamonds could be ‘conflict breaking of legally binding
diamonds’ or simply ‘illicit diamonds’. The second possibility
is that Guinea’s name is applied to diamonds entering Belgium
from another country or countries, as in the Liberian case. A

25
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Table 1
Comparison of Guinean exports and imports into trading and polishing centres 1993-
1999

United States imports United Kingdom imports

Year Guinea exports Belgian imports from Guinea from Guinea from Guinea

Carats US$ Carats US$ Carats US$ Carats US$

(000) (000) (000) (000) (000) (000) (000) (000)

1993 374 29 582 1 030 178 020 3 4 400 - -

1994 381 28 412 876 165 770 1 1 600 - -

1995 452 34 719 780 26 210 2 3 400 - -

1996 364 35 471 440 83 670 1 2 700 - -

1997 380 46 930 533 108 120 3 10 000 - -

1998 355 40 657 596 116 100 17 11 000 - -

1999 357 40 207 554 127 120 10 16 400 84 5 098

Total 2 663 255 978 4 809 805 010 37 49 500 84 5 098

Sources: Bureau National d’Expertise des Diamants et Autres Gemmes, Guinea; Ministry of Economic
Affairs, Belgium; U.S. Department of Commerce; HM Customs & Excise, Tariff & Statistical Office,
UK. No Guinean diamonds appear in Israeli, Indian or Swiss import figures. Negligible amounts are
imported into South Africa. UK£ converted at US$ 1.5.

commercial contracts, tax evasion and money laundering. 144. ‘Conflict diamonds’ have been defined as diamonds
Mostly, such diamonds are illicit in nature. Because the that originate in areas controlled by forces fighting the
volume in illicit diamonds is so high, it is not difficult for the legitimate and internationally recognized government of the
smaller volume of conflict diamonds to become lost in the relevant country. De Beers has estimated that in 1999 the total
larger numbers. volume of conflict diamonds was approximately $255 million,
less than 4 per cent of the world’s rough diamond production
142. A country like Liberia, whose name has been used with
of $6.8 billion. Of these, $35 million were said to originate in
or without its knowledge by illicit traders, can thus conceal its
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, $150 million in Angola,
own trade in illicit or conflict diamonds behind the larger
and $70 million in Sierra Leone. Where the Democratic
rackets being perpetrated by others.
Republic of the Congo is concerned, some researchers place
143. The variations in the way major trading centres record the figure at about twice the De Beers estimate. Where Sierra
the importation of rough diamonds add to the ease with which Leone is concerned, a more detailed discussion can be found
illicit and/or conflict diamonds can be laundered. in paragraphs 78-80 above.

III. ‘Conflict’ diamonds and ‘illicit’

diamonds 145. In its search for conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone,
the Panel discovered that there is a much greater volume of
‘illicit’ diamonds, and that distinguishing between the two is
extremely difficult. As noted above, part of the difficulty in
A. The issue understanding diamond statistics is that once rough
diamonds arrive in Europe, they are sorted, traded across
borders, re-sorted and re-traded - possibly many times -

26
before they actually get to a cutting and polishing centre. or New York, and smuggle them past customs or make a false
declaration.
146. This obscuring of origins makes the diamond industry
vulnerable to a wide variety of illicit behaviour. It is no secret
that diamonds are stolen from virtually every mining area in
the world. Diamonds have long been used as an unofficial
hard currency for international transactions. As with other
B. Conclusion on conflict versus illicit
precious commodities, they lend themselves to money diamonds
laundering operations. Because they are small and easily
concealed, they are readily moved from one country to
another for the purpose of tax evasion, money laundering or 150. The Panel visited three import-export regulatory centres:
to circumvent trade agreements. Virtually all of these in South Africa, Israel and Belgium. Given the huge volume of
diamonds eventually find their way into the legitimate trade. diamonds moving in and out of these three countries alone,
And all of these illicit transactions are made easier by the even a five or tenfold increase in the size of these regulatory
industry’s long history of secrecy. Secrecy in the diamond operations would probably not be enough to deal effectively
industry is understandable for security reasons, but secrecy with the issue of illicit diamonds. A global certification
also obscures illicit behaviour. scheme with teeth would help, because it would require much
147. At an October 2000 intergovernmental meeting on better documentation on the part of exporters and importers,
conflict diamonds in Pretoria, a senior diamond evaluator and and would make false declarations less possible. A global
trade consultant estimated that 20 per cent of the worldwide certification scheme would not completely stop smuggling,
trade in rough diamonds is illicit in nature. The Panel raised but the anomalies described in the Liberian, Gambian and
this issue in its travels, and the figure was widely accepted as Guinean case studies above would not have been possible,
a reasonable estimate. and such a system would help put an end to conflict
diamonds in Sierra Leone.
148. Official rough diamond production in 1999 was
approximately $6.85 billion. About 65 per cent of this was
controlled in one way or another by De Beers, which
maintains that its diamonds are clean. If it is assumed that no IV. A final note on diamonds
De Beers diamonds are ‘illicit’, the illicit 20 per cent of $6.85
billion must all be flowing through the part of the business
that trades on ‘outside markets’. This would mean that a
A. Some recommendations from Sierra Leone
surprising 57 per cent of the outside market is comprised of
illicit diamonds. Two other possibilities exist. The first is that
the 20 per cent estimate is wrong. The second is that if it is
not wrong, De Beers, too, must accept some responsibility for 151. A two-day conference on diamonds, organized by the
the trade in illicit diamonds. Whatever the explanation, this is Network Movement for Justice and Development, the Civil
an area that warrants further study, because it has the Society Movement of Sierra Leone and several other Sierra
potential to taint and damage the entire industry. Leonean organizations, coincided with the visit to that
country of the Panel. This ‘Just Mining’ conference made
149. Regardless of the explanation, it became obvious to the
several recommendations, which the Panel wishes to draw to
Panel that there is a very large trade in illicit diamonds, and
the attention of the Security Council. The recommendations
that conflict diamonds are only a part of this trade. They are,
were based on widespread public frustration in Sierra Leone
in essence, illicit diamonds that have gone septic. They are,
with the de facto division of the country into two parts - one
however, difficult to distinguish from illicit diamonds, because
with diamonds, controlled by the RUF, and one largely
they are often traded in the same way, and by many of the
without diamonds, controlled by the government. The
same people who have been involved in the illicit trade for
conference was vocal in its criticism of UNAMSIL’s mandate
generations. When asked how conflict diamonds enter the
and/or its inability to change this situation. UNAMSIL, the
system, dealer after dealer told the Panel that it happens in the
conference concluded, was actually complicit in dividing the
same way that illicit diamonds enter the system. Someone
country and in ensuring that the RUF can mine diamonds with
brings them to a trading centre - Israel or New York, for
impunity. The conference recommended the following:
example - either smuggling them past customs or making a
false declaration. Either way, they will find a buyer. Or, a • that the Government of Sierra Leone engage a private
dealer will go to Africa and buy them from rebels, or from a military/security firm to bring about a military solution
third or fourth party. He will then take them to Europe, Israel to the problem as soon as possible;

27
 S/2000/1195

• that the United Nations assume responsibility for the

key diamond areas and manage them as a United
Nations Trust Territory;
V. Recommendations on diamonds
• that UNAMSIL be deployed to the diamond areas to
protect them from future incursions and from illicit
mining;
155. In order to better regulate the flow of rough diamonds
• that the Sierra Leone diamond industry be closed down fromproducing countries, a global certification scheme based
completely for a period of five years in order to on the system now adopted in Sierra Leone is imperative. It
encourage non-Sierra Leoneans involved in the will give added impetus to current discussions on this subject
industry to leave, and to provide the government and if the Security Council endorses the concept of a global
people with the time required to devise new investment certification system.
codes and more open systems of transparency and
accountability, so that the diamond industry can benefit 156. In the short run, and in the absence of a global system,
the people of the country, rather than the few who have it is recommended that certification systems similar to that
enjoyed its rewards over the past three decades. adopted by Sierra Leone, be required of all diamond exporting
countries in West Africa, with special and immediate reference
152. The Panel includes these civil society recommendations to Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, as a protective measure for their
in the report for two reasons. The first is that they reflect indigenous industries and to prevent their exposure to
widespread public concern in Sierra Leone about the conflict diamonds. If this has not been completed within a
connection between diamonds and the war, and about the period of six months, the Security Council should impose an
lack of progress in resolving the conflict. The second is that international embargo on diamonds from these countries.
they reflect a widespread concern, shared by the Panel, that
once the conflict is settled, Sierra Leone’s diamond industry 157. The Panel further recommends a complete embargo on
should not be allowed to lapse back into the corruption and all diamonds from Liberia until Liberia demonstrates
mismanagement of earlier years. The objective of the United convincingly that it is no longer involved in the trafficking of
Nations peacekeeping effort, the new diamond certification arms to, or diamonds from, Sierra Leone. The embargo should
scheme, and the work of the Panel of Experts should not be a not be lifted until this condition has been met, and until
return to the status quo of earlier years. Rather the aim should Liberia too has joined the proposed standardized certification
be to help Sierra Leone move forward to a situation in which system.
diamonds are a widespread public good, becoming an engine 158. The Security Council should place an immediate
for development and peace rather than one of war and embargo on trade in all so-called Gambian diamonds until
destruction. such time as its export of diamonds can be reconciled with
imports.
159. Other diamond exporting countries in the region have
B. Further research been designated by the Belgian government as ‘sensitive’
countries, where special attention to imports is required. In
addition to the three countries suffering directly from conflict
diamonds and those mentioned above, these include Uganda,
153. There is reason to believe that a certain amount of Central African Republic, Ghana, Namibia, the Congo
diamonds have been traded by the RUF with officers of the (Brazzaville), Mali, Zambia and Burkina Faso. This list is
former West African peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, in return commended to other major importing countries, including
for cash or supplies. The Panel did not see this issue as part Switzerland, South Africa, India, Israel, the United Kingdom
of its mandate and so did not examine it in any detail, but and the United States. Invoices from these countries need to
repeated accounts, many of them first-hand eyewitness be thoroughly checked, and where there is doubt about either
reports, made the stories impossible to ignore. If the issue is provenance or origin, parcels should be seized until the
thought to be important, it will require further investigation. authorities have checked the facts. Delays in processing will
154. The issue of ‘illicit’ diamonds and their implications for increase the cost of doing business and will encourage better
the diamond industry, as well as for the tracking and paper
4 [Link]
Note: of improperly
term ‘sensitive country’ is notlabelled goods
used in this will
report to
4
discovery of conflict diamonds, is an important one. This discourage
suggestthe habit decisively.
wrong-doing. It is taken from a Belgian government
report which seeks to protect these countries, Belgium and
report has touched on it, but ongoing research and
the industry from problems to which they are all clearly
monitoring may be required in order to do the subject justice. vulnerable. Namibia, for example, is one of the leaders in the

28
160. Urgent attention should be given to extending a Sierra all countries importing rough diamonds must be part of the
Leone-style certification system to these countries as soon as anticipated ‘rough controls’ system.
possible.
165. Throughout its work, the Panel was struck by the
161. The United Nations, the World Diamond Council and widespread breaking of Security Council sanctions on both
the import control authorities of all rough diamond importing weapons and diamonds. If existing and future sanctions are
countries should be vigilant for other exporting countries, or to be effective, the Security Council will require an ongoing
for countries in the future, where trade in diamonds has little capacity to monitor their observance and conduct research.
to do with domestic production or legitimate trading. Where diamonds are concerned, there have been three Expert
Panels examining many of the same issues concurrently.
162. It is essential, and a matter of urgency, that major
There has been useful collaboration, but there has also been
trading centres (Belgium, the United Kingdom, Switzerland,
overlap and duplication. Considering the complexity and the
South Africa, India, the United States and Israel) come to a
changing nature of the conflict diamond issue the Panel
common agreement on the recording and public
recommends that in future, it would serve the Security Council
documentation of rough diamond imports that is consistent
better to have an ongoing focal point within the United
from one country to another, and that clearly designates the
Nations to monitor adherence to sanctions, as well as
country of origin in addition to country of provenance.
progress towards the specific goals stated in General
163. An annual statistical production report should be Assembly resolution 55/56 of 1 December 2000.
compiled by each exporting country and gathered into a
166. The attention of the Security Council, the Government
central annual report, compiled by the World Diamond
of Sierra Leone, donor agencies and other interested parties
Council and/or by the certification body that is expected to
is drawn to the observations and recommendations about
emerge from the ‘Kimberly Process’ of intergovernmental
corruption and the need for probity contained paragraph 151-
negotiation. Countries of origin must be distinguished from
152 and in annex 5. Without serious reform and due diligence
countries of provenance.
within government and government agencies in Sierra Leone,
164. If diamonds are mixed and/or re-invoiced in a free trade international efforts to assist will be wasted.
zone, it is imperative that the government of that country take
responsibility for verifying the bona fides of the diamonds
before they are re-exported. This is especially important with
regard to Switzerland because of the large volumes that pass
through its Freiläger, losing their identity in the process. The
same may be true of the United Arab Emirates. In other words,

fight against conflict diamonds.

29
 S/2000/1195

30
 Part two
Weapons

I. Weapons and the RUF and rebel movements or criminal gangs in one country sell
their arms to groups they are aligned with elsewhere. In other
instances governments may see opportunities for their own
regional ambitions in West Africa, supplying rebel groups
A. Background with weapons in order to further these ambitions.
171. Systematic information on weapons-smuggling in the
region is non-existent, and information which could be used
167. Small arms play an important role in sustaining conflicts, to combat the problem on a regional scale - through ECOWAS
in exacerbating violence, in contributing to the displacement or through bilateral exchanges - is generally not available. Few
of innocent populations and threatening international law, States in the region have the resources or the infrastructure to
and in fuelling crime and terrorism. Recognizing this, the tackle smuggling, a situation that creates opportunities for the
Security Council and the international community have tried smuggling of weapons across all major borders in the region.
to constrain their proliferation in West Africa. The Security
Council placed Sierra Leone under a variety of travel, 172. Officials acknowledge the existence of a large, and
economic and military sanctions after the May 1997 coup. largely uncontrolled informal weapons trade and outright illicit
Following the return of the elected government, the arms trafficking. The extent of such practices, far beyond normal
embargo was amended in June 1998 to lift sanctions against levels of informal trade, aggravate corruption and
the government. Security Council sanctions placed on Liberia criminalization throughout the region.
in 1992 remain in place. 173. In Sierra Leone, the RUF depends almost exclusively on
light weaponry, although it does have access to more
168. On 31 October 1998, members of the Economic
sophisticated equipment. Lists of equipment turned in under
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted ‘The
the Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation (DDR)
Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation
Programme include those of eastern European manufacture as
and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West
well as American, Belgian, British and German types. In May
Africa’. The Moratorium came into force on 1 November 1998,
2000, at the time the Lomé peace process collapsed, roughly
for a period of three years and the Programme for
12,500 weapons and 250,000 pieces of ammunition had been
Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development
collected at the different weapons storage centres that had
(PCASED) supports its implementation. PCASED is designed
been initiated eight months earlier. The weapons included the
to monitor the moratorium and to establish a database and
following:
training programme for law enforcement agencies of the
signatory countries. The programme is supported by the • 496 pistols,
United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations • 4,000 AK-47 ‘Kalashnikov’ rifles,
Department of Political Affairs and the United Nations • 1,072 AK-74 rifles,
Institute for Disarmament Research. • 940 G-3 Rifles,
• 440 FN-FAL rifles,
169. Despite the ECOWAS Moratorium (also called the Mali • 451 SLR rifles,
Moratorium), West Africa is still awash with small arms. • 140 Machine Guns,
Serious problems with weapons have emerged, not only in • 217 Grenade Launchers,
countries that are victims of warfare, but also in major cities • 1,855 Grenades,
across the entire subregion. The rapidly increasing incidence • 45 Mortars.
of armed violence is a consequence. The outbreak of civil
conflict in Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Liberia and Sierra 174. These numbers represent only a small fraction of the
Leone during the past decade has increased the demand for weapons that are actually in the hands of the rebels. The very
light weapons. poor quality and the age of the weapons turned in suggest
that the rebels have held onto the newest and best weapons
170. Guerrilla armies receive weapons through interlinked at their disposal. Despite the setback in May, former rebels,
networks of traders, criminals and insurgents moving across child soldiers and Civil Defence Force members keep
borders. Arms also travel from one unstable zone to another, presenting themselves at the different DDR centres for

31
 S/2000/1195

demobilization and for the turning over of their weapons. armoured personnel carriers were seized when the
rebels detained and disarmed a Guinean UNAMSIL unit
175. Many of the weapons are old and have been obtained
in January 2000. Guinean units serving under ECOMOG
from different sources, both regional and international.
had also been disarmed during previous ambushes and
Provided that suitable ammunition is available, however, a
seizures;
ten-year-old firearm can still be lethal. One of the few positive
elements of the war in Sierra Leone is that there has been little • Kenyan and Zambian UNAMSIL contingents were
or no use of anti-personnel land-mines in the conflict. disarmed when they were taken hostage by rebels in
May 2000. In these cases, great amounts of rifles were
176. With no standardized marking system for small arms
lost to the rebels, as well as eight armoured personnel
and the proliferation of great amounts of weapons of this
carriers and several other military vehicles.
nature, the arms flow to rebel groups on the African continent
remain largely uncontrolled.

II. Liberian support to the RUF

B. Sources of RUF weaponry within Sierra
Leone
A. General

177. The RUF needs a steady flow of arms and ammunition.

Although the arms inventoried by the DDR programme 180. The personal connections between President Charles
originate in many countries, most of the rifles are of eastern Taylor and Foday Sankoh go back ten years to their training
European design. Variants of the AK-47 Kalashnikov are the in Libya, to their combined efforts on behalf of Blaise
most readily available. Although a Russian design, the AK-47 Campaore in his seizure of power in Burkina Faso, and to
is today produced in so many countries, and in so many Sankoh’s involvement in Charles Taylor’s struggle as head of
variants, that a thorough study of model numbers, serial the NPFL to take power in Liberia in the early 1990s. These
numbers and factory markings would be required in order to events are well documented, and President Taylor told the
determine their precise origin. After this, it might be possible Panel that he was a close friend of Foday Sankoh. President
to determine the supply trail of the weapons, but even this Taylor denies unequivocally, however, that he or his
would be complicated by the fact that many may have been government have provided any training to the RUF, any
bought on the open market, and may be second- or even weapons or related matériel, any Liberian facilities or territory
third-hand weapons. for staging attacks, or a safe haven.
178. The RUF have captured many weapons during 181. He told the Panel that RUF leader Sam Bockarie’s
confrontations with the Sierra Leone Army, ECOMOG and presence in Liberia was a gesture of goodwill on Taylor’s part,
UNAMSIL forces. A forthcoming study made available to the in order to allow the RUF to work together for a peaceful
Panel by the Small Arms Survey, a Geneva-based NGO, settlement in Sierra Leone after Foday Sankoh and Bockarie
provides a well-documented summary overview of known had found themselves unable to work together.
seizures of weapons by the RUF. The Panel was able to verify
most of the incidents reported in the survey. 182. The Panel, however, found unequivocal and
overwhelming evidence that Liberia has been actively
179. Supplies obtained by the RUF from intervening forces supporting the RUF at all levels, in providing training,
deployed in Sierra Leone include, for example: weapons and related matériel, logistical support, a staging
• considerable amounts of weaponry seized during ground for attacks and a safe haven for retreat and
confrontations with the government of Sierra Leone recuperation.
armed forces. A lack of training and discipline led to
soldiers abandoning their weapons for ready seizure by
the rebels. SLA soldiers are also reported to have sold B. Training
weapons and ammunition to the rebels;
• a significant number of weapons, including hundreds of
rifles, 24 machine guns, 10 mortars, 20 rocket propelled 183. The RUF has received regular training in Liberia at
grenades, several tons of ammunition and three Gbatala near Gbanga and elsewhere. Hundreds of

32
ex-combatants and many former RUF leaders have confirmed arms transport, but there are other relevant connections. Fred
this in oral testimony and in writing. Sufficient corroborative Rindel was the owner of Dodson. The company was closed
documentary evidence in the form of written reports of RUF on 31 December 1998, but during the period under
commanders to Foday Sankoh is also available. RUF soldiers investigation, the plane was leased to, and operated by,
have been trained alongside Liberia’s Anti-Terrorist Unit Greater Holdings (Liberia) Ltd., a company with gold and
(ATU), and RUF combatants are frequently used by President diamond concessions in Liberia. The plane was used for the
Taylor for his own personal security details. Liberian officers transport of the Greater Holdings’ staff to and from Liberia.
and men are also actively assisting the RUF in Sierra Leone,
189. Niko Shefer is a businessman located in South Africa,
serving as combatants, trainers and liaison officers.
and was Chairman/CEO of the Greater Diamond Company
184. The panel received information on the presence of (Liberia) Ltd, a subsidiary of Greater Holdings. Shefer denies
Ukrainian, Burkinabe, Nigérien, Libyan and South African diamond dealings in Liberia and Sierra Leone, except for two
nationals in Liberia for training purposes. The training was exploration agreements with the Liberian government for
given to non-Liberian nationals for deployment in RUF- concessions in Mano and Lower Lofa. When the employees
territory in Sierra Leone, and for action in recent clashes on of their diamond operations in Mano came under attack,
the Guinea border. Early in 1999, a significant improvement of Shefer discussed security with President Taylor, and
tactics and use of weapons by the RUF rebels was noted in suggested bringing in private security specialists from South
Sierra Leone. It was more than a coincidence that this Africa. This resulted in the security contract with Mr. Rindel.
happened immediately after foreigners started training these In the end, Shefer’s explorations were unprofitable and were
elements in Liberia. abandoned. The American partners in Greater Diamonds were
at that time under investigation by American authorities for
185. In addition, the police interrogation statements of some
tax evasion and money laundering, using assets in Liberia.
of arrested RUF officials and the oral statements of former
Shefer met with RUF leader Foday Sankoh in South Africa in
rebels interviewed by the panel confirm the presence of
February 2000 (see also paragraph 97).
foreign mercenaries including South African and Ukrainians
training and fighting alongside RUF. 190. Fred Rindel states that he has never had any
involvement with diamonds in Liberia and was never
approached by anyone in Liberia with regard to diamonds.
South Africans providing training in Liberia
According to the Liberian Minister of Mines, however, Rindel
was involved in a diamond project with the son of President
186. Fred Rindel, a retired officer of the South African
Taylor, Charles Taylor Jr. Rindel includes a reference to De
Defence Force and former Defence Attaché to the United
Dekker Diamonds (Pty) Ltd. on his business card. Rindel was
States, has played a key role in the training of a Liberian anti-
also contracted as consultant on a mineral and geological
terrorist unit, consisting of Liberian soldiers and groups of
survey of the gold potential in the Mano and Nimba areas in
foreigners, including citizens of Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso,
Liberia. Geologists from South Africa were hired for the
Niger and the Gambia.
purpose. Rindel acquired the gold and other mineral rights for
187. The panel interviewed Mr. Rindel extensively. Rindel two concessions on behalf of a Bermuda based company, the
was contracted as a security consultant by President Charles Bermuda Holding Corporation, a company in which President
Taylor in September 1998, and training started in November Charles Taylor and some of his relatives hold interests.
1998. The contract included consultancy services and Mr. Rindel was also negotiating with a number of international
strategic advice to convert Charles Taylor’s former rebel companies to form joint ventures with the Bermuda
militia into a professional unit. The Anti-Terrorist Unit is used corporation.
in Liberia to protect government buildings, the Executive
191. Mr. Rindel denies bringing other South Africans to
Mansion and the international airport, and to provide VIP
Liberia as trainers. During his time in Liberia, however, there
Security and the protection of foreign embassies. The
were several other South Africans there, including Meno Uys,
numbers trained were approximately 1,200. Because of
Gert Keelder and Faber Oosthuyzen. These men and others
negative media attention, Rindel cancelled his contract in
worked under contract in Liberia in 1998, 1999 and 2000 as
Liberia in August 2000.
security trainers. Their headquarters is at Gbanga. Another
188. In 1998, ECOMOG identified a plane, registration South African, Karl Alberts, is flying helicopters for the
number N71RD, owned by a South African company, Dodson Liberian armed forces. Neither Rindel nor the other South
Aviation Maintenance and Spare Parts, as having carried Africans applied for authorization under the South African
weapons to Robertsfield in September of that year. The plane Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act (1998),
is a Gulfstream 14-seater business jet that cannot be used for because, in his case, according to Rindel, his services were

33
 S/2000/1195

purely of a protective nature and did not include any combat 195. The Panel has found conclusive evidence of supply
training, or training of armed forces in Liberia. lines to the RUF through Burkina Faso, Niger and Liberia.
Weapons supplied to these countries by governments or
private arms merchants have been diverted for use in the
conflict in Sierra Leone. Côte d’Ivoire, under previous
C. Safe haven administrations, was sympathetic to the Liberian government
and, indirectly, to the RUF in Sierra Leone. The Ivorian
relationship dates back to the training of RUF and Liberian
rebels in Côte d’Ivoire in the early 1990s.
192. There are innumerable accounts in RUF written reports,
in oral testimony given to the Panel, and in police and military 196. Typically, the movement of the arms from a supplying
intercepts, of high-level RUF meetings with President Taylor, country to the RUF will entail several stop-overs and cross-
RUF travel to Monrovia, RUF strategy meetings at the border shipments. This should expose arms dealers, especially
Executive Mansion, RUF travel on Liberian helicopters, RUF those breaking United Nations sanctions, to controls, legal
staging bases at Camp Schefflein, Voinjama and Foya-Kama. procedures and regulations on the export, import and transit
Liberia has provided the families of many senior RUF officials of military equipment. Since weapons have moved into the
with a safe haven. Eyewitness accounts speak of RUF fighters region and across borders with impunity, it can only be
being treated in Monrovia hospitals. Most recently, Gibril assumed that the parties involved - the brokers and suppliers
Massaquoi, acting as RUF spokesman on issues relating to of arms to the RUF - have obtained cooperation from border
the 10 November 2000 cease-fire, has been interviewed in, and and customs inspectors, and licensing government
has made his press statements from Monrovia. departments in order to circumvent United Nations sanctions
and normal border controls.
197. The President of Burkina Faso is a close ally of
President Charles Taylor and Burkina Faso has acknowledged
D. Weapons and related matériel the presence of over 400 Burkinabe soldiers in Liberia during
the time Taylor was leading his rebellion in 1994 and 1995.
Provision was made in the government budget to cover
193. Police and military intercepts, civilian accounts, the salaries for the services rendered during this period. Burkina
written reports of RUF commanders to Foday Sankoh and oral Faso has repeatedly denied the involvement of its nationals
testimony provided to the Panel by ex-combatants provide in supporting the RUF. Eyewitnesses and former RUF
lengthy and detailed descriptions of a constant flow of combatants, however, confirm the active involvement of
weapons and supplies entering Sierra Leone from Liberia. Burkinabes with the RUF. A Burkinabe, ‘General’ Ibrahim Bah
Weaponry and supplies include mortars, rifles, RPGs, satellite (a.k.a. Baldé) - referred to in paragraphs 72-73 - handles much
phones, computers, vehicles, batteries, food and drugs. Most of the financial, diamond and weapons transactions between
of the supplies are sent by road or helicopter to Foya-Kama, the RUF, Liberia and Burkina Faso. He shuttles regularly
a few miles from the Sierra Leone border near Kailahun, and between Monrovia and Ouagadougou. Burkina Faso’s
then they are trucked across the border into RUF territory for involvement in weapons transfers is detailed below.
onward distribution.

IV. The role of aircraft in supplying

III. The role of other countries the RUF

194. Weapons can be procured directly from producing A. Direct flights into RUF territory
factories, or from surplus stocks of the armed forces in
different countries. It is mainly through arms merchants or
brokers that weapons are purchased for use by non-State
actors. In the case of the RUF, private brokers and arms 198. Having no access to the sea, the RUF can import
merchants are the principal suppliers, but most large arms and weapons and related matériel only by road or by air. The role
ammunition supplies only reach the RUF indirectly, through of aircraft in the RUF’s supply chain is vital, especially over
countries with governments sympathetic to the rebels. the past two years, as their sphere of influence in Sierra Leone

34
has widened. Given the state of the country’s roads, it would Ukraine government to United Nations Sanctions Committees
be impossible to supply RUF operations such as those shows that the weapons were part of a contract between a
undertaken at Pamelap in Guinea late in 2000, for example, Gibraltar-based company representing the Ministry of
without aerial support. Defence of Burkina Faso, and the Ukrainian State-owned
company Ukrspetsexport. An aircraft of the British company
199. Most Sierra Leonean landing strips in the areas under
Air Foyle, acting as an agent for the Ukrainian air carrier
RUF control were destroyed or have not been maintained
Antonov Design Bureau, shipped the cargo, under a contract
because of the war. The landing strip at Yengema is probably
with the Gibraltar-based company, Chartered Engineering and
not operational, and although the airstrip at Magburaka was
Technical Services. A Ukrainian licence for sale of the
rebuilt during the AFRC period in 1997 and is now in rebel
weaponry was granted after Ukrspetsexport had received an
territory, there are few reports of fixed-wing aircraft landing
end-user certificate from the Ministry of Defence of Burkina
there or elsewhere in RUF-held territory.
Faso.
200. The absence of reports in itself, however, is not very
205. The end-user certificate was dated 10 February 1999.
meaningful, as there is a total lack of governmental oversight
The document authorized the Gibraltar-based company to
of Sierra Leonean airspace, due to insufficient infrastructure
purchase the weapons for sole use of the Ministry of Defence
at the country’s airports and in the subregion in general (see
of Burkina Faso. The document also certified that Burkina
Part III, below).
Faso would be the final destination of the cargo and the end-
201. This problem notwithstanding, it is known that the RUF user of the weaponry. The document is signed by Lieutenant-
have been supplied with weapons by helicopter on a sporadic Colonel Gilbert Diendéré, head of the Presidential Guard of
basis before 1997 and on a regular basis since then. Burkina Faso. During a visit by a Panel Member to Ukraine,
Helicopters originating in Liberia land at Buedu, Kailahun, this sequence of events was reconfirmed.
Makeni, Yengema, Tumbudu, Yigbeda and elsewhere in Kono
206. The authorities of Burkina Faso, in correspondence with
District. More recently, newly delivered Mi-8 transport
the United Nations Sanctions Committee on Sierra Leone,
helicopters have been used for this purpose, including for the
denied allegations that the weapons had been re-exported to
delivery of surface-to-air (SA-7) shoulder-launched missiles.
a third country, Liberia, and during a visit to Burkina Faso the
Panel was shown weapons that were purportedly in that
shipment.
B. Weapons flights into Liberia
207. The weapons in question, however, were not retained
in Burkina Faso. They were temporarily off-loaded in
Ouagadougou and some were trucked to Bobo Dioulasso.
202. Virtually all of the weapons shipped into RUF territory The bulk of them were then trans-shipped within a matter of
are trans-shipped through at least two other countries days to Liberia.
between their point of origin and RUF territory in Sierra
Leone. In virtually all cases, the last transit point before 208. Most were flown aboard a BAC-111 owned by an Israeli
shipment into Sierra Leone is Liberia. The weapons reach businessman of Ukrainian origin, Leonid Minin. The aircraft
Liberia in a variety of ways - occasionally by sea but most bore the Cayman registration VP-CLM and was operated by
frequently by air. The Panel went to considerable lengths to a company named LIMAD, registered in Monaco. Minin was,
document some of these shipments in order to demonstrate and may remain, a business partner and confidant of Liberian
how the supply chain works. President Charles Taylor. He is identified in the police records
of several countries and has a history of involvement in
criminalactivities ranging from east European organized crime,
Case study: Burkina Faso delivery of Ukrainian trafficking in stolen works of art, illegal possession of fire
weapons arms, arms trafficking and money laundering. Minin uses
several aliases. He has been refused entry into many
203. A shipment of 68 tons of weapons arrived at countries, including Ukraine, and travels with many different
Ouagadougou on 13 March 1999. It included 715 boxes of passports. Minin offered the aircraft mentioned above for sale
weapons and cartridges, and 408 boxes of cartridge powder. to Charles Taylor as a Presidential jet, and for a period
The inventory also included anti-tank weapons, surface-to-air between 1998 and 1999, it was used for this purpose. It was
missiles, and rocket propelled grenades and their launchers. also used to transport arms.
204. This shipment has now been well documented. 209. Regarding the shipment in question, the aircraft flew
Documentation provided in April and June 1999 by the from Ibiza in Spain to Robertsfield in Liberia on 8 March 1999.

35
 S/2000/1195

On 15 March, two days after the arrival of the Ukrainian 213. The role of Liberia as a trans-shipment platform for arms
weapons in Ouagadougou, the plane flew from Monrovia to to the RUF is crucial. However, arms are brought into the
Ouagadougou. On 16 March the plane was loaded with region from elsewhere. Many businessmen close to the inner-
weapons and flew back to Liberia. On the 17th, it returned to circle of the Liberian presidency operate on an international
Ouagadougou. After a flight to Abidjan in the Ivory Coast, scale, sourcing their weaponry in Eastern Europe. The Panel
the plane flew again from Ouagadougou to Liberia with focused on a limited number of individuals, but there are many
weapons on the 19th. On the 25th the plane flew again from more examples of the significant presence of criminal
Liberia to Ouagadougou and returned on the same day with organizations in the region.
weapons. On the 27th the plane flew again to Ouagadougou
214. A key individual is a wealthy Lebanese businessman
and from there to Bobo Dioulasso for the weapons that had
named Talal El-Ndine. El-Ndine is the inner-circle’s paymaster.
been trucked there. The aircraft made three flights over the
Liberians fighting in Sierra Leone alongside the RUF, and
next three days between Bobo Dioulasso and Liberia. On 31
those bringing diamonds out of Sierra Leone are paid by him
March the plane flew back to Spain. Because the plane had a
personally. Arms shippers and brokers negotiate their
VIP configuration, it had only limited cargo capacity, which is
payments in his office in Old Road, Monrovia. El-Ndine also
why so many flights were necessary.
brings foreign businessmen and investors to Liberia,
210. A second plane, an Antonov operated by a Liberian individuals who are willing to cooperate with the regime in
company named Weasua, is reported by eye-witnesses to legitimate business activities as well as in weapons and illicit
have flown part of the cargo to Liberia from Bobo Dioulasso. diamonds. The pilots and crew of the aircraft used for
clandestine shipments into or out of Liberia are also paid by
211. Minin’s BAC-111 was used for an earlier shipment of
El-Ndine. They are mostly of Russian or Ukrainian nationality
weapons and related equipment from Niamey Airport in Niger
and they invariably stay at the Hotel Africa in Monrovia.
to Monrovia. This occurred in December 1998, shortly after
Minin purchased the plane and started to operate it in the 215. The manager of this hotel is a Dutch national named
region. On 22 December 1998, the BAC-111 made two trips Gus Van Kouwenhoven. Van Kouwenhoven started his hotel
from Niamey to Monrovia. On the second trip, it took a and a gambling business in Liberia in the 1980s. He is also a
consignment of weapons, probably from existing stocks of the member of President Taylor’s inner circle, through his
armed forces of Niger. The weapons were off-loaded into contacts with Taylor’s economic advisor, Emmanuel Shaw.
vehicles of the Liberian military. A few days after these Shaw, a former Liberian finance minister, owns a number of
events, the RUF rebels started a major offensive that facilities at Robertsfield, including all the hangars. Van
eventually resulted in the destructive January 1999 raid on Kouwenhoven is responsible for the logistical aspects of
Freetown. many of the arms deals. Through his interests in a Malaysian
timber project in Liberia, he organizes the transfer of
weaponry from Monrovia into Sierra Leone. Roads built and
maintained for timber extraction are also conveniently used for
C. The inner circle of the Taylor regime weapons movement within Liberia, and for the onward
shipment of weapons to Sierra Leone.
216. Simon Rosenblum, an Israeli businessman based in
212. President Charles Taylor is actively involved in fuelling Abidjan, has logging and road construction interests in
the violence in Sierra Leone. He and a small coterie of officials Liberia. He, too, is very close to the Liberian President and
and private businessmen around him are in control of a covert carries a Liberian diplomatic passport. His trucks have been
sanctions-busting apparatus that includes international used to carry weapons from Robertsfield to the border with
criminal activity and the arming of the RUF in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone.
Over the years - before President Taylor’s inauguration and 217. Minin and Van Kouwenhoven are linked to Liberia’s
after - this group has contracted foreign businessmen for the timber industry, which provides a large amount of unrecorded
financing, sourcing or facilitating of these covert operations. extrabudgetary income to President Taylor for unspecified
The sanctions-busting is fed by the smuggling of diamonds purposes. Three companies are involved: Exotic and Tropical
and the extraction of natural resources in both Liberia and Timber Enterprise (ETTE), Forum Liberia and the Indonesian-
areas under rebel control in Sierra Leone. In addition, the owned Oriental Timber Company.
sovereign right of Liberia to register planes and ships, and to
issue diplomatic passports, is being misused in order to
further the operations of this group.
V. Liberia and international transport

36
 networks 221. Because of its lax licence and tax laws, Liberia has for
many years been a flag of convenience for the fringe air cargo
industry. A company incorporated in Liberia can locate its
executive offices in another country and conduct business
A. General activities anywhere in the world. Names of corporate officers
or shareholders need not be filed or listed, and there is no
minimum capital requirement. A corporate legal existence can
218. Security Council resolution 1306 (2000) mandated the be obtained in one day. Liberia also has lax maritime and
Panel to consider the adequacy of air traffic control systems aviation laws that provide the owners of ships and aircraft
in the region for the purpose of detecting flights of aircraft with maximum discretion and cover, and with minimal
carrying arms and related matériel across national borders in regulatory interference. Businessmen in several countries
violation of United Nations sanctions. Effective monitoring of compete with each other to attract customers for these
airspace and a proper control system at airports is vital for the offshore registrations. The system has led to a total disregard
detection of illicit trafficking. In this context, the Panel found for aviation safety and a total lack of oversight of Liberian
that regional air surveillance capacities are weak or totally registered planes operating on a global scale.
inadequate in detecting, or in acting as a deterrent to the arms 222. The Panel requested documentation on all Liberian
merchants supplying Liberia and the RUF. Weak airspace registry aircraft from Liberian Civil Aviation Authorities and
surveillance in the region in general, and abusive practices the Ministry of Transport, but was told that the
with regard to aircraft registration, create a climate in which documentation had been lost or was destroyed as a
arms traffickers operate with impunity. (Technical notes on consequence of the Liberian civil war. A schedule of Liberian-
this subject are contained in Part III of this report.) registered aircraft provided to the Panel by the Ministry listed
219. There are many examples of this problem. On 18 July only 7 planes. No documentation was available on more than
2000 an Ilyushin 18D with Liberian registration EL-ALY 15 other aircraft that had been identified by the Panel. Many
requested permission to land at Conakry in Guinea. The aircraft flying under the Liberian flag, therefore, are apparently
aircraft was operated by a company named West Africa Air unknown to Liberian authorities, and are never inspected or
Services. The crew were citizens of the Republic of Moldova seen in the country. Many operate from airports in Central
and the plane had flown from Kyrgyzstan to Burkina Faso, Africa (N’Djili in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
then to Guinea and finally to Liberia. The cargo documents Luanda in Angola or the national airports of the Congo
listed seven tons of ‘spare parts to equipment of aircraft’ and (Brazzaville), Rwanda, Kenya and Gabon) or in the Middle
the client was a company named Kipo Dersgona in Conakry, East (United Arab Emirates, Tripoli in Libya or Khartoum in
Guinea. This ‘Guinean’ company is not listed in the register of Sudan).
companies in Guinea. The plane is also not among those listed 223. Several countries (including Belgium, South Africa, the
for the Panel by the Liberian authorities as having Liberian United Kingdom and Spain) have in recent years banned
registry nor is it listed by the International Civil Aviation Liberian registered aircraft from their airspace and airports, in
Organization. part because of fraudulent activity in relation to their
220. The case was still under investigation at the time of registration. The illegal registration of more than one plane
writing. Tracing a plane carrying an unknown registration with the same number, for example, is a practice frequently
number, however, is practically impossible, and the plane was mentioned by airport inspectors throughout Africa. It is also
probably using multiple registrations, shifting rapidly from widely acknowledged that Liberian EL-registry planes
one to another in order to avoid detection. Such clear abuses operating in Africa and from airports in the United Arab
of international aviation procedures are not easily detected Emirates are commonly used for illicit arms shipments.
unless navigation controllers and national airport authorities
in several countries cooperate, and actively track and share
information on the whereabouts and operations of such
aircraft. C. Key individuals in Liberia’s
aviation registry

B. Aircraft registered in Liberia 224. A Kenyan national named Sanjivan Ruprah plays a key
role in Liberia’s airline registry and in the arms trade. Before
his involvement in Liberia, Sanjivan Ruprah had mining

37
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interests in Kenya, and was associated with Branch Energy owned by Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed bin Saqr al Nayhan, a
(Kenya). Branch Energy owned diamond mining rights in business associate of Victor Bout.
Sierra Leone, and introduced the private military company,
229. Victor Bout is a well-known supplier of embargoed non-
Executive Outcomes to the government there in 1995. Ruprah
State actors - in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the
is also known as an arms broker. He has worked in South
Congo and elsewhere. Viktor Vasilevich Butt, know more
Africa with Roelf van Heerden, a former colleague from
commonly as Victor Bout, is often referred to in law
Executive Outcomes, and together they have done business
enforcement circles as ‘Victor B’ because he uses at least five
in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
aliases and different versions of his last name. He was born in
elsewhere. Ruprah was once in charge of an airline in Kenya,
Dushanbe, Tajikistan, had air force training in Russia, and
Simba Airlines, until investigations into financial irregularities
reportedly worked as a KGB officer shortly before the end of
forced the company’s closure.
the Cold War. He then went into private business, setting up
225. In November 1999, Ruprah was authorized in writing by airline companies throughout Eastern Europe. Today Victor
the Liberian Minister of Transport to act as the ‘Global Civil Bout oversees a complex network of over 50 planes, tens of
Aviation agent worldwide’ for the Liberian Civil Aviation airline companies, cargo charter companies and freight-
Regulatory Authority, and to ‘investigate and regularise the forwarding companies, many of which are involved in
... Liberian Civil Aviation register’. The ostensible aim of shipping illicit cargo. Bout himself lives in the United Arab
Ruprah’s investigation was to ‘suspend and/or cancel the Emirates.
registration of those aircraft which have had illegal certificates
230. Bout has used the Liberian aviation register extensively
issued outside the knowledge of the government’. During its
in connection with his company, Air Cess Liberia. The United
visit to Liberia the Panel asked the Transport Ministry, the
Nations Panel investigating the violations of United Nations
Ministry of Justice and police authorities about Ruprah and
embargoes on UNITA in Angola identified 37 arms flights, all
his work, but was told that Ruprah was not known to them.
with false end-user certificates and false flight schedules,
226. Sanjivan Ruprah travels using a Liberian diplomatic conducted with Liberian-registered planes operated by Victor
passport in the name of Samir M. Nasr. The passport Bout, between July 1997 and October 1998. Victor Bout is a
identifies him as Liberia’s Deputy Commissioner for Maritime resident of the United Arab Emirates and many of his airline
Affairs. companies are based there, providing charter services to
companies in more than ten countries. His planes, however,
227. A British national, Michael G. Harridine, was previously
are registered elsewhere - in Equatorial Guinea, the Central
appointed by the Liberian Minister of Transport to act as
African Republic and elsewhere.
Chairman of the Liberian Civil Aviation Regulatory Authority,
through an office in the United Kingdom. Harridine told the 231. Centrafricain Airlines is one of the many companies
Panel that he is no longer involved with the registration of controlled by Bout and his Air Cess/Transavia Travel Cargo
Liberian aircraft. He acknowledges, however, that irregular group. Early in 2000, an investigation into fraud concerning
activities in the registration of Liberian aircraft were taking the registration of an aircraft operated by Centrafricain
place. Airlines was initiated in the Central African Republic, because
some aircraft flying these colours were operating without a
228. An airline named Santa Cruz Imperial/Flying Dolphin,
licence.
based in the United Arab Emirates, has used the Liberian
registry for its aircraft, apparently unknown to Liberian 232. An Ilyushin 76, registered in Liberia in the name of Air
authorities until 1998. It also used the Swaziland registry until Cess Liberia in 1996, was later registered in Swaziland. It was
the Government of Swaziland de-registered them in 1999. A subsequently removed from the Swaziland register by the
total of 43 aircraft were de-registered, operated by the Civil Aviation Authority because of irregularities. The plane
following companies: Air Cess, Air Pass, Southern Cross then moved to the register of the Central African Republic,
Airlines, Flying Dolphin and Southern Gateway Corporation. where it obtained the designation TL-ACU in the name of
According to the Government of Swaziland, ‘while the names Centrafricain Airlines. The aircraft sometimes carries the
may be different, some of these companies are one and the registration of the government of the Congo (Brazzaville). As
same and did not operate from Swaziland’. When it with other Bout aircraft, the plane is based in Sharjah in the
discovered that some of the aircraft were still operating, the United Arab Emirates.
Government of Swaziland sent information to the Civil
233. This plane was used in July and August 2000 for arms
Aviation Authorities in the United Arab Emirates where some
deliveries from Europe to Liberia. This aircraft and an
of the aircraft were based, in part because of airworthiness
Antonov made four deliveries to Liberia, three times in July
concerns, and in part because it believed that the operators
and once in August 2000. The cargo included attack-capable
may have been involved in arms trafficking. Flying Dolphin is

38
helicopters, spare rotors, anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems,
missiles, armoured vehicles, machine guns and almost a
million rounds of ammunition. The helicopters were Mi-2 and
Mi-17 types. A few months earlier, two Alouette-3 helicopters
A. The role of customs in exporting and
had been flown in by a Libyan government plane, but these transit countries
helicopters were replaced by the newly arrived ones and are
thought to be in Liberia no longer. (A note on European
sources of weaponry is included in paragraph 247, below.) 237. In the case of the July and August 2000 deliveries of
These deliveries, all made after the collapse of the Lomé Peace military helicopters and heavy calibre missiles, the Panel did
Agreement, are especially worrisome. not obtain conclusive information on the exact source of
234. The transactions were set up by Victor Bout in the supply. In general, however, the Panel believes that initiatives
United Arab Emirates, and by Gus van Kouwenhoven, should be taken to enhance the capacity of countries in
mentioned in paragraph 217, above. The plane used for the Eastern Europe to monitor arms exports more carefully. It is
helicopter shipment was the Ilyushin 76, TL-ACU. Bout hard to conceal something the size of an Mi-17 military
worked with a freight forwarder in Abidjan. A non-existent helicopter, and the supply of such items to Liberia cannot go
company ‘Abidjan Freight’ was set up as a front by Sanjivan undetected by customs authorities in originating countries
Ruprah, to conceal the exact routing and final destination of unless there are false flight plans and end-user certificates, or
the plane. The official routing was ‘Entebbe-Robertsfield- unless customs officials at points of exit are paid to look the
Abidjan’ but the cargo was unloaded in Robertsfield. The other way. The constant involvement of Victor Bout’s aircraft
weapons were sourced from Central Europe and Central Asia. in arms shipments from Eastern Europe into African war zones
suggests the latter. A serious investigation into the capacity
of licensing and monitoring authorities in Eastern Europe is
therefore warranted.
D. Offices in the United Arab Emirates 238. Where West Africa is concerned, any aircraft flying
from Eastern Europe must make at least one fuel stop halfway
through the trip. At these refuelling airports, cargo could be
235. Virtually all of Bout’s companies, regardless of where inspected and illicit goods detected. In addition, arms
they are registered, operate out of the United Arab Emirates. shipments in violation of United Nations sanctions often pass
Sharjah Airport is used as an ‘airport of convenience’ for through countries neighbouring the embargoed State. A third
planes registered in many other countries, such as Swaziland, possible inspection of the cargo could occur there. There
Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic and Liberia. have been few significant cases, however, of aircraft with
In October 1998, 15 planes of Santa Cruz Imperial/Flying weapons being grounded in Eastern Europe, at important
Dolphin, all registered in Liberia but operated from Sharjah, fuelling points such as Cairo, Nairobi or Entebbe, or anywhere
were temporarily grounded by the Liberian Aviation in West Africa.
Authority. The planes have also been under investigation in 239. The strengthening of air surveillance or border controls
Swaziland and in South Africa, and were finally barred from alone is not enough to stop the problem of illicit arms flights.
airports in these countries. Coordination and feedback between any country of origin and
236. The authorities in the United Arab Emirates are aware of any country of destination for international military cargo
the seriousness of the issue and told the Panel that they are shipments is needed, and customs and airport authorities can
in the process of taking measures that will make it more play an equally important role in the implementation of
difficult for aircraft registered elsewhere to remain in the sanctions. The World Customs Organization has designed a
United Arab Emirates for more than a year without a local standardized, single document that could harmonize and
inspection. Better registration and safety inspections would standardize the procedure for the declaration and inspection
perhaps make such aircraft more airworthy, but they do not of cargo at border crossings, ports or airports.
address the issue of gun-running. The concerns raised by the
Panel have been raised before in the UAE, and it is not clear
that any serious action has been taken. B. The role of airport authorities and
inspectors

VI. Other issues

39
 S/2000/1195

240. Aircraft that land or ship cargo are obliged to file for a Organization of African Unity, in Bamako, Mali. A declaration
foreign operating licence. The directorate of each airport is was adopted on an African Common Position on the Illicit
responsible for inspecting the legitimacy of all arriving planes Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and
and their operators. Here are two possible levels of inspection Light Weapons. The signatories agreed to enhance the
that can be used to deter illegal arms shippers. The filing of capacity of the OAU’s member States to identify, seize and
false flight plans, the use of fake aircraft registration, and the destroy illicit weapons and to put in place measures to control
background of a plane’s operator can all be scrutinized at the circulation, possession, transfer and use of small arms and
these levels. Some of the arms traffickers and the planes they light weapons and the institutionalization of training
use are well known. programmes to control and eradicate the circulation of illicit
arms in Africa.
241. The use of multiple registration numbers for one plane,
or the changing overnight from one register to another is a 245. Military cargo should always be accompanied by an
practice that should be viewed with suspicion by airport export licence, an end-user certificate, an airway bill, a pro-
authorities worldwide. Victor Bout and other operators forma invoice and a cargo manifest, together with a detailed
transporting illicit goods have been able to get away with description of the items in the cargo. The revised 1996 Kyoto
such practices in far too many countries. In a few cases he Convention on Customs is an adequate basis for this
has attracted minor fines, but not enough to stop his lucrative improved procedure, but the Convention awaits ratification
alliances with warlords, rebel leaders and criminals in many and implementation of United Nations Member States. A
African countries. single globally adapted document accompanying military
cargo would provide customs officers or exporting, transiting
242. Although some countries have temporarily or
and importing authorities with much greater clarity on the
permanently stopped aircraft registered in Liberia from
precise nature of the cargo, and the parties involved in the
entering their airspace, the Liberian register continues to be
handling, shipping, facilitating or buying and selling the
used fraudulently. The practice has clearly been organized
weaponry. As a first step, urgent ratification of the
fromLiberia in cooperation with shrewd businessmen abroad,
Convention by all United Nations Member States is
and Liberian planes remain prominent in many African
necessary.
countries, particularly in countries at war.

D. Further research
C. The non-observance of moratoria and
embargoes
246. Financial assets are at the heart of all criminal enterprise.
Lost workers and equipment can always be replaced if
243. Signatories to the Wassenaar Arrangement, which financial assets are not targeted. Because of time constraints,
includes some of the world’s most significant producers of the Panel could not look into the assets of RUF leaders, their
arms, including small arms and ammunition, have agreed on a sponsors and the members of the organized crime groups that
voluntary basis to participate in weapons and ammunition supply them. Further investigation is required to identify,
export controls. The signatories also agreed to abide by the trace, freeze and confiscate these assets.
ECOWAS Moratorium, and to restrain their arms exports to
West Africa. The Panel deplores the fact that Ukraine, a 247. Because of time constraints, the Panel was unable to
signatory to the Wassenaar Arrangement, and Burkina Faso, fully investigate the original source (i.e. producing countries)
a signatory to the ECOWAS Moratorium, have shown neither of weapons that contravene the Security Council embargoes
restraint nor due care and diligence in their arms transactions, in question. As noted below (paragraph 250), one outstanding
and were involved in a major arms deal only months after query involves an incident in Kazakhstan. Another involves
signing these agreements. Furthermore, the arms were a Moldova-based company named Renan.
diverted to Liberia for use by the rebels in Sierra Leone, in 248. On various occasions prior to the arrival of UNAMSIL
gross violation of the spirit of the ECOWAS-Moratorium and in Sierra Leone, Nigerian ECOMOG troops lost weapons to
of the United Nations sanctions imposed on Liberia and Sierra the RUF when they fell victim to rebel ambushes. During the
Leone. December 1998 siege of Kono, for example, the rebels
244. The ECOWAS Moratorium does not cover illicit captured a great number of ECOMOG weapons, including a
trafficking. However from 30 November to 1 December 2000 a number of armoured vehicles. In addition, however, the Panel
Ministerial Conference was held under the auspices of the heard an overwhelming number of reports on Nigerian

40
ECOMOG troops exchanging weapons with the RUF for cash, use of registrations bought in Liberia on an ad hoc basis and
diamonds, food or other goods. The information was for short periods, without inspection of the plane or its
considered reliable, but in order to verify or disprove these operators, is clearly intended to circumvent the identification
allegations, further investigation will be required. of planes that are used for illicit purposes. Victor Bout,
Sanjivan Ruprah, Leonid Minin and Sheik Abdullah bin Zayed
249. During its work, the Panel obtained information on
bin Saqr al Nayhan are key to such illicit practices, in close
connections between the RUF and rebels in Guinea-Bissau,
collaboration with the highest authorities in Liberia.
and with UNITA representatives in West Africa. The
evidence, however, was not conclusive, and needs more 254. In summary, the RUF is able to obtain large quantities
research, preferably with cooperation from law enforcement of arms, military equipment and related matériel as a result of
and border control authorities in the region. the following key factors:
250. An accomplice of Victor Bout, a Russian citizen named • the purchasing power it derives from the sale of conflict
Oleg Grigorovich Orlov, is the subject of a government diamonds;
investigation in Kazakhstan into the smuggling of two Mi-8T
• the willingness of some major arms producing countries
helicopters out of the country. According to the Government
to sell weapons with disregard as to the final users;
of Kazakhstan, Orlov is active in the arms markets of the
Confederation of Independent States, Syria, Sri Lanka, • the willingness of some countries to provide their end-
Pakistan, North Korea and certain African countries, including user certificates and/or to facilitate the safe passage of
Eritrea. He is associated with the following companies: weapons through their territory;
Dunford-Avia Progress Ltd. (Cyprus), Global Omarus
• the largely unregulated activity of international arms
Technology Ltd. lately renamed EMM Arab System Ltd.
brokers and their intermediaries;
(Cyprus), Euroasian Financial Industry Group (Singapore and
Malaysia), Belmont Trading and Gulfstream. Further • corruption;
investigation of Orlov and his association with Victor Bout
• the inability of Sierra Leone and its neighbours to
could shed light on an important source of illegal weapons
monitor and control their airspace;
flows into Africa.
• Liberia’s interest in destabilizing its neighbours.
251. On 7 December 2000 the panel was informed by
Ugandan authorities that Ugandan Customs had recently
seized a consignment of arms, believed to be destined for
Monrovia. Ugandan authority had been granted for air
transport of the consignment from Entebbe to Conakry for the VIII. Recommendations on weapons,
use of the Guinean Ministry of Defence. The flight plan, transport and air traffic control
however, showed that the real destination of the plane was
Monrovia. Further information is expected.
255. The Panel strongly recommends that all aircraft
operating with an EL-registration number and based at
airports other than in Liberia, should be grounded
VII. Conclusions regarding weapons immediately, and until the provisions in the following
and the RUF recommendation are met. This includes planes based in
Sharjah and other airports in the United Arab Emirates, in the
Congo (Brazzaville), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Gabon, Angola, Rwanda and Kenya. Airport authorities and
252. Liberia is actively breaking Security Council embargoes
operators of planes registered in Liberia over the past five
regarding weapons imports into its own territory and into
years should be advised to keep all their documentation, log
Sierra Leone. It is being actively assisted by Burkina Faso. It
books, operating licences, way bills and cargo manifests for
is being tacitly assisted by all countries providing such
inspection.
weapons, by countries allowing weapons to pass through or
over their territory without question, and by countries 256. It is further recommended that all operators of aircraft
providing a base for the aircraft used in such operations. on the Liberian register, wherever they are based, be required
to file their airworthiness and operating licences and their
253. The registration of aircraft in Liberia is clearly
insurance documents with the International Civil Aviation
connected to illegal activities that go beyond the economic
Organization’s headquarters in Montreal, including
rationale for the offshore registration of aircraft or crews. The

41
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documentation on inspections carried out during the past five busting, profiles of major cargo companies involved in such
years. The aircraft of all operators failing to do so should be practices should be developed, with a view to exploring ways
grounded permanently. Aircraft that do not meet ICAO and means of further strengthening the implementation of
standards should be grounded permanently. sanctions.
257. The Security Council, through ICAO, IATA and the 262. Responsibility for the flood of weapons into West
WCO should create a centralized information bulletin, making Africa lies with producing countries as well as those that
the list of grounded Liberian aircraft known to all airports in trans-ship and use them. The Security Council must find ways
the world. of restricting the export of weapons, especially from eastern
Europe, into conflict areas under regional or United Nations
258. Burkina Faso has recently recommended that the
embargoes. ‘Naming and shaming’ is a first step, but
Security Council supervise a proposed mechanism that would
consideration could be given to an embargo on weapons
monitor all arms imports into its territory, and their use, for a
exports from specific producer countries, just as diamonds
period of three years. The Panel endorses this proposal. The
have been embargoed from producer countries until
Panel also recommends that under such a mechanism, all
internationally acceptable certification schemes have been
imports of weapons and related matériel into Burkina Faso
developed.
over the past five years be investigated. The Panel further
recommends that any State having exported weapons during 263. Current Security Council arms embargoes should be
this period to Burkina Faso should investigate the actual end- amended to include a clear ban on the provision of military
use of these weapons, and report their findings to the and paramilitary training.
Security Council and to the Programme for Coordination and
264. Countries in West Africa that are not signatories to the
Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED)
1989 United Nations Convention on the Recruitment, Use,
established under the ECOWAS Moratorium.
Training and Financing of Mercenaries should be encouraged
259. In view of the sanctions-breaking cases investigated by to do so.
the Panel and the information gathered in the region, it is
265. An analysis of the firearms recovered from rebels
recommended that the Security Council encourage the
should be undertaken in cooperation with Interpol, and its
reinforcement of the ECOWAS Programme for Coordination
International Weapons and Explosives Tracking System. This
and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) with
would help in further identifying those involved in the RUF
support from Interpol and the World Customs Organization.
supply line.
PCASED should have an active capacity to monitor
compliance with arms embargoes and the circulation of illicit 266. The World Customs Organization should be asked to
weapons in the region. share with the Security Council its views on creating adequate
measures for better monitoring and detection of weapons and
260. The Security Council should encourage ECOWAS
related matériel to non-State actors and countries under an
member States to enter into binding regional arrangements
arms embargo.
between States with common frontier zones, to initiate an
effective, common and internationally agreed system of 267. Consideration should be given to the development of
control that includes the recording, licensing, collection and special training programmes on sanctions monitoring for
destruction of small arms and light weapons. These bilateral national law enforcement and security agencies, as well as
arrangements can be promoted and facilitated through airport and customs personnel in West Africa, and the
ECOWAS and through the Programme for Coordination and development of a manual or manuals on the monitoring of
Assistance for Security and Development. A common sanctions at airports for worldwide use by airport authorities
standard and the management of a database on significant and police services.
cases of smuggling and sanctions-busting in the region could
268. Consideration should be given to placing specialized
be developed by Interpol. The IWETS (International
United Nations monitors at major airports in the region (and
Weapons and Explosives Tracking System) programme of
perhaps further afield), focusing on sensitive areas and
Interpol could be used for the purpose of tracking the origin
coordinating their findings with other airports. This would
of the weaponry.
enable better identification of suspect aircraft. It would also
261. In this report, the Panel has identified certain arms create a deterrent against illicit trafficking, and would generate
brokers and intermediaries responsible for supplying weapons the information needed to identify planes, owners and
to the RUF. A project should be developed to profile these operators violating United Nations sanctions and arms
arms brokers with the cooperation of Interpol. Similarly, embargoes.
considering the importance of air transport in the sanctions-
269. The Security Council should consider ways in which air

42
traffic control and surveillance in West Africa can be problems they address are related to the primary supporter of
improved, with a view to curtailing the illicit movement of the RUF, Liberia - its President, its government and the
weapons. Possibilities include: individuals and companies it does business with. The Panel
notes with concern that Security Council resolutions on
• encouraging the installation of primary radar at all major
diamonds and weapons are being broken with impunity. In
West African airports, and finding the financial support
addition to the foregoing, the Panel offers the following
to do so. Only primary radar can independently detect
recommendations.
the movement of aircraft;
271. A travel ban similar to that already imposed on senior
• an alternative could be ‘pseudo radar’ which creates a
Liberian officials and diplomats by the United States should
radar environment with the use of powerful means of
be considered for application by all United Nations Member
transmission of air/ground data through satellite;
nations until such time as Liberia’s support to the RUF and its
• requiring the use in the region of a Global Positioning breaking of other United Nations sanctions ends
System and requiring aircraft to be equipped with the conclusively.
appropriate avionics, with installation of the
272. The principals in Liberia’s timber industry are involved
corresponding equipment on the ground. This would
in a variety of illicit activities, and large amounts of the
entail requiring aircraft flying in West Africa to have on
proceeds are used to pay for extrabudgetary activities,
board or to be equipped with avionics which could
including the acquisition of weapons. Consideration should
enable controllers on the ground to identify any traffic,
be given to placing a temporary embargo on Liberian timber
anywhere and at any time in their sector;
exports, until Liberia demonstrates convincingly that it is no
• encouraging ICAO and other interested agencies to longer involved in the trafficking of arms to, or diamonds
assis t States in reinforcing the financial autonomy of from, Sierra Leone.
bodies established for the management of air navigation
273. Consideration should be given to creating capacity
services.
within the United Nations Secretariat for ongoing monitoring
of Security Council sanctions and embargoes. This is
imperative to the building of an in-house knowledge base on
current issues such as conflict diamonds, as noted in
IX. Concluding recommendations paragraph 165 above, but it is even more important to creating
awareness and capacity on problems, which are not likely to
be solved in the near future, such as the illicit trade in
270. In this report, the Panel has made a variety of specific weapons and related matériel.
recommendations that deal with diamonds, weapons and the
use of aircraft for sanctions-busting and the movement of
illicit weapons. Many of these recommendations and the

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Part three
Technical note on air traffic control
systems in West Africa
I. Background

274. What follows is a technical paper on air traffic control

systems in West Africa. Recommendations emanating from
this part of the report have been included in the previous
section.
275. First, a word on terminology: airspace is divided into
lower and upper airspace and into Flight Information Regions
(FIRs), which can, as required, encompass Terminal Control
Areas (TMAs) or Upper Control Areas (UTAs).
276. An FIR is an airspace with specific dimensions, in which
an information service and an alert service are provided. A
TMA is a control area established, in principle, at airways
crossroads, around one or several important aerodromes.
West African airspace is managed either by agencies to which
governments have delegated responsibility, or by state-
managed administrations. These include the following:
• ASECNA (Agency for the Safety of Air Navigation in
Africa and Madagascar) is in charge of the airspaces of
Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Guinea Bissau,
Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal;
• Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone have established the
Roberts FIR to control their airspace;
• Ghana manages its airspace and that of Benin, Sao
Tomé and Togo from the Accra FIR;
• Cape Verde has an extensive oceanic airspace called Sal
FIR;
• Nigeria has divided its national airspace in two parts:
the Kano FIR to the North and the Lagos FIR to the
South.
277. The Panel agreed, for the purposes of this report, to
review first the air traffic control systems in West Africa, and
then the ones that prevail in the Roberts FIR and the
countries under its jurisdiction. For reasons of timing and
flight availability, the Panel’s expert on the subject was unable
to visit the centres in Abidjan, Lagos and Sal Island.

II. Air traffic systems in West Africa

44
 Communications) Project developed by ICAO and financed
by the European Development Fund. SATCOM, which uses
VSAT (Very Small Aperture Terminal) technology, has
A. Air traffic management facilitated the implementation of several fixed service and
speech circuits in the Region. Many VSAT have been
installed in the region, and there are other projects under
278. The Panel was pleased to note that, contrary to the implementation, especially in the vast airspaces managed by
situation elsewhere, FIRs in West Africa do not strictly follow ASECNA.
the contours of national boundaries, and that the delimitation 284. The Fixed Service is often backed up, however, or
of these FIRs is generally in line with operational replaced by the SITA (Société internationale de
requirements. télécommunications aéronautiques) network, a private
279. The Panel also noted that the present airspace network generally used by airlines. The 97% availability
configuration was redefined to take into account the ICAO threshold recommended by ICAO is often never reached.
(International Civil Aviation Organization) recommendation, 285. As regards the ATS/DS (direct speech) circuits based
which requires states to implement area control as soon as on the use of the public telecommunications network, these
possible, with a view to increasing air traffic safety. A lot seem to be operating better in the ASECNA area
remains to be done however, especially in Nigeria, Mali, (Dakar/Bamako, Niamey/Ouaga, etc) because of the similarity
Mauritania, Niger and elsewhere. of equipment, than they do outside that area (Bobo/Accra,
280. The layout of the airways, which transit the Region, Bamako/Roberts). These ATS/DS circuits enable two
connects major airports, or the radio navigational aids, which controllers working in adjacent centres to exchange traffic
serve these airports. The heaviest traffic flows are the Gulf of data. Usually, when the ATS/DS circuits do not work,
Guinea (Abidjan-Accra-Lagos corridor), then the controllers use the HF for the coordination. This practice is
Dakar/Abidjan axis and the North-South traffic flow. The East- not recommended. In short, communications remain a
West traffic is less dense. The West African airspace is far weakness.
from being congested.

B. Communications C. Navigation

281. The most frequently used means for Aeronautical 286. The main navigational aids in the region operate fairly
Mobile Service (AMS - air/ground and air/air well. However, many of them have reached their age limit,
communications) is the High Frequency (HF), which has an especially the Instrument Landing Systems.
extended range but presents drawbacks on reception, and the 287. The VORs (VHF Omni-directional Radio Range),
Very High Frequency (VHF), whose range is not extended, but coupled or not with DMEs (Distance Measuring Equipment),
which offers greater listening comfort. These technologies are implemented in all international aerodromes and are
operate well on the whole. A study carried out by IATA on generally operational. The same is true for the NDBs (Non-
this subject in May 2000 shows, on the one hand, that the directional radio beacons), which are used nearly everywhere.
VHF is increasingly used and has considerably improved, All these ground facilities work towards providing safe
both from the point of view of quality and availability, and navigation in the Region.
that on the other hand, the HF is still the only available means
in several sectors.
282. In several countries in the subregion, the Single D. Surveillance
Sideband (SSB) is used to provide links between the main
airport and the domestic airports.
283. The Aeronautical Fixed Service (AFS), which ensures 288. The use of radar is very rare in West Africa. The
the transmission of flight plans and other aeronautical explanation given to the Panel is that ICAO recommends that
messages between specific fixed points, operates fairly well, states should use radar only if the situation really warrants it.
especially at main airports. Performance has been enhanced If this is taken as a rule, it would apply only to the Gulf of
by the implementation of the SATCOM (Satellite Guinea States (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria).

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289. Thus Ghana has installed radar in Accra to cover the A. General
Western sector of its airspace. A project is presently under
way which will enable Ghana to cover its entire airspace,
including that of Benin and Togo. In Nigeria, the radar of
Lagos is being replaced. That of Abuja operates within a 295. The Roberts FIR is a dismemberment of the Dakar FIR.
radius of 50 Nautical Miles. It was established in January 1975 by Guinea, Liberia and
Sierra Leone, which decided to manage their airspace jointly.
290. A secondary radar system has been undergoing tests The FIR was named after Roberts International Airport (also
in Abidjan for the past few years. Its official commissioning known as Robertsfield), which hosted the headquarters at its
has been delayed because of a problem between the creation. The headquarters was transferred to Freetown in
government and ASECNA, the manager of the airspace. It has June 1990 because of the war in Liberia. It has been based in
nonetheless proven very useful. As an example, the Panel was Conakry since June 1997 as a result of the war in Sierra Leone.
informed that a few hours after a recent takeoff from Accra, an The Panel also noted that whether in Robertsfield, Freetown
aircraft heading west realized that its navigation instruments or Conakry, the buildings, which have hosted the
were no longer functioning. It therefore decided to land at headquarters and its technical services, are not architectural
Accra, its point of departure. Soon after, it was seen on the models. In Conakry, for example, the building where the FIR
Abidjan radar screens heading north. The Ivorian controllers administration is located is old, tiny and inaccessible. The
were able to guide it safely to its final destination. Flight Information Centre (FIC) is not much better. It is located
291. The Panel was informed that, as part of a surveillance in a very narrow single room, and the control equipment is
exercise, ASECNA had carried out Automatic Dependent old. Everything in the centre dates from an earlier epoch. The
Surveillance (ADS) trials, which had been positive. But for the controllers complain about unsuitable working conditions.
past two or three years, ASECNA has stopped talking about
them. Air traffic management

292. The CNS/ATM (Communication, Navigation, 296. The Roberts FIR TMA extends 40NM north of Conakry
Surveillance/Air Traffic Management) implementation plan and 99NM south of Monrovia. It therefore encompasses the
(1995-2005) provides for the installation of an ADS in Dakar three airports, and VHF coverage is also provided. The most
and in Sal Island to monitor the Oceanic FIRs. frequently flown airway is UB 600, which extends from Dakar
293. The absence of radar is strongly felt and all the to Abidjan. Domestic traffic in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra
aeronautical and/or military authorities questioned by the Leone is very low.
Panel mentioned the problem. Authorities are frequently 297. The Roberts Flight Information Centre is responsible for
informed of violations of their airspace by pilots who come all overflights and takes charge of flights above 3,000 feet,
across illegal traffic. They are also aware that aircraft after takeoff. Upon landing, it transfers traffic to the local
operators can operate with impunity in their sphere of control tower when the descending aircraft has reached about
sovereignty, without their knowledge. At times, it is local 4,000 feet.
authorities or even local individuals who contact them to
inform them of an overflight. The military admit that they do 298. The air traffic service authorities are aware of the
not have the means to intercept such traffic, a common existence of illegal transboundary traffic. They are informed
practice elsewhere. Training and refresher course were also by other pilots who fly in their airspace on the one hand, and
mentioned as a major requirement. by the supervisory authorities of the three countries, on the
other.
294. In spite of the absence of radar, West African air traffic
services still provide the classic elements of control, which is Communications
to prevent collision between aircraft in the air and on the
ground, and to speed up and regulate air traffic generally. 299. The Roberts FIC operates a VHF which covers the
entire TMA. It uses the HF for links with Freetown and
Monrovia.
300. The ATS/DS system is operational with Dakar and
III. The Roberts Flight Information Abidjan. An iridium satellite telephone is used with Bamako.
Region
301. Only the Conakry VSAT is operational. Freetown VSAT
is out of order. The AFS is not operational in the Roberts FIR.

46
 helicopters operating near national borders. It also recognizes
Navigation the existence of several landing strips, either authorized or
not. Some are used by the Office of the United Nations High
302. Navigational aids (ILS, VOR/DME, NDB) are available Commissioner for Refugees and World Food Programme.
at the three airports, except at Roberts (Monrovia) where the
308. The Panel was authorized to visit a domestic airport,
VOR has been out of order for a very long time.
namely the Nzerekore Airport, near the borders with Côte
d’Ivoire and Liberia. An NDB is available. The airport is not
Surveillance fenced. The only communications means available at this
airport is the common frequency with the other airports,
303. There is no radar in the Roberts FIR. However, the Panel including Freetown and Monrovia.
noted that in the Air Navigation Plan for the African/Indian
Ocean Region, the Roberts FIR included the installation of a
radar. C. Sierra Leone

B. Guinea 309. During discussions with the Panel, the civil aviation
authorities of Sierra Leone stressed that military flights in
general and Nigerian military flights in particular do not follow
air traffic instructions. They do whatever they want in Sierra
304. In Conakry, the Panel was informed of the following Leonean airspace. The authorities deplore the absence of
incident: on 10 November 2000, the crew of an Antonov 12, radar, which would enable them to know what these military
registered in Ukraine and chartered over a period of time by a flights actually do on the one hand, and on the other, to
Guinean airline, was carrying out maintenance work on the detect illegal overflights. They also lack the means to detect
aircraft which had been grounded because of a contract weapons and dangerous objects at the airport. Lack of
dispute. The crew requested permission from the control training is also mentioned as a problem.
tower to taxi, in order to test the engines. The authorization
was granted. Soon thereafter, the aircraft took off and 310. The authorities expressed concern about airports being
disappeared into the Guinean sky without a flight plan, open to public air traffic without technical personnel, and of
without authorization and without answering numerous calls them being used for unauthorized private flights. Where
from the tower. It was only few hours later that the aircraft Freetown is concerned, they have made arrangements to act
was reported to be on the ground at Freetown. This is a in case of unauthorized landing, for example, by requesting
concrete example of what can happen at airports in the fire-fighting trucks to block the runway and informing the
Region. appropriate authorities. They gave the Panel a memorandum,
copy of which is attached to this report (as Annex 5). The
305. Guinean civil aviation authorities observe that their Panel noted a large number of aircraft and helicopters in the
country is going through a difficult period, and they have public parking lot on the one hand, and the absence of airport
taken measures to revise overflight and landing agreements. security measures, as well as the absence of a fence, on the
They have noted an increase in the number of requests for other. Virtually everything in the field of civil aviation needs
overflight and landing authorizations whose justification to be done or redone in Sierra Leone.
leaves much to be desired. While key staff in the Air Traffic
Management field have been in the Roberts FIR since its
creation, they badly need training in the field of CNS/ATM.
306. Many domestic airports in Guinea are closed to public D. Liberia
air traffic due to a lack of passengers or aircraft. Most of the
equipment at domestic airports is very old. Where
surveillance is concerned, civil aviation authorities note the 311. The Panel met with President Charles Taylor and found
concern of the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Defence, him to be aware of the shortcomings and deficiencies faced by
and they mention letters from these Ministries informing them Roberts International Airport, which only a few years ago,
of cases of unauthorized overflight. (A copy of one of these was a very dynamic air traffic control centre. He was
letters is attached to this report as Annex 4). concerned by the lack of resources to control his airspace and
307. The DCA is aware of the presence of small aircraft and he said that he had personally approached the United Nations

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for assistance in acquiring the equipment necessary for IV. Conclusions

effective management of the airport. His request, he said, had
yielded no result. Asked about the priority he would give
between the acquisition of military equipment and the
acquisition of means to improve his airport, he chose the 314. As noted in previous sections of this report, major
airport. shortcomings and deficiencies are obvious in the Roberts FIR
and its constituent states in particular, as well as in the other
312. The day before this discussion, the Panel visited West African FIRs in general. The civil aviation community is
Roberts International Airport, which is gradually resuming aware of this situation, and recommendations and
activity. The airport has many burned out and tumbledown conclusions have been adopted at technical meetings
buildings, a consequence of the war. As in Conakry and organized by ICAO on this subject. The problem is a lack of
Freetown, the activities of the control tower are limited to resources, despite the existence of more or less autonomous
takeoffs and landings. However unlike Conakry and Freetown, administrations set up to manage airports and air navigation
there is no link between Robertsfield and the domestic services.
airports of the hinterland, and there is no telephone.
315. Training is a basic requirement in all centres. And
313. The authorities say that they do not have the means to finally, it is essential that each country in the region have the
take inventories or to inspect domestic airports. As regards ability to identify aircraft operating in its airspace.
military flights, the air traffic services are not involved in their
movements. A separate sector is allocated to them.

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Annex 1

50
Annex 2
Meetings and consultations

Belgium
Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Cabinet of Development Cooperation
Ministry of Economic Affairs
Ministry of Finance (Customs)
Cabinet of the Secretary of State for Foreign Trade
Diamond Office
Diamond High Council (Hoge Raad voor Diamant)
Private sector
Mackie Diamonds
Omega Diamonds
Rapaport Belgium
Talib Diamonds
Civil society
International Peace Information Service (IPIS)

Burkina Faso
Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Energy and Mines
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Trade
Customs and Excise
National Police
Ministry of Transport
Ministry of Defence
Representatives of the Armed Forces
Civil society
Mouvement Burkinabe des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples
Private sector
Chamber of Commerce
Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies
France
United States
Agence pour la Securité de la Navigation en Afrique et à Madagascar
(ASECNA)
UNDP

Canada
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

51
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Côte d’Ivoire
Modern Africa Fund Managers
BBC

France
Several Panel members visited Interpol Headquarters in Lyon. Discussions were also
held with the Police Attaché in the Paris Embassy of Israel, and the Deputy Air
Attaché in the Embassy of India

Ghana
Government
Ministry of Roads and Transport
Civil Aviation Authority
Aviation Security
Air Traffic Services
Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies
UNDP

Guinea
Government
Ministère des Mines, de la Géologie et de l’Environnement
Direction Nationale de l’Aviation Civile
Agence Nationale de la Navigation Aérienne
Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies
Canada
France
Ukraine
United Kingdom
World Bank
Office of Roberts Flight Information Region (FIR)
UNDP
Private sector
Société de Gestion de l’Aéroport de Conakry

India
Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Commerce
Customs and Central Excise Department
Airport and Customs Officials, Mumbai (Bombay)
Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies
UNDP
Private sector
Gem and Jewellery Export Promotion Council of India

Media
The Hindu
Indian Express

Israel
Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Industry and Trade: Diamonds, Precious Stones & Jewellery
Administration
Private sector
Israel Diamond Exchange
Israel Diamond Manufacturers Association
Tacy Ltd.

52
 Media
Market Direct Business Communications
Pazit Ravina

Kenya
African Airlines Association
International Air Transport Association (IATA)
International Civil Aviation Organization (East & Southern Africa Regional
Office)
UNDP

Liberia
Government
President Charles Taylor
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Lands, Mines & Energy
Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs
Ministry of Transport
Ministry of Revenue
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Finance, Bureau of Customs & Excise
Ministry of Commerce and Industry
Liberian Police
Roberts International Airport
Private sector
Mr. George Haddad
Mars Diamonds

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Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

European Union
Sierra Leone
UNDP
United Kingdom
United States
Civil society
Centre for Democratic Empowerment
Liberian Interfaith Council
Liberian National Bar Association
Susuku
Media
BBC
The Enquirer
The News

Niger
Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Transport
Civil Aviation Authority
Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies
Agence pour la Sécurité de la Navigation en Afrique et à Madagascar (ASECNA)
UNDP

Mali
Civil Aviation Authority
L’Agence pour la Sécurité de la Navigation en Afrique et à Madagascar
(ASECNA)
UNDP

Nigeria
ECOWAS
UNDP officials in Abuja

Senegal
ICAO (West and Central Africa Regional Bureau)

Sierra Leone
Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Mineral Resources (in Freetown and Kenema)
Ministry of Trade
Ministry of Justice
Customs and Excise
Port Authority
Airports Authority
Government Gold and Diamond Office
National Security Advisor
Sierra Leone Police (several agencies)
Sierra Leone Army
Sierra Leone Air Wing
Private sector
Diamond Counsellor International
Mackie Diamonds
Sar-Kuma Mining Co. Ltd.
Rex Diamonds
Sierra Leone Airports Authority
Several diamond dealers in Kenema
Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

54
 United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UNAMSIL
– officers and officials in Daru
– a wide range of officers and officials in Freetown
UNV (United Nations Volunteers)
United Kingdom
United States
Civil society
Campaign for Good Governance
Human Rights Watch
Network Movement for Justice and Development
Oxfam GB
Search for Common Ground
Sierra Leone Muslim Congress
Various Chiefs and Elders from Kono District
Civil Defence Force (Kamajor) leaders in Kenema and Daru
Media
BBC
CBS News
NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation

South Africa
Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Justice
South African Diamond Board
Civil Aviation Authority
Private sector
Executive Research Associates
Landmat
Lanseria Airport
Raymond Kramer & Associates

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Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

UNDP
United Kingdom
United States
Civil society
Institute for Security Studies
Institute for Global Dialogue
South African Institute for International Affairs
Media
Sunday Independent
Khareen Pech
Other
Participation in Inter-ministerial Meeting on Conflict Diamonds gave Panel members
access to a wide range of government and private sector firms from Africa, Europe,
Israel and North America.
The Panel also participated in an Air Transport Sector Workshop: Controlling the
Movement of Illicit Goods, attended by a wide range of experts from civil aviation
and South Africa agencies, including the National Anti-Corruption Unit, Air Traffic
and Navigation Services and the National Inter-Departmental Structure. The
workshop was organized by Saferworld (U.K.) and the Institute for Security Studies
in Pretoria.

Spain
Meeting with police officials, Madrid.

Switzerland
Government
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (United Nations & International
Organizations; Financial & Economic Affairs)
Federal Customs Administration (Berne)
Federal Customs Administration (Geneva Free Port)
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
Federal Office for Police Matters (Money Laundering Reporting Office NCO
Division)
Private sector
Acal Amit S.A.
HSB Republic Bank (Suisse) S.A.
Bucher & Co. Publikationen
TAG Aviation
Civil society
Small Arms Survey
Other
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

Ukraine
Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
State Security Service
National Security Directorate
Border Control Authority
Civil Aviation Authority
Ministry of Defence
National Security Directorate
Ukrspetsexport
Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies

56
 UNDP

United Arab Emirates

Civil Aviation Authorities
Customs and diamond officials in Sharjah
A visit was also made to Sharjah airport.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Government
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
• Minister of State
• United Nations Department
• Africa Department
• Sanctions Unit
• Arms Control Unit
Department for International Development
Metropolitan Police Service
HM Customs & Excise
Private sector
De Beers
Anaconda Worldwide Ltd.
WWW International Diamond Consultants Ltd.
M. Vainer Ltd.
Civil society
Amnesty International
Global Witness
International Alert
Human Rights Watch
Media
Financial Times
Basel Magazine
Insight News Television
Africa Confidential
Thomas Brian-Johnson

United States of America

Government
Department of State
Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of National Intelligence
USAID
Private sector
World Diamond Council
Rapaport Diamonds
Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies
Sierra Leone Embassy
Missions to the United Nations:
• Bangladesh
• Belgium
• Canada
• France
• India
• Kazakhstan
• Sierra Leone
• Switzerland
• Uganda

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 S/2000/1195

• United Kingdom
• United States
Media
Sebastian Junger
Teun Voeten
The Perspective

Individuals
A number of individuals have played a key part in some of the events noted in this
report, or have been mentioned in that connection in media reports. The Panel was
grateful to several who agreed to be interviewed:
Andrei Bressler
John Caldwell
Roger Crooks
Omrie Golley
Michael Harridine
Nicholas Karras
Ya’ir Klein
Johnny Paul Koroma
Raymond Kramer
Ze’ev Morgenstern
Richard Ratcliffe
Fred Rindel
Niko Schefer
Note: Given the sensitive nature of the subjects being investigated by the Panel,
many individuals spoke under conditions of confidentiality. Several interviews have
therefore not been noted.

58
Annex 3
Key figures in the RUF
Many of the RUF leaders have been given, or have given themselves high-ranking military
titles and nicknames or aliases. As many of them are known mainly by the latter, the report has
occasionally used these as well as real names, where known. The following are some of the
main RUF leaders.
Foday Saybana Sankoh, Chairman of the RUF; currently in prison in Sierra Leone
General Issa H. Sesay, formerly Brigadier, then Battlefield Commander; currently Interim Head
of the RUF
Brigadier General Maurice Kallon; currently heading the northern axis of the RUF
Brigadier Dennis Mingo (alias “Superman”), Battle Group Commander, latterly Battle
Commander, Lunsar Axis; currently fighting with the RUF
Lt. Col. Gibril Massaquoi, latterly Foday Sankoh’s personal assistant; currently acting as RUF
Spokesman behind RUF lines
Major General Sam Bockarie (alias “Mosquito”), former Battle Group Commander and “High
Command”; currently in exile in Liberia
Colonel Boston Flamoh or Flomoh (alias “Rambo”); killed by RUF comrades in Makeni
Brigadier Mike Lamin, formerly Chief Intelligence Officer; Minister of Trade and Industries until
May 2000; currently in prison in Freetown
Eldred Collins, Public Relations Officer, RUF Party; currently in prison in Freetown
General Ibrahim Bah, a Burkinabe, possibly of Gambian origin; senior logistics expert in the
movement of weapons and diamonds between Burkina Faso, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Also
known as Ibrahima Baldé and Baldé Ibrahima.

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Annex 4
Sample communication on aircraft from Guinea

60
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Annex 5
List of problems and recommendations provided by
Sierra Leone Airports Authority

Drawbacks in detecting diamonds and arms smuggling

through the airports

1. No equipment available to detect diamonds or arms.

2. Security personnel screening passengers not properly trained in diamonds and arms
detection.
3. Coordination between various security agencies, viz: airport security, police, UNAMSIL,
SLA etc. very inadequate and the sheer numbers represented make the process counter-
productive.
4. Social aspects of state security personnel exposes them to temptation; e.g. very low
salaries and allowances, poor IQs, poor education, little exposure, etc.
5. VIP protocol and escort extended by state security personnel to too many classes of
people, e.g. ministers, parliamentarians, judges, army and police officers, corporate executives,
diplomats, etc.
6. Poor integrity of many state security and customs personnel, who use the privilege of
their position to directly facilitate smuggling for personal benefit.
7. No facilities for detecting unauthorized aircraft landing elsewhere other than Lungi and
Hastings airports.
8. Direct disloyalty of some state security and customs personnel who intentionally
facilitate smuggling in order to promote the course of saboteurs and dissidents of the
government.

Recommendations

1. To strengthen the aspect of coordination and control by the SLAA through the
provision of equipment such as:
(a) X-ray baggage screening equipment (high resolutions) for both Lungi and
Hastings Airports;
(b) Surveillance radar equipment at Lungi Airport with a coverage of low altitudes;
(c) Air-to-ground and ground-to-ground state-of-the-art VHF and HF communication
equipment to be installed at Lungi, Hastings, Bo and Kenema Airports;
(d) Appropriate training of SLAA personnel in Security, ATC and operations
management.

62
2. To properly screen all state security and customs personnel deployed at the airport to
ensure integrity, loyalty, education, intelligence and character.
3. To provide induction courses and appropriate training for all state security and customs
personnel on the detection of diamonds, arms, laws relating to international smuggling, etc.
4. Substantially improve the remuneration of all personnel charged with the responsibility
of screening passengers.
5. To desist fromall VIP protocol except for persons using the Presidential Lounge and the
heads of diplomatic mission only.
6. To improve coordination and the exchange of information between various security
agencies.
7. To reduce the over-abundance of state security personnel deployed in passenger
screening processes and to limit it to a small and well-trained core.
8. To impose stiff penalties of jail terms without any option of a fine, for persons convicted
of smuggling or facilitating smuggling through action or omission.

63