Civil Law Review | 2018
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Atty. Genevieve Marie D.B. Paulino
A. When do laws take effect?
NCC, ARTICLE 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless, it is otherwise provided.
Tanada versus Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27
Publication is indispensable, absence of which will not render the law effective. But the Legislature
may in its discretion provide that the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or extended.
Publication must be in full or its is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws. It must be made in Official Gazette, and not elsewhere as a requirement for their
effectivity after 15 days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.
Acaac v. Azcuna, G.R. No. 187378
What will happen to the municipal ordinance If no action has been taken by the SP within thirty
(30) days after submission of such an ordinance for review?
Section 56 of the LGC (d) provides that, “if no action has been taken by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan within 30 days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall
be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.”
In this case, petitioners maintain the subject ordinance cannot be deemed approved through the
mere passage of time. It, however, bears to note that more than 30 days have already elapsed from the
time the subject ordinance was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review by the Sangguniang
Bayan. Hence, it should be deemed approved and valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) of the Local Government
Code.
NMSMI v. Military Shrine, G.R. No. 187587, June 5, 2013
Is the handwritten addendum an integral part of the proclamation thus, though not included in the
publication?
NO, the handwritten addendum has no legal force and effect due to lack of the required publication
in the Official Gazette. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all for the purpose that it should
inform the public of the contents of the law. Pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, the requirement of
publication is indispensable in the effectivity of a law unless otherwise provided by the law itself.
B. Legal periods
NCC, Article 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that
years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months of thirty day; day, of twenty-four hours; and
nights from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated in their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they
respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.
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Rules on Period (Article 13)
1. Years - 365 days, unless year is identified
2. Months - 30 days, unless month identified
3. Days – 24 hours
4. Nights-sunset to sunrise
5. Calendar week – Sunday to Saturday
6. Week – Count 7 days as indicated, not necessarily Sunday to Saturday
To count the period, first day is excluded, last day is included.
Exception: Rule does NOT apply to computation of age; each year is counted based on birth anniversary.
Policy if the Last Day is a Sunday or a Legal Holiday:
1. If the act to be performed within the period is prescribed or allowed (1) by the Rules of Court, (2) by an
order of the court, or (3) by any other applicable statute, the last day will automatically be considered
the next working day.
2. If the act to be performed within the period arises from a contractual relationship, the act will become
due despite the fact that the last day falls on a Sunday or Holiday.
cf. Rules of Court (ROC) Rule 22
Section 1. How to compute time. — In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these
Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the
designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the
last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place
where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. (a)
Section 2. Effect of interruption. — Should an act be done which effectively interrupts the running of
the period, the allowable period after such interruption shall start to run on the day after notice of the
cessation of the cause thereof.
The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be excluded in the computation of the period. (n)
EO 292, RAC Sec. 31
Section 31. Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty
days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number
of days the specific month contains; "day," to a day of twenty-four hours; and "night," from sunset to sunrise.
CIR v Primetown, GR 162155, August 28, 2007
1. Year – 12 calendar months
NOTE: In the said case, the Supreme Court declared that the provision of Section 31, Chapter VII, Book I
of the Administrative Code of 1987, being a more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods
with respect to counting “a year.”
2. Months – 30 days, unless designated by their name, in which case, they shall be computed
according to the number of days which they respectively have;
3. Day – 24 hours;
4. Night – from sunset to sunrise;
5. Week – 7 successive days regardless of which day it would start;
6. Calendar week – Sunday – Saturday
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NB: In the computation of period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.
Montajes v People, G.R. No. 183449, March 12, 2012
Re: Computation of Time When the Last Day Falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a Legal Holiday and a
Motion for Extension on Next Working Day is Granted
NB: Petitioner’s filing with the Court of Appeals a petition for extension of time to file petition for review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court praying for an extended period of 15 days from May 21, 2007, or until
June 5, 2007, within which to file his petition (reckoning the extension from May 21, 2007 [Monday] and not
from May 19, 2007 [Saturday]) is in violation A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC dated February 29, 2000.
NB: If the last days falls on a Sunday or a Legal Holiday
If the act to be performed within the period is:
1. Prescribed or allowed by:
a. The Rules of Court;
b. An order of the court; or
c. Any other applicable statute.
The last day will automatically be the next working day.
2. From a contractual relationship – The act will still become due despite the fact that the last day falls
on a Sunday or a legal holiday.
Cheng v. Sy, 592 SCRA 155
C. WAIVER OF RIGHTS
NCC, Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to third person with a right recognized by law.
Famanila v. Court of Appeals 500 SCRA 76
NB: It is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes frowned upon and are considered as ineffective
in barring recovery for the full measure of the worker’s right and that acceptance of the benefits
therefrom does not amount to estoppel. The reason is plain. Employer and employee, obviously do
not stand on the same footing.
However, not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may
not later be disowned simply because of change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the
waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the settlement are
unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where
it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he
was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must
be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking, as in this case.
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To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms, leaving no doubt
as to the intention of those giving up a right or a benefit that legally pertains to them.
Herrera v. Borromeo, G.R. No. L-41171, July 23, 1987
NB: With respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court to pass upon the validity of the waiver of
hereditary rights, respondent Borromeo asserts that since the waiver or renunciation of hereditary
rights took place after the court assumed jurisdiction over the properties of the estate it partakes of
the nature of a partition of the properties of the estate needing approval of the court because it was
executed in the course of the proceedings. lie further maintains that the probate court loses
jurisdiction of the estate only after the payment of all the debts of the estate and the remaining estate
is distributed to those entitled to the same.
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the properties included in an
existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who
by fiction of law continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the character of
future property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of the death of the
deceased, by principle established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code, according
to which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse
from the moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary
property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with
article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of the
corresponding hereditary portion." (Osorio v. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531). The
heirs, therefore, could waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the estate
was issued only in 1969.
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be
effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the
knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. (People v. Salvador,
(CA) 53 O.G. No. 22, p. 8116, 8120). The intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown
clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act
should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the
particular right or advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible.
D. CONFLICT OF LAWS
NCC, Article 14 . Penal Laws and laws of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live
or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty
stipulations.
RPC, Art. 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential
application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including
its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction.
Art. 14 recognizes two exceptions:
1. The principles of Public International Law;
2. The presence of Treaty Stipulations.
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Private international law
It is a part of municipal law of a state which directs its courts and administrative agencies when confronted
with a legal problem involving foreign element, whether or not they should apply the foreign law.
Conflict of laws
It is the inconsistency or difference between the laws of different states or countries, arising in the case of
persons who have acquired rights, incurred obligations, injuries or damages, or made contracts, within the
territory of two or more jurisdictions. (Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition)
Rayray vs. Chae Kyung Lee, G.R. No. 18176, October 26, 1966
NB: The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of plaintiff’s marriage to the defendant,
which is within the jurisdiction of our courts of first instance, and, in Manila, of its Court of Juvenile
and Domestic Relations.
The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his submission thereto in consequence of the
filing of the complaint herein. Defendant was placed under the jurisdiction of said court, upon the
service of summons by publication.
This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein, and status affects or binds
the whole word. The res in the present case is the relation between said parties, or their marriage
tie. Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties,
not the place of celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis. Plaintiff here is a citizen
of the Philippines, domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our jurisdiction, on both
counts. True that defendant was and — under plaintiff’s — theory still is a non-resident alien. But,
this fact does not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her marriage
to plaintiff herein.
Indeed, marriage is one of the cases of double status, in that the status therein involves and affects
two persons. One is married, never in abstract or a vacuum, but, always to somebody else. Hence, a
judicial decree on the marriage status of a person necessarily reflects upon the status of another and
the relation between them. The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the
res, in an action for annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or
a national of, the forum. Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the
lower court had jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the
parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into the legality of the marriage between the parties
herein.
NCC, Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
NB: Art. 15, NCC which is a rule of private international law or a Conflicts Rule stresses the principle
of Nationality.
FC, Article 26 par. 2. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien-spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
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ATCI Overseas Corp vs. Echin, G.R. No. 178551, Oct. 11, 2010
NB: According to RA 8042: “The obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by
and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of such
agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of
such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same
extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and
employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not
proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws
in determining the issues presented before us.
Tuna Processing v Phi. Kingford, GR 185582, February 29, 2012
Whether or not a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, but which collects
royalties from entities in the Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign arbitral award?
ARGUMENT: Petitioner TPI contends that it is entitled to seek for the recognition and enforcement
of the subject foreign arbitral award in accordance with RA No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution
Act of 2004), the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards drafted
during the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration in 1958 (New York
Convention), and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law), as
none of these specifically requires that the party seeking for the enforcement should have legal
capacity to sue.
RULING: YES. Petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do business in the Philippines, may seek
recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004. A foreign corporation’s capacity to sue in the
Philippines is not material insofar as the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is
concerned.
NCC, Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Amos v Bellis, 20 SCRA 358
NB: The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes. Under Texas law, there are no
legitimes. Even if the other will was executed in the Philippines, his national law, still, will govern the
properties for succession even if it is stated in his testate that it shall be governed by the Philippine
law.
It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself
which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos
G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no
forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
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amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Tayag v Benguet Consolidated, GR L-23145, Nov. 29, 1968 NCC 17
The company must issue the new certificates because of the following reasons:
1. While factually the old certificates still exist, the same may by judicial fiction be considered as LOST
– in view of the refusal of the New York administrator to surrender them, despite a lawful order of
our courts. To deny the remedy would be derogatory to the dignity of the Philippine judiciary. The
ancillary Philippine administrator is entitled to the possession of said certificated so that he can
perform his duty as such administrator. A contrary finding by any foreign court or entity would be
inimical to the honor of our country. After all, an administrator appointed in one state has no power
over property matters in another state.
2. The company has nothing to fear about contingent liability should the new certificates be issued. Its
obedience to a lawful court order certainly constitutes a valid defense.
Kazuhiro Hasegawa vs. Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177, November 23, 2007
NB: In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of
law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Corresponding to these phases are the following
questions: (1) Where can or should litigation be initiated? (2) Which law will the court apply? and
(3) Where can the resulting judgment be enforced?
Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise
jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. In this case, only
the first phase is at issue—jurisdiction and not choice of law. Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of
the place of the ceremony” or the law of the place where a contract is made.
The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the “law of the place where a contract
is executed or to be per-formed.” It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it
may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or
implicitly.
Under the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” to ascertain what state law to apply to a
dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence
and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was
negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties.
Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules
proper for the second phase, the choice of law. Clearly the RTC has jurisdiction over the action is it one of those
incapable of pecuniary estimation. There was a premature invocation of the choice of law rule since before
determining which law should apply, first there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application
of the conflict of laws rules.
Raytheon v Rouzie, GR 162894, February 26, 2008
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS?
RULING: On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine
court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed
to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum.
This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.
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As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party
plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party
defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State
of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are
precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question
whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.
The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant
case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on
its jurisdiction where it is not the most “convenient” or available forum and the parties are not precluded from
seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient
to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires
a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is
within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only
after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.
NCC, Article 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency
shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code.
Tamano v Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603, June 29, 1998
NB: As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil
Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant case.
Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would
still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both
in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the sharia courts are not vested with original and
exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim
laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under
Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides -
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: x x x (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions x x x x
Zamoranos v People, G.R. No. 193902, June 1, 2011
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
NB: For our edification, we refer once again to Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazalis Commentaries and Jurisprudence on
the Muslim Code of the Philippines:
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law is complied with. If
together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of the
Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage rite whichever comes first is the validating rite
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and the second rite is merely ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this
Muslim Code will apply.
In effect, two situations will arise, in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when
both parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of
the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the male party is a Muslim
and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.
Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of irrevocable talaq,
as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry.
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge
Jainul of the Sharia Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry
Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the
crime of Bigamy.
F. HUMAN RELATIONS
ABUSE OF RIGHT
NCC, Article 19: Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his dues, and observe honesty and good faith.
Elements: L–B–P-A
1. There is Legal right or duty;
2. Such duty is exercised in Bad faith;
3. It is for the sole intent of Prejudicing or injuring another;
4. The Absence of good faith is essential to abuse of right.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW
NCC, Article 20: Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Sanction for abuse of right under Article 20 of the NCC
Generally, laws provide for their own sanctions and methods of enforcement thereof. Article 20 applies only
in cases where the law does not provide for its own sanctions.
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter
for the same (NCC, Art. 20). The said article provides for a general sanction – indemnification for damages
(Pineda, 2009). (1996, 2006, 2009 BAR)
In view of the general sanction provided for under Art. 20, a person however does not have an absolute right
to be indemnified, it is essential that some right of his be impaired. Without such, he is not entitled to
indemnification (Pineda, 2009).
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ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES
NCC, Article 21: Every person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.
CONTRA BANUS MORES
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury
Elements: A-C-I
1. There is an act which is legal;
2. Such act is contrary to law moral, good customs, public order or policy;
3. It is done with intent to injure.
PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
NCC, Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires
or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return
the same to him.
Prohibition against Unjust Enrichment
No one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. (Pacific Merchandising Corp. v. Consolacion
Insurance and Surety Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-30204, October 29, 1976).
NB: The article applies only:
1. Someone acquires or comes into possession of “something” which means delivery or acquisition of “things”;
and
2. Acquisition is undue and at the expense of another, which means without any just or legal ground.
Accion In Rem Verso
It is the remedy for unjust enrichment. It is an action for recovery of what has been paid or delivered without just cause
or legal ground.
Accion in rem verso can only be availed of if there is no other remedy to enforce it based on contract, quasi-contract,
crime or quasi-delict.
Requisites: E-L-W-A
1. The defendant has been Enriched;
2. The plaintiff has suffered a Loss;
3.
Breach of Promise to Marry
Wassmer v. Velez 12 SCRA 648; December 26,1964
NB: "Mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. However, that the extent to which
acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides
that "Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage".
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not
an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation, and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.
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This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the new Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not
be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the new Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner". The argument is devoid
of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton . . .
reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
Baksh v. CA, 219 SCRA 115
NB: The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept
of torts or quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and
his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto
him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was
only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept his and to obtain her consent to
the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry
but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.
Tanjanco v. CA 18 SCRA 994
NB: Plainly there is voluntariness and mutual passion. The facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to
1959, Araceli, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with Apolonio, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Hence, the courts conclude that no case is made under Art. 21 of the Civil Code and no other cause of action
being alleged, no error was committed by the CFI in dismissing the complaint. The decision of CA is reversed
and that of CFI is affirmed.
A mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual
intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire.
Abanag v Mabute, AM P-11-2922, April 4, 2011
NB: The Court defined immoral conduct as conduct that is willful, flagrant or shameless, and that shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. To justify
suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
Based on the allegations of the complaint, the respondents comment, and the findings of the Investigating
Judge, we find that the acts complained of cannot be considered as disgraceful or grossly immoral conduct.
We find it evident that the sexual relations between the complainant and the respondent were consensual.
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Civil Law Review | 2018
The Court defined immoral conduct as conduct that is willful, flagrant or shameless, and that shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. To justify suspension or
disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is
one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.
While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to a certain extent, private conduct, it is not
within our authority to decide on matters touching on employees’ personal lives, especially those that will affect
their and their family’s future. We cannot intrude into the question of whether they should or should not marry.
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