chapter Three

Geopolitical Models & 111eir Theoretical As·pects

If politics is the art, of government then the 'Geo' prefix implies the application

of geographical Knowledge to this end. Geographically speaking and in

international relation, geopolitics consistently assigns priority to the 'objective

factor' of space and human masses over the 'subjective factor' of cultural and

technical development. The main service a geographer can provide in foreign

affairs is to emphasize the defence which geography offers against the ambitions

of rivals and to instil as much objective geographical reality into the dealings

between nation as possible.

Geopolitics is conce'rned with the recent past, the present, and the near

or distant future. On the basis of the analysis of the recent past and the actual

present, and some times even of assessment of mans historical experience the

geopolitician can evaluate future geopolitical trends and indicate what policy or

policies a particular nation or region, or the world, as a whole should pursue for

its safety and welfare. There is, therefore, scope for writing the particular region

or country, or of the globe as a whole, through this methodology. It discovers

the geopolitical basis for the growth of a worldwide empire. IT further pinpoints

geopolitical reasons for the success or failure of States or empires. As geopolitics

deals with basic aspects of the growth of civilisation, it<; anal?~>i5 in :he form of

a complete methodology has a fourfold objective: ( 1) ~.:· ·=-·J ..)lve a SO:..!l"AG

81
theoretical basis on which geopolitics could be developed as a systematic

discipline; (2) to examine the nature of the development of contemporary

regional and global geopolitics, including seabed and outer space; (3) to

reconstruct the history of geopolitics of any particular country or region or of the

globe; and (4) to analyse the national power of important countries.

Origins of Geopolitics

Friedrich Ratzel, is usually recognised as the founder and father of

modern political geography because of his ideas on state formation and features,

is also often credited with the earliest thinking about geopolitics. His thesis on

the theory of the organic growth of the state, included in his 'Politische

geographie' 1 (1896) was based in part on evolutionary biological and

environmental determinism of the late nineteenth century. While Ratzel

postulated seven 'laws' of state growth, he did not coin the term 'geopolitics'

or 'Geopolitik'; that credit is given to Rudolph Kjellen 2 (1864-1922), a Swedish

political scientist. His ideas on territorial expansion (Lebensraum or living space

according to Ratzel) as a legitimate goal for a state influenced the writings of

a number of German and other European geographers, historians, and political

scientists. Kjellen (1916) argues that: 'vitally strong states with a limited area of

F. Ratzel, 'Politische Geographie', Munich: Oldenbourg, 1897.

2
R. KJellen, 'Der Staat als Lebenform ', Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1917.
sovereignty are dominated by the categorical imperative to enlarge their area by

colonisation, union with other states, or conquests of different types. It is not the

raw material of conquest, but the natural and necessary trend towards expansion

as a means of self preservation. 3

It was out of such thinking that geopolitics became associated with a

state's territorial expansion. The state according to Kjellen, was behaving like

a biological organism, the same theory advocated by Ratzel. Large states would

survive, be powerful, and influence continental and global politics. Only a few

of these were likely to persist.

Definitions of Geopolitics

Hartshome,4 stated in his detailed examination of 'Political Geography'

that at the tum of the century it was difficult analytically to separate political

geography from geopolitics. But for Hartshorne geopolitics had a specific

meaning: 'the application of the Knowledge and techniques of political

geography to the problems of international relations'. 5

3
R. Jeller, 'Staten Som Liysform. Stockholm: Hugo Gebers forlag, 1916.

R. Hartshorne, 'Political Geography', in P.E. James and C.F. Jones (eds),

American Geography: Inventory and Prospect, Syracuse University Press,
Syracuse, New York, (1954), p. 171-2.
5
R. Hartshorne, 'Recent Developments in Poiitical [Link] IJ',
American Political Science Review, 29. 1935(b), p. 96L

83
 Similarly Sprout in his discussion of 'political geography recognises the

association geopolitics had with political geography. Much of the confusion

came from the adjective 'geopolitical' He states: 'This word entered the English

language as a loose translation of 'geopolitik', which came, in the interwar

period (1919-1939), to denote mobilisation of a real knowledge for purposes of

state-in Short, Geo-Policy.6

Ratzel did not coin the term nor is he given credit for introducing it into

political geography. That credit is given to Kjellen who used Ratzels ideas area

theories of the state as a living organism to develop the 'Science of geopolitics.'

Kjellen defined geopolitics as:

'The theory of the state as a geographic organism or phenomenon in

space, i.e., land territory, and, or most especially, as country' (Kjellen, 1914). 7

States according to Kjellen, were regarded more an competing powers

than legal units. With this view it is easy to see that the inevitable result would

be a few large and powerful units devouring the smaller weaker ones. Kasperson

and Minighi (1969, p.8) wrote, about Kjellen and his ideas:

Sprout, 'International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences', 1968: 120.

7
R. Kjellen, 'Samtiliens Stormakter', Stockholm: H. Gebcrs Forl2g.

84
 'He (Kjellen) viewed this process as a perpetual interchange
among 'country, people, and government'. This process of human
occupation of a region gave it, in casual sequence, continuity,
solidarity, ~nteraction, loyalty, and nationality; that the creation of
a nation with what Kjellen called a 'geopolitical instinct'
(Kasperson and Minghi, 1969:8).8

Halford [Link],9 who, had a major influence in the thinking about

world politics early this century. He was concerned with the changes among

warring Eurasian powers and the expansive colonial systems. Mackinder also did

not use the term 'geopolitics', but in his writings, he discussed the emerging

strategic importance of pivotal area in Eurasia, later called the heartland. His

ideas about position, power, dominance, and influences in the rapidly changing

military and political world of the early twentieth century inf)uenced Haushofer

personally and German school of geopolitics.

According to Busteed (1983, pp. 36-7) 10 the German School of

Geopolitics espoused certain views. These included (1) the primacy of the state

over the individual; (2) the state as an organism (following Ratzel and Kjellen);

(3) the adoption of Kjellen's use of the term Geopolitik; and ( 4) the endorsement

8
R.E. Kasperson and J.V. Minghi, (eds), 'The Structure of Political
Geography, Aldine, Chicago, (1969), p.8.
Q
H.J. Mackinder, 'The Geographical Pivot of History', 1904.
10
M.A. Busteed, 'The Developing Nature of Political Geography', in his
Developments in Political Geography, Academic Press, New York :md
London, (1983), pp.36-7.

85
of Kjellen's notion of national self-sufficiency (autarky). Considering that the

School of Zeitschrift emerged in importance in defeated World War I Germany,

it was little wonder that geopolitical ideas and thought came to influence policy.

Haushofer saw in the writings of Ratzel, Kjellen, and Mackinder the basis

for a theory to explain state growth. To make geopolitics a science, he had to

search for 'laws' that would explain and justify the organic growth of a state. He

and his disciplines even developed a vocabulary to fit their science. An organism

(viz., the state) needed living space (Lebensraum to retain power grossmachte),

to define military boundaries (Wehrgrenze), to define an ethnically homogenous

population (Kultur) and to become economically, self sufficient (Autarky). One

of Haushofer's students Otto maul (1936:31) provides a concise definition of

German Geopolitik.

'Geopolitik', concerns itself with the state, not as a

static concept, but as a living being. Geopolitik
investigates the state primarily, in relation to its
environment - its space and attempts to solve all
problems resulting from spatial relationships ...
Geopolitik is concerned with the space requirements
of a state while political geography examines only
its space conditions. In putting geography at the
service of space - Conscious politics, Geopolitik
devoted itself to questions of the future. Are the
space needs of a state met? If not, how can they be
brought into accord with geographical conditions?
In what direction should any change be made?. The
extent to which these questions are answered
determines a state's national and econo:nic structure

86
 and influences its foreign relations .... Geopolitik .. is
a discipline that weighs and evaluates a given
situation and by its conclusions seeks to guide
practical politics. (Otto Maull, 1936:31) 11

Haushofer, according to Hartshorne (1954, p.172). was instrumental in

'supplying a pseudo-scientific rationalisation for the Nazi policy of expansion'

commenting on German geopolitics write:

The analysis of the geographical basis of national

and international power became a pseudo-science;
the early theories were shrewdly manipulated to
further German nationalism, and to rationalise
German territorial expansion. 12

Haushofer's thinking and indeed that of the German School of

Geopolitics is reported in Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik (Weigert, 1942, p.14):

[Geopolitics] should suggest the future course of

political action, and, like the still, small voice of
conscience, keep reminding politicians of what they
should do in the best interests of their country. Yet
geopolitics was something more than strategy
because it helped to formulate the objective of
policy as well as being the means by which that
objective might ultimately be reached. 13

11
0. Maull, 'Das Wesen der Geopolitik'. Leipzig: Teubner, 1936, p.31.
12
R. Hartshorne, 'Political Geography' in P.E. James and C.F. Jones (eds).
American Geography: Inventory and Prospect, Syracuse University Press,
Syracuses New York (1954), p. 172.
13
H.W. Weigert, 'Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics'
London: Oxford University Press, 1942, p.14.

87
 Glassner and de Blij (1980, pp. 268-70) in discussing the origin of

Geopolitik succinctly summarise Haushofer's views:

Haushofer and his group blended together the

organic state theory of Ratzel, its refinements and
elaborations by Kjellen, and the geostrategic
principles of Mahan and Mackinder, added a heavy
dose of German chauvinism, willul ambiguity, and
mysticism, and created a case for a German policy
of expansionism. They used not only maps but
slogans and pictographs to influence people. 14

Definitions during the 1940s by non German political geographers

reflected the emotional and propogranda connotations associated with

geopolitics. Others, such as Fifield and Pearcy 15 (1944) and East and Moodie 16

(1956), related geopolitics directly to foreign policy. Later theoreticians,

including Hartshorne (1954) in their assessments of political geography and

military geography were mindful of how geopolitics was related to power and

strategic studies. Hartshorne writes that: 'It would seem well to identify this area

(national power) of joint interests with a clear and simple name, such as 'power

analysis', rather than to obscure it with the all - embracing term, geopolitics, the

14 -
Glassner and de Blij. Harm, 'Systematic Political Geography', John
Wiley, New York, 1980, p. 268.
15
R. H. Fifield and G.E. Pearcy, 'Geopolitics in Principle and Practice,
Boston, Massachusetts, 1944.
16
W.G. East and A.E Maddie, 'The Changing World, World P.·::'J!~s,
Yonkers-on-Hudson, New Yor, (1956).

88
 17
origin of which is stepped in error, exaggeration, and intellectual position.

(Hartshorne, 1954: 126).

More recently, Sprout suggests that geopolitics is:

The areal aspect of any political pattern and, in

particular, hypothesis that purport to explain or to
predict area distributions and patterns of political
potential in the society of nations 18 (Sprout, 1948:
121).

Today, much of what might be included under the rubric of geopolitics,

deals with economic and military ties state security power influences, and

military defence strategies.

Cohen 19 (1973, p.29) adds a dynamic dimension in his observation that,

"The essence of geopolitical analysis is the relation of a international political

power to the geographical setting. Geopolitical views vary with the chaning

setting and with man's interpretation of the nature of this change. Cohen, is a

major user of the term geopolitics in interpreting contemporary international

relations. He defines the components of a geopolitical study as:

17
op cite., p. 126.
18
H. Sprout, and [Link], 'Environmental Factors in the Study of
International Politics', In J.N. Roseanau (ed.), International Politics and
Foreign Policy, pp. 41-56. New York: Free Press, (1968), p. 121.
19
S. B. Cohen, 'Geography and Politics in a world Divided', Oxford
University Press, New York, (1973), p.29.

R9
(1) description of geographical settings as they relate to political power, and

(2) laying out of spatial frameworks that embrace interacting power units. It

is much more difficult to attempt such analysis today than in the past.

Because of the hierarchical spatial overlap that exists among great power

blocs and the process of constant political realignment, sharply defined

global, political divisions cannot be easily rationalized. Moreover, the

exercise of political, power may be the measure of a mans daring or a

peoples desperation, rather than the result of the cultural and physical

setting. Cohen (1982, 1983) uses geopolitical consideration in assessing

the contemporary political scene and in identifying 27 states that he

believes have, or aspire to, regional power status.

Glassner and de Blij, discuss in some detail 'Geopolitics on a smaller

scale' by focusing on the decay of the buffer zone in southern Africa since 1960

and the geostrategic importance of the Indian ocean. Glassner and de Blij, write

that geopolitics: is concerned basically with the application of geographic

information and geographic perspectives to the development of a states foreign

policies. It has been called, with some justification, 'applied political geography'.

(Glassner and De Blij, J 980: 263) 20 •

20
[Link]., p.263.
 Moreover, geopolitics has a double function. Like political geography, it

represents facts as they are, but unlike political and other departments of

geography, it analyses and interprets the national situation of a country and the

global scene on the basis of facts presented and formulates the internal and

external policies of that country. Postwar, geopolitical writers all focus their

inquiry on the relationship between geography and foreign policy in a changing

international environment. All seek to play down the negative connotations

, associated with the term during the war years.

Three other individuals who are credited with promoting geopolitical

applications are Admiral Thomas Mahan (180-1914), Nicholas Spykman (1893-

1974). Mahan, an historian in the US Navy, was writing before Mackinder about

the importance of seapower in a state's military strategies and international

relations. Among his books are the Influence ofSeapower Upon History, 16601-

783 (1890). The Influence of Seapower upon the French Revolution and Empire,

1973-1812 (1892), and The Problem of Asia and its Effect upon International

Politics (1900). Mahan wa an advocate of a large and strong navy to contain the

expansionist policies of Russia in particular. his ideas exerted substantial

influence on US, British, Japanese and German foreign policies at the tum of

this century.

91
 Spykman, a political scientist, writing after Mackinder's ideas had been

publicised, revised, and criticised, is credited with stressing the geopolitical

importance ofMackinder's Inner or Marginal Crescent on the Rimland. Spykman

believed that powerful states are those that forged alliances between land and sea

powers, i.e, those in the Rimland. Their survival and power were derived from

their strategic Rimland location, hence his dictum:

Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia;

Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world
(Spykman, 1944).

Spykman's major books were America's Strategy in World Politics

(1942a) and the Geography of the Peace (1944). A timely review of the former

book is by Bowman (1942), spykman, according to Hartshorne (1954) used

geopolitics to show the Rimland's importance to the US vis-a-vis the rest of the

world.

De Seversky contended that air power represented a new and challenging

dimension for a state's defence and security. He was influential in alerting the

government and public to the importance of developing air warfare. His books

included Victory Through Air Power (1941) and Air Power: Key to Survival

(1950); he also wrote in popular magazines during World War II. In addition

to stressing the need for the US to develop air power superiority, he also

introduced an azimuthal equidistant projection centred on the North Pole. It

92
showed a pilot's view of the world. Glassner and de Blij (1980, p.272) remark

that his 1949 map.

Performed a most useful function by tearing us

away from zero Mercator-view of the world, by
developing an interim defence system, and by
emphasizing defence instead of expansion as the
prime goal of geostrategy. 21

The ideas of de Seversky, while considered a revolutionary at the time,

were responsible for traditional and emerging European, Asian, and North

American powers rethinking their political relation vis-a-vis other states and their

own military strengths, treaty agreementS, and defence system.

In summary, geopolitics represents one of the major .thrusts of political

geography investigation during the past Ct?ntury whether or not the term has been

specifically identified.

Continuing Controversies

Intellectual controversies have persisted among geopoliticians. One group

of controversies is embedded in geopolitics itself, scholars working within the

geopolitical tradition challenge other scholars working for the same theoretical

framework.

21
[Link]., p.272.

93
 Historically, scholars working within the geopolitical framework have

debated the extent to which geopolitical factors can or cannot be ·altered or

modified. As sprout and sprout explain:

'The political value and significance of location, distance, space,

distribution and configuration - the prime geographic dimensions formerly -

remain fairly static for long periods'. (Sprout and Sprout, 1971: 264) 22 •

However, with changes in the system (technological), these relationships

have become unstable and dynamic.. Infact, the definitions of geopolitics

presented earlier attest to the prevalence of the view, that geopolitical factors are

changeable. As cohen suggests:- 'Geopolitical views vary with the changing

geographical setting and with mains interpretation of the nature of this

change'. 23

A second controversy within the field of geopolitics involves the

specification of the relationship between geopolitics and political

22
H. Sprout, and M. Sprout, 'Environmental Factors in the Study of
International Politics'. In J.N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and
Foreign Policy, New York: Free Press, (1971), pp.264,
23
S. B. Cohen, 'Geography and Politics in a World Divided', Oxford
University Press, New Yok, 1973, p.29.

94
behaviour. Three contrasting views specify this relationship. The first view is that

geopolitics 'determines' political behaviour. German geopolitik of the interwar

and war period comes closest to this position. By suggesting that sufficient land

area and natural resources were needed to support the population of a nation,

they implied that these geopolitical factors determined the policy of

'Lebensraum' or living space supported by Ratzel, Kjellen and Haushofer. 1l1e

above determinism became the rationale for Nazi expansion and aggression.

Geopolitical Models

In the initial stage of the growth of civilization, geopolitical thought

constructions or models developed in an unsystematic and isolated way in

different political areas of the globe. ~Indeed, it was indistinguishable from

geographical ideas, foreign policies and general political notions of different

states and political areas. In tracing the evolution of geopolitical models, we not

only analyse the writings of different geopoliticians, but also discuss the possible

geopolitical significance of that model in relation to geography, foreign policy,

and general political notions which contains geopolitical values and substance

in them.

Geopolitical models are designed to draw attention to the importance of

certain geographical patterns in political history. These models are theories of

95
spatial relationships and historical causation. 'Geopolitics' is one of the grand

models of political geography. Geographical factors or variables are an important

part of the power equation. Geopolitical theory, is of particular relevance to

states strategic policy for a number of reasons.

The two main components of ancient geopolitical thought were the ideas

of geographic homogeneity and land as the main basis of geographic space. In

the early nineteenth century such geographic concepts as 'manifest destiny' were

coined to explain expansion of continental limits. This suggested existence of a

dynamic relationship between a natural boundary and the continuous expansion

of the geographical size of the state. Explanations have been deduced from these

models which suggest the contemporary and future political relevance of various

geographical conceptualisations. The unique nature of geopolitical models and

its attempt to show the interaction between spatial relationships and historical

causation has been eloquently described by sir Halford Mackinder. 'In applying

geography to the lighting up of history, the physical features may, as a first

approximation be treated as constant rock-like, around them the human flood

surges and rests, ebbs and flows now calmly contained in its basin, now

sweeping over, bursting through or wearing away the obstacles' .24

------·----------------
24
H. J. Mackwider, 'The Physical Basis of Political Grc·graphy' Scottish
Geographical Magazine, vol. vi, 1890, p.78.

96
 Geopolitical models were an attempt to show how geographical patterns

of history formulated by geopolitical theorists were the result of historical

movements which were centuries old. Therefore let us see how geopolitical

thought has gradually developed out of ses., land, and at a much later stage (i.e

since the second world war), air geographies. Only a proper understanding of the

evolution of geopolitical models, would enable us to determine the task of

assessing the geopolitical situation of a country or an area in particular, and of

the globe in general, in any given period of history, especially in the

contemporary era.

The Geopolitical models can be organised into three selected categories;

sea power advocates, Land power advocates and Airpower advocates. This can

be supplemented with additional items of German 'geopolitik', maps as tools of

propaganda and contemporary geopolitical models.

Sea Power Models

A. T. Mahan Sea Power Model

Mahan a graduate of United States Naval Academy and retired with a

rank of Rear Admiral. It has been rightly observed that no individual has so

directly and profoundly influenced the theory of sea power and naval strategy

as Mahan.

97
 Mahan's ideas about global strategy cannot be found in any single book

or article. These have to be pieced together from the numerous statements

scattered throughout his large number of writings. His major contribution

consists of the greatrilogy of the following books: The influence of sea power

upon History, 1660-1783 (1890), The influence of sea power upon the French

revolution and Empire, 1793-1832 (1892); and The life of Nelson (1897).

However, all his writings are linked through a common cord. This link was

derived from his firm conviction that the essential condition for world power

status for any state was an effective control of the seas. He was convinced, that

in the struggle for supremacy among the leading states of the world, the oceanic

power would have the upper hand. Mahan attempted to give rationalist

perspective. He emphasized on the investigation of historical event<> which may

then have been woven into geographical ur political patterns. Mahan examined

the relationship between the political control of the sea,through the action of a

Navy, and the effect that the possession of a powerful Navy had on the foreign

policy of the most powerful states throughout the course of history. From these

two factors certain explanations were formulated which predicted the role that

naval power could play in the foreign policy of the united states.

The four spatio-political aspects on the role of sea power in the world

were basic to the thinking of Mahan:

98
a) there is a continuous and unbroken system of oceans and seas on the

earth's surface leading to a united system of oceanic communication.

b) there is a vast transcontinental and almost completely landlocked state the

Russian Empire - extending without a break from the ice bound Arctic

in the north to the rugged desert mountain belt of inner Asia in the south,

and from Eastern Europe to the extreme eastern margin of the Asian

mainland.

c) Around the transcontinental Russian Empire are the maritime states ·of

Europe and the countries of south and East Asia bordering on the Indian

and the Pacific oceans.

d) There are three insular states disconnected from the Eurasian mainland-

Great Britain, Japan and united states.

To Mahan, the sea was a 'great highway'; 'a wide common', over which

men may pass in all direction, but on which some well known paths show that

controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lives o{ travel rather than

others'. In a trade dominated modem world, therefore, suitable oceanic location

offered a distinct politico - economic advantage, and a land locked location was

in that regard a relative disadvantage. Mahan wrote that, the, 'ships that -- sail

to and or must hav~ secure ports to which to return, and must, as far as possibk,

be followed by the protection of their country throughout the voyage .... In these

99
three thing - production, with the necessity of exchanging products, shipping,

whereby the exchange is carried on and colonies, which facilitate and enlarge the

operations of shipping and tend to protect it by multiplying points of safety is

to be found the key to much of the history as well as of policy of nations

bordering the sea.'

Mahan held that control of the sea was a prerequisite of world power. He

listed the following as the six fundamental factors affecting the development of

sea power; geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, size

of population, national character, and govermental character. Control of the sea

could be achieved only by controlling those land bases which had the advantage

of strategic location, coastal shape, and a hinterland endowed with a depth

suitable for defence.

Mahan also believed that no state can be a land power and a seapower

of consequence at the sametime, as the problem of defending a land boundary

against a strong continental rival would preclude successful competition for

supremacy on the sea. Throughout their history, for example, the continent2l

European states have had to stand guard on their borders to prevent possible

intrusion or encroachment by their neighbours. They have thus been preoccupied

i<ngely in military preparations to keep their land forces in battle readiness. f)nly

100
France possessed a geographical setting that could be used as a base for sea

power.

To Mahan the Russian empire typified the strength and the weakness of

land power. Obstacles imposed by physical geography placed a strong check

upon the freedom of movement of the Russian state. Enormous distances and

inadequate internal communications severely limited its internal coherence. At

the sametime because of its landlocked position, Russia was greatly

disadvantaged in that it could be completely shut off by a hostile sea power.

Because of these difficulties inherent in her geography, Mahan thought that the

Russian Empire, if it could not be broken, could atleast be 'contained'.

Mahan, however, ruled out the possibility of a land sea power in Eurasia

seizing control of the ocean. He argued that only great Britain, with its excellent

insular base at home and easily defended bases abroad, could make a bid for

naval supremacy in the world. Mahan also felt that the Northern Hemisphere was

the key to world power, with the Panama and suez marking the southern limit

of active commerce and Politics. Within Eurasia, he described Russia's position

as unassailable as the dominant Asian land power. He called the zone between

thirty and forty degree parallels in Asia as the zone of conflict between Russian

land-power and British sea-power.

101
 According to Mahan, the Russian drive for world dominance could be

checked by the Anglo - American alliance from key land bases surrounding

Eurasia because of the inherent advantages of sea movement over land

movement. Infact, he forecast an alliance between the United States, the United

Kingdom, Germany, and Japan for the common purpose of containing Russia

and China.

In the opinion of Harold and Margaret sprout, Mahan, in his geopolitical·

analysis of the contemporary world, clearly anticipated Mackinder's concept of

the Eurasian 'Heartland'. 'His strategy vis-a-vis the Russian Empire closely

reassembled in geopolitical conception the strategy for containing the soviet

union (that was) actually pursued by the United States during the later 1940s and

1950s, nearly half a century after Mahan's death in 1914'. 25 (Sprout and

Sprout, 1964, p. 325).

However, like all other strategic speculations, Mahan's aiso were written

in the perspective of its time: a time when the Navy of queen victoria (1837-

1901) reigned supreme. Now that the technology of transportation and warfare

have so revolutionizingly changed, and air power has in a good measure replaced

25
[Link], and Sprout, 'Foundations of Intematior;al PGlitics'. New Delhi,
Afiliated East - West Press (1964), p. 325.

102
seapower much of what Mahan wrote has become obsolete. But this in no way

lessens the value of his writings which were full of great insight and had helped

a great deal to mould the strategic thinking of his countrymen. And Mahan

became again relevant with the arrival of a new oceanic age heralded by the

nuclear powered sub-surface ship.

In one way or the other his writings affected the character of naval

thought in France, Italy, Russia, Japan and lesser powers... 'By direct influence

and through the political power of his friends, Theodore Rossevelt and Henry

cabot lodge, he played a leading role in persuading the United States to pursue

a larger destiny overseas during the opening years of the twentieth century'

(Sprout, 1943: 415). 26

G. H. Lea's Model of Sea Power

The geopolitical theories of General Homer Lea 27 , while not reaching

the political prominence of Mahan, initially had a number of important

26
T. M. Sprout, 'Mahan : Evangelist of Sea Power', Chapter 17 in E, M.
Earles' (Ed) Makers of Modem Strategy, Princeton, Princeton University
Press, (1943), p.415.
27
H. Lea., 'The Volaor of Ignorance, New York: Harper Bross', 1909,
Attempts to Illustrate where a Japanese Attack Would Occur in both the
Phillipines and Hawai, and Eventually the East Coast of the United
States.

103
similarities between the latter. First lea, like Mahan, was sustained by a

Darwanian mode of thought when making an analysis of the state system.

Secondly emulating Mahan, and in a vein similar to the classic geopolitical

theorists,- Lea gave expression to a rationalist as opposed to an empiricist

perspective. He also intended his theory to act as a practical guide for political

action for statesmen and policy makers.

Thirdly, while Mahan had formulated principles of naval power based on

geographical position, Lea formulated a number of a priori natural laws from

which certain political aims and objectives could be deduced. These natural

laws formed the central concepts of Lea's theory.

1) First law maintained that the security of an insular power is not measured

by warships but by an ability to c~ntrol the coasts encompassing the sea

in which it is situated.

2) The second law asserted that sea power in an insular empire is not

measured by the number of its ships of war, but by the capacity to

prevent the maritime superiority of any state placed on the external

shores of the sea in which it is located.

3) The third law maintained that a continental state which has access to a

sea in which a sea power is situated will eventually become a more

powerful maritime power than the insular sea-power.

104
 The main weakness of Lea's geopolitical model was similar to that of

German Geopolitics States were interpreted as living organisms. He also paid

little attention to how changes in the levels of transport and weapons technology

would affect the validity of his three natural laws.

Although, within a rationalist perspective Lea used a different method of

analysis to Mahan, the conclusions which he came to were similar - that a

strategic advantage accrued to Russia primarily as a result of her location on the

Eurasian continent. A central geographical location resulted in shorter lives of

communication and transport which was advantageous for defence and offence.

Lea's natural laws can be described as an attempt to explain the

relationship between seapower, land power and geographical configuration.

Land Power Models

Mackinder's Heartland Concept

Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) has perhaps been the best known

geographer in the nongeographic circles, and his has definetly been the best

known global strategic scheme in modem times. Many believe that, 'It would be

difficult to find an essay of comparable length and reputation that is more

105
indefensible m terminology and ideas than Mackinder's' (Malin: 1959,

339) 28

A Scot by birth, Mackinder was a professor of geography at the

university of London, Director of the london school of Economics, and a

member of the British Parliament. Mackinder in a more organized and pointed

way than mahan, provided a fresh political perspective on the geographical

distribution of land masses and bodies of water on the earth. He interpreted

history as essentially a struggle between Land and sea power. The geopolitical

concepts and hypotheses of Mahan and Mackinder are by no means as far apart

as has often been asserted. Their theories of sea and land power have often been

contrasted. But it was Mackinder rather than Mahan who methodologically

ordered the concepts and hypotheses, propounded aninterpretation of history in

the grand style, and drew a geopolitical blue print of the future which for better

or for worse still grips the imagination of men in many lands.

Fundamentals of the Heartland Thesis

In 1904 Mackinder presented before the Royal Geographical society of

London his seminal paper entitled "The geographical pivot of History". It is in

J. C. Malin, "The Contriving Brain as the Pivot of History', Issues and

Conflicts, Lawrence (Kaus). University of Kausas Press, 1959, pp. 339-
363.

106
this paper that the basic ideas of his 'Heartland' thesis were for the first time

presented in an organized manner. In the post - columbian era international

politics had become a closed system of worldwide scope. Mackinder presented

his paper with 'a view to delineating his formula of 'geographical causation' in

the history of the world which in his estimate had, throughout human history,

been "most coercive of human action' 29 (Sprout and Sprout, 1964, p. 320).

From his study of the physical map of the world Mackinder concluded

that on the global scale the earth surface consisted of a huge continuous

landmass consisting of Europe. Asia, and Africa, and some isolated Islands, e.g.,

North and South America, Australia, Britain, and Japan. He named the huge

united land mass of Europe, Asia and Afdca as the 'world Island': But in 1919

presentation he included the whole of Africa in his world Island.

He envisioned the landmasses of the world arranged in three tiers. (see

fig) In the first tier, there is a huge area of interior and Arctic drainage in inner

Eurasia surrounded by mountains on three sides and by the ice-bound Arctic on

the fourth. This was his co-called 'Pivot area' that he later named as the

'Heartland'. The distinguishing feature of Mackinder's Heartland area was that

29
H. S. Sprout and M. Sprout, 'Foundation of Intemation<d Politics,' New
Delhi, Affiliated East West Press, 1964, p.320.

107
since it is surrounded by mountain barriers on three sides and an ice-bound sea

on the fourth, it is not accessible to seapowers and is, therefore, strategically ..

secure like a fortress.

The 'pivot' or the 'Heartland' was pictured by Mackinder as surrounded

by an 'inner' or 'marginal' crescent consisting of an arch of coastland and

characterized by drainage into navigable seas. This inner or marginal crescent

consisted of the whole of Eurasia outside the Heart}[Link] included Europe west

of the Ural mountains, southwest Asia out side the Iranian upland, India, South -

East - A<>ia, and most of China.

Outside the lands of the inner or marginal crescent lay his third tier which

he named as the outer or Insular crescent. Besides the continents of North and

South America, Australia, and Africa south of the Sahara, the Island regions of

the great Britain and Japan were also designated as 'outer' because of their

complete insularity from the mainland of Eurasia.

From his study of Eurasian history as well as the contemporary political

map of the world Mackinder was convinced of the great strategic importance

possessed by the inner Eurasian region in the affairs of the old world. He

interpreted the history of European civilization was a continuing struggle against

recurrent invasions from inner Asia.

108
 Mackinder noted that mobility upon the ocean was the natural rival of the

horse and camel mobility in the heart of the continent. Mackinder was, however,

convinced that, 'trans continental railways are now transmuting the conditions

of land power, and nowhere can they have such effect as in the closed heartland

of Euro Asia, and steppe' (Mackinder, 1904).

Mackinder envisaged two possible ways in which the empire of the world

would be insight. First, if Germany were to ally with Russia, and secondly, if the

chinese, organized by the Japanese were to overthrow the Russian empire and

conquer its territory.

Mackinder was clear in his mind that a seapower could, in the longrun,

be no stronger than the land base that sustained it (i.e., its homebase).

Modification of Heartland Concept

In 1919 Mackinder published a some what laboured and extended version

of his 1904 paper as a book entitled, 'The Democratic Ideals and Reality'. In

this book he renamed the 'pivot region' as the Heartland. He wrote this book

especially with a view to warn and instruct the statesmen of the AJiied countries

who were engaged at that time indiscussing the terms of peace with a defeated

.Germany at the end of the first world war. Events of the war, made it clear to

109
Mackinder that the sea power was capable of controlling a much less extensive

area of the world Island that he had originally thought. He was convinced that

from the view point of strategical thinking the Heartland was much larger than

the one originally defined by him in terms of physic~! geography. He now

defined the heartland as; the region to which, under modem conditions, sea-

power can be refused access, though the western part of it lies without the region

of Arctic and continental drainage. His modified strategic heartland included the

Baltic sea, the navigable middle and lower Danube, the Black sea, Asia Minor,

Armenia Persia, Tibet and Mongolia. (fig) He wished some 'airy cherub' could

keep whispering in the ears of Allied states men at the Peace conference his

strategic formula:

Who Rules East Europe Commands The Heartland

Who Rules The Heartland Commands The World Island
Who Rules World Island Commands The World. "30

The strategic argument is simple. The Heartland is the strongest fortress

on the earth, commanding resources of a huge transcontinental area. Any power

that could organize it effectively was in Mackinder's view, bound to emerge as

a great colossus in world politics, head and shoulders above any other' state.

30
H. Mackinder, 'Democratic Ideals and Reality', London, 1919, p.113).

110
Mackinder's Latest Model

Mackinder's chief virtue was his flexibility of thought. During the second

world war he modified his geopolitical theory considerably. In 1943, he wrote

an article entitled. 'The Round world and the winning of the Peace', to pinpoint

the modifications made by him. He detached Lenaland (the Central Siberian

table land) as from the heartland. He redfined the Heartland. The area consisting

largely of the cleared forest and steppe portions of Eurasia. 'He stated' .. it is

sufficiently accurate to say that the territory of the USSR is equivalent to the

heartland, except in one direction". And that exception, as has already been

pointed out, is lenaland and or Siberia east of the Yenisei.

Besides, Mackinder changed his concept of the map of the world as a

whole. He said that the North Atlantic unit (the Middle ocean) is as significant

as the heartland as the transpolar counterpart of the latter. he also made

Monsoonal Asia and the south Atlantic basin important units in the global

sphere. He also created a fifth unit (which he described as a 'Mantle of the

vacancies') as the barrier zone between the heartland and the Middle ocean on

the one hand, and the other units on the other. Thus, his original concept of the

pivot area of the world changed from that of an area of movement (i.e. as a

region of mobility for land forces) to one of a 'power cit<Jdel ', based upon

people, resources, and interior lines. His changing views indic:-,ted that he w;:iS'

111
well aware of the importance of geographic location in relation to technological

developments, including air power.

It is also clear that Mackinder's geopolitical model believed now more

on national power. After an analytical study of soviet national power, he

concluded:

All things considered, the conclusion is unavoidable that if the

Soviet Union emerges from this war as the conqueror of Germany,
she must rank as the greatest land power on the globe. Moreover,
she will be the power in the strategically strongest defensive
position. The Heartland is the greatest natural fortress on the
earth. For the first time in history it is manned by a garrison
sufficient both in number and quality" (Mackinder, 1944; 501 ) 31 •

From his observations on the Soviet Union and his refashioning of world

political geography by giving some areas important positions as noted above,

certain points emerge. First, the idea of the pivot area must yield place to that

of the area of power citadel. Secondly, the heartland, though reduced in

importance, was still a factor to reckon with. It could be identified with soviet

national power and regarded as potentially the strongest land power on the earth.

Lastly, science and technology played an increasingly important role in rapidly

changing the geopolitical situation of the globe. Mackinder's geopolitical view

thus changed with the changing global geopolitics.

31
H. J. Mackinder, 'The Round World and Winning of Peace', 1944, p.
501.

112
Spykman and the Rim/and Model

Professor Nicholas J. Spykman (1893-1943) of the university of yale,

gave a very different interpretation of the relative importance of the heartland

and the surrounding tier, the inner or marginal crescent 'partly continental and

partly oceanic', which Spykman named as the 'Rimland' (fig).

Drawing attention to maritime mobility as the basis of a new type of

geopolitical structure, the overseas -empire in contrast to the former pattern of

great land powers based on the control of contiguous land masses-spykman

emphasized that 'It is seapower which has made it possible to conceive of the

Eurasian continent as a unit and it is sea power which governs the relationships

between the old and the New worlds' (Spykman, 1944). 32 To him sea power

appeared as the Keyfactor in global strategy.

Spykman criticized, Mackinder's blanket application of the theory of

history as a continuing struggle between land power and sea power. He wrote:

'there has never really been a simple land power sea power opposition. The

historical alignment has always been in terms of some members of the rimland

with Great Britain against some members of the rimland against Russia, or Great

32
N. J. Spykman, 'The Geography of the Peace', New York, Harcourt,
Brace & Co., 1944

113
Britain and Russia together against a dominating rim land power'. Mackinders

dictum about global strategy, therefore appeared false to him. He said that if at

all there need be a slogan for power politics of the world, it must be:

Who Controls The Rimland Rules Eurasia;

Who Rules Eurasia Controls The Destinies of The World
(Spykman, 1944).

Spykman thought that it is a combination of land and seapower

controlling the rimland that would in all probability control "the essential power

relations of the world", inevitably because this combination would emerge as the

owner off greater resources, man power, and mobility, than the heartland or any

other combination.

Writing at a time when the second world war was still going on Spykman

advocated that the Allied powers should base their future policy on preventing

any consolidation of the Rimland by the enemy. With the defeat of Germany in

the second world war and the emergence of the USSR as the sole master of the

Heartland Spykman's prescription became the basis, atleast in part, of the

American policy of 'containment', of communist influence outside the Soviet

Union.

114
Meinigs Model of Functional Criteria

Donald Meinigs33 of the Syracuse university published his theory in

1956. He rooted his ideas in functional and cultural aspects of the region. He

identified the broad similarity of physical conditions, same cultures and interior

core positions which were the nexus of historic land routes interconnecting

various ancient centers of civilization on the oceanic margins of Eurasia.

Another major contribution of practical value is Meining functional re-

evaluation of the Rimland. He thought tha·t Rimland should be viewed in relation

of its politics rather than its physiogeographical orientation, because the

functional importance of the region lies in the political alignment of the rival

blocs.

Meining divided his rimland (inner oriented) as continental rimland and

an (outer oriented) as maritime rimland. He also recognised a group of nations

as neutralist (fig) for e.g. Pakistan had gradually changed from a clear - cut

American orientation in its foreign relations to a somewhat more neutralists,

while its former eastern wing the Republic of Bangia Desh - is now apparently

neutral. Therefore he stressed, since actual functional-political orientations of

33
D. W., Meinig, 'Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian Histor/, Western
Politcal Quarterly, Vol. 9, 1956, p. 553-569.

115
individual states in the Rimland have been changing with changes in the global

power balance, it is wrong to assign the whole of this surrounding tier of states

to a sea power orientation.

Air Power Based Geopolitical Model

After the second world war,the destructive potential of air bombing was

clearly demonstrated, and now any scheme of global strategy that failed to take

air mobility into account was to be regarded as unrealistic. Edward ·Warner noted

that, 'the fundamental doctrine of air power supremacy is that the airplane

possesses such ubiquity, and such advantages of speed and elevation, as they

possess the power of destroying all surface installations and instrument-;, ashore

or afloat, while its remaining comparatively safe from any effective reprisal from

the ground" (Warner, 1943) 34

The most notable among those who have developed the geopolitical

models based on airpower are, Alexander de Se~ersky/ 5 1952, Renner36 and

E. Warner, 'Douhet, Mitchel, Severesky: Theories of Air Warfare',

Chapter 20 in E. M. Earle (Ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton,
Princeton University Press, (1943).
35
A. De Severesky, 'Air Power: Key to Survival', New York, Simon &
Schuster, (1950).
36
G. T., Renner, 'Maps for a New World', Colliers Magazine 533 (June),
1942), p. 14-21.

116
John Slessor. 37 The sum and substance of their theories is the absolute

superiority of air as a means of movement. They brush aside the variable

significance of the landmasses and the seas and hold that any nation with

superior air power can command the world, both in an offensive war and as a

deterrent to aggression, regardless of that nation's territorial location.

Air Man's View of the World

Alexander de Seversky's Air Model

The expression 'airman's global view' has come into vogue since the

second world war through the writings of Alexander de seversky. His ideas were

represented in 1950 in his book, 'Air power': Key to survival. In this book he

advocated that the United States should aim at the development of massive air

power as its primary military defence objective. Seversky opines that by using

Superior air power it is possible to make a war go in favour of a nation in this

nuclear age. He subordinates land and naval forces to air force.

De seversky, looked at the world as on an azimuthal equidistant

projection centered on the North Pole. He, therefore, viewed the chief

adversaries for global supremacy in the post 1945 world as standing face to face

across the Arctic mediterranean, through whose air space pass the shortest routes

37
Sir, J. Slessor, 'Strategy for the West', London, 1954.

117
between places in the Heartland and North America. De seversky's world map

on the azimuthal projection led him to conceive of both the United states and the

Soviet union separately holding complete air dominance over vast areas within

their respective orbits. The circles marking their spheres of influence overlapped

over a vast area in North America and Eurasia. This zone of overlap, de

seversky pointed out, is the critical area in the struggle for global military

supremacy between the two rivals. He termed this zone as the 'area of decision'.

De seversky thought that for its survival in the event of a total war, it was

necessary that the united states should concentrate all its energies and resources

in acquiring complete air dominance in this zone since it is here that, decisive

conflicts of the future would take place. As Jones noted, this notion of absolute

air supremacy based on intercontinental mobility through the air, and the

juxtaposition of the United states and the Soviet union as the principal cold war

antagonists standing face to face across the Arctic, tended to encourage in the

united states a sense of 'air isolationism' oriented to the western hemisphere.

De seversky's generalization of global strategy has not stood the test of

time. From the perspective of the present, his views appear oversimplistic in

view of the further revolutionary changes in transportation technology with the

arrival of inter continental missiles, nuclear powered submarines, and satellites

orbiting around the earth.

118
Air Power Model of Sir John Slessor

John Slessors holds that a strategic air force with nuclear weapons is

the 'great deterrent' which may prevent a total war. He, However, concedes that

local wars may still be possible with ground forces bearing much of the load.

But slessor has no globewide view. He believes that the Rimland is going to be

the focus of local wars. He believes size, centrality, and inaccessibility are no

advantage to the heartland, Rather they are handicaps. He suggests that the

Middle east and south-east Asia will become the arenas of limited wars in which

air power, supplemented by sea supported land actions, would hold the key to

success. he also thinks that even an invasion of western Europe can be countered

by a limited type of air attack and that land defence can, with adequate air

support, check an invasion even without, any all out nuclear war. The only

correct geopolitical forecast of Slessor in his statement that the middle East and

south - east Asia are going to be the areas of limited war. The events in

Vietnam, Arab - Israel war bear out slessor's prediction.

Conclusion

The geopolitical models discussed above emphasize the strategic unity of

space as organised through a single arena of movement Ratzel, Haushofer, and

the earlier writings of Mackjnder postulated the idea of the land mass as

achieved through roads and highway; Mahan and spykman advanced the idea of

38
op. cit., 1954.

119
the unity of the sea as achieved through ocean going ships, Alexander de

seversky ,and slessor presented the idea of the unity of air as achieved through

bombers and missiles. The basic approach in all these views was the

indivisibility and unity of some one arena of movement. It was held that either

the dominant land army could rule the land space, or the dominant fleet could

rule the entire open sea, or the dominant air power could rule the air.

120