AUDITING & GOVERNANCE FOR
ISLAMIC FINANCING INSTITUTIONS
ISF 3207
Section 2
Individual Report
1) Liang Zhang, Zhe Zhang, Ming Jia, Yeyao Ren (2017), Do outside directors matter?
The impact of prestigious CEOs on firm performance
2) Errol Oh (2017), Giving boardroom independence a shelf life
3) Tee Lin Say (2016), Bank Negara tightens regulations.
LECTURER’S NAME: DR HAMDINO BIN HAMDAN
NUR HIDAYAH BINTI JALIL 1428864
SITI NUR NAJWA BINTI HASHIM 1525738
NUR RAIHANAH BINTI MOHD SAKHAF 1524994
NUR’RUL FATIN NAJWA BINTI TA’ARIN 1520306
MARJAN BINTI AZMI 1419668
DATE OF SUBMISSION: 8h March 2018
NUR HIDAYAH BINTI JALIL 1428864
LESSONS FROM THE ARTICLES
The focus on the three papers given to us is mainly on the independent directors. In the
first paper written by Tee Lin Say (2016), the focus which I want to highlight is that it all started
with the Global Financial Crisis happened in the year 2018. During that time, there was a massive
amount of subprime mortgages, where the people with lower level of creditworthiness were given
the same mortgages for housing as the people with high level of creditworthiness and that was the
highest contributor to the crisis. This is because the Wall Street and the banks during that time
were so greedy that when all debtors with lower level of creditworthiness defaulted in their
payment, all the mortgages cannot be repaid back as there were no people who will buy back the
house. Due to the crisis, we know that it happened because of a weak internal control where people
were more motivated with the commission received rather than the consequences that might
happen and thus they tend to take advantage for their own interest.
Because of the crisis happened during that time, our Bank Negara of Malaysia had taken a
several steps to improve the corporate governance of Malaysians companies:
1) BNM has announced a guideline that is similar to the rationale of which US did in the Dodd
Frank Wall Street Reform. It was a law signed by Barack Obama that places regulation of
the financial industry in the hands of the government and also aimed to prevent excessive
risk taking that led to the crisis. The same idea implemented by our Central Bank under the
Consumer Protection Amendment Act 2010 to provide more protection to consumers.
2) Despite that, Bank Negara also introduced a few key measures under its enhanced
standards for corporate governance and this key measures aimed to increase transparency,
reduce risk and leverage, and also the overall risk taking for the bank. Some of the key
measures that BNM has highlighted are the requirement of the independent directors in a
company and the expectation to set a tenure for the independent directors.
An independent director is actually a member of a company’s board of directors who was
brought in, from outside of the company. The Code of Corporate Governance 2012 has given the
definition of independent director which is a non-executive directors who are independent and are
free from any material business or financial connection with the company. As an independent
director, one is ought to do his/her responsibilities in protecting the interest of the company’s
shareholders. One of independent director’s tasks is to oversee and advice the non-independent
directors of the company to avoid any conflict of interest from occurring. So what is the issue
arises in the case of independent directors?
1) In the second paper written by Errol Oh (2017), there is an argument saying that the
tenure life of an independence director should not be made decisive in assessing his
independence as the tenure of the outside directors must be made on their capabilities.
But in the case of having a longer tenure, some people claimed that the longer the
independent director spend in one company, the more it will create doubt about their
effectiveness and ability to challenge the management and fellow board members.
2) There is also some argument saying that having longer tenure for independent director
may also erode the board’s objectivity. Therefore, the Malaysian Code of Corporate
Governance has eventually highlighted a new measure that will make it harder for the
listed companies to have exactly the same director s for more than 12 years. But, in the
case of where the company still needs the individual as an independent director in the
company after 12 years, the director can only stay if the company’s shareholders show
their support through the 2 tier coting process during the general meeting. If both tier
1 and 2 voted for the same decision of making him stay, then only he will be accepted
and otherwise, he will not.
3) The third paper written by Liang Zhang, Zhe Zhang, Ming Jia, Yeyao Ren (2017)
highlights the impact of having the prestigious outside directors towards the corporate
governance of the company. It is said in the paper that the resources benefit of
prestigious CEO will increase when the outside directors of the company are also
prestigious because the CEO tend to have more respect towards the outside directors’
abilities and it is trusted that outside directors govern better as they are independent
and not from the company itself and thus will eventually reduce the agency cost created
by the prestigious CEO.
4) The issue also arises when the author mentioned that there is an interaction effects of
having same surname on prestigious CEO and prestigious outside directors as China as
the informal relation or guanxi can easily be established when they have the same
surname. But having to say it has a positive impact on the company itself is not that
true because it will worsen the agency conflict in the company and as well as will raise
agency costs and lessen the resource benefits as accepting the co-workers only through
having the same surname does not bring much of the positive impacts to the company.
REFLECTION AND COMMENTARY
In my personal opinion, the independent director has no direct relationship with the
company performance as the independent director does not work in the operation of the company.
This opinion can be proved by the study on empirical research done by Donald C. Clarke (2006)
where it highlighted that the board independence is clearly has no guarantee of the corporate
success as if there is mismanagement from others, then it is still not going to succeed. Somehow
we can also look that having the insiders on the board can add some value to the board. As the
independent director is actually a non-executive director which means that they will only give
advices, not responsible as well as not engage in day-to-day management of the organization.
I can relate this to the other paper I read which is written by Steven T. Petra (n.d) which
the paper highlights its aim which to determine whether or not outside independent directors
strengthen the corporate governance of a company. The author has the same opinion as mine as he
stated that the independent director need to do more to protect the interests of the company’s
shareholders. One empirical evidence can be put here that is by Vafeas (2000), which he said that
stock market does not believe that outside independent directors improve the usefulness of
published corporate earnings number. It is said that the public scepticism is what makes the
independent directors needed in a company. As what is highlighted by McKinsey & Co (2000)
which interest me the most is that the institutional investors are willing to pay a premium to own
shares in a company with good corporate governance and have a majority of outside directors.
Having to say that investors are more attracted to the companies with high numbers of outside
directors is somehow sounds logic as the main focus of having the outside directors is to protect
the shareholders interest as the outside directors will not act on behalf of the company’s interest
solely because they are independent and free from any conflict of interest.
As for the same surname, to say that the company’s performance has a positive relationship
with the informal relation created is not true because the guanxi (informal relation) itself has
nothing to do with the credibility one may possess and thus will not give effect to the performance
of the company. Thus, I believe that instead of depending on the informal relation itself, why not
we focus on what matters the most as that will be the cause of the good fruits we will produce later
in the future.
Hence, everything that a person wants to be at its best must come from the person’s attitude
itself. It does not necessarily one need to focus on the material things they have but also some good
skills and wills itself. But I believe it a person only has the skills and not with the wills, then
nothing will differ as having the will to make changes is far more important as we tend to make
things at our best and the outcome itself will reflect everything we did.