Republic of the Philippines the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must

SUPREME COURT be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should

Manila tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was
the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities
SECOND DIVISION incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption
that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be very
much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to
shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good
standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.
G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964,
ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner, was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz,
vs. Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the
First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a
respondent. motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such
motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two
Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf. defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an
urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised
Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf. on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time
service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner,
which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense.
Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964,
denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile,
FERNANDO, J.:p
he instituted this certiorari proceeding.3
What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.
Judge denying a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw
as counsel de oficio.1 One of the grounds for such a motion was his
allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the 1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion
Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time of petitioner to withdraw as counsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began
to the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on February 17,
such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was 1962, with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of
due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case."2 It was likewise Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of
noted that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the
previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category prosecution to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964
being precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in
the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow this case without the express authority of the Commission on
withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however, witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the government
would rest, the motion for postponement is denied. When counsel for
the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his
1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other
today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status of pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his
counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of
the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either
June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him
February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled."8
September 7, 1964."4 Reference was then made to another order of
February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa,9 where
alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is hereby respondent was de oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice
transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its officers and
reminded that at its instance, this case has been postponed at least subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties,
eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses have to come all especially when negligence in the performance of those duties
the way from Manapala."5 After which, it was noted in such order that necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases ...." 10
there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia11 reiterated such a view in these
accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say
election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends of that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused
justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the
continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional
rested its case."6 ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render
effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due
2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer
duly mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger
known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest."12
conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes
in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that
counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only
makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated
due to the apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a
to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the
why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be
A recent statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban:7 "There
rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by Chief
is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases
fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a
there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of
profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even
upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science
State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof,
of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he
especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be
may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not
required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are
know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily
to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that
the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has
become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules
of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of
his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he
desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant
him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own."13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts.14 The present
Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that
the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel,"15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence."16

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar

in the defense of an accused. Such a consideration could have
sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de
oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the
task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his
responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no
such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and
in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may
likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that
petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as
defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase
doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good
standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks
of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when
duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of
self-interest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against

petitioner.