Network Dynamics and Symmetries Analysis
Network Dynamics and Symmetries Analysis
email: abakarsiddique@[Link]
The University of New Mexico
Collaborators
Francesco Sorrentino
Louis M. Pecora
Outline
2 Dynamical Models
Related research
Evolutionary Game Theory
Time-Averaged Outcomes
4 Experimental Realizations
Outline
2 Dynamical Models
Related research
Evolutionary Game Theory
Time-Averaged Outcomes
4 Experimental Realizations
Network
Adjacency matrix, A
4 3
1 2
Siddique A. B., UNM Network Topology and Symmetries December 13, 2017 5 / 28
Symmetries and the Network Dynamics Dynamical Models Quotient Graph Reduction Experimental Realizations
Symmetry
Symmetry
Symmetry is a permutation (π` ) of the network nodes that leaves the network
structure unaltered. For example (1,2)(3,4)(5) is an example of one of the
permutations of the graph G .
Permutation Matrix
We construct the permutation matrix Π such that Πi, j = 1 if node i is
swapped with node j in the permutation and Πi, j = 0 otherwise. All the
permutation matrix hold the identity ΠA = AΠ.
Permutation matrix, Π
4 3
1 2
Siddique A. B., UNM Network Topology and Symmetries December 13, 2017 6 / 28
Symmetries and the Network Dynamics Dynamical Models Quotient Graph Reduction Experimental Realizations
Symmetry Group
Automorphism Group
The symmetries (permutations πi ) of the network form a (mathematical)
group G. πi ∈ G describes all the possible permutations of the graph.
Group Orbit
The orbit of a node x ∈ G is defined as, O(x) := {y ∈ G : ∃g ∈ G : y = π ∗ x},
where ∗ denotes the group action. For example, the symmetric orbits of the
network are {1, 2, 3, 4} and {5}.
4 3 4 1 1 3 4 3
5 5 5 =⇒ 5
2 1 3 2 4 2 1 2
Siddique A. B., UNM Network Topology and Symmetries December 13, 2017 7 / 28
Symmetries and the Network Dynamics Dynamical Models Quotient Graph Reduction Experimental Realizations
Outline
2 Dynamical Models
Related research
Evolutionary Game Theory
Time-Averaged Outcomes
4 Experimental Realizations
Cooperators, Si = 1 D
D
Defectors, Si = 0
C D
Cooperator Defector
Cooperator b−c −c
Defector b 0
Total Payoff
ξi = ∑ Ai j bS j − ki cSi
j
ki : Node degree
Fitness function 1
fi = 1 − ω + ωξi
0 ≤ ω ≤ 1 measures the intensity of selection
1Hisashi Ohtsuki, Christoph Hauert, Erez Lieberman, and Martin A Nowak. Nature,
441(7092):502–505, 2006.
Siddique A. B., UNM Evolutionary Game Theory December 13, 2017 11 / 28
Symmetries and the Network Dynamics Dynamical Models Quotient Graph Reduction Experimental Realizations
C C C
C C C
C C C
D D D
D ? C
C D C D C D
D D D
σ (xi ) = γxi + ε
xi = (FCi − FDi )
γ > 0 and ε are two arbitrary constants.
0≤σ ≤1
2Abu Bakar Siddique, Louis M Pecora, and Francesco Sorrentino. arXiv:1710.05251, 2017.
Siddique A. B., UNM Evolutionary Game Theory December 13, 2017 12 / 28
Symmetries and the Network Dynamics Dynamical Models Quotient Graph Reduction Experimental Realizations
Outline
2 Dynamical Models
Related research
Evolutionary Game Theory
Time-Averaged Outcomes
4 Experimental Realizations
Network Quotient
For each pair of orbits (O x , O y ), we define a quotient C ×C matrix Q such
that
Qxy = ∑ Ai j , i ∈ O x , x, y = 1, 2, . . .C
j∈O y
2 2
2
4 4
2
2
2
4
2
2
2 2
4
The table below is an excerpt from the data on the symmetries of real
networks, reported by MacArthur et al3.
0.95
Evolutionary game theory
Full network
Frequency of being cooperator
0.8
0.75
0.7
0.65
0.6
0.55
0.5
0.45
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
16
18
Source node degrees
Terminologies
Terminologies (cont.)
Relative Error, ∆
ˆ |
1 N |hSii − hSii
∆= ∑ ,
N i hSii
ˆ are the time-averaged frequency of cooperation of node i
where hSii and hSii
and its corresponding node in the quotient network, respectively.
0.4
Media Owners Group
EPA Gov
0.2 Bellsouth
Karate club
US airports 97
0 ER
Reduction coefficient, ρg
Convergence ratio
Reduction coefficient, ρg
Relative error
0.1
Media Owners Group
0.08 (c) EPA Gov
Bellsouth
Karate club
0.06 US airports 97
Error, ∆
ER
0.04
0.02
Reduction coefficient, ρg
Outline
2 Dynamical Models
Related research
Evolutionary Game Theory
Time-Averaged Outcomes
4 Experimental Realizations
Experimental Realizations
4 10
1 7
8 9
3 5
2 6
Arduino UNO R3 + NRF24L01
4 10
1 7 2 2 3 4
1 2 3
8 9 2
3
3 5 5
2 6
1 1
Frequency of cooperation
Frequency of cooperation
0.9 0.9
0.8 0.8
0.7 0.7
Thank you
Questions?