CARSON REALTY & MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner

vs.
RED ROBIN SECURITY AGENCY and MONINA C. SANTOS, Respondents

G.R. No. 225035 February 8, 2017

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:

On March 23, 2007, respondent Monina C. Santos (Santos) filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and
Damages against petitioner Carson Realty & Management Corp. (Carson) with the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court (RTC). As per the Officer's Return dated April 12, 2007 of Process Server Jechonias F. Pajila,
Jr. (Process Server Pajila), a copy of the Summons dated April 11, 2007, together with the Complaint and
its annexes, was served upon Carson at its business address at Pasig City, through its "corporate secretary,"
Precilla S. Serrano.

Thereafter, the appointed Corporate Secretary and legal counsel of Carson, Atty. Tomas Z. Roxas, Jr. (Atty.
Roxas), filed an Appearance and Motion dated April 25, 2007 with the court wherein the latter entered
his appearance and acknowledged that the Summons was served and received by one of the staff assistants
of Carson. Atty. Roxas prayed for an extension of fifteen (15) days from April 27, 2007 within which
to file a responsive pleading. The RTC, in its Order dated May 3, 2007, noted the appearance of Atty.
Roxas as counsel for Carson and granted his request for extension of time to file a responsive pleading.4

Instead of filing a responsive pleading, Atty. Roxas moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the
Summons dated April 11, 2007 was not served on any of the officers and personnel authorized to receive
summons under the Rules of Court.

Petitioner---Santos countered that while the Summons was initially received by Serrano, who as it turned
out was a staff assistant and not the corporate secretary of Carson, the corporation acknowledged receipt of
the Summons when Atty. Roxas alleged in his Appearance and Motion that he may not be able to comply
with the 15-day prescribed period stated in the Summons within which to file a responsive pleading. Thus,
when Carson sought for an affirmative relief of a 15-day extension from April 27, 2007 to file its pleading,
it already voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the RTC.

RTC Decision: The RTC denied Carson's Motion to Dismiss and directed the issuance of an alias
summons to be served anew upon the corporation. On November 9, 2007, Process Server Pajila submitted
his Officer's Report stating in essence that he attempted to serve the alias Summons dated September 24,
2007 on the President and General Manager of Carson, as well as on the Board of Directors and Corporate
Secretary, but they were not around. Hence, he was advised by a certain Lorie Fernandez, the "secretary"
of the company, to bring the alias Summons to the law office of Atty. Roxas. Process Server Pajila
attempted to serve the alias Summons at the law office of Atty. Roxas twice, but to no avail. This prompted
him to resort to substituted service of the alias Summons by leaving a copy thereof with a certain Mr.
JR Taganila, but the latter also refused to acknowledge receipt of the alias Summons.

Atty. Roxas filed a Manifestation stating that the alias Summons was again improperly and invalidly
served as his law office was not empowered to receive summons on behalf of Carson. Santos filed a Motion
to Declare Defendant in Default on December 10, 2007. Finding that there was an improper service of
summons on Carson, the RTC denied the motion.

Santos requested the RTC for the issuance of another alias Summons. The RTC granted this request and
issued an alias Summons dated September 9, 2008. Process Server Pajila submitted his Officer's Return
dated October 28, 2008 on the services of the alias Summons.

After serving the summons on October 2, 16 and 27, 2008, persons were not around and there was no one
in the company authorized to receive the aforesaid summons. Finally on October 28, 2008 just the same,
the President/General Manager of the company was not around, hence, substituted service of summons
was resorted to by leaving the copy of the Alias Summons at the company's office through its employee,
MS. LORIE FERNANDEZ, however, she refused to acknowledge receipt of the process. Fernandez posited
that, as a mere receptionist, she had no authority to receive the said documents and that there was an
improper service of summons.

Santos filed a second Motion to Declare Defendant in Default in January 2009. The RTC granted the
motion and allowed her to present her evidence ex-parte in its Order dated June 29, 2009. On August 27,
2009, Carson filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default alleging that the RTC has yet to
acquire jurisdiction over its person due to improper service of summons. The RTC denied the same.

Carson filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and for Leave of Court to Admit Responsive
Pleading on March 17, 2010, appending thereto its Answer with Counterclaims. In the meantime, Santos
filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Set for Hearing and for Reception of Evidence Before the Branch Clerk of
Court.

On November 22, 2010, the RTC rendered an Order denying Carson's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
and granting Santos Ex-Parte Motion to Set Case for Hearing and for Reception of Evidence before the
Branch Clerk.

Carson filed a Motion for Clarification and prayed for the annulment of the Orders dated June 29, 2009,
December 4, 2009, and November 22, 2010. The RTC, however, maintained its stance and denied the
motion in its Order14dated September 9, 2011.

Thus, Carson filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA, imputing
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the RTC for issuing the Orders.
Carson essentially questioned the validity of the service of the second alias Summons dated September
9, 2008, received by Fernandez, who is a receptionist assigned at its office in Ortigas.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA denied the petition and ruled that the RTC had properly acquired jurisdiction over Carson due
to its voluntary appearance in court. In ruling thus, the CA considered Carson's act of requesting
additional time to file its responsive pleading as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Even on the assumption that Carson did not voluntarily submit to the RTC's jurisdiction, the CA
maintained that the RTC still acquired jurisdiction over it due to the substituted service of the alias
Summons dated September 9, 2008. The appellate court reasoned that Fernandez is a competent person
charged with authority to receive court documents on behalf of the corporation. Carson moved for
reconsideration but was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated June 8, 2016. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Carson.

(2) Whether Carson was properly declared in default.

HELD: YES.

1. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over Carson

The invalidity of the substituted service, such is of little significance in view of the fact that the RTC had
already acquired jurisdiction over Carson early on due to its voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
of the court. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other
hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon
them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority,22 as provided in
Section 20,23 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to
admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order
of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered only by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party
who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot
be considered to have submitted to its authority. Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;

(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth
in an unequivocal manner; and

(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or
motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.

We have, time and again, held that the filing of a motion for additional time to file answer is
considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. If the defendant knowingly does an
act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of personal jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily
appearing in the action, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Seeking an
affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position that no voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask
for such relief, without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the Court's jurisdiction.

In the present case, Carson voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC when it filed, through
Atty. Roxas, the Appearance and Motion dated April 25, 2007 acknowledging Carson's receipt of the
Summons dated April 11, 2007 and seeking additional time to file its responsive pleading. As noted by
the CA, Carson failed to indicate therein that the Appearance and Motion was being filed by way of a
conditional appearance to question the regularity of the service of summons. Thus, by securing the
affirmative relief of additional time to file its responsive pleading, Carson effectively voluntarily submitted
to the jurisdiction of the RTC.

2. Carson was properly declared in default

Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court states when a party may be properly declared in default and the
remedy available in such case:

SEC. 3. Default; declaration of- If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the
court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure,
declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the
claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to
submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.

(a) Effect of order of default. - A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but
not to take part in the trial.

(b) Relief from order of default.- A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before
judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense.
In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose
in the interest of justice. (emphasis supplied)

Carson moved to dismiss the complaint instead of submitting a responsive pleading within fifteen (15) days
from April 27, 2007 as prayed for in its Appearance and Motion. Clearly, Carson failed to answer within
the time allowed for by the RTC. At this point, Carson could have already been validly declared in default.
However, believing that it has yet to acquire jurisdiction over Carson, the RTC issued the September 24,
2007 and September 9, 2008 alias Summons. This culminated in the issuance of the assailed June 29, 2009
Order declaring Carson in default on the basis of the substituted service of the September 9, 2008 alias
Summons. While Carson filed its Urgent Motion to Lift Order of Default, the CA found that the same failed
to comply with the requirement under Sec. 3(b) that the motion be under oath.

It bears noting that the propriety of the default order stems from Carson's failure to file its responsive
pleading despite its voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court reckoned from its filing of the
Appearance and Motion, and not due to its failure to file its answer to the September 8, 2008 alias Summons.

FALLO: the petition is DENIED.