V.

PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

A. Preamble

1. Does not confer rights nor impose duties.

2. Indicates authorship of the Constitution;

3. enumerates the primary aims and aspirations of the framers; and serves as an aid in the construction of the

Constitution. -

B. Republicanism

[Sec. 1. Art. II: The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them].

Essential features:

a. representation
b. renovation.

Manifestations.

a) Ours is a government of laws and not of men [Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39Phil 778].

b) Rule of the majority. [Plurality in elections]

c) Accountability of public officials.

d) Bill of Rights.

e) Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws.

f) Separation of powers.

i) Purpose: To prevent concentration of authority in one person orgroup of persons that might lead to an irreversible
error or abuse in its exercise tothe detriment of republican institutions.

To secure action, to forestall overaction, to prevent despotism and to obtain efficiency

Case: Tuason v. Register of Deeds of Caloocan City,

Application: Not doctrinaire nor with pedantic rigor; not independence butinterdependence
Principle of Blending of Powers

Instances when powers are not confined exclusively within one department but are assigned to or shared by several

departments, e.g., enactment of general appropriations law.

Principle of Checks and Balances.

allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the other
departments, e.g., veto power of the President as check on improvident legislation, etc..

Role of the Judiciary.

Judicial power (Sec. 1, [Link])

includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse, of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Angara v. Electoral Commission

when the court mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries or invalidates the acts of a coordinate body, what it upholds is not itsown
superiority but the supremacy of the Constitution

The first and safest criterion to determine whether a given power has been validly exercised by a particular department is whether or not
the power has been constitutionally conferred upon the department claiming its exercise since the conferment is usually done expressly.
However, even in the absence of express conferment, the exercise of the power may be justified under the doctrine of necessary
implication grant of an express power carries with it all other powers that may be reasonably inferred from it. Note also that there are
powers which although not expressly conferred nor implied therefrom, are inherent or incidental, e.g., the Presidents power to deport
undesirable aliens which may be exercised independently of constitutional or statutory authority, because it is an act of State.

Marcos v. Manglapus

justified theaction of President Aquino in banning the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines on the basis of the Presidents
residual powers.
Political and justiciable questions

JUSTICIABLE QUESTION POLITICAL QUESTION

implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act a question of policy with issues
or dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted and measure
sanctioned by law for
said breach of right(Casibang v. Aquino)

Delegation of Powers

Rule: Potestas delegata non potest delegare

delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own
judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.

Permissible delegation:

Tariff Powers to the President Sec.28(2), Art. VI:

The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the government

The Tariff and Customs Code grants such stand-by powers to the President

Garcia v. Executive Secretary

Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, which
levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter on imported crude oil, and P1.00 per liter on
imported oil products, as a valid exercise of delegatedlegislative authority underthe Tariff
and Customs Code.

Emergency Powers to the Sec.23(2), Art. VI:

President In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

Araneta v. Dinglasan
 Presidents authority to declare a state of emergency VS to exercise emergency powers.

authority to declare a state of emergency exercise emergency power

no legitimate constitutional objection Whether the President may exercise
can be raised, since Sec. 18, Art. VII, such power is dependent on whether
grants the President such power Congress delegates it to the former
pursuant to a law prescribing the
reasonable terms

Delegation to the People (Sec. 32, Art. VI; Sec. 10, Art. X; Sec. 2, Art. XVII; Republic Act 6735)

i. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are specific provisions where the people
have reserved to themselves the function of legislation.

Referendum vs. Plebiscite.

Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election
called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely: referendum on statutes which refers to a
petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress;
and referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or
ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.

Plebiscite is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected
by the people [Sec. 2 (c) and (e), Republic Act No. 6735].

Delegation to local government Such legislation (by local governments) is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative
units power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribe local regulations, according to
(See: R.A. 7160 immemorial practice, subject, of course, to the interposition of the superior in cases of
necessity

recognizes the fact that local legislatures are more knowledgeable than the national
lawmaking body on matters of purely local concern, and are in a better position to enact
appropriate legislative measures thereon.

Delegation to Administrative
Bodies

The power of subordinate

legislation

iie)

In Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., v.

POEA, 243 SCRA 666, POEA Governing Board Resolution No. 01-94, increasing

and adjusting the rates of compensation and other benefits in the Standard

Employment Contract for Seafarers, was held to be a valid exercise of delegated

legislative authority, inasmuch as it conforms to the sufficient and valid standard

of fair and equitable employment practices prescribed in E.O. 797. In Osmena v.

Orbos, supra., it was held that there was no undue delegation of legislative power

in the authority granted by legislature to the Energy Regulatory Board to impose

additional amounts to augment the resources of the Oil Price Stabilization Fund.

See also: Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730; Eastern Shipping v. POEA, 166

SCRA 533. But in Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, supra., the authority

given by LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the

existing authorized fare was held to be illegal for being an undue delegation of

power.

iie1) In Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569, Sec. 68 of

the Revised Administrative Code (authorizing the President to create

municipalities through executive orders) was declared unconstitutional for being

an undue delegation of legislative power However, in Municipality of San Narciso

(Quezon) v. Mendez, 239 SCRA 11, E.O 353 creating the Municipal
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Constitutional Law 79

District of San Andres in 1959 was not declared unconstitutional because it was

only after almost 30 years that the legality of the executive order was challenged;

throughout its 30 years of existence, the municipal district had exercised the

powers and authority of a duly created local government institution, and the State

had, at various times, recognized its continued existence. Likewise, the Pe/aez

ruling was not applied in Municipality of Candihay, Bohol v. Court of Appeals, 251

SCRA 530, because the municipality had been in existence for 16 years before the

Pe/aez ruling was promulgated, and various governmental acts throughout the

years all indicate the States recognition and acknowledgment of the existence of

the municipal corporation, In Municipality of Jimenez, Misamis Occidental v. Borja,

265 SCRA 182, not only was the Municipality of Sinacaban in existence for 16

years before the Pe/aez ruling, but that even the State and the Municipality of

Jimenez itself had recognized Sinacabans corporate existence (by entering into

an agreement concerning common boundaries, and that Sinacaban had attained

de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution

apportioning legislative districts throughout the country which considered

Sinacaban as part of the 2nd district of Misamis Occidental.

iii) Tests for valid delegation: Both of the following tests are to be

complied with [Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569; Tatad v. Secretary of

Energy, supra.]:

iiia) Completeness Test. The law must be complete in all its

essential terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature so that there will be
nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him except to enforce it. See

U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1.

iiib) Sufficient standard test. A sufficient standard is intended to

map out the boundaries of the delegates authority by defining the legislative policy

and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued and effected. This

is intended to prevent a total transference of legislative power from the legislature

to the delegate. The standard is usually indicated in the law delegating legislative

power. See Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra.; de la Liana v. Alba, 112

SCRA 294; Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323.

iiibl) On the challenge relative to the validity of the provision

of R.A. 6734 which authorized the President to merge, by administrative

determination, the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous

Region of Muslim Mindanao, in Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253, the Court

said that the legislative standard need not be expressed, it may simply be gathered

or implied; neither should it always be found in

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80 Constitutional Law

the law challenged, because it may be found in other statutes on the same subject.

In this case, the standard was found in R.A. 5435 on the power of the President to

reorganize the Executive Department to promote simplicity, economy and to

enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social

and economic development.

iiib2) In Tatad v. Secretary, Department of Energy, supra.,

even as the Supreme Court found that R.A. 8180 contained sufficient standards

for the delegation of power to the President to advance the date of full deregulation

(of the oil industry), Executive Order No. 392 constituted a misapplication of R.A.

8180, because the President rewrote the standards set forth in the law when he

considered the extraneous factor of depletion of OPSF funds.

iiib3) In Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No. 159796,

July 17, 2007, the Court held that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety,

in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions,

and that it contains sufficient standards. Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among

others, to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability,

security and affordability of the supply of electric power, and watershed

rehabilitation and management are sufficient standards, as they provide the

limitations on the Energy Regulatory Commissions power to formulate the

Implementing Rules and Regulations.

C. The Incorporation Clause [Sec. 2. Art. II: The Philippines renounces war as an

instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of

international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,

equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations"].

1. Read along with the Preamble; Secs. 7 & 8 (independent foreign policy

and nuclear-free Philippines), Art. II; and Sec. 25 (expiration of bases agreement),

Art. XVIII.

2. Renunciation of war. The historical development of the policy condemning

or outlawing war in the international scene:

a) Covenant of the League of Nations, which provided conditions for the

right to go to war;

b) Kelloqq-Briand Pact of 1928. also known as the General Treaty for

the Renunciation of War, ratified by 62 States, which forbade war as an instrument

of national policy.
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Constitutional Law 81

c) Charter of the United Nations. Art. 2 of which prohibits the threat or

use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State.

3. Doctrine of incorporation. By virtue of this clause, our Courts have applied

the rules of international law in a number of cases even if such rules had not

previously been subject of statutory enactments, because these generally

accepted principles of international law are automatically part of our own laws. See

Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 42 O.G. 4282; Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil 113.

a) The phrase generally accepted principles of international law refers

to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all states,

e.g., renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, sovereign immunity,

a persons right to life, liberty and due process, and pacta sunt servanda

[Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque, G.R.

No. 173034, October 9, 2007],

b) Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the

sphere of domestic law either by transformation or by incorporation. The

transformation method requires that an international law principle be transformed

into domestic law through a constitutional mechanism, such as local legislation.

The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,

international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law [Pharmaceutical and

Health Care Association v. Duque, supra.]

c) The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals

or local courts are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict

between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute

of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give

effect to both. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a

choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law,

jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts.

In Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 115, the reason given by the Court was that the

Retail Trade National Law was passed in the exercise of the police power which

cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. In

Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 and In Re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984, on the basis

of separation of powers and the rule-making powers of the Supreme Court,

respectively. The high tribunal also noted that courts are organs of municipal law

and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

d) However, as applied in most countries, the doctrine of incorporation

dictates that rules of international law are given equal standing with, and are
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82 Constitutional Law

not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle of lex

posterior derogat priori takes effect. In states where the constitution is the highest

law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties

may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution [Secretary of Justice

v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000, citing Salonga & Yap, Public

International Law, 1992 ed.]. The same rule was applied in Philip Morris, Inc. v.

Court of Appeals, where the Supreme Court said that the fact that international law

has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy

of international law over national law in the municipal sphere.

4. See: Chapter I, General Principles, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,

infra..

D. Civilian Supremacy fSec. 3. Art. II: Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme

over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people

and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of
the national territory"].

1. Read Sec. 18, Art. VII (Commander-in-Chief clause).

2. See Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279.

E. Duty of Government; people to defend the State fSec. 4. Art. II: The prime

duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may

call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens

may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or

civil service. Sec. 5. Art. II: The maintenance of peace and order, the protection

of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential

for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings Of democracy.].

1. Read Secs. 4 & 5, Art. XVI (Armed Forces of the Philippines provisions).

2. See People v. Lagman and Zosa, 66 Phil. 13

3. Right to bear arms. The right to bear arms is a statutory, not a

constitutional right. The license to carry a firearm is neither a property nor a

property right. Neither does it create a vested right. Even if it were a property right,

it cannot be considered absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of police power.

The maintenance of peace and order, and the protection of the people against

violence are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is to be

construed in connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties [Chavez

v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004].

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Constitutional Law 83

a) The first real firearms law is Act No. 1780, enacted by the Philippine

Commission on October 12, 1907, to regulate the importation, acquisition,

possession, use and transfer of firearms. Thereafter, President Marcos issued

P.D. 1856, which was amended by R.A. 8294. Being a mere statutory creation,

the right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right

[Chavez v. Romulo, supra.].

F. Separation of Church and State fSec. 6. Art. II: The separation of Church

and State shall be inviolable."]

1. Reinforced by:

a) Sec. 5, Art. Ill (Freedom of religion clause).

b) Sec. 2 (5), Art. IX-C (religious sect cannot be registered as

political party).

c) Sec. 5 (2), Art. VI (no sectoral representative from the religious

sector).

d) Sec. 29 (2), Art. VI (Prohibition against appropriation for

sectarian benefit)

2. Exceptions:

a) Sec. 28 (3), Art. VI: (Churches, parsonages, etc., actually, directly

and exclusively used for religious purposes shall be exempt from taxation).

b) Sec. 29 (2), Art. VI: (Prohibition against appropriation for sectarian

benefit, except when priest, etc., is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal

institution or government orphanage or leprosarium).

c) Sec. 3 (3), Art. XIV: (Optional religious instruction for public

elementary and high school students).

d) Sec. 4 (2), Art. XIV: (Filipino ownership requirement for educational

institutions, except those established by religious groups and mission boards).

3. See discussion on FREEDOM OF RELIGION, infra.

G. Independent foreign policy and nuclear-free Philippines fSec. 7, Art.

II: The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other

states, the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial

integrity, national interest, and the right to self determination. Sec.

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84 Constitutional Law

8, Art. II: The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and

pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory. ]

1. Refer to Sec. 2, Art. II; Sec. 25, Art. XVIII.

2. See: Opinion, Secretary of Justice, S. 1988.

3. In Lim v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002, the

Supreme Court said that these provisions, along with Sec. 2, Art. II, Sec. 21, Art.

VII, and Sec. 26, Art. XVIII, betray a marked antipathy towards foreign military

presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general.

H. Just and dynamic social order fSec. 9. Art. 11: The State shall promote a

just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of

the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate

social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an

improved quality of life for all. ] -

1. Read Preamble.
/. Promotion of Social Justice fSec. 10. Art. II: The State shall promote social

justice in afl phases of national development.] See Calalangv. Williams, 70 Phil

726;Almeda v. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 194; Ondoy v. Ignacio, 97 SCRA 611;

Salonga v. Farrales, 105 SCRA 459.

J. Respect for human dignity and human rights fSec. 11. Art. II: The State

values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human

rights.] Read also Secs. 17-19, Art. XIII.

K. Family and youth fSec. 12. Art. II: The State recognizes the sanctity of

family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social

institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn

from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing

of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall

receive the support of the Government. Sec. 13. Art. II: The State recognizes the

vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their

physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the

youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and

civic affairs. ] 1

1. Read also Art. XV and Art. 52, Civil Code. See Meyer v. Nebraska,

263 U.S. 393; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 266 U.S. 510; Cabanas v.

Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94.

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Constitutional Law 85

2. R.A. 7610, which penalizes child prostitution and other sexual abuses,

was enacted in consonance with the policy of the State to provide special

protection to children from all forms of abuse; thus, the Court grants the victim full

vindication and protection granted under the law [People v. Larin, G.R. No.

128777, October 7, 1998].

L. Fundamental equality of men and women fSec. 14. Art. II: The

State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the

fundamental equality before the law of women and men. ] Read also Sec. 14, Art.

XIII.

1. In Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Co. v. National Labor Relations

Commission, G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997, the Supreme Court held that the

petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any

woman worker who contracts marriage, runs afoul of the test of, and the right
against, discrimination, which is guaranteed all women workers under the

Constitution. While a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried

may be justified as a bona fide occupational qualification where the particular

requirements of the job would demand the same, discrimination against married

women cannot be adopted by the employer as a general principle.

M. Promotion of health and ecology fSec. 15. Art. II: The State shall protect

and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness

among them. Sec. 16. Art. II: The State shall protect and advance the right of the

people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony

of nature.] Read also Secs. 11-13, Art. XIII.

1. In Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792, it was held that the petitioners,

minors duly joined by their respective parents, had a valid cause of action in

questioning the continued grant of Timber License Agreements (TLAs) for

commercial logging purposes, because the cause focuses on a fundamental legal

right: the right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

2. In C & M Timber Corporation v. Alcala, G.R. No. 111088, June 13, 1997,

on the issue that the total log ban is a new policy which should be applied

prospectively and not affect the rights of petitioner vested under the Timber

Licensing Agreement, the Supreme Court declared that this is not a new policy but

a mere reiteration of the policy of conservation and protection expressed in Sec.

16, Art. II, of the Constitution.

N. Priority to education, science, technology, etc. fSec. 17. Art. II: The

State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture and
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86 Constitutional Law

sports, to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and

promote total human liberation and development."] Read also Sec. 2, Art.

XIV.

1. In Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA

770, the Court said that the requirement that a school must first obtain government

authorization before operating is based on the State policy that educational

programs and/or operations shall be of good quality and, therefore, shall at least

satisfy minimum standards with respect to curricula, teaching staff, physical plant

and facilities and administrative and management viability. [See discussion on

Academic freedom, infra.] See also Villarv. TIP, 135 SCRA 706; Tablarin v.
Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730.

2. However, in Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221, and in Philconsa v.

Enriquez, supra., it was held that Sec. 5, Art. XIV, which provides for the highest

budgetary priority to education, is merely directory; the hands of Congress cannot

be so hamstrung as to deprive it of the power to respond to the imperatives of

national interest and the attainment of other state policies and objectives.

3. While it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every

citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to fair, reasonable and

equitable admission and academic requirements, the exercise of this right may be

regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals,

peace, education, order, safety and general welfare. Thus, persons who desire to

engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may

be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen

careers. This regulation assumes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, in

order to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and

ignorance [Professional Regulation Commission v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 144681,

June 21, 2004].

4. See discussion on Art. XIV, infra.

O. Protection to labor rSec. 18. Art. II: The State affirms labor as a primary social

economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.]

Read also Sec. 8, Art. Ill; Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-B; Sec. 3, Art. XIII. 1

1. In JMM Promotion and Management v. Court of Appeals, 260

SCRA 319, the Supreme Court said that obviously, protection to labor

does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and

social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full

employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the governments

constitutional duty to
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Constitutional Law 87

provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas. As

explained in Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386,

in reference to the recurring problems faced by our overseas workers, what

concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above

all, decent, just and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons

and daughters to strange lands, because it cannot satisfy their employment needs
at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty bound to provide

them adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home.

2. In Bernardo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122917, July 12, 1999, the Supreme Court

held that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that qualified disabled

persons be granted the same terms and conditions of employment as qualified

able-bodied employees; thus, once they have attained the status of regular

workers, they should be accorded all the benefits granted by law, notwithstanding

written or verbal contracts to the contrary. This treatment is rooted not merely in

charity or accommodation, but in justice for all.

P. Self-reliant and independent economic order [Sec. 19. Art. II: The State shall

develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by

Filipinos. Sec. 20. Art. II: The State recognizes the indispensable role of the

private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed

investments. ] Read also Art. XII.

1. In Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, it was held that the World Trade

Organization (WTO) agreement does not violate Sec. 19, Art. II, nor Secs. 10 and

12, Art. XII, because the said sections should be read and understood in relation

to Secs. 1 and 13, Art. XII, which require the pursuit of a trade policy that serves

the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the

basis of equality and reciprocity. The provisions of Art. II are not intended to be

self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They do not

embody judicially enforceable rights, but guidelines for legislation. The reasons for

denying cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional

principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and lack of judicial

authority to wade into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy-making.
2

2. In Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine

Coconut Authority, G.R. No. 110526, February 10, 1998, the Supreme

Court said that although the Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a

policy, it nevertheless reserves to the Government the power to intervene

whenever necessary for the promotion of the general welfare, as reflected

in Sec. 6 and 19, Art. XII. This is reiterated in Pest Management

Association of the Philippines v. Fertilizer

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88 Constitutional Law
and Pesticide Authority. I n Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the

Philippines v. Duque, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007, the Court held that free

enterprise does not call for the removal of protective regulations. It must be clearly

explained and proven by competent evidence how such protective regulations

would result in restraint of trade.

Q. Land Reform rSec. 21. Art. II: The State shall promote comprehensive rural

development and agrarian reform. ] Read also Secs. 4-10, Art. XIII. See

Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian

Reform, supra.

R. Indigenous cultural communities fSec. 22. Art. II: The State recognizes

and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework

of national unity and development.] Read also Secs. 5(2), Art. VI; Sec. 5, Art. XII;

Sec. 17, Art. XIV. .

S. Independent peoples organizations FSec. 23. Art. II: The State shall

encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that

promote the welfare of the nation.] Read also Secs. 15-16, Art. XIII.

T. Communication and information in nation-building [Sec. 24. Art. II: The

State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nationbuilding.]

Read also Secs. 10-11, Art. XVI; Sec. 23, Art. XVIII.

U. Autonomy of local governments rSec. 25. Art. II: The State shall ensure

the autonomy of local governments.] Read also Art. X. See Basco v. PAGCOR,

197 SCRA 52, where the Supreme Court said that local autonomy under the 1987

Constitution simply means decentralization, and does not make the local

governments sovereign within the State or an imperium in imperio.

1. In Limbonas v. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786, the Court distinguished

between decentralization of administration and decentralization of power. The

latter is abdication by the national government of governmental powers; while the

former is merely delegation of administrative powers to the local government unit

in order to broaden the base of governmental powers. 2

2. In Lina v. Pano, G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001, the

Supreme Court said that the basic relationship between the national

legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the

new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local

autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, Congress retains

control of the local government units although in a significantly reduced

degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create

still includes the power to destroy. The

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Constitutional Law 89

power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True there are notable

innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on local government

units of the power to tax [Sec. 5, Art. X], which cannot now be withdrawn by mere

statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of local

government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. Ours is still a

unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy

granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the

extent allowed by the central authority.

3. Thus, even as we recognize that the Constitution guarantees autonomy

to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the

power of control by Congress and the power of general supervision by the

President [Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350, December 3,

2002].

a) On the Presidents power of general supervision, however, the

President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit

if he or she finds that the latter had acted contrary to law. The President or any of

his alter egos, cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local

government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any

directive, therefore, by the President or any of his alter egos seeking to alter the

wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is

a patent nullity, because it violates the principle of local autonomy, as well as the

doctrine of separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in

governing municipal corporations [Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, supra.].

V. Equal access of opportunities for public service fSec. 26. Art. II: The
State shall guarantee equal access of opportunities for public service, and prohibit

political dynasties as may be defined by law.] Read also Sec. 13, Art. VII; Secs.

1-2, Art. XIII.

1. In Pamatong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004, the Supreme

Court said that this provision does not bestow a right to seek the Presidency; it

does not contain a judicially enforceable constitutional right and merely specifies

a guideline for legislative action. The provision is not intended to compel the State
to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many as possible into

public office. The privilege may be subjected to limitations. One such valid

limitation is the provision of the Omnibus Election Code on nuisance candidates.

W. Honest public service and full public disclosure fSec. 27. Art. II: The

State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive
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90 Constitutional Law

and effective measures against graft and corruption. Sec. 28. Art. II: Subject to

reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy

of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. ] Read also

Sec. 7, Art. Ill; Secs 12 & 20, Art. VI; Sec. 20, Art. VII; Sec. 4, Art. IX-D; Secs. 4-15

& 17, Art. XI; and Secs. 12 &21, Art. XII. SeeLegaspiv. Civil Service Commission,

150 SCRA 530; Valmonte v. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256; Garcia v. Board of

Investments, 177 SCRA 374; Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, 203 SCRA 515.