CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY

THE
PARTHIANSCONTINENTAL
SYSTEM
Legal History

Submitted to: Submitted by:

1
Dr. Priyadarshni Mam Maitreya Saha
Deepali Singh

(Faculty, Legal History) Roll No. 15411408

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Table of Cotents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 6

INTRODUCTION 8

(A).AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 9

(B).SCOPES AND LIMITATIONS 10

(C).RESEARCH QUESTIONS 11
The researcher has following research questions: 11
1. What was the historical backdrop of the origin of the Parthian Empire? 11
2. What were the factors of growth of the Empire? 11
3. What were the relationship with neighbouring states ? 11
4. What led to the downfall of the mighty empire? 11

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 11

3. SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION 11

2
1. CHARLES RIVER EDITORS, THE PARTHIAN
EMPIRE: THE HISTORY AND CULTURE OF ONE OF
ANCIENT ROME'S MOST FAMOUS ENEMIES . 12

PARTHIANS 51

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PARTHIANS 53

EXPANSION AND CONSOLIDATION 54

RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING STATES 58

Relations during the Republic 58
Relations during the Julio-Claudian dynasty 59
Relations during the Flavian dynasty 60
Relations in Late Antiquity 60

GOVERNMENT AND WORKING ( ADMINISTRATION) 62

Central authority and semi-autonomous kings 62
Nobility 63
Military 65
Currency 66
Society and culture 67
Hellenism and the Iranian revival 67
Religion 69
Art and architecture 70
Clothing and apparel 72
Language 72
Writing and literature 73

DOWNFALL OF THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE 74

3
CONCLUSION ANND SUGGESTION 75

BIBLIOGRAPHY 77

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

CHAPTER 1:
.5
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 2:
.........9
CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

CHAPTER 3 :
...12
ANTECEDENT OF CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

CHAPTER 4:
...26
ORIGIN AND EXTERNAL COURSE OF CONTINENTAL SYSTEM
CHAPTER 5:
...30
WORKING OF CONTINENTAL SYSTEM
CHAPTER6:.................33

4
PROBLEMS $ EFFECTS IN CONTINENTAL SYTEM
CHAPTER 7:
...37
DECLINE OF CONTINENTAL SYSTEM
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
BIBLIOGRAPHY

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single

Any project completed or done in isolation is unthinkable. This project, although prepared
by me, is a culmination of efforts of a lot of people. Firstly, I would like to thank Dr.
Priyadarshni Mamour Professor Miss priyadarshni for, helping me makein making the
project on Parthians andcontinental system for her valuable suggestions towards the making
of this sameproject.

Further to that, I would also like to express my gratitude towards myour seniors who helped
medid a lot in furtherance of help for the completion of this project. The contributions made
by my classmates and friends are, definitely, worth mentioning.

I would like to express my gratitude towards the library staff for their help also. I would also
like to thank the persons asked for help by me without whose support this project would not
have been completed.

Maitreya Saha.

6
Last, but far from the least, I would express my gratitude towards the Almighty for obvious
reasons.

7
 INTRODUCTION

Parthia is a historical region located in north-eastern The Continental System or Continental

Blockade (known in French as Blocus continental) was the Iranforeign policy. It was the Field Code Changed

political and cultural base of the Arsacid dynasty, rulers of the of Parthian EmpireNapoleon Field Code Changed

I of France (247 BC 224 AD). The name "Parthia" is a continuation from in his struggle
against LatinGreat Britain Parthia, from during the Old PersianNapoleonic Wars Parthava, Field Code Changed

which was the . As a response to the naval blockade of the French coasts enacted by the Field Code Changed

British government on 16 May 1806, Napoleon issued the Parthian languageBerlin Decree. Field Code Changed

The Parthian Empire (247 BC 224 AD), also known as the Arsacid Empire was a major
on 21 November 1806, which brought into effect a large-scale embargo against British
[Link] embargo was effective intermittently for about half the time. It ended on 11
April 1814 after Napoleon's first abdication. In terms of economic damage to Great Britain,
the blockade was largely ineffective. As Napoleon realized that extensive trade was going
through Spain and Russia, he invaded those two countries. His forces were tied down in
Spain in which the IranianSpanish War of Independence political and cultural power Field Code Changed

in ancient Iran and Iraq, Its latter name comes from Arsaces I of Parthia . The Parthian
civilization was a dominant feature of the ancient near East for some five centuries, and yet
relatively little is known about it today. But it is established that in the mid-third century
BC, a bold and rebellious leader by the name Arsaces, also the leader of the Parni tribe,
founded it when he conquered the region of Parthia in Iran's northeast, then
a satrapy(province) in rebellion against the Seleucid Empire challenged Hellenic rule and
led his armies to victory. The dynasty which he founded ruled over what became a mighty
empire and restored the glory of Iran following the regions conquest by Alexander the
Great. Mithridates I of Parthia (171138 BC) greatly expanded the empire by
seizing Media and Mesopotamia from the Seleucids. At its height, the Parthian Empire
stretched from the northern reaches of the Euphrates, in what is now central-eastern Turkey,
to eastern Iran. The empire, located on the Silk Road trade route between the Roman
Empire in the Mediterranean Basin and the Han Empire of China, became a center of trade
and commerce. The earliest enemies of the Parthians were the Seleucids in the west and
the Scythians in the east. However, as Parthia expanded westward, they came into conflict
with the Kingdom of Armenia, and eventually the late Roman Republic. Rome and Parthia
competed with each other to establish the kings of Armenia as their subordinate clients. This
imperial eastern superpower, which lasted for 400 years and withstood the might of Rome
for centuries. The Parthian were nomadic horse-warriors who left few written records,
concentrating rather on a rich oral and storytelling tradition. Native Parthian sources, written
in Parthian, Greek and other languages, are scarce when compared other sources. aside from
scattered cuneiform tablets, fragmentary ostraca, rock inscriptions, drachma coins, and the
chance survival of some parchment documents, much of Parthian history is only known
through external sources. These include mainly Greek and Roman histories, but

8
also Chinese histories Frequent civil wars between Parthian contenders to the throne proved
more dangerous to the Empire's stability than foreign invasion, and Parthian dominance
came to a closure when Ardashir I, ruler of Estakhr in Fars, revolted against the Arsacids
and killed their last ruler, Artabanus V, in 224 AD. Ardashir established the Sassanid
Empire, which ruled Iran and much of the Near East until the Muslim conquests of the 7th
century AD.

was occurring simultaneously and suffered severely in, and ultimately retreated from,
Russia in 1812.

The Berlin Decree forbade the import of British goods into European countries allied with or
dependent upon France, and installed the Continental System in Europe. All connections
were to be cut, even the mail. British merchants smuggled in many goods and the
Continental System was not a powerful weapon of economic [Link] was some damage
to British trade, especially in 1808 and 1811, but its control of the oceans led to replacement
trade with North and South America, as well as large scale smuggling in Europe. The loss of
Britain as a trading partner also hit the economies of France and its allies. Angry
governments gained an incentive to ignore the Continental System, which led to the
weakening of Napoleon's coalition1

(A).AIMS AND OBJECTIVES Formatted: Font: +Headings (Cambria), 14 pt

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The researcher aims to know:

1
Continental system(15april,10:00 am)
Available at : [Link]

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 1. About continental system.

2. Napoleon Bonaparte and critically analysecontinental system

3. Problem in continental system

4. Effects of continental system.

(B).HYPOTHESIS

Before proceeding to this project work the Parthian Empire, by lookingresearcher has Formatted: Font: (Default) +Headings (Cambria), Font
color: Text 1, Pattern: Clear
formulated following hypothesis:
1. There was the use of bringing continental system into all the important aspects that Formatted: Normal (Web), Left, Space Before: 0 pt, After:
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led to the origin there after growth and finally the reason for the downfall of the mighty Pattern: Clear (White)
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empire. existence.
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Pattern: Clear

2. (BContinental system was napoleon Bonapartes biggest mistake.

(C).SCOPES AND LIMITATIONS Formatted: Heading 1

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Accent 1

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The researcher is a scholar who has limited time period of 1 month to carry out this project Formatted: Font: Times New Roman, 12 pt
work .So the researcher used some limited booksbook and websites for Formatted: Font: (Default) +Body (Calibri), 11 pt
completionaccomplishment of this project work. Formatted: Font: Times New Roman, 12 pt
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(C

(D).RESEARCH QUESTIONS Formatted: Heading 1

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Formatted: Heading 1, Tab stops: Not at 0.21"
The researcher has following research questions:

1. What was the historical backdropimportance of continental system?

2. What was the origincause of bringing continental system into existence?
1. What was the Parthian Empire?
2. What were the factorseffect of growth of the Empire?
3. What were the relationship with neighbouring states continental system?
4. What led to the downfall of the mighty empirewas the problem in continental
system?

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Formatted: Font: Times New Roman, 12 pt, Font color: Blue
Formatted: Font: Times New Roman, 12 pt, Font color: Blue

The researcher has used doctrinal method of research for accomplishment of this project
work. The researcher relied on the resources available in theNilayan Library of Chankaya
National Law University for doctrinal sources.

3. SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION Formatted: Font: Times New Roman, 12 pt, Font color: Blue
Formatted: Font: Times New Roman, 12 pt, Font color: Blue

The researcher has used secondary source of data collection for fulfillmentfulfilment of
requisite material relevant for this project work.
SECONDARY SOURCE :

Secondary source :

11
 1. Books: Aaslestad, Katherine B., and Johan Joor, eds. Revisiting Napoleons
Continental System: Local, Regional and European Experiences (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2014). Wide-ranging essays by experts Charles River Field Code Changed
Editorsexcerpt, The Parthian Empire: The History and Culture of One of Ancient
Rome's Most Famous Enemies .
2. Parthia:the forgotten ancient super power and its role in biblical history(the lost
tribes of Israel by Steven M Collins.
3. Israels Lost Empires by Steven M Collins

REFERENCES

An, Jiayao (2002), "When Glass Was Treasured in China", in Juliano, Annette L.
and Judith A. Lerner, Silk Road Studies: Nomads, Traders, and Holy Men Along
China's Silk Road, 7, Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, pp. 7994,
Breunig, Charles. The Age of Revolution and Reaction 1789-1850 (1970), Chapter 2
Broers, Michael. Europe Under Napoleon (IB Tauris, 2014).
Crouzet, Franois. "Wars, blockade, and economic change in Europe, 17921815."
Journal of Economic History 24#4 (1964): 567-588. ISBNin JSTOR Field Code Changed
Heckscher, Eli. The continental system: an economic interpretation (1922), the only
global survey of the Continental System

Ruppenthal, Roland. "Denmark and the Continental System." Journal of Modern

History 15.1 (1943): 7-23. 2-503-52178-9in JSTOR. Field Code Changed

Asmussen, J.P. (1983), "Christians in Iran", in Yarshater, Ehsan, Cambridge History

of Iran, 3.2, London & New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 924948,

References

David stephen heidler; jeanne t. heidler (january 2004). ISBNencyclopedia of the war of Field Code Changed
1812 . naval institute press. p. 48. 0-521-20092-Xisbn. Field Code Changed

1. Ball, Warwick (2016), Rome in the East: Transformation of an Empire, 2nd Edition,
London & New York: Routledge, ISBN978-1-59114-362-8 . Field Code Changed

978-0-415-72078-6Jean tulard. Field Code Changed

2. Bausani, Alessandro (1971), The Persians, from the earliest days to the twentieth
century, New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 41, , napolon, hachette, 2008, p.207
3. Paul w. schroeder, the transformation of european politics 17631848 (1994) pp
305-10

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 4. Alexander grab, napoleon and the transformation of europe (2003) pp 2933

ISBNFranois crouzet , "wars, blockade, and economic change in europe, 17921815." Field Code Changed
978-0-236-17760-8journal of economic history. Field Code Changed

1. Bickerman, Elias (1964) 24#4 pp 567588 jstor 2115762.

2. Holberg, tom the acts, orders in council, &c. of great britain (on trade), 1793 - 1812
3. a. n. ryan, "the causes of the british attack upon copenhagen in 1807." english
historical review (1953): 37-55. in jstor
4. Thomas munch-petersen, defying napoleon: how britain bombarded copenhagen and
seized the danish fleet in 1807 (2007)
5. J. (1983), "m. thompson, napoleon bonaparte: his rise and fall (1951) pp 235-40 Formatted: HTML Cite, Font: (Default) +Body (Calibri), 11
pt, Font color: Custom Color(RGB(37,37,37))
6. Alexander grab and charles f. delzell, "the kingdom of italy and napoleon's
continental blockade," consortium on revolutionary europe 1750-1850: proceedings
(1988), vol. 18, pp 587-604.
7. Portugal; jos ferreira borges de castro (visconde de); julio firmino judice biker
(1857). supplemeto colleco dos tratados, convenes, contratos e actos publicos
celebrados entre a cora de portugal e as mais potencias desde 1640. imprensa
nacional. portugal. ministrio dos negcios estrangeiros. pp. 1925.
8. Eric a. arnold, jr. "napoleon's st. cloud decree, 3 july 1810: text and analysis,"
proceedings of the western society for french history (1998, vol. 25, pp 49-54..

13
 CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

After his Navy was destroyed at Trafalgar in 1805, Napoleon realized that if his empire was
ever going to be secure, he would have to defeat Britain. With his navy gone, Napoleon
knew a direct assault on island was for the time impossible, so he decided to wage economic
war against the "nation of shopkeepers", as he called the British. His plan to bring Britain to
its knees was called the Continental System. British goods were to be restricted from
entering Europe. Napoleon demanded that his empire close its ports from British goods, and
he got the Russians, Austrians, and Prussians to cooperate in the Continental System.
Without having the European market to buy up its manufactures, Napoleon hoped Britain
would undergo a severe depression, hurting the nation's economy and ability to maintain
such a powerful navy. Meanwhile, Napoleon was building ships of his own. Napoleon
wanted to hobble the British economy and give France a chance to build up its own
manufacturing and industry.

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The Seleucid Period", in Yarshater, Ehsan, Cambridge History of Iran, [Link] System pt, Font color: Custom Color(RGB(37,37,37))
began in 1806 with Napoleon's Berlin Decree, which banned British ships from entering
European ports. Britain, full of savvy traders, made a concerted effort to undermine the
Continental System by contracting out its shipments to neutral vessels. Napoleon next issued
the Milan Decree in December 1807. This harsh decree, aimed against smuggling, stated
that neutral ships that stopped in Britain before landing in Europe were subject to
confiscation.

14
Britain's retaliated through sea power, creating a blockade of all European ships. If Europe
wouldn't allow British ships to dock at European ports, Britain wouldn't allow European
ships to sail on what was then Britain's ocean.

The other nations of Europe were willing to side with Napoleon in the Continental system
because for the most part they did dislike Britain. Britain was wealthy, rapidly
industrialized, and isolationist. Cranking out textiles on their small island, the British rapidly
became the wealthiest nation in Europe. Using its naval dominance, England built up
colonies and trade networks for its manufactures that were the envy of all of Europe. So
when Napoleon demanded that a Europe- wide boycott of British goods take place under his
Continental System, there were many who were glad for a chance to cut Britain down to
size.

The British blockade preventing European ships from sailing was not intended to "starve"
Europe or make it suffer in any direct sense. Europe was capable of producing its own food
and its own weapons without British help. Britain's real goal was to stop France and its allies
from trading throughout Europe using shipping. In these days, there were no railways, so
most transfer of goods from city to city and country-to-country was accomplished by boat.
Unable to trade by sea routes, goods had to be moved about in Europe by wagons, a slower,
more difficult means of transport use that were particularly poor for crossing mountainous
areas. The British blockade thus severely handicapped internal European trading, which
needed sea-shipping to operate at full capacity.

It is interesting to think of Napoleon's Continental System as an early kind of European

Economic Community (EEC), where the nations of Europe banded together to strengthen
their economy against underselling by an outside force (in Napoleon's period, Britain). The
major goal of the Continental System, like the EEC, was to improve Europe's economy and
give it more leverage in trading. 2

The Continental System or Continental Blockade (known in French as Blocus

continental) was the foreign policy of Napoleon I of France in his struggle against Great
Britain during the Napoleonic Wars. As a response to the naval blockade of the French
coasts enacted by the British government on 16 May 1806, Napoleon issued the Berlin
Decree on 21 November 1806, which brought into effect a large-scale embargo against

2
Wild, Antony. Coffee: A Dark History. New York: W.W. Norton, 2005. 144-47.

15
British trade. The embargo was effective intermittently for about half the time. It ended on
11 April 1814 after Napoleon's first abdication. In terms of economic damage to Great
Britain, the blockade was largely ineffective. As Napoleon realized that extensive trade was
going through Spain and Russia, he invaded those two countries. His forces were tied down
in Spain in which the Spanish War of Independence was occurring simultaneously and
suffered severely in, and ultimately retreated from, Russia in 1812.

The Berlin Decree forbade the import of British goods into European countries allied with or
dependent upon France, and installed the Continental System in Europe. All connections
were to be cut, even the mail. British merchants smuggled in many goods and the
Continental System was not a powerful weapon of economic war. There was some damage
to British trade, especially in 1808 and 1811, but its control of the oceans led to replacement
trade with North and South America, as well as large scale smuggling in Europe. The loss of
Britain as a trading partner also hit the economies of France and its allies. Angry
governments gained an incentive to ignore the Continental System, which led to the
weakening of Napoleon's coalition.3

3
Cavindish, Richard. "The Treaty of Tilsit." History Today 57.7 (2007): 62-63. World History Collection.
Web. 14 Nov. 2012 .

16
 ANTECEDENTS OF CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

The Continental System is a unique measure to which a country resorts for the purpose of
crushing a political enemy by economic means and at the same time building up its own
commercial and industrial prosperity to an extent previously undreamt of. The will to injure
one's enemy and to benefit one's own country is, therefore, a matter to be taken for granted
beforehand, and consequently does not require much elucidation. That will is seldom
lacking in the life of nations, least of all when they are at war, and was evidently bound to
attain an unusual intensity in a statesman of the character of Napoleon, who throughout his
career renounced all moral traditions and made self-assertion his loftiest lodestar. What we
have here to investigate and elucidate, therefore, is not mainly these simple aims of policy,
but rather, if one may put it so, the means to those ends; or, to express it more clearly, what
friends and foes conceive to be gain and loss in the sphere of economics, that is, what kind
of economic changes they regard as beneficial and as detrimental. These matters are very far
from self-evident even at the present time, although they have been the subject of protracted
scientific treatment; and they were obviously still less self-evident a hundred years ago. If
we wish to understand the nature of the Continental System, therefore, we must first
consider the body of ideas whence it proceeded; and if we wish to understand its effects, we
must further consider those ideas with reference to their true economic connexions. Only in
that way, too, can we form a clear idea of the similarities and dissimilarities of the
Continental System with respect to the blockade policy pursued during the recent World

17
War; for the aim to injure the enemy and benefit the home country is to be taken for granted
as much in our own time as it was in the time of Napoleon.
In order to form a correct understanding of the antecedent conditions of the Continental
4
System, in the meaning just given, we must point especially to one feature of the
mercantilist point of view whence it sprang, namely, to what we may call its static
conception of economic life. If, for instance, we refer to one of the most clear-headed and
consistent of the mercantilist statesmen, namely, Colbert, we learn from many of his
writings that he conceived the industry, trade, shipping, and bullion resources of the world
as quantities given once for all, which, therefore, could not be appreciably increased or
decreased by human activity. Under such a conception it is obvious that there can be but one
conclusion, viz., that the economic prosperity of a country depends on its power to deprive
its competitors of their shares of the given quantity, and not on its power to increase the total
quantity. That is to say, only at the expense of others can a country be rich.5

It is not difficult to understand to what kind of economic policy such a conception would
naturally lead. It led to the policy of commercial war; and without any great exaggeration we
may say with the well-known German economic historian, Professor Schmoller, that the
trade policy of former times consisted of an unbroken series of commercial blockades. 6This,
then, was the body of ideas in which the Continental System originated, in so far as
commercial wars, in the current view of that time, were bound to seem economically
profitable to an extent that can scarcely be appreciated by any tolerably clear-minded person
of to-day.

All this, however, does not explain of what the benefit and profit of commercial war, on the
one hand, and the injury and loss on the other, were supposed to consist. But on this point,
too, the mercantilist conception gave all the guidance necessary. Profit was supposed to
consist in the augmentation of exports, in forcing the goods of one's own country on other
countries; loss, in allowing other countries to force goods on one's own country. Industry,
trade, navigation, that is, economic activity in general, were in a way regarded as ends in

4
Salomon, William Pitt der jngere (Leipzig and Berlin, 1906), vol.I, [Link], pp.205 ,( 16 april, 12:00 am).

5
Levasseur, Histoire des classes ouvrires et de l'industrie en France avant 1789 (Paris, 1901), vol. II, pp.
546( 16 april,10:00am).

6
Chaptal, De l'industrie franoise (Paris, 1819), vol. I, p. xvi; Levasseur, Histoire des classes ouvrires et de
l'industrie en France de 1789 1870 (Paris, 1903), vol. I, p. 405.( 16 april,11:00 am).

18
themselves. The goods that were their fruits, so to speak, were to be exported so far as
possible, if they belonged to one's own country, and to be kept out so far as possible, if they
belonged to other countries. The verdict of the balance of tradeincluding, however, the
balance of payments for freightage, &[Link] the result. Modern economists are far
more familiar with this trend of thought than they are with the static conception of things.
Even in our own day 'the natural man' reasons in this way; and this reasoning, so far as one
can see, is substantially a fruit of the ideas contributed to history during the mercantilist
period.

All this makes clear, not only the existence, but also the tendency, of commercial wars.
Their object was necessarily to force the greatest possible amount of one's own goods into
the enemy's country, and, so far as possible, to prevent the enemy from introducing goods
into one's own country. Inasmuch as this, precisely because of the conception indicated, was
the object of trade policy even in time of peace, the transition from peace to war was very
easily effected; and for that reason 7we undoubtedly meet with a consistency in the trade
policy of that time which, strictly speaking, is lacking in our own time. Nowadays, as in the
days of mercantilism, most states, guided by the economic perceptions of the average man,
labour in time of peace to render difficult the importation of foreign goods, and at the same
time to force their own products on the world market, (although in reality this is
incompatible with the former aim). In time of war, however, they suddenly swerve around,
either to the inverted standpoint of encouraging imports and hampering exports, or, in
general terms, of preventing all trade with the enemy. This statement does not, of course,
imply any judgment as to which policy has the greater justification; it is merely an assertion
of the at least seemingly greater inconsistency of our present procedure.

An important part of what follows will be devoted to the investigation of the question as to
whether and to what extent the older procedure may be expected to accomplish its
purposethe crushing of the enemy by economic means. And in that connexion it will be
shown that, while the older tendency in war time was in close harmony with commercial
policy in peace time, its relation to the generally observed rules and methods of naval
warfare was far more inconsistent.

7
Schmidt, Les dbuts de l'industrie cotonnire en France, 1760-1806, in Revue d'histoire conomique et
sociale (Paris, 1914), vol. VII, pp. 26 et seq.; Ballot, Les prts aux manufactures, in Revue des tudes
napoloniennes (Paris, 1912), vol. II, p. 45.

19
 COMMERCIAL POLICY

To begin with, however, it seems expedient to trace in some detail the evolution of
commercial policy during the century before the Continental System, with special reference
to the development of that sphere of activity to which the great trade blockade was
especially to be applied, namely, the commercial relations between Great Britain and
France.

BEGINNING OF ANGLO-FRENCH COMMERCIAL WAR (1660-1786)

England and France, as is well known, had been adversaries, with certain more or less
lengthy intervals, from the early Middle Ages; and after mercantilism had become firmly
established in both countries, it was inevitable that the commercial policy of both should
come to be marked by the efforts and tendencies to which we have just referred. To go back
no further than the middle of the seventeenth century, we find evidences of antagonism in
the customs regulations at least from 1660 on; and after 1678, when the two countries were
on the verge of actual war, we may regard commercial war and mutual embargo simply as
the normal state of relations between them. After the deposition of the House of Stuart and
the outbreak of war between England and France in 1689, there was a further intensification
of the antagonism; and with the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession, in 1701, the
commercial war may be said to have assumed its definitive form. In connexion with the
Peace of Utrecht, in 1713, a famous attempt was made to settle the commercial conflict, as
well as the political differences, by means of a commercial treaty; and good-will was not
wholly lacking either on the French side or on the side of the 8Tory government then
established in Great Britain. But in other British circles, especially among merchants and
manufacturers, the opposition was too strong, and the treaty was consequently deprived of
the two clauses which gave it its importance, that is, the clause concerning mutual treatment
as the most favoured nation and the clause concerning the mutual abolition of all
prohibitions and customs restrictions introduced since 1664, or, in certain cases, since 1699.
The result was that the embargo was maintained on both sides, without any noteworthy
interruptions, throughout the greater part of the eighteenth century, or for a period of more
than a hundred years.

8
Levasseur, Histoire des classes ouvrires, &c., de 1789 1870, vol. I, pp. 38 et seq.; Schmidt, Le Grand-
duch de Berg, 1806-1813 (Paris, 1905), pp. 326-7.( 16 april,01:00 am).

20
An elucidation of the nature of this hundred years' commercial war between France and
Great Britain is essential to a correct understanding of the origin and development of the
Continental System. In England, for instance, all importation of French wine, vinegar,
brandy, linen, cloth, silk, salt, and paper, and also of all manufactures containing French
silk, thread, wool, hair, gold, silver, or leather, was prohibited in [Link] law itself
condemned importation from France, in principle, as 'a common nuisance', and provided that
the French goods were to be destroyed and not allowed to enter, even if they had been
captured by English war-ships or privateers. After 1685, however, when this direct
persecution of French goods was abandoned and replaced by the establishment of a large
number of additional customs duties,a number of severe measures followed on the part of
France. Accordingly, when war actually broke out, in 1689, England returned to the
principles of 1678. In due form she introduced a general prohibition on the importation of
French goods and ordered that all liquid goods that were captured should be poured into the
rivers or the sea, or be 'staved, spilt, and destroyed' at the place where they were stored; also
that all cloths, paper, salt, &c., should be publicly burned.

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the protectionist nature of 9 these measures, the main object
of which was to prevent French products from competing with domestic products in the
English market. Later on, France, which as a rule seems to have been somewhat slower to
act, proceeded to adopt similar measures, especially after the outbreak of the new war in
1701. Thus when Adam Smith, who among other things was a Scottish commissioner of
customs, entered into a detailed discussion of Anglo-French trade policy in the third edition
of his famous work more than eighty years afterwards, he felt justified in stating that, quite
apart from the multitude of import prohibitions, especially on all kinds of textiles, the
majority of the French imports before the outbreak of the new war in 1778, were assessed by
the British customs to the extent of at least 75 per cent. of the value of the goods involved,
and that, as a rule, this was equivalent to a formal prohibition.

SMUGGLING

Such, then, was the nature of commercial policy in the eighteenth century, in so far as it is
revealed in the customs regulations of that time. But no idea of the economic conditions of
former days could be more erroneous than that which is conveyed by the content of such
prohibitions and restrictions. The regulations, as a matter of fact, constitute merely an

9
Sderqvist, Le blocus maritime (Stockholm, 1908), pp. 44-5( 16 april ,02:00 am).

21
expression of what the holders of power wished to see realized, and accordingly may be said
to illustrate, primarily, nothing more than the economic views of the time. As regards the
actual situation, we may safely assume that it was quite different from what the authorities
had in view, since otherwise the regulations would not have been necessary; and if we find
them repeated at short intervals, as is usually the case, we may further assume that this was
due to the fact that they were not complied with. In point of fact, the only exceptions to this
10
principle are certain codifications of an already established system of law. These often
express a phase that has already passed, it is true, but they nevertheless always have
something to correspond to them in the world of realities, which is by no means the case
with the innumerable ordinances of the regulative or creative type.

In the sphere of trade policy it is well known that smuggling played a very important rle.
We do not know, for obvious reasons, the exact extent to which it was carried on, but there
can be no doubt that it was of frequent and widespread occurrence. According to
contemporary opinion, indeed, it was almost as extensive as legitimate trade; and Adam
Smith calculated that the commercial intercourse between Great Britain and France, which
was exceptionally hampered by the customs regulations, was even principally carried on by
smugglers. Thus it hardly entered people's minds that the prohibited foreign goods should be
really unobtainable in the countries concerned. After the Peace of Versailles in 1783, for
instance, everything English came into fashion in France, and prohibited goods were
imported in great quantities, in spite of the fact that the French customs officials, according
to the French economic historian, Emile Levasseur, carried their strictness so far as to seize
the wearing apparel of travellers and hold it pending their departure from the country.

ANGLO-FRENCH COMMERCIAL TREATY OF 1786 (EDEN TREATY)

The author of this departure from the century-old commercial policy was the Comte de
Vergennes. He was quelque peu disciple des philosophes, and it was especially because of
the physiocratic views he shared with certain politically influential circles in France that he
was able to accomplish his purpose. For as physiocracy attached foremost importance to
agriculture, it was only natural that French statesmen were able to create substantial
facilities for the importation of the industrial products which England was eager to sell, in
return for facilities for the exportation of the agricultural products which she was no less

10
Lydia Wahlstrm, Sverige och England under revolutionskrigens brjar (Stockholm, 1917), pp. 192-3;
Parliamentary History, vol. XXXII, pp. 235-6.( 16 april,03:00am).

22
eager to buy. Vergennes, undoubtedly of set purpose, neglected to find out the opinion of
French industrial circles; and there is no doubt that this was later on one of the starting-
points of the disapproval of his work. In England the efforts to establish better trade
connexions between the two countries met with great sympathy, and that, too, precisely
among those elements of the population which had brought to naught the commercial treaty
of 1713. As was shown by a far-reaching inquiry conducted in Great Britain, the
representatives 11of almost all industries were eager for increased sales in the French market,
especially because of their desire to make up for the loss which they believed themselves
incorrectly, as a matter of factto have sustained through the cutting off of the American
market by the secession of the colonies; and with very few exceptions they scoffed at the
idea of danger arising from French competition in the home market. The British statesmen
were naturally much impressed by this attitude, but at the same time they were by no means
uninfluenced by the views of the economic theorists.
It was in England that the new ideas, which had gradually gained more and more
predominance in both countries in the course of the eighteenth century, received their for all
time classical synthesis in Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations (1776), which riddled with
criticism the unreasonableness and inconsistency of the old system that existed on paper,
especially in the form it assumed in the commercial relations between Great Britain and
France. Adam Smith's thesis was that 'a nation that would enrich itself by foreign trade is
certainly most likely to do so when its neighbours are all rich, industrious, and commercial
nations', inasmuch as the international exchange of goods was thereby rendered all the more
profitable. The applicability of this to France is apparent, and of special interest is the
comparison drawn between the trade with the large and near-by French market, on the one
hand, which permitted a turnover of business capital several times a year, and the boasted
and until then in every way favoured trade with the thinly populated and remote North
American colonies, on the other, where the return from invested capital was not made until
after the lapse of several years. Through the American War of Independence this
comparison received an appositeness which Adam Smith himself certainly did not foresee.

The result of these new forces was the Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1786 (often
called the Eden Treaty, after the name of its English negotiator), which put an end to the
hundred years' commercial war between the two western powers. During the negotiations

11
Stephen, War in Disguise: or, the Frauds of the Neutral Flags (Piggott ed., London, 1917), pp. 106-7.( 16
april,04:00 am).

23
Pitt had stood firmly on his ground, with the result that in the final settlement the British
forced compliance with practically all their demands, while the French allowed nearly all
theirs to drop. Customs duties were lowered all along the line, usually down to 10 or 15 per
cent. of the value of the goods, and prohibitions on imports were abolished. On the other
hand, almost the only British industry which was still uneasy about French competition,
namely, the silk industry, had its demands respected to the extent of nothing less than a total
prohibition on the importation of French silks into England.

But it was soon to prove that this somewhat belated breach with the century-old restrictive
policy had no support in French public opinion, least of all in industrial circles. Indeed, one
may go so far as to say that it was precisely this departure from the tradition of commercial
war that led to a renewal of the old policy after the French Revolution. The Eden Treaty,
which was 12signed less than three years before the convening of the French States General
on May 5, 1789, in fact occupied almost from the very beginning a foremost place in the
long list of sins imputable to the ancien rgime. The French textile industries, especially the
cotton industry, had as early as the 'eighties managed to benefit by the great technical
revolution in England, mainly by attracting British foremen and machinery to French mills;
but, naturally enough, they were not yet anything like equal to their teacher. Besides this, it
was alleged by the French that the value of British wares declared at the customs was so
much understated that the duty fell from the nominal 10 or 15 per cent. to an actual 2 or 3
per cent.; and at the same time British manufacturers were said to increase the prices of raw
materials in France through the making of extensive purchases there. The French calico,
woollen, pottery, steel, and leather industries complained bitterly of British competition and
of the general unemployment for which it was held responsible. Even the Lyons silk
industry worked under great difficulties, which could not be attributed to any British
competition, to be sure, but which at all events were in no manner lessened by the treaty
with its retention of the British prohibitions. Bitterest of all were the complaints that
emanated from the textile towns in the north of FranceAmiens, Abbeville, Sedan, Rouen,
Rheims, Chlons-sur-Marne. Their protests were also embodied in the famous cahiers, in
which the French people in 1789 gave expression to their feelings in all branches of activity.
Moreover, it has been observed that Robespierre, one of the sworn enemies of Great Britain
during the Revolution, was a representative of the province of Artois and in such capacity

12
Holm, Danmark-Norges udenrigske Historie fra 1791 til 1807 (Copenhagen, 1875), vol. I, p. 231; Stephen,
op. cit., p. 170.
( 16 april,05:00 am).

24
voiced the dislike that was there fostered against British competition. But the feeling against
the Eden Treaty was by no means confined to these regions. It is really only with regard to
the wine district that we meet with any attitude of satisfaction toward the new policy; and it
is highly significant that the cahiers of the city of Paris, for instance, contained a demand
that the treaty should be submitted to the States General because of the revolutionary
13
changes it had involved and the vigorous protests it had evoked from all parts of the
country. Public opinion, indeed, was unanimous in attributing the severe industrial crisis of
1788 to the Eden Treaty, which was called the death-warrant of French industry. An
inspector of manufactures even went so far as to compare its detrimental effects with those
that had followed the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, which had played havoc
with a great deal of the work done by Colbert and his predecessors.

Thus there could be scarcely any doubt as to the political effects of this first departure from
the policy of commercial war; and it is this aspect of the matter which is of prime
importance in this connexion. It is quite another question whether the Eden Treaty, even for
the moment, was actually responsible for the placing of French economic life upon the low
level where it was destined to remain, with a short interruption, during the revolutionary and
Napoleonic periods. Severe as was the crisis to which it gave rise, there can be little doubt
that precisely the last years of the ancien rgime were characterized by exceptional
prosperity especially, but by no means exclusively, for French trade, and that during the
following ten or fifteen years Frenchmen looked back to this period as the zenith of their
country's economic development. Even as regards industry, it is a fact that not even the
flourishing period of the Consulate (1799-1804) elevated it to anything like the same height
that it had attained under the ancien rgime.11 Moreover, the difficulties created by free
intercourse consequently appear to have been exaggerated. There are positive evidences of
certain wholesome effects on French industry which must be connected with the increased
intercourse with Great Britain. Thus, in 1787, the year of the ratification of the treaty, there
was set up in France (Orlans)naturally by an Englishmanthe first steam-driven cotton
spinning [Link], in the Constituent Assembly we find a muslin manufacturer from
Versailles (1790), as well as a silk manufacturer from Lyons (1791), stating that the
development of French industry, after the difficulties of the first years, had increased apace
under the stimulus of British competition, and that in many cases French manufacturers had

13
Stephen, op. cit., pp. 60 et seq., 90, 195, et al.; Emory Johnson and others, History of the Domestic and
Foreign Commerce of the United States (Washington, 1915), vol. II, p. 23; Parliamentary History, vol. XXXV,
p. 916; Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol. XXIII, pp. 8, 42-3. ( 16 april,06:00 am).

25
succeeded in imitating and, by means of cheaper labour, in actually underselling their British
competitors. This may or may not be a more faithful picture of the actual situation than that
created by the innumerable complaints; but at all events it seems only natural that a more
lively intercourse with Great Britain should have facilitated the spread of new ideas and
inventions. But to this, as to other things, there applies a truth which is far too often
overlooked, namely, that the economic policy of a country is not determined by actual
economic conditions but by the popular ideas concerning those conditionswhich is
manifestly quite another matter.14

The commercial policy of the Revolution, therefore, very soon returned to the traditions
established before 1786. Of recent investigators we may refer especially to M. Albert Sorel,
who in his monumental work, L'Europe et la rvolution franaise (1885-1904), seeks with
exhaustive, though somewhat exhausting, persistence to maintain and emphasize the
consistency of French policy before and after the Revolution. In nearly all the departments
of foreign policy he represents the French revolutionaries of different shades as unconscious
successors of Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV, and as equally unconscious predecessors
of Napoleon, whose ideas and measures are therefore also represented as almost entirely in
line with the traditional policy of France. Sorel has undoubtedly exaggerated the
predestination of this development, as Professor Hjrne has pointed out in his noteworthy
book, Revolutionen och Napoleon (Stockholm, 1911); and in general it is undoubtedly true
that the deepest conception does not consist in representing the same dramatis personae as
constantly reappearing in different costumes. But in the economic spherewhich does not
stand out very much in Sorel's work, with its marked bias in favour of foreign policythe
connexion with the past is very strongly emphasized. As is well known, the men of the
Revolution derived their strongest impressions from Rousseau, and, so far as one can see,
they were very little impressed either by physiocracy or by British liberalism. Consequently
they stood, unconsciously, but almost entirely, under the all-pervading influence of the old
economic conception. Thus it was almost in the nature of things that the Eden Treaty not
only should be treated as an isolated episode, but should positively hasten a return to the old
systemespecially inasmuch as the commercial reconciliation with Great Britain was the
work of none other than the discredited and despised ancien rgime.

14
Brodnitz, Englische Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Jena, 1918), vol. I, p. 140 .

26
Naturally enough, however, it was the general political situation which was chiefly
responsible for the return to the policy of commercial war; and consequently some few years
elapsed before the change was made. In 1791 the Constituent Assembly adopted a new
tariff, which, after great protectionist preparations, ultimately came to offer only a very
moderate amount of actual protection. France and Great Britain were then at peace, and both
were respecting the Eden Treaty. But the new tendency was even then asserting itself in
France, not only in the form of recurring complaints against British competition, but also in
the form of an actual raising of the customs rates on woollens and other textile goods
manufactured in the Duchy of Bergthe even then flourishing textile region on the eastern
side of the Rhine, which was destined to play an important part in the history of the
Continental System. In justification of these measures, whereby the importation of textiles
into France from the east was cut off, there was asserted the need of 'alleviating the
detrimental effects' of the Anglo-French treaty of 1786.

Great Britain, under Pitt's leadership, had as long as possible stood aloof from the struggle
against the French Revolution. But toward the end of 1792 the relations between the two
countries became very strained. Great Britain held up cargoes bound for French ports,
whereupon France retaliated by [25] denouncing the Eden Treaty. This was shortly after the
Formatted: HTML Cite, Font: 11 pt, Bold, Font color:
beginning of 1793; and on February 1, of that year, less than two weeks after the execution Custom Color(RGB(37,37,37))
of Louis XVI, war actually broke out. This precipitated both countries into a policy of
economic strangulation which was destined to last for more than twenty years and soon to
leave all its predecessors far behind. Under the Revolution, and to a certain extent under
Napoleon as well, this policy had two very closely interwoven sides, which, however, must
be kept separate for the present. One side consists of the blockade measures and the
generally rude treatment of maritime intercourse, in which Great Britain decidedly led the
way, but was very closely followed by France; and the other side consists of the compulsory
measures that were adopted specifically in the sphere of commercial policy. The latter
measures were of real importance only on the French side, as a matter of fact, since similar
measures on the British side would have been meaningless for the reason that French goods
could hardly have reached England without English co-operation. It is the latter policy
which we will first consider.15

15
Hansard, vol. IX, app., col. XV; Levasseur, Histoire des classes ouvrires, &c., avant 1789, vol. II, p. 554
note; Johnson and others, op. cit., vol. II, p. 20 .

27
RENEWAL OF ANGLO-FRENCH COMMERCIAL WAR (1793-1799)

On March 1, 1793, only a month after the outbreak of war, the measures of prohibition
began, and within a few months the Convention had passed almost all the laws that were
possible along that line. The first law of this kind passed by the Convention, which also
annulled all treaties previously entered into with enemy countries, prohibited
indiscriminately the importation of a large number of textile, metal, and earthenware goods
which were regarded as normally coming from Englandit was, of course, the home
manufacturers of these articles who had especially complained of British competitionbut
did not restrict the prohibition to goods coming from any specified country. With respect to
all goods not expressly exempted, however, it was stipulated that evidence should be
furnished that they did not come from an enemy country. This rendered necessary the use of
certificates of origin for certain goods, even [26] though they were indispensable to French
consumers and could not be obtained from neutral countries (especially sugar). Two or three
months later (May 19), accordingly, such goods had to be exempted. But the whole of this
first law was a mild warning in comparison with the outbreak of fury, harmonizing
completely with the spirit of the Reign of Terror, which on October 9 of the same year
(Vendmiaire 18, year II) appeared in the form of a law bearing the title: Loi qui proscrit du
sol de la rpublique toutes les marchandises fabriques ou manufactures dans les pays
soumis au gouvernement britannique. Its express application to Great Britain, one of the
enemies of France, is in itself significant, the whole law, as its title indicates, being a
straightforward proposal to persecute all British goods in the most drastic manner. It
imposed on every holder of British goods the obligation to declare them and hand them over
to the authorities, and provided that any customs official who allowed such goods to enter
the country would be liable to twenty years' imprisonment in irons; and the same
punishment was assigned to any person who imported, sold, or bought them. But even this
was not enough. The law further provided that anybody who wore or used British goods was
to be regarded as suspect and to be punished as such in accordance with the notorious loi des
suspects; that is to say, he might be arrested and imprisoned at any time. All posters or
notices couched in English and referring to stocks of British goods or containing British
trade marks or appellations, as also all newspapers announcing the sale of British goods,
were 'proscribed'; and the punishment in this case also was twenty years' imprisonment in
irons.

28
After the crisis of Thermidor and the fall of Robespierre early in 1795, the legislators again
retraced their steps to some extent by slightly lowering the duties on non-British goods. This
did not last long, however, since they were raised again by the Directory at the close of the
following year. On the whole it may be said that the rule of the Directory, from the autumn
of 1795 to the autumn of 1799, marked a return to the policy of the Reign of Terror, though
in a somewhat modified form throughout the entire economic domain. As a sign of welcome
to Lord Malmesbury, who visited Paris to negotiate peace, there was accordingly passed on
October 31, 1796 (Brumaire 10, year V), a law prohibiting the importation and sale of
British goods on an even larger scale than that established by the laws of 1793, inasmuch as
the prohibition was extended to cover goods that were derived, not only from British
industry, but also from British trade. And at the same time there was adoptedso far as is
known for the first time, but certainly not for the last timethe somewhat clumsy expedient
of declaring certain groups of goods to be British, quite irrespective of their real origin. Even
such goods as were brought into the country from captured or stranded vessels were not
allowed to remain there, but had to be promptly re-exported. The resemblance between this
and the above-mentioned regulations of the seventeenth century is unusually striking.
Moreover, nearly all the regulations of the year 1793 were renewed in substance, although
the provision concerning certificates of origin had again to be limited after a few months.
Only in regard to penalties was there a very considerable modification. Among the goods
which were always to be regarded as British was refined sugar; but now again, as in 1793,
its exclusion proved to be impossible, and the smuggling to which it gave rise finally
resulted, in 1799, in the prohibition being replaced by a high customs duty. Evidence of the
extent to which French legislators thought it possible to carry the persecution of everything
British is furnished by the fact that the importation of Geneva watches was prohibited on the
ground that they contained a small amount of steel presumed to be of British origin.16

Another link in the policy of commercial war was formed by the Navigation Act, which was
brought forward with great oratorical fanfare and was passed by the Convention on
September 21, 1793, the anniversary of the overthrow of the monarchy. In exact imitation of
the famous corner-stone of English maritime policy, the Navigation Act of the
Commonwealth of 1651, and also of earlier French ordinances, it forbade foreign vessels to
import any products other than those of their own country or to carry on coasting trade in
France. Moreover, by a supplementary law of October 18 (Vendmiaire 27, year II), all

.
16
Brodnitz, Englische Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Jena, 1918), vol. I, p. 140( 17 apeil,01:00pm ).

29
foreign vessels were saddled with dues about ten times as high as those imposed on French
vessels. There is a close analogy between these measures and those that were adopted during
the seventeenth and early part of the eighteenth centuries. The latter were directed chiefly
against the principal carrying country of the time, the Netherlands; and in the same manner
the law of the Convention was directed against the new commercial nation, Great Britain.
Perfide Albion came to occupy the same position in the popular imagination as its
predecessor, only it was regarded as still more dangerous owing to the great development of
its industries and political power.17

All these trade laws of the Revolution manifestly had the same double character as their
forerunners of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; that is to say, they were intended to
injure Great Britain by excluding her goods and vessels, and at the same time to serve as an
ultra-protectionist measure calculated to benefit French industries. According to the official
statement, the Directory's law of 1796 was designed to 'give new life to trade, restore
manufactures, and re-establish the workshops', and, on the other hand, 'to deprive our
enemies of their most important resource in waging war against us' and compel them to
make peace. In complete analogy with this, Barre, the trumpeter in ordinary of the
Convention, speaking in the name of the Committee of Public Safety, had justified the
Navigation Act partly on the ground that 'Carthage would thereby be destroyed''let us
decree a solemn Navigation Act,' he said, 'and the isle of shopkeepers will be ruined'and
partly on the ground that France would thereby multiply her industries, stimulate the
consumption of domestic products, create her own ship-building yards, build up a
flourishing mercantile marine, &c., &c. This, so to speak, dualistic character the Continental
System was destined to retain but at the same time to lead to an irremediable self-
contradiction.

Naturally it is true of the commercial blockades of the Revolution, as of those of earlier

times, that they were not even approximately maintained; the result was that smuggling
once more became one of the principal means of Anglo-French intercourse. Notwithstanding
the law of 1796, the practice seems to have grown up of importing British and other
prohibited goods on a large scale as captured goods. Disordered as every department of the
public administration was, one can not doubt that the authorities merely winked at all this;
and besides they were often obliged to mitigate the laws, as we have already seen, in order

17
Stephen in the House of Commons, Mar. 3, 1812, Hansard, vol. XXI, p. 1136.( 17 april,02:00pm).

30
to ensure some observance of them. An example of this was given by the Navigation Act,
which was introduced with such high-sounding words and a month later repealed for the
most part by a number of supplementary regulations providing that certain raw materials and
enemy goods might be imported in time of war by neutral vessels; shortly afterwards such
vessels also received the right to carry on coasting trade.

ORIGIN AND EXTERNAL COURSE OF THE CONTINENTAL

SYSTEM

COMMERCIAL WAR BEFORE THE BERLIN DECREE

1. MILITARY WAR (1799-1802)

The accession of Napoleon to power at the close of 1799 did not lead to general
peace, certainly not to peace with Great Britain; and the tendencies which have
been described above consequently continued on both sides. The principal

31
 novelty was an increased activity on the part of the neutrals, resulting in the
organization of the League of Armed Neutrality in December, 1800, between
Sweden, Denmark, and Russia, with Prussia as a somewhat reluctant fourth
party. It was based on the same principles as the Armed Neutrality of 1780, but
with further guaranties against capture under blockade, in the form of a provision
for previous warning on the part of the war-ships on guard, and also of a
prohibition against the searching of trading vessels under convoy. The impulse
had been given by the fact that the Scandinavian convoys had been continued
even after France had annulled the law of Nivse in December 1799, as has
already been mentioned; and consequently it is apparent that the new League was
directed mainly against Great Britain. The consequence of this was a succession
of encounters with British war-ships; and in September 1800 Great Britain was
guilty of an act of unusually flagrant aggression, when British privateers just
outside the port of Barcelona seized a Swedish vessel and, under the protection
of its neutral flag, succeeded in capturing the Spanish ships lying there at
anchor.18

This phase of the blockade policy came to an end fairly soon, however, owing to
the fact that peace was at length concluded between Great Britain and France,
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namely, the preliminaries of London &, in October 1801, and the formal Peace of Color(RGB(37,37,37))
Amiens, in March 1802

1. BLOCKADE( 1803-1856)

At first the commercial war continued on both sides, in the main, under its old
forms; and to certain details of it we shall have occasion to return later on.
Immediately after the outbreak of the war (May 17, 1803) England seized all
French and Dutch vessels lying in British ports. A month later (June 24) the
neutral trade with enemy colonies was regulated on lines half-way between those
of 1794 and 1798; and shortly afterwards (June 28 and July 26) there was taken
what was at least for the moment the most effective of all the British measures,
namely, the declaration that the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser were in state
of blockade, whereby the entire trade of Hamburg and Bremen was cut off.
Again in the following year (August 9, 1804) all French ports on the Channel and

18
Stephen, War in Disguise: or, the Frauds of the Neutral Flags (Piggott ed., London, 1917), pp. 106-7.

32
 the North Sea were declared under blockade. The British measures of the next
two years are distinctly more difficult to summarize, not only because of the
varying conditions of war, but also because of the different tendencies among the
leading English statesmen. On the whole, they applied partly to the colonial
trade, particularly the trade of the Americans with the European mainland, and
partly to the trade with the North Sea coast in general. The colonial trade with the
Americans was made the object of sweeping restrictions in 1805, not, however,
through new ordinances, but through a new interpretation of the law on the part
of British courts. The North Sea coast was again treated in a greatly varying
manner, inasmuch as the blockade of 1803 was annulled in the autumn of 1805
and was renewed in an extended form in April 1806, when it was applied also to
the mouths of the Ems and Trave. On May 16 of the same year a double blockade
was proclaimed, including, in the first place, a strict blockade of the coast
between the mouth of the Seine and Ostend, and, in the second place, a less strict
blockade of the rest of the coast between the mouth of the Seine and Ostend, and,
in the second place, a less strict blockade of the rest of the coast between the Elbe
and Brest. Neutral vessels, however, were allowed, under certain conditions, to
put in at ports on the less strictly blockaded section. Finally, the blockade
between the Elbe and the Ems was annulled on September 25, 1806. Of course,
these wobbling measures could not fail to hit the towns of North Germany
especially very hard; and their paper-blockade nature kept alive the unpopularity
of British policy in naval warfare. 19
2. Napoleon, on his part, had caused many thousands of Englishmen travelling
in France to be arrested immediately after the outbreak of war, and shortly
afterwards had extended this method of belligerency to Holland as well; and
he now proceeded to more comprehensive measures in two different
directions. The first was the exclusion of England from all connexion with
the mainland, especially with the North Sea coast. For this purpose he
occupied Hanover, which, as is well known, belonged to the British royal
house, and from there he extended his repressive measures to the great
centres of maritime trade, Hamburg and Bremen. His general, Mortier,
received orders to seize all British ships, goods, and sailors that were to be

19
Holm, Danmark-Norges udenrigske Historie fra 1791 til 1807 (Copenhagen, 1875), vol. I, p. 231; Stephen,
op. cit., p. 170.

33
 found there. And although this measure failed, the French largely made
themselves masters of British trade to these points, both in general by the
occupation of Hanover, and in particular by the seizure of the little Hamburg
district of Ritzebttel, which included its outport, Cuxhaven, at the mouth of
the Elbe. The first of the above-mentioned British declarations of blockade
formed the answer to this; and the independence of the Hanse Towns was
consequently subjected to new blows from both antagonists. In October 1804,
for instance, Napoleon simply kidnapped the British envoy from Hamburg,
that is to say, from neutral soil. Moreover, in the beginning of 1804 a double
action was taken against the influx of British goods farther south. The
imports through Emden, in Prussian East Friesland, up the Ems to the great
market of Frankfurt-am-Main were barred by the occupation of the town of
Meppen on the Ems; and at the same time large quantities of British goods
were confiscated in the vassal state of Holland. In May 1805, Napoleon
resolved to intervene against British goods in Holland by causing French
patrols to confiscate them along the Dutch side of the frontier. This led the
Dutch legislature, in order to prevent such high-handed procedure in the
future, to pass a law prohibiting all intercourse with Great Britain, to order
the confiscation of all vessels that came from there, to prohibit the
importation of British goods, and also to declare certain kinds of goods to be
ipso facto British, and finally to lay down a line of demarcation within which
the storing of goods was forbidden. These measures undeniably in many
respects presage the events of the following year. 20
3. Nevertheless, in the matter of the Continental blockade all these things bore
the mark of mere skirmishes. Meanwhile, however, Napoleon had also taken
up a second line, which demands greater attention, because this side of his
policy was pursued to its final goal during the first years after the outbreak of
war. The second line was confined, in the main, within the limits of French
jurisdiction; and its object was to close the French market to British industrial
products, and at times to colonial goods of British origin.21

20
Commentaires de Napolon Ier (Paris, 1867), vol. III, p. 413.
21
Cf. Lord Grenville in the House of Lords, Feb. 17, 1809. Hansard, vol. XII, p. 774 .

34
 INTERNAL HISTORY AND WORKING OF CONTINENTAL
SYSTEM

THE task that Napoleon made the central point of his policy manifestly imposed the greatest
demands on its inventor and his helpers, especially when we take into consideration the
administrative powers at the disposal of the governments of the [Link] regard to what
was by far the most important point, namely, the exclusion of British and colonial goods, the
question of the application of the system at once struck upon a peculiar difficulty, namely,
the problem of what to do with the confiscated merchandise. To Napoleon himself, strange
as it may seem, this problem was a matter of minor importance, inasmuch as from first to
last he adhered to the view taken over from the politicians of the Convention, that all goods
were sold on the credit of Englishmen and thus were not yet paid for when they were seized,

35
and that, accordingly, the loss in any case hit the enemy. With a persistence that never
wavered he preached to his allies and helpers the doctrines that, 'inasmuch as the
(continental) merchants never buy except on credit, it is a fact that no goods are ever paid
for,' and that, 'all goods being the property of the English,' their confiscation means 'a
backhanded blow for England which is terrific'.*1 On this assumption, moreover, the whole
difficulty would pretty soon have been overcome; for after a sufficiently large number of
such losses had been inflicted on the English they might reasonably be expected to grow
weary of sacrificing their goods and thus abandon the attempt to force them on the
Continent. It is true that not even under Napoleon's assumption did it do to allow goods, at
least the industrial products of England, to make their way into France itself, where they
competed with the French products. But for the industries of the rest of the Continent
Napoleon had no such interest, wishing solely to prevent their competition with the
continental exports of France; and, lastly, it is manifest that neither of these points could
create uneasiness in respect of colonial goods of British origin. 22

From the very outset this caused an expedient which could not fail to lead the whole system
into a wrong track, namely, that the towns and other places where the goods were seized
received the right to repurchase them, usually at an extremely high figure. Consequently, the
goods were not excluded. On the contrary, the different continental markets were able, to a
very large extent, to provide themselves by means of such repurchases (rachats), and the
control of illicit imports was thus rendered exceedingly difficulta result which was also
furthered by the great auctions that Napoleon caused to be held for the sale of captured and
confiscated, though not repurchased, goods.*2 The only device which might have
completely eradicated the difficulty would have been the absolute destruction of the illicit
goods in accordance with earlier methods; and for several years it does not appear to have
occurred to Napoleon to go so far. But the injury done by the repurchase tactics was not
limited to this, but went much deeper, inasmuch as from the very beginning it robbed the
policy of its ideal attributes and its stamp of grandeur, as being a means for the emancipation
of the Continent. It gave rise to intrigues, which in an incessant crescendo strengthened the
notion that the intention of the whole affair was merely to levy blackmail, to find a means of
squeezing money out of the continental peoples for the benefit of the Emperor and French
funds, as well as of French marshals, generals and soldiers, ministers and consuls. Already
in connexion with the events of 1808 an unusually competent observer, Johann Georg Rist,
the German-born representative in Hamburg of France's intimate ally, Denmark, writes in
his memoirs, compiled in the years 1816 to 1821, that no one among the merchants, peasants
or officials, or even among the scholars, believed in any plans for the good of Europe, but
only in the desire to line French pockets. It was commonly held that no justice was to be
expected, but merely arbitrariness and the basest motives, all marked by high words, threats,
and deception. And with regard to the last phase of the system (from 1810 onward) almost
exactly the same words fall from Mollien, who was Napoleon's good and faithful servant,

22
48 Geo. III, c. 26, s. 16 (the Principal 'Orders in Council Act'). Cf. Lord Erskine in the House of Lords, Mar.
8, 1808 (Hansard, vol. X, pp. 966-7).

36
though a man of strong and independent judgment. He says that 'this pretended
system...deprived of every vestige of political prestige, has only proved itself in the eyes of
everybody to be the most pernicious and false of fiscal inventions'.*3 It was precisely
fiscalism, the bane of so many systems of commercial policy, which thereby got a footing
from the very beginning in the imposing and soaring plan and threw radical difficulties in
the way of its execution.

This was all the more the case for the reason that Napoleon's assumption that everything was
sold on credit was so far from being correct that it was the very reverse of the truth.
Apparently the demand that prevailed on the Continent for British and colonial goods made
it possible for them to be sold practically always for cash; consequently it was the
continental buyers who were the chief sufferers. And even when that was not the case, one
finds the continental buyers, e.g., not only Hamburg merchants, but importers all over
Germany and Holland generallyaccording to the evidence in 1807 of their British
creditors themselvesdisplaying an extraordinary zeal in the regular payment of their
debts.23

Consequently there was little or no likelihood that the British would tire of supplying the
Continent with goods. On the contrary, the inner history of the Continental System came to
consist essentially in the embittered and uninterrupted struggles against the endless stream
of British [Link] difficulty with which Napoleon was confronted with regard to the very
structure of the blockade was further complicated by the difficulty of getting honest and
zealous persons to assist him in putting it into execution. It was almost impossible to obtain
such assistants among his allies and their organs; and consequently one of the most amply
justified views in the historical literature of the present time is the explanation that the
incessant extension of the empire along the coast of Europe was due to the Emperor's need
of direct control, with a view to the observance of the Continental System. Of the
innumerable examples of this we may mention two, one Swedish and one Prussian. In
August 1811, when Sweden was nominally at war with Great Britain, Axel Pontus von
Rosen, the Governor of Gothenburg, informed the minister of state, von Engestrm, that for
once in a way he had caused to be confiscated ten oxen intended for Admiral Saumarez's
English fleet, which lay off Vinga, and added: 'I entreat that this be put in the papers, so that
I, wretched that I am, may for once wear the nimbus of Continental zeal in the annals of
Europe. Saumarez was informed beforehand, so that he will not be annoyed.' During the
winter of 1811-12 a systematic import of forbidden colonial goods by the state itself went on
in Prussia through a special commissioner for the minister of finance, Privy Councillor von
Heydebreck; and at the same time Hardenberg, the leading minister, wrote to that very man
and requested the strictest inquiry into the smuggling. But the fact that the situation was
untenable when the application of the system lay in such hands must by no means be
23
Le Moniteur, Jan. 3, 1793; Sorel, op. cit., vol. m, pp. 244-5.( 19 april,05:00 pm)

37
interpreted to mean that the difficulties were overcome so soon as Napoleon was able to set
his own administrators to the task. The general weakness of authority in those days, in
comparison with the present day, was perhaps best expressed in the lack of will and capacity
on the part of subordinate organs to follow out the intentions of the heads of the state, and
that, too, even under such an almost superhumanly equipped ruler as Napoleon. The fiscal
methodsto use a fine-sounding expressionwhich Napoleon employed in his own interest
were often turned by his subordinates against him, or at least against his policy; and his
altogether unabashed endeavour to turn these abuses to his own account never failed to
divert the Continental System still further from its task. In these respects the difference is
inconsiderable between the various organs which were more or less completely employed
for the purposes of the blockade policy, viz., the large detachments of troops along the coast
and their naval coadjutors in ports and estuaries, the customs staff and border police, and
finally the local administration in the territories belonging to the Empire and the French
legation staffs and consuls in vassal states and occupied territories. 24

PROBLEM IN CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

Following the French defeat at Trafalgar in 1805, which prevented the invasion of Britain,
Napoleon was forced to resort to economic warfare and the Continental System. The Continental System
led to economic recessions in many port towns such as Marseille, ruined many French
industries and created an anti Napoleon feeling, while Napoleons incessant drive to enforce the
System led to the Peninsular War and the invasion of Russia, which arguably led to
Napoleons downfall. The
Continental System forced Napoleon to overextend himself and France and eventually led to Napoleons
downfall. The Continental System led to economic problems within France and created an

24
Holm, Danmark-Norges udenrigske Historie fra 1791 til 1807 (Copenhagen, 1875), vol. I, p. 231; Stephen,
op. cit., p. 170.

38
anti-Napoleon feeling. The great ports of the Atlantic and the Channel coasts suffered
severely from the loss of trade, and further from Britains retaliatory Orders of the Council.
Port cities such as Marseille suffered recessions that led to large amounts of impoverishment, and
created discontent towards Napoleon. Furthermore, ship building and maritime trades, such as rope
making and sail making declined, as did inland industries that depended on overseas markets.
Napoleon sought to use the Continental System to make France and the Empire more self
sufficient, but the retaliation of Britain to the Continental System made it harder to do this as
the French Navy as inadequate to deal with the Royal Navy. Industries, such as the linen
industries of the north and west of France, suffered heavily from the loss of exports. Commercial
activity in areas such as Bordeaux, Lyons on Rouen was almost non- existent. 1811 particularly proved to
be a poor one for Frances economy as there had been poor grain harvests, but Napoleon forbade the
bakers to increase the price of bread. This led to economic problems as the wheat industry
couldnt alter prices to deal with a shortage in wheat. Moreover, the loss of profits from overseas
trade resulted in less capital for investment. Some investors moved their money out of commercial
enterprises such as trading to more secure areas such as land ownership.25 This meant that little
money was being spent on French enterprise, leading to a downturn. This had detrimental
effects for Napoleon in the future as he struggled to finance his army and France suffered from a
dire economic situation, which caused dissatisfaction towards Napoleon. However, in areas away from the
coasts, many traders and producers benefitted from protection to home industries offered by the
Blockade. It provided the opportunity to export goods across the Alps and the Rhine. Consumers
in those areas who were denied access to cheaper British goods had no choice but to pay the higher
prices demanded by French producers. This meant that certain French industries improved
due to the Continental System, but it also meant that Napoleon was blamed for rising prices
throughout the Empire. Furthermore, as the British Navy closed the sea lanes to French goods, trade routes
moved overland, away from the coast. This led to major French cities such as Paris flourishing as
they became trading centres for luxuries and items of fashion. In some aspects, the Continental
System created new areas for French industry to expand to, however, the overall effects on France were
negative as the System multiplied the economic effect of the constant war Napoleon was waging and
created an atmosphere of discontent towards Napoleon, that ultimately led to a lack of support for
Napoleon when he required it in 1814.
The Continental System affected Napoleons foreign policy and led to numerous problems
for Napoleon within the Empire that ultimately led to his downfall. Napoleons unrelenting
drive to
replace Britain with France in Europe meant that he sought to rigorously enforce the
Continental System within the Empire. The Continental System invited an influx of
contraband British goods to flood into Europe through the numerous ports within Europe.
Napoleon was spread thin and in his attempts to plug the various holes in his blockade, he

25
Hansard, vol. IX, app., col. XV; Levasseur, Histoire des classes ouvrires, &c., avant 1789, vol. II, p. 554
note; Johnson and others, op. cit., vol. II, p. 20.

39
invaded numerous countries, spreading his resources thin. The invasion of Portugal in 1808
was a direct consequence of its refusal to apply the System, and this invasion led to the
Peninsular War, aptly described as the Spanish Ulcer that constantly drained Napoleons
resources and eventually pre-empted his downfall. This process was furthered by the
annexation of the Kingdom of Holland for its relaxation of the Continental System. The
process culminated with the invasion of Russia that proved disastrous for Napoleon and the
French Army; it led to the destruction of the Napoleonic legend and a 500,000 strong
army. This accelerated his downfall and led to greater economic problems within France, as Napoleon
sought to re-instate his army in preparation of fighting another war. In his futile
implementation of the draconian measures of his Continental System, Napoleon was merely
distracting his satellites attention from his inability to deal with the threat of Britain. This
laid bare his helplessness for all in France to see, resulting in irreparable damage to the reputation of
his regime and a rapid end of his reign. In conclusion, the Continental System led to discontent
within France and towards Napoleon as people were unable to cope with the strict measures.
Rules such as the Fontainebleau Decree harshly punished smugglers, while the System itself
caused inflation in prices within France. The implementation of the Continental System
itself led to a series of wars that led to economic problems within France and eventually led
to Napoleons downfall. On balance, although the Continental System did cause certain
industries within France to flourish, it failed to serve its purpose of defeat of Britain. It laid
bare Napoleons weaknesses
leaving him vulnerable to attacks and created an atmosphere of anger towards Napoleon, all
culminating in his downfall and plunged France into a period of downturn. 26

EFFECTS OF CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

Britain's first response was to launch a major naval attack on the weakest link in Napoleon's
coalition, Denmark. Although ostensibly neutral, Denmark was under heavy French and
Russian pressure to pledge its fleet to Napoleon. London could not take the chance of
ignoring the Danish threat. In November 1807, the Royal Navy bombarded Copenhagen,

26
Lecky, History of England in the Eighteenth Century (original library edition, London, 1882), vol. IV, p.
157.( 18 april, 04:00 pm).

40
seized the Danish fleet, and assured control of the sea lanes in the North Sea and Baltic Sea
for the British merchant fleet.

The System had mixed effects on British trade, with British exports to the Continent falling
between 25% to 55% compared to pre-1806 levels. However, trade sharply increased with
the rest of the world, covering much of the decline.

Belgium and Switzerland benefited the most particularly the industrialized north and east
of France, and south of Belgium, which saw significantly increased profits due to the lack of
competition from British goods (particularly textiles, which were produced at a much
cheaper cost in Britain).Southern France, especially the port cities of Marseille and
Bordeaux as well as the city of La Rochelle, suffered from the reduction in trade. Moreover,
the prices of staple foods rose for most of continental [Link] Italy, the agricultural sector
flourished.

The Dutch economy, predicated on trade, suffered greatly as a result of the embargo.
Napoleon's economic warfare was much to the chagrin of his own brother, King Louis I of
[Link] embargo encouraged British merchants to seek out new markets aggressively
and to engage in smuggling with continental Europe. Napoleon's exclusively land-based
customs enforcers could not stop British smugglers, especially as these operated with the
connivance of Napoleon's chosen rulers of Spain, Westphalia and other German states.

Britain, by Orders in Council (1807), prohibited its trade partners from trading with France.
The British were able to counter the plan by threatening to sink any ship that did not come to
a British port or chose to comply with France. This double threat created a difficult time for
neutral nations like the United States. In response to this prohibition, compounded by the
Chesapeake Incident, the U.S. government adopted the Embargo Act of 1807 and eventually
Macon's Bill No. 2. This embargo was designed as an economic counterattack to hurt
Britain, but it proved even more damaging to American merchants. Together with the issues
of the impressment of foreign seamen, and British support for Indian raids in the American
west, tensions led to a declaration of war by the U.S. in the War of 1812. This war, not
Napoleon's blockade, sharply reduced British trade with the United States.

The embargo also had an effect on France itself. Ship building, and its trades such as rope-
making declined, as did many other industries that relied on overseas markets, such as the
linen industries. With few exports and a loss of profits, many industries were closed down.

41
Portugal openly refused to join the Continental System. In 1793, Portugal signed a treaty of
mutual assistance with Britain.[11] After the Treaty of Tilsit of July 1807, Napoleon
attempted to capture the Portuguese Fleet and the House of Braganza, and to occupy the
Portuguese ports. He failed. King John VI of Portugal took his fleet and transferred the
Portuguese Court to Brazil with a Royal Navy escort. The Portuguese population rose in
revolt against the French invaders, with the help of the British Army under Arthur
Wellesley, later 1st Duke of Wellington. Napoleon intervened, and the Peninsular War
began in 1808. Napoleon also forced the Spanish royal family to resign their throne in favor
of Napoleon's brother, Joseph.

Sweden, Britain's ally in the Third Coalition, refused to comply with French demands and
was invaded by Russia in February [Link] also chafed under the embargo, and in 1810
reopened trade with Britain. Russia's withdrawal from the system was a motivating factor
behind Napoleon's decision to invade Russia in 1812, which proved the turning point of the
[Link]'s St. Cloud Decree in July 1810 opened the southwest of France and the
Spanish frontier to limited British trade, and reopened French trade to the United States. It
was an admission that his blockade had hurt his own economy more than the British. It also
failed to reduce British financial support to its allies27

DECLINE OF CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

Causes of the Failure of the Continental System

1. It was an impossible scheme. Every country was not expected to bear the innumerable
stresses by following this scheme.

27
Stephen, War in Disguise: or, the Frauds of the Neutral Flags (Piggott ed., London, 1917), pp. 106-7.

42
2. It was impossible for France to control the vast sea without a powerful fleet.

3. England was short of corn but Napoleon continued to supply corn at high rates. He
presumed that England had little wealth which will be reduced all the more by making
purchases of coil at high rates which would result in an economic crisis [Link] he
stopped the supply of corn completely, people might have begun to starve and would have
forced authorities of England for a treaty but the miscalculation Napoleon was a contributing
factor to the failure of this scheme.

4. Most of the European countries including France depended British goods and they could
not possibly live without these goods. But after the supply of these articles was stopped,
people had to face great difficulties and they began to oppose this scheme [Link]
1807 Napoleon himself purchased fifty thousand overcoats from Great Britain through
Holland at the time of the battle of Eyleau.

Rose has remarked:

"The European trade was greatly ruined due to the continental system. In 1810 only one or
two sugar mills out of 428 could seen working in Hamburg."

5. The smuggling of goods became widespread in the entire Europe and Napoleon could not
check this black marketing due to his weak navy.

6. Napoleon had to wage wars against many countries for implementation of this scheme.
The names of Russia, Spain Holland need special mention. This scheme was the root cause
of the struggle between Napoleon and the Pope of Rome. Consequently all these countries
turned into his deadly foes.

7. Portugal and Spain also did not join this scheme and extended their cooperation to
England.

8. Napoleon lost the sympathy of people. They began to hate for his selfish and tyrannical
rule. Napoleon failed to cope with the rising tide of public opinion. It was a fault on the part
Napoleon to have introduced the continental system. Hazen writes: "The continental system
was a great blunder on the part of Napoleon."28

Madelin also remarks:

Britain's first response was to launch a major naval attack on the weakest link in Napoleon's
coalition, Denmark. Although ostensibly neutral, Denmark was under heavy French and

28
Hansard, vol. IX, app., col. XV; Levasseur, Histoire des classes ouvrires, &c., avant 1789, vol. II, p. 554
note; Johnson and others, op. cit., vol. II, p. 20.

43
Russian pressure to pledge its fleet to Napoleon. London could not take the chance of
ignoring the Danish threat. In November 1807, the Royal Navy bombarded Copenhagen,
seized the Danish fleet, and assured control of the sea lanes in the North Sea and Baltic Sea
for the British merchant fleet.

The System had mixed effects on British trade, with British exports to the Continent falling
between 25% to 55% compared to pre-1806 levels. However, trade sharply increased with
the rest of the world, covering much of the decline.

9. Napoleon had overconfidence in his intelligence and abilities. He wanted obedience from
all quarters without any 'ifs' and 'buts'. His overweening pride and bloated ego were the chief
reasons for the failure of this scheme and his own downfall. Edwards writes:

"It was a fantastic scheme which transgressed the limits practical statesmanship. It was
based on the fundamental error that Napoleon's subjects would sacrifice their personal
comforts to enable him to crush his hated and invincible enemy, Great Britain, which was
economically indispensable to Europe."

The entire Europe was disturbed by this scheme of Napoleon and various countries began to
conspire against France. There was a pervading atmosphere of chaos and confusion against
Napoleon.

Not only the people of Europe raised their voice against Napoleon, he also lost the sympathy
of the middle-class people of France, who had made him. Markham writes:

"Napoleon had not only roused the people of Europe against the Empire by his continental
system, he had also lost the confidence of the French middle-class, which had put him into
power."

Thompson, a prominent historian, has also written:

"If, then, England lived on her export trade, Napoleon's attempt to destroy it was remarkably
unsuccessful. It might be said that this was because during the years in which the continental
ports were increasingly shut against her ships, she was able to develop new markets
overseas."

In fact, this scheme of Napoleon totally failed and proved suicidal for him, and ultimately
Napoleon felt that he himself had been trapped in the net which he laid for England.

44
 CONCLUSION

The Continental System began in 1806 with Napoleon's Berlin Decree, which banned
British ships from entering European ports. Britain, full of savvy traders, made a concerted
effort to undermine the Continental System by contracting out its shipments to neutral
vessels. Napoleon next issued the Milan Decree in December 1807. This harsh decree,

45
aimed against smuggling, stated that neutral ships that stopped in Britain before landing in
Europe were subject to confiscation.

Britain's retaliated through sea power, creating a blockade of all European ships. If Europe
wouldn't allow British ships to dock at European ports, Britain wouldn't allow European
ships to sail on what was then Britain's ocean. The other nations of Europe were willing to
side with Napoleon in the Continental system because for the most part they did dislike
Britain. Britain was wealthy, rapidly industrialized, and isolationist. Cranking out textiles on
their small island, the British rapidly became the wealthiest nation in Europe. Using its naval
dominance, England built up colonies and trade networks for its manufactures that were the
envy of all of Europe. So when Napoleon demanded that a Europe- wide boycott of British
goods take place under his Continental System, there were many who were glad for a chance
to cut Britain down to size.

Great Britain was the central important force in encouraging and financing alliances against
Napoleonic France. In addition, the British government enacted a naval blockade of the
French and French-allied coasts, on 16 May 1806. As France lacked the naval strength to
invade Britain or to decisively defeat the Royal Navy at sea, Napoleon resorted instead to
economic warfare. As a result of the Industrial Revolution the financial powerhouse in
London, Britain was Europe's manufacturing and business centre. Napoleon believed it
would be easy to take advantage of an embargo on trade with the European nations under his
control, causing inflation and great debt to undermine the British strength.

In November 1806, having recently conquered or allied with every major power on the
European continent, Napoleon issued the Berlin Decree forbidding his allies and conquests
from trading with the British. The UK responded with the Orders in Council of 1807 issued
11 November 1807. These forbade French trade with the UK, its allies or neutrals, and
instructed the Royal Navy to blockade French and allied ports. Napoleon retaliated with the
Milan Decree of 1807, which declared that all neutral shipping using British ports or paying
British tariffs were to be regarded as British and seized.

Napoleon's plan to defeat Britain was to destroy its ability to trade. As an island nation, trade
was its most vital lifeline. Napoleon believed that if he could isolate Britain economically,
he would be able to invade the nation after its economic collapse. Napoleon decreed that all
commerce ships wishing to do business in Europe must first stop at a French port in order to

46
ensure that there could be no trade with Britain. He also ordered all European nations and
French allies to stop trading with Britain, and he threatened Russia with an invasion if they
did not comply as well. His orders backfired in Spain, setting off peninsular war. He pushed
Russia too hard, both in terms of the Continental System, and in his demands for control
over part of Poland. His attempted punishment of Russia through a massive invasion 1812
was one of the famous military disasters in world history, and set the stage for Napoleon's
final downfall.

Britain's first response was to launch a major naval attack on the weakest link in Napoleon's
coalition, Denmark. Although ostensibly neutral, Denmark was under heavy French and
Russian pressure to pledge its fleet to Napoleon. London could not take the chance of
ignoring the Danish threat. In November 1807, the Royal Navy bombarded Copenhagen,
seized the Danish fleet, and assured control of the sea lanes in the North Sea and Baltic Sea
for the British merchant fleet.

The System had mixed effects on British trade, with British exports to the Continent falling
between 25% to 55% compared to pre-1806 levels. However, trade sharply increased with
the rest of the world, covering much of the decline.

"It was a fantastic scheme which transgressed the limits practical statesmanship. It was
based on the fundamental error that Napoleon's subjects would sacrifice their personal
comforts to enable him to crush his hated and invincible enemy, Great Britain, which was
economically indispensable to Europe."

The entire Europe was disturbed by this scheme of Napoleon and various countries began to
conspire against France. There was a pervading atmosphere of chaos and confusion against
[Link] only the people of Europe raised their voice against Napoleon, he also lost the
sympathy of the middle-class people of France, who had made him. Markham writes:

"Napoleon had not only roused the people of Europe against the Empire by his continental
system, he had also lost the confidence of the French middle-class, which had put him into
power."Thompson, a prominent historian, has also written:

"If, then, England lived on her export trade, Napoleon's attempt to destroy it was remarkably
unsuccessful. It might be said that this was because during the years in which the continental
ports were increasingly shut against her ships, she was able to develop new markets
overseas."

In fact, this scheme of Napoleon totally failed and proved suicidal for him, and ultimately
Napoleon felt that he himself had been trapped in the net which he laid for England.

47
The paper has clearly illustrated about the background of the continental system ,working of
continental system, problems and effects of the continental system and finally what were the
causes that led to the decline of the continental system .The researcher had proved that
continental system was one of the biggest mistake of the Napolean Bonaparte.

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2. Bivar, A.D.H. (1983), "The Political History of Iran Under the Arsacids", in Yarshater, Pattern: Clear (White)
Ehsan, Cambridge History of Iran, 3.1, London & New York: Cambridge University Formatted: Font color: Custom Color(RGB(11,0,128))
Press, pp. 2199, ISBNJean Tulard , Napolon, Hachette, 2008, p.207 Formatted: Font color: Custom Color(RGB(37,37,37))
3. Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 17631848 (1994) pp 305- Field Code Changed
10 Formatted: Default Paragraph Font, Font: (Default) +Body
4. Alexander Grab, Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe (2003) pp 2933 (Calibri), 11 pt, Font color: Custom Color(RGB(37,37,37))
Formatted: Font color: Custom Color(RGB(37,37,37))
0-521-20092-XFranois Crouzet. Field Code Changed
Bivar, A.D.H. (2007), "Gondophares and the Indo-Parthians", in Curtis, Vesta Sarkhosh and Field Code Changed
Sarah Stewart, The Age of the Parthians: The Ideas of Iran, 2, London & New York: I.B.
Tauris & Co Ltd., in association with the London Middle East Institute at SOAS and the
British Museum, pp. 2636, , "Wars, blockade, and economic change in Europe, 17921815."
ISBNJournal of Economic History (1964) 24#4 pp 567588 978-1-84511-406-0JSTOR. Field Code Changed
Field Code Changed

50 | P a g e
 PARTHIANS

5. The Parthian Empire (247 BC 224 AD), also known as the Arsacid Empire29 was a
major Iranian2115762 political and cultural power in . Field Code Changed
6. Holberg, Tom ancient IranThe Acts, Orders in Council, &c. of Great Britain (on Trade), Field Code Changed
1793 - 1812 and
7. A. N. Ryan, "The Causes of the British Attack upon Copenhagen in 1807." English
Historical Review (1953): 37-55. Iraqin JSTOR30. Its latter name comes from Field Code Changed
8. Thomas Munch-Petersen, Defying Napoleon: How Britain Bombarded Copenhagen and
Seized the Danish Fleet in 1807 (2007)
9. J. M. Thompson, Napoleon Bonaparte: His rise and fall (1951) pp 235-40
10. Alexander Grab and Charles F. Delzell, "The Kingdom of Italy and Napoleon's
Continental Blockade," Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750-1850: Proceedings
(1988), Vol. 18, pp 587-604.

Portugal; Jos Ferreira Borges de Castro (Visconde de); Julio Firmino Judice Biker (1857).
Field Code Changed
Arsaces I of ParthiaSupplemeto Colleco dos tratados, convenes, contratos e actos
publicos celebrados entre a cora de Portugal e as mais potencias desde 1640 who, as
leader of the Parni tribe, founded it in the mid-3rd century BC when he conquered the region
of Parthia31 in Iran's northeast, then a satrapy(province) in rebellion against the Seleucid
Empire. Mithridates I of Parthia (r. c. 171138 BC) greatly expanded the empire by
seizing Media and Mesopotamia from the Seleucids. At its height, the Parthian Empire stretched
from the northern reaches of the Euphrates, in what is now central-eastern Turkey, to
eastern Iran. The empire, located on the Silk Road trade route between the Roman Empire in
the Mediterranean Basin and the Han Empire of China, became a center of trade and commerce.

The Parthians largely adopted the art, architecture, religious beliefs, and royal insignia of their
culturally heterogeneous empire, which encompassed Persian, Hellenistic, and regional cultures.

29
From Ancient Greek Arsaks, from Parthian Arak.
30
Waters 1974, p. 424.
31
Retrived from : [Link] 12th October,2016 ; 01:00pm).

51 | P a g e
For about the first half of its existence, the Arsacid court adopted elements of Greek culture,
though it eventually saw a gradual revival of Iranian traditions. The Arsacid rulers were titled the
"King of Kings", as a claim to be the heirs to the Achaemenid Empire; indeed, they accepted
many local kings as vassals where the Achaemenids would have had centrally appointed, albeit
largely autonomous, satraps. The court did appoint a small number of satraps, largely outside
Iran, but these satrapies were smaller and less powerful than the Achaemenid potentates. With
the expansion of Arsacid power, the seat of central government shifted
from Nisa to Ctesiphon along the Tigris (south of modern Baghdad, Iraq), although several other
sites also served as capitals.

The earliest enemies of the Parthians were the Seleucids in the west and the Scythians in the east.
However, as Parthia expanded westward, they came into conflict with the Kingdom of Armenia,
and eventually the late Roman Republic. Rome and Parthia competed with each other to
establish the kings of Armenia as their subordinate clients. The Parthians soundly
defeated Marcus Licinius Crassus at the Battle of Carrhae in 53 BC, and in 4039 BC, Parthian
forces captured the whole of the Levantexcept Tyre from the Romans. However, Mark
Antony led a counterattack against Parthia, although his successes were generally achieved in his
absence, under the leadership of his lieutenant Ventidius. Also, various Roman emperors or their
appointed generals invaded Mesopotamia in.

the course of the several Roman-Parthian Wars which ensued during the next few centuries. The
Romans captured the cities of Seleucia and Ctesiphon on multiple occasions during these
conflicts, but were never able to hold on to them.

Frequent civil wars between Parthian contenders to the throne proved more dangerous to the
Empire's stability than foreign invasion, and Parthian power evaporated when Ardashir I, ruler
of Estakhr in Fars, revolted against the Arsacids and killed their last ruler, Artabanus V, in
224 AD. Ardashir established the Sassanid Empire, which ruled Iran and much of the Near East
until the Muslim conquests of the 7th century AD, although the Arsacid dynasty lived on through
the Arsacid Dynasty of Armenia, the Arsacid dynasty of Iberia, and the Arsacid Dynasty of
Caucasian Albania; all eponymous branches of the Parthian Arsacids.

Native Parthian sources, written in Parthian, Greek and other languages, are scarce when
compared to Sassanid and even earlier Achaemenid sources. Aside from
scattered cuneiform tablets, fragmentary ostraca, rock inscriptions, drachma coins, and the
chance survival of some parchment documents, much of Parthian history is only known through
external sources. These include mainly Greek and Roman histories, but also Chinese histories,
prompted by the Han Chinese desire to form alliances against the Xiongnu.[12] Parthian

52 | P a g e
artwork is viewed by historians as a valid source for understanding aspects of society and culture
that are otherwise absent in textual sources.32

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PARTHIANS

Before Arsaces I of Parthia founded the Arsacid Dynasty, he was chieftain of the Parni, an
ancient Central-Asian tribe of Iranian peoples and one of several nomadic tribes within the
confederation of the Dahae. The Parni most likely spoke an eastern Iranian language, in contrast
to the northwestern Iranian language spoken at the time in Parthia. The latter was a northeastern
province, first under the Achaemenid, and then the Seleucid empires. After conquering the
region, the Parni adopted Parthian as the official court language, speaking it alongside Middle
Persian, Aramaic, Greek, Babylonian, Sogdian and other languages in the multilingual territories
they would conquer.

Why the Arsacid court retroactively chose 247 BC as the first year of the Arsacid era is
uncertain. A.D.H. Bivar concludes that this was the year the Seleucids lost control of Parthia
to Andragoras, the appointed satrap who rebelled against them. Hence, Arsaces I "backdated
his regnal years" to the moment when Seleucid control over Parthia ceased. However, Vesta
Sarkhosh Curtis asserts that this was simply the year Arsaces was made chief of the Parni

32
Retrieved from : [Link] ( 13th october,2016; 02:00pm).

53 | P a g e
tribe. Homa Katouzian and Gene Ralph Garthwaiteclaim it was the year Arsaces conquered
Parthia and expelled the Seleucid authorities, yet Curtis and Maria Brosius state that Andragoras
was not overthrown by the Arsacids until 238 BC.

It is unclear who immediately succeeded Arsaces I. Bivarand Katouzian affirm that it was his
brother Tiridates I of Parthia, who in turn was succeeded by his son Arsaces II of Parthia in
211 BC. Yet Curtis and Brosius state that Arsaces II was the immediate successor of Arsaces I,
with Curtis claiming the succession took place in 211 BC, and Brosius in 217 BC. Bivar insists
that 138 BC, the last regnal year of Mithridates I, is "the first precisely established regnal date of
Parthian history." Due to these and other discrepancies, Bivar outlines two distinct royal
chronologies accepted by historians. Later on, some of the Parthian Kings would claim
Achaemenid descent. The claim has recently received support from numismatic and other written
evidence suggesting that both Achaemenid and Parthian kings suffered from the hereditary
disease neurofibromatosis.

For a time, Arsaces consolidated his position in Parthia and Hyrcania by taking advantage of the
invasion of Seleucid territory in the west by Ptolemy III Euergetes (r. 246222 BC) of Egypt.
This conflict with Ptolemy, the Third Syrian War (246241 BC), also allowed Diodotus I to
rebel and form the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom in Central Asia. The latter's successor, Diodotus II,
formed an alliance with Arsaces against the Seleucids, but Arsaces was temporarily driven from
Parthia by the forces of Seleucus II Callinicus (r. 246225 BC). After spending some time in
exile among the nomadic Apasiacae tribe, Arsaces led a counterattack and recaptured Parthia.
Seleucus II's successor, Antiochus III the Great (r. 222187 BC), was unable to immediately
retaliate because his troops were engaged in putting down the rebellion of Molon in Media.

Antiochus III launched a massive campaign to retake Parthia and Bactria in 210 or 209 BC. He
was unsuccessful, but did negotiate a peace settlement with Arsaces II. The latter was granted the
title of king (Greek: basileus) in return for his submission to Antiochus III as his superior. The
Seleucids were unable to further intervene in Parthian affairs following increasing encroachment
by the Roman Republic and the Seleucid defeat at Magnesia in 190 BC. Phriapatius of
Parthia (r. c. 191176 BC) succeeded Arsaces II, and Phraates I of Parthia (r. c. 176171 BC)
eventually ascended the throne. Phraates I ruled Parthia without further Seleucid interference.

EXPANSION AND CONSOLIDATION

Phraates I is recorded as expanding Parthia's control past the Gates of Alexander and
occupied Apamea Ragiana, the locations of which are unknown. Yet the greatest expansion of

54 | P a g e
Parthian power and territory took place during the reign of his brother and successor Mithridates
I of Parthia (r. c. 171138 BC), whom Katouzian compares to Cyrus the Great (d. 530 BC),
founder of the Achaemenid Empire.

Relations between Parthia and Greco-Bactria deteriorated after the death of Diodotus II, when
Mithridates' forces captured two eparchies of the latter kingdom, then under Eucratides
I (r. c. 170145 BC). Turning his sights on the Seleucid realm, Mithridates invaded Media and
occupied Ecbatana in 148 or 147 BC; the region had been destabilized by a recent Seleucid
suppression of a rebellion there led by Timarchus. This victory was followed by the Parthian
conquest of Babylonia in Mesopotamia, where Mithridates had coins minted at Seleucia in
141 BC and held an official investiture ceremony. While Mithridates retired to Hyrcania, his
forces subdued the kingdoms of Elymais and Characene and occupied Susa. By this time,
Parthian authority extended as far east as the Indus River. 33

Whereas Hecatompylos had served as the first Parthian capital, Mithridates established royal
residences at Seleucia, Ecbatana, Ctesiphon and his newly founded city, Mithradatkert (Nisa,
Turkmenistan), where the tombs of the Arsacid kings were built and maintained. Ecbatana
became the main summertime residence for the Arsacid royalty. Ctesiphon may not have become
the official capital until the reign of Gotarzes I of Parthia (r. c. 9080 BC). It became the site of
the royal coronation ceremony and the representational city of the Arsacids, according to
Brosius.

The Seleucids were unable to retaliate immediately as general Diodotus Tryphon led a rebellion
at the capital Antioch in 142 BC. However, by 140 BC Demetrius II Nicator was able to launch a
counter-invasion against the Parthians in Mesopotamia. Despite early successes, the Seleucids
were defeated and Demetrius himself was captured by Parthian forces and taken to Hyrcania.
There Mithridates treated his captive with great hospitality; he even married his
daughter Rhodogune of Parthia to Demetrius.

Antiochus VII Sidetes (r. 138129 BC), a brother of Demetrius, assumed the Seleucid throne and
married the latter's wife Cleopatra Thea. After defeating Diodotus Tryphon, Antiochus initiated a
campaign in 130 BC to retake Mesopotamia, now under the rule of Phraates II of
Parthia (r. c. 138128 BC). The Parthian general Indates was defeated along the Great Zab,
followed by a local uprising where the Parthian governor of Babylonia was killed. Antiochus

33
Retrieved from : [Link] ( 14th october,2016 ; 03:00pm.)

55 | P a g e
conquered Babylonia and occupied Susa, where he minted coins. After advancing his army into
Media, the Parthians pushed for peace, which Antiochus refused to accept unless the Arsacids
relinquished all lands to him except Parthia proper, paid heavy tribute, and released Demetrius
from captivity. Arsaces released Demetrius and sent him to Syria, but refused the other
demands. By Spring 129 BC, the Medes were in open revolt against Antiochus, whose army had
exhausted the resources of the countryside during winter. While attempting to put down the
revolts, the main Parthian force swept into the region and killed Antiochus in battle. His body
was sent back to Syria in a silver coffin; his son Seleucus was made a Parthian hostage and a
daughter joined Phraates' harem. 34

While the Parthians regained the territories lost in the

west, another threat arose in the east. In 177176 BC the nomadic confederation of
the Xiongnu dislodged the nomadic Yuezhi from their homelands in what is now Gansu province
in Northwest China; the Yuezhi then migrated west into Bactria and displaced
the Saka (Scythian) tribes. The Saka were forced to move further west, where they invaded the
Parthian Empire's northeastern borders. Mithridates was thus forced to retire to Hyrcania after
his conquest of Mesopotamia.

Some of the Saka were enlisted in Phraates' forces against Antiochus. However, they arrived too
late to engage in the conflict. When Phraates refused to pay their wages, the Saka revolted,
which he tried to put down with the aid of former Seleucid soldiers, yet they too abandoned
Phraates and joined sides with the Saka. Phraates II marched against this combined force, but he
was killed in battle. The Roman historian Justin reports that his successor Artabanus I of
Parthia (r. c. 128124 BC) shared a similar fate fighting nomads in the east. He claims Artabanus
was killed by the Tokhari (identified as the Yuezhi), although Bivar believes Justin conflated
them with the Saka. Mithridates II of Parthia (r. c. 12490 BC) later recovered the lands lost to
the Saka in Sistan.

34
Bickerman, Elias J. (1983), "The Seleucid Period", in Yarshater, Ehsan, Cambridge History of Iran, 3.1,
Cambridge University Press, pp. 320.

56 | P a g e
 Chinese silk from Mawangdui, 2nd century BC, Han dynasty; silk from China was perhaps the
most lucrative luxury item the Parthians traded at the western end of the Silk Road.

Following the Seleucid withdrawal from Mesopotamia, the Parthian governor of Babylonia,
Himerus, was ordered by the Arsacid court to conquer Characene, then ruled
by Hyspaosines from Charax Spasinu. When this failed, Hyspaosines invaded Babylonia in
127 BC and occupied Seleucia. Yet by 122 BC, Mithridates II forced Hyspaosines out of
Babylonia and made the kings of Characene vassals under Parthian suzerainty. After Mithridates
extended Parthian control further west, occupying Dura-Europos in 113 BC, he became
embroiled in a conflict with the Kingdom of Armenia. His forces defeated and
deposed Artavasdes I of Armenia in 97 BC, taking his son Tigranes hostage, who would later
become Tigranes II "the Great" of Armenia (r. c. 9555 BC). 35

The Indo-Parthian Kingdom, located in modern-day Afghanistan and Pakistan made an alliance
with the Parthian Empire in the 1st century BC. Bivar claims that these two states considered
each other political equals. After the Greek philosopher Apollonius of Tyana visited the court
of Vardanes I of Parthia (r. c. 4047 AD) in 42 AD, Vardanes provided him with the protection
of a caravan as he traveled to Indo-Parthia. When Apollonius reached Indo-Parthia's
capital Taxila, his caravan leader read Vardanes' official letter, perhaps written in Parthian, to an
Indian official who treated Apollonius with great hospitality.

Following the diplomatic venture of Zhang Qian into Central

Asia during the reign of Emperor Wu of Han (r. 14187 BC), the Han Empireof China sent a
delegation to Mithridates II's court in 121 BC. The Han embassy opened official trade
relations with Parthia via the Silk Road yet did not achieve a desired military alliance against the

35
Bivar, A.D.H. (1983), "The Political History of Iran under the Arsacids", in Yarshater, Ehsan, Cambridge History
of Iran, 3.1, Cambridge UP, pp. 2199.

57 | P a g e
confederation of the Xiongnu. The Parthian Empire was enriched by taxing the Eurasian caravan
trade in silk, the most highly priced luxury good imported by the Romans. Pearls were also a
highly valued import from China, while the Chinese purchased Parthian spices, perfumes, and
fruits. Exotic animals were also given as gifts from the Arsacid to Han courts; in 87 AD Pacorus
II of Parthia sent lions and Persian gazelles to Emperor Zhang of Han (r. 7588 AD). Besides
silk, Parthian goods purchased by Roman merchants included iron from India, spices, and fine
leather. Caravans traveling through the Parthian Empire brought West Asian and
sometimes Roman luxury glasswares to China. The merchants of Sogdia, speaking an Eastern
Iranian language, served as the primary middlemen of this vital silk trade between Parthia and
Han China.

RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING STATES

Relations during the Republic

The first direct contact between the Roman Republic and the Parthians was c. 96 BCE, when
Lucius Cornelius Sulla, while proconsul in Cilicia, met the Parthian ambassador Orobazus.
Plutarch reports that he managed to take the central seat between the Parthian Ambassador and
an ambassador from Pontus, and concluded a treaty that set the Euphrates as the boundary
between the two powers. Orobazus was executed on his return to Parthia for allowing Sulla to
outmaneuver him, and Sulla himself later came under criticism for being too high-handed in his
treatment of such a powerful nation.

The first time the Romans came into direct military contact with Parthia came when Lucullus
invaded Armenia in 69 BCE, leading to diplomatic friction and clashes on the frontier between
Armenia and Parthia. Over the following decades both empires became entangled in each other's

58 | P a g e
civil wars, perhaps beginning with Crassuss disastrous invasion of Parthia. Parthia was later
involved in the civil war after the assassination of Julius Caesar. In 42 BCE, when Antony placed
a legion in Syria, Cassius envoy Labienus joined forces with king Orodes of Parthia and, led by
the Roman general Pacorus, attacked Antonys republican forces. However, this was not to last
as Antony successfully sent his general Publius Ventidius Bassus to recover the lost territory.
After some difficulty dealing with local Parthian appointee kings, the Romans finally subdued
the regained province and installed Herod the Great as king. Antonys forces attempted a
crossing of the Euphrates at the city of Zeugma but were held back by Parthian defences and had
to settle for annexing the Armenian kingdom after deposing its king.36

Relations during the Julio-Claudian dynasty

A Parthian warrior as depicted on Trajan's column

Augustus was loath to seek further conflict with Parthia. However, the coveted standards were
still held by the Parthians and this was of great concern to Augustus, forcing him to regain them
through a less conventional method. In 30 BCE, Phraates IV usurped the throne of Tiridates who
fled to Syria under the protection of the Romans, whence he launched an attack on his native
land. Although this failed, an agreement was made whereby he could live under the Romans as a
king in exile if he brokered the return of the Roman standards. The standards were returned to
the future emperor Tiberius, who received them on an island in the Euphrates.

The next half century saw relations between the two nations antagonistic but not overtly hostile,
with the Romans unsuccessfully supporting a series of pretender kings, including Claudius in 49

36
K. Butcher, Roman Syria and the Near East, Getty Publications, Los Angeles, 2003 ISBN 0-89236-715-
6

59 | P a g e
CE, indicating the extent to which Rome was attempting to influence Parthian politics for its own
ends. However, during the reign of Nero, Vologases I invaded Armenia and installed his own
brother on the throne, disrupting the balance of influence which had hitherto existed there. The
ensuing war was ended by a compromise which allowed the Parthian prince Tiridates and his
descendants to reign in Armenia on condition that he and his successors received their crown
from the Roman emperor and ruled as his clients.37

Strabo described the Parthian Empire as the only rival existing to Rome.

Relations during the Flavian dynasty

During Vespasians rule Parthia seemed to make some attempts to strengthening the ties between
the two powers, such as asking to form an alliance at the Caucasus against belligerent Sarmatian
tribes and offering assistance to Vespasian against the short lived emperor Vitellius once it
became clear that Vespasian would rule. However, both of these Vespasian refused.

Relations in Late Antiquity

Parthian belt bucket featuring Roman cultural influences.

37
R. C. Brockley, East Roman Foreign Policy, Francis Cairns Publications, Leeds, 1992 ISBN 0-905205-83-9

60 | P a g e
 Parthian jewelry found at Nineveh.

In the 2nd century CE, the balance of power shifted emphatically in favour of the Romans. A
series of invasions repeatedly overran Mesopotamia and sacked the Parthian capital of
Ctesiphon, made substantial territorial gains in northern Mesopotamia and benefited from the
manipulation of frequent Parthian dynastic civil wars, which eventually undermined the Parthian
state. Under Caracalla, an interesting twist in Parthian relations occurred. After submitting a
request to marry the daughter of Persian king Artabanus V (potentially allowing an heir to
assume control of both empires) Caracalla massacred the diplomatic party sent to arrange the
marriage and attempted an invasion of Persia in 216. This was eventually unsuccessful and the
Persians soon retaliated, inflicting heavy losses upon the Romans.

The replacement of the Parthian Empire by that of the Sassanids in 226 CE, which was more
stable and effectively organised, shifted the balance of power against the Romans. The
neighboring rivaling Sasanian Empire and the Roman-Byzantine Empire were recognized as the
two leading world powers, for a period of more than 400 years.38 Frequent Persian aggression
during the 3rd century placed Roman defences under severe strain, but the Romans were
eventually successful in warding these off and avoiding any territorial losses. Indeed, they
eventually made significant gains towards the end of the century, although these were reversed in
the mid-4th century. By that time, as Rome had become monotheistic like the Persians with their
Zoroastrianism, conflicts attained an added religious dimension. It is in this context that the
future of RomanPersian relations would be played out over the remaining centuries, continuing
into the Byzantine era. Neither side was able to inflict a decisive and convincing military victory
against the other, and the movement between hostilities and diplomacy would continue to play
out between each power.39

38
Norman A. Stillman The Jews of Arab Lands pp 22 Jewish Publication Society, 1979 ISBN 0827611552.
39
Anthony Pagden. Worlds at War: The 2,500-Year Struggle Between East and West Random House Publishing
Group, 25 mrt. 2008 ISBN 1588366782 p 84.

61 | P a g e
 GOVERNMENT AND WORKING ( ADMINISTRATION)

Central authority and semi-autonomous kings

Coin of Kamnaskires III, king of Elymais (modern Khzestn Province), and his wife Queen
Anzaze, 1st century BC

Compared with the earlier Achaemenid Empire, the Parthian government was notably
[Link] indigenous historical source reveals that territories overseen by the central
government were organized in a similar manner to the Seleucid Empire. They both had a
threefold division for their provincial hierarchies: the Parthian marzbn, xatrap, and dizpat,
similar to the Seleucid satrapy, eparchy, and [Link] Parthian Empire also contained several
subordinate semi-autonomous kingdoms, including the states of Caucasian Iberia, Armenia,
Atropatene, Gordyene, Adiabene, Edessa, Hatra, Mesene, Elymais, and Persisian. The state
rulers governed their own territories and minted their own coinage distinct from the royal
coinage produced at the imperial mints. This was not unlike the earlier Achaemenid Empire,

62 | P a g e
which also had some city-states, and even distant satrapies who were semi-independent but
"recognised the supremacy of the king, paid tribute and provided military support", according to
Brosius.[191] However, the satraps of Parthian times governed smaller territories, and perhaps had
less prestige and influence than their Achaemenid predecessors.. During the Seleucid period, the
trend of local ruling dynasties with semi-autonomous rule, and sometimes outright rebellious
rule, became commonplace, a fact reflected in the later Parthian style of governance.40

Nobility

A bronze statue of a Parthian nobleman from the sanctuary at Shami in Elymais (modern-day
Khzestn Province, Iran, along the Persian Gulf), now located at the National Museum of Iran.

The King of Kings headed the Parthian government. He maintained polygamous relations, and
was usually succeeded by his first-born son. Like the Ptolemies of Egypt, there is also record of
Arsacid kings marrying their nieces and perhaps even half-sisters; Queen Musa married her own
son, though this was an extreme and isolated cas p]rovides an extract from a letter written in
Greek by King Artabanus II in 21 AD, which addresses the governor (titled "archon") and

40
Kurz, Otto (1983), "Cultural Relations Between Parthia and Rome", in Yarshater, Ehsan, Cambridge History of
Iran, 3.1, London & New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 559567, ISBN 0-521-20092-X.

63 | P a g e
citizens of the city of Susa. Specific government offices of Preferred Friend, Bodyguard and
Treasurer are mentioned and the document also proves that "while there were local jurisdictions
and proceedings to appointment to high office, the king could intervene on behalf of an
individual, review a case and amend the local ruling if he considered it appropriate.41

The hereditary titles of the hierarchic nobility recorded during the reign of the first Sassanid
monarch Ardashir I most likely reflect the titles already in use during the Parthian [Link] were
three distinct tiers of nobility, the highest being the regional kings directly below the King of
Kings, the second being those related to the King of Kings only through marriage, and the lowest
order being heads of local clans and small territories.

By the 1st century AD, the Parthian nobility had assumed great power and influence in the
succession and deposition of Arsacid kings Some of the nobility functioned as court advisers to
the king, as well as holy priests,f the great noble Parthian families listed at the beginning of the
Sasanian period, only two are explicitly mentioned in earlier Parthian documents: the House of
Suren and the House of Karen. The historian Plutarch noted that members of the Suren family,
the first among the nobility, were given the privilege of crowning each new Arsacid King of
Kings during their coronations. Later on, some of the Parthian kings would claim Achaemenid
descent. This has recently been corroborated via the possibility of an inherited disease
(neurofibromatosis) demonstrated by the physical descriptions of rulers and from evidence of
familial disease on ancient coinage42

41
Kennedy, David (1996), "Parthia and Rome: eastern perspectives", The Roman Army in the East, Ann Arbor:
Cushing Malloy Inc., Journal of Roman Archaeology: Supplementary Series Number Eighteen, pp. 6790, ISBN 1-
887829-18-0
42
Zhang, Guanuda (2002), "The Role of the Sogdians as Translators of Buddhist Texts", in Juliano, Annette L. and
Judith A. Lerner, Silk Road Studies: Nomads, Traders, and Holy Men Along China's Silk Road, 7, Turnhout: Brepols
Publishers, pp. 7578, ISBN 2-503-52178-9

64 | P a g e
Military

A Parthian stucco relief of an infantryman, from the walls of Zahhak Castle, East Azarbaijan
Province, Iran

The Parthians, like their neighbors to the north on the steppes (the Scythians), were able to
succeed in battle often due to their use of horse archers. Capable of shooting in virtually any
direction while riding at speed, these archers could inflict heavy damage while maintaining a
position of relative safety themselves. Even when fleeing, the archers could turn and fire
backward at their enemies, a practice from which the term "Parthian Shot" emerged. The term
has come to be used for sharp words dealt while taking leave; one can easily see that the negative
connotations of this phrase suggest a Roman origin, as they would have been the ones getting hit
by those shots

The Parthian Empire had no standing army, yet were able to quickly recruit troops in the event of
local [Link] was a permanent armed guard attached to the person of the king, comprising
nobles, serfs and mercenaries, but this royal retinue was small. Garrisons were also permanently
maintained at border forts; Parthian inscriptions reveal some of the military titles granted to the
commanders of these locations. forces could also be used in diplomatic gestures. For example,
when Chinese envoys visited Parthia in the late 2nd century BC, the Shiji maintains that 20,000

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horsemen were sent to the eastern borders to serve as escorts for the embassy, although this
figure is perhaps an exaggeration. 43

The main striking force of the Parthian army was its cataphracts, heavy cavalry with man and
horse decked in mailed armor.] The cataphracts were equipped with a lance for charging into
enemy lines, but were not equipped with bows and arrows which were restricted to horse archers
Due to the cost of their equipment and armor, cataphracts were recruited from among the
aristocratic class who, in return for their services, demanded a measure of autonomy at the local
level from the Arsacid kings. light cavalry was recruited from among the commoner class and
acted as horse archers; they wore a simple tunic and trousers into battle.] They used composite
bows and were able to shoot at enemies while riding and facing away from them; this technique,
known as the Parthian shot, was a highly effective tactic. The heavy and light cavalry of Parthia
proved to be a decisive factor in the Battle of Carrhae where a Parthian force defeated a much
larger Roman army under Crassus. Light infantry units, composed of levied commoners and
mercenaries, were used to disperse enemy troops after cavalry charges.44

The size of the Parthian army is unknown, as is the size of the empire's overall population.
However, archaeological excavations in former Parthian urban centers reveal settlements which
could have sustained large populations and hence a great resource in manpower. Dense
population centers in regions like Babylonia were no doubt attractive to the Romans, whose
armies could afford to live off the land.

Currency
Usually made of silver, the Greek drachma coin, including the tetradrachm, was the standard
currency used throughout the Parthian [Link] Arsacids maintained royal mints at the cities
of Hecatompylos, Seleucia, and [Link] most likely operated a mint at Mithridatkert/Nisa
as [Link] the empire's inception until its collapse, drachmas produced throughout the Parthian
period rarely weighed less than 3.5 g or more than 4.2 g. The first Parthian tetradrachms,
weighing in principle around 16 g with some variation, appear after Mithridates I conquered
Mesopotamia and were minted exclusively at Seleucia.

43
Y, Ying-shih (1986), "Han Foreign Relations", in Twitchett, Denis and Michael Loewe, Cambridge History of
China: the Ch'in and Han Empires, 221 B.C. A.D. 220, 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 377462,
ISBN 0-521-24327-0.
44
Widengren, Geo (1983), "Sources of Parthian and Sasanian History", in Yarshater, Ehsan, Cambridge History of
Iran, 3.2, London & New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 12611283, ISBN 0-521-20092-X.

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Society and culture

Hellenism and the Iranian revival

Parthian horseman, now on display at the Palazzo Madama, Turin.

Although Greek culture of the Seleucids was widely adopted by peoples of the Near East during
the Hellenistic period, the Parthian era witnessed an Iranian cultural revival in religion, the arts,
and even clothing fashions. Conscious of both the Hellenistic and Persian cultural roots of their
kingship, the Arsacid rulers styled themselves after the Persian King of Kings and affirmed that
they were also philhellenes ("friends of the Greeks"). The word "philhellene" was inscribed on
Parthian coins until the reign of Artabanus II. The discontinuation of this phrase signified the
revival of Iranian culture in Parthia. Vologases I was the first Arsacid ruler to have the Parthian
script and language appear on his minted coins alongside the now almost illegible
[Link] , the use of Greek-alphabet legends on Parthian coins remained until the collapse
of the empire.

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 A ceramic Parthian water spout in the shape of a man's head, dated 1st or 2nd century AD

Greek cultural influence did not disappear from the Parthian Empire, however, and there is
evidence that the Arsacids enjoyed Greek theatre. When the head of Crassus was brought to
Orodes II, he, alongside Armenian king Artavasdes II, were busy watching a performance of The
Bacchae by the playwright Euripides (c. 480406 BC). The producer of the play decided to use
Crassus' actual severed head in place of the stage-prop head of Pentheus. 45

On his coins, Arsaces I is depicted in apparel similar to Achaemenid satraps. According to A.

Shahbazi, Arsaces "deliberately diverges from Seleucid coins to emphasize his nationalistic and
royal aspirations, and he calls himself Krny/Karny (Greek: Autocratos), a title already borne by
Achaemenid supreme generals, such as Cyrus the Younger."In line with Achaemenid traditions,
rock-relief images of Arsacid rulers were carved at Mount Behistun, where Darius I of Persia (r.
522486 BC) made royal inscriptions. Moreover, the Arsacids claimed familial descent from
Artaxerxes II of Persia (r. 404358 BC) as a means to bolster their legitimacy in ruling over
former Achaemenid territories, i.e. as being "legitimate successors of glorious kings" of ancient
Iran Artabanus III named one of his sons Darius and laid claim to Cyrus' [Link] Arsacid
kings chose typical Zoroastrian names for themselves and some from the "heroic background" of
the Avesta, according to V.G. Lukonin. The Parthians also adopted the use of the Babylonian
calendar with names from the Achaemenid Iranian calendar, replacing the Macedonian calendar
of the Seleucids.

45
Green, Tamara M. (1992), The City of the Moon God: Religious Traditions of Harran, BRILL, ISBN 90-04-
09513-6.

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Religion

Parthian votive relief from Khzestn Province, Iran, 2nd century AD

The Parthian Empire, being culturally and politically heterogeneous, had a variety of religious
systems and beliefs, the most widespread being those dedicated to Greek and Iranian cults. Aside
from a minority of Jews and early Christians ,most Parthians were [Link] and
Iranian deities were often blended together as one. For example, Zeus was often equated with
Ahura Mazda, Hades with Angra Mainyu, Aphrodite and Hera with Anahita, Apollo with
Mithra, and Hermes with [Link] from the main gods and goddesses, each ethnic group
and city had their own designated deities.] Aswith Seleucid rulers,Parthian art indicates that the
Arsacid kings viewed themselves as gods; this cult of the ruler was perhaps the most widespread.

The extent of Arsacid patronism of Zoroastrianism is debated in modern scholarship.] The

followers of Zoroaster would have found the bloody sacrifices of some Parthian-era Iranian cults
to be [Link], there is evidence that Vologeses I encouraged the presence of
Zoroastrian magi priests at court and sponsored the compilation of sacred Zoroastrian texts

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which later formed the [Link] Sassanid court would later adopt Zoroastrianism as the
official state religion of the empire. 46

Art and architecture

A barrel vaulted iwan at the entrance at the ancient site of Hatra, modern-day Iraq, built c. 50 AD

Parthian art can be divided into three geo-historical phases: the art of Parthia proper; the art of
the Iranian plateau; and the art of Parthian Mesopotamia. The first genuine Parthian art, found at
Mithridatkert/Nisa, combined elements of Greek and Iranian art in line with Achaemenid and
Seleucid traditions. In the second phase, Parthian art found inspiration in Achaemenid art, as
exemplified by the investiture relief of Mithridates II at Mount Behistun. The third phase
occurred gradually after the Parthian conquest of Mesopotamia.

Common motifs of the Parthian period include scenes of royal hunting expeditions and the
investiture of Arsacid kings Use of these motifs extended to include portrayals of local rulers.[241]
Common art mediums were rock-reliefs, frescos, and even graffiti. and stylized plant patterns
were also used on stucco and plaster walls. The common motif of the Sassanid period showing
two horsemen engaged in combat with lances first appeared in the Parthian reliefs at Mount
Behistun.

46
Wood, Frances (2002), The Silk Road: Two Thousand Years in the Heart of Asia, Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-24340-4.

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In portraiture the Parthians favored and emphasized frontality, meaning the person depicted by
painting, sculpture, or raised-relief on coins faced the viewer directly instead of showing his or
her [Link] frontality in portraiture was already an old artistic technique by the Parthian
period, Daniel Schlumberger explains the innovation of Parthian frontality:

'Parthian frontality', as we are now accustomed to call it, deeply differs both from ancient Near
Eastern and from Greek frontality, though it is, no doubt, an offspring of the latter. For both in
Oriental art and in Greek art, frontality was an exceptional treatment: in Oriental art it was a
treatment strictly reserved for a small number of traditional characters of cult and myth; in Greek
art it was an option resorted to only for definite reasons, when demanded by the subject, and, on
the whole, seldom made use of. With Parthian art, on the contrary, frontality becomes the normal
treatment of the figure. For the Parthians frontality is really nothing but the habit of showing, in
relief and in painting, all figures full-face, even at the expense (as it seems to us moderns) of
clearness and intelligibility. So systematic is this use that it amounts to a complete banishment de
facto of the side-view and of all intermediate attitudes. This singular state of things seems to
have become established in the course of the 1st century A.D47

47
Frye, R.N. (1983), "The Political History of Iran Under the Sasanians", in Yarshater, Ehsan, Cambridge History
of Iran, 3.1, London & New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 116180, ISBN 0-521-20092-X.

71 | P a g e
Clothing and apparel

A statue of a young Palmyran in fine Parthian trousers, from a funerary stele at Palmyra, early
3rd century AD

The typical Parthian riding outfit is exemplified by the famous bronze statue of a Parthian
nobleman found at Shami, Elymais. Standing 1.9 m (6 ft), the figure wears a V-shaped jacket, a
V-shaped tunic fastened in place with a belt, loose-fitting and many-folded trousers held by
garters, and a diadem or band over his coiffed, bobbed hair. His outfit is commonly seen in relief
images of Parthian coins by the mid-1st century BC.

Examples of clothing in Parthian inspired sculptures have been found in excavations at Hatra, in
northwestern Iraq. Statues erected there feature the typical Parthian shirt (qamis), combined with
trousers and made with fine, ornamented materials. The aristocratic elite of Hatra adopted the
bobbed hairstyles, headdresses, and belted tunics worn by the nobility belonging to the central
Arsacid court The trouser-suit was even worn by the Arsacid kings, as shown on the reverse
images of [Link] Parthian trouser-suit was also adopted in Palmyra, Syria, along with the use
of Parthian frontality in art.

Language
As culturally and religiously tolerant the Parthians were, they adopted Greek as their official
language while Aramaic remained the lingua franca in the empireThe native Parthian language,
Middle Persian, and Akkadian were also used.
72 | P a g e
Writing and literature

A sculpted head (broken off from a larger statue) of a Parthian soldier wearing a Hellenistic-style
helmet, from the Parthian royal residence and necropolis of Nisa, Turkmenistan, 2nd century BC

It is known that during the Parthian period the court minstrel (gsn) recited poetic oral literature
accompanied by music. However, their stories, composed in verse form, were not written down
until the subsequent Sasanian period In fact, there is no known Parthian-language literature that
survives in original form, since it was written down in the following centuries. It is believed that
such stories as the romantic tale Vis and Rmin and epic cycle of the Kayanian dynasty were part
of the corpus of oral literature from Parthian times, although compiled much later. Although
literature of the Parthian language was not committed to written form, there is evidence that the
Arsacids acknowledged and respected written Greek literature48

48
Demiville, Paul (1986), "Philosophy and religion from Han to Sui", in Twitchett and Loewe, Cambridge History
of China: the Ch'in and Han Empires, 221 B.C. A.D. 220, 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 808
872, ISBN 0-521-24327-0.

73 | P a g e
 DOWNFALL OF THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE
The Armenian compromise served its purpose, but nothing was arranged for the deposition of a
king. After 110, the Parthian king Vologases III was forced to dethrone an Armenian leader, and
the Roman emperor Trajan -a former general- decided to invade Parthia. War broke out in 114
CE and the Parthians were severely beaten. The Romans conquered Armenia, and in the
following year, Trajan marched to the south, where the Parthians were forced to evacuate their
strongholds. In 116, Trajan captured Ctesiphon, and established new provinces in Assyria and
Babylonia.

However, rebellions broke out (which proves the loyalty of the population to the Parthians). At
the same time, the diasporic Jews revolted and Trajan was forced to send an army to suppress
them. Trajan overcame these troubles, but his successor Hadrian gave up the territories (117 CE).
Nonetheless, it was clear that the Romans had learned how to beat the Parthians.

Perhaps it was not Roman strength, but Parthian weakness that caused the disaster. In the first
century, the Parthian nobility had become more powerful, because the kings had given them
more right over the peasants and their land. They were now in a position to resist their king. At
the same time, the Arsacid family had become divided.

But the end was not near, yet. In 161 CE king Vologases IV declared war against the Romans
and conquered Armenia. The counter-offensive was slow, but in 165 CE, Ctesiphon fell. The
Roman emperors Lucius Verus and Marcus Aurelius added Mesopotamia to their realms, but
were unable to demilitarize the region between the Euphrates and Tigris. It remained an
expensive burden. But it was now clear that the Romans were superior.

The final blow came thirty years later. King Vologases V had tried to reconquer Mesopotamia
during a Roman civil war (193 CE), but when general Septimius Severus was master of the
empire, he attacked Parthia. Again, Ctesiphon was captured (198 CE), and large spoils were
brought to Rome. According to a modern estimate, the gold and silver were sufficient to
postpone a European economic crisis for three or four decades, and we can imagine the
consequences for Parthia.

Parthia, now impoverished and without any hope to recover the lost territories, was demoralized.
The kings had to do more concessions to the nobility, and the vassal kings sometimes refused to
obey. In 224 CE, the Persian vassal king Ardair revolted. Two years later, he took Ctesiphon,
and this time, it meant the end of Parthia. It also meant the beginning of the second Persian
Empire, ruled by the Sassanid kings.

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 CONCLUSION ANND SUGGESTION

The Parthian Empire (247 BC 224 AD), also known as the Arsacid Empire49 was a
major Iranian political and cultural power in ancient Iran and Iraq50. Its latter name comes
from Arsaces I of Parthia who, as leader of the Parni tribe, founded it in the mid-3rd century BC
when he conquered the region of Parthia51 in Iran's northeast, then a satrapy(province) in
rebellion against the Seleucid Empire. Mithridates I of Parthia (r. c. 171138 BC) greatly
expanded the empire by seizing Media and Mesopotamia from the Seleucids. At its height, the
Parthian Empire stretched from the northern reaches of the Euphrates, in what is now central-
eastern Turkey, to eastern Iran. The empire, located on the Silk Road trade route between
the Roman Empire in the Mediterranean Basin and the Han Empire of China, became a center of
trade and commerce.

The Parthians largely adopted the art, architecture, religious beliefs, and royal insignia of their
culturally heterogeneous empire, which encompassed Persian, Hellenistic, and regional cultures.
For about the first half of its existence, the Arsacid court adopted elements of Greek culture,
though it eventually saw a gradual revival of Iranian traditions. The Arsacid rulers were titled the
"King of Kings", as a claim to be the heirs to the Achaemenid Empire; indeed, they accepted
many local kings as vassals where the Achaemenids would have had centrally appointed, albeit
largely autonomous, satraps. The court did appoint a small number of satraps, largely outside
Iran, but these satrapies were smaller and less powerful than the Achaemenid potentates. With
the expansion of Arsacid power, the seat of central government shifted
from Nisa to Ctesiphon along the Tigris (south of modern Baghdad, Iraq), although several other
sites also served as capitals.

Before Arsaces I of Parthia founded the Arsacid Dynasty, he was chieftain of

the Parni, an ancient Central-Asian tribe of Iranian peoples and one of several nomadic tribes
within the confederation of the Dahae. The Parni most likely spoke an eastern Iranian language,
in contrast to the northwestern Iranian language spoken at the time in Parthia. The latter was a
northeastern province, first under the Achaemenid, and then the Seleucid empires. After
conquering the region, the Parni adopted Parthian as the official court language, speaking it
alongside Middle Persian, Aramaic, Greek, Babylonian, Sogdian and other languages in the
multilingual territories they would conquer.

49
From Ancient Greek Arsaks, from Parthian Arak.
50
Waters 1974, p. 424.
51
Retrived from : [Link] 12th October,2016 ; 01:00pm).

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Why the Arsacid court retroactively chose 247 BC as the first year of the Arsacid era is
uncertain. A.D.H. Bivar concludes that this was the year the Seleucids lost control of Parthia
to Andragoras, the appointed satrap who rebelled against them. Hence, Arsaces I "backdated
his regnal years" to the moment when Seleucid control over Parthia ceased. However, Vesta
Sarkhosh Curtis asserts that this was simply the year Arsaces was made chief of the Parni
tribe. Homa Katouzian and Gene Ralph Garthwaiteclaim it was the year Arsaces conquered
Parthia and expelled the Seleucid authorities, yet Curtis and Maria Brosius state that Andragoras
was not overthrown by the Arsacids until 238 BC.

It is unclear who immediately succeeded Arsaces I. Bivarand Katouzian affirm that it was his
brother Tiridates I of Parthia, who in turn was succeeded by his son Arsaces II of Parthia in
211 BC. Yet Curtis and Brosius state that Arsaces II was the immediate successor of Arsaces I,
with Curtis claiming the succession took place in 211 BC, and Brosius in 217 BC. Bivar insists
that 138 BC, the last regnal year of Mithridates I, is "the first precisely established regnal date of
Parthian history." Due to these and other discrepancies, Bivar outlines two distinct royal
chronologies accepted by historians. Later on, some of the Parthian Kings would claim
Achaemenid descent. The claim has recently received support from numismatic and other written
evidence suggesting that both Achaemenid and Parthian kings suffered from the hereditary
disease neurofibromatosis.

Compared with the earlier Achaemenid Empire, the Parthian

government was notably [Link] indigenous historical source reveals that territories
overseen by the central government were organized in a similar manner to the Seleucid Empire.
They both had a threefold division for their provincial hierarchies: the Parthian marzbn, xatrap,
and dizpat, similar to the Seleucid satrapy, eparchy, and [Link] Parthian Empire also
contained several subordinate semi-autonomous kingdoms, including the states of Caucasian
Iberia, Armenia, Atropatene, Gordyene, Adiabene, Edessa, Hatra, Mesene, Elymais, and
Persisian. The state rulers governed their own territories and minted their own coinage distinct
from the royal coinage produced at the imperial mints. This was not unlike the earlier
Achaemenid Empire, which also had some city-states, and even distant satrapies who were semi-
independent but "recognised the supremacy of the king, paid tribute and provided military
support", according to Brosius., the satraps of Parthian times governed smaller territories, and
perhaps had less prestige and influence than their Achaemenid predecessors.. During the
Seleucid period, the trend of local ruling dynasties with semi-autonomous rule, and sometimes
outright rebellious rule, became commonplace, a fact reflected in the later Parthian style of
governance.

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 Bibliography

Neusner, J. (1963), "Parthian Political Ideology", Iranica Antiqua, 3: 4059

Schippmann, Klaus (1987), "Arsacid ii. The Arsacid dynasty", Encyclopaedia Iranica, 2, New York:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 526535

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 11. . Imprensa nacional. Portugal. Ministrio dos Negcios Estrangeiros. pp. 1925.
12. Eric A. Arnold, Jr. "Napoleon's St. Cloud Decree, 3 July 1810: Text and Analysis,"
Proceedings of the Western Society for French History (1998, Vol. 25, pp 49-54

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