Iraq

Pablo E. Rivera

Prof. Summers

U.S. Foreign Policy

July 2009
 2

Table of Contents

Factual Background……………………………………………………………………………...1

Issues and Interests…………………………………………………………………………….....3

Analysis…………………………………………………………………………………………...6

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….12

References……………………………………………………………………………………….13
 1

Factual Background

During the last six years the United States has been involve n a conflict, which for some

has no easy solution, in Iraq. This conflict, of local and global consequences, has been part of a

greater one: the Global War on Terror. The reasons the for the United States to invade Iraq had

been full of uncertainty for many, and the theories to explain such action has not ceased to be

developed, just like the opinions about what is the best approach to ending the conflict. Many

reasons were presented as why the U.S. had to invade Iraq, ranging from Hussein’s weapons of

mass destruction to his supposed connections to Al-Qaeda. “All of these assertions have been

proven wrong.” (Polk, 2005) The next two years are crucial to the future of the country of Iraq,

and to the interests of the United States in the region. To understand the unraveling of this

conflict is necessary to informed ourselves, at least about the basics of the realities and

circumstances that developed, into the current situation, and of the countries, groups, individuals,

ideas, and institutions that have been involved.

On September 11th, 2001 our nation suffered an unprecedented attack. Two of our

symbolic institutions were hit, the World Trade Center, which represented our economical power

in the world, and the Pentagon, the root of our military dominance. “Effecting a regime change

in Iraq was secretly adopted as American policy the day after al-Qaida attack on September 11,

2001, and was openly espoused by 2002.” (Polk, 2005) According to a book written by Bob

Woodward, 72 days after the September 11th attacks President Bush asked Donald Rumsfeld to

prepare for a war with Iraq. (Hamilton, 2004) President Bush in its State of the Union Address

said: “Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror . . . This is a

regime that agreed to international inspections then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime
 2

that has something to hide from the civilized world.” (President’s State of the Union Address,

2002)

The U.S. started their invasion of Iraq on March 2003. “Four-hundred fourteen days

passed from the time President Bush named Iraq as part of an axis of evil to the time the first

missiles flew.” (TIME, 21 Days to Baghdad, 2003). The truth may be that the invasion of Iraq

was inevitable in the eyes of the Bush administration, a necessary step and the most logical

progression of the War on Terror. And it may be that the invasion was based on faulty

intelligence and rash decisions. But at this moment, within the current circumstances, we have to

figure out what is the best possible course of action.

On November 2008, after more than four thousand American lives lost and billions of

dollars spent, the governments of the United States and Iraq signed an agreement for the

withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Iraq. The signed agreement came into effect on January 1 st,

2009, and has already resulted in the withdrawal of American forces from the urban areas. It

could be that we may “overstate the importance of the June 30 troop withdrawal. U.S. forces are

leaving areas that they entered before and especially during the surge” ordered by President Bush

in 2007. (Hiltermann, 2009) Contrary to what some may belief, our problems may get more

complicated in Iraq, and our serious challenges may be just starting. “The real turning points

over the coming months will be the country's parliamentary elections in January and the

comprehensive withdrawal of U.S. combat troops by August 2010.” (Hiltermann, 2009) It has

been said that there was no exit strategy for the war in Iraq, and finding a successful one might

just be what the current administration has to do. The United States must concentrate not only

on the short term goals and challenges Iraq presents, but also on the future repercussions that our

actions might entail.

Issues and Interests

situation. We have invested money and lives in this conflict, and new challenges lie ahead.

With the new force-agreement, between the U.S. and the government of Iraq, our role in the

country has changed from an occupier force to an almost invitee consultant force. We are no

longer in charge, at least not in the literal sense of the word. The United States will have to

achieve its goals and objectives by respecting the laws and sovereignty of Iraq. “It is the duty of

the United States Forces and its civilian component to respect Iraqi laws, customs, traditions, and

conventions and to refrain from any activities that are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of

this agreement. (Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq,

2008)

There are four major basic interests in terms of foreign poly-making: Power, Peace,

Prosperity and Principles. During the course of the United States foreign policy’s history these

interests have been used as a reason, or justification, for our actions in the world arena.

Depending on the situation, any one of these may take precedent over another, and at other times

more than one interest is involved. Iraq is one of those situations, where there is a confluence of

interests. It is a complex situation, with many influential factors, and many possible

consequences. The complexity of this situation has been developing throughout many years. It

does not involve only the internal actors of this dilemma, Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, but it also

encompasses the future of the Middle East.

The stability of the government of the Iraqi government is crucial to all the interests of

the United States in the area. The approach I suggest is a comprehensive one, which involves

many avenues of approach. The military option, at least a direct one, is out of the picture. The
 4

forces agreement entered by both the United States government and the Iraqi government would

have as a result a complete withdrawal of all U.S. armed forces from Iraq. Our foreign policy

regarding Iraq cannot depend, anymore, on the superior force of our military power. We have to

advance our interests in the area with both diplomatic and economical ways.

Our standing has to be a coherent union of a “real politic” approach with the right amount

of liberalism. Our main concern should be our security, our national security. Security is tied to

our power as a nation. The power, not only to use brute force with our military, but to persuade

others to act in accordance with our other interests. My view is that power should be the main

interest in our foreign policy with Iraq, and once that interest is achieved, all of the other

interests regarding our foreign policy would be easier to achieve. Power is related to the

achievement of peace and prosperity, and these two conditions make propitious the spreading of

our principles. Our success as a nation is our highest interest, because all other interests depend

on it.

First, we should be concerned about the development of the relationship between the

Iranian government and the Iraqi government. In both countries the Shiite Muslims are the

majority, and the strengthening of that relationship can bring serious consequences to the

security and peace situation in the area. Iraq has a substantial oil reserve, second in the world,

and that would lead to a serious fight for power with other Arab nations, such as Saudi Arabia,

which is predominantly Sunni. Second, we have the current division and strife among Shiites,

Sunnis and Kurds in the country. The area that is occupied by the Kurds is rich in oil, and any

attempt from their part to obtain more freedom of governance can steer the country into a full

blown civil war. Third, the possible existence of terrorist groups that can develop into the area,

once the US withdraws, is now a serious concern. Even though there has never been any proof
 5

of a connection between Hussein’s government and Al-Qaeda, it is a fact that after the US

involvement in the country many foreigners and radical Islamists have taken residence in Iraq.

Finally, the economically interests of the United States are obvious and important. With the vast

resources that Iraq posses, the United States must develop a sensible and effective strategy to

take advantage of those resources.

Analysis: Goals, Objectives, and Means

I have outlined the interests and main concerns that are presented by the current situation

in Iraq. But, what are our objectives, our goals? And most importantly, how are we going to

achieve them? We have to ensure that the government of Iraq is a stable institution, and this is

not an easy task. Depending on that is the whole future of the area, and that is not an easy task.

In the current situation, understanding the fragmentation of Iraq in different cultures and

groups, religious and ethnic, is determinative to the furthering of our interests in the area. The

majority of the population in Iraq practices Islam, but that doesn’t mean that it is a homogenized

country, and that is where most of the problems arise. The majority of the Muslim world is

divided in Shiites and Sunnis, two factions of Islam that are in direct conflict with each other.

“Sunnis, a minority in Iraq but a majority in the Arab world, have been historically recognized as

the economical and political elite of the country. . . In this context, Saddam Hussein governed

during more than three decades supported by the Sunni Arabs.” (Batalla, 2003). Saddam proved

to be a strong leader for the country and maintained control for many years. This demonstrated

to be crucial to maintain the unity of the country; of course this was accompanied with brutal

cruelty and ruthlessness. I am not advocating such a leader needs to be imposed on Iraq, but we

need to be sure that Al-Maliki is a strong figure of leadership and power if we are to succeed.

“Maintaining the public image of a strengthening, self-sufficient Iraqi government is a

security priority for the United States and will be essential for the planned withdrawal of troops

over the coming years.” (Parker, 2009) The main problem is how to achieve this without losing

control of the leaders of the country. How can we tackle this dichotomy of developing a strong

government in Iraq, while at the same time maintaining our influential cloak over its leaders?
 7

“The idea that the United States could invade an Arab country, topple its government, and

establish a new one that would earn democratic legitimacy and be an ally of the United States

was always unlikely given regional political dynamics and Iraq's history, which require some

degree of distance from Washington.” (Parker, 2009) And if it is such an unlikely idea, what are

we supposed to do? We have to use all our resources in the diplomatic arena, plus an effective

use of the intelligence assets we have in the area. Even though the government of Iraq may have

to give an image of strong independence, from America, to portray a powerful image at home

and to the rest of the countries in the area, “behind closed doors, many Iraqi leaders, including

the prime minister's advisors, express their desire for a close long-term relationship with the

United States.” (Parker, 2009)

The United States needs to help Nouri Al-Maliki to establish a strong image of power,

and it is in our best interest to do so. We need to lend our full support, even to the extent of

providing economical support to his bid for reelection in next year’s election. The people that

surround Al-Maliki “think Iraq will need U.S. military support well beyond 2011 (requiring a

negotiation of a new agreement superseding the SOFA) and would like the very favorable terms

on which Uncle Sam provides this support to continue.” (Parker, 2009) To maintain a certain

control and influence over the government of Iraq, we have to ensure that this same group of

officials remain in power. We may have some disagreements with Al-Maliki’s government, and

we will not condone all their actions.

Last July, “Iraqi troops and police carried out a bloody raid Tuesday on the camp of an

Iranian opposition group that the United States has long sheltered . . . offering the latest sign that

American influence is waning as Iranian clout rises. The operation, which caught U.S. officials

off guard, coincided with a visit by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, and analysts said it
 8

appeared designed to send a message of Iraqi independence.” (Jaffe and Londoño, 2009) This is

the type of situation that presents our biggest challenge, and presents the difficulty of the dualist

nature of our state of affairs regarding the future of Iraq. But we can use the relationship of the

Iraqi government with Iran to our advantage. That kind of operation, without the approval or

blessing of the United States cannot happen again. We have to use all our diplomacy to make

sure that the government of Iraq understands this. We have to use finesse, while we present a

strong position with them. Our intelligence was faulty in that situation, and that cannot happen

again. “The attacks of September 11, 2001, showed the Western world that Arab tyranny -- as

enabled by U.S. foreign policy -- was an essential alloy in the alchemy of Islamist terrorism. But

the response of the George W. Bush administration only made Arab authoritarianism more

likely.” (Gardner, 2009)

Diplomacy and intelligence will cost not even a fraction of the cost of maintaining a full

force in Iraq. But we cannot retreat completely from the area. We have to maintain our forces in

neighboring Kuwait. This will not only be essential to deter Iran from attempting to intrude in

Iraqi affairs too boldly. Diplomacy is of no use in today’s world without the ability to act

forcefully when necessary. It is true that diplomacy should be the path, the modus operandi, of

our government. The interdependence among countries, our economy’s dependence on the well

being of other countries, demands it. But in the end, diplomacy would be hollow without the

leverage of power. Iran is, and will be, a constant threat to the area. Our relationship with Iraq

can assist our interests in a great way.

While maintaining a close relationship with a strong Iraqi government, we have the assets

to collect intelligence, and to monitor Iran’s actions. This will be more effective than any

intelligence we can obtain from a rogue Iranian opposition group stationed in Iraq. We can use
 9

situations like the raid on the camp opposition group to our favor. We should have

acknowledged, in public, that the act of the Iraqi government was a brave move against a

terrorist group and in accordance with their sovereignty, while at close doors enabling a forceful

conversation with the Iraqi government. We have to let them know that we can be the best allies

they can have, and at the same time make it clear that at this moment, without our full support,

their government would not survive.

While we have to keep in our sights the relationship of the Iraqi and Iranian governments,

we have to be aware of the internal strife that may divide the country. The current differences

among the different sectors of the country, Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, are not simple to solve.

People tend to emphasize their attention in the Sunni and Shiite conflict, which extends to the

rest of the Arab world. But the relationship between Kurds and the rest of the Iraqi nation is the

most neuralgic point at this moment. There is at this moment a Federal type of government in

Iraq, and “to have a federal state in the Middle East is quite revolutionary.” (Barkey, 2009) And

the problem with the Kurds does not only affect the future of Iraq, but of the whole area. Turkey

has big population of Kurds, and the problems with Kurds in Iraq are not in the best interests of

Turkey, or the whole area. “To the extent that the Kurdistan Regional Government is now

recognized constitutionally within Iraq and Kurdish is the second language, you can almost think

of Iraq now as a – almost as a bi-national state. And this has consequences, obviously, for the

region.” (Barkey, 2009)

The area in northern Iraq, the autonomous region Kurdistan Regional Government is

located, is rich in oil. This entails an important interest for the United States. We have to ensure

that the oil assets of Iraq can be utilized to our benefit. We are dependent on foreign oil for our

economy, and the situation does not seem to be going to change in the foreseeable future. After
 10

all the money and resources we have invested in Iraq, we would not benefit from an unstable

region. Diplomacy plays an integral part in this situation too. We have to promote a strong

federalist government, but at the same time it should not be an oppressive one. The Kurds need

to feel as part of the country, but the power need to be centralized in Baghdad. “The best

possible solution for Iraq is for that federal structure – and the boundaries is something we can

discuss later – for that federal structure to be really consolidated, because without a consolidation

of that federal structure, then you will have potential, the tendency of Kurds to go for secession.”

(Barkey, 2009)

We also need to establish conversations between the government of the Kurdish region,

with the central Iraqi government, and the government of Turkey. It is imperative that all these

actors work together towards the stability of the region, and to form a partnership toward peace

in the region. Economical interests are always an incentive for peace. If we manage to involve

all parties in the sensible exploitation of the areas, if all parties are to benefit from the use of the

oil resources of the area, then everyone has an incentive for stability. “Washington is in a strong

position to help because of its positive relationships with both Turkey and the Kurds.” (Barkey,

2009) “Turkey for the United States is the single most important country in the region. Turkey,

as you know, is a NATO – Turkey is a country that is trying to become a member of the

European Union.” (Barkey, 2009) We have to understand that the Iraq situation does not exist in

a vacuum, and that the repercussions can extend beyond its borders. We should try to create a

consortium of companies with partners form the different parties to exploit the oil resources of

Iraq. Once we achieve to involve all the factions in the success of the region, the interests of the

United States will be furthered.

And let us not forget about the Sunnis. They have to feel like they have an interest in the

stability of Iraq. There are great wounds to be healed, after the Sunni minority controlled Iraq

during Hussein’s regime. This does not mean that it is without solution, and at the same time it

signifies that it is a hard task to accomplish. If we provide the Iraqi police and government with

the professional training that is required, we could avoid the consequences of an abusive

government institution. That should be the mission of our armed forces at this moment in Iraq,

to train the Iraqi police and army not only in tactics, but in values and ideals. Anyone can learn

how to shoot a weapon, or conduct a simple and basic tactical movement, but the sense of order

and discipline that should be present in the armed branch of a government is more difficult to

instill. If only we could ask George Washington and Baron Von Steuben of how to achieve this.

The sad truth is that we cannot, and we have to figure it ourselves. We should allow

people, Sunnis, who served in the army under Hussein, to re enter the ranks and files of the army.

And not only the low ranks, but experienced leaders of the Iraq-Iran war. The biggest mistake

we did was to disband the army completely. A trained soldier, a career soldier, understands the

chain of command. These valuable assets, with experience in the military art, would understand

that there is a new boss to obey, a new commander. They would have an interest in the survival

of the government, and they would regain their status, socially and economically.

All this efforts would also discourage the citizens of Iraq from harboring foreigners with

radical ideals and agendas. There has never been any proof of a connection of Saddam Hussein

with Al-Qaeda or any other terrorist organization, but the situation in Iraq became fertile ground

for radicals. A stable and prosperous Iraq would cease to be a harboring possibility for radicals.
 12

Conclusion

In this brief the emphasis has been on power and economy. This would not mean that

other interests, such as peace and principles are not important. Peace and principles are part of

our standing as a nation in the world, or at least we attempt them to be. There is no better way to

achieve peace and to instill our principles, of liberty and freedom in the world, than by furthering

our power and prosperity interests. How could we be an exemplary force to the world if we

cannot present an image of success. How can we persuade through diplomacy, if we do not have

the power to effect change and action.

We have invested billions of dollars in Iraq, and thousands of American lives have been

lost. We have to reap the rewards of our efforts, no matter what reasons were given for our

involvement in the conflict. We have a responsibility to our citizens, to the future of our nation,

to the security of our nation. The utilization of a “strong” diplomatic stance, coupled with an

efficient intelligence gathering, and the smart utilization and allocation of economical resources

would result in the successful advancement of our interests in the area. A strong Iraqi

government, under the influence of the U.S., but at the same time with the image of an

independent thinker will be the key for the stability of the area.

A comprehensive plan, that maintains a strong central government, while giving

participation to other sectors of the population, such as the Kurds and the Shiites, will be

necessary. This will all come at not even a fraction of the cost of what we have spent to this day

in this conflict, and we will have to maintain a ready-force in Kuwait just in case the situation

gets out of hand.

References

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq. 2008

Alaaldin, Ranj. 2009. A Hollow Victory for Iraq. Retrieved from

[Link]

American Forces Press Services. 2009. Training Takes Center Stage in Iraq. Retrieved from

[Link]

Barkey, Henri. 2009. A Chance for Turkish-Kurdish Peace. Retrieved from

[Link]

fa=view&id=23303&prog=zgp&proj=zme

Barkey, Henri. 2009. Preventing Conflict Over Kurdistan. Retrieved from

[Link]

Batalla, Xavier. 2003. ¿Por qué Irak? Liberdúplex, S.L. Barcelona. p. 43-130

Central Intelligence Agency. World Factbook: Iraq. Retrieved from

[Link]

Gardner, David. 2009. Obama’s Shallow Realism. Retrieved from

[Link]

Haddick, Robert. 2009. This Week at War: Life After Insurgency. Retrieved from

[Link]

Hamilton, William. 2004. Bush Began to Plan War Three Months After 9/11. Retrieved from

[Link]
 14

Hiltermann, Joost. 2009. Iraq’s Real Deadline. Retrieved from

[Link]

Jaffe, Greg & Londoño, Ernesto. 2009. Iraq Raids Camp of Exiles From Iran. Retrieved from

[Link]

Keating, Joshua. 2009. Maliki to U.S.: We’ll Tell You if We Need a Hand. Retrieved from

[Link]

Koepp, Steve et al. Ed. 2003. 21 Days to Baghdad. Time Books: New York. P.7

Parker, Sam. 2009. The New Nuri al-Maliki. Retrieved from

[Link]

obref=obinsite

Polk, William R. 2005. Understanding Iraq. Harper Perennial: New York. P.167-169.

President’s State of the Union Address. Retrieved from

[Link] 2002

Renner, Michael. 2003. Post-Saddam Iraq: Linchpin of a New World Order. Foreign Policy in

Focus. [Link]

Shadid, Anthony. 2009. Iraq’s Mud is Getting Wetter. Retrieved from

[Link]

Sulaymaniyah. 2009. The Times They are a-Changing. Retrieved from

[Link]