Military Justice and General Order No. 7
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EsLebeDeutschlandMilitary Justice and General Order No. 7
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EsLebeDeutschlandESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY JUSTICE .
813
and the argument in support of it, I am confident that no such language wa s
used in anything that had to do with obtaining the approval of the Secretary
of War in the establishment of that order .
Q . What was Gen . Crowder's actual attitude with respect to General Orde r
No . 7?-A . So far as I know, Gen. Crowder's attitude was this : He believed tha t
it would effectively meet any criticism which had been raised by Gen . Ansel l
as to a lack of corrective power in the office of the Judge Advocate General when
cases were reviewed in which we discovered that errors of law had been mad e
in the trial and disposition of the case . I do not know, of course, what th e
innermost attitude of Gen . Crowder toward this order was, but that wa s
the purpose of its adoption, and it was designed as a complete answer to th e
contention that the War Department was incapable to do justice to the me n
tried by court-martial . I note also, in referring to this same order, that Gen .
Ansell claims that full action under this order was not taken until September ,
1918, after his return from France . He states that prior to that time the offic e
view had been that the Judge Advocate General's office was limited in passin g
upon any case that came to the office under that order to technical question s
of law, and that they were forbidden by the terms of the order to advise con-
vening authorities as to punishments that had been given in particular cases .
He states that notwithstanding the order and notwithstanding the view that ha d
been taken by the Judge Advocate General's office he reversed that view an d
instructed boards of review to express their opinion in addressing militar y
commanders to the effect that justice would require clemency on their part i n
passing upon certain sentences, and if it was a case in which the commandin g
general could not take action that we would forward the proceedings direct t o
the President, which means the Secretary of War .
Gen . Ansell is mistaken in his statement that this is the first time that thi s
corrective action was applied under General Order No . 7 . General Order
No. 7 was administered during the time that I waa in the Judge Advocate
General's Office and in the Disciplinary Division . We conceived it a functio n
of the Judge Advocate General's Office to constantly advise reviewing author-
ities as to the action which it would be proper to take in particular cases b y
them . We suggested that they reverse or set aside the action of the court
wherever errors of law had been exhibited inasmuch as they had reserve d
jurisdiction to do so, and we also suggested certain mitigation of punishmen t
in particular cases when we thought the case deserved it.
It was exactly this procedure that Gen. Ansell so strenuously objected to as
it was applied in the early part of 1918, under General Order No. 7 . He stated ,
for instance, that a commanding general could not, under the law, revers e
jurisdiction to take any further 'action in a court-martial ease which had onc e
passed his hands ; that when he had acted on it such action was final, and i f
any corrective action was later taken it had to be taken by the Secretary of War ,
or, as he contended, it should be properly taken by the Judge Advocate General ,
under the power which he claimed could be deduced from 1199, Revise d
Statutes.
During the time that I was in the Disciplinary Division, notwithstandin g
these views held by Gen . Ansell, having Gen . Crowder's support for the carry-
ing out of this policy, this action continued to be taken .
On the 18th of April, 1918, I left the office of the Judge Advocate Genera l
to make a trip of inspection of the military camps in this country, for th e
purpose of ascertaining how General Order No. 7 was being carried out an d
how military justice was administered in these camps under this order . Upon
my return to the office of the Judge Advocate General, about the middle o f
May, I found that Gen . Ansell had, in the meantime, departed for his trip to
France, and Col . Mayes had become the senior assistant to Gen . Crowder an d
was signing papers as Acting Judge Advocate General . Col. Mayes, in th e
meantime, placed Col. Reed in charge of the Disciplinary Division, and o n
my return I was assigned to other work, and two or three months thereafte r
assigned to the General Staff. Col . Mayes supported Gen . Ansell in hi s
objection to the corrective action which the department was taking unde r
General Order No. 7, and when he became senior assistant he reversed thes e
corrective processes which we had established, and it was Col. Mayes 's view
of this order which Gen . Ansell stated that he reversed in September . Hi s
action, therefore, was simply a going back to the policy which was establishe d
in the Judge Advocate General's Office when General Order No . 7 was first
published, and which he at first strenuously opposed .