Military Justice Reform Recommendations
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EsLebeDeutschlandMilitary Justice Reform Recommendations
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EsLebeDeutschland768 ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY JUSTICE .
Senate Military Affairs Committee adopted the unanimous report of its sub -
committee which, in conclusion, stated as follows :
" Convinced that the revision embodies many essential reforms in our mili -
tary law, and that it presents an adequate and modern military code, you r
subcommittee earnestly recommends that the project, as set forth in th e
amended draft, be recommended for enactment."
"(2) To what extent, if at all, has the making of such recommendations fo r
clemency, or otherwise properly administering the business of military justice ,
been affected by the difference of opinion with regard to the interpretation o f
section 1199 of the Revised Statutes of the United States? " (Exhibit 1 . )
The difference of opinion concerned only a question of statutory construction .
There has never been a controversy in the office of the Judge Advocate Genera l
over the necessity for exercising as complete a revisory or appellate jurisdiction
over courts-martial as was possible without interfering with the necessary
disciplinary powers of officers commanding, and therefore responsible for th e
discipline of, troops .
For a long time after, and in spite of, the adverse ruling by the Secretary o f
War in November, 1918, Gen. Ansell persisted in his view, under his " reinter-
pretation " of an old statute, that the Judge Advocate General was the onl y
lawful court of last resort in all court-martial cases, and as such supreme
not subordinate even to the Secretary of War or the President. That view he
pressed upon his subordinates while they were acting under General Orders,
No . 7. These orders he insisted were wrong in legal principle . This persist-
ence in opposing the announced and final decision of the Secretary of War wa s
marked . and continued with gradually decreasing obtrusiveness until Gen. Ansell
departed for Europe in April, 1918 . Gen . Ansell's assertion that, during thi s
period, he was relieved from duty in connection with the administration o f
military justice is not based upon fact . He never was so relieved, nor wer e
his duties in the Judge Advocate General ' s Office ever curtailed in the slightes t
degree by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, or the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral . While it is true that, in November, 1917, the Secretary of War was de-
sirous, and expressed the hope, . that Gen . Crowder might give more of hi s
time to the office of the Judge Advocate General, it has been seen that th e
duties of the Provost Marshal General's office prevented . From Februar y
until April, 1918, Gen . Ansell's duties and authority remained undiminished ,
except in so far as he voluntarily failed to have anything whatever to do wit h
the operation of General .Orders, No . 7 .
Upon his return from Europe in July, Gen . Ansell gave the provisions of
General Orders, No . 7 . the same liberal interpretation that prevailed when th e
orders first became effective . While the provisions of General Orders, No . 84,
were contrary to the interpretation of section 1199, Revised Statutes, as ap-
pro--el by the Secretary of War, the administration of military justice did no t
suffer during the period that those orders remained in force.
Until recently, what was first a mere difference of opinion went no further.
The opposing views were urged with force, but with dignity . Such opposition
as existed was an opposition of opinion, of judgment, and not of personality .
There was no diffusion of energies nor conflict of loyalties . The work wa s
carr ied en with marked diligence and unanimity of purpose by all concerned .
The disagreement did not at any time affect the functioning of the machiner y
to which it related . It is clear that all the recommendations of Gen . Ansel l
received most careful consideration by the War Department and there has no t
been a simile instance, except with respect to section 1199, Revised Statutes ,
and the fiftieth article of war, where his recommendations on matters of policy
relating to the administration of military justice have not been adopted i n
whole or in part.
Recently, there has developed, among the officers now in the Judge Advo
cate General's Office, a feeling of resentment over the one-sided and unfai r
discussion of the whole matter in the public press. The testimony to that effect
comes in part from officers who concur, or at least concurred originallyy ,
in Gen . Ansell's construction of the statute . Most of those officers are lawyer s
who left positions of prominence at the bar, on the bench, or the faculties o f
colleges of law to accept their commissions . They have labored with unceasing
diligence. They have reviewed all of the thousands of general court-martia l
cases . Needless to say, not being military men, their intellectual mediu m
of examination, their standard of justice (if there is more than one suc h
standard), has been that of the civilian rather than the soldier .
Feeling as they do that they have accomplished their mission, which ha s
been to prevent injustice, they do not take kindly to an attack from any