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 The Conspiracy Theory Meme as a Tool of Cultural Hegemony:
A Critical Discourse Analysis

by

JAMES EDWIN RANKIN, JR.

Abstract

Those rejecting the official accounts of significant suspicious and impactful events are often

labeled conspiracy theorists and the alternative explanations they propose are often referred

to as conspiracy theories. These labels are often used to dismiss the beliefs of those

individuals who question potentially hegemonic control of what people believe. The

conspiracy theory concept functions as an impediment to legitimate discursive examination

of conspiracy suspicions. The effect of the label appears to constrain even the most respected

thinkers. This impediment is particularly problematic in academia, where thorough, objective

analysis of information is critical to uncovering truth, and where members of the academy

are typically considered among the most important of epistemic authorities. This dissertation

tracked the development and use of such terms as pejoratives used to shut down critical

thinking, analysis, and challenges to authority. This was accomplished using critical

discourse analysis as a research methodology. Evidence suggesting government agents were

instrumental in creating the pejorative meme conspiracy theorist was found in contemporary

media. Tracing the evolution of the conspiracy theory meme and its use as a pejorative

silencer may heighten awareness of its use in this manner and diminish its impact.

Key Words: conspiracy theory, conspiracy theorist, discourse analysis, critical discourse

analysis, hegemony, propaganda, suppression, censorship

ii
 Copyright by

JAMES EDWIN RANKIN, JR.

2017

iii
 Acknowledgements

There are many people who have supported me in the completion of this work.

Kathryn Eaker, my study partner and student reader, told me when we met at Fieldings New

Student Orientation, a Fielding graduate she knew had warned her that, This process will

change you. At the time, I didnt get it. After all, I was in my 50s and already rather worldly

I thought. How could this possibly change me that much? Well, a couple of years later, I

found myself wondering how I had reached my age without knowing about systems theory,

epistemology, hegemony, and the other disciplines and ideas I have been introduced to in the

years since I began this process.

Ive studied with several outstanding faculty and many incredible students at

Fielding. There are too many to mention. Special thanks go to my committee chair Four

Arrows (AKA Don Trent Jacobs), the greatest example of self-authorship Ive ever known.

His personal and academic courage and enthusiasm for my topic has been inspirational. His

support and encouragement kept me headed for the finish line. Dr. David Blake Willis

guidance and suggestions about research design and writing helped immensely. I believe Dr.

Keith Melvilles insistence on adherence to high academic standards and the structure of the

work helped ensure this work is credible and makes a meaningful, substantive contribution to

the literature. Kathryn has been a great supporter and kept me informed about all the

administrative things I tend to neglect. I thank my External Examiner, Dr. Dave Collum, one

of the brightest, most interesting people I know, for inspiring me to think outside the box. I

think Daves an example of how brilliance can be created when academics are courageous

enough to get out of their compartments.

iv
 I thank Lance deHaven-Smith, PhD for his courageous work in the conspiracy theory

genre and for suggesting I pursue this topic, I think. I also thank Laura Marcos, PhD for her

editorial suggestions and guidance. Special thanks go to Adam Green for his great

documentary, The Conspiracy Theory Conspiracy.

Finally, I want to thank my soul mate life partner, best friend, confidant, and loving

wife Thuy Thanh Le for her steadfast support, encouragement, and occasional kick in the

rear. She is truly an exceptional person with great personal courage and quiet, confident

resolve. I dont know how I would have done this without her.

v
 Dedication

I dedicate this work to my mother, Jean Seawell Rankin, one of lifes

ordinary people whos accomplished extraordinary things. My mother encouraged

me to think independently and to act. In her wisdom, she knows happiness comes

from shared experience, not from the accumulation of things. A woman who at age

34, dedicated her life to raising three young boys, ages 3, 8, and 11, following the

tragic death of my father in an automobile accident; and to my father, James Edwin

(Jim) Rankin who valued learning as much as anyone Ive known. Somewhere in the

ether of the universe, I know hes smiling upon his three boys and his wife Jean.

vi
 Table of Contents

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1

Topic 1

Conceptual Framework 2

Theoretical Foundation 5

Definition of Terms 9

Limitations of the Study 10

Summary 10

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 12

What is a Conspiracy Theory and Who Are Conspiracy Theorists? 13

The Philosophical Debate 15

Some Conspiracy Suspicions Are Warranted 19

The Construction of the Pejorative 20

Individual Traits and Differences 26

Nature of Intelligence, Cognition, and Emotion 32

Biased Social Cognition 44

Hegemony 46

Research Question 58

Summary and Synthesis 59

CHAPTER THREE: METHODS 60

Methodology 60

CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS 70

Karl Popper 70

vii
 Richard Hofstadter 71

CIA 72

Evidence of the Pejorative in Media 73

Popper and Hofstadter in the Media 73

Evidence of Conspiracy Associated with Major Events 73

Other Influential Scholars and Journalists 74

CIA Talking Points and Counter Arguments 76

Evidence of Pejorative Use in Contemporary Media 77

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 82

Summary of Findings 82

Discussion of Findings 82

Comparison of Findings to the Literature 83

Revisit of Assumptions and Limitations 83

Recommendations for Practice 84

Recommendations for Theory 85

Recommendations for Future Research 85

Personal Reflection 86

Conclusions 87
References 90
Appendices
112
Vita
122

viii
 List of Tables

Table 1: Composite Taxonomy of Discriminatory Discourse Strategies Found in 67

the CDA Literature

Table 2: Activities and Memberships of Influencers 75

ix
 List of Appendices

Appendix A: Google News Search of Pejoratives 7/31/16 112

Appendix B: Google and Google Scholar Searches of Pejoratives 7/31/16 113

Appendix C: Google and Google Scholar Searches Correlating Shermer, Pipes, 115
Sunstein, and, Eichenwald with Conspiracy 7/31/16

Appendix D: Google Search Results for Karl Popper and Richard Hofstadter and 116
Conspiracy Theory 7/31/16

Appendix E: Appearance of Conspiracy Theorists and Conspiracy Theory in 117

Conjunction with Negative Language in Google News, Google, and
Google Scholar 7/31/16

Appendix F: Time Plot of Terms Conspiracy and Theorist appearing in books 119
7/31/16

Appendix G: Time Plot of Karl Popper and Conspiracy Theory 7/31/16 120

Appendix H: Time Plot of Richard Hofstadter and Conspiracy Theory 7/31/16 121

x
 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Topic

People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion,
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public.
--Adam Smith (1776), The Wealth of Nations, Book 1, Chapter X, p.72

This work is an analysis of the role of power in contributing to the creation of the

pejorative way the terms conspiracy theory and conspiracy theorist have come to be used. It

is not about a specific conspiracy theory or theories. People who do not accept the official

accounts for events like the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy (JFK) or the

attacks upon the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 (9/11) are

often called conspiracy theorists, and their theories conspiracy theories (Green, 2015). Being

labeled a conspiracy theorist implies one is delusional or otherwise unable to accurately

perceive reality, among other things (Bale, 2007; Basham, 2001; Chomsky, 2004). Indeed,

often conspiracy suspicions are not dismissed at the level of evidence, but simply by

applying the label conspiracy theory (Bratich, 2008).

Those holding power have obvious motives to silence those who challenge their

authority by questioning their official interpretations of policy and actions, such as

justifications for going to war or rationalizations for new laws (Herman & Chomsky, 2002).

Those who reject the official accounts for events like assassinations and terrorist attacks

often compete with epistemic authorities (e.g., academics, government agencies,

government-sponsored special commissions, etc.) who may support official government

positions (Harambam & Aupers, 2015). As Harambam and Aupers (2015) stated,
 2

conspiracy theorists compete with (social) scientists in complex battles for epistemic

authority in a broader field of knowledge contestation (p. 466).

The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), taking advantage of previous

academic work equating those rejecting official accounts for significant political and social

events with pathology (Popper, 1949; Hofstadter, 1964), intentionally set in motion a process

leading to the creation of the terms conspiracy theory and conspiracy theorist as pejoratives

(deHaven-Smith & Witt, 2013). These pejoratives were subsequently adopted as such by

academics, the news media, and other authorities (Green, 2015). This conspiracy theory

meme has been used to shut down critical thinking and analysis to control public debate

about actions of those in power. Stated simply, the terms have taken on such negative

connotations that some people will repress their own conspiracy suspicions and accept the

official account for fear of being stuck with the label (Chomsky, 2004, 2009). Perhaps best

stated this way:

When pundits and pluralists attack conspiracy thinking, they are not aiming for more

political involvement or increased political activity. They want action within the

parameters defined by elites, action that legitimizes the status quo, that confirms the

party system, pays lobbyists, and provides daily sound bites. (Dean, 2000, p.299)

Conceptual Framework

The term conspiracy theory is used as a powerful hegemonic tool against those who

question authority and claims made by those in power. There is no doubt the conspiracy

theory meme functions as an impediment to legitimate discursive examination of conspiracy

suspicions and one purpose of this dissertation was to help counter this barrier to speaking

truth to power (Khalidi, 2000). This problem is particularly problematic in academia, where
 3

thorough, objective analysis of information is critical to uncovering truth. For example, in

some cases, the simple discussion of significant conspiracies has been excluded from

higher education curricula (Jacobs & Lewis, 2011).

Indeed, academics aversion to the label conspiracy theory is acknowledged by some

of them. Jeffrey Bale (2007) stated that very few notions nowadays generate as much

intellectual resistance, hostility and derision within academic circles as a belief in the

historical importance or efficacy of political conspiracies (p. 47). Many, perhaps most,

scientists and academics consider conspiracy theorists and their beliefs irrational and are

averse to being associated with them (Coady, 2007). Levy (2007) suggested that academics

and other intellectuals who become associated with conspiracy theorizing . . . [risk

exclusion from] epistemic authorities (p. 181), putting their ability to engage in genuine

inquiry, including that required to evaluate conspiracy theory itself, at risk. The label can be a

death knell for an academic.

Noam Chomsky, author of Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic

Societies (2003) and Manufacturing Consent (2002), a man whose life work has been about

exposing government hegemony and the use of the news media as an instrument of the

privileged groups dominating domestic society and world governments (Herman &

Chomsky, 2002), said the conspiracy theorist label is the intellectual equivalent of four

letter words and tantrums (Chomsky, 2004, para. 17). Chomsky (2009) dismissed

conspiracy theorizing about the assassination of JFK and the 9/11 attacks, even though in

1979, the Select Committee on Assassinations of the United States House of Representatives

(1979) determined that President John F. Kennedy was probably assassinated as a result of a

conspiracy (para. C); and more than 2,300 architects and engineers rejected the
 4

governments explanation for the events on 9/11 (Architects and Engineers for 9/11 Truth,

2016). Chomskys rejection of conspiracies behind these events puzzled some of his allies in

the academic community (Four Arrows & Metzger, 2004). Despite Chomskys efforts to

avoid the label, Pipes (1997) still referred to him and his associates as left-wing conspiracy

theorists (p. 160) and suggested Chomsky encouraged unwarranted conspiracy theorizing.

Although previously questioning the official story of the events of 9/11, George

Monbiot (2007) also seemed to distance himself from the conspiracy theorist label when he

stated conspiracy theories about 9/11 were a cowards fantasy . . . [and] an excuse for

inaction used by those who dont have the stomach to engage in real political fights (para.

7). For decades, academia and the media have linked conspiratorial thinking in America to

anti-intellectualism (Green, 2015, Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009), feelings of alienation,

powerlessness, hostility (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999) and paranoia

(Darwin, Neave, Holmes, 2011; Green, 2015; Hofstadter, 1964; Oliver & Wood, 2014).

Those buying into a conspiracy were characterized as either cognitively-impaired or

suffering from paranoia (Hofstadter, 1958, 1963, 1964). Yet research suggests many people

overtly reject conspiracy theories while privately accepting them as true (Douglas & Sutton,

2010). Do Chomskys (2009) and Monbiots (2001) rejections of the speculation that these

events were the result of conspiracies represent their true beliefs, or do they fear being

discredited by the conspiracy theorist label? As Bratich (2008) stated, Among the

competing accounts for any event, the official version is not merely the winner in the game

of truthit determines who the players can be (p. 7). Clearly, labeling someone a

conspiracy theorist is a tactic employed as a strategy of subjugation (p.7) or a strategy by

 5

whichdisbelief is validated andcounterknowledge [sic] is discredited (Fiske, 1994,

p.192).

Bratich (2008) argued the conspiracy theory pejorative functions as an intolerable

line and an antagonism (p. 11). Although often linked to specific groups the panic over

conspiracy suspicions and suggestions is over a particular form of thought (and its potential

links to action) (p. 11). The panic is over the deviance. The panics help to define the

normal modes of dissent (p. 11) and to identify the subversive and threatening them (p.

11). In any case, if the source of the pejorative use of the meme is indeed hegemonic, as it

seems to be, many who use it accordingly, knowingly or not, are fulfilling the goal of

hegemony: to make it a common sense understanding.

Theoretical Foundation

The theoretical foundation of this work includes the grand theories (Adams &

Buetow, 2014, p. 99) of Freuds theoretical model of mental structure, specifically the

unconscious mind and the language-game theory of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953/2009), the

translational theories (p. 99) of John Austins (1975) theory of speech acts, and Jurgen

Habermas (1984) theory of communicative action. Potter (1996) and Faircloughs (1995a,

1995b) theories of discourse analysis form the foundational/methodology theory (p. 100) of

the work. The background theory (p. 98) of hegemony developed by Gramsci (Adamson,

1980) was discussed earlier. Another background theory, the propaganda model of media

control introduced by Herman and Chomsky (2002) is discussed here.

The positioning of a term gives it meaning. Language-game theory posits words have

meaning depending upon when and how they are used (Wittgenstein, 1953/2009).

Wittgenstein said the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life" (p. 23)
 6

which gives language its meaning. How are the terms under study used in ways that

contribute to them becoming pejoratives? Wittgenstein is a philosopher of language, a

discipline concerned with meaning, language use, cognition, and the relationship between

language and reality. Wittgenstein believed language rules are analogous to the rules of

games. Speaking is analogous to making a chess move.

Another way of analyzing the terms under study is to view them as speech acts which

can be evaluated by the subject or topic they represent, how the speaker uses them, and the

effect they have on the listener. British philosopher John Langshaw J. L. Austin (1975) is

credited with forming the concept of speech acts through a series of lectures delivered at

Harvard University in 1955. Austin suggests speech acts, or utterances, can be analyzed on

three levels: locutionary or referential (their subject or topic), illocutionary (what the speaker

does with them), and perlocutionary (the effects on the listener). Austin was one of the first

to declare language is action. Habermas and others have expanded upon Austins theory.

When accepting or rejecting the official account for an event, an individual is

deciding either based upon emotion or conscious rational thought. The concept of

conspiracism is wrapped up in determining what is true. How individuals determine their

truth is a component of this research (Dawkins, 2012). Habermass theory of

communicative action (1984) focuses on the importance of rationality and cognition in

communication rather than emotionality. About communicative action, Eriksen and Weigard

(2003) say it is not our conclusions but the manner in which we arrive at them which are

permanent and in a way above criticism (p. 4). Conclusions should be based upon the

preponderance of evidence and may be changed when new evidence is made available.
 7

Language utterances are speech acts and we choose to act or not based on the

speech acts of others. Communicative action is action which is oriented towards interaction

on the basis of a consensus about those claims (p. 4). The theory implies that we

continuously have to take a yes or no position to specific validity claims which are implicit in

the utterances (p. 4) or speech acts. In other words, in communication people are constantly

making decisions about the truth, rightness or truthfulness (p. 51) of the statements of

others. Habermas (1984) described three different kinds of validity claims implicit in speech

acts:

that the statement is true

that the speech act is right in relation to the current normative context; and

that the speakers manifest intention is meant as it is expressed. (p. 99)

Habermas (1984, 1989) had a few things to say about public opinion formation and

his philosophy of universal pragmatics provides a good basis for CDA (Hammersley,

1997). Habermas believed that one of the pillars of public opinion formation is the public

sphere. Only those ideas surviving the scrutiny of free individuals in public debate are

rational. The public sphere, found in the coffee houses of early 19th century England, is

found in the internet chat rooms of modern America. In the public sphere, authority springs

from the spoken word and truth makes the law (Habermas,1989).

Herman and Chomskys (2002) propaganda model of media control attempts to

understand how the social, economic, and political opinions of people are manipulated by

propaganda disseminated through the media. Rather than a vehicle for disseminating news

and informing the public, propaganda theory views the news media as a business selling
 8

access to its readers and subscribers to other business entities that pay for their

advertisements to appear in the media. The news is distorted in this system.

Factors which misshape news are called filters. The five filters are

Size, ownership, and profit orientation of the mass media;

The advertising license to do business;

Sourcing mass-media news;

Flak and the enforcers; and

Anticommunism as a control mechanism.

Size, ownership, and profit orientation of the mass media serves as a filter by limiting

the number of media outlets with substantial reach. The advertising license to do business

refers to the effect advertisers have on the costs of media. Those outlets attracting advertising

can sell their product below the actual cost of production. The products of media outlets

without advertising revenue are put at a price disadvantage and may be unable to compete.

The sourcing mass-media news filter is created when media outlets come to rely upon

commonly held authoritative sources like large government and corporations (Herman &

Chomsky, 2002).

The fourth filter, flak and enforcers, comes from the influence of powerful interests or

those with substantial resources. It may come in the form of letters mailed, petitions

presented, speeches given, legislation introduced, or phone calls made. The fifth and final

filter identified by Herman and Chomsky is the ideology of anticommunism. Communism is

a threat to those holding power in capitalist America. Labeling someone or their ideas

communist demonizes and suppresses. They later updated this filter to the War on Terror"

and "counter-terrorism."
 9

Finally, Stanley Cohen (1972) provided a theoretical framework that suggests

Western societies maintain their identities by the management and expulsion of deviance

(Bratich, 2008, p. 8). To the extent that challenges to official knowledge create moral or

conspiracy panics (p. 8), minority or subjugated groups create a condition, episode,

person or group of persons [who] become defined as a threat to societal values and interests

(Cohen, 1972, p. 9). Although Cohen saw these panics being spread by rumor, gossip, and

urban legends (Bratich, 2008), others noted how they were amplified by journalists and the

media (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, 1978; Young, 1971). Soderlund (2002)

identified journalisms role in making moral panics a matter of hegemonic maintenance and

paradigm repair (Bratich, 2008, p. 9).

Definition of Terms

The true condition of hegemony is effective self-identification with the hegemonic

forms: A specific and internalized socialization which is expected to be positive but
which, if that is not possible, will rest on a (resigned) recognition of the inevitable
and the necessary. (Williams, 1977, p. 118)

For this study, the following terms are defined as used herein:

Conspiracy theorists: those who believe in conspiracy theories as defined herein.

Conspiracy theory: a proposed explanation of some historical event (or events) in

terms of significant causal agency (Coady, 2006, p. 116) by conspirators as defined herein.

Conspirators or would-be conspirators: (a) a group of agents working together and

(b) in secret (Coady, 2006).

Discourse: There are multiple definitions of discourse and what constitutes it. For

example, spoken language, written language, and language use above the level of the

sentence are all considered discourse. Discourse analysis is a study of texts and talk in social

practice. It is the medium for interaction; analysis of discourse becomes then, analysis of
 10

what people do (Potter, 1997, p. 146). Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a somewhat

unrestrained analysis of what people are doing with talk and text. In CDA, the researcher

engages with the texts under study. Rather than attempting to suspend analysis of texts until

all the data are collected, the researcher interprets the texts continually (Fairclough, 1995a,

1995b; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wood & Kroger, 2000).

Hegemony: the preponderant influence or authority over others (Merriam-Webster,

2015) by indirect, nonviolent means. Cultural hegemony is the domination of society by an

elite ruling class, or hegemons. By manipulating society, the ruling class coerces the larger

society to accept the ideology of the ruling class as its cultural norm.

Limitations of the Study

The CDA research method limits the study because it is a subjective process relying

on the researchers experience and knowledge of the methodology, skill at critiquing the

data, and awareness and management of his biases. The inherent limitation of CDA is a

deliberate absence of neutrality. The researcher is looking for evidence of discourses of

power. The approach leaves the methodology open to criticism that the analyst can or will

identify data supporting his or her hypotheses. Additionally, small sample sizes often make it

difficult to generalize findings to a larger population (Creswell & Clark, 2011).

Summary

It is clear the terms conspiracy theorist and conspiracy theory are often used by the

media, authority figures, and others in power to discount those who question official

accounts for many significant events (deHaven-Smith & Witt, 2013; Green, 2015). What is

unclear is how these terms evolved and became such powerful pejoratives and what impact
 11

powerful people and institutions played in their development. This study explores the

evolution of the pejorative and its possible intentional construction by hegemons.

 12

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Rather than a sum of its paranoid parts, conspiracism is greater and more complex.
(Goldberg, 2004, p. 260)

There is an absence of a scholarly exploration of the evolution of the terms

conspiracy theory, conspiracy theories, conspiracy theorist, and conspiracy theorists as

pejoratives (deHaven-Smith, personal communication, September 14, 2014; deHaven-Smith

& Witt, 2013; Manwell, 2010). There are a few explorations of the terms use as pejorative

silencers (Green, 2015; Husting & Orr, 2007), but little academic evidence and support exists

for the contention of intentional hegemonic construction of the memes (Bratich, 2008,

deHaven-Smith & Witt, 2013; Green, 2015). This review includes the ways in which the

underlying individual and group psychological processes might be manipulated through mass

media to construct a pejorative meme in common language (Hallin, 1985).

As a research genre, the conspiracy theory literature is relatively new and rapidly

evolving. This review focuses on frequently cited works of a relatively small cadre of

academics published in peer-reviewed journals focused on personality psychology, political

psychology, prejudice, public administration, social science philosophy, applied philosophy,

epistemology, social psychology, and sociology and authors of academic books.

A contemporary philosophical debate about conspiracism that significantly impacts

how the concept is perceived is examined here. Contemporary work about the psychology of

conspiracy theory (including the individual and group processes, like cognitive biases and

rumor development) and how it impacts beliefs is discussed. This work is important because

media psychologists, advertising and public relations executives, and other communications

professionals understand how human beliefs and behaviors are influenced by manipulating
 13

cognitive processes and appealing to emotion. A review of the concept of hegemony and its

possible contribution to the development of pejoratives is also included.

What is a Conspiracy Theory and Who Are Conspiracy Theorists?

Evidence of the pejorative use of the term conspiracy theory in academic literature

occurred first in the January 1870 issue of the Journal of Mental Science (Maudsley &

Sibald, 1870, p. 141). In 1909, reviewer Alan Johnson used the term in reference to an

alleged collusion of authority figures in an American Historical Review critique of a doctoral

dissertation. As early as the late 1940s, many events that people found unpopular were

frequently attributed to the direct actions of powerful individuals or groups and considered

conspiracies (Popper, 1949) but the term first appeared in a 1997 supplement to the Oxford

English Dictionary (Spark & Knight, 1998).

Today, many definitions of conspiracy exist, but most contain two elements: (a) a

group of agents working together, and (b) in secret (Coady, 2006). A proposed explanation

of some historical event (or events) in terms of significant causal agency (p. 116), added to

those elements, yields a conspiracy theory. A balanced definition, acknowledging that some

conspiracy theories are true, is, A conspiracy occurs when two or more people collude to

abuse power or break the law. A conspiracy theory is a proposal about a conspiracy that may

or may not be true; it has not yet been proven. (Olmsted, 2009, p. 3). Although not always

expressing an immoral or illegal intent, the terms conspiracy theory and conspiracy theorist

hold negative connotations for most people (Coady, 2007; Fenster, 2009; Husting & Orr,

2007). Certainly, the idea of important decisions made in secrecy is antidemocratic and that

likely seems unjust to many (Pigden, 2006).

 14

The majority of academic literature about conspiracy theory falls into two categories:

(a) analytic philosophy of epistemology, science, and politics; and (b) sociology and

psychology (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). Much of the academic literature about conspiracy

theory is attributable to analytical philosophers, seeking to determine what counts as a

conspiracy theory and whether such theories are sound. Most of the balance of the literature

is found in sociology and psychology, related to investigating the causes of theorizing

(Sunstein, 2009). More investigation into the emotional connotations tied to the concept of

conspiracy theories and their origins is needed (deHaven-Smith & Witt, 2013; Sunstein &

Vermeule, 2009). Sunstein (2009) noted the need for research into emotional valence.

Emotional valence refers to intrinsic attraction or aversion to events or situations as a factor

in accepting or rejecting the official account for so-called conspiratorial events.

deHaven-Smith and Witt (2012) asserted that government authorities have

contributed to a negatively biased construction of the term conspiracy theorist and deHaven-

Smith (2013) uncovered evidence to support this view. deHaven-Smith (2006) proposed an

alternative theory and term, state crimes against democracy (SCAD), to represent real

transgressions made by government. SCADs are concerted actions or inactions by public

officials that are intended to weaken or subvert popular control of their government

(deHaven-Smith, 2006, p. 333). He noted one gap in the literature is failing to study the

social construction of the conspiracy theory concept as a pejorative silencer (deHaven-

Smith, personal communication, September 14, 2014). He added, the conspiracy-theory

label is so dangerous as a principle for regulating political speech; it equates intellectual non-

conformity with irrationality and seeks to enforce conformity in the name of reason, civility,

and democracy (deHaven-Smith & Witt, 2013, p. 40).

 15

Much of the extant research is about those who believe in conspiracy theories; their

ethnic, and social group standing; and their personality characteristics. The dearth of research

about those who readily accept the official accounts for historical events despite significant

evidence to the contrary suggests that the popular assumption among researchers is that the

failure to accept the official explanation must be caused by something pathological. There is

much derision of conspiratorial thinking in the popular press (Green, 2015; Grossman, 2006).

It appears there is a bias toward accepting the explanations of authorities and dismissing

those who do not accept such explanations. Is this bias a result of the pejorative constructed

through hegemony?

The Philosophical Debate

Rather than being dismissed at the level of evidence, those questioning official

accounts are frequently dismissed by being labeled conspiracy theorists. Their views are

dismissed because they are considered outside the sphere of legitimate controversy (Hallin,

1986). In other words, the conspiracy theorists are not engaging in the game of truth

defined by those in power (Foucault, 1980a). They are not playing by the rules by which

truth is produced. Put another way, conspiracy theories are unofficial, subjugated

knowledges (Foucault, 1980b). Subjugated knowledges are blocs of historical knowledge

which were present but disguised within the body of functionalist and systematic theory

(p.80). They have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated:

nave knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of

cognition or scientificity [sic] (p.83). These theorists are not simply proposing false

explanations, they are not even wrong (Hitchens, 2004). They do not reach a level of
 16

legitimacy to even be falsified (Bratich, 2008). They are para (beyond or beside) the nous

(mind). They are paranoid (p.3).

The contemporary philosophical debate about conspiracy theories centers around

whether they and their theorists are harmful to society (Coady, 2006). The research suggests

that some beliefs have negative consequences. For example, belief in conspiracies has been

shown to increase an individuals sense of powerlessness, thus reducing ones intention to

engage in politics (Jolley & Douglas, 2014). Many in science and academia dismiss

conspiracy theorists as irrational and paranoid (Hofstadter, 1966; Pipes, 1997; Shermer,

2010; Van Horn, 2010). In fact, sources in much of the academic literature characterize

conspiracists as destructive, paranoid, or otherwise pathological, thus reinforcing the

pejorative label. Some academics assert conspiracists harm society and suggest they should

be censored or infiltrated and discredited (Braman, Gastil, Kahan, & Stovic, 2006; Sunstein

& Vermeule, 2009). Sunstein (2014) advocated the cognitive infiltration of online groups and

websites of those advocating what Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) considered false

conspiracy theories about the government. Goldzwig (2002) considers conspiratorial

thinking dangerous; he suggests conspiracy theorizing undermines confidence in personal

and social relations and institutions, and may inspire some to commit acts of violence.

Others have suggested that although some conspiracy theorists might be considered

irrational, they do little harm, and that such theories are better understood as stories of

individuation rather than paranoid delusions (Coady, 2007; Raab, Ortlieb, Auer, Guthmann,

& Carbon, 2013). At their worst, such theorists might sound alarms unnecessarily; at their

best, they may point out legitimate plots and crimes (Pigden, 2007). As Pigden stated,

All these theories [the United States overthrow of South Vietnamese President Diem,
the Watergate break-in, and the Iran-Contra arms deal] were once inconsistent with
 17

official opinion, though nowadays official opinion managed to catch up with the
facts. Thus it would have been an epistemic mistake to have adopted this strategy in
the past. More importantly, it would have been a political mistake. If these activities
had gone unnoticed, there would have been no check on the abuse of Presidential
power, which would have probably gone on to worse excesses. The price of liberty is
eternal vigilance. The revised strategy [failing to expose the conspiracy] would have
sent us to sleep. (p. 230)

Others believe conspiracism can have societal costs. Anti-Semitism, a dynamic

Adolph Hitler used to consolidate his power over Germany, and the fear of secret societies, a

mechanism Joseph Stalin used to create the Soviet Union, have been traced to conspiracy

theories arising out of the French Revolution (Pipes, 1997). Others link anti-Semitic

conspiratorial suspicions to the rise of authoritarianism (Billig, 1978, 1979, 1988). The

paranoid style, or way of thinking (Hofstadter,1964), is often linked to European historical

events, beginning with the French Revolution and peaking with the great World Wars (Pipes,

1997; Quigley, 1966). In creating the term paranoid style, Hofstadter contributed to the

transformation of many beliefs about conspiracy into a style or way of thinking connected to

psychopathology (Bratich, 2008)

Unjustified beliefs in a false conspiracy or one which is not true, are not necessarily

attributable to irrational thinking but often to a lack of information about the event in

question. Sunstein (2014) referred to these as crippled epistemologies (p.10). This is an

important question: Is belief, or not, in a conspiracy largely attributable to the presence or

absence of information, or to flawed thinking? Such unjustified beliefs in false conspiracies

may be quite rational within the limited information access of those holding them, whereas

such beliefs are unjustified in broader, more open democratic societies (Popper, 1945/1994;

Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). It is probable that a democracy, as in the United States,

tolerates more open discussions of conspiracies than a more totalitarian society (Sunstein &
 18

Vermeule, 2009). Consistent with this view, Hollander (1992) noted more open criticism and

anti-American sentiment comes from within the United States than outside the country.

Popper (1945/1994) coined the phrase conspiracy theory of society (p. 306).

Although acknowledging that conspiracies exist, he suggested they are rarely successful.

Popper posited that in their effort to explain societal events, humans unwittingly ascribe

causality to individuals and groups rather than to chance. Popper attributed this to

psychologism, or a philosophical orientation to attempt to explain events in psychological

terms (p. 307). Others have concurred with this attribution (Hofstadter, 1963; Mandik, 2007;

Shermer, 2010).

Popper (1962) advocated for a scientific epistemology he called "falsificationism"

(p.37). He believed the best way to differentiate the scientific from the unscientific was

through the process of falsification. In his view, an unfalsifiable theory could not be

considered empirical science and was therefore pseudoscience. From this perspective, many,

if not most, conspiracy theories would be classified as unscientific since it is often very

difficult to prove them wrong (Popper, 1962).

In contrast to Popper (1945/1994, 1962), Kuhn (1962/1970) stated accepted theory

leads to an established paradigm or explanatory framework that guides science. The

paradigm facilitates normal science (p.10) where researchers accumulate data consistent

with the underlying paradigm without challenging its theoretical assumptions. During the

period of normal science researchers engage in puzzle solving (p.35) where, following

the paradigm, data are accumulated expanding and explaining the theory. Failures of

research to conform to the paradigm are generally viewed as flaws in the research rather than

challenges to the underlying theory. It is only after an increasing preponderance of evidence

 19

contradictory to the accepted theory emerges that a crisis occurs. These crises create

paradigm shifts where the old paradigm is subsumed by the new one and the underlying

theory is abruptly transformed. Kuhn called this revolutionary science (p. 130). Kuhn

considered contradictory theories incommensurable, meaning it was not possible to

understand competing paradigms through anothers framework. As he said, "When scientists

must choose between competing theories, two men fully committed to the same list of

criteria for choice may nevertheless reach different conclusions." (Kuhn, 1959/1977, p. 324).

From Kuhns perspective, those committed to a theory, the official story, or an alternative

conspiracy will remain committed to it until the preponderance of evidence forces a

paradigm shift.

Leo Strauss, an influential political philosopher of the mid-20th century, advocated for

rulers to use secrecy and deception over the general public. Strauss believed those most fit to

rule are those who realize there is no morality and he asserted there is only one natural right

the right of the superior few to rule over the inferior many (Strauss, 1950). Strauss was a

popular figure among leading neoconservative political operatives in the administration of

George W. Bush, including Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of

Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone, and Gary Schmitt, the director of the Project for

the New American Century, which was chaired by William Kristol, the editor of the

conservative journal the Weekly Standard (Hersh, 2003)

Some Conspiracy Suspicions Are Warranted

Having knowledge of real conspiracies causes people to be more receptive to

conspiratorial thinking (Nelson, Adams, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2010; Stempel, Hargrove,

& Stempel, 2007). Although more than half of the American public believes in at least one
 20

conspiracy, these beliefs are not linked to authoritarianism, ignorance, nor political

conservatism, but rather a willingness to believe in other unseen, intentional forces (Oliver

& Wood, 2014, p. 952). For most Americans, 9/11, perhaps the most recognized alleged

American conspiracy of the recent past, likely evokes images of radical Islamists conspiring

to orchestrate a complex scheme of terror from caves deep within Afghanistan. For those

who reject the official account, one alternative theory is that agents of the Israeli intelligence

service, the Mossad, planted thermite explosives in the World Trade Center towers in a

complex clandestine plan, involving young Saudi Arabian extremists duped into boarding

remote-controlled passenger planes flown by secret operatives of a Zionist network

(Bollyn, 2012, p. 166). These conspiracy theorists believe the intent of 9/11 attacks was to

create a new Pearl Harbor, an event sufficiently outrageous to cause the American people to

support invading the resource-rich Middle East region, thereby launching the Project for a

New American Century (2000).

The Construction of the Pejorative

Given evidence that conspiracies exist (deHaven-Smith, 2009; deHaven-Smith, 2010;

Quigley, 1966; Scott, 2015; U.S House of Representatives, 1979), why does the conspiracy

theorist label carry such a negative connotation? Perhaps it is attributable to academias

pursuit of rational epistemological explanations and empiricism that conflicts with the

secretive nature of conspiracy theory (Basham, 2001). How can one prove or disprove

something crafted in secrecy? In fact, to label something a conspiracy theory is to assign it

negative epistemic status (Coady, 2006) and labeling one explanation among competing

explanations a conspiracy theory serves to legitimize the others (Husting & Orr, 2007).
 21

Many intellectuals and academics regard much of the conspiratorial thinking in the

popular culture unsupported and baseless (Clark, 2002; Keeley, 1999). They consider popular

culture conspiracism to be anti-intellectual (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013). They

believe these unwarranted conspiracy theories (Keeley, 1999, p. 111) are the ridiculous

ones and are obvious (Shermer, 2010). In the conspiracy theory conversation, a double

standard applies. An official version of events that includes a conspiracy is almost never

considered a conspiracy theory, yet practically anyone who chooses to reject the official

account of events is considered a conspiracy theorist. For example, the official account for

the events of 9/11 includes 19 young Islamic extremists conspiring to fly commercial aircraft

into buildings in New York City and Washington, DC, yet those accepting this explanation

are not considered conspiracy theorists (Coady, 2006).

Conspiratorial thinking is not exclusively a right wing phenomenon (Pipes, 1997).

Both the left and the right spin the same events or label the same groups as conspiratorial. As

Pipes (1997) suggests, replace the Rights bogeys (Illuminati, the Rothschild family,

Trotsky) with those of the Left (Jesuits, the Rothschilds, Disraeli), and conspiracism becomes

ambidextrous (p. 155). Pipes posits an adversary culture (p. 174) and self-hatred found in

the United States contributes to the pervasiveness of conspiratorial thinking.

Perhaps the most negative and frequently made attribution to conspiracy theorists is

paranoia, and one of the most frequently cited authors on the subject, Richard Hofstadter

(1958, 1963, 1964, 1966) is responsible for linking the two. As early as 1958, Hofstadter

began linking conspiracy theorists with paranoia (p. 16) and right wing extremists (p. 45)

with conspiratorial thinking. Beginning in 1964, he published a series of articles that

chronicled the evolution of conditions giving rise to what he considered the extreme right in
 22

America. He called it the paranoid style in American politics (1964, p. 103). Hofstadters

impact on the publics attitude toward conspiracy theorists and the approach to the study of

the concept by scholars is difficult to overstate. As Bratich (2008) stated,

Transposing a clinical psychology term onto the field of politics, Hofstadter not only
pathologized conspiracy theories, he gave them formal coherence, historical
persistence, and intelligibility as a genre of political knowledge. Hofstadters essay
also marks a moment when conspiracy theories were articulated to political
extremism. Most serious contemporary analysts of conspiracy theories (on various
points of the political spectrum) cite Hofstadter. In so doing, they use conspiracy
theories as paradigmatic instances of the paranoid style. (p. 4)

Hofstadter (1963, 1964, 1966) himself moved from an extreme liberal, leftist point of

view he held early in his career to a more centrist, consensus perspective of American

history. In contrast to Beard (2004), who asserted the Constitution was largely an economic

construction, Hofstadter and other consensus historians believed economically driven class

struggles were not the driving force in American history. Consensus history suggests that

American values were paramount, and that conflicts, if not trivial, were less significant than

perhaps most would believe (Fenster, 2009). From the perspective of the consensus

historians, extreme political viewswhether right or left of centermight be considered

pathological (Fenster, 2009). Fenster (2009) stated, Hofstadter (1964) implied a continuum

between proper politics and pathology (p. 33). While Hofstadter maintained his use of the

term paranoid in describing conspiracists was intended only in an analogical sense his

writings, and the writings of those who followed (Aaronovitch, 2009; Billig, 1979;

Brotherton & Eser, 2014; Cohn, 1967; Goertzel, 1994; Horton, 2015; Miller, 2010; Oliver &

Wood, 2014; Pipes, 1997; Pratt, 2003; Robins & Post, 1997; Sommers, 2011; Sunstein, 2014;

Uscinski & Parent, 2014; Wulff, 1987) contributed to a larger societal view equating

conspiracy theorizing with paranoia and other psychopathologies (Blaskiewicz, 2013;

Darwin, Neave & Holmes, 2011; Douglas & Jolley, 2012, Douglas & Sutton, 2010, 2011;
 23

Douglas, Sutton, & Wood, 2012; Drinkwater, Dagnall & Parker, 2012; Harrison & Thomas,

1997; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; Levy, 2007; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013;

Monbiot, 2001; Shermer, 2010, 2011; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009; Swami, Chamorro-

Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010; Van der Tempel & Alcock, 2015). Hofstadter admitted his use

of the term paranoid style in connection with conspiracy theorists was intentional. He said,

Of course this term is pejorative, and it is meant to be; the paranoid style has a greater

affinity for bad causes than good (p.77).

Comparing mid-20th century conspiracy theorists, like anti-communist witch hunter

Senator Joseph McCarthy (Stewart, 2002) and John Birch Society founder Robert Welch

(Stewart, 2002), to the anti-Masonic movement of the 19th century (Byford, 2011),

Hofstadter (1966) suggested the paranoid style (p. 29) was not the result of one

acknowledging conspiratorial acts, of which he admitted there are many, but that

practitioners of the paranoid style regard a vast or gigantic conspiracy as the motive force

in historical events (p. 29). The term paranoid style transformed a multiplicity of beliefs in

conspiracy into a style [sic] of thought (Bratich, 2008, p. 4). As Bratich (2008) stated,

Hofstadter not only pathologized conspiracy theories, he gave them formal coherence,

historical persistence, and intelligibility as a genre of political knowledge (p. 4). Those

holding conspiracist views may be driven more by a predisposition to generally reject official

accounts than beliefs about a specific conspiracy (Wood & Douglas, 2013).

Unlike the narrow conspiracies of a specific assassination or other event, grand

conspiracies (Stewart, 2002, p. 442), like that of the John Birch Society (Stewart, 2002), are

built on a broad-based ideology and are more difficult to disprove. Such grand conspiracies

portray a way of life threatened by an evil force in a secret and elaborate plot (p. 442).
 24

Revealing themselves over long expanses of time, such grand conspiracies enable their

proponents to make associations among a procession of ideological connections.

Like Popper (1945/1994), Hofstadter (1964) posited that the suffering paranoid

conspiracy theorist sees conspiracy in everything. Believing conspiracy theories to be largely

a construction of the political far right (Hofstadter, 1966), Hofstadter attributed this

conspiratorial thinkings roots to anti-Semitic and anti-Masonic movements (Pipes, 1997).

Hofstadter (1966) theorized the American political far right conceived a vast and sinister

conspiracy, a gigantic and yet subtle machinery of influence set in motion to undermine and

destroy a way of life (p. 29). While acknowledging that real conspiracies exist, Hofstadter

(1966) proposed that what differentiates the paranoid style in America is that the

conspiracy theorists believe conspiracy is the motive force (p. 29), and that the political

system itself is a conspiracy. Popper (1945/1994) and Sunstein and Vermeule (2009)

maintained such a grand conspiracy is not possible in a democratic, open society, defined

by Popper (1945/1994) as a society that sets free the critical powers of man (p. xxi) and

the society in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions (p. 165).

Hofstadters (1963, 1964, 1966) work has exerted great influence over conspiracy

theory thought and research. During the administration of President George W. Bush (2001-

2009), the media frequently used the term paranoid style in reference to the President,

members of his administration, the Republican and Democratic Parties, and conservatives

and liberals alike (Fenster, 2009, p. 25). In recent writings, Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1985),

David Greenberg (1998, 2006, 2009), and Paul Krugman (2006, 2009, 2012) discussed

Hofstadters ideas extensively; Hofstadters work is cited in practically every article and

book published on the subject of conspiracy theory. Scott Horton (2007) wrote, The
 25

Paranoid Style in American Politics" was "one of the most important and most influential

articles published in the 155 year [sic] history of the magazine. Laura Miller (2010) wrote

that 'The Paranoid Style in American Politics' reads like a playbook for the career of [a well-

known conservative media figure], right down to the paranoid's 'quality of pedantry' and

heroic strivings for 'evidence' embodied in [his] chalkboard and piles of books (para.5). It

seems the most significant social construction of the pejorative began with Hofstadter

(Fenster, 2009; Hofstadter, 1958; Horton, 2007).

There is evidence the term conspiracy theory acquired much of its negative

connotation because of a Central Intelligence Agency (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,

1967a) program to counteract questioning the findings of The President's Commission on the

Assassination of President Kennedy, referred to as the Warren Commission (Warren

Commission, 1964), about the JFK assassination (deHaven-Smith & Witt, 2013). Within two

years after the publication of its findings, newspaper articles and books challenging the

Commissions report began to appear. The term conspiracy theory appeared in five

separate stories published in the New York Times in 1964 (deHaven-Smith & Witt, 2013). In

January 1967, the CIA sent Dispatch 1035-960 to its local offices around the world. The

document outlined a set of activities designed to influence the media to support the

acceptance of the report, and instructed CIA personnel to implement them. The document

contained recommended explicit arguments and counterarguments (deHaven-Smith & Witt,

2013). Its directives instructed agents:

To employ propaganda assets to [negate] and refute the attacks of the critics. Book
reviews and feature articles are particularly appropriate for this purpose. The
unclassified attachments to this guidance should provide useful background material
for passing to assetsOur ploy should point out, as applicable, that the critics are (I)
wedded to theories adopted before the evidence as in, (II) politically interested, (III)
 26

financially interested, (IV) hasty and inaccurate in their research, or (V) infatuated
with their own theories. (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1967a, para.3)

An example of the success of CIAs program was the publication of a letter authored

by John P. Roche, a political scientist and special assistant to JFKs successor, President

Lyndon Johnson. The letter, first published in a letters to the editor section of the London

Times Literary Supplement (Roche, 1968) and discussed in Time (1968) magazine later that

year, supported the Warren Commissions (1964) report. In the letter, Roche stated, Those

who can conspire havent got the time; those who do conspire, havent got the talent, a view

similar to Poppers (1994). Roche referred to a priesthood of marginal paranoids (as cited

in Time, 1968, para. 1), linking paranoia, marginality, and religiosity to the conspiracy theory

label.

The conspiracy theory meme has become solidly entrenched in the language as a

pejorative label. As a leading philosopher of science, Poppers (1994) influence over the

adoption of the meme among academics seems obvious. Hofstadters (1958, 1963, 1964,

1966) influence in academia and the publics adoption of the meme is also evident. Through

the CIA, it appears the government also played a role in influencing the media to continue to

develop the pejorative. The individual and group psychological processes that may have been

exploited to accomplish this are discussed next.

Individual Traits and Differences

Understanding the psychology of conspiracy theory is important to understanding

how agents of hegemony use the media and other tools to manipulate individuals and groups

to create pejoratives and control the narrative (deHaven-Smith & Witt, 2013). The research

about the psychology of conspiracy theory is clustered around three major areas: individual

traits and characteristics, characteristics of human nature, and the motivational roots of
 27

biased social cognition [and] situational and system-related cues (Bilewicz, Cichocka, &

Soral, 2015, p. xi). The individual traits cluster focuses on personality, individual differences,

and political attitudes. The studies of the human nature of conspiracy theory investigate

cognitive schemes and attributional biases (p. xi). The studies of the motivational roots of

conspiratorial beliefs have shed light on the control motivation, or the apparent tendency for

people to blame a conspiracy for an event when they feel a sense of lack of control (Zukier,

1987).

Some think the bias toward individualism in American culture is at the core of the

popularity of conspiratorial thinking (Featherstone, 2000). In Aliens in America (1998), Dean

pointed to a general mistrust of authority in contemporary American democracy as a primary

cause of conspiratorial thinking. The research of Van Prooijen and Jostmann (2013) seems to

confirm this. They found people more likely to buy into a conspiracy theory when the

perceived morality of authorities is questionable. Goldberg (2004) was more cynical. He

posited that competing elites may fuel conspiratorial thinking by taking advantage of

intelligence failures and contest [compete] for power with conspiratorial interpretations of

events that provide psychological comfort by offering explanations for events, targeting

culprits, and fixing blame (p. 249).

Conspiracy theorists are often considered paranoid and one of the common traits

ascribed to paranoia is a belief in conspiracies (Bilewicz et al., 2015). Someone with a

paranoid personality disorder, according to the American Psychiatric Associations

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM-5; APA; 2013),

exhibits pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of others such that their motives are

interpreted as malevolent (p. 649). Paranoia is often a component of other mental disorders.
 28

People suffering from schizophrenia may have paranoid delusions. Two other disorders,

persecutory delusional disorder and paranoid personality disorder include paranoid features.

The DSM-5 defines delusion as a false belief based upon incorrect inference about external

reality that is firmly held despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what

constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary (p. 819).

One can exhibit symptoms of paranoia and not satisfy the requirements for diagnosis

as a mental disorder (Byford, 2011). Symptoms of mental disorders are found in the general

population on a continuum of severity (Johns & van Os, 2001). Paranoia and persecutory

delusions are present in about 10% of the population (Eaton, Romanoski, Anthony, &

Nestadt, 1991). However, even so-called normal thinking can be characterized

occasionally as paranoid (Bell, 2003).

The difference between the conspiracy theorists paranoid thinking and the paranoid

ideation of those with clinically diagnosed paranoia is the lack of immediacy of personal

threat (Byford, 2011). The paranoid individual believes he or she is being persecuted

personally (APA, 2013). Although the conspiracy theorist might believe the larger society is

being threatened by the plans of conspirators, he or she does not typically internalize the

threat (Byford, 2011). Fear plays a different role in paranoia and conspiracy theorizing. The

fear and the isolation of paranoia are not typically present in conspiracy theorists, rather, one

often finds optimism about the vulnerability of the conspirators among conspiracy theorists

(Byford, 2011).

Many philosophers, researchers, and pundits have hypothesized a collective paranoid

disorder as an explanation of conspiracy theorizing (Billig, 1978, 1979, 1988; Hofstadter,

1964, 1966; Pipes, 1997; Popper, 1949, 1994). They assert mass movements affecting entire
 29

nations and cultures may be the result of a form or collective delusion (Robins & Post, 1997;

Zonis & Joseph, 1994, 1996). With a theoretical basis in Freudian psychoanalytic thought,

this view of conspiracy theorizing has many problems (Byford, 2011). This line of thinking

seeks to link repressed homosexuality with paranoia and cultural practices and traditions such

as those found in Islam (Zonis & Joseph, 1994). Psychoanalytic explanations assume the

collective paranoid mind is determined solely by what happens to boys (Byford, 2011, p.

128). Psychoanalytic explanations of conspiracism have a pronounced male bias yet there is

no evidence that men are more susceptible to conspiracy theorizing than women (Byford,

2011, p. 127).

There is some evidence belief in conspiracy theories correlates with psychopathology.

Studies have linked belief in conspiracy theories to feelings of alienation, low self-esteem

and levels of trust, high levels of external locus of control, hostility, powerlessness, and

feeling disadvantaged (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994). People who feel

dispossessed, alienated and disenchanted with politics are thought to be attracted to

conspiracy theorizing because these beliefs confirm the persons sense that the world is

beyond their control, while also protecting self-esteem by offering a simple explanation for

existential and status-related problems (Byford, 2011, p. 129) and others support this view

(Heins, 2007; Pratt, 2003).

Paranoid ideation, schizotypy (a personality disorder characterized by a need for

social isolation, anxiety in social situations, odd behavior and thinking, and often creativity

and unconventional beliefs) are strongly associated with belief in conspiracy (Darwin, Neave

& Holmes, 2011). Evidence suggests anxiety-producing situations increase belief in

conspiracies (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013). Some researchers suggest conspiracist beliefs can be

 30

divided into two subcategories: secular (attributing conspiratorial activities to humans) and

supernatural (attributing conspiracies to supernatural forces such as aliens, for example; Van

der Tempel & Alcock, 2015). Research suggests schizotypy may be more prevalent among

those who subscribe to supernatural causes (p. 140).

Boredom may play a role in conspiratorial thinking. Brotherton and Eser (2014)

found people who exhibit symptoms of boredom also have a higher incidence of paranoia,

and bored paranoiacs are more predisposed to engage in conspiratorial thinking, but simply

being bored was not enough. One of the features of paranoia is idiosyncratic thought that is

considered delusional; but for delusions to be considered paranoid, they must be shown to be

irrelevant and unsupportable to others in the individuals cultural or subcultural group

(Gains, 1988). It is easy in todays interconnected world for conspiracy theorists to find

groups of like-minded people (Sunstein, 2014). The clinical definitions of paranoia would not

likely apply to most conspiracy theorists. In fact, empirical evidence linking conspiratorial

thinking with clinically diagnosable psychopathology is sparse.

In many cases, conspiracy theories have a great deal of social support. Some

conspiracy theorists publish books, host radio talk shows, and speak at conferences (Uscinski

& Parent, 2014). And although conspiracy theorists shared bodies of knowledge often

challenge or contradict the official accounts, their beliefs do not justify a diagnosis of

paranoia. Instead, they are often the subject of sociological studies (Heise, 1988). In reality,

diagnosed paranoiacs egocentricity interferes with good conspiracism, because they are not

able to find a common reality with others (Wulff, 1987). The social and shared nature of

beliefs is the primary factor distinguishing conspiracy theorists from paranoids (Byford,

2011).
 31

Much, if not most, of the conspiracy theory research is about those who believe in

conspiracy theories. It is as if Hofstadters linking conspiracy theorists with paranoia led

researchers to focus on determining what psychopathologies conspiracy theorists possessed.

Conversely, there is a dearth of information about those who readily accept the official

accounts for historical events and reject conspiracy theories despite significant evidence to

the contrary. There is a bias towards accepting the explanations of authorities (Byford, 2011),

but obviously this bias can result in manipulation and choices detrimental to individual and

collective self-interest (deHaven-Smith & Witt, 2013). So what is to be better understood

about this dynamic and what is a better course to take? What causes people to shun

conspiracy theorists and conspiracy theorizing?

The predisposition to accept or reject the official account for significant social,

political, and economic events is a somewhat complex construction involving both social and

individual psychological processes. The schemas through which we view the world and make

sense of it are both individually and socially constructed (Geller, Hamsher, & Rotter, 1968).

Additionally, social and individual information and knowledge are important in belief

formation. Our realities are both objectively and subjectively created (Berger & Luckmann,

1967).

Early research on conspiratorial thinking arose from studies of authoritarianism

(Billig, 1978, 1979, 1988; Byford, 2014) and much of this research is contradictory and

inconclusive (Byford, 2014). Although many of those studies focused on individual

personality characteristics linking conspiracy theorizing to paranoia (Bale, 2007; Darwin,

Neave, & Holmes, 2011; Hofstadter, 1964, 1966), some studies have shown association

among authoritarianism to conspiratorial thinking (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Billig, 1978,

 32

1979, 1988; Grzesiak-Feldman & Irzycka, 2009), and others have not (Imhoff & Bruder,

2013; McHoskey, 1995). Conspiracy mentality, a general propensity to endorse conspiracy

beliefs (Imhoff & Bruder, 2013, p. 25), has been shown to be a distinct political attitude,

associated with a dislike of, and feeling threatened by, powerful groups (Imhoff & Bruder,

2013).

McHoskey (1995) found research participants with authoritarian personality

characteristics were more likely to accept nonconspiratorial explanations for the Kennedy

assassination than their less authoritarian counterparts. Stempel, Hargrove, and Stempel

(2007) found belief in major conspiracies aligned with major political party divisions,

suggesting conspiracy thinking in America was then a part of mainstream politics.

Challenging traditional belief that conspiracy theorists are predisposed to exhibit

authoritarian personality characteristics (Altmeyer, 1996; Swami et al., 2010) found a

correlation between beliefs in conspiracy theories and adherence to democratic principles,

suggesting conspiracism is more a product of disenchantment with mainstream politics in

general rather than a right-wing or left-wing political orientation. Similarly, Sommers (2011)

found believers in a 9/11 conspiracy were not associated with either the Republican or the

Democratic party but were more likely to see both parties connected to a greater conspiracy

to implement a world government.

Nature of Intelligence, Cognition, and Emotion

Beyond the basic issue of perception, there is the problem of how the individual

creates his or her reality. How do we form our beliefs? There are many components. An

important element of intelligence missing from most standard measures of intelligence is

rational thought. Rational thought comprises the following:

 33

Adaptive behavioral acts, judicious decision making, efficient behavioral regulation,

sensible goal prioritization, reflectivity, the proper calibration of evidenceall of the
characteristics that are lacking when we call an action foolish, dumb, or stupidare
precisely the characteristics that cognitive scientists study when they study rational
thought. (Stanovich, 2009, p. 15)

Cognitive psychologists recognize two types of rational thinking: instrumental

rationality or behaving in a way to get what you want (Stanovich, 2009), and epistemic

rationality (sometimes called theoretical rationality or evidential rationality) or how well

ones beliefs reflect reality (Stanovich, 2009). If rationality and traditional measures of

intelligence are different, then intelligent people making bad decisions does not present a

conceptual problem. Traditional measures of intelligence are largely measures of academic

intelligence.

Stanovich (2014) differentiated between rational intelligence and the more traditional

view of intelligence as the mental abilities measured by intelligence tests (para.7)

(MAMBIT). If rationality and MAMBIT are combined conceptually, then there might be a

concern with otherwise intelligent people, as determined by MAMBIT, frequently making

irrational decisions and perhaps not being as smart as they are considered to be (Stanovich,

2009). Stanovich (2009) considers an otherwise intelligent person (someone who scores high

on MAMBIT) who makes irrational decisions as being impaired. He coined the term

disrationalia to describe someone who has the inability to think and behave rationally

despite adequate intelligence (p.18). Someone with disrationality may have significant

difficulties in belief formation, in the assessment of belief consistency (p. 18).

What gets in the way of rational decision-making? Psychologists identify two kinds

of cognitive processes, called Type 1 and Type 2. Type 1 processes are rapidly executed,

mandatory, and autonomous. They can operate in parallel and are not dependent on input

from conscious thought (Stanovich, 2009). Type 1 processing is used in unconscious

 34

processing of things like face recognition and depth perception. It is rather effortless and is

computationally inexpensive. Type 1 processing is our common processing default. Type 1

processing might also be characterized as mindless unconscious thinking (Langer, 1989).

Type 2 processing is relatively slow and computationally expensiveit is the focus

of our awareness (Stanovich, 2009, p. 22). Type 2 processing requires more conscious effort

than Type 1 processing. It is language-and rule-based. An important function of Type 2

processing is to override Type 1 processing. Type 2 processing is conscious and deliberate. It

is awareness. Suppressing Type 1 processing is not enough. Because it is simply reactive and

not analytical, to identify factual truth, the Type 1 decision must frequently be replaced with

something else. An alternative explanation must be developed through Type 2 processing

(Stanovich, 2009).

When evaluating conspiracy theories, one has several options:

accept an official explanation which is actually true and reject one or more
unofficial explanations which are actually false;

reject an official explanation which is actually true and accept an unofficial

explanation which is actually false;

accept an official explanation which is actually false and reject an unofficial

explanation which is actually true; or

reject both the official explanation and one or more unofficial explanations.

Assessing these choices involves employing some combination of probabilistic thinking,

logic, and scientific reasoning. These tools of rationality (Stanovich, 2009, p. 67) are often

learned incompletely (Stanovich, 2009).

Human beings bring a framework or a perspective into every critical thinking

scenario. Psychologists refer to these mental representations as schema. Schemas are socially

constructed (Arbib & Hesse, 1986). Our family, ethnic, spiritual, and other systemic spheres
 35

of influence play a major role in how we perceive and categorize our world (Arbib & Hesse,

1986; Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Sometimes referred to as stereotypes or biases, schemas

become activated by associated thoughts. For example, some people with a racial bias might

see a picture of a young Black man holding a gun and think of violence, whereas if the man

were White, they may not have the same reaction. Schemas cause us to pay attention to some

things and ignore others (Langer, 1989; Mischel, Shoda, & Ayduk, 2008).

Conspiracy theories are frequently seen as the result of faulty reasoning. Often, there

is a tendency to view conspiracy theories as the product of perceptual or cognitive deficits,

leading to causal attribution error, the problem of wrongly attributing cause to certain events

(Byford, 2011). Two types of attributions can occur: (a) personal attribution, ascribing events

to the actions of individuals; or (b) situational attribution, attributing cause to circumstances

not tied to specific actions of individuals (Byford, 2011). As part of humans sensemaking

process, people act as nave or intuitive scientists (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973). People

constantly process information, testing hypotheses about cause, and making inferences about

the causes of events. Yet this type of thinking may not always reflect critical analysis

(Byford, 2011).

Emotions often get in the way of logic and critical analysis (Byford, 2011). Indeed,

research suggests conspiratorial thinking may contribute to the rejection of science such as

that suggesting human fossil fuel consumption is a major contributor to global warming

(Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013). In their effort to explain political and social

events, people will often push the personal attribution to the point of absurdity (Billig,

1988, p. 161). Although research suggests complex events tend to have complex causes

(Billig, 1988), a criticism leveled at conspiracy theorists is they seem to frequently abandon
 36

multicausal explanations (p. 319) and attribute big events to big causes (McCauley &

Jacques, 1979; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; Shermer, 2010). One example is insisting the JFK

assassination, an extremely important historical event, could not possibly have been the result

of a lone assassin but must have involved a much grander conspiracy.

Some people seem to have a need to equate the magnitude of the event with the cause

(Byford, 2011). For example, when asked about hypothetical assassinations, people are more

likely to suspect a conspiracy if the assassination attempt results in death (Douglas & Sutton,

2010; McCauley & Jacques, 1979). Even those not likely to believe in conspiracies make this

mistake. This major cause/major event bias works both ways. For example, some events, like

major political revolutions that were indeed precipitated by a small group of conspirators,

might be viewed as spontaneous mass movement for the cause to match the event (Pipes,

1992).

A question for psychologists is whether conspiracy theories represent gross

distortions of reality and are they to be classed as cognitive illusions paralleling the widely

documented perceptual illusions? (Kruglanski, 1989, p. 220). Indeed, there are hundreds of

biases or cognitive heuristics that have enormous impact on our perceptions, thinking, and

behavior and these affect the attribution process. Shermer (2011) defined heuristic as a

mental method of solving a problem through intuition, trial and error, or informal methods

when there is no formal means or formula for solving it (p. 258). Cognitive biases engage

Type 1 level processes and are therefore not particularly analytical and critical (Shermer,

2011; Stanovich, 2009).

As previously noted, conspiracy theorizing can be the result of irrational thinking,

often attributable to cognitive biases (Shermer, 2011). Most of us seek and evaluate
 37

information in ways that support what we already believe. This is referred to as confirmation

bias (Shermer, 2011). For example, dental researchers may investigate only the perceived

benefits of water fluoridation and ignore its potential toxicity to defend current and past

practices. A notorious example of confirmation bias was the tobacco industrys promotion of

research contradicting the hazards of cigarette smoking despite an abundance of evidence

linking smoking with lung cancer, heart disease, and other ailments. Similarly, those seeking

to confirm their belief in a conspiracy may more carefully attend to information confirming

their theory, while rejecting information supporting the official account. Confirmation bias

can work both ways.

A related concept is assimilation bias, in which case individuals readily accept

information supporting their existing beliefs while rejecting information challenging those

beliefs (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). This phenomenon is universal and not simply

attributable to conspiracy theorists (Harrison & Thomas, 1997). Skeptics are also susceptible

to assimilation bias. Beliefs in conspiracies rest less on emotional upheaval and gross

distortions of reality than on normal, primarily rational information processing strategies that

are accountable also for other beliefs (p. 115). In short, we seek and more readily accept

information confirming what we already believe to be true.

Perhaps Festingers (1957) cognitive dissonance theory explains the need to create

alternative explanations for events. Festinger proposed that when one holds two thoughts that

are contradictory, one experiences a negative emotion or dissonance. Unable to rationalize

these thoughts away, one seeks to reduce this dissonance by changing one or more of the

thoughts or cognitions or finding a way to blend them together. Dissonance is a motivating

factor in its own right (Festinger, p. 3). Cognitive dissonance theory is really about how
 38

people try to make sense out of their beliefs, their environment, and their behaviorand thus

try to lead lives that are (at least in their own minds) reasonable, sensible, and meaningful

(Aronson, 1997, p. 129). Because we think, we frequently get ourselves into a tangled

muddle of self-justification, denial and distortion (p. 130). Rokeach (1960) sought to

explain belief formation in terms of systems or cognitive organizations: we organize the

world of ideas, people and authority basically along lines of congruence. What is not

congruent is further organized in terms of similarity to what is congruent (p. 395). In our

effort to reduce our cognitive dissonance and create congruence among our beliefs, we may

avoid information inconsistent with them or create alternative theories that create

congruence.

Recent developments in neuroscience have shown our brains actually handle

information we like and information we do not like differently (Heffernan, 2011).

Investigations into motivated reasoninghow the brain handles conflicting cognitive and

emotional constraintssuggest we go to great lengths to ignore evidence that we think is

wrong or interpret it in ways confirming what we already believe to be true (Western, 2007).

We seek and more closely attend to information reinforcing what we already believe to be

true. Those who wish to confirm or dispute an official account or theory, will identify with

information confirming their beliefs.

When we frame problems and define their assessment narrowly, we are exhibiting

framing bias (Kahneman, 2011; Shermer, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). We draw

different conclusions depending on how information is presented. Research suggests people

will drive a short distance to save $150 on a $300 purchase but will not drive the same

distance to save the same amount on a $1,500 purchase (Kahneman, 2011). It seems the
 39

relativity of the amount of savings is more important to our decision-making than the

absolute amount of savings. We find framing bias in political and scientific beliefs also. For

example, in an experiment, researchers presented participants with four scenarios in a

contagious disease outbreak (Shermer, 2011). They could either (a) save 200 out of 600

people, or (b) choose a scenario where there was a 33% probability they could save all 600

and a 66% chance no one would be saved. During this research, 72% of the participants

chose the (a) scenario.

Next, in the same study, researchers presented the participants with the following

options: (c) choose a scenario where 400 people would die, or (d) choose a scenario where

there is a 33% probability no one will die and a 66% probability all 600 would die. Although

the results of both sets of options were the same, the participants switched from choice (a) to

choice (d). This was the result of framing. Participants preferred to think in terms of how

many people they would save rather than how many would die (Kahneman, 2011).

Inattentional bias, or blind spot bias, is the tendency to overlook something rather

obvious while attending to something less obvious but specific. For example, when instructed

to attend to two teams of people dressed in black shirts and white shirts passing a ball back

and forth, observers consistently failed to recognize a man dressed in a gorilla suit walking

directly through the groups (Shermer, 2011, p. 272). People often see what they expect to

see, and often fail to see what they do not expect. Biases contribute to what people perceive

and therefore how people create their realities.

Denial is a powerful human emotion and a significant psychological defense

mechanism (Varki & Brower, 2013). Is Chomskys (2004) refusal to acknowledge the

possibility of conspiracies due to his fear of exclusion or is Chomsky (2009) in denial about
 40

the JFK assassination and 9/11? There is evidence denial may be a trait with roots in human

evolution. In their book, Denial: Self-Deception, False Beliefs and the Origins of the Human

Mind, Varki and Brower (2013) argue that humans evolved a predisposition for denial. Citing

evidence from the fields of genetics and anthropogony, the authors theorize mortality

awareness is a uniquely human trait and that we must deny our mortality to function. Without

denial, we would not take risks, procreate or do many things we do, they maintain. For us to

function in the world, we must manage both our awareness of our self and others and deny

our mortality. People deny mortality because it is inevitable. Nothing can be done about it.

Perhaps people deny the existence of real conspiracies because they believe they cannot do

anything about them (Basham, 2001).

Denial can itself be a conspiracy. In The Elephant in the Room, Zerubavel (2006)

suggested fear and embarrassment are at the core of most denial. Denial of child abuse is

often evident in families where the abused and others knowledgeable often conspire to

remain silent. Conspiracies of silence are concealed in this way : You cant talk about the

affair, and you cant talk about not talking about it. Soon, you cant talk about any subject

thats remotely related to it (Cary, 2007). Denial is employed to protect our psychological

well-being (Varki & Brower, 2013).

Our perceptual system our sensory and cognitive processes--and our analysis of the

information that passes before it is powerfully impacted by the beliefs we already hold. We

seek out, and attend more carefully, to ideas and things we already believe to be true

(Nickerson, 1998). These beliefs create pattern detection filters (Shermer, 2011, p. 209).

Confirmation and hindsight biasconnecting explanations to what was previously known

create the basis for conspiratorial belief (p. 209). Conspiracy theory skeptics have suggested
 41

that the pattern detection filters of those who have a predisposition to reject the official

accounts of significant events and believe in conspiracies are too open (Kay, Whitson,

Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009). These people see patterns in seemingly random events that are

not supported by epistemically sound arguments (Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky,

2009). We more closely attend to information confirming what we already believe to be true,

and we are predisposed to surround ourselves with people whose evaluations of us are

consistent with our self-concepts (Swann & Pelham, 1988). We also elicit behaviors from

others that reinforce our self-concepts (Swann & Read, 1981).

Research has not shown a relationship of belief in conspiracy theories and gender,

educational level, or occupation but it is related to minority group status. For example,

African Americans have shown a higher predisposition to believe in conspiracy theories than

the general population (Nelson et al., 2010; Stempel, Hargrove, & Stempel, 2007). This

difference exists even when controlled for socio-economic status (Crocker, Luhtanen,

Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999; Parsons & Simmons, 2005). It is thought a higher level of distrust

and powerlessness often found among minority group members might be the cause (Bird &

Bogart, 2005; Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999). Perhaps intergroup knowledge

about the Tuskegee experiment and other real conspiratorial activities might contribute to a

higher rate of belief in conspiracies among African Americans.

Exposure to information about a specific potential conspiracy does increase feelings

of anger and cause people to be less hopeful (Butler, Koopman, & Zimbardo, 1995) and

exposure about actual, past conspiracies increases the belief in the plausibility of future

conspiracies (Nelson et al., 2010). Counterevidence can reduce beliefs (Newheiser, Farias &

Tausch, 2011). Low levels of media involvement with mainstream media is correlated with
 42

conspiracy belief as well as consumption of less traditional media like blogs and tabloids

(Stempel, Hargrove, & Stempel, 2007).

Rather than attempt to fold conspiracy theorists into an existing clinical psychiatric

classification, perhaps it might be more productive to determine the psychological construct

of conspiracy theorists and contrast that with non-believers. As Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999)

stated, history may well be a conspiracy, but apparently only certain types of people endorse

this view (p. 646). Some of the personality characteristics found among conspiracy

theorists, openness to experience, intellectual curiosity, and active imagination, would be

considered positive traits not typically associated with psychopathology.

Researchers have found a slight correlation to a low score of Agreeableness on

Goldbergs (1993) Big Five personality test to belief in the 9/11 conspiracy and another

measure, Openness, was also found to correlate with exposure to conspiracy theory material

and beliefs in conspiracy theories in general. Perhaps openness to consider conspiracy claims

and to expose oneself to conspiracy material is evidence one might be better informed

(Swami et al., 2010). Lobato, Mendoza, Sims, and Chin (2014) found those open to belief in

conspiracy-oriented epistemically unwarranted beliefs (p. 624) were more likely to believe

in the paranormal and pseudoscientific claims (cognitions about material phenomena that

claim to be science yet use nonscientific evidentiary processes, p. 618). This questions

what qualifies as epistemically warranted beliefs and scientific evidentiary processes. This

question is central to the conspiracy theory concept.

So is conspiracy belief an individual or a social phenomenon? Much of the research

on conspiracy theory focuses on the belief systems of the individual. Typically, researchers

have used questionnaires combining different scales. Often, one scale is used to measure the
 43

participants belief in specific conspiracy theories and others measuring other variables the

researchers hypothesize might explain belief in conspiracies (Byford, 2011). Questionnaire

construction requires developing hypotheses about the characteristics of both conspiracy

theorists and non-believers.

In the field of conspiracy theory research, many researchers have relied on the work

of non psychologists or simply intuition (Swami et al., 2010). Most of these hypotheses, like

conspiracy theories, provide a way of simplifying a complex world or provide an outlet for

hostility, and follow assumptions found in the sociological literature. For example,

Hofstadter (1966) suggested people who feel alienated and powerless are more likely to be

conspiracy theorists and this hypothesis has found its way into most research on the topic

(Byford, 2011). More recently, Bruder, Neave, Nouripanah, and Imhoff (2013) developed the

Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire, a cross-cultural measure of conspiratorial beliefs.

Some studies have linked authoritarianism to conspiracy (Abalakina-Paap et al.,

1999; Grzesiak-Feldman & Irzycka, 2009) and others have not (McHoskey, 1995).

McHoskey (1995) found authoritarian research subjects were more likely to accept non-

conspiratorial explanations for the Kennedy assassination than their less authoritarian

counterparts. These findings contradict the Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999) belief that

authoritarian personalities were more prone to seek scapegoats and were therefore more

predisposed to believe in conspiracies. Contradicting traditional belief that conspiracy

theorists are right-wing authoritarians (Altmeyer, 1996) Swami et al. (2010) found a

correlation between beliefs in conspiracy theories and adherence to democratic principles,

suggesting conspiracism is more a product of disenchantment with mainstream politics in

general rather than a preference for a right or left-wing solution.

 44

Biased Social Cognition

Conspiracy theories may not be the result of individual thinking but collectively

(ideologically) conditions patterns of misinterpretations (Ichheiser, 1943, p. 145) people

default to when making sense of world events. Rather than individual paranoia or cognitive

bias, a shared social explanation may be responsible for conspiratorial thinking (Edwards &

Potter, 1992). People may attribute unexplained or unacceptably explained events to a

conspiracy to make meaning of it or they may accept the official account to gain acceptance

by the majority. The power of the crowd will often cause people to accept the official

explanation (Canetti, 1984).

As has been shown, the predisposition to believe in conspiracies among African

Americans may be attributable to an increased exposure to culturally specific and

historically contingent ways of interpreting the world and the power relations within it

(Byford, 2011, p. 139). Indeed, by stripping conspiracy theory down to a one-dimensional

attitude, psychologists have ignored what is, arguably, the most important aspect of this

phenomenon: its persistence as a dynamic set of stories and shared assumptions about the

world embedded in a tradition of explanation (p. 139). Wood and Douglas (2015) found

evidence those predisposed to accept conspiracy theories do so because they hold worldviews

inclined to distrust official or mainstream explanations. Indeed, belief in one conspiracy

increases the probability of a belief in other conspiracies (Byford, 2011; Drinkwater, Dagnall

& Parker, 2012; Furnham, 2013).

An important, yet often overlooked area of research connected to conspiracy is the

psychology of rumor (Byford, 2011). Many popular conspiracy theories, for example, Jewish

child abuse rituals, began as rumors (Cohen, 1972; Cohn, 1967; Billig, 1988). With
 45

pervasiveness of the internet and social media, what were once transmitted by word of

mouth, rumors are now spread rapidly (Balfour, 2000; Bratich, 2008; Clark, 2002). These

persistent messages can become solidified rumors (Allport & Postman, 1965) or recurring

themes. What rumor psychology shares with the psychology of conspiracy theory is a

process of adaptation and fine tuning (Byford, 2011, p. 140). The rumor and the conspiracy

theory are both dynamic social processes shaped by the need to attract the audience, to meet

its expectations, manage the speakers identity as a credible source and someone who is in

the know (p. 140). Both are characterized by the attempts of people to make sense of

ambiguity, danger or threats, and to manage risk (Bordia & DiFonzo, 2005). Where they may

differ is that the primary purpose of rumor is thought to be to entertain and enhance social

relationships (Guerin & Miyazaki, 2006).

We know social approval is an important motive in human behavior. To what degree

is the rejection of alternative explanations of major events thwarted by individual desire for

social acceptance? Numerous studies demonstrate individuals will compromise truth to

receive the approval of others (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964; Geller et al.,1968). In fact, one of

the most reinforcing benefits of conspiracy theorizing is the recognition one receives from

others as the research on rumor suggests (Bordia & DiFonzo, 2005). Being considered in the

know provides status among peers. With the development of the internet, conspiracy

theorizing has increasingly become a collective effort (Balfour, 2000) and conspiracy

theorists appear to increasingly view themselves part of a better informed genuinely heroic

elite group who can see past the official version duplicated for the benefit of the lazy and

inert mass of people by the powers that be (Aaronovitch, 2009, p.10).

 46

Hegemony

Were an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while youre
studying that reality judiciously, as you will well act again, creating other new
realities, which you can study too, and thats how things will sort out. Were historys
actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do. Aide to President
George W. Bush (Suskind, 2004, para. 62)

Understanding belief in conspiracy theories is more complicated than analyzing

cognitive biases and other flawed thinking. It is more complicated than measuring collective

paranoia and other emotional disturbances. Conspiracy theorizing is a product of social and

historical factors and dynamic interpretations of causal relations as people make meaning of

world events. The impact of hegemony on meaning making goes largely unnoticed and

unacknowledged.

Antonio Gramsci, the General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party was

imprisoned by the Italian fascist government in 1926. While in prison, he authored a series of

papers which became known as the Prison Notebooks. Through this work, Gramsci

expanded on the ideas of Russian revolutionary, Nicholai Lenin, extending Marxist thinking

about hegemony, a concept previously used to explain working-class leadership, to a theory

of cultural hegemony. Gramsci sought to explain how the bourgeoisie in capitalist societies

controlled the working class through ideology. Not simply relying on force and political and

economic coercion, Gramsci believed the ruling class created a cultural hegemony which led

the working class to accept and adopt societal norms benefitting the bourgeoisie. While

Gramscis work emanates from the political left, his thinking has influenced social scientists

from both the center and the right of the political spectrum (Adamson, 1980).

In his 1962 presentation, The Ultimate Revolution, at the University of California,

Berkeley, Aldous Huxley, author of Brave New World, discussed the probability of society
 47

replacing external constraints with internal compulsions. Huxley said, A really efficient

totalitarian state would be one in which the all-powerful executive of political bosses and

their army of managers control a population of slaves who do not have to be coerced,

because they love their servitude (Huxley, 1962). Perhaps an example of perfect hegemonic

control.

There is substantial evidence people are right to mistrust authority and government.

Overt physical force, or its threat, is often a mechanism of control and repression (Goldstein,

1978; Quigley, 1966). In the 20th century, more than 169,000,000 people were killed by their

governments (Rummel, 1994). In some cases, government leaders have been quite open

about the usefulness of force in controlling their populations. In a 2008 lecture, geopolitical

strategist and former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski (2009) stated,

I once put it rather pungently, and I was flattered that the British Foreign Secretary
repeated this, as follows namely, in earlier times, it was easier to control a million
people, literally it was easier to control a million people, than physically to kill a
million people. Today, it is infinitely easier to kill a million people than to control a
million people. It is easier to kill, than to control. (p.54)

How can such coercive control be effective without force? Leading thinkers have

long acknowledged a lack of awareness, consciousness, or disconnection from reality among

people. Mills (1951/2002) suggested people often operate from a false consciousness.

What men are interested in is not always what is to their interest; the troubles they are
aware of are not always the ones that beset them...Increased awareness is not enough,
for it is not only that men can be unconscious of their situations; they are falsely
conscious of them. (p. xix)

This false consciousness, in part created by societal power structures through

withholding and manipulating knowledge and information, leads people to take actions often

not truly serving their best interests. This indoctrination occurs through the control of the

media, educational and other social systems. People accept the status quo because they are
 48

ignorant of how they are being harmed by it and are unaware of viable alternatives (Parenti,

1996). This is the essence of hegemony.

There are two kinds of false consciousness (Parenti, 1996). Parenti states, First, there

are the instances in which people pursue policy preferences that are actually at odds with

their interests--as they themselves define those interests (p. 211). An example of this might

be lower income citizens favoring the elimination of a progressive income tax system with a

regressive sales tax. The second type of false consciousness, the way people define their

interests may itself work against their well-being, (p. 211). As he explains, Americans may

believe supporting U.S. global military interventionism is in their best interest when in reality

high taxes and national debt may actually be lowering security and quality of life.

Pressure to conform and fear of being ostracized and finding oneself isolated are

powerful motives. U.S. Constitution author James Madison (1788) understood this. He said,

If it be true that all governments rest on opinion, it is no less true that the strength of
opinion in each individual, and its practical influence on his conduct, depend much on
the number which he supposes to have entertained the same opinion. The reason of
man, like man himself is timid and cautious, when left alone; and acquires firmness
and confidence, in proportion to the number with which it associated. (para.3)

Human vulnerability to manipulation by those in authority is well documented.

Milgrams (1974) infamous experiments demonstrated the ease with which authority

figures could persuade subjects to apply electric shocks to people who responded incorrectly

to questionnaire items and Asch (1951) demonstrated how powerful the need to conform is

and how scarce truly self-reliant individuals are. Philip Zimbardo, creator of the landmark

Stanford Prison Experiment suggests mind control is not the result of hypnosis or

brainwashing but rather the systematic manipulation of the most mundane aspects of

human nature over time in confining setting (Zimbardo, 2008, p. 258). In her book, The

Spiral of Silence, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1993) offers numerous examples of how the
 49

fear of isolation drives behavior. Pressure to conform can be tyrannical and suppress

individualism. She asks, Must we create a fiction of public opinion based on critical

judgement because to acknowledge the real forces that keep human society together would

not be compatible with our ego ideal? (p. 100).

Those in power have often conspired to create a world that benefits them and often

to the detriment of others (Quigley, 1966). In fact, it may be relatively easy for people to find

themselves engaged in conspiratorial activities without intention or preparation to devise a

meticulous and ingenious plan (Raikka, 2009, p. 199). Raikka stated, It would be wrong to

say that typical conspirators are just ordinary people; but typical conspirators are not terribly

extraordinary either. Most often, they are just people whose judgment failed profoundly and

who were able to conspire (p. 199).

Keeping people in a state of fear makes them easier to manipulate and control. It has

been demonstrated that people in distress are more vulnerable to suggestion by perceived

authority figures. For example, first responders have enormous influence over how people

react to emergencies (Jacobs, 1997). Governments have incentives to create fear among their

populations through orchestrating terrorist events or allowing them to happen. Such actions

have been used to justify invasions, start wars, and reign in civil liberties. So-called false

flags, covert operations carried out by government agents designed to appear as if they had

been carried out by others, are well documented.

Newly elected German Chancellor Adolf Hitler set fire to the Reichstag and blamed it

on his opponents to justify the declaration of a state of emergency in that country and

President Lyndon Johnson falsely claimed North Vietnamese forces attacked U.S. ships in

the Gulf of Tonkin to escalate military operations there. Further, obedience to authority will
 50

often cause even informed people to behave in ways detrimental to their own self-interest.

Examples are the kamikaze pilots of WWII and modern day suicide bombers whose drive to

conform and obey drove them to self-destruction. In academic experiments, volunteers have

demonstrated a preference to harm themselves rather than disobey the experimenters

instructions (Martin, Lobb, Chapman, & Spillane, 1976).

The influence of small, and often corrupt powerful groups over significant world

events is well-documented (Mills, 1956; Quigley, 1966; Aarons & Loftus, 1998; Perkins,

2007; Wedel, 2009; Loftus, 2011). Quigley (1966) described countless examples of

significant world events, from assassinations to economic subterfuge, affected by

conspiratorial activities. He referred to an international Anglophile network of powerful

people he called Round Table Groups operating transnationally. Initially spearheaded by

British imperialists Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Milner, Quigley asserted the groups, operating

in secret, exerted considerable influence over British and American foreign policy in the first

half of the 20th century. It should be noted former President Bill Clinton considered Quigley

one of his most important mentors (Clinton, 1992).

In The Power Elite, sociologist C. Wright Mills (1956) described an American ruling

class moving across the political, military, and economic domains of society. This group

shares a common worldview that societal power should rest with them. Centralizing authority

had three components: a military metaphysic (p. 205) or a framing of reality within a

militaristic perspective, a class identity recognizing the elites privileged position, and an

interchangeability allowing members to move freely within and between the political,

military, and economic domains. Mills believed the elite, as a means of controlling American
 51

capitalism, maintain a permanent war economy and public opinion is controlled by a

manipulative social and political order through the mass media.

In his 1928 book, Propaganda, Edward Bernays laid out the systemic approach to

public manipulation by government and corporations. About the book, Noam Chomsky

(Bernays, 1928/2005) said, Bernays honest and practical manual provides much insight

into some of the most powerful and influential institutions of contemporary industrial-state

capitalist democracies (cover). Often referred to as the father of public relations (Held,

2009, p. 32), Bernays (who was Sigmund Freuds nephew), along with Walter Lippmann,

considered by many to be one of the most influential American journalists of the 20th century

(McPherson, 1980) and perhaps the first to use the phrase the manufacture of consent

(Lippmann, 1997, p. 158), were key members of the U.S. Committee on Public Information,

the U.S. government-related agency responsible for selling the American people on entering

World War I. Bernays, who combined Freudian thinking about the power of the unconscious

with Lippmanns ideas about the use of the media, directed some of the most impactful

public relations and marketing campaigns in history including a campaign for United Fruit

Company which led to a 1954 CIA-led coup dtat of a democratically elected government of

Guatemala (Quigley, 1966) and an extremely successful 1930s campaign promoting cigarette

smoking to women (Bernays, 1928/2005; Tye, 2002).

Bernays (1928/2005) impact on the use of media for purposes of propaganda is

difficult to overestimate and his advocacy of it to control the general population is clear. He

believed governments depend on acquiescent public opinion. Bernays believed the elite were

obligated to control public opinion in an increasingly complex society by the use of

propaganda utilizing an increasingly sophisticated media.

 52

Providing insight into his attitude toward the working class and democracy, Bernays

(1928/2005) stated, The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and

opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society (p.37). As an

important member of the ruling class, his disdain for the common man should not go unnoted

and his impact on the world should not be underestimated. Bernays understood that even

well-informed people could be easily seduced by propaganda.

The threat of the use of force is an important element of control. In Changing

Patterns of Military Politics (Huntington, 1962), Samuel Huntington, author of Clash of

Civilizations (1997), and other contributors, described the rapidly growing political influence

of post-World War II militaries in the Unites States and around the world. Echoing President

Dwight Eisenhowers warning about the growing influence of a scientific-technological

elite and the military-industrial complex in his January 17, 1961 farewell address to the

nation, one contributor, Harold Lasswell (1962), suggested in his essay, The Garrison-State

Hypothesis Today, world political power was moving toward the domination of specialists

on violence (p. 51). Lasswell (1947) was one of the first to discuss how people with

predispositions toward psychopathy are drawn to seek political leadership roles.

The use of force and/or coercion for political repression has always been present in

the United States. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, official repression took place in

the early days of the organized labor movement as corporations gained power in post-Civil

War America. Later, opposition to WWI and the communist movements led to government

acts of government repression. These were followed by the Great Depression when tens of

thousands of potential communist sympathizers were deported and tear gas was used on

demonstrators. During WWII Italian Americans and German Americans endured increased
 53

surveillance by government agencies and thousands of Japanese Americans were confined to

internment camps. These acts were followed by the better known McCarthy hearings of the

1950s and the Vietnam War-era campus shootings and other repressions (Chomsky, 2003;

Quigley, 1966).

Others have observed the structure of American hegemony evolve. In The American

Deep State (Scott, 2015) consistent with Mills (1956) and Quigley, Peter Dale Scott

suggested there is a hidden, transnational force exerting power and influence over the U.S.

government. He presented convincing evidence of this deep state (p. 11), growing in power

and scope since WWII and encompassing federal agencies like the National Security

Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and private corporations like global consulting firm

Booz Allen Hamilton. Allied with global banks, international corporations, and law firms, the

deep states objectives are often at odds with those of the United States and the American

people.

Centralization of power and control facilitates hegemony. Contemporary research

indicates the United States is no longer a democracy but an oligarchy (Gilens & Page, 2014).

Sheldon Wolin, in Democracy, Inc. (2008, said the US had become an inverted totalitarian

[state or] managed democracy (p. xxiv). He states we have tendencies in our system of

power that are opposed to the fundamental principles of constitutional democracy. Those

tendencies are, I believe, totalizing in the sense that they are obsessed with control,

expansion, superiority, and supremacy (p. xvii). Like Mills, Wolin asserts this

totalitarianism depends on perpetual war and at its core are a group of intellectual elites who

are not acting on behalf of democracy and the majority, but for their own self-interest. This
 54

concentration of power would seem to necessarily lead to the manipulation and control of the

general public.

A systemic change in American power has taken place. Operatives of the elite receive

preferential treatment and move across military, economic, and political domains. They often

operate transnationally. The new system further undermines free markets and democracy.

Wedel (2009) calls these operatives flexians (p. 5). Flexians work in networks and often

perform overlapping roles. As an example of a flexian she offers up former German

Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder who before losing his bid for reelection, signed an agreement

between his government and the Russian energy company Gazprom. After the election, he

was named to a position equivalent to the role of Chair of Gazproms Board of Directors.

Another flexian example would be Henry Paulson, the former CEO of mega-bank

Goldman Sachs, who later as Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, oversaw the bailout of Goldman

in the economic financial crisis in 2008.

Evidence of this hegemony can be observed in government. In recent decades, the

separation of powers under the U.S. Constitution has diminished. In essence, Congress has

transferred power to unelected regulatory agencies, a part of the executive branch of

government, through the power to make law through regulation. A revolving door of industry

executives being appointed to top positions in regulatory agencies and then often returning to

industry, has created a dynamic where industries now essentially control the agencies

charged with their regulation (Emord, 2008).

This industry capture is clearly visible in the pharmaceutical industrys influence

over the Food and Drug Administration, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

(CDC, and many other institutions connected to the industry. This influence extends to
 55

professional and medical education, medical research and the content in medical journals,

and prescription behavior of healthcare practitioners (Emord, 2008). Members of the United

States Congress face intense pressure from industry lobbyists. Indiana Congressman Dan

Burton stated the industry has unlimited resources . . . when they push real hard to get

something accomplished in the Congress . . . they can get it (Burton, as quoted in Rosen,

2007). Legislation is often passed with little review by legislators. Referring to a piece of

legislation regarding prescription drugs, North Carolina Congressman Walter Jones (as

quoted in Rosen, 2007) said, "The pharmaceutical lobbyists wrote the bill. The bill was over

1,000 pages. And it got to the members of the House that morning, and we voted for it at

about 3 a.m. in the morning."

Questioning accepted research, like that supporting vaccines, will often earn someone

a conspiracist label yet there is substantial reason to raise questions. Researchers have found

as much as one-half of published psychological studies are not reproducible (Baker, 2015;

Nosek, 2015) and leading medical authorities have suggested similar problems exist in that

discipline (Ioannidis, 2005). Editors of leading peer-reviewed medical journals have

suggested flagrant conflicts of interests and methodological problems have rendered as much

as one-half of all published medical research invalid (Angell, 2009; Horton, 2015).

Some suggest conspiratorial thinking predicts a rejection of scientific evidence in the

context of genetically modified foods, vaccinations, and climate science (Bilewicz et al.,

2015, p. xii) yet there is evidence the science in each of these areas may not be so

scientific. The potential for industrys influence over research outcomes is enormous.

Financial incentives which might lead to corruption have been identified. Some have found

industry-supported research impacts medical journal revenue (Lundh, Barbateskovic,

 56

Hrbjartsson, & Gtzsche, 2010). Indeed, raising questions about the legitimacy of the

regulatory approval system and processes can bring oppression via self-censorship. In 2012,

the New York Times reported the Food and Drug Administration tracked the emails of

scientists who raised questions about the agency to members of Congress and other

authorities (Lichtblau & Shane, 2012).

Politicians and agency executives are often lobbied to pass laws and implement

regulations that are ostensibly for the public good, but in reality benefit only a few companies

or segments of an industry at the expense of competing companies and the public. In 1974

economist Anne Krueger coined the term rent seeking where one company can manipulate

laws or regulations to gain advantage over competitors. While often attributed to

dictatorships and banana republics, widespread, global systemic administrative corruption is

found in both developed and underdeveloped societies and is well-documented (Caiden &

Caiden, 1977).

Perhaps a no more troubling example of industry capture of regulators by a

corporation or industry is CDC Director Dr. Julie Gerberdings appointment as president of

Mercks vaccine division in 2009. Shortly before joining Merck, the manufacturer of

Measles, Mumps and Rubella (MMR) vaccine, CDC researcher Dr. William Thompson,

states Dr. Gerberding orchestrated a suppression of data suggesting a potential link between

the MMR vaccine and autism in African American boys. Numerous independent studies have

shown a relationship between Thimerosal, a mercury-containing ingredient found in the

MMR vaccine, and neurodevelopmental disorders (Hooker et al., 2014).

In defense of their positions on the safety of Thimerosal, Merck, and the CDC pointed

to six studies supporting the vaccines safety. Hooker et al. (2014) found significant
 57

methodological issues and evidence of malfeasance in those studies, including the CDCs

direct commission of five of them. In August of 2015, Dr. Gerberding, now an executive vice

president at Merck, sold 38,368 of her shares in Merck stock for more than $2.3 million.

Thompson has been provided immunity from prosecution by President Obama, and

Congressman Bill Posey of Florida called for an investigation of the matter from the floor of

the U.S. House of Representatives on July 29, 2015.

More recently, a group of CDC scientists, calling themselves CDC Scientists

Preserving Integrity, Diligence and Ethics in Research (SPIDER), wrote to the CDCs Chief

of Staff, expressing concern about the state of ethics at the agency (Gillam, 2016). In the

letter, a copy of which was sent to public watchdog group U.S. Right to Know (2016),

SPIDER members asserted the CDCs mission is being influenced and shaped by outside

parties and rogue interests (p.1). Further, they charge, Congressional intent for our agency

is being circumvented by some of our leaders. What concerns us most, is that it is becoming

the norm and not the rare exception, the letter states. These questionable and unethical

practices threaten to undermine our credibility and reputation as a trusted leader in public

health (p.1). SPIDER members suggest some CDC executives ties to industry appear to be

influencing how the agency handles data and its recommendations.

Control of the mass media is perhaps the most powerful tool hegemons possess. In

recent years, there has been a rapid consolidation of media companies (television, radio,

newspapers, magazines, billboard advertising) in the United States with six companies now

controlling almost 90% of the industry (Stewart, 2014). Similar consolidations have taken

place in advertising (Kim, 1995) and Hollywood film production and distribution (Horwitch,
 58

2006). This places enormous power in the hands of a very few people, a concern expressed

by many (Champlin & Knoedler, 2002; Wellstone, 2000).

Research Question

The research question underpinning this work is, How has the phrase conspiracy

theory developed as a powerful hegemonic tool against those who question authority and

claims made by those in power? As stated above, this work explored the possibility that the

label is a hegemonically constructed concept serving as a silencer. This research is important

because those rejecting the official accounts of some of the most significant political and

social events in world history have been labeled conspiracy theorists, and the alternative

explanations they have proposed have been labeled conspiracy theories, contributing to the

dismissal of such individuals and their beliefs (deHaven-Smith & Witt, 2013). This dismissal

serves to shut down critical thinking and limit further investigations to find truth (deHaven-

Smith & Witt, 2013).

This study was not intended to discuss the merits of particular conspiracy theories

people may have about controversial issues of our times. Some, like theories about 9/11, are

used to help answer the research question about hegemonic implications. The social and

systemic dynamics impacting beliefs about conspiracies and conspiracy theories, as well as

the psychological predispositions, both cognitive and emotive, are reviewed as they might

provide insight into how people are controlled by hegemonic intentions. Although some of

the research cited here originated in Western Europe, Canada, and Australia, the primary

focus is on connections between the use of the phrases and hegemony in the United States.
 59

Summary and Synthesis

There is general agreement on the definition of conspiracy theorist. The

disagreement is around what constitutes a valid conspiracy theory and what is an invalid one.

While many alleged conspiracies are not true, some are. Philosophers disagree about the

liabilities and benefits of conspiracy theorization. There are valid reasons to avoid

discouraging what some might consider unwarranted conspiratorial thinking. Substantial

evidence exists that powerful institutions and their agents created the terms conspiracy

theory and conspiracy theorist as pejoratives. Individual personality characteristics and

socially constructed beliefs can be exploited to distract people from the truth. As agents of

hegemons, institutions of government and media created the pejorative. The pejorative has

been used to discourage challenges to the official accounts for assassination, terrorist attacks,

and other social and political events. The evolution of the pejoratives has never been fully

chronicled and analyzed empirically. This review suggests a valid method of conducting such

a review is an analysis of the discourse in popular media and the academic literature and

evaluates the connections to power among those appearing influential in the creation of the

memes. Consolidation and control of the media, industry influence over elected political

representatives, and capture of regulators are evidence of hegemony.

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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS

"First they ignore you. Then they ridicule you. And then they attack you and want to
burn you. And then they build monuments to you. (Klein, 1919, p. 53)

This dissertation explored the scope and complexity of the development of the term

conspiracy theory as a pejorative. The goal of this research was to explore how the term

evolved as an intentional hegemonic social construction. The intent was to identify how

throughout the 20th and 21st centuries it has evolved into a meme within academic and

popular literature that reveals hegemonic benefits derived from often unintentional

complicity of many to protect the interests of the hegemons because they have accepted as

common sense the hegemonic view of the world.

Methodology

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) was used as the primary data analysis method.

Discourse analysis is used for analyzing language use and its effect on communication and

knowledge creation (Wood & Kroger, 2000). Using the specific example of the pejorative

use of conspiracy theory this research examined how discourses and words themselves can

cause individuals to create realities that may unwittingly support harmful hegemony by

stifling critical thinking and the speaking of truth to power. This is how Fairclough (1995a)

linked linguistic analysis to social analysis. Drawing on Foucault, Fairclough (1995a) stated

that

The aim is to map three separate forms of analysis onto one another: analysis of
(spoken or written) language texts, analysis of discourse practice (processes of text
production, distribution and consumption) and analysis of discursive events as
instances of sociocultural practice. (p. 2)

The first of these forms, extended linguistic analysis, focuses on the structure and

organization of text; the second focuses on how texts are produced and interpreted. In the
 61

third, hegemony, ideology, power, and systems of power relations are considered (Van Dijk,

1988, 1995).

To better understand the impact of the terms used as pejoratives, it is necessary to

understand not only the frequency of their use but the context in which they are used. One

must not only consider what is said, but how it is said. One of the basic assumptions about

discourse made here is that language is action. What are people doing in and with their talk

and text (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 7). All utterances, including those occurring in text, are

treated as actions. In the effort to expose the hegemonic aspects of the conspiracy concept,

it is important to remember that ideological hegemony refers to the conscious or unconscious

domination of the beliefs and actionable assumptions behind language.

It is important to understand that discourse analysis is not content analysis. While

content analysis is a rather mechanical process of categorization, CDA is interested in

semantic content, not categorization. There are multiple perspectives on discourse therefore

multiple definitions of discourse and what constitutes it. Common perspectives include

spoken language, written language, and language use above the level of the sentence (Wood

& Kroger, 2000). Similarly, there are different perspectives on CDA. However, it is generally

held that CDA adopts a critical stance towards both the products of research and to the issues

under study. To add the word critical to discourse analysis suggests a lifting of restraint

on the evaluation of media and the context within which it is used. It implies an attempt to

unify theory and practice (Hammersley, 1997).

Faircloughs (1995a) model for CDA, which considers three dimensions of a

discursive event, was the model chosen for this work. These dimensions, viewed

simultaneously are text, discursive practice (the production and interpretation of text), and
 62

social practice. CDA textual analysis is an analysis of the way propositions are structured,

combined, and sequenced. Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of Faircloughs

approach to CDA textual analysis.

Fairclough argues that to fully understand discourse, the analysis needs to draw out

the form and function of the text, the way the text relates to the way it is produced and

consumed, and the relation of this to the wider society in which it takes place (Richardson,

2007, p.37). Following this model should help provide for the tracing of the development of

the term conspiracy theory as a pejorative. Richardson (2007) breaks down textual analysis

using CDA into three components: Representations (ideation function), Identities and Social

Relations (interpersonal function, and Cohesion and Coherence (textual function; p.38).

The relationship between the consumption of media and social practices is dialectical.

The peoples worldviews determine how they make meaning of media messages, while these

messages continually shape their knowledge and beliefs. Power is central to this process.

Power influences what messages are produced and what mediums are used. The power of

media shapes the individuals understanding and the power of the individual determines how

well they resist such shaping and how they reproduce or transform their world. While these

transformations frequently benefit those in power who are producing the messages, it is not

necessarily so. One of the potential benefits of CDA is the exposure of power inequalities

and manipulation.

This research will approach CDA as an analysis of the social construction of reality

through discourse. It will involve analyzing language in relation to the social context and the

consequence of that use. This research examined the relationship(s) between discourse and
 63

its social conditions, ideologies and power relations (Richardson, 2007, p.45) by analyzing

the power relationships among those appearing to propagate the use of the pejorative terms.

Discourses are not simply talk. They are processes which create social realities. They

shape socioeconomic, institutional, and cultural conditions and processes (Greckhamer &

Cilesiz, 2014, p. 424) and conducting an empirical discourse analysis, like much qualitative

research, presents significant challenges. Four of these challenges are (a) conducting an

analysis that goes beyond description of what is stated in the text; (b) providing transparency

to the analysis while performing an interpretation; (c) providing sufficient evidence of rigor

in the analysis and knowledge claims; and (d) representing all this succinctly (Greckhamer &

Cilesiz, 2014).

Gee (2005, 2011) suggested seven aspects of reality are always and simultaneously

constructed through discourse. These are significance (how meanings are reproduced,

transformed, or integrated through discourse); activities (how discourses build certain kinds

of activities); identities (how meanings of identities are accomplished); relationships (how

discourse impacts relationships); politics (how power is built); connections (how individuals,

themes, institutions are portrayed as relevant to one another); sign systems and knowledge

(how discourse values forms of written and spoken language). While all seven are important,

the most relevant aspects to this research are significance, identities, relationships, politics

and connections. This research followed an analytic commitment to studying discourse as

texts and talk in social practices. That is, the focus is not on language as a medium for

interaction; analysis of discourse becomes, then, analysis of what people do (Potter, 1997, p.

146).
 64

There are some good examples of CDA applied to media in the literature. Graham,

Kenan and Dowd (2004) could find common themes in George W. Bushs creation of the

war on terror in call to arms speeches made by leaders over a thousand-year period.

From 120 texts created over the past millennium, the researchers selected four speeches

exemplary of call to arms rhetoric. These were (a) an address made by Pope Urban II in

1095 launching the first crusade; (b) a 1588 speech by Queen Elizabeth I declaring war on

Spain; (c) Adolf Hitlers 1938 address at the Reichstag prior to Germanys annexation of

Austria; and (d) Bushs 2001 White House declaration of the war on terror. In each of

these four texts, the researchers found the four generic elements of (a) appeals to legitimating

power source(s) external to the orator; (b) appeals to history; (c) constructing the evil other;

(d) uniting behind the greater good (pp.6-16).

In another study, Wilson, Nairn, Coverdale, and Panapa (2000) examined the

portrayal of mental illness in childrens television in New Zealand. From their analysis of

128 episodes of childrens programming, they discovered 46.1% contained predominantly

negative references to mental illness. The most common terms used to describe mental illness

were crazy, mad, and losing your mind. Other terms were nuts, driven bananas,

twisted, deranged, disturbed, wacko, cuckoo, loony, lunatic, loon, insane,

and freak. The researchers also evaluated character facial expressions such as head motions

and rolling eyes.

The subtle othering or marginalization of individuals and groups can be found in

texts and speech. In a study of major Finnish newspaper representations of indigenous Sami

people, Pietikainen (2003) analyzed how journalistic practices impact choice of subject

representation, journalists use of texts and other resources, and how these choices impacted
 65

representations. Results suggest journalistic practices contributed to polarizing ethnic

representation and the marginalizing of the Sami population. Reinforcing the importance of

CDA, others have identified commonly occurring indirect sexism in language use by

studying utterances in context (Mills, 2008). Johnson (2005) identified language use to

further a political agenda though an analysis of metaphors used by opponents and supporters

of bilingual education. He discovered the debate between opponents and proponents was

characterized as a war, bilingual education was portrayed as a failure, and bilingual students

were characterized as victims, while the English language was positioned as the American

Dream by the media.

From their study of discriminatory discursive practices in a leading Hong Kong

newspaper, Flowerdew, Li, and Tran (2002) found significant othering can occur in media

even within groups of people who share the same ethnicity, race, and language. The

researchers developed a composite taxonomy of discriminatory discursive practices from a

review of the literature. An adaptation of their taxonomy, displayed in Table 1, was utilized

for this research.

In this study, common research tools like Google Ngram Viewer and Google News

were used to assist with the chronicling of the change in the use of the terms in common

language. These Google tools were used to explore how the terms conspiracy theorist,

conspiracy theorists, conspiracy theory, and conspiracy theories are used in conjunction with

terms like paranoid, kook, crackpot, dingbat, fruitcake, nut, and lunatic in books and the

news media. These tools allow the researcher to search thousands of books, newspapers,

periodicals, and news services for entries containing specific terms. When terms are entered
 66

into Google Books Ngram Viewer, a graph is displayed showing how those terms occurred in

books during a time period specified by the researcher.

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Table 1

Composite Taxonomy of Discriminatory Discourse Strategies Found in the CDA Literature

Discourse Source and

strategy type Description
Negative other Van Dijk (1991): Negative Focuses attention on the negative social differences,
presentation other presentation deviance or threats attributed to them; effective in
sustaining existing attitudes or forming new negative
attitudes.
Teo (2000): Negative-them Accentuates positive us presentation versus negative
presentation or othering them presentation in news headlines and leads; uses
overlexicalization to stigmatize the minority group.
Graumann and Wintermantel Assigns negative traits by labeling others with adjectives;
(1989): Fixating (labeling & assigns types by stereotyping others with nouns.
stereotyping)
Bar-Tal (1989): Trait Attributes extremely negative and unacceptable
characterization personality traits to the minority group.
Scare tactics Van Dijk (1991): Scare Uses exaggerated figures and extensive attention to
tactics alleged threat to the interests and privileges of the
dominant group to create panic and discredit the
powerless group.
Horvat et al. (1997): Uses exaggeration and scare tactics by means of
Abnormalization and manipulation of the number of refugees; exaggerates
criminalization of the other threats to the public order.
Blaming the Van Dijk (1991): Blaming the Accuses the outgroup of creating a burden on social
victim victim, positive resources to justify the majority groups discriminatory
discrimination, self- attitude.
justification
Gruber (1997): Blaming the The most extreme form of scapegoating is to blame the
victim victim rather than the offender for the course of events.
Wodak (1997): Justification Justifies a societal status quo ante by emphasizing the
legitimacy of past acts and attitudes of the majority group
(the own national we-group).
Delegitimation Wodak (1997): Discredits and disempowers the outgoup group.
Delegitimation
Bar-Tal (1989): Outcasting Categorizes a delegitimized group as violators of pivotal
social norms.
Van Dijk (1991): Problematizes issues concerning the outgroup (e.g.,
Problematization immigration, residence, cultural conflicts, etc.).
Note. CDA is critical discourse analysis. Adapted from Discriminatory News Discourse: Some Hong Kong
Data, by J. Flowerdew, D. Li, and S. Tran (2002), Discourse & Society, 13(3), pp. 329-330. Copyright 2002
by Sage. Adapted with permission.
 68

Who are those using these terms together? In what publications do these terms

appear? What is the ownership of the publications and what is their relationship to influential

people and institutions of power? An important element of this analysis was to examine the

power relationships among the authors of texts, the producers and directors of other media,

and the media in which they appear. For example, one of the most noteworthy critics of

conspiracy theorists in recent history, psychologist Michael Shermer, has been a scientific

advisor to the American Council on Science and Health (ACSH), an organization that

receives a substantial portion of its funding from corporations. The ACSH has been accused

of issuing industry-favorable opinions on products produced by organizations supporting it

financially. Additionally, Shermer is a contributor to Scientific American, a publication

owned by the publishing conglomerate Macmillan. This research identified some of these

power relations.

In addition to establishing the clear pejorative usage, which appears obvious, the

contexts of the communication and the disposition, politics, motivation, and intention of the

users of the meme was reviewed. From this research, and the analysis of it, the potential

influence of hegemony was revealed. This analysis is important to answer the research

question and to assess its use as a hegemonic tool.

The review encompasses published books, American newspapers, popular magazines,

and peer-reviewed academic journals from the post-war era (1947) until the present for

trends in the use of these terms as pejoratives. There are three critical publications

contributing most to the spread of the pejorative. These are Poppers Open Society and Its

Enemies first published in 1945, Hofstadters 1964 essay published in Harpers and

subsequently a book of essays, and the CIAs (1967a, 1967b) internal document maligning
 69

conspiracy theorists. The language presented in these documents was used to establish

baseline research terms. The impact of these publications was evaluated.

In the documentary film, The Conspiracy Theory Conspiracy, filmmaker Adam

Green (2015) chronicles various media uses of conspiracy theory as a pejorative. The movie

provides an excellent chronicling of current mass media use of the terms and compelling

evidence of the medias complicity in creating and supporting the continued suppression of

legitimate conspiracy suspicions. Following the evolution of the pejorative from Popper to

Green completed the analysis.

Wood and Kroger (2000) discussed specific techniques for analyzing and interpreting

texts. They recommended to give yourself permission to be an analyst, that is, to do the sort

of interpretive work that is involved in analysis, in generating results (vs. more

conventional approaches, in which interpretation is allegedly suspended until the results are

in) (p. 95).

The assumptions underlying this investigation evolved as discoveries were made

about the evolution of the memes under study. Rather than following a more traditional

approach of gathering data, tabulating it, and then conducting an analysis, employing the

CDA technique means the data were analyzed as presented and allowed those discoveries to

steer the investigation. This analysis produced the results of the research.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS

The findings encompass an analysis of the impact of Karl Popper (1949, 1962, 1994),

Richard Hofstadter (1958, 1963, 1964, 1966), and the CIA (1967a, 1967b) on the creation of

the pejorative. The analysis reveals evidence of the impact of each on contemporary language

and thought about those who question the official accounts for major social, political, and

tragic events. My study of the language presented in contemporary media reveals that the

original hegemonic intentions for putting down conspiracy theories and those that promote

them stem initially and primarily from seven influential authors whose claims are repeated

over and over by others intending the pejorative use of the meme. After briefly referring to

them, I identify how the media parrots their claims, accusations, and allegations in ways to

stifle critiques of hegemonic positions. My analysis also reveals evidence of the impact of the

claims upon contemporary language and thought about anyone who questions official

hegemonic accounts of important events.

Karl Popper

Karl Popper first mentioned the conspiracy theory of society in 1949 (p. 87). He

suggested some people believe that major unpopular events are the result of conspiratorial

activities of powerful people. Acknowledging this thinking was widespread, he characterized

it as a somewhat primitive kind of superstition (p. 87) that is older than historicism, a

theory that social and cultural phenomena are determined by history. Popper suggested

historicism itself might be derived from conspiracy theory and religious superstition. He

compared conspiracy theories of his day to those conducted by the Greek gods. Popper

acknowledged real conspiracies exist, but he maintained they are rare, are rarely successful,

and their impacts are negligible. What people attribute to conspiracies can likely be attributed
 71

to the unintended social consequences of typical human actions (p. 87). In other words, the

events some people attribute to conspiracy are simply the result of social systems. Some

people in denial of these unintended consequences must find real villains to blame for their

failures. Popper pointed to Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels attributing the failure of

German society to Jews as an example of a conspiracy theorists epistemological failure. By

associating conspiratorial thinking with superstition, Popper served to delegitimize

conspiracists and their views (Wodak, 1997). By associating them with Goebbels, he was

performing a negative othering (Van Dijk, 1991, Table 1)

Richard Hofstadter

Although Richard Hofstadter is best known for his 1964 Harpers magazine article,

an earlier work of his provides evidence of the governments involvement of the creation of

the pejorative. Hofstadter (1958) was commissioned by the Fund for the Republic to write a

memorandum on the contemporary extreme right in the United States. Alleged to be a front

for the CIA (Brown, 2006) and funded by the Ford Foundation, the mission of the Fund for

the Republic was to work for the elimination of restrictions on the freedom of thought,

inquiry, and expressions in the United States (Reeves, 1965, p. 197). In his 1958 paper,

Hofstadter linked conspiratorial thinking with the extreme right (p. 1), paranoia, anti-

Semitism, anti-Catholicism, anti-Negroism (p. 16), hostility to modernism in religion (p.

17), anti-internationalism, xenophobia, anti-intellectualism, anti-metropolitanism (p. 70),

fascism, isolationism, extreme nationalism, and radical individualism. He said,

Their [extreme right] tone is an angry tone, even, as a rule, among their more
sophisticated spokesmen. Although one hesitates to use clinical terms in such a
connection, the right-wing sense of persecution is so active that a great deal of the
right wing literature seems paranoid. (p. 44)
 72

While there is no evidence Hofstadter was aware of the CIAs funding link to the Fund for

the Republic (Brown, 2006), his memorandum may be the first evidence of the governments

involvement in the negative othering (Van Dijk, 1991) of conspiratorial thinkers.

Borrowing from his (1958) Fund for the Republic essay, Hofstadter (1964) introduced

the characterization of conspiratorial thinking as a paranoid delusion in mainstream America

in his infamous Harpers article. In the article, he admitted to deliberately contributing to the

creation of the pejorative: Of course this term [paranoid style] is pejorative, and it is meant

to be; the paranoid style has a greater affinity for bad causes than good (p. 77). Here, he

associated conspiratorial thinking with feelings of powerlessness, a propensity to engage in

fantasy thinking, heated exaggeration (p. 77), suspiciousness, a paranoid style (p. 77),

and an unenlightened level of awareness. Evident in Hofstadters (1958, 1963, 1964, 1966)

work are negative othering (Van Dijk, 1991) and delegitimization (Wodak, 1997).

CIA

While the United States has carried out intelligence-gathering operations since its

inception, WW2 prompted the creation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) a federal

government-chartered capability to collect and analyze strategic information (CIA, 2014,

para.1). The OSS was abolished at the end of the war. Among other actions, the National

Security Act of 1947 mandated the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency charged with

coordinating the nations intelligence activities and correlating, evaluating and disseminating

intelligence affecting national security (para. 2). While the CIAs mandate was to conduct

international operations, it has operated domestically (Bernstein, 1977; Brown, 2006; U.S.

Senate, 1976; Webb, 1998).

 73

Evidence of the Pejorative in Media

Association of the terms conspiracy theory and conspiracy theorist with negative

language is found easily in Google News (2016), Google (2016), and Google Scholar (2016).

To the extent these databases are representative of the content of popular news media and

academic publications and discussions, they are valid sources. Each of these databases holds

tens of thousands of records wherein the terms appear in conjunction with lunatic fringe,

wingnuts, irrational, illegitimate, paranoid, nutcase, loony, whack jobs, crazy, bizarre, and

weird (Appendix E). These terms are consistent with the negative othering (Van Dijk, 1991)

and delegitimation (Wodak, 1997) discourse strategies described by Flowerdew et al. (2002).

Popper and Hofstadter in the Media

Evidence of Poppers (1994) influence on the creation of the pejorative exists in the

associations of his name and term conspiracy theorist. Using Google Books Ngram Viewer

(Google Books, 2016), Poppers name and conspiracy theorist are mentioned in similar

proportions until his death in 1994 (Appendix G), and similar associations with Hofstadter

until his death in 1970 (Appendix H ). Both men were very influential in academia and in the

news media. Both are mentioned along with conspiracy theory thousands of times. A term

search using Google Scholar, a largely academic database, and Google News, a database of

mainstream publications, video sources, and websites, return tens of thousands of hits

(Appendix A).

Evidence of Conspiracy Associated with Major Events

An association of conspiracy with major events like the JFK assassination and

Watergate is also evident in Google Books (2016), where the use of the term increases
 74

following those events and others (Appendix F). It is possible these events spawned

increased use of the meme.

Other Influential Scholars and Journalists

Other influential scholars and journalists such as Michael Shermer (2010), Daniel

Pipes (1997), Cass Sunstein (2014), and Kurt Eichenwald (2016) are linked to the creation of

the pejorative. Their writings and public statements include the use of the terms conspiracy

theory and conspiracy theorist pejoratively. Each of these individuals has direct and indirect

links to institutions of power that may have an interest in protecting the official narrative

(Table 2).

Each of these individuals is mentioned tens of thousands of times in popular

literature, using Google in conjunction with the term conspiracy, but much less so in the

scholarly literature using Google Scholar (Appendix E). Additionally, Sunstein was the most

frequently cited legal scholar from 2009 to 2014 (Farris, Aggerbeck, McNevin, & Sisk,

2016). Eichenwald, Shermer, and Sunstein appeared as experts in the Green (2015)

documentary.
 75

Table 2

Activities and Memberships of Influencers

Influencer Activities and memberships

Kurt Eichenwald Columnist, Vanity Fair; Columnist, New York Times

(2016)
Daniel Pipes President, Middle East Forum; Affiliate Professor, University of
(2016) Haifa; Columnist, Washington Times; Contributing Columnist, Israel
Hayom, La Razon, LOpinione, Australian; five U.S. presidential
administrations; Vice Chair, Fulbright Board of Foreign Scholarships;
Board Member, U.S. Peace Institute; Director, Foreign Policy
Research Institute; Teacher, Harvard, Pepperdine, U.S. Naval War
College, University of Chicago; Author (1997), Conspiracy,
establishing the importance of conspiracy theories in modern Europe
and the US.
Cass Sunstein Professor, Harvard; Administrator, White House Office of
(2016) Information and Regulatory Affairs; Founder and Director, Program
on Behavioral Economics and Public Policy, Harvard Law School;
Author (2014), Conspiracy Theories and Other Dangerous Ideas;
Author (2009), Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures. Friend and
former colleague of President Barack Obama at the University of
Chicago; Husband to Samantha Power, U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations.
Michael Shermer Founding Publisher, Skeptic magazine; Columnist, Scientific
(2016) American; Contributor, [Link]; Presidential Fellow, Chapman
University; Teacher, Occidental College, Glendale College,
Claremont Graduate University; Contributor, Wall Street Journal, Los
Angeles Times, Science, Nature; Author (2011), The Believing Brain:
From Ghosts and Gods to Politics and Conspiracies-How We
Construct Beliefs and Reinforce Them as Truths.

Note. Eichenwald, Pipes, Sunstein and Shermer are frequently cited and often appear as authorities on
conspiracy theories in major broadcast and print media.
 76

CIA Talking Points and Counter Arguments

CIA-Dispatch 1035-960 (CIA, 1967a, 1967b) was a psychological operations

program with the clear intent of discrediting those questioning the Warren Commissions

(1964) findings about the JFK assassination. The agency stated in the memo, The aim of

this dispatch is to provide material for countering and discrediting the claims of the

conspiracy theorists [critics of the Warren Commissions Report] so as to inhibit the

circulation of such claims in countries (CIA, 1967a, p. 1). Points, counterpoints, and

instructions in the memo included

Claim that it would be impossible to conceal such a large-scale conspiracy (p.

2).
Claim that A group of wealthy conspirators could have arranged much more
secure conditions (p. 2).
Claim that no significant new evidence has emerged (p. 2).
Claim that conspiracy theorists are wedded to theories adopted before the
evidence was in (p. 2).
Claim that conspiracy theorists light on some theory and fall in love with it (p.
2).
Accusation that conspiracy theorists are politically interested (p. 2).
Accusation that conspiracy theorists are financially interested (p. 2).
Claim that conspiracy theorists are hasty and inaccurate in their research (p. 2).
Claim that the attacks on the Warren Commission have produced no new
evidence (p. 2)
Claim that no new culprits have been convincingly identified (p. 2).
Claim that there is no agreement among the critics (p. 2).
Claim that the charges of the critiques are without serious foundation and based
on unreliable eyewitness testimony (p. 2).
Claim that vague accusations such as that more than ten people have died
mysteriously can always be explained in some more natural way (p. 3).
Instruct agents to counter speculation by encouraging reference to the official
explanation or report. Commissions Report itself (p. 3).
Linking critics to groups holding anti-American, far-left, or Communist
sympathies (CIAb, p.1).
Claim that further speculative discussion only plays into the hands of the
opposition (p.1).
Suggestion that conspiracy theorists are burning to give the world their theory
(p.2)
Suggestion that conspiracy theorists raise as many questions as possible (p. 2).
 77

Some of these claims such as wedded to theories adopted before the evidence was in (p. 2),

light on some theory and fall in love with it (p. 2), claim that the charges of the critiques

are without serious foundation and based on unreliable eyewitness testimony (p. 2) and

conspiracy theorists are burning to give the world their theory (p.2) imply those

questioning the Warren Commissions report exhibit irrational or irresponsible thinking. This

appears consistent with Hofstadters association of conspiracy theorizing with

psychopathology.

Evidence of Pejorative Use in Contemporary Media

Greens (2015) documentary provides evidence of the effectiveness of the CIAs

program influencing language in contemporary news media. The film samples several major

news media broadcasts. Several of the CIAs talking points were identified in the film. These

talking points are intended to either delegitimize (Van Dijk, 1991; Table 1) or create a

negative other (Van Dijk, 1991; Table 1). Some of these claims found in the documentary are

Claim that it would be impossible to conceal such a large-scale conspiracy.

This claim serves to delegitimize conspiracy suspicions (Wodak, 1997).

Greg Gutfeld [Fox News television talk show host]: I dont believe in conspiracies
because nobody keeps anything secret. Nobody keeps anything secret.

Unidentified Speaker: Thats

Unidentified Speaker: Yeah, thats right.

Unidentified Speaker: That is the best defense against conspiracy theories.

Michael Shermer [author appearing on C-SPAN]: The biggest problem with

conspiracies, particularly government conspiracies, is government bureaucrats are not
very competent and they cant keep their mouths shut. There is no conspiracy because
people cant keep their mouths shut.

Glen Beck [television talk show host appearing on CNN]: Can you actually imagine
that our government was capable [of organizing a conspiracy] and then keeping it off
of the front page of The New York Times? No.
 78

John Stossel [Fox Business television talk show host]: It would be a conspiracy of
thousands of people all over the world. Wouldnt it leak? Wouldnt some of those
people be eager to talk about it? Wouldnt we in the media love to put it in the front
page? Wouldnt it be a big headline? Dont you think that the fact that its not on the
front page means its probably not true? And they look at me and they just dont
believe. I dont convince them.

Kurt Eichenwald [Newsweek Senior Writer appearing on C-SPAN]: If something like

this was going on, I promise you someone would be blowing the whistle.

Note the primary speakers identified here are influential hosts and pundits and these

appearances are all in the mainstream media.

Claim that further speculative discussion only plays into the hands of the

opposition. This claim serves to create a negative other (Van Dijk, 1991).

Bill OReilly [Fox News talk show host]: Billionaire businessman Mark Cuban, the
owner of the Dallas Mavericks basketball team, is putting up money to distribute a
9/11 conspiracy film and its awful. You know that. The film is going to be used by
American haters all over the world, and decent people should be outraged. Its not a
free speech argument. Its basically you give the enemies of America all over the
world who play to uninformed bigotry . . . you give them another tool in which to hurt
America.
Michael Reagan [radio talk show host appearing on Fox News]: What bothers me
more is that jihadists and those in the other parts of the world are going to use it and
also point to Mark Cuban and say, Look and see what happened. The Americans did
it to themselves. Were innocent. We didnt do anything. Blame the Jews. Blame
America.
Sean Hannity [Fox News talk show host]: . . . But Ive got to tell you something; this
will be used by Americas enemies as propaganda.

Bill OReilly [Fox News talk show host]: This is dangerous propaganda. It would not
have happened in World War II. Mark Cuban . . . . This is going to get Americans
killed. If Mark Cuban had done this in World War II, Franklin Delano Roosevelt
would have thrown his butt in jail.

Unidentified Speaker [Hannity & Colmes Fox News talk show]: People who support
that also are giving aid and comfort to the enemy who want to kill Americans.

Alan Colmes [Hannity & Colmes Fox News talk show host]: Yeah. Stop with the aid
and comfort to the enemy.
 79

These statements serve to demonize conspiracy theorists by creating fear that they are

encouraging people who might want to do harm to Americans. They incorporate words like

danger and awful and phrases like uniformed bigotry, decent people should be outraged,

and this is going to get Americans killed.

Claim that no significant new evidence has emerged. This claim serves to

delegitimize conspiracy suspicions (Wodak, 1997).

Unidentified Panelist 1 [Skeptics Guide to the Universe Conference]: Its the same
old stuff, the same old points, nothing new.

Unidentified Panelist 2 [Skeptics Guide to the Universe Conference]: If youve got

evidence show us, but theres been no new evidence in . . . .

Unidentified Panelist 3 [Skeptics Guide to the Universe Conference]: Right.

Unidentified Panelist 2: . . . 8 years. Go away. Sorry.

These panelists at a gathering of skeptics (Skeptics Guide to the Universe Conference)

were discussing the 9/11 conspiracy. 9/11 Truthers (Architects and Engineers for 9/11

Truth, 2016) would likely argue that new evidence had emerged in the preceding 8 years.

Accusation that theorists fall in love with their theories. This claim serves to

delegitimize conspiracy suspicions (Wodak, 1997) and create a negative other (Van Dijk,

1991).

Rachel Maddow [MSNBC television talk show host on RT]: They [conspiracy
theorists] are too ideologically and, I think, emotionally satisfying to the people who
espouse them.

This statement suggests conspiracy theorists are too ideological and their suspicions are

irrational and emotionally driven.

Claim conspiracy theorists commit to their theories prior to evidence. This claim

serves to delegitimize conspiracy suspicions (Wodak, 1997).

 80

Kurt Eichenwald [Newsweek Senior Writer appearing on C-SPAN]: Conspiracy

theorists take those facts and unwind them on the basis of an original belief.
Conspiracy theories work backwards.

This statement suggests conspiracy theorists form their beliefs then look for evidence

to support them. Eichenwald suggests they are victims of confirmation bias (Shermer, 2011).

Accusation that theorists are politically motivated. This claim serves to

delegitimize conspiracy suspicions (Wodak, 1997) and create a negative other (Van Dijk,

1991).

Bill OReilly [Fox News talk show host]: The far left fringe has embraced the
conspiracy theory that elements of the U.S. government carried out the attacks on
9/11. Its unbelievable, but thats what theyre saying. Why is the far left putting
military and all Americans in danger?

Michael Reagan [radio talk show host appearing on Fox News]: The lefts going to go
nuts over it like they did with Michael Moore.

Sean Hannity [Fox News talk show host]: All right, Mr. Liberal, why dont you get to
your point instead of being a little snotty, you know, left-wing radical? Go ahead.

Unidentified guest [Fox News talk show Hannity & Colmes]: Rather than just . . . .

Sean Hannity [Hannity & Colmes Fox News talk show host]: This is also not a left
right issue.

Unidentified Guest: Lets sit down and talk.

Unidentified Guest: Right, right, right. This is this is an issue on . . .

Alan Colmes [Hannity & Colmes Fox News talk show host]: Alex Jones is behind
this movie as a . . .

Unidentified Guest: . . . what are . . . what are the . . .

Alan Colmes [Hannity & Colmes Fox News talk show host]: . . . as a right winger by
the way. Its not left, right.

Unidentified Guest: What . . . what . . .

Alex Jones [Radio talk show host on The Big Picture with Thom Hartman television
show]: Youre trying to create a partisan wedge to keep people in the partisan left
right paradigm.
 81

In these exchanges, note the term far left fringe used by conservative talk show host

OReilly and left wing radical used by the conservative Hannity. Conservative host Colmes

claims Alex Jones, an alternative media talk show host who is often critical of both

conservative and liberal mainstream media, is connected to the conspiracy film. Jones

suggests Hartman, is attempting to create a partisan wedge to keep people in the partisan

leftright paradigm.

Accuse theorists of being financially motivated.

This claim serves to create a negative other (Van Dijk, 1991).

Rachel Maddow [MSNBC television talk show host]: I get that the guys who sell this
stuff for a living have a reason to sell this stuff. Theres always going to be a very,
very, very exciting market for these things. There is money to be made in feeling the
ragged edge of Americas longstanding conspiratorial mindset. And, you know, Im
sure its good for business. These guys have a good racket going. Its always the end
of the world, but not quite yet. Subscribe for 1 more month, because then it will be
the end of the world. Only $19.95," and, yes, you can pay in gold.
Here Maddow quite directly accuses conspiracy theorists of profiting from promoting their

suspicions.

In each of the examples provided above, negative othering (Van Dijk, 1991) and/or

delegitimization (Wodak, 1997) is evident. Clearly, the CIAs talking points are evident in

the sample.
 82

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary of Findings

Evidence of the intentional construction of the conspiracy theory meme is present in

the data. Influential authors with links to government, primarily Richard Hofstadter (1958,

1963, 1964, 1966) and an agency of the government, the CIA (1967a, 1967b), played a

significant role in creating and adopting the meme in popular culture. There is evidence the

talking points outlined in the CIAs Dispatch 1035-960 (1967) have found their way into

contemporary normal public discourse. This evidence, in conjunction with the frequency of

use of the terms conspiracy theory and conspiracy theorist in conjunction with negative terms

like wingnut, lunatic fringe, irrational, and illegitimate provides further evidence CIAs

talking points outlined in Dispatch 1035-960 (CIA, 1967a, 1967b) have been widely-adopted.

The evidence suggests the contemporary authors and academics Kurt Eichenwald (2016),

Daniel Pipes (1997, 2016), Cass Sunstein (2014), and Michael Shermer (2010, 2011) have

adopted and expanded the meme. These individuals have ties to powerful institutions.

Discussion of Findings

The sample studied contains significant evidence of the dissemination of the talking

points, arguments, and counterarguments proposed by the CIA (1967a, 1967b). A significant

extension of the evidence presented by deHaven-Smith and Witt (2013), this study suggests

the CIAs influence was substantial, pervasive, and remains so today. What remains

uncertain is the validity of attributing the adoption of these CIA recommendations by the

media to the CIA. The findings, at least in part, answer the research question, How has the

phrase conspiracy theory developed as a powerful hegemonic tool against those who question

authority and claims made by those in power? by identifying the individuals (Popper and
 83

Hofstadter) and organizations (CIA) most responsible for positioning the terms as pejoratives

in common language. The evidence suggests the intent of Hofstadter (1964) to cast

conspiracy theorists in a psychopathological manner, and of the CIA to delegitimize and to

create a negative other presentation of conspiracy theorists was successful (Van Dijk, 1991).

The evidence affirms the power of language (Foucault, 1980a, 1980b; Habermas, 1984,

1989) and of the influence and contribution of media and propaganda (Bernays, 1928/2005;

Chomsky, 2003; Herman & Chomsky, 2002) to the creation of language and its impact on

belief formation (Allport & Postman, 1965; Arbib & Hesse, 1986; Ariely, 2008; Berger &

Luckmann, 1967; Potter, 1996). The ability of powerful institutions and people to influence

and control populations by creating and manipulating language and public discourse is

further evident in the research presented here.

Comparison of Findings to the Literature

Previous research directly-related to this research question is sparse. The data here

significantly adds to and expands the work done by deHaven-Smith and Witt (2013), the only

significant work done to identify and track the evolution of the conspiracy theory meme as a

pejorative. The current study expands on the evidence he found of the talking points,

arguments, and counterarguments from the CIAs (1967a) memo finding their way into the

media and public discourse.

Revisit of Assumptions and Limitations

The specific use of CDA in this study was in identifying the intent of the CIAs

program and finding evidence of that intent in common language. The researchers skill at

determining the intent and finding evidence of it in the sample is a limitation. In a critical

discourse analysis, the biases of the researcher, specifically confirmation bias, will
 84

significantly impact what is identified and how it is evaluated. Since this study was designed

to identify and follow the development of the pejorative, the negative impact of the bias on

the results was likely negligible. The primary sample, taken from the transcript of a video

documentary (Green, 2015) included statements from acknowledged experts and pundits

on the topic of conspiracy theory and well-known media personalities. Those statements

comprise the sample used to compare with the CIAs talking points and counter arguments

are documented and noted previously. The degree to which the examples provided in the

sample adequately demonstrates a broader, pervasive, and systemic existence of the

pejorative development is uncertain so the generalizability of the study may not be obvious.

Recommendations for Practice

Those who have an interest in following the evolution of socially constructed memes,

should follow the development of big data analysis technologies. It is probable that

analyses of this type will be made easier and the results more robust as the next generation of

analytics becomes available (Barnesmoore, Huang, & El Ghaoui, 2015).

Those concerned with issues of deliberative democracy, the undue influence of

government over social systems and public belief formation, attitudes, and behavior might

consider the increasing potential for government or other powerful people to influence

language development. As evidence of increased government surveillance of civilians, direct

and indirect involvement of government in media and a government freer to propagandize its

citizens is revealed (U.S. Congress, 2012; U.S. Department of Justice, 2016), the impact on

citizens and society should be of interest to those concerned with many social science

disciplines.
 85

Recommendations for Theory

Considering the plausibility of Cohens (1972) theory that Western society maintains

itself by managing its deviants, continuing to view the construction of pejorative memes to

define individuals or groups, such as conspiracy theorists, makes sense. The research here

supports Cohens theory. If those deviants who challenge the official explanations for

events like assassinations and terrorist attacks can be successfully labeled with a pejorative

like conspiracy theorist and then be subsequently discounted, then those in power are better

able to escape challenges to their authority. Rather than readily accepting conspiracy theories

pose a real danger to society, perhaps researchers should ask how the risky thought

encapsulated in the conspiracy theory problem is generated discursively, under what

conditions, and to what ends (Bratich, 2008, p. 9).

Recommendations for Future Research

Was the CIA in fact responsible, directly or indirectly, for the widespread adoption of

these discursive strategies? Is the adoption the result of a coincidence, a systemic operating

dynamic, a deliberate propaganda strategy orchestrated by others, or simply a result of less

intentional hegemony? These questions may be more clearly answered as advances in

technology make interpreting interrelationships of influential organizations and people more

feasible through analyzing large data sets.

Although tracking the interconnections among those who have contributed to the

development of the conspiracy theory pejorative has been made easier by tools such as

Google (2016), Google Scholar (2016), Google Books (2016), Ngram Viewer (Google

Books, 2016), and Google News (Google, 2016), the task remains difficult and time

consuming. As new text data-gathering and analysis technologies emerge, it is probable more
 86

complete models can be constructed (Barnesmoore, Huang, & El Ghaoui, 2015) facilitating a

more empirically valid and evidentiary analysis of the construction of pejoratives and other

social constructions. It may be easier to identify and trace the effect of power on social

norms.

Personal Reflection

Instead of letting evidence drive our belief formation, we too often allow our existing

biases to direct our pursuit of information. We attend to information confirming what we

already believe to be true. This is called confirmation bias. This is very natural and we all do

it. Our sensory systems and perceptions are wired this way.

Once beliefs are formed and "hard wired," it is often difficult to change our point of

view, no matter how much contradictory evidence is presented to us. For most of us, the

contradictory information causes something called cognitive dissonance. Sometimes, when

we are faced with a challenge to our beliefs, the anxiety caused by the cognitive dissonance

is too difficult to overcome so we will deny or ignore the new information. We are all

vulnerable to this phenomenon.

The only way I know to combat it is a great deal of self-awareness, reflection,

curiosity and a constant pursuit of valid evidence, and a willingness to change our minds and

admit we were wrong. Those who challenge a widely accepted belief or an official story, like

the Warren Commission's (1964) report on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy,

raise cultural anxiety and cause discomfort. They are often labeled "conspiracy theorists."

The often legitimate suspicions of the conspiracy theorists are frequently dismissed, not at

the level of evidence, but of emotion. Indeed, Galileo Galilei was arrested for suggesting the

Earth revolved around the Sun.

 87

Conclusions

One month following the JFK assassination, President Harry Truman (1963) penned

this about the CIA, an agency he created:

It [the CIA] has become an operational and at times a policy-making arm of the
Government. This has led to trouble and may have compounded our difficulties in
several explosive areas . . . This quiet intelligence arm of the President has been so
removed from its intended role that it is being interpreted as a symbol of sinister and
mysterious foreign intrigueand subject for cold war enemy propaganda. (p. A11)

A few years later, the Senate Intelligence Committee, chaired by Senator Frank

Church, conducted hearings about the CIAs infiltration of the U.S. media through a program

that the media termed Operation Mockingbird. Through the program, the agency recruited

members of the news media into a propaganda network to present the CIAs views to the

American public. The agencys contention that the program was halted in 1976 has been

disputed (Bernstein, 1977).

The incentives for agents of power to extend their propaganda capabilities seems to

only grow. In 2012, Congress passed HR 5736, or the Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of

2012 (U.S. Congress, 2012), lifting restrictions prohibiting the government from deploying

propaganda domestically. In 2015, leaks by high-ranking State Department officials indicated

the agency actively sought to influence news reports through coercion of the media

(Gosztola, 2015). More recently, on September 15, 2016, the U.S. Department of Justices

(2016) Office of Inspector General published an opinion essentially approving the Federal

Bureau of Investigations practice of allowing its agents to pose as journalists.

It seems powerful people will always use institutions of power to further their goals.

As Gramsci (Adamson, 1980) and others maintained, power is most effective when it

furthers its goals through nonviolent means. As British historian Lord Acton said, Power
 88

tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad

men, even when they exercise influence and not authority; still more when you superadd [add

something to what has already been added] the tendency of the certainty of corruption by

authority (Acton Institute, 2016). A degree of vigilance and applied critical thinking and

analysis among the public is essential to the creation of truth. With the advent of

sophisticated mass surveillance technologies and the loosening of restrictions on government

propaganda, the public must be ever more conscious of the potential for their manipulation

and coercion through hegemony.

Just as one criticizing President Barack Obama's policies is likely to be labeled a

racist, or someone criticizing presidential candidate Hillary Clinton will likely draw a

misogynist label, the term "conspiracy theorist" is used by those in power, to dismiss the

oftentimes legitimate claims of critical thinkers. The dismissal is made at the level of denial,

willful blindness, or cognitive bias, not at the level of evidence.

To revisit Deans (2000) statement,

When pundits and pluralists attack conspiracy thinking, they are not aiming for more

political involvement or increased political activity. They want action within the

parameters defined by elites, action that legitimizes the status quo, that confirms the

party system, pays lobbyists, and provides daily soundbites. (p.299)

If it is true, as Cohen (1972) suggested, that Western society maintains itself by

managing its deviants, then labeling people who bring forth legitimate challenges to accepted

false dogma as conspiracy theorists does not likely well-serve the long term best interests of

society. If those deviants who challenge the official explanations for events like

assassinations and terrorist attacks can be successfully labeled with a pejorative like
 89

conspiracy theorist and then be subsequently discounted, then those in power are better able

to escape challenges to their authority. In many cases, it simply serves to preserve and protect

a crippled epistemology (Sunstein, 2014, p.10).

Rather than readily accepting conspiracy theories pose a real danger to society,

perhaps researchers should ask how the risky thought encapsulated in the conspiracy theory

problem is generated discursively, under what conditions, and to what ends (Bratich, 2008,

p. 9).
 90

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Appendix A: Google News Search of Pejoratives 7/31/2016

conspiracy theorists+lunatic fringe

All=55,500
1st Lunatic Fringe- Huff Po
News=1,060
1st Donald Trumps United States of Conspiracy New Republic
2nd Donald Trump Conspiracy Theories: 11 Fringe Theories
Video=2,680
1st The Conspiracy Theory Conspiracy Documentary
conspiracy theorists+wingnuts
All=91,800
News=2,660
Video=4,420
conspiracy theory+irrational
All=379,000
Videos=18,600
News=14,200
conspiracy theory+ illegitimate
All=369,000
News=4,720
Videos=10,600
 113

Appendix B: Google and Google Scholar Searches of Pejoratives 7/31/16

Google
conspiracy theory+paranoid
687,000 records
conspiracy theory+nutcase
34,100 records
conspiracy theory+loony
77,300
conspiracy theory+whack jobs
112,000
conspiracy theory+crazy
1,560,000
conspiracy theory+bizarre
1,320,000
conspiracy theory+weird
1,460,000
Google Scholar
conspiracy theory+paranoid
32,800
conspiracy theory+nutcase
578
conspiracy theory+whack jobs
4,900
conspiracy theory+crazy
28,900
conspiracy theory+bizarre
32,100
 114

conspiracy theory+weird
31,900
 115

Appendix C: Google and Google Scholar Searches Correlating Shermer, Pipes,

Sunstein, and Eichenwald with Conspiracy 7/31/16
Google
Michael Shermer+conspiracy
78,900
Daniel Pipes+conspiracy
366,000
Cass Sunstein+conspiracy
76,500
Kurt Eichenwald+conspiracy
36,100

Google Scholar
Michael Shermer+conspiracy
980
Daniel Pipes+conspiracy
16,300
Cass Sunstein+conspiracy
4,830
Kurt Eichenwald
632
 116

Appendix D: Google Search Results for Karl Popper and Richard Hofstadter and
conspiracy theory 7/31/16

Google Scholar
Karl Popper+conspiracy theory 5760 results
1st record Conjectures and Refutations cited 15231
2nd record Philosophy of Science cited 169
Richard Hofstadter+conspiracy theory 5860 results
1st record The Age of Reform (1955) cited 2750
2nd record The Paranoid Style (2012) cited 1679
All Google (News) (1947-2016)
Karl Popper+conspiracy theory
All= 24,500 (includes websites, blogs etc)
News=227
Videos=9,090
Richard Hofstadter+conspiracy theory
All=24,500
News=773
Videos=4,870
 117

Appendix E: Appearance of Conspiracy Theorists and Conspiracy Theory in

Conjunction with negative language in Google News, Google, and Google Scholar
7/31/16

Google News
conspiracy theorists+lunatic fringe
All=55,500
News=1,060
Video=2,680
conspiracy theorists+wingnuts
All=91,800
News=2,660
Video=4,420
conspiracy theory+irrational
All=379,000
Videos=18,600
News=14,200
conspiracy theory+ illegitimate
All=369,000
News=4,720
Videos=10,600
Google
conspiracy theory+paranoid
687,000 records
conspiracy theory+nutcase
34,100 records
conspiracy theory+loony
77,300
conspiracy theory+whack jobs
 118

112,000
conspiracy theory+crazy
1,560,000
conspiracy theory+bizarre
1,320,000
conspiracy theory+weird
1,460,000
Google Scholar
conspiracy theory+paranoid
32,800
Conspiracy theory+nutcase
578
conspiracy theory+whack jobs
4,900
conspiracy theory+crazy
28,900
conspiracy theory+bizarre
32,100
conspiracy theory+weird
31,900
 119

Appendix F: Time Plot of terms conspiracy and theorist appearing in books 7/31/16.
 120

Appendix G: Time Plot of Karl Popper and Conspiracy Theory 7/31/16

 121

Appendix H: Time Plot of Richard Hofstadter and Conspiracy Theory 7/31/16

 122

James Edwin Rankin, Jr.

Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Dissertation: THE CONSPIRACY THEORY MEME AS A TOOL OF CULTURAL

HEGEMONY: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Major Field: Human and Organizational Systems

Education: Bachelor of Science in Psychology, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC,

1979

Master of Science in Labor and Industrial Relations, University of North Texas, Denton, TX,

1987

Master of Arts in Human and Organizational Systems, Fielding Graduate University, Santa

Barbara, CA, 2012