History lesson: Why did Bill Clintons North Korea deal fail?
The North Korean regime hates the United States. Everyday, North Koreans are told that
the Americans are "imperialists," "aggressors," and "hostile." North Korean children are
taught that "cunning American wolves" want to kill them. To understand why, we need to go
back to the Korean War. (Anna Fifield, Jason Aldag/The Washington Post)
The actor James Woods tweeted a 1994 clip of President Bill Clinton announcing a deal with
North Korea, suggesting the current standoff was the fault of the former president.
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Theres plenty of bipartisan blame to go around, however. Heres a quick summary of what
happened. (Note: Glenn Kessler covered the collapse of the Clinton deal and subsequent
efforts to negotiate a nuclear deal with Pyongyang as The Washington Posts diplomatic
correspondent from 2002-2011.)
The Facts
Clintons deal was called the Agreed Framework. In contrast to the detailed and lengthy
agreement negotiated in 2015 under President Barack Obama intended to restrain Irans
nuclear ambitions, the Agreed Framework, struck in 1994,was only a few pages long.
Essentially, an international consortium planned to replace the Norths plutonium reactor
with two light-water reactors; in the meantime, the United States would supply the North
with 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil every year to make up for the theoretical loss of the
reactor while the new ones were built.
North Koreas program was clearly created to churn out nuclear weapons; the reactor at
Yongbyon was not connected to the power grid and appeared only designed to produce
plutonium, a key ingredient for nuclear weapons. The theory of the deal was that, with the
plant shuttered and the plutonium under the close watch of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), North Korea would not be able to produce a bomb. There were also vague
references in the text to improving relations and commerce.
The deal was hugely controversial in Congress. Just as with Obamas Iran negotiations,
Clinton structured the agreement so that it was not considered a treaty that would have
required ratification by the Senate. As with Iran, there was also an international component,
with South Korea, Japan and a European agency joining with the United States to create an
organization to implement the accord.
As Iowa State University professor Young Whan Kihl noted in an article exploring the
political ramifications:
Since the Agreed Framework took the form of a presidential executive agreement, rather
than a formal treaty (such as SALT I & II), the U.S. Senate did not need to give advise and
consent under the U.S. Constitution. However, the terms of the agreement are
controversial and subject to scrutiny by the Republican-dominant U.S. Congress that began
a series of congressional hearings in mid-January 1995. Some congressmen and senators
demanded that the agreed framework be treated as a formal treaty; this move was
resisted by the Clinton Administration but, because of the budgetary and appropriation
clauses of the agreement, the U.S. Congress was inevitably drawn into the process of
implementation and verification of the agreement.
So how did North Korea get its hands on the nuclear material? George W. Bush became
president in 2001 and was highly skeptical of Clintons deal with North Korea. Secretary of
State Colin L. Powell was even slapped down when he suggested the administration would
follow the path set by the Clinton administration. The new administration terminated missile
talks with Pyongyang and spent months trying to develop its own policy.
Then intelligence agencies determined that North Korea was cheating on the agreement by
trying to develop nuclear material through another method highly enriched uranium. The
Bush administration sent an envoy who confronted North Korea and the regime was said
to have belligerently confirmed it in 2002, just as the Bush administration was mostly
focused on the pending invasion of Iraq.
In response, the Bush administration terminated the supply of fuel oil that was essential to
the agreement and then North Korea quickly kicked out the U.N. inspectors, restarted the
nuclear plant and began developing its nuclear weapons, using the material in radioactive
fuel rods that previously had been under the close watch of the IAEA. Japan and South
Korea, the key partners in the accord, were not happy with the decision to terminate the
Agreed Framework, but there was little they could do about it.
Within two years, U.S. intelligence analysts concluded North Korea was using the plutonium
to create nuclear weapons.
After North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, the Bush administration tried
desperately to negotiate a new accord with Pyongyang, including offering significant new
concessions, but those efforts ultimately failed. Bush, to the anger of conservatives and the
government of Japan, evenremoved North Korea from the State Department list of state
sponsors of terrorism only to see the hard work turn to dust. The nuclear genie by then
was out of the bottle, and North Korea had little incentive to give up its stash of plutonium,
no matter what the United States and its negotiating allies offered.
(Toward the end of the negotiations, the Bush administration learned that North Korea had
helped Syria build a nuclear facility, which was destroyed by Israeli warplanes. Bush kept
negotiating, even though North Korea in theory had crossed a red line set by Bush in 2003
that it could not transfer nuclear technology to other parties.)
The issue was considered such a loser that the Obama administration barely bothered to
restart disarmament talks, adopting a stance dubbed strategic patience. (One official
privately said the Obama team was stunned at the concessions offered by Bush when they
reviewed the diplomatic history after taking office.) During that eight-year period of fitful
talks, North Korea improved its mastery of nuclear technology, including uranium
enrichment, and also its missile technology.
Questions have since been raised about whether the Bush administration misinterpreted
North Koreas supposed confirmation and doubts also emerged about the quality of U.S.
intelligence that inspired the confrontation. But Bushs later efforts to negotiate a new
accord were hampered by fresh evidence that North Korea actually did have an undisclosed
uranium-enrichment program.
Interestingly, former Clinton administration officials have said they knew North Korea was
cheating on the uranium enrichment front dating back to 1998 and planned to use that
intelligence as leverage to keep the Agreed Framework in place and the plutonium under
lock and key. Other Clinton administration officials will also concede that they never thought
they would have to build the light-water reactors because they assumed, wrongly, that the
regime would collapse before the reactors would be built.
But in the end, the regime has survived. Much like the Iranian accord negotiated by Obama,
the North Korea deal had little bipartisan support and was rejected by the incoming
president as a bad deal. But, as Bush quickly learned, terminating one deal is much easier
than renegotiating a better one.
How North Korea Cheats Sanctions
Will the latest UN action be different?
Carlos Jasso / Reuters
In July 2013, U.S. law-enforcement was tipped off about a North Korean vessel that was
making its first visit to the Americas in four years. Authorities were told the Chong Chon
Gang, which was supposed to be carrying sugar from Cuba to North Korea, was hiding drugs
or weapons in its cargo. U.S. officials informed their Panamanian counterparts, who
intercepted the vessel, finally managing to seize it after a five-day standoff with the ships
crew. What they found inside became the stuff of punch lines: Cold War-era military
equipment on its way to be repaired in North Korea.
Three years later, after more stringent international sanctions, another North Korean vessel,
the Jie Shun, was intercepted, this time by Egypt. The vessels cargo included 30,000 PG-7
rocket-propelled grenades and other military equipment. The ships stated cargo: iron ore.
The UN described the haul as the largest seizure of ammunition in the history of sanctions
against North Korea. Who the weapons were intended for is still not publicly known.
But what the affairs with the Chong Chon Gang and the Jie Shun illustrate is the lengths to
which North Korea, one of the most heavily sanctioned nations on Earth, will go to earn the
foreign exchange needed to finance its illicit missile and nuclear programs. Therein lies the
fundamental flaw within nearly every Western-led attempt to pressure North Korea,
including the latest measures approved unanimously by the UN Security Council last
Saturday: How do you stop a country determined to find ways to evade sanctions against it?
They can do the same things that they were doing before. They will continue to try and
send cargoes abroad. Theyll continue to try and engage in financial transactions. Theyll
continue to try and sell their goods, Richard Nephew, a former U.S. State Department
official who is now a senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at
Columbia University, told me. And to some extent, theyll find new goods to sell. When you
find that you cant sell coal anymore, what that means is youre going to double-down on
manufacturing clothing, or something like that. Because thats not yet prohibited.
International negotiators have long been aware of this. As recently as February, a UN panel
of experts that monitors the implementation of sanctions against North KoreaSaturdays
was the seventh round of UN sanctions imposed on the country since 2006said that
despite foreign ports blocking certain North Korean vessels, Pyongyang has adapted to
these measures through various tactics, including identity fraud. The country, the
panel noted, continues to circumvent UN sanctions through its trade in weapons and other
illicit goods with African states by using evasion techniques that are increasing in scale,
scope and sophistication. North Korea, the panel said, also continues to enjoy access to the
international financial system by using agents who are highly experienced and well trained
in moving money, people and goods, including arms and related materiel, across borders.
These agents use citizen of other countries and front companies to move money around, the
report said.
Scott Snyder, a senior fellow for Korea studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, told me
that North Korea acts through a combination of changing names of front companies and
embedding themselves in the Chinese supply chain by using Chinese agents to obscure the
real customer for North Korean procurement.
Anthony Ruggiero, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies who spent
nearly two decades working in the U.S. government, pointed out that other countries and
regions are involved in trade with North Korea, as well, though on a smaller scale. Malaysia
has long maintained close ties with the North (though those ties suffered this year following
the assassination of Kim Jong Uns half-brother in Kuala Lumpur). Singapore sells it luxury
goods; European firms ski equipment. Iran and Syria have bought its ballistic-missile
technology, while other Middle Eastern countries employ North Korean workers. China may
be North Koreas dominant trade partner, Ruggiero told me, but theres still enough there
on the outside to start squeezing North Koreas other trading partners. In that case, even if
China doesnt fully comply with the new sanctions, it could still start to impact North
Korea.
The latest UN sanctions, passed in response to two tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles
in July, are perhaps the strongest ever enacted against the country: They call for a total ban
on North Koreas major exports, including coal, iron and iron ore, lead and lead ore, and
seafood. They also expand the definition of the kinds of companies that can be classified as
financial institutionsan important step to battle those firms that provide Pyongyang access
to moneyand limit the number of North Korean workers overseas, who remain a valuable
source of foreign exchange. At the same time, they attempt to strengthen some prohibitions
on port calls by vessels that have been previously involved in illicit trade, Snyder told me.
Those restrictions are already pretty strong but theres an additional effort on that front,
he said.
Nephew, the former State Department official who contributes to the North Korea-focused
website 38 North, said the challenge remains enforcement, and the degree to which states
take it seriously.
So you now have a set of restrictions on what people can buy from North Korea. Are they
actually going to hold to that? And are they going to inspect ships and cargo containers and
so forth when they are coming from North Korea to prove that, in fact, they arent breaking
those terms? Nephew said. Those are the problems that have bedeviled UN sanctions for
quite a long timeand North Korea sanctions in particular.
The new UN sanctions have been advertised as particularly severe based onestimates that
they will cost North Korea $1 billion a yeara third of its annual export revenue. But Snyder
pointed out that much of the assessment of the value of trade with North Korea is based on
officially reported trade statistics. North Korea does not maintain these. China, which
accounts for 90 percent of trade with the North, simply moves some transactions off the
books while reporting others. There is simply no way to measure North Koreas trade
volume accuratelyand thus no way to measure the true impact of the new financial
penalties.
By definition what we dont know is what is not reported, Snyder said. People who go to
Pyongyang and ask themselves the question: Gosh, it seems like theres a lot of liquidity
here. Where is the capital coming from? I think part of the answer to that question is that
not everything that goes into North Korea is officially recorded.
For example, Snyder said: Weve seen the Chinese stop recording oil exports to North
Korea, Snyder told me, though I think the widespread presumption is that the supply
from China to North Korea has continued. Circumstantial evidence for the idea that they
have continued is that there has been discussion in the run-up to this resolution [on the
new UN sanctions] to implementing a petroleum trade ban. That does not appear in the
resolution.
David Pressman, a former U.S. ambassador to the UN who is now partner at Boies Schiller
Flexner LLP, said that, even if previous rounds of UN sanctions against North Korea have
forced it to find new ways to look to circumvent the restrictions, the North hasnt had to
work all that hard because theyve continued to have next door to them a government
thats willing to continue to do business with them.
The counterintuitive reality may simply be that trade with the impoverished North Korea is
simply too lucrative to pass up. Snyder said that even if Chinese customs and border
officials were extraordinarily scrupulous in doing their jobs, is it plausible to imagine that
shady Chinese actors who are willing to circumvent Chinese regulations would not continue
to engage with North Korean actors given the likelihood that the risk, and therefore the
profit margins, would be even higher?
Thats a bet the North Korean regime is willing to take.
Nephew pointed out that sanctions usually take into account a small amount of evasion. The
logic, he told me, is that if overall compliance is good, evasion will translate into relatively
small dollar amounts.
Thats not the case with North Korea, he said.
Nephew compared the international sanctions on North Korea with those imposed on Iran
over its nuclear program (which was ultimately frozen for 15 years in exchange for
sanctions relief). He said the tens of billions of dollars involved in the Iran case were really
meaningful to the economy and the leadership.
With North Korea, even if you take away $1 billion, I think the North Korean regime still
feels pretty good about having $3 billion because theyre not trying to make their population
happy and satisfied in the same way that even Iran is, Nephew said. The problem with
sanctions evasion with North Korea is every single small slip-up, every $5 million
transaction, every $50 million transaction, is more meaningful to the North Koreans than
maybe $1 billion was to the Iranians. This is why evasion with North Korea is even more
dangerous.
Fewer people in China are tying the knot a trend alarming families and worrying
the government. Gender inequality is at the heart of this phenomenon, writes
Xuan Li.
One of the greatest fears of Chinese parents is coming true: Chinas young
people are turning away from marriage. The trend is also worrying the
government.
After a whole decade of increases in the national marriage rate, China
witnessed its second year of decline in the number of newly registered
unions in 2015, with a 6.3% drop from 2014 and 9.1% from 2013. This
was accompanied by a rise in the age of marriage, which has increased by
about a year and a half in the first ten years of this century.
The decline and delay of marriage in China is part of a global trend.
The United States, most OECD nations, and Japan, have all undergone a
similar process in recent years, as have other major Chinese societies. Hong
Kong and Taiwan, for instance, both have much higher ages of first
marriage than mainland China.
But in a culture that puts great value on family, parents are alarmed by even
the tiniest likelihood that their offspring will remain unmarried and childless.
They fear the breaking of family lineage, or that there will be no one to look
after their unmarried children when theyre gone.
A woman poses for a wedding picture at the Bund in front of the financial district of Pudong in
Shanghai (Credit: Getty Images)
Causing worry
While the traditional practice of arranged marriage has been illegal in China
since the 1950s, parents remain heavily involved in their childrens
marital decisions. Many Chinese parents relentlessly try to persuade their
children to enter wedlock through much-dreaded interrogations during
festive family gatherings.
Some go to matchmaking corners where parents gather to exchange
information about their single children and arrange blind dates - often without
the knowledge of or against the will of children themselves.
The Chinese government hasnt sat idly by either. In 2007, the Ministry of
Education publicly shamed women who were 27 years or older as leftover
women, urging them to lower unrealistic standards during their search for
a partner. While still alive and well in the public discourse to refer to both
genders, the term leftover has been criticised by scholars and resisted by
young women.
In 2016, the government cancelled the extra seven-day honeymoon
leave that had been granted to couples who married late (older than 25
years for men, and 23 years for women). The hope was that this would spur
young people to marry (and eventually, bear children) as soon as possible.
The state is especially worried about the millions of surplus men in China
The state is especially worried about the millions of surplus men in China,
who were born after the 1970s as a result of gender-selective
abortion and are now looking for brides.
The number of these leftover men varies depending on the age group, and
whether one talks about the current situation or the future. According to state
media, it may be 24 million or 33 million.
Typically rural and impoverished, these unwed men upset bare branches
who are not able to add offshoots to their family tree are considered a
threat to social stability because of the financial, social and sexual frustration
they face.
Peoples Daily recently stressed that leftover men constitute a more
pressing crisis than women in a similar situation, quoting a survey on
unmarried rural men that found some of them engage in criminal activities
such as gambling, prostitution, and human trafficking.
Parents gather at a matchmaking corner in Xian to scout for potential partners for their
children (Credit Alamy)
A different path
But young people follow their own mind. And while romance and coupledom
are much endorsed by both men and women in their 20s and 30s, marriage as
a legal institution is no longer a must.
Growing up with more diverse values than previous generations, Chinese
youth born in the 1980s and 1990s see options beyond the linear life path
leading up to the baby carriage. Many prioritise work over partnership -
either willingly or with reluctance.
Chinese youth born see options beyond the linear life path leading up to the baby carriage
Government statistics also suggest that more than 85% of both male and
female migrant workers a third of whom are at marrying age work
more than 44 hours a week, which leaves them little time and energy to build
relationships.
Changing lifestyles and modern entertainment are contributing to spouse-free lives (Credit:
Getty Images)
Others are simply exploring alternative lifestyles with or without a romantic
partner. Cohabitation is increasingly commonplace. And thanks to affordable
technology, casual sex is also easier to access than ever.
Then, theres the sea of books, films and television series that portray other
ways to live. For young, professional Chinese urbanites who have access to
modern entertainment, a cool, an enriched life can well be spouse-free.
Gender disparity
Young Chinese women are particularly vocal about the institution of marriage.
An advertisement by cosmetic company SK-II, showing young women voicing
their protest against parental and social pressure, for instance, went viral in
China.
Its not that single women are uninterested in having a love life many are
actually keen to get married but too much is at stake. In a country
where gender equality has been stalling, if not deteriorating, over the past
decade, women face enduring discrimination in education and the
workplace.
There are already many more men than women looking for a partner in China and that gap
looks set to widen (Credit: Getty Images)
The Chinese government relaxed its one-child policy in October 2015,
allowing all couples to have a second child. But the state didnt take account
of the change in welfare policies for families or employers. So the majority
of career women said no to the offer out of fear of being further devalued
on the job market.
Unlike their counterparts in other countries, Chinese women receive no
effective protection from the law in case their marriage dissolves. Knowing
that bleak career prospects and a non-existent safety net await them, these
women have every reason not to trade their career or personal freedom for a
wedding.
Empowered urban Chinese women have a tough choice to make between
intimacy and autonomy - but at least they still have a choice. Behind them are
their rural sisters, who have much less control over their own fates.
Poverty relief programmes or allowing women to have more than one husband have been
suggested as possible solutions
Deprived of educational and social resources by patriarchal tradition and a
capitalist economy, rural women have little bargaining power compared to
their urban counterparts against unwanted marriages, inequality between
spouses, or even violence within or for the sake of marriage.
Chinese state media are certainly aware of marriage decline as a potential
social problem, although most of their sympathetic attention has
been channelled towards bachelors who cannot exercise their right to
acquire a wife. Their struggles are vividly depicted, and are often attributed
to womens rising demands for bride wealth (money that the grooms
family pays the brides family); the rise in economic disparity; and
sometimesto the nations skewed gender ratio.
Poverty relief programmes or allowing women to have more than one husband
(polyandry) have been suggested as possible solutions to their difficulties.
But theres no discussion of what could be done for the urban women who
might face the glass ceiling at work, or for rural ones who are married but
suffering as the result of patriarchal traditions.
A better way to enhance the lure of marriage could start with the
underprivileged in Chinese society. That means giving the decision to marry or
not back to young people; promoting family-friendly workplace policies; and
finally, securing womens rights.