SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, Vol. 3, No.

2, Autumn 2005, ISSN 14798484

Note:
The following addendum to Jon Fernquest, (2005) Min-gyi-nyo,
the Shan Invasions of Ava (1524-27), and the Beginnings of
Expansionary Warfare in Toungoo Burma: 1486-1539, SOAS
Bulletin of Burma Research 3.2 (Autumn 2005): 35-142, was
submitted after the journal was off to press (so to speak). We have
added it here at the end of the volume. It is hoped that readers of
Jons article, earlier in this journal, will also take note of this
additional and revised material.
M.W.C.
________

Addendum: The Shan Realm in the Late Ava

Period (1449-1503)
Jon Fernquist
Several factors conditioned the relation between the Shan Realm,
China, and Burmese Ava before Min-gyi-nyos accession to power:
1. The Shan Realm had been a perpetual threat to Ava since
the end of the Pagan dynasty (Than Tun, 1959, 111-12).
2. The Shan Realm was an economic frontier for Ava
connecting it via trade to the expanding markets of Ming
dynasty China (SLC 97-198).
3. The Shan Realm prospered economically from its proximity
to China through trade in gems and luxury goods with which
it was well-endowed (SLC 134-153; Brook, 1998, 75-79).
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4. Much Shan wealth was expropriated by the Chinese state

through various forms of taxation (Ward, 2004, 5, 16-17, 2829).
5. Increased wealth in the Shan Realm from farming and
trade led to increased population and a surplus to finance
armies and supply them with military resources such as
weapons, animals, and the time of humans spent away from
subsistence farming.
6. Ming Chinas conquest and consolidation of power in
Yunnan created more Shan states with some degree of local
independence but with limited territory (Ward, 2004, 4, 5, 9,
22-25; Daniels, 2003, 3-10).
7. Shan expansion to the east into China was not possible.
8. Expansion to the south into Upper Burma was an easier
natural alternative for territorial expansion.
9. On its frontier with the Shan Realm, the Ming Chinese
state had a policy of divide and conquer and fragmenting
potentially powerful states (Ward, 2004, 23-25; Wang
Gungwu, 1998, 318-9), but increased warfare sometimes
resulted in even stronger states (MSL 12 Oct 1499).
10. The Shan-Chinese frontier region was in a continual state
of warfare from 1449 to at least 1503.
The Shan state of Mong Mao arose in the power vacuum that
ensued after the fall of the Dali kingdom in Yunnan to the Mongols
in 1254. Through expansionary warfare the power of the Mong Mao
state eventually extended over most of the Shan states of Burma
and Tai ethnic states of Yunnan. This all came to an abrupt end in
the 1380s when the newly emergent Ming state invaded Yunnan
and proceeded to consolidate its power there. The center of the
Mong Mao state was located in the modern-day districts of
Longchuan and Ruili on the Yunnan-Burmese border and had its
capital at what is now the modern-day border town of Reili (Liew
Foon Ming, 1996, 64; Daniels, 2003, 5-6; Wade, 2004, 31; Tapp,
2000; Reynolds, 2003).
From 1498 to 1504 the Ming replaced the tributary relations
of the Tai states that surrounded Mong Mao with administrative
divisions and taxation of their own making (Ward, 2004, 4-5, 9;
Liew Foon Ming, 1996, 168-9). Under the pressure of increasing
taxation, in 1411 Mong Mao refused to receive imperial envoys
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with proper ceremony which led to the Mong Mao leader being
removed from office in 1413. During the twenty years from 1413 to
1435 the next ruler Chau-ngan-pha [Sa Ngam Pha, Thonganbwa]
waged constant warfare against the former tributary states of Mong
Mao. Although his initial ambition may have been to reclaim Mong
Maos lost territory, the zone of Tai states soon fell into a state of
endemic warfare much like that which would exist in the later part
of the century. Such an endemic state of warfare is not uncommon
among small proto-states (Ferguson and Whitehead, 1999; Turchin,
2003; Haas, no date, 11-14; Johnson and Earle, 2000, 34-45).
Mong Mao was not always the aggressor. In 1436 Mong Mao
received a tax exemption because of Hsenwi encroachments on its
land (Liew Foon Ming, 169-170).
In the 1530s the intensity of warfare increased. As Wang
Gungwu observes:
The re-emergence of the Maw Shan chieftains of Lu-chuan
followed on the withdrawal of Ming armies from Vietnam in
1427. Knowing that the Ming court was in no condition to
fight on the Yunnan border, the Maw Shan tribes became
increasingly ambitious during the next few years. After 1436,
their armies began to invade the border counties of central
Yunnan, reaching as far as the Yung-chang and Ching-tung
[in Chinese territory] (Wang Gungwu, 1998, 325-6).
Eventually, one of the tit-for-tat seizures of territory in this state of
endemic warfare triggered Chinese military intervention. In 1437
the ruler of the Tai state of Nandian requested Chinese assistance
in returning land that had been taken from it by Mong Mao. The
regional commander of Yunnan was requested to make an
investigation into the matter and in 1438 he found that Mong Mao
had repeatedly invaded Nanlian, Ganyai, Tengchong,Lujiang,
and Jinchi and that the Mong Mao ruler had appointed local
chieftains of the neighboring regions subordinate to him without
asking for the approval of the Ming court and that some of these
men joined forces with him to invade Jinchi (Liew Foon Ming,
1996, 170). In response, the Chinese sent the first of four military
expeditions against Mong Mao in a war that would last for over a
decade, a war that is now known as the Luchuan-Pingmian
Campaigns (1436-1449). As Wang Gungwu observes:
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This war had disastrous consequences for the Ming state, it

disrupted the economies of all the southwestern provinces
involved in sending men and supplies in fighting a war of
attrition against a small tribal state and it cost the Ming state
the respect of its tribal allies on the border, who saw how
inept and wasteful the Ming armies were. Moreover, the war
drew commanders, officers, men, and other resources from
the north which might have been vital to the defense of the
northern borders. It is significant that the end of the Luchuan campaigns early in 1449 was followed immediately by
extensive tribal uprisings and other revolts in five provinces
south of the Yangtze river, and, on the northern frontiers, by
the spectacular defeats later in the year which virtually
destroyed the imperial armies in the north and led to the
capture of the emperor himself by the Mongols. The year 1449
was a turning point in the history of the dynasty (Wang
Gungwu, 1998, 326).
The rise of the Shan state of Mong Yang that would soon play such
a significant role in Burmese history after 1524 occurs in the
chaos that ensued at the end of the Luchuan-Pingmian Campaigns.
The third campaign from 1443 to 1444 removed Chau-ngan-pha
from power as the ruler of Mong Mao, but his son Chau-si-pha
[Jifa] escaped capture and established a power base in Mong Yang
on the west bank of the Irrawaddy river (Daniels, 2003, 8). A fourth
campaign was sent in 1449 to capture him, but probably failed to
achieve this main objective. The Chinese allowed remnants of the
Mong Mao royal family to remain in Mong Yang if they agreed
never to cross the Irrawaddy river to the east. Chinese sources
disagree about how Chau-si-pha finally met his end, one Shan
chronicle even claiming he reigned for another fifty years (Mangrai,
1969, xx). The version of events found in the official Chinese
history includes one possible motive for Mong Yangs eventually
invasion of Ava in 1524-27, revenge:
Jifa [Chau-si-pha] escaped to Mengyang [Mong Yang] in early
1449 but was caught by the chieftain of Ava-Burma. In April
1454 the chieftain of Ava-Burma asked the Chinese to revert
the land to him and the Ming ceded Yinjiato Burma, so Si
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Jifa and his family, a total of six people, were delivered to the
Ming troops at a village on Upper Irrawaddy. Si Jifa [Chau-sipha] was immediately escorted to the capital where he was
executed. However, Ava-Burma let Si Bufa, the younger
brother of Si Jifa, go free. He and his son, Si Hongfa
(Thohanbwa) continued to rule Mengyang without the official
approval of the Ming court. They sent tribute missions to
China, but the court kept a close eye on the matter. Early in
the Jiajing reign one of the descendants of Si Renfa [Chaungan-pha, Thonganbwa], then ruling Mengyang, managed to
take revenge. In 1527 (Jiajing 6) he led an army that marched
south to invade Ava-Burma, killing the chieftain Mang-ji-si
(Shwenankyawshin) [Narapati (1502-1527)] and his wife (Liew
Foon Ming, 1996, 198).
Mong Yang, to the northwest of Mong Mao, in 1449 began to
emerge as the successor state to Mong Mao.
During the 1480s the power of the two Shan states Mong
Yang and Mong Mit, rose in tandem, fueled by trade with the rising
Ming dynasty of China. Mong Mit was most famous for rubies from
the town of Mogok, sending tribute missions to the Chinese court
with them as early as 1407. Mong Yang was famous for amber and
jade (SLC 127, 129, 227, 241). The adjacent Shan states of Hsenwi
and Hsipaw effectively defined a boundary between Chinese and
Burmese spheres of influence in the Shan Realm. Hsipaw was a
steadfast ally of Ava for much of the fifteenth century and appears
to have had no relations with the Chinese state since it is never
mentioned in Chinese sources. Hsenwi was the largest Shan
political entity recognized by the Chinese state in the Shan Realm
during the early Ming dynasty (SLC 2000, 228), but in the late
fifteenth century over the course of several decades Mong Mit
gradually broke free from Hsenwis control and was finally
recognized by the Chinese state as a separate political entity (SLC
230). In the mid-fifteenth century the Chinese governor of Hsenwi
married his daughter Nang Hannong to the ruler of Mong Mit. She
was put in charge of Mong Mits gem mines and eventually became
ruler of Mong Mit. Starting from the 1450s Nang Hannong, using
the gem trade with China as a lever, separated Mong Mit from
Hsenwi. The role of Ming dynasty court politics and the gem trade
in Mong Mits serpentine rise to power during the later half of the
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fifteenth century has been documented by Sun Laichen (SLC 227232). Other minor Shan states in the Shan Realm that are
explicitly referred to in Burmese and Chinese sources include Kalei
on the Upper Chindwin river as well as Mong Nai and Yawnghwe in
the southern Shan states near modern-day Taung-gyi.
During the 1580s and 1590s tribute missions were sent
frequently to the Chinese court by Shan rulers. Sending a mission
was usually a strategic move that often did not indicate actual
submission. It was often used to delay Chinese military action,
gain acquiescence to territory that had been seized, and also as a
bid to get hard to obtain recognition as a state by China. Mong
Yang sent regular tribute missions to the Chinese court with items
such as elephants, horses, gold, and silver in 1482, 1487, and
1491. Mong Mit sent missions in 1481, 1483, and 1496. Hsenwi
sent them in 1496, 1505, 1517, and 1530 (MSL: Mong Yang: 23
Apr 1482, 4 Apr 1487, 3 May 1491; Mong Mit: 19 Jun 1481, 25
Sep 1483, 4 Nov 1496; Hsenwi: 29 Apr 1496, 8 Nov 1505, 22 Mar
1517, 21 Oct 1530).
While the Mong Yang Shans were placating the Chinese to
the north, they were engaging in regular raids on the Burmese
frontiers to the south. In 1483 (BE 844) the Burmese chronicle
records that the Mong Yang Shans continued to attack Myedu and
Ngarane in the north (UKII:106). In 1484 (BE 845) a new Burmese
governor of Myedu was appointed (UKII:107). In 1484 Mong Mit
was finally recognized by the Chinese state as an independent
political entity (i.e. an anfusi or pacification office) no longer
under the control of Hsenwi.
Compared with the chaotic state of continual warfare in the
Shan Realm described by Chinese sources, Burmese sources often
hardly seem to describe the same region. This probably stems
from the different approach taken by the Burmese and Chinese
states in their relations with Shan states in the late fifteenth
century. In the face of endemic warfare in the Shan states, the
Chinese state was reluctant to get militarily involved, choosing to
control and monitor Shan states through continual diplomatic
contact and coercion instead. The Burmese, on the other hand,
were less concerned about continual monitoring and control and
seem to have continued a strategy of once-off military expeditions
to extract promises of submission and token payments of tribute to
the exclusion of diplomatic relations. The continual contact of
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Chinese officials with Shans in the Shan-Chinese frontier during

this period led to overall better descriptions of what was going on
there when compared with Burmese descriptions of events in the
Shan-Burmese half of the frontier. Rhetorical differences between
the Chinese and Burmese traditions of historical writing may also
be a factor.
A good example of Burmas military approach to relations is
provided by the Burmese chronicles description of a punitive
expedition led by Ava against the two Shan states Mong Yang and
Mogaung in 1477. Mong Yang and Mogaung are tightly associated
with each other in the Burmese chronicle, more often than not
acting as one political entity (SLC 233), but in the 1477 campaign
they were treated as separate entities by Ava. The Burmese
chronicle records that in 1477 (BE 838) the king of Ava heard there
was warfare in the Shan states and that the Mong Yang and
Mogaung sawbwas [rulers] had entered into an alliance and were
helping each other militarily, so the king of Ava ordered the crown
prince to look after the capital of Ava in his absence and appointed
his younger son, the lord of Yamethin Min-ye-kyaw-swa, to march
by land with five armies (300E; 6,000H; 70,000S). The king of Ava
himself marched with 12 armies travelling by river in his golden
royal barge (70,000S). When they arrived at the port of Katha on
the Irrawaddy, they disembarked and marched by land to Mong
Yang. According to the chronicle, when the Mong Yang and
Mogaung sawbwas learned of the kings arrival they lost heart and
were not brave enough to resist. They sent gifts and arms and
entered into the Burmese kings side. If they did in fact submit in
this manner, what led them to do this? Perhaps the Shans were
intimidated by the shear size of Avas forces. Perhaps it was
common cultural knowledge that submitting in advance to
Burmese forces was a cultural norm that would allow the local
ruler to maintain his position of power and it was this expectation
that led to an early submission. The logic being, probably, that the
quicker the submission to the Burmese, the quicker the Burmese
would return to the capital and leave them to rule without
interference. After their submission, the Burmese chronicle records
that the king of Ava took the Mong Yang sawbwa and gave him the
town of Tagaung in the north on the Irrawaddy to rule over. Mong
Yang was given to the younger brother of the Mogaung sawbwa to
rule over. The king of Ava returned to Ava in 1477 (BE 838)
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(UKII:98).
By itself, the description in the Burmese chronicle is
unnoteworthy, but juxtaposed with Chinese sources it has
important implications for later events. The Burmese were
relocating the Mong Yang rulers with their followers to Tagaung
near Hsenwi without the knowledge of the Chinese. Tagaung is on
the Irrawaddy river south of Bhamo which would have given Mong
Yang troops a head start in their later invasion and occupation of
Bhamo around 1500. It would have put them one step closer to the
Burmese heartland and given them a taste of the China trade that
traveled down the Irrawaddy river from the entrepot of Bhamo. The
Chinese are also likely to have misinterpreted this Burmese
relocation as an independent move by the Shans (cf. MSL 12 Oct
1499).
Chinese sources describe similar events, but from a different
perspective. In 1479 the Ming Annals record that Ava asked China
to give it the town and territory surrounding Kaung-zin [Gongzhang] on the Irrawaddy river near Bhamo (MSL 17 Oct 1479).
There is usually a lag between events in the Shan Realm and their
being recorded in Chinese sources. The transportation delay alone
for sending a message to the capital in Beijing was at least three
months (Brooks, 1998, 30). In this case, a two year lag in
processing the information would put the Burmese military
expedition against Mong Yang around the same time as the
Chinese refusal to give the port of Kaung-zin to the Burmese.
Kaung-zin was an important port and a stopping point for
Burmese tribute missions to the Chinese capital. China had
promised to give Mong Yang to Ava after Ava helped in the capture
of Mong Maos ruler Si Ren-fa in 1449. After apparently initially
intending to honor this agreement (Liew Foon Ming, 1996, footnote
116, p. 198), Chinese officials eventually decided not to honor the
agreement, so Ava requested this port town instead. The request
was refused by the Chinese. In the wake of this refusal, Ava may
have led an expedition against Mong Yang to uphold its prior claim
to Mong Yang.
To summarize, the Shan Realm in the period leading up to
Min-gyi-nyos reign was politically fragmented and plagued with
endemic warfare as well as frequently shifting loyalties and
alliances. This very fragmentation and disunity, however, also gave
the region a fluid and malleable quality with a future potential for
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concerted action under strong leadership.

A Shan Confederation rules Upper Burma? (1527-1555)
The fall of Ava in 1527 resulted in a sudden and short-lived
expansion of Shan rule over Upper Burma from 1527 to 1555. This
state expansion was to be over-shadowed by Bayinnaungs even
greater expansion of the Burmese state into the Tai region to the
east from 1551 to 1581. Shan rule over Upper Burma after the
invasion of 1527 caused a radical shift in the regional geopolitical
structure of western mainland Southeast Asia. The Shan realm
suddenly extended along the Irrawaddy in the east all the way to
the borders of Promes territory in the south and in 1532, after
Prome was taken, it reached the border of the Mon kingdom of
Ramanya. In the eastern part of Upper Burma, Shan rule left Mingyi-nyos ruling house in Toungoo and intact with its own sphere of
influence. Even after Min-gyi-nyos son Tabinshweihti embarked
upon warfare against Pegu from 1535 to 1539, the new Shan state
chose not to attack what must have been a weakly defended
northern Toungoo frontier.
Shan rule over Upper Burma consisted of a confederation of
Shan states. Although Chinese sources provide confirmation that
Ava fell to a Shan invasion around 1524-1527, the evidence for
Shan political control over Upper Burma from 1527 to 1555 lies
entirely in Burmese sources. The existence of the confederation is
only revealed at certain critical junctures in the Burmese chronicle
narrative. One critical juncture occurs when the king of Prome
calls on five Shan rulers to relieve the siege that Tabinshweihti
waged against Prome in 1542 (BE 903). The sawbwas of Ava (Thohan-bwa), Hsipaw, and Mong Yang come to Promes aid and two
additional sawbwas, Bhamo and Mong Mit, arrive late after their
defeat. Mustering together forces from these disparate states to the
north of Ava to defend the southern borders must have presented
quite a challenge. Although collectively the confederation may have
been able to field a formidable army, this manpower must have
been difficult to mobilize. Another critical juncture takes place in
1543 (BE 904) after the palace coup of Burmese residing at Avas
court (UKII:136). After the Ava sawbwa Tho-han-bwa was
assassinated, the sawbwa of Hsipaw, the former Shan ally of Ava
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at the time of its defeat in 1527 is chosen by the Burmese as his

successor. Perhaps the choice of a Shan successor by a Burmese
led coup was necessitated by the need to keep the confederation of
Shan states that defended Ava intact. Shortly after the Hsipaw
sawbwa becomes king of Ava he organizes a military expedition to
retake Prome from Tabinshweihti. By this time the confederation
has expanded to seven sawbwas including two new sawbwas from
Yawnghwe and Mong Nai in the southern Shan states. These two
new sawbwas most likely joined as long-time allies of Hsipaw,
because during the Shan invasions of 1525-7 the chronicle already
records the Hsipaw sawbwa as traveling to these Shan states to
replenish his elephants, horses, and soldiers (UKII:126). Later in
this section we will look at the demise of the Shan confederation
under Bayinnaung and the evidence that these events provide of
Shan cooperation.
There is some evidence of Shan migration to and settlement
in Upper Burma during the period of the Shan rule. As mentioned
above, Kyaukse tax records from the nineteenth century show
Shan settlement at Myaung-hla in Kyaukse (Trager, 1979, 383-4)
and one of the last kings of Ava under the Shan confederation,
Mobye Narapati (r. 1546-52), is said to have constructed Nga-kyi
weir in Kyaukse, no doubt accompanied to some degree by Shan
settlement (Harvey, p. 109). It is also worth speculating that both
agricultural technology and the Buddhist religion may have started
to flow into the Shan Realm with increased Shan contact with
lowland Burmese practices after the Shan conquest of Upper
Burma in 1527. Daniels (2003) finds significant changes in
agricultural technology that likely began in the sixteenth century
(Daniels, 2003, 18-21; Daniels, 2001, 77).
The origins of the Shan confederation hinge on the question
of whether Mong Yang had any Shan allies when it invaded Ava
from 1524 to 1527. The evidence is scattered and inconclusive.
Mong Yang worked with Hsenwi and other smaller Shan states as
well as the Chinese in the 1594 offensive against Bhamo, but the
state of endemic warfare in the Shan Realm meant that alliances
and vassal-overlord relations could change rapidly. Minkin, Kalei
[Upper Chindwin] and Twin-tin along the invasion path used in
1524 are mentioned as being Mong Yang vassals in 1511
(UKII:120), but in 1520 they had once again become vassals of Ava.
This is at least evidence for the possibility of quickly changing
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loyalties and alliances. The Burmese chronicle only mentions Mong

Yang as the invading force in 1524-7, but by 1527 Mong Yang
had been used to refer to Shan invasions from the north for so long
that it could well have frozen into a fixed chronicle clich without
much intrinsic meaning. Chinese sources are more ambiguous
about who invaded Ava:
Some Chinese sources record that Mong Yang and Mong
Mitor even Mong Yang, Mong Mit, and Hsenwi
altogethersacked Ava and partitioned its territory, while
Burmese chronicles show that Mong Yang almost singlehandedly (except with some help from Prome) conquered Ava.
The actual situation should be that Mong Yang and Hsenwi
formed an alliance, but Mong Mit was not part of it, as Mong
Mit was even attacked by Mong Yang after Mong Yang sacked
AvaChinese and Burmese sourcescoincide with respect to
the help Mong Yang obtained from Prome (SLC 239).
The discontinuous transition from conflict and endemic warfare to
an era of Shan political cooperation is rather perplexing. There is
at least some precedent for this type of proto-state formation
among the Mongol ethnic groups of Chinas northern border.
To make better sense of the scattered evidence of cooperation we
will construct a model of state formation and expansion based on
Di Cosmos model for Chinas northern borders later in this paper.
The evidence in the Burmese chronicle indicates that the functions
of the confederation were limited to defense and the election of a
ruler. As Scott and Hardiman (1900, 200) observed, Shan states
were semi-independent States which only united for common
action under achief of particular energy, or in cases of national
emergency.
How did this confederation achieve coordination
among its various members? How did the different Shan states
benefit from participating in this confederation?
What were the Shan motives for this sudden invasion of Ava?
As we have seen the human agency motive of revenge that official
Chinese historiography provides is one possibility, but were there
more fundamental structural reasons based on economic or
demographic factors? Prior to 1524 Mong Yangs military actions
against Ava had been restricted to attacking small garrison towns
in the Mu irrigation district and the Irrawaddy. In 1524 the Mong
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Yang Shans made a sudden entrance into the Chindwin Valley and
started systematically moving down the Chindwin and then
Irrawaddy river valleys right up to Thayet raiding settlements along
the way. Why this sudden shift to targets deep within Upper
Burma? Was it simply the pursuit of additional territory or were
there additional motivating factors such as trade or Shan relations
with their Chinese overlord to the north? What did the Shans
stand to gain from controlling this territory? We will look at three
possible explanations here: 1. Control of trade routes, 2. Resource
extraction and raiding for plunder on a grand scale, and 3.
Relieving population pressure on the limited territory of the Shan
realm thereby reducing the endemic warfare of the region and
creating a more secure border for the Chinese state.
First, control of trade routes would have been one logical
economic motive for the Shans to invade Upper Burma. Such a
motive is found in the expansionary warfare of the Mong Mao state
prior to the Ming conquest. In the Baiyi Zhuan [Account of One
Hundred Barbarians] Mong Mao is said to have repeatedly
invaded
and
disturbed
the
various
routes.
Marshal
Dashibaduwent to punish him, but could not subdue him. Si
Kefa annexed even more routes (Daniels, 2003, 5, translating
Jiang Yingliang, 1980, 52-55, my italics, see also Wade, 1996;
Wade, forthcoming). Controlling trade routes is also a motive often
assigned to Tabinshweihtis invasion of Ramanya to the south from
1535 to 1539. As (Bin Yang, 2004) has shown, trade along a
Southwest Silk Road from Yunnan to South and Southeast Asia
was substantial. The flow of cowries originating in the Bay of
Bengal into Yunnan and their use there as an important medium
of exchange until the seventeenth century
attests to the
importance of this trade with China. The trade routes for this trade
have been reconstructed by Deyell (1994) by examining how
bullion was shipped from Yunnan and Upper Burma into Bengal
during the period 1200-1500 (Bin Yang, 2004, 289).
The first two routes were mostly overland routes. The first
route passed from Yung Chang to Momien, crossed the Irrawaddy
to Mogaung, went north through the Hukawng Valley, across
passes in the Patkai Range, to the Upper Brahmaputra Valley. The
second route followed the Shweli River, crossing the Irrawaddy at
Tagaung, followed the Chindwin River north, and crossed via the
Imole Pass to Manipur. Overland trade routes, besides being
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slower than river transport, probably suffered from higher degrees

of interference such as tolls, warfare, and banditry.
The third trade route passed through Upper Burma and
relied mostly on more efficient river transportation. The third route
embarked on the Irrawaddy at Tagaung, Ava, or Pagan, and then
passed from Prome over the Arakan Range (Arakan Yoma) to
Arakan. A variation of this went directly from Pagan to Arakan via
the Aeng Pass. This gave access to either a land route northward to
Chatigaon, or embarkation on the coastal trading boats to Bengal
(Bin Yang, 2004, p. 289, citing Deyell, 1994, p. 128). Control over
this third lowest cost trade route through the rivers of Upper
Burma would be one logical motive for invasion. Controlling this
important trade route would have allowed a monopoly on trade
along the more efficient river route or at least the collection of tolls
and duties.
Second, raiding on a much grander scale than had been
attempted by the Shans before would be another logical motive for
invasion. If earlier Shan military activity against the northern
borders could be characterized as raiding for plunder and booty,
seizing any form of transportable wealth, with little if any strategic
objective of setting up some system of governance for taxation and
more permanent resource extraction, the invasion of 1527 can be
seen as raiding on a much larger scale with Burmese Buddhist
religious institutions themselves as the target, institutions which
absorbed much of Avas food surplus and wealth. This included
large amounts of physical wealth such as silver, gold, and
gemstones, building materials, and land, as well as manpower that
was pledged to monasteries to support them. Whereas the
traditional modes of Burmese religious reform to recapture this
wealth stayed within culturally acceptable bounds, according to
the chronicle the Shans used essentially military techniques to
reclaim this wealth, reducing the population of monks through
state-sponsored murder and raiding religious edifices such as
pagodas that absorbed much surplus wealth in their underground
treasure chambers and in their decoration (Aung-Thwin, 1985,
181). In the face of Shan plundering of Burmese religious wealth,
religious donations virtually ceased at Ava and with it the passage
of wealth into religious institutions (Aung-Thwin, 1998, 128).
Third, relieving the population pressure on the limited
territory of the Shan realm would have been another logical motive.
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The endemic warfare in the Shan realm in the fifteenth century

recorded by Chinese sources was mostly over limited territory. One
can imagine the massive territorial expansion of the Shan Realm
and reduction in population density that Mong Yangs invasion
brought about as solving the problem of limited territory and land,
eliminating the causus belli for the warfare that plagued the Shan
Realm. Migrations of Shans southwards into Lan Na around 1517
searching for new agricultural land is additional evidence that the
Shan Realm was experiencing some demographic pressure that
needed to be relieved around the time of the invasions of 1524-27
(Grabowsky, 2005, 42).
Local Shan chronicles could help elucidate the history of
interstate competition and cooperation in the Shan Realm. The
Shan Realm had two levels of interstate relations: 1. between large
Shan states (e.g. Hsenwi, Hsipaw, Mong Mit, and Mong Yang) and
the two much larger non-Shan states, China and Burma, and 2.
between the larger Shan states and smaller Shan states (and
perhaps even groups of non-Tai ethnicity such as Mon-Khmer or
Tibeto-Burman-Lolo, see Daniels, 2001, 53-68). Shan chronicles
provide a lot of information about the later local type of relation,
including marriage alliances, shifting loyalties, and endemic interstate warfare, but this history is often difficult to integrate into the
larger-scale historical narratives of China and Burma (see Daniels
(2005 forthcoming) for a successful integration). References to
events outside the locality that might help verify local events and
fit them into a larger geopolitical landscape are often missing from
Shan chronicles.
In the limited survey of Shan chronicles made for this paper
there was only one reference to the 1524-27 Shan invasions of Ava,
one of the most important events in Tai-Burmese relations of the
pre-modern era. A version of the Hsipaw chronicle recorded by Sai
Aung Tun (2001) mentions the invasion, but follows the Burmese
chronicle so closely as to cast doubt on its independent origin. It is
also a second-hand summary, the original manuscript not being
made available to scholars for more detailed scrutiny.
Why are the invasions of Ava included in the historical
narratives of larger states like Ming dynasty China and Ava while
they are missing from the narratives of the smaller Shan states
subject to these states? (Hsenwi: Witthayasakphan, 2001b; Scott,
1900; Mong Mao: Witthayasakphan et al, 2001a; Mangrai, 1969, iiSBBR

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xiv; Scott, 1900, 216-217; from Elias, 1876; Mogaung: Mangrai,

1969, xviii-xxiv). Censorship or pressures on court historians to
self-censor might be one explanation. A chronicle celebration of a
Shan victory over the Burmese state of Ava would have been
offensive to later Burmese sovereigns after the restoration of
Burmese rule to Upper Burma in 1555. Of course this argument
only holds if Burmese sovereigns or members of the ruling elite
had access to these local texts.
Power relations between states sometimes determine the
inclusion or omission of events from historical narratives. This can
include overt censorship or pressure on historians to self-censor
texts to match state policy. Texts are sometimes edited or changed
to make them seem as if these polities and societies had long seen
themselves as part of or attached to Chinese polities
(Burmaresearch Forum, SOAS, University of London, 17 Aug
2005). The Shan chronicle of Mong Mao that has been used in this
paper was, in fact, initially a translation from Shan to Chinese
(Kazhangjia, 1990) and then a translation from Chinese into
central Thai for a readership in Thailand (Witthayasakphan et al,
2001a), providing one example of how, if there was a powerlegitimizing change to a historical narrative, it could be unwarily
disseminated. The practice of including the original manuscript
source of translations, as Mangrai (1981) did, would ensure that
the historical narratives of smaller less powerful states do not
disappear into the oblivion of larger state nationalist rhetorics.
Successive redactions and translations of texts run the risk of
introducing cumulative errors as Pullum (1989) clearly
demonstrates.
The authors of Tai chronicles have likely always felt political
pressures during the compilation and writing of their chronicles
that changed when their overlord changed. For example, truthful
but negative depictions of warfare and devastation under a
Burmese overlord were much more common during and after the
Chakri conquest of Lan Na than they were in the period
immediately after the imposition of Burmese hegemony in 1558
(Wyatt and Wichienkeeo, 1995). Does this mean that warfare circa
1558 had less bloodshed? Probably not (see Charney, 2004, 1722). Negative references to a powerful overlord would have risked
offending the overlord and might even have been considered an act
of rebellion. Versions of the earlier Chiangmai chronicle narrative
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1173

were actually translated into Burmese and kept at the Burmese

capital as the Zinme Yazawin for Burmese ruling elite to glean
information from regarding court and administrative traditions at
Chiangmai (Sithu Gamani Thingyan, 2003, i-ii, 53-67).
Long periods of unexplained silence also seem to increase as
a chronicle becomes more local, silence (or erasure) being a
particular easy form of self-censorship to implement. Compare the
continuity of the Burmese chronicle with the long hiatuses of the
Chiangmai chronicle under Burmese rule after 1558. Traditions of
critical textual analysis in philology (see Warring States Project,
2005) and anthropology (see Scott, 1990) provide new perspectives
on how to deal with these textual silences and censorships. In
explaining the "silence of the evidence" Brooks (2005b) notes that
"there are various reasons, other than literal nonexistence, why
some item of culture is not, or seems not to be, mentioned in the
texts of the time, a "cultural taboo" being one such reason. Brooks
provides an example from the Chinese Warring States period that
bears some similarity to the invasion of Ava omission:
Non-Chinese peoples are mentioned occasionally in texts of
the 14th century, but after a certain point, such mentions
cease. The point where such mentions stop is probably the
point at which hostilities escalate between the Chinese and a
new coalition of steppe peoples to the north. The existence of
a society comparably organized but adversatively disposed
was a fact which the Chinese worldview could not readily
accommodate (Brooks, 2005b).
Many open questions about the origin, evolution, and strength of
the Shan confederation remain. It may even be the case, as it was
in the case of the Three Shan Brothers, that the Shan coalition
never actually did exist, at least as the Burmese chronicle portrays
it (Aung-Thwin, 1996). There is the question of when Hsipaw the
former ally of Ava joined the Shan confederation and whether there
were any states that didnt join the confederation. Hsenwis
absence from the 1542 list of states in the Shan confederation is
noteworthy. Even though frontiers were ill-defined in the premodern period, states can be roughly divided as being on one or
both sides of the frontier. Along an axis stretching from Avas
capital into Yunnan, Hsipaw lied on the Burmese side and Hsenwi
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lied on the Chinese side. Hsipaw was a close and reliable ally of
Ava according to Burmese sources. Hsenwi was early recognized as
an autonomous ethnic region [An Fusi = Pacification Office] by the
Ming Dynasty in 1404 and was a frequent participant in inter-state
conflicts along the Shan-Chinese frontier recorded by Chinese
sources (SLC 2000, 79; Liew Foon Ming, 2003, 152). After
Bayinnaungs conquest around 1557 Hsenwi would permanently
move to the Burmese side of the frontier. As weve seen Mong Yang
seems to have been poised ambiguously on both sides of the
frontier alternatively entering into the Chinese and Burmese
political spheres of control, but like Hsenwi permanently moving to
the Burmese side after Bayinnaungs conquest around 1557.
What exactly the systematic presence or absence of
references to a state means in the historical records of a given
state means is not clear. It could indicate regular relations between
states or the extent of military intelligence regarding events on the
other side of the frontier. The absence of references to Hsipaw in
Chinese sources and Hsenwi references in Burmese sources seems
to indicate that relations as well as military intelligence were
limited at least after the Ming conquest. The question also arises of
why Mong Mit and not Hsenwi is mentioned by the Burmese
chronicle as a member of the Shan coalition in the 1540s?
Although Mong Mit started off as part of Hsenwi, it eventually
challenged its overlord and was recognized by the Chinese as a
separate autonomous ethnic region in 1584. If Tho-han-bwa who
ruled Ava after 1527 was in fact from Mong Mit, Mong Mit may well
have eclipsed Hsenwi in importance by then and swallowed it up
as Chinese sources describe it.
All told, the question of a Shan alliance during the invasion
of 1524-1527 and a confederation afterwards raises more
questions than it answers. The Burmese chronicle has a heavy
ideological overlay during this period due to the politically-sensitive
nature of Shan rule which throws suspicion over many of its
interpretations. Ming Chinas knowledge of political events does
not seem to have penetrated very far beyond the Shan-Chinese
frontier. In the absence of additional independent primary sources,
only tentative speculations can be made. As Aung-Thwin (1998)
has shown with the myth of the Three Shan Brothers there is
always the danger that historical speculation based on thin
evidence is mistaken for historical fact.
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1175

The End of the Shan Confederation (1554-1557)

Perhaps the greatest amount of information about the Shan
confederation comes from the events surrounding its demise. In
1555 having re-established the kingdom of his predecessor
Tabinshweihti, Bayinnaung marched north to re-conquer Upper
Burma. When the king of Ava learned of this, he called the Shan
states of Hsipaw, Bhamo, Mogaung, and Mong Yang to come to his
aid. The governors of the northern garrison towns of Myedu,
Ngarane, Si-bok-taya, Sitha, Tabayin, and Kani were ordered to
move south and garrison the town of Amyin near the confluence of
the Irrawaddy and Chindwin rivers. On Avas southern approaches
forces Yamethin, Wati, Yindaw, Hlaingdet, Nyaungyan, Tagara,
Pindale, and Pyinsi together with Shan fighting boats were ordered
to put up a defense from the port town of Tayot on the Irrawaddy,
but quickly fled upon Bayinnaungs approach (UKII: 244).
Advancing on Ava, Bayinnaung repulsed a Shan cavalry attack and
marched on to Sagaing near the capital of Ava. The governor of
Sagaing is said to have fled to Mong Yang, perhaps indicating that
the governor was of Shan ethnicity (UKII:246).
The walled capital of Ava fell quickly to Bayinnaungs
onslaught. Events in the Shan state of Hsipaw show the state of
chaos following the fall of Ava and how deeply Shan rule had
penetrated Upper Burma. Hsipaw was ruled by a sawbwa named
Paw also known as Hkon-maing-kyi (King of Ava 1543-46). Paws
son ruled over the town of Singu in Upper Burma on the Irrawaddy
south of Pagan. When Paws son heard that Ava had fallen, he
retreated to the walls of Singu, strengthening his defenses, but was
quickly defeated by a special expedition sent by Bayinnaung
(UKII:249). Paws son fled back to Hsipaw. Paw gave his son the
Shan state of Mong Nai to the south to rule over. Paw died in 1556
(BE 918) and his younger brother Sa-hsain-loun, who was resident
in Hsipaw at the time, became ruler of Hsipaw. When Paws son
heard about this in Mong Nai, he gathered together an army,
marched to Hsipaw, and attacked the city. Sa-hsain-loun sent gifts
to Bayinnaung requesting his help, but sawbwa Paws son
managed to overcome Hsipaws defenses. The town was taken and
Sa-hsain-loun was killed (UKII:257)
Again indicating how difficult it must have been to muster
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ADDENDUM

together troops from the remote north for the defense of the
southern borders of Shan Ava, several of the Shan states were late
in arriving to Avas defense as they had been at Prome (1542). The
Hsipaw sawbwa is said to have arrived after the fall of Ava
(UKII:248). At the time Ava fell to Bayinnaungs forces, three of
Shan states, Mogaung, Mohnyin, and Kalei, were marching
towards Ava to provide aid. When they learned of the defeat at the
town of Tawatein in the Shan states they halted and encamped
there (UKII:250).
Bayinnaung followed up his victory at Ava with a short
campaign into the southern Shan states to attack the Shans that
were coming to Avas aid. Mogaung, Mohnyin, and Kalei fled to
Myedu after a short battle, but the governors of Pakan, Si-boktaya, and Tabayin (brother-in-law of the Mong Yang ruler) all
surrendered. The governor of Wuntho (nephew of the Mong Yang
sawbwa) was appointed to resist from the village Ta-se along the
route to Myedu. The Burmese forces first overcame the forces at
Ta-se and pursued them all the way to Myedu where they routed
the combined forces of Mogaung, Mohnyin, and Kalei (UKII:251).
As the rainy season was quickly approaching which make
transportation in the northern reaches of the Shan Realm
extremely difficult, Bayinnaung decided against following up his
recent victory with an attack on the centers of the Shan states
themselves to the north. Bayinnaung appointed new Burmese
governors for the important northern garrison towns of Myedu and
Si-bok-taya. In acts of munificence Bayinnaung awarded the
governors who had just submitted to him appanages to rule over.
Pakangyi was given to the governor of Tabayin, brother in law of
the Mohnyin sawbwa, and Badon was given to the governor of Sibok-taya, nephew of Mohnyin sawbwa. The governors of Kani and
Amyin were reinstated. Here the chronicle once again stresses an
early submission is rewarded with reinstatement of the ruler,
pointing perhaps to a didactic function of the chronicle directed at
sons of tributary rulers resident at the Burmese capital and future
Burmese generals on campaign. To what extent this practice was a
rhetorical creation rather than historical reality can only be
determined by further independent sources. Finally, on the march
back to Ava several small states and towns were subjugated
including
San-pe-nago (Bhamo), Kyan-nyut, Tagaung, Kyuntaung, Myat-taung, and Hti-kyaing (UKII:252).
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1177

In 1557, after having spent the rainy season in the southern

capital of Pegu, Bayinnaung broached the subject of further
expeditions into the Shan realm to his ministers. The minister
Banyadala argued that the usurpation of the throne at Hsipaw by
Paws son was so serious and the Shan states so strong that just
appointing the kings younger brother, sons, generals, and
ministers to be leaders of the expedition would not be good
enough, the king himself would have to lead the expedition. Only
when the king accompanied the expedition would all his younger
brothers, sons, generals, and ministers lay down their down lives.
After conquering Hsipaw, Mong Mit, Bhamo, Mogaung, Mong Yang,
and Kale would quickly follow. The lesson being conveyed here by
the Burmese chronicle is that the risk of bloodshed is necessary to
military success. To what extent warfare actually involved
bloodshed in battles is something that only independent sources or
archaeological evidence can determine.
Marching to the north, Bayinnaung passed through Pagan
and when he reached the port of Tayot-myo on the Irrawaddy two
local governors offered to help him catch the ruler of Mong Yang,
also at that time ruling over Wun-tho. These were the two
governors that Bayinnaung had appointed during his last
campaign in the north, the governor of Tabayin who was the
brother-in-law of the Mong Yang sawbwa and the governor of Sibok-taya and Badon. While Bayinnaung resided for a time at Ava,
the Hsipaw ruler, who he had appointed on last expedition to the
north, and the ruler of Thon-hse came and submitted to the king
(UKII:260).
In due time a military expedition left Ava headed for Mong
Mit, Hsipaw, and Mong Yang marching along three paths. One
division marching along the path of Kin-taya-ngan, another from
Thon-hse to Mong Mit passing besides Mong Yang, and the third,
with Bayinnaung himself leading it, marched along the west bank
of the Irrawaddy until it reached Bhamo. At Bhamo they built a
bridge for the elephants and horses to cross over the Irrawaddy
river and from Bhamo they marched on to Mong Mit. Before
arriving in Mong Mit the Shans launched an attack. After an initial
Shan success, the Burmese defeated the Mong Mit forces and the
Mong Mit ruler fled to Hsipaw pursued by Burmese forces
(UKII:261). Another Burmese column attacking Hsipaw was
initially overwhelmed by the Shans, but after what by chronicle
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ADDENDUM

standards was a fairly lengthy battle Hsipaw was defeated and

taken. While Bayinnaung resided in Mong Mit, the so-called Mong
Mit united army composed of the governors of Mo-la, Mo-wan, and
Saga-taung came to submit to the Burmese with gifts and an oath
of loyalty (UKII:262).
The Mong Mit sawbwa fled by elephant and horse taking
with him all his sons and wives to join forces with the Hsipaw
sawbwa, but when he reached a place called Pan-nya he learned of
Hsipaws defeat and remained there. The Burmese eventually
found him and, after a short resistance, the Mong Mit sawbwa
surrendered. Mong Mit was given to the Hsipaw sawbwas
grandson, the governor of Maing-lon, to govern. He was given a
seal to govern Mong Mit with because he came to submit himself.
He was also given back his sons, wives, father-in-law, and motherin-law from Hanthawaddy who had all been captured when Singu,
ruled by Paws son, was taken. They were ordered to pay tax every
year in the form of rubies, gold, silver, sheep, musk deer, and
horses. Hsipaw was given to the governor of Thonse to govern
together with the seal of the kings right hand and all the equipage
required by a sawbwa. Bayinnaung then called all the divisions of
his expeditionary forces to meet together at Mong Mit (UKII:263).
After the victories at Hsipaw and Mong Mit, Bayinnaung
instituted reforms in the Shan religion to bring it into conformity
with Burmese practice. The narrative of the Burmese chronicle
does not state whether these Shan states were practicing
Buddhism or not and this remains an open question (Daniels,
2000, 74-80). In 1555 a similar sort of religious reform or
purification had even been carried out at Pagan in the Burmese
heartland to rid the area of spirit worship and animal sacrifice at
Mount Popa (UKII:254). In Hsipaw and Mong Mit and almost the
whole Shan states there were said to have been wrong practices
[Meik-sa-deik-ti] like killing the elephant and horse ridden by the
sawbwa and the slaves loved and highly valued by him and
burying them together with the dead sawbwa. When Bayinnaung
learned of these practices, he had them stopped. Since there were
no learning centers for Buddhism, he built one pagoda in Hsipaw
and another one in Mong Mit and made offerings of land,
materials, and supplies to support them. In Mong Mit he built a
temple that was surrounded by ten small buildings to teach
Buddhism in. Here they asked monks and virtuous persons who
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1179

were well-versed in Pali Athakata (commentary on the original Pali

text composed by the Rahandas) and Nika (supplementary to the
inspired commentary of the Rohandas) to stay there. Starting from
the sawbwa, all of the Shan generals, ministers, and leaders had to
undergo instruction in Buddhism regarding the five duties binding
on all creatures, the five great commands, and the eight duties
that are to be performed by all people on days of worship. They
underwent three to four months of training. They kept half of the
Buddhist scriptures in Hsipaw and half in Mong Mit. The leaders of
the soldiers had to warn the people in both the towns and villages
to undergo instruction about religion for from three to four
months. As regards to the usage of measures such as one tin
(basket), kwe half a basket, hseit quarter of a basket and
measures such as tsaroot a measure of capacity equal to two
Pyees, and weights such as mu, pe, kyat, ta-se, viss, etc.
all these had to made to conform to the standards of the capital
(UKII:264). Bayinnaung sent the Hsipaw and Mong Mit rulers with
all their families to the capital Pegu in the south.
After putting affairs in order at Hsipaw and Mong Mit, even
though the rainy season was fast approaching, Bayinnaung and
his ministers decided to march north to Mong Yang and Mogaung
rather than south to Mong Nai and Yawnghwe (Nyaungshwe).
Mong Yang and Mogaung were chosen first for they had caused a
lot of trouble and destruction upon the whole northern part of
Burma. Mong Yang had once conquered and occupied the throne
of Ava and had been engaged in warfare with the Chinese for
twelve years (i.e. The Luchuan-Pingmian Campaigns, 1436-1449)
(UKII:265).
Early in 1556 (BE 918) Bayinnaung marched north from
Mong Mit. When they arrived to the place called Ti-kyit they built a
pontoon bridge for elephants, horses, buffaloes, bulls, cows,
soldiers, and their leaders to cross over the river. When they heard
of the Burmese approach, the Mong Yang and Mogaung rulers
gathered together their forces and hid in the forest to the north of
Mong Yang building stockades there to resist the Burmese from.
The Burmese quickly overcame these Mong Yang defenses and
encamped near the town called Maing-naut. Shortly afterwards,
the Mogaung sawbwa is said to have betrayed the Mong Yang
sawbwa, handing him over to the Burmese and blaming their
collective resistance on his stubbornness. Bayinnaung is said to
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ADDENDUM

have forgiven both of them. The Mogaung sawbwa was given back
his own town together with the right hand seal of the king. The
king took away two sons, one daughter, one nephew, and one niece
of the Mogaung sawbwa to be with him always. They were ordered
to pay annual taxes like gold, silver, amber, sheep, musk deer,
satin, Tibetan bulls, and horses. Mong Yang was given to the
governor of Tabayin named Zaloun who had joined with
Bayinnaung in the south and who had provided help in capturing
Mong Yang and Mogaung. He was given the full regalia of a
sawbwa and his son and daughter had to remain with the king. Inkind taxes consisting of gold, silver, sheep, musk deer, ducks,
horses, and saddle clothes had to be given annually when
magistrates sent by the king came to collect them. The sawbwa of
Mong Yang, after taking an oath that he would remain faithful to
the king, was given the town called Nun-sein-kan-meit to govern.
By naming the son of the Mong Yang sawbwa Mo-lon, he was
given Tabayin to govern. One of his sons and one of his daughters
was to remain with the king always (UKII:266).
As he had done in Hsipaw and Mong Mit, Bayinnaung
instituted religious reforms in Mong Yang and Mogaung to bring
Shan religious practice into conformity with Burmese practice.
They also asked monks knowledgeable in Gandadurat
(Wipanadurat or Wipatana, a kind of wisdom which enables the
possessor to make extraordinary discoveries Judsons Dictionary)
to reside there and teach Buddhism. By copying Buddhist scripts
(Pali Athakata) they kept one copy in Mogaung and another in
Mohnyin. As regards to measuring and weighing, they instituted
the standards used in the Burmese capital. In 1557 (BE 919)
Bayinnaung marched back to Ava and after staying there for seven
days he marched southwards to the capital at Pegu (UKII:267).
Re: Ming Shi-lu 10 November 1528
The Ming Annals entry for November 10, 1528 is both an intriguing
and confusing primary source document for the early sixteenth
century that warrants further scrutiny. References to the Shan
states and Ava hint at significant political developments, but a
close analysis of the entry shows that the events referred to were
spread over several years, sometimes decades before 1528. The
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1181

entry even begins with a statement to this effect: the native

yiwrangled and fought feuds among themselves. This went on for
years
References to kings of Ava show that the Chinese court was
looking at Burmese history on a quite a different time-scale than
that of the actual events: the grandfather of the Ava-Burma
royal family member Mang Qi-Sui was extremely loyal, but he
became involved in disputes and thereby met his death, and later,
Mang Qi-sui is to be shown great compassion and assistance. He
and Si Zhen are both permitted to inherit their respective posts
(MSL Nov 10, 1528). Mang Qi-sui is a transliteration into
Chinese of Min-gyi-shwe (literally: great-king-gold) referring to
the king of Ava Shwe-nan-kyaw-shin Narapati or Narapati II (15021527), taking the first syllable from his title. Although this Ming
Annals entry is dated 1528 and Narapati became king of Ava
in1502 and actually died in 1527, the recognition of a ruler by
Ming China did not have to be anywhere near when he assumed
the ruling post, particularly when links were so infrequent (Wade,
personal communication, 22 Sep 2005). As for the reference to
Narapati IIs grandfather, grandfather in the original Chinese can
actually refer also to great-grandfather or even great-greatgrandfather (Wade, personal communication, 22 Sep 2005). Avas
succession had since Narapati I (r. 1442-68) been lineal father to
son, but Narapati I had inherited the throne from his brother
(Harvey, p. 366). Tin Hla Thaw (1959, 151) reconstructs this
genealogy from inscriptional evidence. Given these facts, the
reference to Narapati IIs grandfather could refer to either Narapati
I or Thihathura (r. 1468-82). Of these two kings Narapati was the
king who had extensive relations with the Chinese during the
Luchuan-Pingmian Campaigns (1436-1449). Evidence for close
relations between Narapati I and Ming China 75 years before this
entry in the 1440s exists in Chinese sources (Liew Foon Ming,
1998, 198; Ward, 2004, 16), the Burmese chronicle (UKII:82), and
Burmese inscriptions (Tin Hla Thaw, 1959), so Ming court
references to the grandfather as being extremely loyal are
probably references to Narapati I, the great-grandfather of Narapati
II. The comment that he became involved in disputes and thereby
met his death most probably refers to the circumstances
surrounding his death which had nothing to do with Shan or
Chinese political relations at all. Narapati died as the result of a
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complicated domestic quarrel at the court of Ava which is related

in great detail by the Burmese chronicle (UKII: 90-93). So to
summarize, MSL Nov 10 1528 takes a different more large-scale
view of Burmese history mixing recent events with events that
occurred 75 years ago in a sort of timeless past.
Additional References:
Aung-Thwin, Michael (1996) The Myth of the Three Shan
Brothers and the Ava Period in Burmese History, The
Journal of Asian Studies 55.4 (Nov., 1996): 881-901.
Daniels, Christian (2003) Consolidation and Restructure; Tai
Polities and Agricultural Technology in Northern Continental
Southeast Asia during the 15th Century, Workshop on
Southeast Asia in the 15th Century: The Ming Factor, 18-19
July 2003, Singapore.
Daniels, Christian (forthcoming) "Historical Memories of a Chinese
Adventurer in a Tay Chronicle; Usurping the throne of a Tay
Polity in Yunnan, 1573-1584," International Journal of Asian
Studies.
Ferguson, R. Brian, and Neil L. Whitehead, eds. 1999. War in the
Tribal Zone: Expanding States and Indigenous Warfare.
School of American Research Press.
Haas, Jonathan (no date) Warfare and the Evolution of Culture
(Online)
Jiang Yingliang (1980) Baiyi zhuan jiaozhu
[A collated and
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