Rubi, et. al. vs.

Provincial Board of Mindoro

GR 14078, 7 March 1919
En Banc, Malcolm (J): 3 concur
<Nature of the case: application for habeas corpus>
Doctrine: Substantive Due Process
Facts: On 1 February 1917, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted
Resolution 25 creating a reservation/permanent settlement for Mangyans
(Mangyanes) in an 800-hectare public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan
Lake, and resolving that Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on the
reservation provided that said homestead applications be previously
recommended by the provincial governor <they base this right on section
2077 of the Administrative Code>. On 21 February 1917, the Secretary of
Interior approved Resolution 25. On 4 December 1917, the provincial
governor of Mindoro issued Executive Order 2 <this one was based on
section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code> which directed all
Mangyans in the vicinities of the townships of Naujan and Pola and the
Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan
and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao,
Naujan Lake, not later than 31 December 1917, and penalizing any Mangyan
who refused to comply with the order with imprisonment of not exceeding 60
days, in accordance with section 2759 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwellings within the
reservation of Tigbao and are prosecuted in accordance with section 2759 of
the revised Administrative Code. On the other hand, Doroteo Dabalos was
detained by the sheriff of Mindoro by virtue of the provisions of Articles 2145
and 2759 of Act 2711, for having run away from the reservation. Rubi and
other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro applied for writs of habeas
corpus, alleging that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their
liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Counsel for petitioner
argues that the law which segregates non-Christians "constitutes an attempt
by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their
religious beliefs, and is, consequently, unconstitutional.
<N.B.:
1. the Court traced the genealogy of sec. 2145 of the revised Administrative
Code and concluded that it is not new to Phil law.
2. the word non-Christians as used in the Administrative Code is also found
in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands, even before the
acquisition of the Phil by the US (through the decrees during the Spanish
time), to the organic law passed by the Americans which likened the

uncivilized tribes to the North American Indians, to the Acts of Congress

which recognized a dividing line between the territory not inhabited by Moros
or other non-Christian tribes, acts of the Philippine Commission and
legislature.
3. word "non-Christian," was not given its literal meaning, which would result
in giving to it a religious signification. Neither is it based on geographical
conception but is predicated on the civilization or lack of civilization of the
inhabitants. The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to
degree of civilization, is substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial, and
executive authority. It refers to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low
grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled
communities.
4. the methods followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands in its
dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be
practically identical with that followed by the United States Government in its
dealings with the Indian tribes.>
Issue: Whether due process was followed in the restraint of the Manguianes
liberty, either on their confinement in reservations and/or imprisonment due
to violation of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code.
Held: We hold that the term "non-Christian" (based on long continued
meaning given to a common expression) refers to natives of the Philippines
Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals an
account of religious differences.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of
law. The meaning of "due process of law" is that "every citizen shall hold his
life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general
rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," a judicial
proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and
notice are not requisite, a rule which is especially true where much must be
left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to
particular cases. Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of
liberty. Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned
by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative
power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these
principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law. Due
process of law means simply that "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in
harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the
Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third,
that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure

prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the
state or to all of a class."
What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the
subject-matter and necessities of the situation. The pledge that no person
shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute
which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable
basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature. Herein, one cannot hold that
the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own
good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due
process of law and equal protection of the laws. There exists a law; the law
seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class. Action pursuant to
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his
liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance
with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We
are further of the opinion that Section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a
legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian
policy of the United States. Rubi and the other Manguianes are not unlawfully
imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not
issue.
<sub-issue: Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute
an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to a
provincial official and a department head, therefore making it
unconstitutional? No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority
upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and
the provincial board. In determining whether the delegation of legislative
power is valid or not, the distinction is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no
valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature
to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of
executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has
committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The
growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of
the case. In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the
Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval
of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as
to the execution of the law. This is necessary since the provincial governor

and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are
better qualified to judge when such as course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order. As officials charged with the administration of the
province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select
sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who
have the misfortune of being in a backward state. Hence, Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power
by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.>

Ople v. Torres
GR 127685, 23 July 1998
Doctrine: Void for Vagueness/Overbreadth
En Banc, Puno (J) : 2 concur, 1 concurs in result
Facts: On 12 December 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order 308,
entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System." A.O.
308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and
foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social
security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if
not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking
basic services. Section 4 thereof provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN)
generated by the NSO as a common reference number to establish a linkage among
concerned agencies through the use of Biometrics Technology and computer
application designs.
On 24 January 1997, Senator Blas F. Ople, as a Senator, taxpayer and member of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), filed instant petition against then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as
members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee are charged with the
implementation of Administrative Order 308.
<petitioner>it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and it impermissibly
intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
Issue: Whether the Philippine President can issue an Administrative Order for the
adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System, independent of a
legislative act.
Held: Administrative Order 308 establishes a system of identification that is allencompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign
resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy. Such a system requires a
delicate adjustment of various contending state policies: the primacy of national security,

the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of

policies, etc. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of
our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power
of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be
evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law. The Order is a law,
negating claims that it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and
creates no office. Under it, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies
delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No
citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with
government. It is thus clear that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising
his rights and enjoying his privileges. Administrative Order 308 does not merely
implement the Administrative Code of 1987, but establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. An administrative order is an ordinance
issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The authority to prescribe
rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws. AO 308 was
beyond the power of the President to issue.
Taada v. Tuvera
GR L-63915, 29 December 1986
Doctrine: Publication Requirement
Resolution En Banc, Cruz (J) : 8 concur
Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern
(Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Taada,
Abraham F. Sarmiento, and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood,
Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. [MABINI] sought a writ of mandamus to compel
Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
Hon. Joaquin Venus, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President, Melquiades P. De La Cruz, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang
Records Office, and Florendo S. Pablo, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders. On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication

to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of

general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force
and effect. The decision was concurred only by 3 justices. Tanada, et. al.
moved for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions.
They suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete
publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette. The Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory
opinion. Meanwhile, the February EDSA Revolution took place, which
subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the
issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court).
Issue: Whether laws should be published in full and in the Official Gazette
only.
Held: Omission of publication would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. It is not
unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they
would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because
they did not know of its existence. Publication is required, even if their
enactment is otherwise provided or effective immediately. The term "laws"
should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some
that do not apply to them directly. To be valid, the law must invariably affect
the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever
the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the
Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of
enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation;
(4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5)
Monetary Board circulars to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce. Publication requirements does not apply to
(1) interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, i.e.
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public;
(2) Letters of Instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties; and (3) instructions of Ministry heads on case studies. Further,
publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. It should be published in the
Official Gazette and not elsewhere. Even if newspapers of general circulation

could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as
such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and
come out regularly, this kind of publication is not the one required or
authorized by existing law.

Anzaldo v. Clave
GR L-54597 (15 December 1982)
Doctrine: Impartial Court or Tribunal
Second Division, Aquino (J); 4 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part
Facts: In 1974, the position of Science Research Supervisor II (Medical
Research Department) became vacant when the incumbent, Dr. Kintanar,
became Director of the Biological Research Center of the National Institute of
Science and Technology (NIST). Dr. Anzaldo and Dr. Venzon were both next-inrank to the vacant position, both holding positions of Scientist Research
Associate IV. Dr. Anzaldo finished BS Pharmacy (1950, College of Pharmacy,
UP), and MS Pharmacy (1962, CEU), Doctor of Pharmacy (1965, CEU). Aside
from her civil service eligibility as a pharmacist, she is a registered medical
technologist and supervisor (unassembled). She started working in the NIST
in 1954 and has served for 28 years. On the other hand, Dr. Venzon finished
Medicine (1957, UST). She started working in the NIST in 1960 and has
served for 21 years.
Dr. Anzaldo is senior to her in point of service. Dr. Quintin Kintanar
recommended Dr. Venzon for the position. Dr. Anzaldo protested against such
recommendation, to which the NIST Reorganization Committee found such
protest to be valid and meritorious. Due to the impasse, the NIST
Commissioner, however, did not resolve the issue. The position was not filled
up. Dr. Pedro Afable, Vice Chairman, later became OIC of the NIST. He
appointed Dr. Anzaldo to the position effective 4 January 1978, after thorough
study and screening of the qualifications of both doctors and upon
recommendation of the NIST Staff Evaluation (88-61 votes).
The Civil Service Commission approved the appointment. Dr. Venzon
appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines (addressed to
Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo Clave, who was concurrently the
Chairman of the CSC). The appeal was forwarded to the NIS OIC Jose P.
Planas, who reiterated Dr. Afables decision. The appeal-protest was later sent
to the CSC. CSC Chairman Clave and Commissioner Jose A. Melo
recommended In Resolution 1178 dated 23 August 1979 that Dr. Venzon be
appointed to the position, in conflict with the 1978 appointment of Dr.

Anzaldo which was duly attested and approved by the CSC. The Resolution
was made in pursuance to Section 19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines (PD 807, 6 October 1975), which provides that "before deciding a
contested appointment, the Office of the President shall consult the Civil
Service Commission." On 5 January 1980, after denial of her motion for the
reconsideration of the resolution, Dr. Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the
President of the Philippines.
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave in his decision of 20 March 1980
revoked Dr. Anzaldo's appointment and ruled that, "as recommended by the
Civil Service Commission" (meaning Chairman Clave himself and
Commissioner Melo), Dr. Venzon should be appointed to the contested
position but that Dr. Anzaldo's appointment to the said position should be
considered "valid and effective during the pendency" of Dr. Venzon's protest.
In a resolution dated 14 August 1980, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave
denied Dr. Anzaldo's motion for reconsideration. On 25 August 1980, Dr.
Anzaldo filed in the Supreme Court the special civil action of certiorari.
Issue: Whether CSC Commissioner Jacobo Clave can concur with the
recommendation of the Presidential Executive Assistant, who is himself, in the
appointment of Dr. Venzon.
Held: The 20 March 1980 decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave
implemented the 23 August 1979 Resolution (1178) of Clave (as CSC
Chairman), concurred with by Commissioner Melo, recommending the
appointment of Dr. Venzon as Science Research Supervisor II in place of Dr.
Anzaldo. When Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in his decision that
he was "inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service
Commission", what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman
Clave's recommendation: he was concurring with himself . It is evident that
Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive
Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of the
Civil Service Commission (See also Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court
of Appeals). Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in
the Civil Service Commission, who should be consulted by the Office of the
President, should be a person different from the person in the Office of the
President who would decide the appeal of the protestant in a contested
appointment.

Sheppard v. Maxwell
384 U.S. 333 (1966)
Doctrine: Prejudicial Publicity

<nature of case: habeas corpus>

Facts: Petitioner's wife was bludgeoned to death July 4, 1954. From the outset officials
focused suspicion on petitioner, who was arrested on charge of murder on July 30 and
indicted August 17. His trial began October 18 and terminated with his conviction
December 21, 1954. During the entire pretrial period, virulent and incriminating publicity
about petitioner and the murder made the case notorious, and the news media frequently
aired charges and countercharges besides those for which petitioner was tried. Three
months before trial, he was examined for more than five hours without counsel in a
televised three-day inquest conducted before an audience of several hundred spectators in
a gymnasium. Over three weeks before trial, the newspapers published the names and
addresses of prospective jurors causing them to receive letters and telephone calls about
the case. The trial began two weeks before a hotly contested election at which the chief
prosecutor and the trial judge were candidates for judgeships. Newsmen were allowed to
take over almost the entire small courtroom, hounding petitioner and most of the
participants. Twenty reporters were assigned seats by the court within the bar and in close
proximity to the jury and counsel, precluding privacy between petitioner and his counsel.
The movement of the reporters in the courtroom caused frequent confusion and disrupted
the trial, and, in the corridors and elsewhere in and around the courthouse, they were
allowed free rein by the trial judge. A broadcasting station was assigned space next to the
jury room. Before the jurors began deliberations they were not sequestered, and had
access to all news media, though the court made "suggestions" and "requests" that the
jurors not expose themselves to comment about the case. Though they were sequestered
during the five days and four nights of their deliberations, the jurors were allowed to
make inadequately supervised telephone calls during that period. Pervasive publicity was
given to the case throughout the trial, much of it involving incriminating matter not
introduced at the trial, and the jurors were thrust into the role of celebrities. At least some
of the publicity deluge reached the jurors. At the very inception of the proceedings and
later, the trial judge announced that neither he nor anyone else could restrict the
prejudicial news accounts. Despite his awareness of the excessive pretrial publicity, the
trial judge failed to take effective measures against the massive publicity, which
continued throughout the trial, or to take adequate steps to control the conduct of the trial.
The petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition contending that he did not receive a fair
trial. The District Court granted the writ. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Until the Coroner's inquest on July 22, at which time he was subpoenaed,
Sheppard made himself available for frequent and extended questioning
without the presence of an attorney.
>his refusal to submit to a lie detector test
>Sheppard was subpoenaed to a three-day inquest which was staged in a
gymnasium and attended by a swarm of reporters and it was broadcast. At
this point his counsel was present but was not allowed to participate. When
the chief counsel attempted to place some documents in the record, he was
forcibly ejected from the room by the Coroner, who received cheers, hugs,
and kisses from ladies in the audience. Sheppard was questioned for five and
one-half hours about his actions on the night of the and murder, his married
life, and a love affair with Susan Hayes.
The newspapers also delved into Sheppard's personal life. Articles stressed
his extramarital love affairs as a motive for the crime. The newspapers
portrayed Sheppard as a Lothario, fully explored his relationship with Susan
Hayes, and named a number of other women who were allegedly involved
with him.
>When Sheppard was arrested he was immediately arraigned -- having been
denied a temporary delay to secure the presence of counsel -- and bound
over to the grand jury.
Issue: Whether Sheppard was deprived of a fair trial in his state conviction for
the second-degree murder of his wife because of the trial judge's failure to
protect Sheppard sufficiently from the massive, pervasive and prejudicial
publicity that attended his prosecution.
Ruling: Sheppard did not receive a fair trial consistent with the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

While we cannot say that Sheppard was denied due process by the judge's refusal to take
precautions against the influence of pretrial publicity alone, the court's later rulings must
be considered against the setting in which the trial was held. In light of this background,
we believe that the arrangements made by the judge with the news media caused
Sheppard to be deprived of that "judicial serenity and calm to which [he] was entitled."
The carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have been avoided, since the
courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the court. As
we stressed in Estes, the presence of the press at judicial proceedings must
be limited when it is apparent that the accused might otherwise be
prejudiced or disadvantaged. Bearing in mind the massive pretrial publicity,
the judge should have adopted stricter rules governing the use of the

courtroom by newsmen, as Sheppard's counsel requested. The number of

reporters in the courtroom itself could have been limited at the first sign that
their presence would disrupt the trial. They certainly should not have been
placed inside the bar. Furthermore, the judge should have more closely
regulated the conduct of newsmen in the courtroom.
Secondly, the court should have insulated the witnesses from the press.
Thirdly, the court should have made some effort to control the release of
leads, information, and gossip to the press by police officers, witnesses, and
the counsel for both sides. Much of the information thus disclosed was
inaccurate, leading to groundless rumors and confusion. The prosecution
repeatedly made evidence available to the news media which was never
offered in the trial. Much of the "evidence" disseminated in this fashion was
clearly inadmissible. The exclusion of such evidence in court is rendered
meaningless when news media make it available to the public. More
specifically, the trial court might well have proscribed extrajudicial
statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged
prejudicial matters, such as the refusal of Sheppard to submit to interrogation
or take any lie detector tests.

From the cases coming here, we note that unfair and prejudicial news comment on
pending trials has become increasingly prevalent. Due process requires that the accused
receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. Given the pervasiveness
of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the
minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is
never weighed against the accused. And appellate tribunals have the duty to make an
independent evaluation of the circumstances. Of course, there is nothing that proscribes
the press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom. But where there is a
reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge
should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so
permeated with publicity. In addition, sequestration of the jury was something the judge
should have raised sua sponte with counsel. If publicity during the proceedings threatens
the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be ordered. But we must remember that
reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the
prejudice at its inception. The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will
protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors,
counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming
under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function.
Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a

criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable, and worthy of
disciplinary measures.
Since the state trial judge did not fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the inherently
prejudicial publicity which saturated the community and to control disruptive influences
in the courtroom, we must reverse the denial of the habeas petition. The case is remanded
to the District Court with instructions to issue the writ and order that Sheppard be
released from custody unless the State puts him to its charges again within a reasonable
time.
It is so ordered.

Webb v. de Leon [GR 121234, 23 August 1995]

also Gatchalian v. de Leon [GR 121245], and
Lejano v. de Leon [GR 121297]
Doctrine: Prejudicial Publicity
Second Division, Puno (J) : 2 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: This was a highly-publicized case (dubbed as Vizconde Massacre, and
involves a son of a Philippine Senator). On 19 June 1994, the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a lettercomplaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J.
Lejano and 6 other persons, with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith,
the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State
prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo to conduct the preliminary investigation of those
charged with the rape and killing on 30 June 1991 of Carmela Vizconde, her
mother and sister in their home in Paraaque. During the preliminary
investigation, the NBI presented the sworn statements of Maria Jessica Alfaro,
2 former housemaids of the Webb family, Carlos Cristobal (a plane
passenger), Lolita Birrer (live-in partner of Biong), 2 of Vizcondes maids,
Normal White (a security guard) and Manciano Gatmaitan (an engineer). The
NBI also submitted the autopsy report involving Estrellita (12 stab wounds),
Carmela (9 stab wounds), and Jennifer (19 stab wounds); and the genital
examination of Carmela confirming the presence of spermatozoa. The NBI
submitted photocopies of the documents requested by Webb in his Motion for
Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents, granted by the DOJ
Panel. Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not
commit the crime as he went to the United States on 1 March 1991 and

returned to the Philippines on 27 October 1992. The others Fernandez,

Gatchalian, Lejano, Estrada, Rodriguez and Biong submitted sworn
statements, responses, and a motion to dismiss denying their complicity in
the rape-killing of the Vizcondes. Only Filart and Ventura failed to file their
counter-affidavits though they were served with subpoena in their last known
address. On 8 August 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution
"finding probable cause to hold respondents for trial" and recommending that
an Information for rape with homicide be filed against Webb, et. al. On the
same date, it filed the corresponding Information against Webb, et. Al. with
the RTC Paraaque. Docketed as Criminal Case 95-404 and raffled to Branch
258 presided by Judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, Judge Raul de
Leon, pairing judge of Judge Escano, who issued the warrants of arrest
against Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited
himself from the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality
considering his employment with the NBI before his appointment to the
bench. The case was re-raffled to branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita
Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest against Webb, et. al. On 11
August 1995, Webb voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities at Camp
Ricardo Papa Sr., in Taguig. Webb, et. al. filed petitions for the issuance of the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application
for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction with the Supreme
Court to: (1) annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued against
petitioners by respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in
Criminal Case No. 95-404; (2) enjoin the respondents from conducting any
proceeding in the aforementioned criminal case; and (3) dismiss said criminal
case or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused therein. Gatchalian and
Lejano likewise gave themselves up to the authorities after filing their
petitions before the Court.
Issue: Whether the attendant publicity of the case deprived Webb, [Link], of
their right to fair trial.
Held: No. Pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Herein, however,
nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the
publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the
fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. The DOJ Panel is composed of an
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors; and their long
experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining
whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. At no
instance in the case did Webb, et. al. seek the disqualification of any member
of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity. Further, on the contention of the denial of their
constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial

investigation, records show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the
preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Webb, et. al. were given fair
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against them. Still, the Supreme
Court reminds a trial judge in high profile criminal cases of his/her duty to
control publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice. The ability to
dispense impartial justice is an issue in every trial and in every criminal
prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a silent accused. More than
convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the judiciary
is to assure fulfillment of the promise that justice shall be done and is done,
and that is the only way for the judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of
public opinion.
>SC ruled that the DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found
probable cause against the petitioners. A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
>Also ruled that alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by
a prosecution witness.
>no need for clarificatory questions since probable cause merely implies
probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner.
Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an
accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to
confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. In the
case at bar, the DOJ Panel correctly adjudged that enough evidence had been
adduced to establish probable cause and clarificatory hearing was
unnecessary.

>on the charge that respondent judge issued warrants of arrest against them without
conducting the required preliminary examination. the Constitution, the Rules of Court,
and our case law repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent judges should
have conducted "searching examination of witnesses" before issuing warrants of arrest
against them. They also reject petitioners' contention that a judge must first issue an order
of arrest before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law or rule requiring the issuance
of an Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of arrest.
In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page
report, the two (2) sworn statements of Alfaro and the sworn statements of
Carlos Cristobal and Lolita Birrer 35 as well as the counter-affidavits of the
petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking recital and analysis of the parties'
evidence made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied both judges that there is

probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners. Again, we

stress
that
before
issuing
warrants
of
arrest,
judges
merely
determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused.
In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the review process
cannot be measured by merely counting minutes and hours. The fact that it
took the respondent judges a few hours to review and affirm the probable
cause determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made no personal
evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case.

People v. Sanchez
GR 121039-45, 18 October 2001
Doctrine: Prejudicial Publicity
Resolution of First Division, Melo (J) : 3 concur
Facts: (The Sarmenta-Gomez rape-slay) On 28 June 1993, Luis and Rogelio
"Boy" Corcolon approached Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, forcibly took
the two and loaded them at the back of the latter's van, which was parked in
front of Caf Amalia, Agrix Complex, Los Banos, Laguna. George Medialdea,
Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit also boarded the van while Aurelio
Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan, who were also with the group, stayed in
the ambulance. Both vehicles then headed for Erais Farm situated in
Barangay Curba, which was owned by Mayor Antonio Sanchez of Calauan,
Laguna. The two youngsters were then brought inside the resthouse where
Eileen was taken to the Mayors room. Allan was badly beaten up and
thereafter thrown out of the resthouse. At around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, a
crying Eileen was dragged out of the resthouse by Luis and Medialdea her
hair disheveled, mouth covered by a handkerchief, hands still tied and
stripped of her shorts. Eileen and Allan were then loaded in the Tamaraw van
by Medialdea, et. al. and headed for Calauan, followed closely by the
ambulance. En route to Calauan, gunfire was heard from the van. The van
pulled over whereupon Kawit dragged Allan, whose head was already
drenched in blood, out of the vehicle onto the road and finished him off with a
single gunshot Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 17 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
from his armalite. The ambulance and van then sped away. Upon reaching a
sugarcane field in Sitio Paputok, Kilometro 74 of Barangay Mabacan, Eileen
was gang-raped by Luis Corcolon, Medialdea, Rogelio Corcolon, Ama, Brion
and Kawit. After Kawits turn, Luis Corcolon shot Eileen with his baby armalite.
Moments later, all 8 men boarded the ambulance and proceeded to Calauan,

leaving the Tamaraw van with Eileens remains behind. Initially, the crime was
attributed to one Kit Alqueza, a son of a feared general (Dictador Alqueza).
Luis and Rogelio Corcolon were also implicated therein. However, further
investigation, and forensic findings, pointed to the group of Mayor Sanchez.
Centeno and Malabanan bolstered the prosecution's theory. On 11 March
1995, Judge Harriet O. Demetriou of the Regional Trial Court (Pasig City,
Branch 70) found Mayor Sanchez, Medialdea, Ama, Brion, Luis Corcolon,
Rogelio Corcolon and Kawit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape with homicide, ordering them to pay Eileen Sarmenta the amount of
P50,000 and additionally, the amount of P700,000.00 to the heirs of Eileen
Sarmenta and Allan Gomez as additional indemnity. On 25 January 1999, the
Supreme Court, through Justice Martinez, affirmed in toto the judgment of
conviction rendered by the trial court. Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin
Brion and Pepito Kawit seasonably filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on 6
December 1999. Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and conviction by
publicity, besides claims that principal witness Centeno and Malabanan lack
credibility, that the testimony of his 13- year old daughter should have been
given full faith and credit, and that the gargantuan damages awarded have
no factual and legal bases. Ama, Brion and Kawit maintain that Centeno and
Malabanan were sufficiently impeached by their inconsistent statements
pertain to material and crucial points of the events at issue, besides that
independent and disinterested witnesses have destroyed the prosecutions
version of events. On 2 February 1999, Justice Martinez retired in accordance
with AM 99-8-09. The motions for reconsideration was assigned to Justice
Melo for study and preparation of the appropriate action on 18 September
2001.
Issue: Whether the publicity of the case impaired the impartiality of the judge
handling the case.
Ruling: Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused
to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of Mayor Sanchez, et. al., was given a
day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. The right
of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible
reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial. The press does not
simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of
justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Our judges are learned in the law and
trained to disregard off-court evidence and on camera performances of
parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity
stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. To warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have

been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity. Records herein do not

show that the trial judge developed actual bias against Mayor Sanchez, et.
al., as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and
trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that
the trial judge acquired a fixed position as a result of prejudicial publicity
which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial.
Mayor Sanchez, et. al., has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has
not discharged the burden.

Justice Secretary v. Lantion

GR 139465, 17 October 2000
Doctrine: Notice and Hearing
Resolution En Banc, Puno (J): 6 concur, 1 dissents, 1 concurs based on prior
opinion, 1 concurs in result
Facts: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of
Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". On 13 November
1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the
"Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. "The Senate,
by way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said
treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting
Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents
accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal
diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the
Requesting State). On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from
the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a
request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to
the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued
by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting
documents for said extradition. Jimenez was charged in the United States for
violation of (a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the
United States, 2 counts), (b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4
counts), (c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts), (d) 18
USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and (E) 2 USC 441f (Election
contributions in name of another; 33 counts). On the same day, the Secretary
issued Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a panel of
attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the
aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999) requested copies

of the official extradition request from the US Government, as well as all

documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time
to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the
requested papers. The Secretary denied the request. On 6 August 1999,
Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to
furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to
afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request,
and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively);
certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretarys letter dated 13 July 1999); and
prohibition (to restrain the Justice Secretary from considering the extradition
request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any
act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary
filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000,
by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the
Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file
his comment with supporting evidence. On 3 February 2000, the Secretary
timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether Jimenez had the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of an extradition process.
Held: Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition
Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the
petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of
the petition for extradition in the extradition court (Section 6). It is of judicial
notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which will be
answered by the extraditee. There is no provision in the Treaty and in PD
1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from the Justice
Secretary copies of the extradition request from the US government and its
supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still
undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the DOJ, as well as the US government,
maintained that the Treaty and PD 1069 do not grant the extraditee a right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition process. It is
neither an international practice to afford a potential extraditee with a copy of
the extradition papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
extradition process evaluation stage. Further, as an extradition proceeding is
not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition

proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process

safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. The
procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin
with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action." The concept of due process is flexible for "not all
situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of
procedure." Thus, the temporary hold on Jimenez's privilege of notice and
hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive
him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his
extradition to the US. There is no denial of due process as long as
fundamental fairness is assured a party.

People v. Estrada
GR 130487, 19 June 2000
Doctrine: Notice and Hearing
En Banc, Puno (J): 13 concur, 1 on official leave
Facts: On 27 December 27, 1994, Roberto Estrada y Lopez sat at the bishops
chair while the sacrament of confirmation was being performed at the St.
Johns Cathedral, Dagupan City. Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the
cathedral, was summoned by some churchgoers. Mararac went near Estrada
and told him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Mararac twice tapped Estradas
hand with his nightstick. When Mararac was about to strike again, Estrada
drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting him
below his left throat. Mararac fell. Wounded and bleeding, Mararac slowly
dragged himself down the altar. SP01 Conrado Francisco received a report of
the commotion inside the cathedral, went inside the cathedral, approached
Estrada who was sitting on the chair, and advised the latter to drop his knife.
Estrada obeyed. However, when Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy
Police Chief, who was also at the confirmation rites, went near Estrada,
Estrada embraced Rosario and two wrestled with each other. Rosario was able
to subdue Estrada. Estrada was brought to the police station and placed in
jail. Maranac expired a few minutes after arrival at the hospital. On 29
December 1994, Estrada was charged with the crime of murder for the killing
of Mararac. On 6 January 1995, at the arraignment, the Public Attorney's
Office, filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit
Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital." It was alleged that
Estrada could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was
suffering from a mental defect; that before the commission of the crime, he
was confined at the psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio

City. The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu
proprio, propounded several questions on Estrada. Finding that the questions
were understood and answered by him "intelligently," the court denied the
motion that same day. The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty
was entered by the court on Estrada's behalf. On 23 June 1997, the trial court
(RTC Dagupan City, Branch 44, Criminal Case 94-00860-D) rendered a
decision upholding the prosecution evidence and found Estrada guilty of the
crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death, and ordered him to pay
P50,000 for indemnity, P18,870 for actual expenses, and P100,000 as moral
damages. Estradas counsel appealed.
Issue: Whether a mental examination of the accused should be made before
the accused may be subjected to trial.
Held: The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the
protection of the accused, rather than of the public. It has been held that it is
inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of God to make a just defense
for his life or liberty. To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict
and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial and
due process of law. Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure speaks of a "mental examination." An intelligent determination of
an accused's capacity for rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper
and more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen can
make through observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical or
psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of incompetency
be determined by the trial court. By depriving appellant of a mental
examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial. The
trial court's negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due
process; and for this reason, the proceedings before the said court must be
nullified.

Flores vs. Montemayor

G.R. No. 170146, August 25, 2010
HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, in his capacity as Senior Deputy Executive Secretary in
the Office of the President, HON. ARTHUR P. AUTEA, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Secretary in the Office of the President, and the PRESIDENTIAL ANTIGRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC),
Petitioners,
- versus ATTY. ANTONIO F. MONTEMAYOR,
Respondent.

<Doctrine: Opportunity to be Heard>

FACTS: Respondent Atty. Antonio Montemayor was appointed by the President
as Regional Director II of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Region IV,
in San Fernando, Pampanga.
On January 30, 2003, the Office of the President received a letter from a
concerned citizen relating Montemayors ostentatious lifestyle which is
apparently disproportionate to his income as a public official. The Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) conducted a fact-finding inquiry into the
matter and issued subpoenas duces tecum to concerned agencies and
obtained, among others, certified true copy of his Sworn Statement of Assets
and Liabilities (SSAL) for the years 1999-2002. The LTO furnished the PAGC
with a record of vehicles registered to Montemayor, to wit: a 2001 Ford
Expedition, a 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser, and a 1983 Mitsubishi Galant. The
PAGC noted that while Montemayor declared his ownership over several motor
vehicles in his 1999 and 2000 SSAL, he failed to do the same in his 2001 SSAL.
On the basis of the said documents, the PAGC issued a Formal Charge against
Montemayor for failure to declare the 2001 Ford Expedition with a value ranging
from 1.7 million to 1.9 million pesos, and the 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser with an
estimated value of 1 million to 1.2 million pesos in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL. On
the same date, the PAGC issued an Order directing Montemayor to file his
counter-affidavit or verified answer to the formal charge against him within ten
(10) days from the receipt of the Order. Montemayor, however, failed to submit
his counter-affidavit or verified answer to the formal charge lodged against him.
On June 4, 2003, during the preliminary conference, Montemayor, through
counsel, moved for the deferment of the administrative proceedings
explaining that he has filed a petition for certiorari before the CA questioning
the PAGCs jurisdiction to conduct the administrative investigation against
him. The PAGC denied Montemayors motion for lack of merit, and instead
gave him until June 9, 2003 to submit his counter-affidavit or verified
answer. Still, no answer was filed.
On June 23, 2003, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in CAG.R. SP No. 77285 enjoining the PAGC from proceeding with the investigation
for sixty (60) days. On September 12, 2003, shortly after the expiration of the
sixty (60)-day TRO, the PAGC issued a Resolution finding Montemayor
administratively liable as charged and recommending to the Office of the
President Montemayors dismissal from the service.
On March 23, 2004, the Office of the President, through Deputy Executive
Secretary Arthur P. Autea, issued a Decision adopting in toto the findings and

recommendation of the PAGC and found petitioner administratively liable as

charged and dismissed him from the service.
Montemayor sought reconsideration of the said decision. This time, he argued
that he was denied his right to due process when the PAGC proceeded to
investigate his case notwithstanding the pendency of his petition
for certiorari before the CA, and its subsequent elevation to the Supreme
Court. The motion was eventually denied.
Aggrieved, Montemayor brought the matter to the CA via a petition for
review. The CA in its assailed Decision ruled in favor of Montemayor. The CA
concluded that Montemayor was deprived of an opportunity to present
controverting evidence amounting to a brazen denial of his right to due
process.
Issue: Whether respondent was deprived of his right to due process when it
proceeded to investigate him on the basis of an anonymous complaint and
allegedly without an opportunity to present evidence in his defense.

Ruling: Section 4 (c) of EO No. 12 which created the PAGC gives it the power to
give due course to anonymous complaints against presidential appointees if
there appears on the face of the complaint OR based on the supporting
documents attached to the anonymous complaint a probable cause to engender
a belief that the allegations may be true. Because of the said provision, an
anonymous complaint may be given due course even if the same is without
supporting documents, so long as it appears from the face of the complaint that
there is probable cause.
We find nothing irregular with the PAGCs decision to proceed with its
investigation notwithstanding the pendency of Montemayors petition
for certiorari before the CA. The mere pendency of a special civil action
for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court
or an administrative body such as the PAGC, does not interrupt the course of
the latter where there is no writ of injunction restraining it.
The Court ruled against the CA when it said that there was an undue haste in
the PAGCs resolution which was barely a week after the lapse of the TRO, for
the following reasons:
1. presumption of regularity since it was done in the performance of its
duties;
2. <that he should be given a second opportunity to present
controverting evidence> does not hold water. The essence of due process in

administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one s side or an

opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to explain his side, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with.
Significantly, the records show that the PAGC gave Montemayor several
chances to present counter-affidavits or verified answers but the deadline
lapsed without any evidence being presented by Montemayor in his defense.
We stress that the PAGCs findings and recommendations remain as
recommendations until finally acted upon by the Office of the President.
Montemayor, therefore, had two (2) choices upon the issuance of the PAGC
resolution: to move for a reconsideration thereof, or to ask for another
opportunity before the Office of the President to present his side particularly
since the assailed resolution is merely recommendatory in nature. Having
failed to exercise any of these two (2) options, Montemayor cannot now be
allowed to seek recourse before this Court for the consequences of his own
shortcomings.
<later, administrative and criminal cases were filed against Montemayor in the
Ombudsman, and he argues that because of this the authority of the PAGC to
investigate him and the Office of the President to act on its recommendation
ceased. SC ruled otherwise, as the cases before the Ombudsman were
initiated after the Office of the President decided to dismiss Montemayor, and
the proceedings before the PAGC were already finished even prior to the
initiation and filing of cases against him by the Ombudsman>
As to the substantive aspect, the PAGCs recommendation to dismiss
Montemayor from government service is supported by substantial evidence. The
law requires that the SSAL be accomplished truthfully and in detail without
distinction as to how the property was acquired. Montemayor, therefore, cannot
escape liability by arguing that the ownership of the 2001 Ford Expedition has
not yet passed to him on the basis of a lame excuse that the said vehicle was
acquired only on installment basis sometime on July 3, 2001.
<Montemayor claimed that the value of the vehicle was included among the
machinery/equipment in his SSAL, but the Court found the worth of the vehicle
significantly higher than what he declared under machinery/equipment.>
Montemayors repeated and consistent failure to reflect truthfully and
adequately all his assets and liabilities in his SSAL betrays his claim of
innocence and good faith. Accordingly, we find that the penalty of dismissal
from government service, as sanctioned by Section 11 (a) and (b) of RA No.
6713, meted by the Office of the President against him, is proper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

<N.B. nature of the PAGC: created by virtue of EO No. 12, signed on April 16,
2001 to speedily address the problem on corruption and abuses committed in
the government, particularly by officials appointed by the President. It has the
power to investigate and hear administrative complaints provided (1) that the
official to be investigated must be a presidential appointee in the government
or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, and (2) that the said official must
be occupying the position of assistant regional director, or an equivalent rank,
or higher.>

PHILCOMSAT vs. Alcuaz

G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989
Doctrine: Exceptions to Notice and Hearing Requirements
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE
LUIS
A.
ALCUAZ,
as
NTC
Commissioner,
and
NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued
by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National
Telecommunications Commission which directs the provisional reduction of
the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of its
services by fifteen percent (15%) with the reservation to make further
reductions later, for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against
undue delegation of legislative power and a denial of procedural, as well as
substantive, due process of law.
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing international satellite
communications services.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514,
petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service
Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No.
196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction,
control and regulation of respondent NTC. Executive Order No. 546, on the
other hand, granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Respondents required
petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and
necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the
corresponding authority to charge rates therefor. PHILCOMSAT complied and
was given provisional authority to continue operating its existing facilities, to
render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then

charging. This authority was valid for 6 months and was renewed for another
6 months thereafter.
The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the provisional
authority of the petitioner for another six (6) months, counted from
September 16, 1988, but it directed the petitioner to charge modified
reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present
authorized rates. Respondent Commissioner ordered said reduction based on
an evaluation by the Rates Regulation Division of the Common Carriers
Authorization Department of the financial statements of applicant, that there
is merit in a REDUCTION in some of applicant's rates, subject to further
reductions, should the Commission finds (sic) in its further evaluation that
more reduction should be effected.
Petitioner is questioning the constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos. 546
and 196 on the ground that
1. the same do not fix a standard for the exercise of the power therein
conferred, thus, an undue delegation of legislative power
2. it violates procedural due process for having been issued motu proprio or
without prior notice and hearing; and (b) the rate reduction it imposes is
unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of
substantive due process. Petitioner argues that the function involved in the
rate fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasilegislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the absence thereof
results in a violation of due process.
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Ruling: We hold otherwise.

1. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only
upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in
making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power.
Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case,
establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established
in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard,
the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing
power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of
the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been
held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this
standard may be implied.
Under the provisions of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC in the exercise of its
rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest,

reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the
requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power.
2. Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised
by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the
function of the administrative agency is legislative, notice and hearing are not required,
but where an order applies to a named person, as in the instant case, the function involved
is adjudicatory. Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts obtaining the order in
question need not be preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued pursuant to
respondent NTC's legislative function but because the assailed order is merely
interlocutory, it being an incident in the ongoing proceedings on petitioner's application
for a certificate of public convenience; and that petitioner is not the only primary source
of data or information since respondent is currently engaged in a continuing review of the
rates charged.
We find merit in petitioner's contention.
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, 9 we made a categorical
classification as to when the rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial
and when it is legislative, thus:
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix
rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of
a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative
character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the
same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is
predicated upon the finding of fact-based upon a report submitted by the
General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a profit of more than
12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the
latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to
introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or
complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom
by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact,
respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character,
the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.
This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the
Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. to wit:
It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the
administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due
process of law (See Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185,
204, supra, where it is said: 'If the nature of the administrative agency is
essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are not
necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if
vested rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined

according to the same rules which apply in the case of the direct
application of a policy to a specific individual) ... It is said in 73 C.J.S.
Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453:
'Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an
administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and
the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view
of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a
general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of
administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of
executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public
administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts
are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the
person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to
notice and hearing.
The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the
attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication.
1. said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other.
2. it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a
reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's
financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what
particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate
reduction.
No rationalization was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed,
which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction.
It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its
rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it charges result from
an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a
public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to
lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates
would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public
considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the
financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to
cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its
questioned order.
At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the
questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists
that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to
the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of
merit.
While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the
application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not

exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the
requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not
exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as
temporary in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of
statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same
matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law. In the case at bar, the applicable
statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which provides:
Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the
Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in
accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the
limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the
contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... which shall be
imposed, observed and followed thereafter by any public service; ...
There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision does not apply to respondent
NTC, there being no limiting, excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in Executive
Orders Nos. 546 and 196.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such
order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or
permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary
investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case.
While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have other sources
of information or data, still, since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should act solely
on the basis of the evidence before it and not on knowledge or information otherwise
acquired by it but which is not offered in evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner was
given no opportunity to controvert.
Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made effective on a specified date.
It becomes a final legislative act as to the period during which it has to remain in force
pending the final determination of the case. An order of respondent NTC prescribing
reduced rates, even for a temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable or even
confiscatory, especially if the rates are unreasonably low, since the utility permanently
loses its just revenue during the prescribed period. In fact, such order is in effect final
insofar as the revenue during the period covered by the order is concerned. Upon a
showing, therefore, that the order requiring a reduced rate is confiscatory, and will unduly
deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its property, a declaration of its nullity
becomes inductible, which brings us to the issue on substantive due process.

III. Petitioner contends that the rate reduction is confiscatory in that its implementation
would virtually result in a cessation of its operations and eventual closure of business. On
the other hand, respondents assert that since petitioner is operating its communications
satellite facilities through a legislative franchise, as such grantee it has no vested right
therein. What it has is merely a privilege or license which may be revoked at will by the
State at any time without necessarily violating any vested property right of herein
petitioner. While petitioner concedes this thesis of respondent, it counters that the
withdrawal of such privilege should nevertheless be neither whimsical nor arbitrary, but it
must be fair and reasonable.
There is no question that petitioner is a mere grantee of a legislative franchise which is
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the common good so
requires. Apparently, therefore, such grant cannot be unilaterally revoked absent a
showing that the termination of the operation of said utility is required by the common
good.
The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of public
utilities is limited by the consideration that it is not the owner of the property of the
utility, or clothed with the general power of management incident to ownership, since the
private right of ownership to such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the
regulatory power. The power to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless
enterprises, but is the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due
regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its
patrons. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private
property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is
void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.
Hence, the inherent power and authority of the State, or its authorized agent, to regulate
the rates charged by public utilities should be subject always to the requirement that the
rates so fixed shall be reasonable and just. A commission has no power to fix rates which
are unreasonable or to regulate them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of reasonableness
comprehends such rates which must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to
be oppressive.
What is a just and reasonable rate is not a question of formula but of sound business
judgment based upon the evidence it is a question of fact calling for the exercise of
discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment. In determining
whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given situation,
requirements and opportunities of the utility. A method often employed in determining
reasonableness is the fair return upon the value of the property to the public utility.
Competition is also a very important factor in determining the reasonableness of rates
since a carrier is allowed to make such rates as are necessary to meet competition.
A cursory perusal of the assailed order reveals that the rate reduction is solely and
primarily based on the initial evaluation made on the financial statements of petitioner,

contrary to respondent NTC's allegation that it has several other sources of information
without, however, divulging such sources. Furthermore, it did not as much as make an
attempt to elaborate on how it arrived at the prescribed rates. It just perfunctorily declared
that based on the financial statements, there is merit for a rate reduction without any
elucidation on what implications and conclusions were necessarily inferred by it from
said statements. Nor did it deign to explain how the data reflected in the financial
statements influenced its decision to impose a rate reduction.
On the other hand, petitioner may likely suffer a severe drawback, with the consequent
detriment to the public service, should the order of respondent NTC turn out to be
unreasonable and improvident. The business in which petitioner is engaged is unique in
that its machinery and equipment have always to be taken in relation to the equipment on
the other end of the transmission arrangement. Any lack, aging, acquisition,
rehabilitation, or refurbishment of machinery and equipment necessarily entails a major
adjustment or innovation on the business of petitioner. As pointed out by petitioner, any
change in the sending end abroad has to be matched with the corresponding change in the
receiving end in the Philippines. Conversely, any in the receiving end abroad has to be
matched with the corresponding change in the sending end in the Philippines. An inability
on the part of petitioner to meet the variegations demanded be technology could result in
a deterioration or total failure of the service of satellite communications.
At present, petitioner is engaged in several projects aimed at refurbishing, rehabilitating,
and renewing its machinery and equipment in order to keep up with the continuing
charges of the times and to maintain its facilities at a competitive level with the
technological advances abroad. There projected undertakings were formulated on the
premise that rates are maintained at their present or at reasonable levels. Hence, an undue
reduction thereof may practically lead to a cessation of its business. While we concede
the primacy of the public interest in an adequate and efficient service, the same is not
necessarily to be equated with reduced rates. Reasonableness in the rates assumes that the
same is fair to both the public utility and the consumer.
Consequently, we hold that the challenged order, particularly on the issue of rates
provided therein, being violative of the due process clause is void and should be nullified.
Respondents should now proceed, as they should heretofore have done, with the hearing
and determination of petitioner's pending application for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity and in which proceeding the subject of rates involved in the
present controversy, as well as other matter involved in said application, be duly
adjudicated with reasonable dispatch and with due observance of our pronouncements
herein.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents, dated
September 2, 1988, in NTC Case No. 87-94 is hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary
restraining order issued under our resolution of September 13, 1988, as specifically
directed against the aforesaid order of respondents on the matter of existing rates on
petitioner's present authorized services, is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.