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Overview of Semiotics Concepts

This document provides an overview of semiotics, the study of signs and sign processes. It discusses key terminology, history, formulations, notable figures, applications, and branches of semiotics. Specific topics covered include signs, codes, connotation, denotation, representation, salience, semiosis, and semiotic elements/classes of signs. The document serves as a general introduction and reference for concepts in semiotics.

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Kieran McKenna
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
98 views65 pages

Overview of Semiotics Concepts

This document provides an overview of semiotics, the study of signs and sign processes. It discusses key terminology, history, formulations, notable figures, applications, and branches of semiotics. Specific topics covered include signs, codes, connotation, denotation, representation, salience, semiosis, and semiotic elements/classes of signs. The document serves as a general introduction and reference for concepts in semiotics.

Uploaded by

Kieran McKenna
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

General Semiotics Notes

Contents
1

Semiotics

1.1

Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3

Formulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4

Notable semioticians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.5

Current applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.6

Branches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.6.1

Pictorial semiotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.6.2

Semiotics and globalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.7

Main institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.8

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.9

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.10 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

Sign (semiotics)

14

2.1

Dyadic signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

2.2

Triadic signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

2.2.1

Classes of triadic signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

2.3

20th century theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

2.4

Postmodern theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

2.5

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

2.6

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

2.7

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

Code (semiotics)

20

3.1

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20

3.2

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

3.3

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

Connotation (semiotics)

22

4.1

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

4.2

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

4.3

Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

ii
5

CONTENTS
Denotation (semiotics)

24

5.1

Discussion

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

5.2

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

5.3

Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

Content word

26

6.1

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

6.2

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

Modality (semiotics)

27

7.1

Discussion of sign-type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

7.2

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

7.3

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

Representation (arts)

29

8.1

Dening representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

8.2

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

8.3

Contemporary ideas about representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

8.4

Peirce and representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

8.4.1

Semiotics and logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

8.4.2

Using signs and objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

8.5

Saussure and representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

8.6

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

8.7

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

8.8

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

8.9

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

Salience (language)

37

9.1

Semiotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

9.1.1

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

Communication studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

9.2.1

Axioms of salience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

9.2.2

Policy making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

9.3

Public opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

9.4

Marketing stimuli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

9.5

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

9.5.1

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40

Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40

9.2

9.6

10 Semiosis

41

10.1 Introduction to theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

10.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

10.3 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

CONTENTS

iii

10.4 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11 Semiosphere

42
43

11.1 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

11.2 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

12 Semiotic elements and classes of signs

44

12.1 Semiotic elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

12.1.1 Sign relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

12.1.2 Sign, object, interpretant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

12.2 Classes of signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47

12.2.1 I. Qualisign, sinsign, legisign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

12.2.2 II. Icon, index, symbol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

12.2.3 III. Rheme, dicisign, argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

12.2.4 The three sign typologies together: ten classes of sign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

12.3 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

12.4 References and further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

12.5 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53

13 Umwelt

55

13.1 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55

13.2 Critics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

13.3 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

13.4 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

13.5 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

13.6 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

14 Value (semiotics)

57

14.1 Saussures Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57

14.2 Denitions

57

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14.2.1 Saussure

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57

14.2.2 Barthes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

58

14.3 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

58

14.4 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

58

14.5 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

14.5.1 Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

14.5.2 Images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

14.5.3 Content license . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

Chapter 1

Semiotics
Semiotics (also called semiotic studies; not to be con- that is, with all the psychological, biological, and sociofused with the Saussurean tradition called semiology logical phenomena that occur in the functioning of signs.
which is a part of semiotics) is the study of meaningmaking, the study of sign processes and meaningful
communication.[1] This includes the study of signs and 1.1 Terminology
sign processes (semiosis), indication, designation, likeness, analogy, metaphor, symbolism, signication, and
The term derives from the Greek
communication.
smeitikos, observant of signs,[4] (from
Semiotics is closely related to the eld of linguistics, smeion, a sign, a mark,[5] ) and it was rst used in
which, for its part, studies the structure and meaning of English by Henry Stubbes[6] (spelt semeiotics) in a very
language more specically. The semiotic tradition ex- precise sense to denote the branch of medical science
plores the study of signs and symbols as a signicant part relating to the interpretation of signs.[7][8] John Locke
of communications. As dierent from linguistics, how- used the term sem(e)iotike in book four, chapter 21 of An
ever, semiotics also studies non-linguistic sign systems. Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690).[9][10]
Semiotics may be divided into three branches:
Here he explains how science may be divided into three
parts:
Semantics: relation between signs and the things
to which they refer; their signied denotata, or
All that can fall within the compass of
meaning
human understanding, being either, rst, the
nature of things, as they are in themselves,
their relations, and their manner of operation:
or, secondly, that which man himself ought to
do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the
attainment of any end, especially happiness:
or, thirdly, the ways and means whereby the
knowledge of both the one and the other of
these is attained and communicated; I think
science may be divided properly into these
three sorts.
Locke, 1823/1963, p. 174

Syntactics: relations among or between signs in formal structures


Pragmatics: relation between signs and sign-using
agents or interpreters

Semiotics is frequently seen as having important


anthropological dimensions; for example, the late Italian semiotician and novelist Umberto Eco proposed
that every cultural phenomenon may be studied as
communication.[2] Some semioticians focus on the logical
dimensions of the science, however. They examine areas
belonging also to the life sciencessuch as how organisms make predictions about, and adapt to, their semiotic Locke then elaborates on the nature of this third category,
niche in the world (see semiosis). In general, semiotic naming it (Semeiotike) and explaining it as
theories take signs or sign systems as their object of study: the doctrine of signs in the following terms:
the communication of information in living organisms is
covered in biosemiotics (including zoosemiotics).
Nor is there any thing to be relied upon in
Syntactics is the branch of semiotics that deals with the
Physick,[11] but an exact knowledge of medicinal physiology (founded on observation, not
formal properties of signs and symbols.[3] More precisely,
syntactics deals with the rules that govern how words are
principles), semiotics, method of curing, and
combined to form phrases and sentences. Charles Mortried (not excogitated,[12] not commanding)
ris adds that semantics deals with the relation of signs to
medicines.
their designata and the objects that they may or do denote;
Locke, 1823/1963, 4.21.4, p. 175
and, pragmatics deals with the biotic aspects of semiosis,
1

2
In the nineteenth century, Charles Sanders Peirce dened
what he termed semiotic (which he sometimes spelled
as semeiotic) as the quasi-necessary, or formal doctrine of signs, which abstracts what must be the characters of all signs used by... an intelligence capable of
learning by experience,[13] and which is philosophical
logic pursued in terms of signs and sign processes.[14][15]
The Peirce scholar and editor Max H. Fisch[16] claimed
in 1978[17] that semeiotic was Peirces own preferred
rendering of Lockes .

CHAPTER 1. SEMIOTICS

1.2 History

The importance of signs and signication has been recognized throughout much of the history of philosophy,
and in psychology as well. Plato and Aristotle both
explored the relationship between signs and the world,
and Augustine considered the nature of the sign within
a conventional system. These theories have had a lasting eect in Western philosophy, especially through
scholastic philosophy. (More recently, Umberto Eco, in
Charles W. Morris followed Peirce in using the term his Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, has argued
semiotic and in extending the discipline beyond human that semiotic theories are implicit in the work of most,
perhaps all, major thinkers.)
communication to animal learning and use of signals.
Ferdinand de Saussure, however, founded his semiotics, The general study of signs that began in Latin with Augustine culminated in Latin with the 1632 Tractatus de Signis
which he called semiology, in the social sciences:
of John Poinsot, and then began anew in late modernity
with the attempt in 1867 by Charles Sanders Peirce to
It is... possible to conceive of a science
draw up a new list of categories. Peirce aimed to base
which studies the role of signs as part of social
his new list directly upon experience precisely as constilife. It would form part of social psychology,
tuted by action of signs, in contrast with the list of Arisand hence of general psychology. We shall
totles categories which aimed to articulate within expericall it semiology (from the Greek semeon,
ence the dimension of being that is independent of expe'sign'). It would investigate the nature of signs
rience and knowable as such, through human understandand the laws governing them. Since it does
ing.
not yet exist, one cannot say for certain that it
The estimative powers of animals interpret the environwill exist. But it has a right to exist, a place
ment as sensed to form a meaningful world of objects,
ready for it in advance. Linguistics is only
but the objects of this world (or Umwelt, in Jakob von
one branch of this general science. The laws
Uexklls term,[19] ) consist exclusively of objects related
which semiology will discover will be laws
to the animal as desirable (+), undesirable (), or safe to
applicable in linguistics, and linguistics will
ignore (0).
thus be assigned to a clearly dened place in
the eld of human knowledge.
In contrast to this, human understanding adds to the
Cited in Chandlers Semiotics for Beginanimal Umwelt a relation of self-identity within obners, Introduction.
jects which transforms objects experienced into things
as well as +, , 0 objects.[20] Thus, the generically animal objective world as Umwelt, becomes a speciesWhile the Saussurean semiotic is dyadic (sign/syntax, sig- specically human objective world or Lebenswelt (lifenal/semantics), the Peircean semiotic is triadic (sign, ob- world), wherein linguistic communication, rooted in the
ject, interpretant), being conceived as philosophical logic biologically underdetermined Innenwelt (inner-world)
studied in terms of signs that are not always linguistic or of humans, makes possible the further dimension of cularticial. The Peircean semiotic addresses not only the tural organization within the otherwise merely social orexternal communication mechanism, as per Saussure, but ganization of non-human animals whose powers of obthe internal representation machine, investigating not just servation may deal only with directly sensible instances
sign processes, or modes of inference, but the whole in- of objectivity. This further point, that human culture dequiry process in general. Peircean semiotics further sub- pends upon language understood rst of all not as comdivides each of the three triadic elements into three sub- munication, but as the biologically underdetermined astypes. For example, signs can be icons, indices, and sym- pect or feature of the human animals Innenwelt, was
originally clearly identied by Thomas A. Sebeok.[21] Sebols.
beok also played the central role in bringing Peirces
Yuri Lotman introduced Eastern Europe to semiotics work to the center of the semiotic stage in the twentiand adopted Lockes coinage as the name to subtitle eth century,[22] rst with his expansion of the human use
() his founding at the University of Tartu in of signs (anthroposemiosis) to include also the generiEstonia in 1964 of the rst semiotics journal, Sign Systems cally animal sign-usage (zosemiosis),[23] then with his
Studies.
further expansion of semiosis (based initially on the work
Thomas Sebeok assimilated semiology to semiotics of Martin Krampen,[24] but taking advantage of Peirces
as a part to a whole,[18] and was involved in choosing the point that an interpretant, as the third item within a sign
name Semiotica for the rst international journal devoted relation, need not be mental[25] ) to include the vegetative world (phytosemiosis).
to the study of signs.

1.3. FORMULATIONS
One of Peirces distinctions was that of distinguishing an
interpretant from an interpreter. Peirces interpretant
notion opened the way to understanding an action of signs
beyond the realm of animal life (study of phytosemiosis
+ zosemiosis + anthroposemiosis = biosemiotics),
which was his rst advance beyond Latin Age semiotics.
Other early theorists in the eld of semiotics include
Charles W. Morris.[26] Max Black argued that the work
of Bertrand Russell was seminal in the eld.[27]

3
is a necessary overlap between semiotics and communication. Indeed, many of the concepts are shared, although in each eld the emphasis is dierent. In Messages and Meanings: An Introduction to Semiotics, Marcel
Danesi (1994) suggested that semioticians priorities were
to study signication rst, and communication second.
A more extreme view is oered by Jean-Jacques Nattiez
(1987; trans. 1990: 16), who, as a musicologist, considered the theoretical study of communication irrelevant to
his application of semiotics.

Semiotics diers from linguistics in that it generalizes the


denition of a sign to encompass signs in any medium
or sensory modality. Thus it broadens the range of
sign systems and sign relations, and extends the denition of language in what amounts to its widest analogical or metaphorical sense. Peirces denition of the term
semiotic as the study of necessary features of signs
also has the eect of distinguishing the discipline from
linguistics as the study of contingent features that the
worlds languages happen to have acquired in the course
of their evolutions. From a subjective standpoint, perhaps
more dicult is the distinction between semiotics and the
philosophy of language. In a sense, the dierence lies between separate traditions rather than subjects. Dierent
authors have called themselves philosopher of language
or semiotician. This dierence does not match the separation between analytic and continental philosophy. On
a closer look, there may be found some dierences reColor-coding hot- and cold-water faucets (taps) is common in garding subjects. Philosophy of language pays more atmany cultures but, as this example shows, the coding may be ren- tention to natural languages or to languages in general,
dered meaningless because of context. The two faucets (taps) while semiotics is deeply concerned with non-linguistic
probably were sold as a coded set, but the code is unusable (and
signication. Philosophy of language also bears connecignored), as there is a single water supply.
tions to linguistics, while semiotics might appear closer
to some of the humanities (including literary theory) and
Semioticians classify signs or sign systems in relation to to cultural anthropology.
the way they are transmitted (see modality). This process of carrying meaning depends on the use of codes that Semiosis or semeiosis is the process that forms meaning
may be the individual sounds or letters that humans use from any organisms apprehension of the world through
to form words, the body movements they make to show signs. Scholars who have talked about semiosis in their
attitude or emotion, or even something as general as the sub-theories of semiotics include C. S. Peirce, John
clothes they wear. To coin a word to refer to a thing (see Deely, and Umberto Eco. Cognitive semiotics is comlexical words), the community must agree on a simple bining methods and theories developed in the disciplines
meaning (a denotative meaning) within their language, of cognitive methods and theories developed in semiotics
but that word can transmit that meaning only within the and the humanities, with providing new information into
languages grammatical structures and codes (see syntax human signication and its manifestation in cultural pracand semantics). Codes also represent the values of the tices. The research on cognitive semiotics brings together
culture, and are able to add new shades of connotation to semiotics from linguistics, cognitive science, and related
disciplines on a common meta-theoretical platform of
every aspect of life.
concepts, methods, and shared data.
To explain the relationship between semiotics and
communication studies, communication is dened as the Cognitive semiotics may also be seen as the study of
process of transferring data and-or meaning from a source meaning-making by employing and integrating methods
to a receiver. Hence, communication theorists construct and theories developed in the cognitive sciences. This
models based on codes, media, and contexts to explain involves conceptual and textual analysis as well as experthe biology, psychology, and mechanics involved. Both imental investigations. Cognitive semiotics initially was
disciplines recognize that the technical process cannot developed at the Center for Semiotics at Aarhus Univerbe separated from the fact that the receiver must decode sity (Denmark), with an important connection with the
the data, i.e., be able to distinguish the data as salient, Center of Functionally Integrated Neuroscience (CFIN)
and make meaning out of it. This implies that there at Aarhus Hospital. Amongst the prominent cognitive

1.3 Formulations

CHAPTER 1. SEMIOTICS

semioticians are Per Aage Brandt, Svend stergaard,


Peer Bundgrd, Frederik Stjernfelt, Mikkel Wallentin,
Kristian Tyln, Riccardo Fusaroli, and Jordan Zlatev.
Zlatev later in co-operation with Gran Sonesson established CCS (Center for Cognitive Semiotics) at Lund
University, Sweden.

1.4 Notable semioticians


Charles Sanders Peirce (18391914), a noted logician who founded philosophical pragmatism, dened semiosis as an irreducibly triadic process
wherein something, as an object, logically determines or inuences something as a sign to determine or inuence something as an interpretation
or interpretant, itself a sign, thus leading to further
interpretants.[28] Semiosis is logically structured to
perpetuate itself. The object may be quality, fact,
rule, or even ctional (Hamlet), and may be immediate to the sign, the object as represented in
the sign, or dynamic, the object as it really is, on
which the immediate object is founded. The interpretant may be immediate to the sign, all that the
sign immediately expresses, such as a words usual
meaning; or dynamic, such as a state of agitation;
or nal or normal, the ultimate ramications of
the sign about its object, to which inquiry taken far
enough would be destined and with which any interpretant, at most, may coincide.[29] His semiotic[30]
covered not only articial, linguistic, and symbolic
signs, but also semblances such as kindred sensible
qualities, and indices such as reactions. He came c.
1903[31] to classify any sign by three interdependent
trichotomies, intersecting to form ten (rather than
27) classes of sign.[32] Signs also enter into various
kinds of meaningful combinations; Peirce covered
both semantic and syntactical issues in his speculative grammar. He regarded formal semiotic as logic
per se and part of philosophy; as also encompassing study of arguments (hypothetical, deductive, and
inductive) and inquirys methods including pragmatism; and as allied to, but distinct from logics pure
mathematics. In addition to pragmatism, Peirce provided a denition of the term sign as:
A sign, or representamen, is
something which stands to somebody for something in some respect
or capacity. It addresses somebody,
that is, creates in the mind of that
person an equivalent sign. That sign
which it creates I call the interpretant of the rst sign. The sign stands
for something, its object not in all
respects, but in reference to a sort
of idea. Peirce called the sign a
representamen, in order to bring out

the fact that a sign is something


that represents something else in
order to suggest it (that is, represent it) in some way.[33] For a
summary of Peirces contributions
to semiotics, see Liszka (1996) or
Atkin (2006).
Ferdinand de Saussure (18571913), the father of
modern linguistics, proposed a dualistic notion of
signs, relating the signier as the form of the word
or phrase uttered, to the signied as the mental concept. According to Saussure, the sign is completely
arbitraryi.e., there is no necessary connection between the sign and its meaning. This sets him apart
from previous philosophers, such as Plato or the
scholastics, who thought that there must be some
connection between a signier and the object it signies. In his Course in General Linguistics, Saussure credits the American linguist William Dwight
Whitney (18271894) with insisting on the arbitrary
nature of the sign. Saussures insistence on the arbitrariness of the sign also has inuenced later philosophers and theorists such as Jacques Derrida, Roland
Barthes, and Jean Baudrillard. Ferdinand de Saussure coined the term smiologie while teaching his
landmark Course on General Linguistics at the
University of Geneva from 1906 to 1911. Saussure posited that no word is inherently meaningful.
Rather a word is only a signier, i.e., the representation of something, and it must be combined in
the brain with the signied, or the thing itself, in
order to form a meaning-imbued sign. Saussure
believed that dismantling signs was a real science,
for in doing so we come to an empirical understanding of how humans synthesize physical stimuli into
words and other abstract concepts.
Jakob von Uexkll (18641944) studied the sign
processes in animals. He used the German word for
environment, umwelt, to describe the individuals
subjective world, and he invented the concept of
functional circle (funktionskreis) as a general model
of sign processes. In his Theory of Meaning (Bedeutungslehre, 1940), he described the semiotic approach to biology, thus establishing the eld that
now is called biosemiotics.
Valentin Voloshinov (18951936) was a SovietRussian linguist, whose work has been inuential
in the eld of literary theory and Marxist theory of
ideology. Written in the late 1920s in the USSR,
Voloshinovs Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (tr.: Marksizm i Filosoya Yazyka) developed
a counter-Saussurean linguistics, which situated language use in social process rather than in an entirely
decontexualized Saussurean langue.
Louis Hjelmslev (18991965) developed a formalist approach to Saussures structuralist theories. His

1.4. NOTABLE SEMIOTICIANS

best known work is Prolegomena to a Theory of Language, which was expanded in Rsum of the Theory
of Language, a formal development of glossematics,
his scientic calculus of language.
Charles W. Morris (19011979). In his 1938 Foundations of the Theory of Signs, he dened semiotics
as grouping the triad syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Syntax studies the interrelation of the signs,
without regard to meaning. Semantics studies the
relation between the signs and the objects to which
they apply. Pragmatics studies the relation between
the sign system and its human (or animal) user.
Unlike his mentor George Herbert Mead, Morris
was a behaviorist and sympathetic to the Vienna
Signaling and communication between the Astatotilapia burtoni
Circle positivism of his colleague, Rudolf Carnap.
Morris was accused by John Dewey of misreading
Peirce.[34]
of the issues addressed by philosophy of mind and
coining the term zoosemiotics. Sebeok insisted that
Thure von Uexkll (19082004), the father of
all communication was made possible by the relamodern psychosomatic medicine, developed a ditionship between an organism and the environment
agnostic method based on semiotic and biosemiotic
in which it lives. He also posed the equation beanalyses.
tween semiosis (the activity of interpreting signs) and
lifea view that the Copenhagen-Tartu biosemiotic
Roland Barthes (19151980) was a French literary
school
has further developed.
theorist and semiotician. He often would critique
pieces of cultural material to expose how bourgeois
Yuri Lotman (19221993) was the founding memsociety used them to impose its values upon othber of the Tartu (or Tartu-Moscow) Semiotic
ers. For instance, the portrayal of wine drinking in
School. He developed a semiotic approach to the
French society as a robust and healthy habit would
study of culturesemiotics of cultureand estabbe a bourgeois ideal perception contradicted by cerlished a communication model for the study of text
tain realities (i.e. that wine can be unhealthy and
semiotics. He also introduced the concept of the
inebriating). He found semiotics useful in conductsemiosphere. Among his Moscow colleagues were
ing these critiques. Barthes explained that these
Vladimir Toporov, Vyacheslav Ivanov and Boris Usbourgeois cultural myths were second-order signs,
pensky.
or connotations. A picture of a full, dark bottle is a
sign, a signier relating to a signied: a fermented,
Christian Metz (19311993) pioneered the applicaalcoholic beveragewine. However, the bourgeois
tion of Saussurean semiotics to lm theory, applying
take this signied and apply their own emphasis to it,
syntagmatic analysis to scenes of lms and groundmaking wine a new signier, this time relating to
ing lm semiotics in greater context.
a new signied: the idea of healthy, robust, relaxing
wine. Motivations for such manipulations vary from
Umberto Eco (19322016) made a wider audience
a desire to sell products to a simple desire to mainaware of semiotics by various publications, most notain the status quo. These insights brought Barthes
tably A Theory of Semiotics and his novel, The Name
very much in line with similar Marxist theory.
of the Rose, which includes (second to its plot) applied semiotic operations. His most important contributions to the eld bear on interpretation, ency Algirdas Julien Greimas (19171992) developed a
clopedia, and model reader. He also has criticized
structural version of semiotics named, generative
in several works (A theory of semiotics, La struttura
semiotics, trying to shift the focus of discipline
assente, Le signe, La production de signes) the iconfrom signs to systems of signication. His theories
ism or iconic signs (taken from Peirces most fadevelop the ideas of Saussure, Hjelmslev, Claude
mous triadic relation, based on indexes, icons, and
Lvi-Strauss, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
symbols), to which he purposes four modes of sign
Thomas A. Sebeok (19202001), a student of
production: recognition, ostension, replica, and inCharles W. Morris, was a prolic and wide-ranging
vention.
American semiotician. Although he insisted that an Eliseo Vern (19352014) developed his Social
imals are not capable of language, he expanded the
Discourse Theory inspired in the Peircian conceppurview of semiotics to include non-human signaltion of Semiosis.
ing and communication systems, thus raising some

CHAPTER 1. SEMIOTICS

The Mu Group (Groupe ) (founded 1967) devel- The major semiotic book series Semiotics, Communicaoped a structural version of rhetorics, and the visual tion, Cognition, published by De Gruyter Mouton (sesemiotics.
ries editors Paul Cobley and Kalevi Kull) replaces the
former Approaches to Semiotics (more than 120 volumes) and Approaches to Applied Semiotics (series editor Thomas A. Sebeok). Since 1980 the Semiotic Soci1.5 Current applications
ety of America has produced an annual conference series: Semiotics: The Proceedings of the Semiotic Society of
America.

1.6 Branches
Semiotics has sprouted subelds including, but not limited to, the following:
Biosemiotics: the study of semiotic processes at all
levels of biology, or a semiotic study of living systems (e.g., CopenhagenTartu School).
Semiotic anthropology.
Chart semiotics of social networking

Applications of semiotics include:


It represents a methodology for the analysis of
texts regardless of the medium in which it is presented. For these purposes, text is any message
preserved in a form whose existence is independent
of both sender and receiver;
It may improve ergonomic design in situations where
it is important to ensure that human beings are able
to interact more eectively with their environments,
whether it be on a large scale, as in architecture, or
on a small scale, such as the conguration of instrumentation for human use.
In some countries, its role is limited to literary criticism
and an appreciation of audio and visual media, but this
narrow focus may inhibit a more general study of the social and political forces shaping how dierent media are
used and their dynamic status within modern culture. Issues of technological determinism in the choice of media
and the design of communication strategies assume new
importance in this age of mass media.
Publication of research is both in dedicated journals
such as Sign Systems Studies, established by Yuri Lotman and published by Tartu University Press; Semiotica,
founded by Thomas A. Sebeok and published by Mouton
de Gruyter; Zeitschrift fr Semiotik; European Journal
of Semiotics; Versus (founded and directed by Umberto
Eco), et al.; The American Journal of Semiotics; and as
articles accepted in periodicals of other disciplines, especially journals oriented toward philosophy and cultural
criticism.

Cognitive semiotics: the study of meaning-making


by employing and integrating methods and theories
developed in the cognitive sciences. This involves
conceptual and textual analysis as well as experimental investigations. Cognitive semiotics initially
was developed at the Center for Semiotics at Aarhus
University (Denmark), with an important connection with the Center of Functionally Integrated Neuroscience (CFIN) at Aarhus Hospital. Amongst
the prominent cognitive semioticians are Per Aage
Brandt, Svend stergaard, Peer Bundgrd, Frederik
Stjernfelt, Mikkel Wallentin, Kristian Tyln, Riccardo Fusaroli, and Jordan Zlatev. Zlatev later in
co-operation with Gran Sonesson established the
Center for Cognitive Semiotics (CCS) at Lund University, Sweden.
Computational semiotics: attempts to engineer the
process of semiosis, in the study of and design for
human-computer interaction or to mimic aspects of
human cognition through articial intelligence and
knowledge representation. See also cybercognition.
Cultural and literary semiotics: examines the literary world, the visual media, the mass media, and
advertising in the work of writers such as Roland
Barthes, Marcel Danesi, and Yuri Lotman (e.g.,
TartuMoscow Semiotic School).
Cybersemiotics: built on two already-generated interdisciplinary approaches: cybernetics and systems
theory including information theory and science,
and Peircean semiotics including phenomenology
and pragmatic aspects of linguistics, attempts to
make the two interdisciplinary paradigmsboth going beyond mechanistic and pure constructivistic
ideascomplement each other in a common framework. Sren Brier.[35]

1.6. BRANCHES
Design semiotics or product semiotics: the study
of the use of signs in the design of physical products; introduced by Martin Krampen, a o, and in a
practitioner-oriented version by Rune Mon while
teaching industrial design at the Institute of Design,
Ume University, Sweden.

1.6.1 Pictorial semiotics

Pictorial semiotics[37] is intimately connected to art history and theory. It goes beyond them both in at least
one fundamental way, however. While art history has
limited its visual analysis to a small number of pictures
that qualify as works of art, pictorial semiotics focuses
Ethnosemiotics is a disciplinary perspective which
on the properties of pictures in a general sense, and on
links semiotics concepts to ethnographic methods.
how the artistic conventions of images can be interpreted
Film semiotics: the study of the various codes and through pictorial codes. Pictorial codes are the way in
signs of lm and how they are understood; see which viewers of pictorial representations seem automatically to decipher the artistic conventions of images by
Christian Metz.
being unconsciously familiar with them.[38]
Gregorian chant semiology is a current avenue of
palaeographical research in Gregorian chant which According to Gran Sonesson, a Swedish semiotician,
pictures can be analyzed by three models: (a) the naris revising the Solesmes school of interpretation.
rative model, which concentrates on the relationship beLaw and semiotics: one of the more accomplished tween pictures and time in a chronological manner as in a
publications in this eld is the International Journal comic strip; (b) the rhetoric model, which compares picfor the Semiotics of Law, published by International tures with dierent devices as in a metaphor; and (c) the
Association for the Semiotics of Law.
laokoon (or laocoon) model, which considers the limits
Marketing semiotics, or commercial semiotics is an and constraints of pictorial expressions by comparing texthat utilize time with visual mediums that
application of semiotic methods and semiotic think- tual mediums[39]
utilize
space.
ing in the analysis and development of advertising

and brand communications in cultural context. Key The break from traditional art history and theoryas well
gures include Virginia Valentine, Malcolm Evans, as from other major streams of semiotic analysisleaves
Greg Rowland, Georgios Rossolatos.
open a wide variety of possibilities for pictorial semiotics.
Music semiology: There are strong arguments that Some inuences have been drawn from phenomenologimusic inhabits a semiological realm which, on both cal analysis, cognitive psychology, structuralist, and cogontogenetic and phylogenetic levels, has develop- nitivist linguistics, and visual anthropology and sociology.
mental priority over verbal language. (Middleton
1990, p. 172) See Nattiez (1976, 1987, 1989), Ste1.6.2 Semiotics and globalization
fani (1973, 1986), Baroni (1983), and Semiotica (66:
13 (1987)).
Studies have shown that semiotics may be used to make or
break a brand. Culture codes strongly inuence whether
Semiotics of music videos.
a population likes or dislikes a brands marketing, es Organisational semiotics: the study of semiotic pecially internationally. If the company is unaware of
processes in organizations (with strong ties to a cultures codes, it runs the risk of failing in its marcomputational semiotics and human-computer in- keting. Globalization has caused the development of a
teraction).
global consumer culture where products have similar as Social semiotics: expands the interpretable semiotic sociations, whether positive or negative, across numerous
[40]
landscape to include all cultural codes, such as in markets.
slang, fashion, and advertising (See Roland Barthes, Mistranslations may lead to instances of "Engrish" or
Michael Halliday, Bob Hodge, and Christian Metz). "Chinglish", terms for unintentionally humorous crosscultural slogans intended to be understood in English.
This may be caused by a sign that, in Peirces terms, mistakenly indexes or symbolizes something in one culture,
that it does not in another.[41] In other words, it creates
a connotation that is culturally-bound, and that violates
Theatre semiotics: extends or adapts semiotics on- some culture code. Theorists who have studied humor
stage; key theoricians include Keir Elam.
(such as Schopenhauer) suggest that contradiction or incongruity creates absurdity and therefore, humor.[42] Vi Urban semiotics
olating a culture code creates this construct of ridiculous Visual semiotics: analyses visual signs; prominent ness for the culture that owns the code. Intentional humodern founders to this branch are Groupe and mor also may fail cross-culturally because jokes are not
Gran Sonesson (see also visual rhetoric).
on code for the receiving culture.[43]
Structuralism and post-structuralism in the work of
Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Louis Hjelmslev, Roman Jakobson, Jacques Lacan, Claude LviStrauss, Roland Barthes, etc.

Semiotics of photography.[36]

A good example of branding according to cultural code

CHAPTER 1. SEMIOTICS

is Disneys international theme park business. Disney ts 1.9 References


well with Japan's cultural code because the Japanese value
cuteness, politeness, and gift giving as part of their cul- Notes
ture code; Tokyo Disneyland sells the most souvenirs of
any Disney theme park. In contrast, Disneyland Paris [1] The science of communication studied through the interfailed when it launched as Euro Disney because the compretation of signs and symbols as they operate in various
pany did not research the codes underlying European culelds, esp. language, Oxford English Dictionary (2003)
ture. Its storybook retelling of European folktales was
taken as elitist and insulting, and the strict appearance [2] Caesar, Michael (1999). Umberto Eco: Philosophy,
Semiotics, and the Work of Fiction. Wiley-Blackwell. p.
standards that it had for employees resulted in discrim55. ISBN 978-0-7456-0850-1.
ination lawsuits in France. Disney souvenirs were perceived as cheap trinkets. The park was a nancial failure [3] The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Lanbecause its code violated the expectations of European
guage: Syntactics
culture in ways that were oensive.[44]
On the other hand, some researchers have suggested that
it is possible to successfully pass a sign perceived as a cultural icon, such as the Coca-Cola or McDonalds logos,
from one culture to another. This may be accomplished if
the sign is migrated from a more economically-developed
to a less developed culture.[44] The intentional association of a product with another culture has been called
Foreign Consumer Culture Positioning (FCCP). Products also may be marketed using global trends or culture
codes, for example, saving time in a busy world; but even
these may be ne-tuned for specic cultures.[40]
Research also found that, as airline industry brandings
grow and become more international, their logos become
more symbolic and less iconic. The iconicity and symbolism of a sign depends on the cultural convention and, are
on that ground in relation with each other. If the cultural
convention has greater inuence on the sign, the signs get
more symbolic value.[45]

1.7 Main institutions


A world organisation of semioticiansthe International
Association for Semiotic Studies, with its journal
Semioticawas established in 1969. The larger research
centers together with extensive teaching program include
the semiotics departments at the University of Tartu,
Aarhus University, and Bologna University.

1.8 See also


Outline of semiotics
Index of semiotics articles
Semiotic elements and classes of signs
Medical sign
Ethnosemiotics
Language-game (philosophy)
Private language argument

[4] , Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A


Greek-English Lexicon, on Perseus
[5] , Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A GreekEnglish Lexicon, on Perseus
[6] Stubbe, H.,The Plus Ultra reduced to a Non Plus ... (London, England, 1670), page 75: "... nor is there any thing
to be relied upon in Physick, but an exact knowledge of
medicinal phisiology (founded on observation, not principles), semeiotics, method of curing, and tried (not excogitated, not commanding) medicines ....
[7] The branch of medical science relating to the interpretation of symptoms, Oxford English Dictionary (1989)
[8] For the Greeks, signs occurred in the world of nature,
symbols in the world of culture. Not until Augustine
of Hippo would a thematic proposal for uniting the two
under the notion of sign (signum) as transcending the
nature-culture divide and identifying symbols as no more
than a species (or sub-species) of signum be formally proposed. See the monograph study on this question, Le teorie
del segno nellantichit classica by Giovanni Manetti (Milan: Bompiani, 1987); trans. by Christine Richardson as
Theories of the Sign in Classical Antiquity (Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1993). Classic also is the
article by Luigi Romeo, The Derivation of Semiotics
through the History of the Discipline, in Semiosis 6, Heft
2 (1977), 3749. See also Andrew LaVelles discussion
of Romeo on Peirce-l at .
[9] Locke used the Greek word [sic] in the 4th
ed. of 1700 (p. 437) of his Essay concerning Human Understanding. He notably writes both (a) "" and
(b) ""when term (a) is followed by any kind
of punctuation mark, it takes the form (b); see Ancient
Greek accent. The 1689/1690 rst edition of Lockes Essay concerning Human Understanding, in the concluding
Division of the Sciences chapter, Locke introduces, in
4, "" as his proposed name synonymous with
"the Doctrine of Signs" for the development of the future study of the ubiquitous role of signs within human
awareness. In the 1689-1690 original edition, the Division of the Sciences chapter was Chapter XX. In the 4th
ed. of 1700, a new Chapter XIX Of Enthusiasm is inserted into Book IV, after which the Chapter XX of the
1st ed. becomes Chapter XXI for all subsequent editions.
see in John Deely, Why Semiotics? (Ottawa: Legas,
2004), 7188, esp. 7780 for the editions of Lockes

1.9. REFERENCES

Essay from 1689 through 1716. It is an important fact


that Lockes proposal for the development of semiotics,
with three passing exceptions as asides in the writings of
Berkeley, Leibniz, and Condillac, is met with a resounding silence that lasts as long as modernity itself. Even
Lockes devoted late modern editor, Alexander Campbell
Fraser, dismisses out of hand this crude and supercial
scheme of Locke" (see Lockes modest proposal subversive of the way of ideas, its reception, and its bearing on
the resolution of an ancient and a modern controversy in
logic in Chap. 14 of Deelys Four Ages of Understanding, pp. 591606). In the 1975 Oxford University Press
critical edition, prepared and introduced by Peter Harold
Nidditch, Nidditch tells us, in his Foreword, p. vii, that
he presents us with a complete, critically established, and
unmodernized text that aims at being historically faithful
to Lockes nal intentions"; p. xxv tells us further that the
present text is based on the original fourth edition of the
Essay", and that readings in the other early authorized
editions are adopted, in appropriate form, where necessary, and recorded otherwise in the textual notes. The
term "" appears in that 1700 4th edition, the
last published (but not the last prepared) within Lockes
lifetime, with exactly the spelling and nal accent found
in the 1689/1690 1st edition. Yet if we turn to (the nal) chapter XXI of the 1975 Oxford edition, we nd
on p. 720 not "" but rather do we nd substituted the "" spelling (and with nal accent
reversed). (Note that in Modern Greek and in some systems for pronouncing classical Greek, "" and
"" are pronounced the same.)

[15] Peircean semiotic is triadic (sign, object, interpretant), as


opposed to the dyadic Saussurian tradition (signier, signied), and is conceived of as philosophical logic studied
in terms of signs that are not always linguistic or articial,
and sign processes, modes of inference, and the inquiry
process in general, with emphases not only on symbols
but also on signs that are semblances (icons) and signs
that are signs by being factually connected (indices) to
their objects.

[10] Prior to Locke, the notion of sign as transcending the


nature/culture divide was introduced by Augustine of
Hipposee John Deely, Augustine & Poinsot: The Protosemiotic Development (Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 2009) for full details of Augustines originality on this pointa specialized study was rmly established. Himself a man of medicine, Locke was familiar with this semeiotics as naming a specialized
branch within medical science. In his personal library
were two editions of Scapulas 1579 abridgement of
Henricus Stephanus Thesaurus Graecae Linguae, which
listed as the name for diagnostics, the
branch of medicine concerned with interpreting symptoms of disease ("symptomatology"). Indeed the English
physician and scholar Henry Stubbes had transliterated
this term of specialized science into English precisely as
semeiotic in his 1670 work, The Plus Ultra Reduced to
a Non Plus (p. 75).

[20] Cf. Martin Heidegger (1927), in the 1962 trans. by John


Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Being and Time (New
York, NY: Harper & Row), p. 487: The distinction between the being of existing Dasein and the Being of entities, such as Reality, which do not have the character
of Dasein...is nothing with which philosophy may tranquilize itself. It has long been known that ancient ontology works with Thing-concepts and that there is a danger of reifying consciousness. But what does this reifying signify? Where does it arise? Why does Being get
conceived proximally in terms of the present-at-hand
and not in terms of the ready-to-hand, which indeed lies
closer to us? Why does reifying always keep coming back
to exercise its dominion?" This is the question that the
Umwelt/Lebenswelt distinction as here drawn answers to.

[16] Max Fisch compiled Peirce-related bibliographical supplements in 1952, 1964, 1966, 1974; was consulting editor on the 1977 microlm of Peirces published works
and on the Comprehensive Bibliography associated with
it; was among the main editors of the rst ve volumes
(published 19811993) Writings of Charles S. Peirce; and
wrote a number of published articles on Peirce, many collected in 1986 in Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, Ketner and Kloesel, eds., Indiana University Press: catalog
page, Bloomington, IN, 480 pages. See Charles Sanders
Peirce bibliography.
[17] Fisch, Max H. (1978), Peirces General Theory of Signs
in Sight, Sound, and Sense, ed. T. A. Sebeok. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 3170.
[18] The whole anthology, Frontiers in Semiotics, was devoted
to the documentation of this pars pro toto move of Sebeok.
[19] See Umwelt, Semiotica 1341/4 (2001), 125135; Special Issue on Jakob von Uexkll: A paradigm for biology
and semiotics Guest-Edited by Kalevi Kull.

[13] Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,


vol. 2, paragraph 227.

[21] Thomas A. Sebeok, The Evolution of Communication


and the Origin of Language, lecture in the 1984 June 1
3 International Summer Institute for Semiotic and Structural Studies 1984 Colloquium on Phylogeny and Ontogeny of Communication Systems, published under the
title Communication, Language, and Speech. Evolutionary Considerations, in Sebeoks I Think I Am A Verb.
More Contributions to the Doctrine of Signs (New York:
Plenum Press, 1986), pp. 1016. For subsequent context,
see the Afterword to the volume of Sebeoks Semiotic
Prologues, ed. John Deely and Marcel Danesi (Ottawa,
Canada: Legas, 2012), pp. 365383; version online at .

[14] Peirce, C.S. (1902), Logic, Considered as Semeiotic,


Manuscript L75, transcription at Arisbe: The Peirce Gateway, and, in particular, its On the Denition of Logic
(Memoir 12), transcription at Arisbe.

[22] Detailed demonstration of Sebeoks role of the global


emergence of semiotics is recorded in at least three recent volumes. (1) Semiotics Seen Synchronically. The
View from 2010 (Ottawa: Legas, 2010). (2) Semiotics

[11] A now-obsolete term for the art or profession of curing


disease with (herbal) medicines or (chemical) drugs; especially purgatives or cathartics. Also, it specically refers
to the treatment of humans.
[12] That is, thought out, contrived, or devised (Oxford
English Dictionary).

10

CHAPTER 1. SEMIOTICS

Continues To Astonish. Thomas A. Sebeok and the Doctrine of Signs (Berlin: Mouton De Gruyter, 2011)a 526page assemblage of essays, vignettes, letters, pictures attesting to the depth and extent of Sebeoks promotion of
semiotic understanding around the world, including his
involvement with Juri Lotman and the Tartu University
graduate program in semiotics (currently directed by P.
Torop, M. Lotman and K. Kull). (3) Sebeoks Semiotic
Prologues (Ottawa: Legas, 2012)a volume which gathers together in Part I all the prologues (i.e., introductions, prefaces, forewords, etc.) that Sebeok wrote for
other peoples books, then in Part 2 all the prologues
that other people wrote for Sebeok.
[23] See Thomas A. Sebeok, Communication in Animals and
Men, review article covering three books: Martin Lindauer, Communication among Social Bees (Harvard Books
in Biology, No. 2; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961, pp. ix + 143); Winthrop N. Kellogg,
Porpoises and Sonar (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 1961, pp. xiv + 177); and John C. Lilly, Man and
Dolphin (Garden City, New York: Doubleday), in Language 39 (1963), 448466.

[31] Peirce, Collected Papers v. 2, paragraphs 243263, written c. 1903.


[32] He worked on but did not perfect a ner-grained system of
ten trichotomies, to be combined into 66 (Tn) classes of
sign. That raised for Peirce 59,049 classicatory questions
(59,049 = 310 , or 3 to the 10th power). See p. 482 in
Excerpts from Letters to Lady Welby, Essential Peirce
v. 2.
[33] Ryan, Michael (2011). [[Link]
[Link]/entry/wileylitcul/semiotics> The Encyclopedia of Literary and Cultural Theory]. Hoboken, NJ,
USA: Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 978-1-4051-8312-3.
[34] Dewey, John, (1946, February 14), Peirces Theory of
Linguistic Signs, Thought, and Meaning. The Journal of
Philosophy, v. 43, n. 4, pp. 8595.
[35] Brier, Sren (2008). Cybersemiotics: Why Information Is
Not Enough!. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto
Press. ISBN 978-0-8020-9220-5.
[36] Semiotics of Photography

[24] Martin Krampen, Phytosemiotics, Semiotica, 36.3/4


(1981), 187209.

[37] Pictorial Semiotics. Oxford Index. Oxford University


Press, n.d. Web.

[25] Peirce c. 1907: Excerpt from Pragmatism (Editor [3])",


published under the title A Survey of Pragmaticism in
The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. 5,
ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1934), 5.473. See also the part
of Peirces letter of to Lady Welby dated 23 December
1908, in Semiotic and Signics: The Correspondence between C. S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby, ed. Charles
S. Hardwick with the assistance of James Cook (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977), pp. 7386.
And Semiosis: The Subject Matter of Semiotic Inquiry,
Chap. 3 of Basics of Semiotics by John Deely (5th ed.:
Tartu, Estonia: Tartu University Press, 2009), 2650, esp.
31 & 38 41).

[38] Pictorial Codes. Oxford Index. Oxford University Press,


n.d. Web.

[26] 1971, orig. 1938, Writings on the general theory of signs,


Mouton, The Hague, The Netherlands
[27] 1944, Black M. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell,
Library of Living Philosophers, vol. 5.
[28] For Peirces denitions of signs and semiosis, see under
"Sign" and "Semiosis, semeiosy" in the Commens Dictionary of Peirces Terms; and "76 denitions of sign by C.
S. Peirce" collected by Robert Marty. Peirces "What Is a
Sign" (MS 404 of 1894, Essential Peirce v. 2, pp. 410)
provides intuitive help.
[29] See Peirce, excerpt from a letter to William James, March
14, 1909, Collected Papers v. 8, paragraph 314. Also
see under relevant entries in the Commens Dictionary of
Peirces Terms. On coincidence of actual opinion with nal opinion, see MS 218, transcription at Arisbe, and appearing in Writings of Charles S. Peirce v. 3, p. 79.
[30] He spelt it semiotic and semeiotic. See under
"Semeiotic [etc.] in the Commens Dictionary of Peirces
Terms.

[39] Sonesson, Gran (1988). Methods and Models in Pictorial Semiotics": 298.
[40] Alden, Dana; Jan-Benedict Steenkamp & Rajeev Batra.
(1999). Brand Positioning Through Advertising in Asia,
North America, and Europe: The Role of Global Consumer Culture, Journal of Marketing 63 (1), 7587.
[41] Chandler, Daniel. (2001/2007). Semiotics: The Basics.
London: Routledge
[42] Spotts, H. Weinberger M. & Parsons A. (1997). Assessing the use and impact of humor on advertising eectiveness: A contingency approach, Journal of Advertising, 26
(3), 1732
[43] Beeman, William. (1981). Why do they laugh? An interactional approach to humor in traditional Iranian improvisatory theater: Performance and its eects. Journal
of American Folklore, 94 (374), 506526.
[44] Brannen, M. (2004). When Mickey Loses Face: Recontextualization, Semantic Fit, and the Semiotics of Foreignness, Academy of Management Review, 29 (4), 593
616
[45] Thurlow, C. & Aiello, G. (2007). National pride, global
capital: a social semiotic analysis of transnational visual
branding in the airline industry, Visual Communication,
6(3), 305344

Bibliography
Atkin, Albert. (2006). "Peirces Theory of Signs",
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

1.9. REFERENCES

11

Barthes, Roland. ([1957] 1987). Mythologies. New


York: Hill & Wang.

Eagleton, Terry. (1983). Literary Theory: An Introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Barthes, Roland ([1964] 1967). Elements of Semiology. (Translated by Annette Lavers & Colin Smith).
London: Jonathan Cape.

Eco, Umberto. (1976). A Theory of Semiotics. London: Macmillan.

Chandler, Daniel. (2001/2007). Semiotics: The Basics. London: Routledge.

Eco, Umberto. (1986) Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press.

Clarke, D. S. (1987). Principles of Semiotic. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Eco, Umberto. (2000) Kant and the Platypus. New


York, Harcourt Brace & Company.

Clarke, D. S. (2003).
Kluwer.

Dordrecht:

Eco, Umberto. (1976) A Theory of Semiotics. Indiana, Indiana University Press.

Culler, Jonathan (1975). Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Emmeche, Claus; Kull, Kalevi (eds.) (2011) Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs.
London: Imperial College Press. pdf

Danesi, Marcel & Perron, Paul. (1999). Analyzing


Cultures: An Introduction and Handbook. Bloomington: Indiana UP.

Foucault, Michel. (1970). The Order of Things: An


Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London: Tavistock.

Danesi, Marcel. (1994). Messages and Meanings:


An Introduction to Semiotics. Toronto: Canadian
Scholars Press.

Greimas, Algirdas. (1987). On Meaning: Selected


Writings in Semiotic Theory. (Translated by Paul J
Perron & Frank H Collins). London: Frances Pinter.

Sign Levels.

Danesi, Marcel. (2002). Understanding Media


Semiotics. London: Arnold; New York: Oxford UP.
Danesi, Marcel. (2007). The Quest for Meaning:
A Guide to Semiotic Theory and Practice. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press.
Deely, John. (2005 [1990]). Basics of Semiotics.
4th ed. Tartu: Tartu University Press.
Deely, John. (2000), The Red Book: The Beginning
of Postmodern Times or: Charles Sanders Peirce and
the Recovery of Signum. Eprint PDF (578 KiB).

Herlihy, David. 1988present. 2nd year class of


semiotics. CIT.
Hjelmslev, Louis (1961). Prolegomena to a Theory
of Language. (Translated by Francis J. Whiteld).
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Hodge, Robert & Kress, Gunther. (1988). Social
Semiotics. Ithaca: Cornell UP.
Lacan, Jacques. (1977) crits: A Selection. (Translated by Alan Sheridan). New York: Norton.

Deely, John. (2000), The Green Book: The Impact


of Semiotics on Philosophy. Eprint PDF (571 KiB).

Lidov, David (1999) Elements of Semiotics. New


York: St. Martins Press.

Deely, John. (2001). Four Ages of Understanding.


Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Liszka, J. J. (1996) A General Introduction to the Semeiotic of C.S. Peirce. Indiana University Press.

Deely, John. (2003), On the Word Semiotics, Formation and Origins, Semiotica 146.1/4, 150.

Locke, John, The Works of John Locke, A New Edition, Corrected, In Ten Volumes, [Link], T. Tegg,
(London), 1823. (facsimile reprint by Scientia,
(Aalen), 1963.)

Deely, John. (2003). The Impact on Philosophy of


Semiotics. South Bend: St. Augustine Press.
Deely, John. (2004), "'' to 'Sign' by Way of
'Signum': On the Interplay of Translation and Interpretation in the Establishment of Semiotics, Semiotica 1481/4, 187227.
Deely, John. (2006), On 'Semiotics as Naming the
Doctrine of Signs, Semiotica 158.1/4 (2006), 133.
Derrida, Jacques (1981). Positions. (Translated by
Alan Bass). London: Athlone Press.

Lotman, Yuri M. (1990). Universe of the Mind:


A Semiotic Theory of Culture. (Translated by Ann
Shukman). London: I.B. Tauris.
Morris, Charles W. (1971). Writings on the general
theory of signs. The Hague: Mouton.
Menchik, D., and X. Tian. (2008) Putting Social
Context into Text: The Semiotics of Email Interaction. The American Journal of Sociology. 114:2
pp. 33270.

12
Peirce, Charles S. (1934). Collected papers: Volume
V. Pragmatism and pragmaticism. Cambridge, MA,
USA: Harvard University Press.

CHAPTER 1. SEMIOTICS
The Semiotics of the Web
Tartu Semiotics Department

Hard Semiotics by Robert Marty


Petrilli, S. (2009).
Semiotics as semioethics
in the era of global communication. Semiotica, 173(14), 343347, 353354, 359. doi: Peircean focus
10.1515/SEMI.2009.015
Ponzio, Augusto & S. Petrilli (2007) Semiotics Today. From Global Semiotics to Semioethics, a Dialogic Response. New York, Ottawa, Toronto: Legas.
84 pp. ISBN 978-1-894508-98-8
Romeo, Luigi (1977), The Derivation of 'Semiotics through the History of the Discipline, Semiosis, v. 6 pp. 3750.
Sebeok, T.A. (1976), Contributions to the Doctrine
of Signs, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN.

Arisbe: The Peirce Gateway


Minute Semeiotic, English, Portuguese
Peirces Theory of Semiosis: Toward a Logic of Mutual Aectionfree online course
Semiotics according to Robert Marty, with 76 denitions of the sign by C. S. Peirce
The Commens Dictionary of Peirces Terms

Sebeok, Thomas A. (Editor) (1977). A Perfusion of Journals, book seriesassociations, centers


Signs. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Signs and Meaning: 5 Questions, edited by
Peer Bundgaard and Frederik Stjernfelt, 2009
(Automatic Press / VIP). (Includes interviews with
29 leading semioticians of the world.)
Short, T.L. (2007), Peirces Theory of Signs, Cambridge University Press.

American Journal of Semiotics, Joseph Brent, Editor, & John Deely, Managing Editorfrom the
Semiotic Society of America.
Applied Semiotics / Smiotique applique(AS/SA),
Peter G. Marteinson & Pascal G. Michelucci, Editors.

Stubbe, Henry (Henry Stubbes), The Plus Ultra reduced to a Non Plus: Or, A Specimen of some Animadversions upon the Plus Ultra of Mr. Glanvill,
wherein sundry Errors of some Virtuosi are discovered, the Credit of the Aristotelians in part Readvanced; and Enquiries made...., (London), 1670.

Approaches to Applied Semiotics (20002009 book


series), Thomas Sebeok et al., Editors.

Uexkll, Thure von (1982).


Semiotics and
medicine. Semiotica 38-3/4:205-215

Biosemiotics, Marcello Barbieri, Editor-in-Chief


from the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies.

Williamson, Judith. (1978). Decoding Advertisements: Ideology and Meaning in Advertising. London: Boyars.
Zlatev, Jordan. (2009). The Semiotic Hierarchy:
Life, Consciousness, Signs and Language, Cognitive
Semiotics. Sweden: Scania.

1.10 External links


Applied Semiotics / Smiotique applique
Communicology: The link between semiotics and
phenomenological manifestations
Language and the Origin of Semiosis
Semiotics for Beginners
[Link] semiotic
theories and theories closely related to semiotics

Approaches to Semiotics (196997 book series),


Thomas A. Sebeok, Alain Rey, Roland Posner, et
al., Editors.

Center for Semiotics, Aarhus University, Denmark.


Cognitive Semiotics, Per Aage Brandt & Todd Oakley, Editors-in-Chief.
Cybernetics and Human Knowing, Sren Brier,
Chief Editor.
International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems
(IJSSS), Angelo Loula & Joo Queiroz, Editors.
Open Semiotics Resource Center. Journals, lecture
courses, etc.
The Public Journal of Semiotics, Paul Bouissac, Editor in Chief; Alan Cienki, Associate Editor; Ren
Jorna, Winfried Nth.
S.E.E.D. Journal (Semiotics, Evolution, Energy,
and Development) (20017), Edwina Taborsky,
Editorfrom SEE.

1.10. EXTERNAL LINKS


The Semiotic Review of Books, Gary Genosko, General Editor; Paul Bouissac, Founding Editor.
Semiotica, Marcel Danesi, Chief Editorfrom the
International Association for Semiotic Studies.
Semiotiche, Gian Paolo Caprettini, Managing Director; Andrea Valle & Miriam Visalli, Editors. Some
articles in English. Home site seems gone from
Web, old url no longer good, and Wayback Machine
cannot retrieve.
Semiotics, Communication and Cognition (book series), Paul Cobley & Kalevi Kull, Editors.
SemiotiX New Series: A Global Information Bulletin,
Paul Bouissac et al.
Sign Systems Studies, Kalevi Kull, Kati Lindstrom, Mihhail Lotman, Timo Maran, Silvi Salupere, Peeter Torop, Editorsfrom the Dept. of Semiotics, U. of Tartu, Estonia.
Signs and Society, Richard J. Parmentier, Editor.
Signs: International Journal of Semiotics. Martin
Thellefsen, Torkild Thellefsen, & Bent Srensen,
chief eds.
Tartu Semiotics Library (book series), Peeter Torop,
Kalevi Kull, Silvi Salupere, Editors.
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Cornelis de Waal, Chief Editorfrom The Charles S.
Peirce Society.
Versus: Quaderni di studi semiotici, founded by
Umberto Eco.

13

Chapter 2

Sign (semiotics)
In semiotics, a sign is something that can be interpreted
as having a meaning, which is something other than itself,
and which is therefore able to communicate information
to the one interpreting or decoding the sign. Signs can
work through any of the senses, visual, auditory, tactile,
olfactory or taste, and their meaning can be intentional
such as a word uttered with a specic meaning, or unintentional such as a symptom being a sign of a particular
medical condition.

surean sign exists only at the level of the synchronic system, in which signs are dened by their relative and hierarchical privileges of co-occurrence. It is thus a common
misreading of Saussure to take signiers to be anything
one could speak, and signieds as things in the world. In
fact, the relationship of language to parole (or speech-incontext) is and always has been a theoretical problem for
linguistics (cf. Roman Jakobsons famous essay Closing
Statement: Linguistics and Poetics et al.).

There are two major theories about the way in which signs
acquire the ability to transfer information; both theories
understand the dening property of the sign as being a relation between a number of elements. In the tradition of
semiotics developed by Ferdinand de Saussure the sign
relation is dyadic, consisting only of a form of the sign
(the signier) and its meaning (the signied). Saussure
saw this relation as being essentially arbitrary, motivated
only by social convention. Saussures theory has been particularly inuential in the study of linguistic signs. The
other major semiotic theory developed by C. S. Peirce
denes the sign as a triadic relation as something that
stands for something, to someone in some capacity[1]
This means that a sign is a relation between the sign vehicle (the specic physical form of the sign), a sign object (the aspect of the world that the sign carries meaning
about) and an interpretant (the meaning of the sign as understood by an interpreter). According to Peirce signs can
be divided by the type of relation that holds the sign relation together as either icons, indices or symbols. Icons
are those signs that signify by means of similarity between
sign vehicle and sign object (e.g. a portrait, or a map), indices are those that signify by means of a direct relation of
contiguity or causality between sign vehicle and sign object (e.g. a symptom), and symbols are those that signify
through a law or arbitrary social convention.

A famous thesis by Saussure states that the relationship


between a sign and the real-world thing it denotes is an
arbitrary one. There is not a natural relationship between
a word and the object it refers to, nor is there a causal relationship between the inherent properties of the object
and the nature of the sign used to denote it. For example,
there is nothing about the physical quality of paper that
requires denotation by the phonological sequence paper.
There is, however, what Saussure called relative motivation: the possibilities of signication of a signier are
constrained by the compositionality of elements in the linguistic system (cf. Emile Benveniste's paper on the arbitrariness of the sign in the rst volume of his papers on
general linguistics). In other words, a word is only available to acquire a new meaning if it is identiably dierent from all the other words in the language and it has no
existing meaning. Structuralism was later based on this
idea that it is only within a given system that one can dene the distinction between the levels of system and use,
or the semantic value of a sign.

2.1 Dyadic signs


According to Saussure (18571913), a sign is composed
of the signier[2] (signiant), and the signied (signi).
These cannot be conceptualized as separate entities but
rather as a mapping from signicant dierences in sound
to potential (correct) dierential denotation. The Saus-

2.2 Triadic signs


Charles Sanders Peirce (18391914) proposed a dierent theory. Unlike Saussure who approached the conceptual question from a study of linguistics and phonology,
Peirce was a somewhat Kantian philosopher who distinguished sign from word as only a particular kind
of sign, and characterized the sign as the means to
understanding. He covered not only articial, linguistic, and symbolic signs, but also all semblances (such
as kindred sensible qualities), and all indicators (such
as mechanical reactions). He counted as symbols all
terms, propositions, and arguments whose interpretation

14

2.2. TRIADIC SIGNS


is based upon convention or habit, even apart from their
expression in particular languages. He held that all
this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs.[3] The setting of Peirces
study of signs is philosophical logic, which he dened
as formal semiotic,[4] and characterized as a normative
eld following esthetics and ethics, as more basic than
metaphysics,[5] and as the art of devising methods of
research.[6] He argued that, since all thought takes time,
all thought is in signs,[7] that all thought has the form of inference (even when not conscious and deliberate),[7] and
that, as inference, logic is rooted in the social principle,
since inference depends on a standpoint that, in a sense,
is unlimited.[8] The result is a theory not of language in
particular, but rather of the production of meaning, and
it rejects the idea of a static relationship between a sign
and that which it represents, its object. Peirce believed
that signs are meaningful through recursive relationships
that arise in sets of three.
Even when a sign represents by a resemblance or factual connection independent of interpretation, the sign is
a sign only insofar as it is at least potentially interpretable
by a mind and insofar as the sign is a determination of a
mind or at least a quasi-mind, that functions as if it were
a mind, for example in crystals and the work of bees[9]
the focus here is on sign action in general, not on psychology, linguistics, or social studies (elds which Peirce also
pursued).
A sign is something which depends on an object in a way
that enables (and, in a sense, determines) an interpretation, an interpretant, to depend on the object as the sign
depends on the object. The interpretant, then, is a further
sign of the object, and thus enables and determines still
further interpretations, further interpretant signs. The
process, called semiosis, is irreducibly triadic, Peirce held,
and is logically structured to perpetuate itself. It is what
denes sign, object, and interpretant in general.[10] As
Jean-Jacques Nattiez (1990: 7) put it, the process of referring eected by the sign is innite. (Note also that
Peirce used the word determine in the sense not of strict
determinism, but of eectiveness that can vary like an
inuence.[11] )
Peirce further characterized the three semiotic elements
as follows:[12]
1. Sign (or representamen[13] ): that which represents
the denoted object (cf. Saussures signier).

15
may be
(a) immediate to the sign, the object as represented
in the sign, or
(b) dynamic, the object as it really is, on which the
immediate object is founded.
3. Interpretant (or interpretant sign): a signs meaning
or ramication as formed into a further sign by interpreting (or, as some put it, decoding) the sign. The
interpretant may be:
(a) immediate to the sign, a kind of possibility, all
that the sign is suited to immediately express,
for instance a words usual meaning;
(b) dynamic, that is, the meaning as formed into an
actual eect, for example an individual translation or a state of agitation, or
(c) nal or normal, that is, the ultimate meaning
that inquiry taken far enough would be destined to reach. It is a kind of norm or ideal
end, with which an actual interpretant may, at
most, coincide.
Peirce explained that signs mediate between their objects
and their interpretants in semiosis, the triadic process of
determination. In semiosis a rst is determined or inuenced to be a sign by a second, as its object. The object
determines the sign to determine a third as an interpretant. Firstness itself is one of Peirces three categories
of all phenomena, and is quality of feeling. Firstness is
associated with a vague state of mind as feeling and a
sense of the possibilities, with neither compulsion nor reection. In semiosis the mind discerns an appearance or
phenomenon, a potential sign. Secondness is reaction or
resistance, a category associated with moving from possibility to determinate actuality. Here, through experience
outside of and collateral to the given sign or sign system,
one recalls or discovers the object to which the sign refers,
for example when a sign consists in a chance semblance of
an absent but remembered object. It is through ones collateral experience[14] that the object determines the sign
to determine an interpretant. Thirdness is representation
or mediation, the category associated with signs, generality, rule, continuity, habit-taking, and purpose. Here one
forms an interpretant expressing a meaning or ramication of the sign about the object. When a second sign is
considered, the initial interpretant may be conrmed, or
new possible meanings may be identied. As each new
sign is addressed, more interpretants, themselves signs,
emerge. It can involve a minds reading of nature, people, mathematics, anything.

2. Object (or semiotic object): that which the sign represents (or as some put it, encodes). It can be anything thinkable, a law, a fact, or even a possibility
(a semiotic object could even be ctional, such as Peirce generalized the communicational idea of utterance
[15]
Hamlet); those are partial objects; the total object is and interpretation of a sign, to cover all signs:
the universe of discourse, the totality of objects in
that world to which one attributes the partial object.
Admitting that connected Signs must have
For example, perturbation of Plutos orbit is a sign
a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that
about Pluto, but not only about Pluto. The object
there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs

16

CHAPTER 2. SIGN (SEMIOTICS)


require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasiutterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although
these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the
sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct.
In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical
evolution of thought should be dialogic.

According to Nattiez, writing with Jean Molino, the tripartite denition of sign, object, and interpretant is based
on the "trace" or neutral level, Saussures sound-image
(or signied, thus Peirces representamen). Thus, a
symbolic form...is not some 'intermediary' in a process
of 'communication' that transmits the meaning intended
by the author to the audience; it is instead the result of a
complex process of creation (the poietic process) that has
to do with the form as well as the content of the work;
it is also the point of departure for a complex process of
reception (the esthesic process that reconstructs a 'message'"). (ibid, p. 17)
Molinos and Nattiezs diagram:
(Nattiez 1990, p. 17)
Peirces theory of the sign therefore oered a powerful
analysis of the signication system, its codes, and its processes of inference and learning, because the focus was
often on natural or cultural context rather than linguistics
which only analyses usage in slow-time whereas, in the
real world, there is an often chaotic blur of language and
signal exchange during human semiotic interaction. Nevertheless, the implication that triadic relations are structured to perpetuate themselves leads to a level of complexity not usually experienced in the routine of message
creation and interpretation. Hence, dierent ways of expressing the idea have been developed.

2.2.1

Classes of triadic signs

By 1903[16] Peirce came to classify signs by three universal trichotomies dependent on his three categories (quality, fact, habit). He classied any sign:[17]

3. by how the sign stands for its object to its interpretant either (rheme, also called seme,[18] such as a
term) as regards quality or possibility, as if the sign
were a qualisign, though it can be qualisign, sinsign,
or legisign or (dicisign, also called pheme, such as
a proposition) as regards fact, as if the sign were an
index, though it can be index or symbol or (argument, also called delome[19] ) as regards rule or habit.
This is the trichotomy of all signs as building blocks
in an inference process.
Any qualisign is an icon. Sinsigns include some
icons and some indices. Legisigns include some
icons, some indices, and all symbols.
Any icon is a rheme. Indices (be they sinsigns or
legisigns) include some rhemes and some dicisigns.
Symbols include some rhemes, some dicisigns, and
all arguments.
Because of those classicatory interdependences, the
three trichotomies intersect to form ten (rather than 27)
classes of signs. There are also various kinds of meaningful combination. Signs can be attached to one another. A
photograph is an index with a meaningfully attached icon.
Arguments are composed of dicisigns, and dicisigns are
composed of rhemes. In order to be embodied, legisigns
(types) need sinsigns (tokens) as their individual replicas or instances. A symbol depends as a sign on how
it will be interpreted, regardless of resemblance or factual connection to its object; but the symbols individual
embodiment is an index to your experience of the object. A symbol is instanced by a specialized indexical
sinsign. A symbol such as a sentence in a language prescribes qualities of appearance for its instances, and is itself a replica of a symbol such as a proposition apart from
expression in a particular language. Peirce covered both
semantic and syntactical issues in his theoretical grammar, as he sometimes called it. He regarded formal semiotic, as logic, as furthermore encompassing study of arguments (hypothetical, deductive, and inductive) and inquirys methods including pragmatism; and as allied to
but distinct from logics pure mathematics.

Peirce sometimes referred to the ground of a sign. The


ground is the pure abstraction of a quality.[20] A signs
ground is the respect in which the sign represents its object, e.g. as in literal and gurative language. For example, an icon presents a characteristic or quality attributed
2. by how the sign stands for its object either (icon) to an object, while a symbol imputes to an object a quality
by its own quality, such that it resembles the object, either presented by an icon or symbolized so as to evoke
regardless of factual connection and of interpretive a mental icon.
rule of reference or (index) by factual connec- Peirce called an icon apart from a label, legend, or other
tion to its object, regardless of resemblance and of index attached to it, a hypoicon, and divided the hyinterpretive rule of reference or (symbol) by rule poicon into three classes: (a) the image, which depends
or habit of interpreted reference to its object, re- on a simple quality; (b) the diagram, whose internal regardless of resemblance and of factual connection; lations, mainly dyadic or so taken, represent by analogy
the relations in something; and (c) the metaphor, which
and
1. by what stands as the sign either (qualisign, also
called a tone) a quality or (sinsign, also called token) an individual fact or (legisign, also called
type) a rule, a habit;

2.4. POSTMODERN THEORY


represents the representative character of a sign by representing a parallelism in something else.[21] A diagram
can be geometric, or can consist in an array of algebraic
expressions, or even in the common form All __ is ___
which is subjectable, like any diagram, to logical or mathematical transformations. Peirce held that mathematics
is done by diagrammatic thinking observation of, and
experimentation on, diagrams. Peirce developed for deductive logic a system of visual existential graphs, which
continue to be researched today.

2.3 20th century theories


It is now agreed that the eectiveness of the acts that may
convert the message into text (including speaking, writing, drawing, music and physical movements) depends
upon the knowledge of the sender. If the sender is not
familiar with the current language, its codes and its culture, then he or she will not be able to say anything at all,
whether as a visitor in a dierent language area or because of a medical condition such as aphasia (see Roman
Jakobson).
Modern theories deny the Saussurian distinction between
signier and signied, and look for meaning not in the
individual signs, but in their context and the framework
of potential meanings that could be applied. Such theories assert that language is a collective memory or cultural
history of all the dierent ways in which meaning has
been communicated, and may to that extent, constitute
all lifes experiences (see Louis Hjelmslev). Hjelmslev
did not consider the sign to be the smallest semiotic unit,
as he believed it possible to decompose it further; instead,
he considered the internal structure of language to be a
system of gurae, a concept somewhat related to that of
gure of speech, which he considered to be the ultimate
semiotic unity.[22][23][24]
This position implies that speaking is simply one more
form of behaviour and changes the focus of attention
from the text as language, to the text as a representation
of purpose, a functional version of the authors intention.
But, once the message has been transmitted, the text exists independently.
Hence, although the writers who co-operated to produce
this page exist, they can only be represented by the signs
actually selected and presented here. The interpretation
process in the receivers mind may attribute meanings
completely dierent from those intended by the senders.
But, why might this happen? Neither the sender nor the
receiver of a text has a perfect grasp of all language.
Each individuals relatively small stock of knowledge is
the product of personal experience and their attitude to
learning. When the audience receives the message, there
will always be an excess of connotational meanings available to be applied to the particular signs in their context
(no matter how relatively complete or incomplete their

17
knowledge, the cognitive process is the same).
The rst stage in understanding the message is therefore,
to suspend or defer judgement until more information becomes available. At some point, the individual receiver
decides which of all the possible meanings represents the
best possible t. Sometimes, uncertainty may not be
resolved, so meaning is indenitely deferred, or a provisional or approximate meaning is allocated. More often,
the receivers desire for closure (see Gestalt psychology)
leads to simple meanings being attributed out of prejudices and without reference to the senders intentions.

2.4 Postmodern theory


In critical theory, the notion of sign is used variously.
Many postmodernist theorists postulate a complete disconnection of the signier and the signied. An 'empty'
or 'oating signier' is variously dened as a signier with
a vague, highly variable, unspeciable or non-existent signied. Such signiers mean dierent things to dierent
people: they may stand for many or even any signieds;
they may mean whatever their interpreters want them to
mean.[25]

2.5 See also


Grapheme
Semantic
Semeiotic
Semiotic triangle
Sign (linguistics)
Sign relation
Triadic relation
Freudian slip

2.6 Notes
[1] Marcel Danesi and Paul Perron, Analyzing Cultures.
[2] Mardy S. Ireland denes a signier as:
A unit of something (i.e., a word, gesture) that can carry
ambiguous/multiple meanings (e.g., as U.S. President Bill
Clinton once said, It depends on what the meaning of the
word 'is, is)
Ireland, Mardy S. (2003). The Art of the Subject: Between
Necessary Illusion and Speakable Desire in the Analytic Encounter. Other Press. 159051033X. p. 13.
[3] Peirce, C. S., Collected Papers, v. 5, paragraph 448 footnote, from The Basis of Pragmaticism in 1906.

18

[4] Peirce, C.S., 1902, Application to the Carnegie Institution, Memoir 12, On the Denition of Logic, Eprint.
Note that by logic Peirce means a part of philosophy,
not the mathematics of logic. (See Classication of the
sciences (Peirce).
[5] On his classications, see Peirce, C.S. (1903), Collected
Peirce v. 1, paragraphs 180202 Eprint and (1906) The
Basis of Pragmaticism in The Essential Peirce v. 2, pp.
3723. For relevant quotes, see Philosophy and Logic
in the Commens Dictionary of Peirces Terms.
[6] Peirce, C.S., 1882, Introductory Lecture on the Study of
Logic delivered September 1882, Johns Hopkins University Circulars, v. 2, n. 19, pp. 1112, November 1892,
Google Book Eprint. Reprinted in Collected Papers v. 7,
paragraphs 5976, The Essential Peirce v. 1, pp. 21014,
and Writings of Charles S. Peirce v. 4, pp. 37882.
[7] Peirce, C.S. (1868), Questions concerning certain Faculties claimed for Man (Arisbe Eprint), Journal of Speculative Philosophy vol. 2, pp. 103114. Reprinted in Collected Papers v. 5, paragraphs 21363.
[8] Peirce, C. S. (1878) The Doctrine of Chances, Popular Science Monthly, v. 12, pp. 60415, 1878, reprinted
in Collected Papers, v. 2, paragraphs 64568, Writings
of Charles S. Peirce v. 3, pp. 27690, and The Essential Peirce v. 1, pp. 14254. "...death makes the number
of our risks, the number of our inferences, nite, and so
makes their mean result uncertain. The very idea of probability and of reasoning rests on the assumption that this
number is indenitely great. .... ...logicality inexorably
requires that our interests shall not be limited. .... Logic
is rooted in the social principle.
[9] See under "Quasi-mind" in the Commens Dictionary of
Peirces Terms.
[10] For Peirces denitions of sign and semiosis, see under
"Sign" and "Semiosis, semeiosy" in the Commens Dictionary of Peirces Terms; and "76 denitions of sign by C.
S. Peirce" collected by Robert Marty. Peirces "What Is a
Sign" (MS 404 of 1894, Essential Peirce v. 2, pp. 410)
provides intuitive help.
[11] For example, Peirce said determined (i.e., specialized,
bestimmt)" in a letter to William James, dated 1909, see
p. 492 in The Essential Peirce v. 2.
[12] For Peirces denitions of immediate object and the rest,
see the Commens Dictionary of Peirces Terms.
[13] Pronounced with the a long and stressed:
/[Link]/. See wiktionary:representamen.
[14] In that context Peirce speaks of collateral experience, collateral observation, collateral acquaintance, all in much
the same terms. See pp. 4049 in Pragmatism in The
Essential Peirce v. 2. Ten quotes on collateral experience
from Peirce provided by Joseph Ransdell can be viewed
here at peirce-ls Lyris archive.
[15] Peirce (1906), Prolegomena To an Apology For Pragmaticism, The Monist, v. XVI, n. 4, pp. 492546, see
pp. 5234, Google Books Eprint. Reprinted in Collected
Papers v. 4, paragraphs 53072, see 551.

CHAPTER 2. SIGN (SEMIOTICS)

[16] Peirce (1903 MS), Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined, under
other titles in Collected Papers (CP) v. 2, paragraphs 233
72, and reprinted under the original title in Essential Peirce
(EP) v. 2, pp. 28999. Also see image of MS 339 (August 7, 1904) supplied to peirce-l by Bernard Morand of
the Institut Universitaire de Technologie (France), Dpartement Informatique.
[17] For more as to the denitions, terminology, and development of the classications, see the Commens Dictionary
of Peirces Terms
[18] In 1902 Peirce used the word seme instead for an index,
especially an indexical sinsign. See Collected Papers v. 2,
paragraph 283.
[19] Peirce said, pronounce deeloam, from ", Peirce
(1906), Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism,
The Monist, v. 16, n. 4, pp. 492546, see 507. Reprinted
in Collected Papers v. 4, paragraphs 530572, see 538.
Eprint.
[20] Peirce, C.S. (1867), "On a New List of Categories", Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,
v. 7 (1868), pp. 28798. (Delivered orally by Peirce in
1867 and distributed by him in 1867 as part of an extract).
[21] Peirce, Collected Papers v. 2, paragraphs 2767, written
circa 1902. See under "Diagram" in the Commens Dictionary of Peirces Terms.
[22] Hjelmslev [1943] Prolegomena to a Theory of Language,
pp.47, 65, 67, and cf. 6.26, 30
[23] Robert de Beaugrande (1991) [Linguistic Theory: The
Discourse of Fundamental Works], section on Louis
Hjelmslev.
[24] Nth, Winfried (1990) Handbook of semiotics, pp.66, 701 section 3
[25] Daniel Chandler, Semiotics: The Basics, Routledge 2007,
page 78

2.7 External links


Semiotics For Beginners full text online, Daniel
Chandler
Associations and journals
American Journal of Semiotics, Joseph Brent, Editor, & John Deely, Managing Editorfrom the
Semiotic Society of America.
Applied Semiotics / Smiotique applique(AS/SA),
Peter G. Marteinson & Pascal G. Michelucci, Editors.
Approaches to Applied Semiotics (20002009 book
series), Thomas Sebeok et al., Editors.

2.7. EXTERNAL LINKS


Approaches to Semiotics (196997 book series),
Thomas A. Sebeok, Alain Rey, Roland Posner, et
al., Editors.
Biosemiotics, Marcello Barbieri, Editor-in-Chief
from the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies.
Center for Semiotics, Aarhus University, Denmark.
Cognitive Semiotics, Per Aage Brandt & Todd Oakley, Editors-in-Chief.
Cybernetics and Human Knowing, Sren Brier,
Chief Editor.
International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems
(IJSSS), Angelo Loula & Joo Queiroz, Editors.
Open Semiotics Resource Center. Journals, lecture
courses, etc.
The Public Journal of Semiotics, Paul Bouissac, Editor in Chief; Alan Cienki, Associate Editor; Ren
Jorna, Winfried Nth.
S.E.E.D. Journal (Semiotics, Evolution, Energy,
and Development) (20017), Edwina Taborsky,
Editorfrom SEE.
The Semiotic Review of Books, Gary Genosko, General Editor; Paul Bouissac, Founding Editor.
Semiotica, Marcel Danesi, Chief Editorfrom the
International Association for Semiotic Studies.
Semiotiche, Gian Paolo Caprettini, Managing Director; Andrea Valle & Miriam Visalli, Editors. Some
articles in English. Home site seems gone from
Web, old url no longer good, and Wayback Machine
cannot retrieve.
Semiotics, Communication and Cognition (book series), Paul Cobley & Kalevi Kull, Editors.
SemiotiX New Series: A Global Information Bulletin,
Paul Bouissac et al.
Sign Systems Studies, Kalevi Kull, Kati Lindstrom, Mihhail Lotman, Timo Maran, Silvi Salupere, Peeter Torop, Editorsfrom the Dept. of Semiotics, U. of Tartu, Estonia.
Signs and Society, Richard J. Parmentier, Editor.
Signs: International Journal of Semiotics. Martin
Thellefsen, Torkild Thellefsen, & Bent Srensen,
chief eds.
Tartu Semiotics Library (book series), Peeter Torop,
Kalevi Kull, Silvi Salupere, Editors.
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Cornelis de Waal, Chief Editorfrom The Charles S.
Peirce Society.

19
Versus: Quaderni di studi semiotici, founded by
Umberto Eco.

Chapter 3

Code (semiotics)
For other uses, see Code (disambiguation).
In semiotics, a code is a set of conventions or sub-codes
currently in use to communicate meaning. The most
common is ones spoken language, but the term can also
be used to refer to any narrative form: consider the color
scheme of an image (e.g. red for danger), or the rules of
a board game (e.g. the military signiers in chess).
Ferdinand de Saussure (18571913) emphasised that
signs only acquire meaning and value when they are interpreted in relation to each other. He believed that the
relationship between the signier and the signied was
arbitrary. Hence, interpreting signs requires familiarity
with the sets of conventions or codes currently in use to
communicate meaning.

the social identity each individual constructs through the


way the language is spoken (i.e. with an accent or as a
dialect) or written (i.e. in sentences or in SMS format),
the place of residence (see Americanisms), the nature of
any employment undertaken, the style of dress, and nonverbal behaviour (e.g. through dierentiating customs as
to the extent of private space, whether and where people may touch or stare at each other, etc.). The process
of socialisation is learning to understand the prevailing
codes and then deciding which to apply at any given time,
i.e. acknowledging that there is sometimes an ideological
quality to the coding system, determining levels of social
acceptability, reecting current attitudes and beliefs. This
includes regulatory codes that are intended to control behaviour and the use of some signifying codes. The human
body is a means of using presentational codes through facial expressions, gestures, and dress. So words spoken
may change their connotation to unacceptable if accompanied by inappropriate nonverbal signs.

Roman Jakobson (18961982) elaborated the idea that


the production and interpretation of texts depends on the
existence of codes or conventions for communication.
Since the meaning of a sign depends on the code within The other code forms rely upon knowledge held by, and
which it is situated, codes provide a framework within the interests of, the addressees. Specialised denotational
which signs make sense (see Semiosis).
codes may provide a more objective and impersonal form
of language for mathematical, philosophical, and scientic texts. Hence, for example, the ability to read this
text depends upon a more specialised form of vocabulary
3.1 Discussion
and dierent skills to those required to read a genre text
detailing the investigations of a detective or the advenTo that extent, codes represent a broad interpretative tures of a secret agent. There are also specialised connoframework used by both addressers and their addressees tational and ideological codes to reect particular social,
to encode and decode the messages. Self-evidently, political, moral, and aesthetic values. Musical and iconic
the most eective communications will result when codes would be relevant as between a work by Arnold
both creator and interpreter use exactly the same code. Schoenberg and a piece of bubblegum pop, and a paintSince signs may have many levels of meaning from the ing by Rembrandt and a comic book by Frank Miller,
denotational to the connotational, the addressers strategy etc. Each medium has its own specialised codes and, by
is to select and combine the signs in ways that limit the making them more explicit, semiotics is attempting to
range of possible meanings likely to be generated when explain the practices and conventions have appeared in
the message is interpreted. This will be achieved by in- each form and to understand how meaning is being comcluding metalingual contextual clues, e.g. the nature of municated. In return, this assists addressers to improve
the medium, the modality of the medium, the style, e.g. their techniques, no matter what their functional needs,
academic, literary, genre ction, etc., and references to, e.g. as politicians, journalists, advertisers, creative artists,
or invocations of, other codes, e.g. a reader may initially etc. Indeed, awareness leads to an intentional blending of
interpret a set of signiers as a literal representation, but codes for eect, e.g. an advertiser may produce a more
clues may indicate a transformation into a metaphorical eective campaign with a slogan, images and a jingle usor allegorical interpretats diachronically. Distinctions of ing lexical, social gestural, and musical codes.
class or memberships of groups will be determined by
20

3.3. REFERENCES

3.2 See also


genetic code

3.3 References
Chandler, Daniel, Semiotics: The Basics, Routledge,
London, UK, 2002. ISBN 0-415-36375-6
Jakobson, Roman, Language in Relation to Other
Communication Systems, pp. 570579 in Selected
Writings, Volume 2, Mouton, The Hague, 1971.
ISBN 90-279-3178-X

21

Chapter 4

Connotation (semiotics)
This word has distinct meanings in logic, philosophy, and common usage. See connotation.

information adds to other data forming a symptomology


for the patient, a summation that takes place at a connotative cognitive level. Hence, the meanings as to health
or illness are selected from the connotational framework
which the interpreter has constructed through training
and experience given that each possible state of wellbeing is represented by a cluster of symbolic attributes,
one of which is the patients temperature.

In semiotics, connotation arises when the denotative relationship between a signier and its signied is inadequate to serve the needs of the community. A second
level of meanings is termed connotative. These meanings
are not objective representations of the thing, but new usages produced by the language group.
Connotation is concerned with how the sign system is
used in each message. The semantic content is selected
by the addresser and represents that individuals values
and intentions. Limiting an analysis purely to the sign
4.1 Discussion
system comprised by paradigms and syntagms excludes
Drawing from the original denition proposed by key elements in the interpretive process. Thus, subjective
tests such as the commutation test have been developed to
Saussure (1857-1913), a sign has two parts:
map connotations and so decode more of the addressers
intentions. This is achieved by changing the form of the
as a signier, i.e. it will have a form that a person signiers, by substituting signiers to assess what the alcan see, touch, smell, and/or hear, and
ternative connotations would be and by considering what
as the signied, i.e. it will represent an idea or men- signiers are absent and why their absences might be signicant. Changes of form would require substituting diftal construct of a thing rather than the thing itself.
ferent fonts for the same text, or dierent colours or designs for the same visual content. The use of synonyms
Connotative meanings are developed by the community
and antonyms claries connotational choices as between,
and do not represent the inherent qualities of the thing
say, pejorative and euphemistic usages. As to absences,
or concept originally signied as the meaning. The adif a modern image of a group of people employed in a
dition of such meanings introduces complexity into the
major public enterprise only contains individuals of the
coding system. If a signier has only a single denotational
same gender and ethnicity, the analyst would enquire into
meaning, the use of the sign will always be unambiguthe signicance of the exclusion of those of the opposite
ously decoded by the audience. But connotative meangender and a dierent ethnicity. The editorial decision
ings are context-dependent, i.e. the addresser must learn
may be supporting social values, attitudes and beliefs that
how to match the meaning intended by the addresser to
are embedded into the culture---for example, that nations
one of the various possible meanings held in memory.
ought to conscript only men to serve on the front-lines of a
The power of connotation is that it enables the addresser war. Other explanations of dierent contexts may expose
to more easily consider abstract concepts and to intro- cultural myths and prejudices which are less reasonable.
duce subtlety into the discourse. For example, a digital thermometer produces a numerical value that indicates the current state of a specic operational parameter. 4.2 References
This technology provides an indexical sign of heat (adopting the classication of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839 Barthes, Roland. Elements of Semiology (trans. An1914), an indexical sign by real connection between the
nette Lavers & Colin Smith). London: Jonathan
signier and the signied). The number is a denotative
Cape. (1967).
value, i.e. it speaks only for itself. The doctor, nurse
Chandler, Daniel. (2001/2007). Semiotics: The Baor patient will relate to the number as a visual trope, in
this case a metaphor, for the health of the body. Such
sics. London: Routledge.
22

4.3. FURTHER READING

4.3 Further reading


Georgij Yu. Somov, Semiotic systems of works of
visual art: Signs, connotations, signals, Semiotica
157 (1/4), 1-34, 2005 .
Georgij Yu. Somov, Connotations in semiotic systems of visual art (by the example of works by M.
A. Vrubel). Semiotica 158 (1/4), 147-212, 2006 .

23

Chapter 5

Denotation (semiotics)
In semiotics, denotation is the surface or literal meaning Barthes and others have argued that it is more dicult
encoded to a signier, and the denition most likely to to make a clear distinction when analysing images. For
appear in a dictionary.
example, how is one to interpret a photograph? In the
real world, a human observer has binocular vision, but the
two-dimensional picture must be analysed to determine
depth and the relative size of objects depicted by applying
5.1 Discussion
rules of perspective, the operation of which can be confused by focus and composition. One view might be that
Drawing from the original word or denition proposed by the picture as interpreted is evidence of what it depicts
Saussure (1857-1913), a sign has two parts:
and, since the technology collects and stores data from
the real world, the resulting picture is a denition of what
the camera was pointed at, and so denotational. Adopting
as a signier, i.e. it will have a form that a person
the classication of Charles Sanders Peirce, this would be
can see, touch, smell, and/or hear, and
considered an indexical sign, i.e. there is a direct connection between the signier and the signied. While it is
as the signied, i.e. it will represent an idea or mental
true that an unedited photograph may be an index, digital
construct of a thing rather than the thing itself.
technology is eroding the viewers condence that the image is an objective representation of reality. Further, the
To transmit information, both the addresser and the ad- photographer made conscious decisions about the comdressee must use the same code, whether in the literal position of the image, how to light it, whether to take a
sense, e.g. Morse Code or in the form of a language. The close-up or long shot, etc. All of these decisions repredenotative meaning of a signier is intended to commu- sent both the intention and the values of the photographer
nicate the objective semantic content of the represented in wishing to preserve this image. This led John Fiske to
thing. So, in the case of a lexical word, say book, the in- suggest that, denotation is what is photographed, connotention is to do no more than describe the physical object. tation is how it is photographed. Such problems become
Any other meanings or implications will be connotative even more dicult to resolve once the audience knows
meanings.
that the photograph or moving image has been edited or
The distinction between denotation and connotation can staged. (See also modality)
be made in textual analysis and the existence of dictionaries is used to support the argument that the sign system
begins with a simple meaning that is then glossed as new
usages are developed. But this argument equally means
that no sign can be separated from both its denotational
and connotational meanings, and, since the addresser is
always using the sign for a particular purpose in a context,
no sign can be divorced from the values of the addresser.
Louis Hjelmslev (1899-1965) therefore proposes that although the function of signication may be a single process, denotation is the rst step, and connotation the second. Roland Barthes (1915-1980) added a third possible
step in world view or Weltanschauung in which metacognitive schema such as liberty, sexuality, autonomy, etc.
create a framework of reference from which more abstract meanings may be attributed to the signs, depending
on the context.

5.2 References

24

Barthes, Roland. Elements of Semiology (trans. Annette Lavers & Colin Smith). London: Jonathan
Cape. (1967).
Chandler, Daniel. (2001/2007). Semiotics: The Basics. London: Routledge.
Fiske, John. Introduction to Communication Studies.
London: Routledge. (1982)

5.3. FURTHER READING

5.3 Further reading


Georgij Yu. Somov, Semiotic systemity of visual
artworks: Case study of The Holy Trinity by Rublev.
Semiotica 166 (1/4), 1-79, 2007 .
Georgij Yu. Somov, The role of structures in semiotic systems (analysis of some ideas of Leonardo
da Vinci and the portrait Lady with an Ermine).
Semiotica 172 (1/4), 351-417, 2008 .

25

Chapter 6

Content word
In linguistics content words are words such as nouns,
most verbs, adjectives, and adverbs that refer to some
object, action, or characteristic. Content words contrast
with function words, which function primarily to express
the grammatical relationships between other words in a
sentence. Content words are most often open class words,
meaning that new content words can be added to the
lexicon easily.[1] In relation to phonology, content words
adhere to the minimal word constraint, while function
words do not.[2]

6.1 See also


Lexical verb
Grammaticalization, the process by which words
may change from content to function words

6.2 References
[1] Winkler, Elizabeth Grace (2007). Understanding Language. Continuum. pp. 8485. ISBN 978-08264-84833.
[2] [Link]
Function_Words.pdf

26

Chapter 7

Modality (semiotics)
In semiotics, a modality is a particular way in which
information is to be encoded for presentation to humans,
i.e. to the type of sign and to the status of reality ascribed
to or claimed by a sign, text or genre. It is more closely
associated with the semiotics of Charles Peirce (1839
1914) than Ferdinand de Saussure (18571913) because
meaning is conceived as an eect of a set of signs. In the
Peircean model, a reference is made to an object when
the sign (or representamen) is interpreted recursively by
another sign (which becomes its interpretant), a conception of meaning that does in fact imply a classication of
sign types.

7.1 Discussion of sign-type


The psychology of perception seems to suggest the existence of a common cognitive system which treats all or
most sensorily conveyed meanings in the same way. If
all signs must also be objects of perception, there is every reason to believe that their modality will determine
at least part of their nature. Thus, the sensory modalities will be visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, gustatory,
kinesthetic, etc. A list of sign types would include:
writing, symbol, index, image, map, graph, diagram, etc.
Some combinations of signs can be multi-modal, i.e. different types of signs grouped together for eect. But the
distinction between a medium and a modality should be
claried:

Braille, and kinetic media as sign language. When meaning is conveyed by spoken language, it is converted into
sound waves broadcast by the speaker and received by anothers ears. Yet this stimulus cannot be divorced from
the visual evidence of the speakers manner and gestures,
and the general awareness of the physical location and
its possible connotative signicance. Similarly, meaning
that is contained in a visual form cannot be divorced from
the iconicity and implications of the form. If handwritten, is the writing neat or does it evidence emotion in its
style. What type of paper is used, what colour ink, what
kind of writing instrument: all such questions are relevant to an interpretation of the signicance of what is
represented. But images are distinguishable from natural language. For Roland Barthes (191580), language
functions with relatively determinate meanings whereas
images say nothing. Nevertheless, there is a rhetoric for
arranging the parts which are to signify, and an emerging,
if not yet generally accepted, syntax that articulates their
parts and binds them into an eective whole. Rhetorician
Thomas Rosteck dened rhetoric as the use of language
and other symbolic systems to make sense of our experiences, construct our personal and collective identities,
produce meaning, and prompt action in the world.[1]

7.2 See also


denotation
narrative paradigm

text is a medium for presenting the modality of natural language;

semantics

image is both a medium and a modality;

pragmatics

syntactics

music is a modality for the auditory media.


So, the modality refers to a certain type of information
and/or the representation format in which information is
stored. The medium is the means whereby this information is delivered to the senses of the interpreter. Natural
language is the primary modality, having many invariant
properties across the auditory media as spoken language,
the visual media as written language, the tactile media as

7.3 References

27

[1] Borchers, Timothy (2006). Rhetorical Theory: An Introduction. Belmont, CA. p. 8. ISBN 978-1-57766-731-5.

Barthes, Roland. Elements of Semiology. (Translated by Annette Lavers & Colin Smith). London:
Jonathan Cape. ([1964] 1967)

28
Barthes, Roland. The Rhetoric of the Image in
Image, Music, Text, (Translated by Stephen Heath).
Hill and Wang. (1977)
Chandler, Daniel. (2001/2007). Semiotics: The Basics. London: Routledge.

CHAPTER 7. MODALITY (SEMIOTICS)

Chapter 8

Representation (arts)
Representation is the use of signs that stand in for and The term 'representation' carries a range of meanings and
take the place of something else.[1] It is through rep- interpretations. In literary theory, 'representation' is comresentation that people organize the world and reality monly dened in three ways.
through the act of naming its elements.[1] Signs are arranged in order to form semantic constructions and ex1. To look like or resemble
press relations.[1]
2. To stand in for something or someone
3. To present a second time; to re-present[2]
Representation began with early literary theory in the
ideas of Plato and Aristotle, and has evolved into
a signicant component of language, Saussurian and
communication studies.[2]

8.1 Dening representation


To represent is to bring to mind by description, also to
symbolize, to be the embodiment of;" from [Link]. representer (12c.), from L. repraesentare, from re-, intensive
prex, + praesentare to present, lit. to place before.
A representation is a type of recording in which the sensory information about a physical object is described in a
medium. The degree to which an artistic representation
resembles the object it represents is a function of resolution and does not bear on the denotation of the word.
For example, both the Mona Lisa and a childs crayon
drawing of Lisa del Giocondo would be considered representational, and any preference for one over the other
would need to be understood as a matter of aesthetics.
Bust of Aristotle, Greek philosopher

For many philosophers, both ancient and modern, man is


regarded as the representational animal or animal symbolicum, the creature whose distinct character is the creation and the manipulation of signs things that stand
for or take the place of something else.[1]

8.2 History

Since ancient times representation has played a central


role in understanding literature, aesthetics and semiotics.
Plato and Aristotle are key gures in early literary theory who considered literature as simply one form of
Representation has been associated with aesthetics (art) representation.[3] Aristotle for instance, considered each
and semiotics (signs). Mitchell says representation is an mode of representation, verbal, visual or musical, as beextremely elastic notion, which extends all the way from ing natural to human beings.[4] Therefore, what distina stone representing a man to a novel representing the day guishes humans from other animals is their ability to crein the life of several Dubliners.[1]
ate and manipulate signs.[5] Aristotle deemed mimesis as
29

30

CHAPTER 8. REPRESENTATION (ARTS)


of evil.[5]
Aristotle went on to say it was a denitively human
activity.[1] From childhood man has an instinct for representation, and in this respect man diers from the other
animals that he is far more imitative and learns his rst
lessons though imitating things.[1] Aristotle discusses representation in three ways
1. The object: The symbol being represented.
2. Manner: The way the symbol is represented.
3. Means: The material that is used to represent it.
The means of literary representation is language. An important part of representation is the relationship between
what the material and what it represents. The questions
arising from this are, A stone may represent a man but
how? And by what and by what agreement, does this understanding of the representation occur?"[1]

Reproduction of the Mona Lisa

One apprehends reality only through representations of


reality, through texts, discourses, images: there is no such
thing as direct or unmediated access to reality. But because one can see reality only through representation it
does not follow that one does not see reality at all Reality is always more extensive and complicated than any
system of representation can comprehend, and we always
sense that this is so-representation never gets reality,
which is why human history has produced so many and
changing ways of trying to get it.[7]
Consequently, throughout the history of human culture,
people have become dissatised with languages ability to
express reality and as a result have developed new modes
of representation. It is necessary to construct new ways
of seeing reality, as people only know reality through
representation.[7] From this arises the contrasting and alternate theories and representational modes of abstraction, realism and modernism, to name a few.

Greek theatrical masks depicted in Hadrians Villa mosaic

8.3 Contemporary ideas about representation

natural to man, therefore considered representations as


necessary for peoples learning and being in the world.[4]
Plato, in contrast, looked upon representation with more
caution. He recognised that literature is a representation
of life, yet also believed that representations create worlds
of illusion leading one away from the real things.[6] For
Plato, representation, like contemporary media, intervenes between the viewer and the real, creating illusions
that lead one away from real things. Plato believed that
representation needs therefore, to be controlled and monitored due to the possible dangers resulting in its ability
to foster antisocial emotions or encourage the imitation

It is from Platos caution that in the modern era many


are aware of political and ideological issues and the inuences of representations. It is impossible to divorce representations from culture and the society that produces
them. In the contemporary world there exist restrictions
on subject matter, limiting the kinds of representational
signs allowed to be employed, as well as boundaries that
limit the audience or viewers of particular representations. In motion picture rating systems, M and R rated
lms are an example of such restrictions, highlighting also
societys attempt to restrict and modify representations to
promote a certain set of ideologies and values. Despite
these restrictions, representations still have the ability to

8.4. PEIRCE AND REPRESENTATION

31

take on a life of their own once in the public sphere, and


can not be given a denitive or concrete meaning; as there
will always be a gap between intention and realization,
original and copy.[5]
Consequently, for each of the above denitions there exists a process of communication and message sending and
receiving. In such a system of communication and representations it is inevitable that potential problems may
arise; misunderstandings, errors, and falsehoods. The accuracy of the representations can by no means be guaranteed, as they operate in a system of signs that can never
work in isolation from other signs or cultural factors. For
instance, the interpretation and reading of representations
function in the context of a body of rules for interpreting,
and within a society many of these codes or conventions
are informally agreed upon and have been established
over a number of years. Such understandings however,
are not set in stone and may alter between times, places,
peoples and contexts. How though, does this agreement
or understanding of representation occur? It has generally been agreed by semioticians that representational
relationships can be categorised into three distinct headCharles Sanders Peirce
ings: icon, symbol and index.[5]
For instance objects and people do not have a constant
meaning, but their meanings are fashioned by humans in
the context of their culture, as they have the ability to
make things mean or signify something.[6] Viewing representation in such a way focuses on understanding how
language and systems of knowledge production work to
create and circulate meanings. Representation is simply
the process in which such meanings are constructed.[6]
In much the same way as the post-structuralists, this approach to representation considers it as something larger
than any one single representation. A similar perspective is viewing representation as part of a larger eld, as
Mitchell, saying, "representation (in memory, in verbal
descriptions, in images) not only 'mediates our knowledge (of slavery and of many other things), but obstructs,
fragments, and negates that knowledge[8] and proposes a
move away from the perspective that representations are
merely objects representing, towards a focus on the relationships and processes through which representations
are produced, valued, viewed and exchanged.

8.4 Peirce and representation


Charles Sanders Peirce (18391914) was an innovative
and accomplished logician, mathematician, and scientist,
and founded philosophical pragmatism. Peirces central
ideas were focused on logic and representation.

8.4.1

Semiotics and logic

Peirce distinguished philosophical logic as logic per se


from mathematics of logic. He regarded logic (per se)

as part of philosophy, as a normative eld following esthetics and ethics, as more basic than metaphysics,[9] and
as the art of devising methods of research.[10] He argued
that, more generally, as inference, logic is rooted in the
social principle, since inference depends on a standpoint
that, in a sense, is unlimited.[11]
Peirce held that logic is formal semiotic,[12] the formal
study of signs in the broadest sense, not only signs that
are articial, linguistic, or symbolic, but also signs that
are semblances or are indexical such as reactions. He
held that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is
not composed exclusively of signs,[13] along with their
representational and inferential relations, interpretable by
mind or quasi-mind (whatever works like a mind despite
perhaps not actually being one);[14] the focus here is on
sign action in general, not psychology, linguistics, or social studies).
He argued that, since all thought takes time, all thought
is in signs[15] and sign processes ("semiosis") and that
the three irreducible elements of semiosis are (1) the sign
(or representamen), (2) the (semiotic) object, the signs
subject matter, which the sign represents and which can
be anything thinkablequality, brute fact, or lawand
even ctional (Prince Hamlet), and (3) the interpretant
(or interpretant sign), which is the signs meaning or ramication as formed into a kind of idea or eect that is
a further sign, for example, a translation.[16] Even when
a sign represents by a resemblance or factual connection
independent of interpretation, the sign is a sign because it
is at least potentially interpretable. A sign depends on its
object in a way that enables (and, in a sense, determines)
interpretation, forming an interpretant which, in turn, de-

32
pends on the sign and on the object as the sign depends on
the object and is thus a further sign, enabling and determining still further interpretation, further interpretants.
That essentially triadic process is logically structured to
perpetuate itself and is what denes sign, object, and interpretant.
An object either (1) is immediate to a sign, and that is
the object as represented in the sign, or (2) is a dynamic
object, which is the object as it really is, on which the immediate object is founded. Usually, an object in question,
such as Hamlet or the planet Neptune, is a special or partial object. A signs total object is the objects universe
of discourse, the totality of things in that world to which
one attributes the object. An interpretant is either (1) immediate to a sign, for example a words usual meaning,
a kind of interpretive quality or possibility present in the
sign, or (2) dyanamic, an actual interpretant, for example
a state of agitation, or (3) nal or normal, a questions
true settlement, which would be reached if thought or inquiry were pushed far enough, a kind of norm or ideal end
with which any actual interpretant may, at most, coincide.
Peirce said that, in order to know to what a sign refers,
the mind needs some sort of experience of the signs object, experience outside, and collateral to, the given sign
or sign system. In that context he spoke of collateral experience, collateral observation, collateral acquaintance,
all in much the same terms.[17] For example, art work can
exploit both the richness and the limits of the audiences
experience; a novelist, in disguising a roman clef, counts
on the typical readers lack of personal experience with
the actual individual people portrayed. Then the reader
refers the signs and interpretants in a general way to an
object or objects of the kind that is represented (intentionally or otherwise) by the novel. In all cases, the object
(be it a quality or fact or law or even ctional) determines
the sign to an interpretant through ones collateral experience with the object, collateral experience in which the
object is newly found or from which it is recalled, even
if it is experience with an object of imagination as called
into being by the sign, as can happen not only in ction
but in theories and mathematics, all of which can involve
mental experimentation with the object under speciable
rules and constraints. Through collateral experience even
a sign that consists in a chance semblance of an absent
object is determined by that object.
Peirce held that logic has three main parts:
1. Speculative grammar,[18] on meaningfulness, conditions for meaning. Study of signicatory elements
and combinations.
2. Logical critic,[19] on validity, conditions for true
representation. Critique of arguments in their various distinct modes.
3. Speculative rhetoric, or methodeutic,[20] on conditions for determining interpretations. Methodology
of inquiry in its mutually interacting modes.

CHAPTER 8. REPRESENTATION (ARTS)


1. Speculative Grammar. By this, Peirce means discovering relations among questions of how signs can be
meaningful and of what kinds of signs there are, how
they combine, and how some embody or incorporate others. Within this broad area, Peirce developed three interlocked universal trichotomies of signs, depending respectively on (1) the sign itself, (2) how the sign stands
for its object, and (3) how the sign stands for its object to
its interpretant. Each trichotomy is divided according to
the phenomenological category involved: Firstness (quality of feeling, essentially monadic), secondness (reaction
or resistance, essentially dyadic), or thirdness (representation or mediation, essentially triadic).[21]
1. Qualisigns, sinsigns, and legisigns. Every sign is either (qualisign) a quality or possibility, or (sinsign)
an actual individual thing, fact, event, state, etc., or
(legisign) a norm, habit, rule, law.
2. Icons, indices, and symbols. Every sign refers either (icon) through similarity to its object, or (index)
through factual connection to its object, or (symbol)
through interpretive habit or norm of reference to its
object.
3. Rhemes, dicisigns, and arguments. Every sign is
interpreted either as (rheme) term-like, standing
for its object in respect of quality, or as (dicisign)
proposition-like, standing for its object in respect of
fact, or as (argument) argumentative, standing for
its object in respect of habit or law. This is the trichotomy of all signs as building blocks of inference.
Some (not all) sign classes from dierent trichotomies intersect each other. For example, a qualisign is always an
icon, and is never an index or a symbol. He held that
there were only ten classes of signs logically denable
through those three universal trichotomies.[23] He thought
that there were further such universal trichotomies as
well. Also, some signs need other signs in order to be
embodied. For example, a legisign (also called a type),
such as the word the, needs to be embodied in a sinsign
(also called a token), for example an individual instance
of the word the, in order to be expressed. Another form
of combination is attachment or incorporation: an index
may be attached to, or incorporated by, an icon or a symbol.
Peirce called an icon apart from a label, legend, or other
index attached to it, a hypoicon, and divided the hypoicon into three classes: (a) the image, which depends
on a simple quality; (b) the diagram, whose internal relations, mainly dyadic or so taken, represent by analogy
the relations in something; and (c) the metaphor, which
represents the representative character of a sign by representing a parallelism in something else.[24] A diagram
can be geometric, or can consist in an array of algebraic
expressions, or even in the common form All __ is ___
which is subjectable, like any diagram, to logical or mathematical transformations.

8.5. SAUSSURE AND REPRESENTATION


2. Logical critic or Logic Proper. That is how Peirce
refers to logic in the everyday sense. Its main objective, for Peirce, is to classify arguments and determine
the validity and force of each kind.[19] He sees three
main modes: abductive inference (guessing, inference to
a hypothetical explanation); deduction; and induction. A
work of art may embody an inference process and be an
argument without being an explicit argumentation. That
is the dierence, for example, between most of War and
Peace and its nal section.

33
words they depend on interpretation, they are indices in
depending on the requisite factual relation to their individual objects. A personal name has an actual historical
connection, often recorded on a birth certicate, to its
named object; the word this is like the pointing of a
nger.
Symbol

Peirce treats symbols as habits or norms of reference and


meaning. Symbols can be natural, cultural, or abstract
and logical. They depend as signs on how they will be
interpreted, and lack or have lost dependence on resemblance and actual, indexical connection to their represented objects, though the symbols individual embodiment is an index to your experience of its represented
object. Symbols are instantiated by specialized indexical sinsigns. A proposition, considered apart from its ex8.4.2 Using signs and objects
pression in a particular language, is already a symbol, but
many symbols draw from what is socially accepted and
Peirce concluded that there are three ways in which signs
culturally agreed upon. Conventional symbols such as
represent objects. They underlie his most widely known
horse and caballo, which prescribe qualities of sound
trichotomy of signs:
or appearance for their instances (for example, individual instances of the word horse on the page) are based
Icon
on what amounts to arbitrary stipulation.[5] Such a symbol uses what is already known and accepted within our
Index
society to give meaning. This can be both in spoken and
written language.
Symbol[25]
3. Speculative rhetoric or methodeutic. For Peirce this
is the theory of eective use of signs in investigations,
expositions, and applications of truth. Here Peirce coincides with Morriss notion of pragmatics, in his interpretation of this term. He also called it methodeutic, in
that it is the analysis of the methods used in inquiry.[20]

Icon
This term refers to signs that represent by resemblance,
such as portraits and some paintings though they can also
be natural or mathematical. Iconicity is independent of
actual connection, even if it occurs because of actual connection. An icon is or embodies a possibility, insofar as
its object need not actually exist. A photograph is regarded as an icon because of its resemblance to its object,
but is regarded as an index (with icon attached) because
of its actual connection to its object. Likewise, with a
portrait painted from life. An icons resemblance is objective and independent of interpretation, but is relative
to some mode of apprehension such as sight. An icon
need not be sensory; anything can serve as an icon, for
example a streamlined argument (itself a complex symbol) is often used as an icon for an argument (another
symbol) bristling with particulars.
Index
Peirce explains that an index is a sign that compels attention through a connection of fact, often through cause and
eect. For example, if we see smoke we conclude that it
is the eect of a cause re. It is an index if the connection is factual regardless of resemblance or interpretation.
Peirce usually considered personal names and demonstratives such as the word this to be indices, for although as

For example, we can call a large metal object with four


wheels, four doors, an engine and seats a car because
such a term is agreed upon within our culture and it allows
us to communicate. In much the same way, as a society
with a common set of understandings regarding language
and signs, we can also write the word car and in the
context of Australia and other English speaking nations,
know what it symbolises and is trying to represent.[26]

8.5 Saussure and representation


Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (18571913) played
a major role in the development of semiotics with his
argument that language is a system of signs that needs
to be understood in order to fully understand the process of linguistics.[27] The study of semiotics examines
the signs and types of representation that humans use to
express feelings, ideas, thoughts and ideologies.[28] Although semiotics is often used in the form of textual analysis it also involves the study of representation and the
processes involved with representation.
The process of representation is characterised by using
signs that we recall mentally or phonetically to comprehend the world.[29] Saussure says before a human can use
the word tree she or he has to envision the mental concept of a tree.
Two things are fundamental to the study of signs:[30]

34

CHAPTER 8. REPRESENTATION (ARTS)


may associate the term sister to represent a close friend
that they have a bond with. This means that the representation of a signier depends completely upon a persons cultural, linguistic and social background. Saussure
argues that if words or sounds were simply labels for existing things in the world, translation from one language
or culture to another would be easy, it is the fact that this
can be extremely dicult that suggests that words trigger a representation of an object or thought depending on
the person that is representing the signier.[32] The signied triggered from the representation of a signier in one
particular language do not necessarily represent the same
signied in another language. Even within one particular
language many words refer to the same thing but represent dierent peoples interpretations of it. A person may
refer to a particular place as their work whereas someone else represents the same signier as their favorite
restaurant. This can also be subject to historical changes
in both the signier and the way objects are signied.

Saussure claims that an imperative function of all written


languages and alphabetic systems is to represent spoken
language.[33] Most languages do not have writing systems
that represent the phonemic sounds they make. For example, in English the written letter a represents dierent phonetic sounds depending on which word it is written in. The letter a has a dierent sound in the word
in each of the following words, apple, gate, marFerdinand de Saussure
garine and beat, therefore, how is a person unaware of
the phonemic sounds, able to pronounce the word prop1. The signied: a mental concept, and
erly by simply looking at alphabetic spelling. The way
the word is represented on paper is not always the way
2. The signier: the verbal manifestation, the sethe word would be represented phonetically. This leads
quence of letters or sounds, the linguistic realisation.
to common misrepresentations of the phonemic sounds
of speech and suggests that the writing system does not
The signier is the word or sound; the signied is the rep- properly represent the true nature of the pronunciation
resentation.
of words.
Saussure points out that signs:
Are arbitrary: There is no link between the signier and the signied
Are relational: We understand we take on meaning in relation to other words. Such as we understand up in relation to down or a dog in relation
to other animals, such as a cat.
constitute our world You cannot get outside of
language. We exist inside a system of signs.[30]
Saussure suggests that the meaning of a sign is arbitrary,
in eect; there is no link between the signier and the
signied.[31] The signier is the word or the sound of the
word and the signied is the representation of the word
or sound. For example, when referring to the term sister (signier) a person from an English speaking country
such as Australia, may associate that term as representing someone in their family who is female and born to
the same parents (signied). An Aboriginal Australian

8.6 Notes
[1] Mitchell, W. 1995, Representation, in F Lentricchia &
T McLaughlin (eds), Critical Terms for Literary Study, 2nd
edn, University of Chicago Press, Chicago
[2] O'Shaughnessy, M & Stadler J, Media and society: an introduction, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2005
[3] Childers J (ed.), Columbia Dictionary of Modern Literary
and Cultural Criticism, Columbia University Press, New
York, 1995
[4] <Vukcevich, M 2002, Representation, The University
of Chicago, viewed 7 April 2006
[5] Mitchell, W, Representation, in F Lentricchia & T
McLaughlin (eds), Critical Terms for Literary Study, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1990

8.7. SEE ALSO

[6] Hall, S (ed.), Cultural Representations and Signifying


Practice, Open University Press, London, 1997. ISBN
978-0761954323

35

[19] See "Critic" in Commens Dictionary of Peirces Terms.


[20] See "Methodeutic" in Commens Dictionary of Peirces
Terms.

[7] Dryer 1993, cited in OShaughnessy & Stadler 2005


[8] Mitchell, W, Picture Theory, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1994
[9] On his classications, see Peirce, C.S. (1903), CP 1.180
202 Eprint and (1906) The Basis of Pragmaticism in
The Essential Peirce 2:3723. For the relevant quotes,
see Philosophy and Logic at Commens Dictionary
of Peirces Terms, Bergman and Paavola, editors, U. of
Helsinki.
[10] Peirce, C.S., 1882, Introductory Lecture on the Study of
Logic delivered September 1882, Johns Hopkins University Circulars, vol. 2, no. 19, pp. 1112, November 1892,
Google Book Search Eprint. Reprinted in Collected Papers
of Charles Sanders Peirce v. 7, paragraphs 5976, The
Essential Peirce 1:214214; Writings of Charles S. Peirce
4:378382.
[11] Peirce, C.S. (1878) The Doctrine of Chances, Popular
Science Monthly, v. 12, pp. 604615, 1878, reprinted in
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, v. 2, paragraphs 645668, Writings of Charles S. Peirce 3:276290,
and The Essential Peirce 1:142154. "...death makes the
number of our risks, the number of our inferences, nite,
and so makes their mean result uncertain. The very idea
of probability and of reasoning rests on the assumption
that this number is indenitely great. .... ...logicality inexorably requires that our interests shall not be limited. ....
Logic is rooted in the social principle.
[12] Peirce, C. S. (written 1902), MS L75: Logic, Regarded
As Semeiotic (The Carnegie application of 1902): Version 1: An Integrated Reconstruction, Joseph Ransdell,
ed., Arisbe, see Memoir 12.
[13] Peirce, C.S., The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders
Peirce, v. 5, paragraph 448 footnote, from The Basis of
Pragmaticism in 1906.
[14] See "Quasi-Mind" at the Commens Dictionary of Peirces
Terms, Mats Bergman and Sami Paavola, eds., University
of Helsinki.
[15] Peirce, C.S. (1868), Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man (Arisbe Eprint), Journal of Speculative Philosophy vol. 2, pp. 103114. Reprinted (Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, v. 5, paragraphs
213263, the quote is from paragraph 253).
[16] For Peirces denitions of semiosis, sign, representamen, object, interpretant, see the Commens Dictionary
of Peirces Terms.
[17] Ten quotes on collateral observation from Peirce provided
by Professor Joseph Ransdell can be viewed here. Also
see pp. 404409 in Pragmatism by Peirce in The Essential Peirce v. 2.
[18] See "Grammar: Speculative" in Commens Dictionary of
Peirces Terms.

[21] "Categories, Cenopythagorean Categories", Commens


Dictionary of Peirces Terms, Mats Bergman and Sami
Paavola, editors, University of Helsinki.
[22] Peirce (1903 MS), Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined, under
other titles in Collected Papers (CP) v. 2, paragraphs 233
72, and reprinted under the original title in Essential Peirce
(EP) v. 2, pp. 28999. Also see image of MS 339 (August 7, 1904) supplied to peirce-l by Bernard Morand of
the Institut Universitaire de Technologie (France), Dpartement Informatique.
[23] See Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, v. 2, paragraphs 254263, reprinted in Philosophical Writings of
Peirce pp. 115118, and in The Essential Peirce v. 2, pp.
294296.
[24] On image, diagram, and metaphor, see "Hypoicon" in the
Commens Dictionary of Peirces Terms.
[25] For Peirces denitions of icon, index, symbol, and related
terms, see the Commens Dictionary of Peirces Terms
[26] Dupriez, B, A Dictionary of Literary Devices, University
of Toronto Press, Canada, 1991.
[27] Culler, J 1976, Saussure, Fontana Modern Masters,
Britain, 1976.
[28] Ryder, M, Semiotics: Language and Culture, 2004 viewed
6 April 2006 see link below
[29] Klarer, M, An Introduction to Literary Studies, Routledge,
London, 1998.
[30] Barry, P, Beginning Theory: an Introduction to Literary
and Cultural Theory, Manchester University Press, Great
Britain, 2002.
[31] Holdcroft 1991 no details
[32] Chandler, D, Semiotics for Beginners: Modality and representation, viewed 8 April 2006
[33] Arnason, D, Reference material, 2006, viewed 12 April
2006

8.7 See also


8.8 References
Arnason, D, Semiotics: the system of signs (via the
Wayback Machine)
Baldick, C, New historicism, in The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms, 1996, viewed 8
April 2006

36
Barry, P, Beginning Theory: an Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory, Manchester University
Press, Great Britain, 2002.
Burch, R 2005, Charles Sanders Peirce, in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, viewed 24
April 2006 .
Chandler, D, Semiotics for Beginners: Modality and
Representation, 2001, viewed 8 April 2006 .
Childers J. (ed.), Columbia Dictionary of Modern
Literary and Cultural Criticism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995.
Concise Routledge, Encyclopaedia of Philosophy,
Routledge, London, 1999.
Culler, J., Saussure, Fontana Modern Masters,
Britain, 1976.
Dupriez, B, A Dictionary of Literary Devices, University of Toronto Press, Canada 1991.
Fuery, P & Manseld N, Cultural Studies and Critical Theory, Oxford University Press, Australia,
2005. (ISBN 978-0-19-551294-6)
Hall, S (ed.), Cultural Representations and Signifying
Practice, Open University Press, London, 1997.
Holder, D, Saussure Signs, System, and Arbitrariness, Cambridge, Australia, 1991.
Lentricchia, F. & McLaughlin,T (eds.), Critical
Terms for Literary Study, University of Chicago
Press, London, 1990.
Klarer, M, An Introduction to Literary Studies, Routledge, London, 1998.
Mitchell, W, Representation, in F Lentricchia & T
McLaughlin (eds), Critical Terms for Literary Study,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990.
Mitchell, W, Representation, in F Lentricchia & T
McLaughlin (eds), Critical Terms for Literary Study,
2nd edn, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
1995.
Mitchell, W, Picture Theory, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1994.
Moon, B, Literary terms: a Practical Glossary, 2nd
edn, Chalkface Press, Cottesloe, 2001.
Murn, R & Ray, S.M, The Bedford Glossary of
Critical and Literary Terms, Bedford Books, Boston,
1997.
O'Shaughnessy, M & Stadler J, Media and Society:
an Introduction, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press,
South Melbourne, 2005. (ISBN 978-0-19-5514025)

CHAPTER 8. REPRESENTATION (ARTS)


Prendergast, C, Circulating Representations: New
Historicism and the Poetics of Culture, Substance:
The Review of Theory and Literary Criticism, no.
28, issue 1, pp. 90105, 1999, (online Humanities
International Complete)
Ryder, M, Semiotics: Language and Culture, 2004,
viewed 6 April 2006 .
Shook, J, The Pragmatism Cybrary: Charles Morris,
in The Pragmatism Cybrary, 2005, viewed 24 April
2006 .
Vukcevich, M, Representation, The University of
Chicago, 2002, viewed 7 April 2006.

8.9 External links


University of Chicago

Chapter 9

Salience (language)
This article is about salience in the eld of semiotics greater salience to visual data involving plants, and a perand communication. For other uses, see Salience son trained as an architect may scan buildings to identify
(disambiguation).
features of interest. A persons world view or Weltanschauung may predispose salience to data matching those
views. Because people live for many years, responses beSalience is the state or condition of being prominent. The Oxford English Dictionary denes salience as come conventional. At a group or community level, the
conventional levels of signicance or salience are slowly
most noticeable or important. The concept is discussed
in communication, semiotics, linguistics, sociology, embedded in the sign systems and culture, and they cannot arbitrarily be changed. For example, the rst thing
psychology, and political science. It has been studied
with respect to interpersonal communication, persuasion, seen in a poster may be the title or picture of a face.
politics, and its inuence on mass media.

9.2 Communication studies


9.1 Semiotics
In semiotics (the study of signs or symbolism), salience
refers to the relative importance or prominence of a part
of a sign. The salience of a particular sign when considered in the context of others helps an individual to
quickly rank large amounts of information by importance
and thus give attention to that which is the most important. This process keeps an individual from being overwhelmed with information overload.

9.1.1

Salience is the critical concept, along with agenda and


spin, for the Persuasion theory of Professor Richard E.
Vatz of Towson University as articulated in his book,
/The Only Authentic Book of Persuasion/, (Kendall Hunt,
2012, 2013). Salience, in his book and articles, is used as
a measure of how reality is created for chosen audiences.
He claims (1973) (2013) that the struggle for salience
(and agenda and meaning and spin) is the sine qua non
of the persuasive process.[2]

9.2.1 Axioms of salience

Discussion

Meaning can be described as the system of mental representations of an object or phenomenon, its properties and
associations with other objects and/or phenomena. In the
consciousness of an individual, meaning is reected in the
form of sensory information, images and concepts.[1] It
is denotative or connotative, but the sign system for transmitting meanings can be uncertain in its operation or conditions may disrupt the communication and prevent accurate meanings from being decoded.

Communication scholars have found that a number of different factors have a direct eect on the salience of attitude objects.
Direct experience

William Crano posits that ones direct experience with an


issue or attitude object increases the salience and consequently the potency of that attitude, and the level of conFurther, meaning is socially constructed and dynamic as sistency between attitude and behavior.
the culture evolves. That is problematic because an individuals frame of reference and experience may proFor example: Consider two people: one with
duce some divergence from some of the prevailing soemphysema, one without. Both of whom share
cial norms. So the salience of data will be determined
a negative attitude toward cigarette smoking.
by both situational and emotional elements in a comThe person with emphysema would have a
bination relatively unique to each individual. For exstronger attitude than his counterpart, and conample, a person with an interest in botany may allocate
sequently would show greater consistency be37

38

CHAPTER 9. SALIENCE (LANGUAGE)


tween his relevant attitude and behavior. It
is posited by Crano that the attitude toward
smoking of the person with emphysema may
be more salient due to his direct experience
with the consequence of smoking.

Self-Interest
The concept called vested interest by Crano is called selfinterest by Sears (1997). It seems that self-interest
is the more widely recognized term. Self-interest involves either perceived or actual personal consequences.
That is, Crano (1997) argues that vested interest involves
perceived personal consequences (p. 490), while Sears
(1997, a critique of Crano) counter-argues that Cranos
survey experiments dene it objectively. Crano argues
that vested interest should have a moderating eect on
attitudes. Sears argues that, actually, evidence for this is
conicting: The survey literature has rarely found significant eects of self-interest, while the experimental literature nds signicant eects. The literature is concerned
with salience only marginally; it is actually about strength
of attitudes (i.e. how well they correlate with behavior). It is about salience inasmuch as anything strong
is salient.

Needs and aspirations


The salience (prominence) of an attitude can also be measured by the relevance of an idea to that persons needs
or aspirations.[3] As ideals become more salient they become more accessible, the more accessible the attitude
object is the stronger the attitude toward the object. As
accessibility increases, so does the likelihood of selfinterested voting (Young).
For example: In times of elections, issue relevant events are the focus of attention. Therefore, candidates, due to their aspiration for a
certain political position are interest driven toward the salient events since they are favorable
to their party.

9.2.2

Policy making

Political scientists agree that salience is relatively important in examining political policy, because policies are not
only determined by what issues are important to people
but also by how important they are. This involves examining what issues are ignored and which are made important. One research agenda that political scientists are
concerned with understanding is when and how salience
and changes in salience matter for political action.
There are three related understandings of salience.

1. The rst (classical) interpretation considers


salience to be independent of the "status quo" and
politicians ideal policies and programs. Although
it says salience is independent of ideals, it does
not say that salience is independent of preferences.
This means, where there is a change in salience
there is also a change in preferences. Often a player
or policymakers ideals may not be known but their
preferences are usually revealed in their partys
manifestos. Often policymakers cannot achieve
their ideals but rather must choose between the
oers on the table. They may prefer one over the
other and this is where salience aects a party or a
politicians position on an issue.
2. The second ("valence") interpretation proposes that
for certain issues salience is a very important factor.
In other words, when there is a general consensus
of principles, the relative salience of various issues amongst the public determines the policy position of policy makers. This is due to constraints
in policy making, where ideals are often induced,
which policy makers view as the tradeo space. For
example, although ideally they may like to see
low unemployment and low ination, they are usually constrained to pick a position on the tradeo
line. Thus, their ideal has been induced due to constraints. In these situations salience and policy position are almost interchangeable, because their induced ideal is their favored allocation. In the classical interpretation, salience would be used to describe the dierent levels of preference between positions on policies.
3. The third (price) interpretation assumes that
salience is not separate from ideals, as the classical view states, but that it is also not the same as
ideals, as the valence view claims. This interpretation assumes that although a group of players, sharing benevolent preferences, all dissatised with the
status quo, may still value dierent aspects dierently when considering policy change. The price interpretation is favored over the other two for three
reasons. First, it is more applicable. Unlike the classical view, the price interpretation can be applied to
a more wide-ranging set of situations. Second, the
price interpretation uses both the classical point of
view and ideals in its evaluation of salience. Not
only do you need to know a players weighted preferences but also their connection to their ideal point
and the status quo. Therefore, a change in salience
can reect a change in ideal point, status quo, or their
weighted preferences. Third, this interpretation can
be used to determine the elements stand in importance or worth. For example, players may organize
and focus their time and energy into options with the
biggest pay o. That is they may look to see where
they get the greatest bang for their buck."[4]

9.5. REFERENCES

9.3 Public opinion


A particular study that researched salience and public
opinion examined most of the agenda-setting research
since the United States presidential election, 1968 which
has been concerned with how the public salience of the
issue is related to mass medias ranking of these issues
in terms of frequency of coverage and news play. The
main hypothesis examined in this study is the ranking
of certain issues by the media, which, in time, becomes
the public agenda. More importantly, the article searched
whether the perceived public salience of the federal budget decit is signicantly related to the amount of public knowledge about the issue, direction of public opinion
regarding one possible solution to the issue, the strength
of that opinion and political behavior such as writing letters, signing petitions, voting, etc. The result of this
study concluded that even though the federal decit issue was one of the more salient to newspaper and voters
during the 1988 election, it (the federal budget decit)
was not as emotional or dramatic as some of the other
highly salient issues such as drug abuse or environmental
pollution. Thus it seemed likely that public opinion regarding a solution to the federal budget decit might be
rather evenly split and would likely be more stable during
the month of interviewing than would opinion on some of
the other more dramatic issues being emphasized in news
media coverage and political advertisements. In other
words, issues that directly involve subjects, in this study,
would conclude to be more salient than issues that do not
involve them directly.

9.4 Marketing stimuli


Although salience is a stimulus response, is it a stimulus
quality or an absolute quality?[5] Salience plays an important role in intergroup communication. According to
Harwood, Raman and Hewstone, Group salience is a key
variable both in inuencing quality of intergroup contact
and in moderating the eects of intergroup contact on
prejudicial attitudes.
In their study of family communication and intergroup
relationships, Group salience is an individuals awareness of group memberships and respective group dierences in an intergroup encounter (e.g., the salience of
race in an interracial conversation).[6] This study carefully examines the dynamics of intergroup relationships
with respect to communication in a family context. Their
study involved communicative aspects associated with
age salience in the grandparent grandchild relationship,
the extent to which various dimension of communication
predicts measures of salience, relational or inter-family
proximity, and attitudes towards aging. According to
Harwood, Raman and Hewstone, Communication phenomena that were positively correlated with measures of
age salience were negatively related to relational close-

39
ness. Only one communication measure (grandparents
talking about the past) moderated the relationship between quality of contact with grandparent and attitudes
toward older people. Specic communicative dimensions emerged that warrant further investigation in this
and other intergroup contexts.[6]
Salience also from an applied communicative perspective plays an important role in our Consumer- Marketing
world. In Gianluigi Guidos book, The Salience of Marketing Stimuli: an incongruity salience hypothesis on consumer awareness, salience triggered by an external physical stimuli, like all marketing stimuli are before being
internalized by consumers to explain and predict the
conditions under which a marketing stimulus, is able to
achieve its communication outcomes in term of processing and memory.[5] The book clearly denes the history
of the denition of salience and the ambiguities of arriving at an accurate denition. It also utilizes various theories to best dene salience in our marketing world. Of
the many theories, Guido uses aspects of Incongruity theory, Schema theory and an information processing model
referred to as the In-salience hypothesis emphasizes the
nature of prominence of salience.
This model is part of wider Dichotic theory
of salience, according to which a stimulus is
salient either when it is incongruent in a certain context to a perceivers schema, or when
it is congruent in a certain context to a perceivers goal. According to the four propositions of the model, in-salient stimuli are better
recalled, aect both attention and interpretation, and are moderated by the degree of perceivers comprehension (i.e., activation, accessibility, and availability of schemata), and involvement (i.e., personal relevance of the stimuli). Results of two empirical studies on print
advertisements show that in-salient ad messages have the strongest impact in triggering ad
processing which, in turn, leads to consumer
awareness.[5]
Therefore, to dene salience as appropriate as possible
using the information, it would be apt to dene it such
that, salience is that intrinsic concept of the perceived or
interpreted prominence of an attitude, and its manifestation on our choices.

9.5 References
[1] Bedny, G. & Karwowski, W. (2004) Meaning and sense
in activity theory and their role in the study of human performance. International Journal of Ergonomics and Human Factors. (26:2, 121140.)
[2] Richard E Vatz, The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation,
Philosophy & Rhetoric 6 no. 3 (Summer 1968): 157.

40

CHAPTER 9. SALIENCE (LANGUAGE)

Quoted from The New Rhetoric; Perelman, 116-117.


and Richard E Vatz, The Mythical Status of Situational
Rhetoric: Implications for Rhetorical Critics Relevance in
the Public Arena. The Review of Communication 9 no. 1
(January 2009): 1-5.
[3] Showers, C., & Cantor, N. (1985). Social cognition: A
look at motivated strategies. Annual Review of Psychology, 36, 275305.
[4] The new shorter Oxford English dictionary. 1993. New
York: Oxford University Press
[5] Guido, Gianluigi (2001). The Salience of Marketing Stimuli: An incongruity salience hypothesis on consumer
awareness. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[6] Harwood, J., Raman, P., & Hewstone, M. (2006,
July).
The Family and Communication Dynamics
of Group Salience.
Journal of Family Communication, 6(3), 181200.
Retrieved July 29, 2008,
doi:10.1207/s15327698jfc0603_2

9.5.1

Bibliography

Crano, W. D. (1995). Attitude strength and vested


interest. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.),
Attitude strength: Antecedents and Consequences.
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 131158.
Higgins, E. T., & Bargh, J. A. (1987). Social cognition and social perception. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 369425.
Humphreys & Garry, M & J (2000). Thinking about
salience. Early drafts from Columbia. 155.
Sears, D. O., & Citrin, J. (1985). Tax revolt: Something for nothing in California (enlarged ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Weaver, D (1991). Issue salience and public opinion: Are there consequences of agenda-setting?. International journal of public opinion research. 116.
Vatz, R. E. (1973). The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation. Philosophy and Rhetoric. 155-162.
Vatz, R. E. (2012, 2013) The Only Authentic Book
of Persuasion. Dubuque, Iowa. Kendall Hunt.

9.6 Further reading


Benjamin Brown, 'But Me No Buts: The Theological Debate Between the Hasidim and the Mitnagdim in Light of the Discourse-Markers Theory'
'Benjamin Brown, Some Say This , Some Say
That": Pragmatics and Discourse Markers in Yad
Malachis Interpretation Rules

Chapter 10

Semiosis
Semiosis (from the Greek: , smesis, a
derivation of the verb , smei, to mark) is any
form of activity, conduct, or process that involves signs,
including the production of meaning. Briey semiosis is sign process. The term was introduced by Charles
Sanders Peirce (18391914) to describe a process that
interprets signs as referring to their objects, as described
in his theory of sign relations, or semiotics. Semiosis is
triadic and cyclic. Other theories of sign processes are
sometimes carried out under the heading of semiology,
following on the work of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857
1913).

how semiosis produces its eects, which is odd given that


the word sign is in everyday use and most people would
understand what it means. But semiotics has not oered
clear technical denitions, nor is there agreement about
how signs should be classied.

As an insect or animal, human or otherwise, moves


through its environment (sometimes termed the umwelt),
all the senses collect data that are made available to the
brain. However, to prevent sensory overload, only salient
data will receive the full attention of the cognitive elements of the mind. This indicates that a part of the process must be controlled by a model of the real world capable of ranking data elements in terms of their signicance
and ltering out the data irrelevant to survival. A sign cannot function until the brain or audience distinguishes it
10.1 Introduction to theory
from the background noise. When this happens, the sign
then
triggers cognitive activity to interpret the data input
Peirce was interested primarily in logic, while Saussure
and
so
convert it into meaningful information. This would
was interested primarily in linguistics, which examines
suggest
that, in the semiosphere, the process of semiosis
the functions and structures of language. However, both
goes
through
the following cycle:
of them recognized that there is more to signicant representation than language in the narrow sense of speech
The plant, insect, or animal with the need to comand writing alone. With this in mind, they developed the
municate (e.g., to recognise an object of food) will
idea of semiosis to relate language to other sign systems
know what needs to be said and assess the best
both human and nonhuman. Today, there is disagreemeans of saying it (e.g., starting a searching bement as to the operating cause and eect. One school
haviour);
of thought argues that language is the semiotic prototype
and its study illuminates principles that can be applied to
This information will then be encoded and relevant
other sign systems. The opposing school argues that there
muscle groups will eect transmission although
is a metasign system and that language is simply one of
to some extent intentional in the human, the actual
many codes for communicating meaning, citing the way
movements of the body are autonomic, i.e. the inin which human infants learn about their environment bedividual is not aware of moving individual muscles,
fore they have acquired verbal language. Whichever may
but achieves the desired result by an act of will (see
be right, a preliminary denition of semiosis is any action
H. L. A. Hart on the nature of an action);
or inuence for communicating meaning by establishing
relationships between signs which are to be interpreted by
The audience lters ambient data and perceives the
an audience.
uttered code as a grouping of signs;

10.2 Discussion
Semiosis is the performance element involving signs. Although a human can communicate many things unintentionally, individuals usually speak or write to elicit some
kind of response. Yet there is little real explanation of
41

The audience then interprets the signs (sometimes


termed decoding) to attribute meaning. This involves matching the signs received against existing
patterns and their meanings held in memory (i.e. it
is learned and understood within the community).
In plants, insects and animals, the results of a successful interpretation will be an observable response
to the stimuli perceived.

42
In biology, scout bees and ants will return home to tell
the others where food is to be found, the fact of fertility
must be announced to prospective mates from the same
species, and the presence of danger must be passed as a
warning to others in the group. Such transmission may
be chemical, auditory, visual, or tactile whether singly or
in combination. There is a new eld of research activity
termed biosemiotics, and Jesper Homeyer claims that
endosymbiosis, self-reference, code duality, the availability of receptors, autopoiesis, and others are the general
properties of all living systems. Thomas Sebeok suggests that a similar list of properties for life may coincide with the denition of semiosis, i.e. that the test of
whether something is alive, is a test to determine whether
and how it communicates meaning to another of its kind,
i.e., whether it has semiosis. This has been called the Sebeoks Thesis.
For humans, semiosis is an aspect of the wider systems
of social interaction in which information is exchanged.
It can result in particular types of social encounter, but
the process itself can be constrained by social conventions
such as propriety, privacy, and disclosure. This means
that no social encounter is reducible to semiosis alone,
and that semiosis can only be understood by identifying
and exploring all the conditions that make the transmission and reception of signs possible and eective. When
two individuals meet, the ways in which they think, the
specic identities they assume, the emotional responses
they make, and the beliefs, motives, and purposes they
have, will frame the situation as it develops dynamically
and potentially test the legitimacy of the outcomes. All
these elements are, to a greater or lesser extent, semiotic in nature in that prevailing codes and values are being applied. Consequently, where the line is drawn between semiosis and semiotics will always be somewhat
arbitrary.

10.3 See also


Semiology
Index of semiotic terms

10.4 References
Bains, Paul. The Primacy of semiosis: An ontology
of relations. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
(2006)
Homeyer, Jesper. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
(1996)

CHAPTER 10. SEMIOSIS

Chapter 11

Semiosphere
Semiosphere is the sphere of semiosis in which sign processes operate in the set of all interconnected Umwelten.
The concept was coined by Juri Lotman in 1982 and is
now applied to many elds, including cultural semiotics
generally, biosemiotics, zoosemiotics, geosemiotics, etc.
The concept is treated more fully in the collection of Lotmans writings published in English under the title Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture"(1990)

11.1 Discussion
Juri Lotman, a semiotician at Tartu University, Estonia, was inspired by Vernadskys terms biosphere and
noosphere to propose that a semiosphere comes into being when any two Umwelten are communicating. Later,
Jesper Homeyer suggested a variation to the eect that
the community of organisms occupying the semiosphere
will inhabit a semiotic niche". This implies that the
semiosphere may be partially independent of the Umwelten. Kalevi Kull argues that this suggestion is not consistent with the nature of semiosis which can only be a
product of the behaviour of the organisms in the environment. It is the organisms that create the signs which
become the constituent parts of the semiosphere. This
is not an adaptation to the existing environment, but the
continuous creation of a new environment. Kull believes
that it is only possible to accept Homeyers view as an
analogy to the concept of an ecological niche as it is traditionally used in biology, so that the community develops
according to the semiotic understanding of the processes
which are responsible for the building of Umwelt.

11.2 References
Homeyer, Jesper. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
(1996)
Kull, Kalevi. On Semiosis, Umwelt, and Semiosphere. Semiotica vol. 120(3/4), pp. 299-310.
(1998)
43

Lotman, Yuri M. Universe of the mind: a semiotic theory of culture (Translated by A. Shukman)
(1990)London & New York: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd.
Lotman, Yuri M. O semiosfere. Sign Systems
Studies (Trudy po znakovym sistemam) vol. 17, pp.
5-23. (1984)
Lotman, Yuri M. On the semiosphere. (Translated
by Wilma Clark) Sign Systems Studies, 33.1 (2005)

Chapter 12

Semiotic elements and classes of signs


Logician, mathematician, philosopher, and scientist
Charles Sanders Peirce (18391914) began writing on
semeiotic, semiotics, or the theory of sign relations in
the 1860s, around the time that he devised his system
of three categories. He eventually dened semiosis as
an action, or inuence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and
its interpretant, this tri-relative inuence not being in any
way resolvable into actions between pairs (Houser 1998,
411). This specic type of triadic relation is fundamental
to Peirces understanding of logic as formal semiotic.
By logic he meant philosophical logic. He eventually
divided (philosophical) logic, or formal semiotic, into (1)
speculative grammar, or stechiology, on the elements of
semiosis (sign, object, interpretant), how signs can signify
and, in relation to that, what kinds of signs, objects, and
interpretants there are, how signs combine, and how some
signs embody or incorporate others; (2) logical critic, or
logic proper, on the modes of inference; and (3) speculative rhetoric, or methodeutic, the philosophical theory of
inquiry, including his form of pragmatism. His speculative grammar, or stechiology, is this articles subject.

12.1 Semiotic elements


Here is Peirces denition of the triadic sign relation that
formed the core of his denition of logic.
Namely, a sign is something, A, which
brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of
correspondence with something, C, its object,
as that in which itself stands to C. (Peirce 1902,
NEM 4, 2021).

This denition, together with Peirces denitions of correspondence and determination, is sucient to derive all
of the statements that are necessarily true for all sign relations. Yet, there is much more to the theory of signs than
simply proving universal theorems about generic sign relations. There is also the task of classifying the various
species and subspecies of sign relations. As a practical
matter, of course, familiarity with the full range of concrete examples is indispensable to theory and application
Peirce conceives of and discusses things like representa- both.
tions, interpretations, and assertions broadly and in terms
In Peirces theory of signs, a sign is something that stands
of philosophical logic, rather than in terms of psycholin a well-dened kind of relation to two other things, its
ogy, linguistics, or social studies. He places philosophy at
object and its interpretant sign. Although Peirces denia level of generality between mathematics and the special
tion of a sign is independent of psychological subject matsciences of nature and mind, such that it draws princiter and his theory of signs covers more ground than linples from mathematics and supplies principles to special
guistics alone, it is nevertheless the case that many of the
sciences.[2] On one hand, his semiotic does not resort to
more familiar examples and illustrations of sign relations
special experiences or special experiments in order to setwill naturally be drawn from linguistics and psychology,
tle its questions. On the other hand he draws continually
along with our ordinary experience of their subject maton examples from common experience, and his semiotic
ters.
is not contained in a mathematical or deductive system
and does not proceed chiey by drawing necessary con- For example, one way to approach the concept of an inclusions about purely hypothetical objects or cases. As terpretant is to think of a psycholinguistic process. In this
philosophical logic, it is about the drawing of conclu- context, an interpretant can be understood as a signs efsions deductive, inductive, or hypothetically explanatory. fect on the mind, or on anything that acts like a mind,
Peirces semiotic, in its classications, its critical analysis what Peirce calls a quasi-mind. An interpretant is what
of kinds of inference, and its theory of inquiry, is philo- results from a process of interpretation, one of the types
sophical logic studied in terms of signs and their triadic of activity that falls under the heading of semiosis. One
usually says that a sign stands for an object to an agent, an
relations as positive phenomena in general.
interpreter. In the upshot, however, it is the signs eect
on the agent that is paramount. This eect is what Peirce
called the interpretant sign, or the interpretant for short.
44

12.1. SEMIOTIC ELEMENTS


An interpretant in its barest form is a signs meaning, implication, or ramication, and especial interest attaches
to the types of semiosis that proceed from obscure signs
to relatively clear interpretants. In logic and mathematics
the most claried and most succinct signs for an object
are called canonical forms or normal forms.
Peirce argued that logic is the formal study of signs in
the broadest sense, not only signs that are articial, linguistic, or symbolic, but also signs that are semblances
or are indexical such as reactions. Peirce held that all
this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed
exclusively of signs,[3] along with their representational
and inferential relations. He argued that, since all thought
takes time, all thought is in signs:
To say, therefore, that thought cannot happen in an instant, but requires a time, is but another way of saying that every thought must be
interpreted in another, or that all thought is in
signs. (Peirce, 1868[4] )
Thought is not necessarily connected with
a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world;
and one can no more deny that it is really there,
than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects
are really there. Consistently adhere to that
unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven
to some form of idealistic nominalism akin to
Fichtes. Not only is thought in the organic
world, but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying
it, so there cannot be thought without Signs.
We must here give Sign a very wide sense, no
doubt, but not too wide a sense to come within
our denition. Admitting that connected Signs
must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a
Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind)
in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded.
Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human
Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every
logical evolution of thought should be dialogic.
(Peirce, 1906[5] )

12.1.1

Sign relation

Signhood is a way of being in relation, not a way of being in itself. Anything is a sign not as itself, but in
some relation to another. The role of sign is constituted
as one role among three: object, sign, and interpretant
sign. It is an irreducible triadic relation; the roles are
distinct even when the things that ll them are not. The

45
roles are but three: a sign of an object leads to interpretants, which, as signs, lead to further interpretants. In
various relations, the same thing may be sign or semiotic object. The question of what a sign is depends on
the concept of a sign relation, which depends on the concept of a triadic relation. This, in turn, depends on the
concept of a relation itself. Peirce depended on mathematical ideas about the reducibility of relations dyadic,
triadic, tetradic, and so forth. According to Peirces Reduction Thesis,[6] (a) triads are necessary because genuinely triadic relations cannot be completely analyzed in
terms of monadic and dyadic predicates, and (b) triads
are sucient because there are no genuinely tetradic or
larger polyadic relationsall higher-arity n-adic relations
can be analyzed in terms of triadic and lower-arity relations and are reducible to them. Peirce and others,
notably Robert Burch (1991) and Joachim Hereth Correia and Reinhard Pschel (2006), have oered proofs of
the Reduction Thesis.[7] According to Peirce, a genuinely
monadic predicate characteristically expresses quality. A
genuinely dyadic predicate reaction or resistance. A
genuinely triadic predicate representation or mediation. Thus Peirces theory of relations underpins his
philosophical theory of three basic categories (see below).
Extension intension = information. Two traditional
approaches to sign relation, necessary though insucient, are the way of extension (a signs objects, also
called breadth, denotation, or application) and the way of
intension (the objects characteristics, qualities, attributes
referenced by the sign, also called depth, comprehension,
signicance, or connotation). Peirce adds a third, the way
of information, including change of information, in order to integrate the other two approaches into a unied
whole.[8] For example, because of the equation above,
if a terms total amount of information stays the same,
then the more that the term 'intends or signies about
objects, the fewer are the objects to which the term 'extends or applies. A propositions comprehension consists
in its implications.[9]
Determination. A sign depends on its object in such a way
as to represent its object the object enables and, in a
sense, determines the sign. A physically causal sense of
this stands out especially when a sign consists in an indicative reaction. The interpretant depends likewise on
both the sign and the object the object determines the
sign to determine the interpretant. But this determination
is not a succession of dyadic events, like a row of toppling dominoes; sign determination is triadic. For example, an interpretant does not merely represent something
which represented an object; instead an interpretant represents something as a sign representing an object. It is
an informational kind of determination, a rendering of
something more determinately representative.[10] Peirce
used the word determine not in strictly deterministic
sense, but in a sense of specializes, bestimmt,[10] involving variation in measure, like an inuence. Peirce came

46

CHAPTER 12. SEMIOTIC ELEMENTS AND CLASSES OF SIGNS

to dene sign, object, and interpretant by their (triadic)


mode of determination, not by the idea of representation, since that is part of what is being dened.[11] The
object determines the sign to determine another sign
the interpretant to be related to the object as the sign
is related to the object, hence the interpretant, fullling
its function as sign of the object, determines a further
interpretant sign. The process is logically structured to
perpetuate itself, and is denitive of sign, object, and interpretant in general.[12] In semiosis, every sign is an interpretant in a chain stretching both fore and aft. The
relation of informational or logical determination which
constrains object, sign, and interpretant is more general
than the special cases of causal or physical determination.
In general terms, any information about one of the items
in the sign relation tells you something about the others,
although the actual amount of this information may be nil
in some species of sign relations.

12.1.2

Sign, object, interpretant

Some of the understanding needed by the mind depends


on familiarity with the object. In order to know what
a given sign denotes, the mind needs some experience
of that signs object collaterally to that sign or sign system, and in this context Peirce speaks of collateral experience, collateral observation, collateral acquaintance, all
in much the same terms.[15]
"Representamen" (properly with the a long and stressed:
/rprzntemn/) was adopted (not coined) by Peirce
as his blanket technical term for any and every sign or
sign-like thing covered by his theory. It is a question of
whether the theoretically dened representamen covers only the cases covered by the popular word sign.
The word representamen is there in case a divergence
should emerge. Peirces example was this: Sign action always involves a mind. If a sunower, by doing nothing
more than turning toward the sun, were thereby to become fully able to reproduce a sunower turning in just
the same way toward the sun, then the rst sunowers
turning would be a representamen of the sun yet not a
sign of the sun.[16] Peirce eventually stopped using the
word representamen.[17]

Peirce held that there are exactly three basic semiotic


elements, the sign, object, and interpretant, as outlined Peirce made various classications of his semiotic elements, especially of the sign and the interpretant.
above and eshed out here in a bit more detail:
Of particular concern in understanding the sign-object A sign (or representamen) represents, in the broad- interpretant triad is this: In relation to a sign, its object
est possible sense of represents. It is something and its interpretant are either immediate (present in the
interpretable as saying something about something. sign) or mediate.
It is not necessarily symbolic, linguistic, or articial.
An object (or semiotic object) is a subject matter of a
sign and an interpretant. It can be anything discussable or thinkable, a thing, event, relationship, quality, law, argument, etc., and can even be ctional,
for instance Hamlet.[13] All of those are special or
partial objects. The object most accurately is the
universe of discourse to which the partial or special object belongs.[14] For instance, a perturbation
of Plutos orbit is a sign about Pluto but ultimately
not only about Pluto.
An interpretant (or interpretant sign) is the signs
more or less claried meaning or ramication,
a kind of form or idea of the dierence which
the signs being true or undeceptive would make.
(Peirces sign theory concerns meaning in the broadest sense, including logical implication, not just the
meanings of words as properly claried by a dictionary.) The interpretant is a sign (a) of the object and (b) of the interpretants predecessor (the
interpreted sign) as being a sign of the same object. The interpretant is an interpretation in the sense
of a product of an interpretive process or a content
in which an interpretive relation culminates, though
this product or content may itself be an act, a state
of agitation, a conduct, etc. Such is what is summed
up in saying that the sign stands for the object to the
interpretant.

1. Sign, always immediate to itself that is, in a tautologous sense, present in or at itself, even if it is not
immediate to a mind or immediately accomplished
without processing or is a general apprehended only
in its instances.
2. Object
(a) Immediate object, the object as represented in
the sign.
(b) Dynamic object, the object as it really is, on
which the idea which is the immediate object
is founded, as on bedrock[18] Also called the
dynamoid object, the dynamical object.
3. Interpretant
(a) Immediate interpretant, the quality of the impression which a sign is t to produce, not any
actual reaction, and which the sign carries with
it even before there is an interpreter or quasiinterpreter. It is what is ordinarily called the
signs meaning.
(b) Dynamic interpretant, the actual eect (apart
from the feeling) of the sign on a mind or
quasi-mind, for instance the agitation of the
feeling.

12.2. CLASSES OF SIGNS

47

(c) Final interpretant, the eect which the sign


would have on the conduct of any mind or
quasi-mind if circumstances allowed that effect to be fully achieved. It is the signs end or
purpose. The nal interpretant of ones inquiry
about the weather is the inquirys purpose, the
eect which the response would have on the
plans for the day of anybody in ones shoes.
The nal interpretant of a line of investigation as such is the truth as the ideal nal opinion and would be reached sooner or later but
still inevitably by investigation adequately prolonged, though the truth remains independent
of that which you or I or any nite community
of investigators believe.

ical typologies can nonetheless be observed, one crucial


one being the distinction between icons, indices and
symbols (CP 2.228, CP 2.229 and CP 5.473). The
icon-index-symbol typology is chronologically the rst
but structurally the second of three that t together as
a trio of three-valued parameters in regular scheme of
nine kinds of sign. (The three parameters (not Peirces
term) are not independent of one another, and the result
is a system of ten classes of sign, which are shown further
down in this article.)

The immediate object is, from the viewpoint of a theorist, really a kind of sign of the dynamic object; but phenomenologically it is the object until there is reason to
go beyond it, and somebody analyzing (critically but not
theoretically) a given semiosis will consider the immediate object to be the object until there is reason to do
otherwise.[19]

*Note: An interpretant is an interpretation (human or otherwise) in the sense of the product of an interpretive process.

Peirces three basic phenomenological categories come


into central play in these classications. The 1-2-3 numerations used further below in the exposition of sign
classes represents Peirces associations of sign classes
with the categories. The categories are as follows:

The three sign typologies depend respectively on (I) the


sign itself, (II) how the sign stands for its denoted object,
and (III) how the signs stands for its object to its interpretant. Each of the three typologies is a three-way division,
Peirce preferred phrases like dynamic object over real a trichotomy, via Peirces three phenomenological cateobject since the object might be ctive Hamlet, for gories.
instance, to whom one grants a ctive reality, a reality
1. Qualisigns, sinsigns, and legisigns . Every sign is eiwithin the universe of discourse of the play Hamlet.[13]
ther (qualisign) a quality or possibility, or (sinsign)
It is initially tempting to regard immediate, dynamic, and
an actual individual thing, fact, event, state, etc., or
nal interpretants as forming a temporal succession in an
(legisign) a norm, habit, rule, law. (Also called types,
actual process of semiosis, especially since their conceptokens, and tones, also potisigns, actisigns, and famtions refer to beginning, midstages, and end of a semiotic
isigns.)
process. But instead their distinctions from each other
are modal or categorial. The immediate interpretant is a
2. Icons, indices, and symbols. Every sign refers eiquality of impression which a sign is tted to produce, a
ther (icon) through similarity to its object, or (index)
special potentiality. The dynamic interpretant is an actuthrough factual connection to its object, or (symbol)
ality. The nal interpretant is a kind of norm or necessity
through interpretive habit or norm of reference to its
unaected by actual trends of opinion or interpretation.
object.
One does not actually obtain a nal interpretant per se; in3. Rhemes, dicisigns, and arguments . Every sign is
stead one may successfully coincide with it.[20] Peirce, a
interpreted either as (rheme) term-like, standing
fallibilist, holds that one has no guarantees that one has
for its object in respect of quality, or as (dicisign)
done so, but only compelling reasons, sometimes very
proposition-like, standing for its object in respect of
compelling, to think so and, in practical matters, must
fact, or as (argument) argumentative, standing for
sometimes act with complete condence of having done
its object in respect of habit or law. This is the triso. (Peirce said that it is often better in practical matters
chotomy of all signs as building blocks of inference.
to rely on instinct, sentiment, and tradition, than on theo[21]
(Also called sumisigns, dicisigns, and suadisigns, also
retical inquiry. ) In any case, insofar as truth is the nal
semes, phemes, and delomes.)
interpretant of a pursuit of truth, one believes, in eect,
that one coincides with a nal interpretant of some question about what is true, whenever and to whatever extent Every sign falls under one class or another within (I) and
that one believes that one reaches a truth.
within (II) and' within (III). Thus each of the three typologies is a three-valued parameter for every sign. The
three parameters are not independent of each other; many
co-classications aren't found.[29] The result is not 27 but
12.2 Classes of signs
instead ten classes of signs fully specied at this level of
Peirce proposes several typologies and denitions of the analysis.
signs. More than 76 denitions of what a sign is have In later years, Peirce attempted a ner level of analysis,
been collected throughout Peirces work.[22] Some canon- dening sign classes in terms of relations not just to sign,

48

CHAPTER 12. SEMIOTIC ELEMENTS AND CLASSES OF SIGNS

object, and interpretant, but to sign, immediate object, line iconically for a fork in the road and stands indicadynamic object, immediate interpretant, dynamic inter- tively near a fork in the road.
pretant, and nal or normal interpretant. He aimed at 10
trichotomies of signs, with the above three trichotomies
1. An icon (also called likeness and semblance) is a sign
interspersed among them, and issuing in 66 classes of
that denotes its object by virtue of a quality which
signs. He did not bring that system into a nished form.
is shared by them but which the icon has irrespecIn any case, in that system, icon, index, and symbol were
tively of the object. The icon (for instance, a portrait
classed by category of how they stood for the dynamic
or a diagram) resembles or imitates its object. The
object, while rheme, dicisign, and argument were classed
icon has, of itself, a certain character or aspect, one
by the category of how they stood to the nal or normal
which the object also has (or is supposed to have)
interpretant.[30]
and which lets the icon be interpreted as a sign even
These conceptions are specic to Peirces theory of signs
if the object does not exist. The icon signies essenand are not exactly equivalent to general uses of the
tially on the basis of its ground. (Peirce dened the
notions of icon, symbol, index, tone, token,
ground as the pure abstraction of a quality, and the
type, term, proposition, argument, and rhema.
signs ground as the pure abstraction of the quality in
respect of which the sign refers to its object, whether
by resemblance or, as a symbol, by imputing the
12.2.1 I. Qualisign, sinsign, legisign
quality to the object.[32] ). Peirce called an icon apart
from a label, legend, or other index attached to it,
Also called tone, token, type; and also called potisign, aca hypoicon, and divided the hypoicon into three
tisign, famisign.
classes: (a) the image, which depends on a simple
quality; (b) the diagram, whose internal relations,
This is the typology of the sign as distinguished by signs
mainly dyadic or so taken, represent by analogy the
own phenomenological category (set forth in 1903, 1904,
relations in something; and (c) the metaphor, which
etc.).
represents the representative character of a sign by
representing a parallelism in something else.[33] A
1. A qualisign (also called tone, potisign, and mark) is
diagram can be geometric, or can consist in an ara sign which consists in a quality of feeling, a possiray of algebraic expressions, or even in the combility, a First.
mon form All __ is ___ which is subjectable, like
2. A sinsign (also called token and actisign) is a sign
any diagram, to logical or mathematical transformawhich consists in a reaction/resistance, an actual sintions. Peirce held that mathematics is done by diagular thing, an actual occurrence or fact, a Second.
grammatic thinking observation of, and experimentation on, diagrams.
3. A legisign (also called type and famisign) is a sign
which consists in a (general) idea, a norm or law or
2. An index* is a sign that denotes its object by virtue
habit, a representational relation, a Third.
of an actual connection involving them, one that he
also calls a real relation in virtue of its being irreA replica (also called instance) of a legisign is a sign, ofspective of interpretation. It is in any case a relation
ten an actual individual one (a sinsign), which embodwhich is in fact, in contrast to the icon, which has
ies that legisign. A replica is a sign for the associated
only
a ground for denotation of its object, and in
legisign, and therefore is also a sign for the legisigns obcontrast
to the symbol, which denotes by an interject. All legisigns need sinsigns as replicas, for exprespretive
habit
or law. An index which compels atsion. Some but not all legisigns are symbols. All symtention
without
conveying any information about its
bols are legisigns. Dierent words with the same meanobject
is
a
pure
index, though that may be an ideal
ing are symbols which are replicas of that symbol which
limit
never
actually
reached. If an indexical relaconsists in their meaning but doesn't prescribe qualities
[31]
tion
is
a
resistance
or
reaction physically or causally
of its replicas.
connecting an index to its object, then the index is a
reagent (for example smoke coming from a building
is a reagent index of re). Such an index is really
12.2.2 II. Icon, index, symbol
aected or modied by the object, and is the only
This is the typology of the sign as distinguished by phekind of index which can be used in order to ascernomenological category of its way of denoting the object
tain facts about its object. Peirce also usually held
(set forth in 1867 and many times in later years). This
that an index does not have to be an actual individual
typology emphasizes the dierent ways in which the sign
fact or thing, but can be a general; a disease symprefers to its object the icon by a quality of its own, the
tom is general, its occurrence singular; and he usuindex by real connection to its object, and the symbol by a
ally considered a designation to be an index, e.g.,
habit or rule for its interpretant. The modes may be coma pronoun, a proper name, a label on a diagram,
pounded, for instance, in a sign that displays a forking
etc. (In 1903 Peirce said that only an individual

12.2. CLASSES OF SIGNS

49

is an index,[34] gave seme as an alternate expres- attributes to the signs way of denoting the object (set
sion for index, and called designations subindices forth in 1902, 1903, etc.):
or hyposemes,[35] which were a kind of symbol; he
allowed of a degenerate index indicating a non1. A rheme (also called sumisign and seme*) is a sign
individual object, as exemplied by an individual
that represents its object in respect of quality and so,
thing indicating its own characteristics. But by 1904
in its signied interpretant, is represented as a charhe allowed indices to be generals and returned to
acter or mark,[39] though it actually may be icon,
classing designations as indices. In 1906 he changed
index, or symbol. The rheme* (seme) stands as
the meaning of seme to that of the earlier sumits object for some purpose.[40] A proposition with
isign and rheme.)
the subject places left blank is a rheme; but subject
terms by themselves are also rhemes. A proposition,
3. A symbol* is a sign that denotes its object solely by
said Peirce, can be considered a zero-place rheme,
virtue of the fact that it will be interpreted to do so.
a zero-place predicate.
The symbol consists in a natural or conventional or
logical rule, norm, or habit, a habit that lacks (or
2. A dicisign (also called dicent sign and pheme ) is a
has shed) dependence on the symbolic signs havsign that represents its object in respect of actual
ing a resemblance or real connection to the denoted
existence and so, in its signied interpretant, is repobject. Thus, a symbol denotes by virtue of its inresented as indexical,[41] though it actually may be
terpretant. Its sign-action (semeiosis) is ruled by a
either index or symbol. The dicisign separately indihabit, a more or less systematic set of associations
cates its object (as subject of the predicate).[42] The
that ensures its interpretation. For Peirce, every
dicisign is intended to have some compulsive efsymbol is a general, and that which we call an acfect on the interpreter of it.[40] Peirce had generaltual individual symbol (e.g., on the page) is called
ized the idea of proposition to where a weathercock,
by Peirce a replica or instance of the symbol. Symphotograph, etc., could be considered propositions
bols, like all other legisigns (also called types),
(or dicisigns, as he came to call them). A proponeed actual, individual replicas for expression. The
sition in the conventional sense is a dicent symbol
proposition is an example of a symbol which is irre(also called symbolic dicisign). Assertions are also
spective of language and of any form of expression
dicisigns.
and does not prescribe qualities of its replicas.[36]
3. An argument (also called suadisign and delome)
A word that is symbolic (rather than indexical like
is a sign that represents its object in respect of
this or iconic like whoosh!") is an example of a
law or habit and so, in its signied interpretant, is
symbol that prescribes qualities (especially looks or
[37]
represented as symbolic (and was indeed a symsound) of its replicas. Not every replica is actual
bol in the rst place).[43] The argument separately
and individual. Two word-symbols with the same
monstrates its signied interpretant (the argumeaning (such as English horse and Spanish caments conclusion); an argument stripped of all signs
ballo) are symbols which are replicas of that symbol
of such monstrative relationship is, or becomes, a
which consists in their shared meaning.[31] A book,
dicisign.[42] It represents a process of change in
a theory, a person, each is a complex symbol.
thoughts or signs, as if to induce this change in
the Interpreter through the interpreters own self* Note: in On a New List of Categories (1867) Peirce
control.[40] A novel, a work of art, the universe, can
gave the unqualied term sign as an alternate expresbe a delome in Peirces terms.
sion for index, and gave general sign as an alternate
expression for symbol. Representamen was his blanket technical term for any and every sign or signlike thing
covered by his theory.[38] Peirce soon reserved sign
to its broadest sense, for index, icon, and symbol alike.
He also eventually decided that the symbol is not the
only sign which can be called a general sign in some
sense, and that indices and icons can be generals, generalities, too. The general sign, as such, the generality as a
sign, he eventually called, at various times, the legisign
(1903, 1904), the type (1906, 1908), and the famisign (1908).

12.2.3

III. Rheme, dicisign, argument

*Note: In his Prolegomena To an Apology For Pragmaticism (The Monist, v. XVI, no. 4, Oct. 1906), Peirce
uses the words seme, pheme, and delome (pp. 506,
507, etc.) for the rheme-dicisign-argument typology, but
retains the word rheme for the predicate (p. 530) in his
system of Existential Graphs. Also note that Peirce once
oered seme as an alternate expression for index in
1903.[34]

12.2.4 The three sign typologies together:


ten classes of sign

The three typologies, labeled I., II., and III., are


This is the typology of the sign as distinguished by the shown together in the table below. As parameters, they
phenomenological category which the signs interpretant are not independent of one another. As previously said,

50

CHAPTER 12. SEMIOTIC ELEMENTS AND CLASSES OF SIGNS

many co-classications aren't found.[29] The slanting and


vertical lines show the options for co-classication of a
given sign (and appear in MS 339, August 7, 1904, viewable here at the Lyris peirce-l archive[44] ). The result is
ten classes of sign.
Words in parentheses in the table are alternate names for
the same kinds of signs.
*Note: As noted above, in On a New List of Categories
(1867) Peirce gave the unqualied word sign as an alternate expression for index, and gave general sign as an
alternate expression for symbol. Peirce soon reserved
sign to its broadest sense, for index, icon, and symbol
alike, and eventually decided that symbols are not the only
signs which can be called general signs in some sense.
See note at end of section II. Icon, index, symbol for
details.
Note that a term (in the conventional sense) is not just any
rheme; it is a kind of rhematic symbol. Likewise a proposition (in the conventional sense) is not just any dicisign,
it is a kind of dicent symbol.

12.3 Notes
[1] Brent, Joseph (1998), Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, 2nd
edition, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press (catalog page); also NetLibrary.
[2] For Peirces denitions of philosophy, see for instance A
Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic, CP 1.183-186, 1903
and Minute Logic, CP 1.239-241, 1902. See Peirces
denitions of philosophy at CDPT under "Cenoscopy" and
"Philosophy".
[3] Peirce, C.S., CP 5.448 footnote, from The Basis of Pragmaticism in 1906.
[4] Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for
Man (Arisbe Eprint), Journal of Speculative Philosophy
vol. 2 (1868), pp. 103-114. Reprinted (CP 5.213-263,
the quote is from para. 253).
[5] Prolegomena To an Apology For Pragmaticism, pp.
492546, The Monist, vol. XVI, no. 4 (mislabeled VI),
Oct. 1906, see p. 523. Reprinted CP 4.530572; see
para. 551 Eprint.
[6] See The Logic of Relatives, The Monist, Vol. 7, 1897,
pp. 161217, see p. 183 (via Google Books with registration apparently not required). Reprinted in the Collected Papers, vol. 3, paragraphs 456-552, see paragraph
483.
[7]

Burch, Robert (1991), A Peircean Reduction Thesis:


The Foundations of Topological Logic, Texas Tech
University Press, Lubbock, Texas
Anellis, Irving (1993) Review of A Peircean Reduction Thesis: The Foundations of Topological
Logic by Robert Burch in Modern Logic v. 3, n.
4, 401-406, Project Euclid Open Access PDF 697
KB. Criticism and some suggestions for improvements.

Anellis, Irving (1997), Tarskis Development of


Peirces Logic of Relations (Google Book Search
Eprint) in Houser, Nathan, Roberts, Don D., and
Van Evra, James (eds., 1997), Studies in the Logic of
Charles Sanders Peirce. Anellis gives an account of
a Reduction Thesis proof discussed and presented
by Peirce in his letter to William James of August
1905 (L224, 40-76, printed in Peirce, C. S. and
Eisele, Carolyn, ed. (1976), The New Elements of
Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, v. 3, 809-835).
Hereth Correia, Joachim and Pschel, Reinhard
(2006), The Teridentity and Peircean Algebraic
Logic in Conceptual Structures: Inspiration and
Application (ICCS 2006): 229-246, Springer.
Frithjof Dau called it the strong version of proof
of Peirces Reduction Thesis. John F. Sowa in
the same discussion claimed that an explanation in
terms of conceptual graphs is suciently convincing about the Reduction Thesis for those without
the time to understand what Peirce was saying.
In 1954 W. V. O. Quine claimed to prove the reducibility of larger predicates to dyadic predicates,
in Quine, W.V.O., Reduction to a dyadic predicate, Selected Logic Papers.
[8] Peirce, C. S. (1867), Upon Logical Comprehension and
Extension (CP 2.391-426), (W 2:70-86, PEP Eprint).
[9] Peirce, C.S and Ladd-Franklin, Christine, Signication
(and Application, in logic)", Dictionary of Philosophy and
Psychology v. 2, p. 528. Reprinted CP 2.431-4.
[10] Peirce, letter to William James, dated 1909, see EP 2:492.
[11] Peirce, C.S., A Letter to Lady Welby (1908), Semiotic
and Signics, pp. 80-81:
I dene a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its Object,
and so determines an eect upon a person,
which eect I call its Interpretant, that the
latter is thereby mediately determined by the
former. My insertion of upon a person is a
sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making
my own broader conception understood.
[12] See "76 denitions of the sign by [Link]", collected
by Professor Robert Marty (University of Perpignan,
France).
[13] A Letter to William James, EP 2:498, 1909, viewable at
CDPT under Dynamical Object
[14] A Letter to William James, EP 2:492, 1909, viewable at
CDPT under "Object".
[15] See pp. 404-409 in Pragmatism, EP 2. Ten quotes
on collateral observation from Peirce provided by Joseph
Ransdell can be viewed here. Note: Ransdells quotes
from CP 8.178-179, are also in EP 2:493-4, which gives
their date as 1909; and his quote from CP 8.183, is also
in EP 2:495-6, which gives its date as 1909.
[16] A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic, EP 2:272-3,
1903

12.3. NOTES

[17] A Draft of a Letter to Lady Welby, Semiotic and Signics,


p. 193, 1905
[18] In EP 2:407, viewable at CDPT under "Real Object"
[19] See Ransdell, Joseph, On the Use and Abuse of the
Immediate/Dynamical Object Distinction draft 2007,
Arisbe Eprint
[20] See Peirces 1909 letter (or letters) to William James, CP
8.314 and 8.315, and Essential Peirce v. 2, pp. 496-7,
and a 1909 letter to Lady Welby, Semiotic and Signics
pp. 110-1, all under "Final Interpretant" at CDPT. Also
see 1873, MS 218 (Robin 379) in Writings of Charles S.
Peirce v. 3, p. 79, on the nal opinion, and CP 8.184, on
nal opinion as nal interpretant, in a review of a book by
Lady Welby.
[21] Philosophy and the Conduct of Life, 1898, Lecture 1
of the Cambridge (MA) Conferences Lectures, published
CP 1.616-48 in part and in Reasoning and the Logic of
Things, Ketner (ed., intro.) and Putnam (intro., comm.),
pp. 105-22, reprinted in Essential Peirce v. 2, pp. 27-41.
[22] See 76 Denitions of The Sign by C. S. Peirce collected
and analyzed by Robert Marty, Department of Mathematics, University of Perpignan, Perpignan, France, With an
Appendix of 12 Further Denitions or Equivalents proposed by Alfred Lang, Dept of Psychology, University of
Bern, Bern, Switzerland, Arisbe Eprint.
[23] Minute Logic, CP 2.87, c.1902 and A Letter to
Lady Welby, CP 8.329, 1904. See relevant quotes under "Categories, Cenopythagorean Categories" in Commens Dictionary of Peirces Terms (CDPT), Bergman &
Paalova, eds., U. of Helsinki.
[24] See quotes under "Firstness, First [as a category]" in
CDPT.
[25] The ground blackness is the pure abstraction of the quality
black. Something black is something embodying blackness, pointing us back to the abstraction. The quality
black amounts to reference to its own pure abstraction,
the ground blackness. The question is not merely of noun
(the ground) versus adjective (the quality), but rather of
whether we are considering the black(ness) as abstracted
away from application to an object, or instead as so applied (for instance to a stove). Yet note that Peirces distinction here is not that between a property-general and
a property-individual (a trope). See "On a New List of
Categories" (1867), in the section appearing in CP 1.551.
Regarding the ground, cf. the Scholastic conception of a
relations foundation, Google limited preview Deely 1982,
p. 61
[26] A quale in this sense is a such, just as a quality is a suchness. Cf. under Use of Letters in 3 of Peirces Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives, Memoirs of the American Academy, v. 9, pp. 31778 (1870),
separately reprinted (1870), from which see p. 6 via
Google books, also reprinted in CP 3.63:
Now logical terms are of three grand
classes. The rst embraces those whose
logical form involves only the conception of

51

quality, and which therefore represent a thing


simply as a . These discriminate objects
in the most rudimentary way, which does not
involve any consciousness of discrimination.
They regard an object as it is in itself as such
(quale); for example, as horse, tree, or man.
These are absolute terms. (Peirce, 1870. But
also see Quale-Consciousness, 1898, in CP
6.22237.)
[27] See quotes under "Secondness, Second [as a category]" in
CDPT.
[28] See quotes under "Thirdness, Third [as a category]" in
CDPT.
[29] For the reasons why, see CP 2.254-263, reprinted in the
Philosophical Writings of Peirce pp. 115118, and in EP
2:294-296.
[30] See CP 8.343-75, from a 1908 partial draft of a letter to
Lady Welby.
[31] New Elements (Kaina Stoicheia) MS 517 (1904); EP
2:300-324, Arisbe Eprint, scroll down to /317/, then rst
new paragraph
[32] Cf. the Scholastic conception of a relations foundation,
Deely 1982, p. 61 (Google Books)
[33] On image, diagram, and metaphor, see "Hypoicon" in the
Commens Dictionary of Peirces Terms.
[34] In 'A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2:274,
1903, and viewable under "Index" at CDPT.
[35] In A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic, EP 2:274,
1903, and viewable under "Subindex, Hyposeme" at the
CDPT.
[36] MS599 c.1902 Reasons Rules, relevant quote viewable
under MS 599 in Role of Icons In Predication, Joseph
Ransdell, ed. Arisbe Eprint.
[37] A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic, EP 2:274, 1903,
and Logical Tracts, No. 2, CP 4.447, c. 1903. Relevant
quotes viewable at the CDPT, under Symbol.
[38] A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic, EP
2:272-3. Relevant quote viewable at CDPT, under
Representamen
[39] A Letter to Lady Welby, Semiotic and Signics pp. 33-34,
1904, viewable at CDPT under Rhema, Rheme.
[40] Peirce, 1906, Prolegomena To an Apology For Pragmaticism, pp. 506507 in 492546, The Monist, v. XVI, n.
4 (mislabeled VI), Oct. 1906, reprinted in CP 4.538
[41] A Letter to Lady Welby, Semiotic and Signics, pp. 3334, 1904; also A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic',
EP 2:275-276 and 292, 1903; all three quotes viewable at
CDPT under "Dicent, Dicent Sign, Dicisign".
[42] New Elements (Kaina Stoicheia)", Manuscript 517
(1904), and EP 2:300-324, see 308, viewable in Arisbe
Eprint, scroll down to /308/

52

CHAPTER 12. SEMIOTIC ELEMENTS AND CLASSES OF SIGNS

[43] A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic, EP 2:296, 1903,


quote viewable at CDPT under "Argument".

Peirce, C.S. (1903) Sundry Logical Conceptions, EP 2:267-88.

[44] the image was provided by Bernard Morand of the Institut Universitaire de Technologie (France), Dpartement
Informatique.

Peirce, C.S. (1903) Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are
Determined, EP 2:289-99

[45] See peirce-l post by Anderson Vinicius Romanini Re:


representing the ten classes of signs (corrected)" 200606-16 Eprint and peirce-l post by Joseph Ransdell Re:
1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)" 2006-06-18
Eprint. The manuscript can be viewed (and magnied by
clicking on image) here at the Lyris peirce-l archive. The
image was provided by Joseph Ransdell, Professor Emeritus, Philosophy, Texas Tech University.

12.4 References and further reading


Pieces by Peirce on semiotic
Peirce, C.S. (1867), "On a New List of Categories",
Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences 7 (1868), 287298. Presented, 14 May
1867. Reprinted (Collected Papers (CP), v. 1, paragraphs 545559), (Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A
Chronological Edition, v. 2, pp. 4959), (The Essential Peirce (EP) v. 1, 110). Arisbe Eprint.
Peirce, C.S. (1867), Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension, Proceedings of the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences, pp. 416432. Presented 13 November 1867. Reprinted CP 2.391426, Writings v. 2, pp. 7086. Eprint.

Peirce, C.S. (1904 MS) New Elements


(Kaina Stoicheia)", pp. 23563 in Carolyn
Eisele, ed., The New Elements of Mathematics
by Charles S. Peirce, Volume 4, Mathematical
Philosophy. Reprinted (EP 2:300-24). Eprint.
Peirce, C.S. (c.1903 MS), Logical Tracts, No. 2,
CP 4.418509.
Peirce, C.S. (1904 Oct 12), A Letter to Lady Welby,
CP 8.32741.
Peirce, C.S. (1905), A Draft of a Letter to Lady
Welby, Semiotic and Signics p. 193
Peirce, C.S. (1906), Prolegomena To an Apology
For Pragmaticism, pp. 492546, The Monist, vol.
XVI, no. 4 (mislabeled VI), Oct. 1906 (links embedded in page numbers and edition numbers are
via Google Book Search, full access not yet available
widely outside the USA). Reprinted CP 4.530-572
Eprint.
Peirce, C.S. (1907 MS), Pragmatism, EP 2:398433.
Peircc, C.S. (1908, Dec. 24, 25, 28), From a partial
draft of a letter to Lady Welby, CP 8.34279.
Peircc, C.S. (1911 MS), A Sketch of Logical Critics, EP 2:451-62.

Peirce, C.S. (c.1894 MS), What Is a Sign?". Published in part in CP 2.281, 285, and 297-302, and in
Peirce collections
full in EP 2:4-10. Peirce Edition Project Eprint.
Peirce, C.S. (1895 MS), Of Reasoning in General.
Published in part in CP 2.282, 286-91, 295-96, 43544, and 7.555-8, and in full in EP 2:11-26.
Peirce, C.S. (1896), The Regenerated Logic, The
Monist, v. VII, n. 1, pp. 1940, The Open
Court Publishing Co., Chicago, Illinois, 1896, for
the Hegeler Institute. Reprinted (CP 3.425-455).
Internet Archive, The Monist 7, p. 19.
Peirce, C.S. (1897), The Logic of Relatives, The
Monist, v. VII, pp. 161217. Reprinted in CP
3.456-552.
Peirce, C.S. (c.1902 MSS), Minute Logic, CP 2.1118.
Peirce, C.S. (c.1902 MS), Reasons Rules Eprint
Peirce, C.S. A Syllabus of Certain Topics of
Logic, EP 2:

Peirce, C.S. (193135, 1958), Collected Papers of


Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 16, 193135, Charles
Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, eds., vols. 78, 1958,
Arthur W. Burks, ed., Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Peirce, C.S (1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, 4 volumes in 5, Carolyn
Eisele, ed., Mouton Publishers, The Hague, Netherlands, 1976. Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands,
New Jersey.
Peirce, C.S., and Welby-Gregory, Victoria (Lady
Welby) (1977, 2001), Semiotic and Signics: The
Correspondence between C. S. Peirce and Victoria
Lady Welby, edited by Charles S. Hardwick with the
assistance of James Cook, Indiana University Press,
Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana, 1977, 2nd
edition (Peirce Studies 8), 2001, the Press of Arisbe
Associates, Elsah, Illinois.

12.5. EXTERNAL LINKS


Peirce, C.S. (1981-), Writings of Charles S. Peirce, A
Chronological Edition, vols. 1-6 & 8, of a projected
30, Peirce Edition Project, eds., Indiana University
Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana.
Peirce, C.S. (1992, 1998) The Essential Peirce,
Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 1 (1867
1893), 1992, Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel,
eds., and Volume 2 (18931913), 1998, Peirce Edition Project, eds., Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
Peirce, C. S. (1994), Peirce on Signs: Writings on
Semiotic, James Hoopes, ed., paper, 294 pp., University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, North
Carolina.
Other
Marty, Robert (1997), 76 Denitions of the Sign
by C. S. Peirce collected and analyzed by Robert
Marty, Department of Mathematics, University of
Perpignan, Perpignan, France, and 12 Further Definitions or Equivalent proposed by Alfred Lang,
Dept. of Psychology, University of Bern, Bern,
Switzerland. Eprint. Martys semiotics.
Bergman, Mats and Paavola, Sami, eds. (2003-),
Commens Dictionary of Peirces Terms. Peirces own
denitions, often many per term across the decades.
Includes denitions of most of his semiotic terms.
Atkin, Albert (2006), Peirces Theory of Semiotics", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Articles Secondary Bibliography.
Ransdell, Joseph (2007 draft), On the Use and
Abuse of the Immediate/Dynamical Object Distinction, Arisbe Eprint.

12.5 External links


Peirce, including semiotics
Arisbe: The Peirce Gateway, Joseph Ransdell, ed.
Over 100 online writings by Peirce as of 11/24/10,
with annotations. 100s of online papers on Peirce.
The peirce-l e-forum. Much else.
Center for Applied Semiotics (CAS) (19982003),
Donald Cunningham & Jean Umiker-Sebeok, Indiana U.
Centro de Estudos Peirceanos (CeneP) and Centro
Internacional de Estudos Peirceanos (CIEP), Lucia
Santaella et al., Pontical Catholic U. of So Paulo
(PUC-SP), Brazil. In Portuguese, some English.

53
Centro StudiPeirce, Carlo Sini, Rossella Fabbrichesi, et al., U. of Milan, Italy. In Italian and English.
Part of Pragma.
Charles S. Peirce Foundation.
Co-sponsoring
the 2014 Peirce International Centennial Congress
(100th anniversary of Peirces death).
Charles S. Peirce Society
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society.
Quarterly journal of Peirce studies since spring
1965. Table of Contents of all issues.
Charles S. Peirce Studies, Brian Kariger, ed.
Semiotic elements and classes of signs at the
Mathematics Genealogy Project
Collegium for the Advanced Study of Picture Act
and Embodiment: The Peirce Archive. Humboldt
U, Berlin, Germany. Cataloguing Peirces innumerable drawings & graphic materials. More info (Prof.
Aud Sissel Hoel).
Digital Encyclopedia of Charles S. Peirce, Joo
Queiroz (now at UFJF) & Ricardo Gudwin (at Unicamp), eds., U. of Campinas, Brazil, in English. 84
authors listed, 51 papers online & more listed, as of
1/31/09.
Existential Graphs, Jay Zeman, ed., U. of Florida.
Has 4 Peirce texts.
Grupo de Estudios Peirceanos (GEP) / Peirce Studies Group, Jaime Nubiola, ed., U. of Navarra,
Spain. Big study site, Peirce & others in Spanish
& English, bibliography, more.
Helsinki Peirce Research Center (HPRC), AhtiVeikko Pietarinen et al., U. of Helsinki, with
Commens: Virtual Centre for Peirce Studies, Mats
Bergman & Sami Paavola, eds. 23 papers by 11 authors as of 11/24/10.
Commens Dictionary of Peirces Terms (CDPT):
Peirces own denitions, often many per term across
the decades.
His Glassy Essence. Autobiographical Peirce. Kenneth Laine Ketner.
Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism, Kenneth Laine
Ketner, Clyde Hendrick, et al., Texas Tech U.
Peirces life and works.
International Research Group on Abductive Inference, Uwe Wirth et al., eds., Goethe U., Frankfurt,
Germany. Uses frames. Click on link at bottom of
its home page for English. Moved to U. of Gieen,
Germany, home page not in English but see Artikel
section there.

54

CHAPTER 12. SEMIOTIC ELEMENTS AND CLASSES OF SIGNS

L'I.R.S.C.E. (19742003)Institut de Recherche


en Smiotique, Communication et ducation, Grard Deledalle, Jolle Rthor, U. of Perpignan,
France.

Center for Semiotics, Aarhus University, Denmark.

Minute Semeiotic, Vinicius Romanini, U. of So


Paulo, Brazil. English, Portuguese.

Cybernetics and Human Knowing, Sren Brier,


Chief Editor.

Peirce at Signo: Theoretical Semiotics on the Web,


Louis Hbert, director, supported by U. of Qubec.
Theory, application, exercises of Peirces Semiotics
and Esthetics. English, French.

International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems


(IJSSS), Angelo Loula & Joo Queiroz, Editors.

Peirce Edition Project (PEP), Indiana U.-Purdue U.


Indianapolis (IUPUI). Andr De Tienne, Nathan
Houser, et al. Editors of the Writings of Charles S.
Peirce (W) and The Essential Peirce (EP) v. 2. Many
study aids such as the Robin Catalog of Peirces
manuscripts & letters and:
Biographical introductions to EP 12 and W 16
&8
Most of W 2 readable online.
PEPs branch at Universit du Qubec Montral (UQM). Working on W 7: Peirces work on
the Century Dictionary. Denition of the week.
Peirces Existential Graphs, Frithjof Dau, Germany
Peirces Theory of Semiosis: Toward a Logic of Mutual Aection, Joseph Esposito. Free online course.
Pragmatism Cybrary, David Hildebrand & John
Shook.
Research Group on Semiotic Epistemology and
Mathematics Education (late 1990s), Institut fr Didaktik der Mathematik (Michael Homan, Michael
Otte, Universitt Bielefeld, Germany). See Peirce
Project Newsletter v. 3, n. 1, p. 13.
Semiotics according to Robert Marty, with 76 denitions of the sign by C. S. Peirce.
Related semiotics

Cognitive Semiotics, Per Aage Brandt & Todd Oakley, Editors-in-Chief.

Open Semiotics Resource Center. Journals, lecture


courses, etc.
The Public Journal of Semiotics, Paul Bouissac, Editor in Chief; Alan Cienki, Associate Editor; Ren
Jorna, Winfried Nth.
S.E.E.D. Journal (Semiotics, Evolution, Energy,
and Development) (20017), Edwina Taborsky,
Editorfrom SEE.
The Semiotic Review of Books, Gary Genosko, General Editor; Paul Bouissac, Founding Editor.
Semiotica, Marcel Danesi, Chief Editorfrom the
International Association for Semiotic Studies.
Semiotiche, Gian Paolo Caprettini, Managing Director; Andrea Valle & Miriam Visalli, Editors. Some
articles in English. Home site seems gone from
Web, old url no longer good, and Wayback Machine
cannot retrieve.
Semiotics, Communication and Cognition (book series), Paul Cobley & Kalevi Kull, Editors.
SemiotiX New Series: A Global Information Bulletin,
Paul Bouissac et al.
Sign Systems Studies, Kalevi Kull, Kati Lindstrom, Mihhail Lotman, Timo Maran, Silvi Salupere, Peeter Torop, Editorsfrom the Dept. of Semiotics, U. of Tartu, Estonia.
Signs and Society, Richard J. Parmentier, Editor.

American Journal of Semiotics, Joseph Brent, Editor, & John Deely, Managing Editorfrom the
Semiotic Society of America.

Signs: International Journal of Semiotics. Martin


Thellefsen, Torkild Thellefsen, & Bent Srensen,
chief eds.

Applied Semiotics / Smiotique applique(AS/SA),


Peter G. Marteinson & Pascal G. Michelucci, Editors.

Tartu Semiotics Library (book series), Peeter Torop,


Kalevi Kull, Silvi Salupere, Editors.

Approaches to Applied Semiotics (20002009 book


series), Thomas Sebeok et al., Editors.
Approaches to Semiotics (196997 book series),
Thomas A. Sebeok, Alain Rey, Roland Posner, et
al., Editors.
Biosemiotics, Marcello Barbieri, Editor-in-Chief
from the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies.

Versus: Quaderni di studi semiotici, founded by


Umberto Eco.
Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography has numerous
external links throughout to Peirce materials readable online.

Chapter 13

Umwelt
very epicenter of the study of both communication and
signication in the human [and non-human] animal.[1]
The term is usually translated as self-centered world.[2]
Uexkll theorised that organisms can have dierent
umwelten, even though they share the same environment.
The subject of umwelt and Uexklls work is described
by Dorion Sagan in an introduction to a collection of
translations.[3]

13.1 Discussion
Early Scheme for a circular Feedback Circle from Theoretische Biologie 1920.

Small circular Feedback Pictograms between the Text

Each functional component of an umwelt has a meaning


and so represents the organisms model of the world.
These functional components correspond approximately
to perceptual features,[4] as described by Anne Treisman.
It is also the semiotic world of the organism, including
all the meaningful aspects of the world for any particular organism, i.e. it can be water, food, shelter, potential threats, or points of reference for navigation. An organism creates and reshapes its own umwelt when it interacts with the world. This is termed a 'functional circle'. The umwelt theory states that the mind and the world
are inseparable, because it is the mind that interprets the
world for the organism. Consequently, the umwelten of
dierent organisms dier, which follows from the individuality and uniqueness of the history of every single
organism. When two umwelten interact, this creates a
semiosphere.[5][6]

As a term, umwelt also unites all the semiotic processes


of an organism into a whole. Internally, an organism is
the sum of its parts operating in functional circles and, to
survive, all the parts must work together co-operatively.
This is termed the collective umwelt" which models the
organism as a centralised system from the cellular level
upward. This requires the semiosis of any one part to be
continuously connected to any other semiosis operating
within the same organism. If anything disrupts this process, the organism will not operate eciently. But, when
Schematic view of a cycle as an early biocyberneticist
semiosis operates, the organism exhibits goal-oriented or
In the semiotic theories of Jakob von Uexkll and intentional behaviour.
Thomas A. Sebeok, umwelt (plural: umwelten; from Uexklls writings show a specic interest in the various
the German Umwelt meaning environment or sur- worlds that he believed to exist ('conceptually') from the
roundings) is the biological foundations that lie at the point of view of the umwelt of dierent creatures such as
55

56

CHAPTER 13. UMWELT

ticks, sea urchins, amoebae, jellysh and sea worms.

Qualia

The biosemiotic turn in Jakob von Uexklls analysis occurs in his discussion of the animals relationship with
its environment. The umwelt is for him an environmentworld which is, according to Agamben, constituted by a
more or less broad series of elements [called] 'carriers of
signicance' or 'marks which are the only things that interest the animal. Agamben goes on to paraphrase one
example from Uexklls discussion of a tick, saying,

Reality tunnel

"...this eyeless animal nds the way to her


watchpoint [at the top of a tall blade of grass]
with the help of only its skins general sensitivity to light. The approach of her prey becomes apparent to this blind and deaf bandit
only through her sense of smell. The odor of
butyric acid, which emanates from the sebaceous follicles of all mammals, works on the
tick as a signal that causes her to abandon her
post (on top of the blade of grass/bush) and
fall blindly downward toward her prey. If she
is fortunate enough to fall on something warm
(which she perceives by means of an organ sensible to a precise temperature) then she has attained her prey, the warm-blooded animal, and
thereafter needs only the help of her sense of
touch to nd the least hairy spot possible and
embed herself up to her head in the cutaneous
tissue of her prey. She can now slowly suck up
a stream of warm blood.
Thus, for the tick, the umwelt is reduced to only three
(biosemiotic) carriers of signicance: (1) The odor of
butyric acid, which emanates from the sebaceous follicles of all mammals, (2) The temperature of 37 degrees
celsius (corresponding to the blood of all mammals), (3)
The hairy topography of mammals.

Weltanschauung

13.4 References
[1] Sebeok, Thomas A. (1976). Foreword. Contributions to
the Doctrine of Signs. Lisse, Netherlands: Peter de Ridder
Press. p. x. ISBN 0-87750-194-7.
[2] Kull, Kalevi (2010). Umwelt. In Cobley, Paul. The
Routledge Companion to Semiotics. London: Routledge.
pp. 348349. ISBN 978-0-415-44072-1.
[3] Dorion Sagan (2010). Introduction: Umwelt after
Uexkll. In Jakob von Uexkll; Marina von Uexkll;
Joseph D. ONeil. A Foray Into the Worlds of Animals
and Humans: With a Theory of Meaning (Joseph D O'Neil
translation of 1940 ed.). University of Minnesota Press.
p. 3. ISBN 9781452903798.
[4] Treisman & Gelade, 1980, 98-99
[5] Uexkll, Thure von (1987). The sign theory of Jakob von
Uexkll. In Krampen; et al. Classics of Semiotics. New
York: Plenum. pp. 147179. ISBN 0-306-42321-9.
[6] Uexkll, Jakob von (1957). A Stroll Through the
Worlds of Animals and Men: A Picture Book of Invisible Worlds. In Schiller, Claire H. Instinctive Behavior:
The Development of a Modern Concept. New York: International Universities Press. pp. 5.

Treisman, A. M., Gelade, G. 1980. A FeatureIntegration Theory of Attention. COGNITIVE


PSYCHOLOGY 12, 97-136

13.5 Further reading


13.2 Critics

Kull, Kalevi (1998). On Semiosis, Umwelt, and


Semiosphere. Semiotica 120 (3/4): 299310.

Uexklls application of the notion of umwelt to the human person has been contested. In Welt und Umwelt Naming Natureby Carol Kaesuk Yoon
and Die Wahrheit der Dinge the philosopher and sociologist Josef Pieper argued that reason allows the human
person to live in Welt (world) while plants and animals
13.6 External links
do indeed live in an Umwelt a notion which he traces
back far beyond Uexkll to Plato, Aristotle, and Thomas
Umwelt by John Deely
Aquinas.
Umwelt and Phenomenology

13.3 See also


Cognized environment
Existential therapy
Phenomenology

Umwelt and semiosphere by Kalevi Kull


Pragmatism and Umwelt-theory by Alexei Sharov
TDE-R - A Subjective Biocomputer by Charles
Dyer

Chapter 14

Value (semiotics)
In semiotics, the value of a sign depends on its position It must also be noted that it is only the sign as a whole
and relations in the system of signication and upon the that has value. Linguistic structure simultaneously unites
particular codes being used.
sound with thought and decomposes thought-sound into
linguistic units, or signs, consisting of a signier and a signied (sound-pattern and concept, respectively). When
analysed in isolation, the sound-pattern or concept are
14.1 Saussures Value
pure dierences, emerging from series of sound-patterns
or concepts that they themselves are dependent upon. But
in isolation, they are mere abstractions, because neither
can exist without the connection between the two. It is
the sign as a whole, then, that is the concrete entity of
structural linguistics, which is not a pure dierence, a
negative term, but a pure value, a positive term that is
the internal, vertical relationship between signier and signied merely in opposition or resistance to all the other signs in
the system.
is distinct from the horizontal relation of values between signs.
Value is the sign as it is determined by the other signs in a
semiotic system. For linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, for 14.2 Denitions
example, the content of a sign in linguistics is ultimately
determined and delimited not by its internal content, but 14.2.1 Saussure
by what surrounds it: the synonyms redouter (to dread),
craindre (to fear), and avoir peur (to be afraid) have Drawing from the original denition proposed by
their particular values because they exist in opposition to Saussure (1857-1913), a sign has two parts:
one another. If two of the terms disappeared, then the
remaining sign would take on their roles, become vaguer,
as a signier, i.e. it will have a form that a person
less articulate, and lose its extra something because it
can see, touch, smell, and/or hear, and
would have nothing to distinguish itself from.
as the signied, i.e. it will represent an idea or mental
For de Saussure, this suggests that thought is a chaotic
construct of a thing rather than the thing itself.
nebula until linguistic structure dissects it and holds its
divisions in equilibriums. This is akin to the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, who indirectly inuenced
Saussure[1] and believed that the mind could only grasp
an idea through distinguishing it from something that it
is not. He reasoned that the two objects would otherwise
collapse together for the mind and become indistinguishable from one another.

This emphasises that the sign is merely a symbol for the


class of object referred to. Hence, the lexical word or
noun box evokes a range of possibility from cheap card
to gold-encrusted container. The reader or audience may
not be able to see the particular box referred to but will
be aware of its likely form from the other signs accompaValue determines the sign as a whole, not just meaning. nying the use of the particular word.
Sound is also an indeterminate nebulous. The arbitrary However, there is no necessary connection between the
nature of the sign and the exibility of sound means that signier and the signied. There is nothing inherently
an agreed upon contrast is required. For example, zena boxy about the component sounds or letters that comprise
is useful because it stands in contrast to zenb within the noun box the scope of onomatopoeia is limited
an agreed upon system. Without the distinction, zena when forming a language. All that is necessary is that the
could be used for absolutely anything, or indeed nothing, relevant group of people should decide to use that word to
denote the object. Evidence that this is the correct view
making communication an impossibility.
57

58

CHAPTER 14. VALUE (SEMIOTICS)

comes from the fact that each language can encode signi- 14.3 Methods
ers with whichever signied they wish to communicate.
Hence, for example, the letters comprising air signify The commutation test can be used to identify which sigwhat humans breathe in English, and what sh breathe in niers are signicant. The test depends on substitution: a
Malay, i.e. water.
particular signier is chosen, then the eect of substitutThis makes a system of signs a very exible mechanism ing alternatives is considered to determine the extent to
for communicating meaning, but one which is condi- which the value of the sign is changed. This both illumitioned by history and culture, i.e. once a sign acquires nates the meaning of the original choice and identies the
a commonly accepted meaning in each language, it can- paradigms and code to which the signiers used belong.
not arbitrarily be changed by any one person, but it is able Paradigmatic analysis compiles a list of the signiers
to change diachronically.
present in the text. This set comprises the paradigm.
Further, Roman Jakobson (1896-1982) proposes that
when a group of signs is used, there is an emotive function
that reects the speakers attitude to the topic of his or her
discourse. Language and the other coding systems are the
means whereby one self-aware individual communicates
with another. By selecting particular signs and placing
them in a context, the addresser is making a cognitive use
of the sign system to refer to his or her own social, moral,
ethical, political or other values.

The analyst then compares and contrasts the set with absent signiers, i.e. with other signiers that might have
been chosen. This reveals the signicance of the choices
made which might have been required because of technical production constraints or the limitations of the individuals own technique, or because of the tropes, generic
conventions, style and rhetorical purpose of the work.
The analysis of paradigmatic relations helps to dene the
value of specic items in a system.

14.4 References
14.2.2

Barthes

Because signs may have multiple meanings, a sign can


only be interpreted in its context. Saussure believed that
any one sign takes its value from its position and relations with other signs within the linguistic system. Modern semiotics draws its inspiration from the work of, inter
alios, Roland Barthes (1915-80), who argued that semiotics should expand its scope and concern: "...any system of signs, whatever their substance and limits; images,
gestures, musical sounds, objects, and the complex associations of all of these, which form the content of ritual,
convention or public entertainment: these constitute, if
not languages, at least systems of signication. (1967,
9).
In the system to be interrogated, the relations will be both
weak and strong, positive and negative, qualitative and
quantitative, etc. In this, a sign cannot be attributed a
value outside its context (although what is signied may
have connotative meaning(s) that resonate outside the
context), and what is not present can be just as signicant as what is present.
In a slightly dierent context of critique through the archaeological and genealogical methods for the study of
knowledge, Michel Foucault (1926-84) used the idea of
discontinuity as a means to revalorise elements of knowledge. In this, he considered the silences and lacunae
within a text to be as signicant as express statements.
In both systems, the specic processes of analysis examine these gaps to reveal whose interests are served by the
omissions. Such analysis is particularly useful to identify
which questions are left unasked.

[1] The Poet who could Smell Vowels

Barthes, Roland ([1964] 1967). Elements of Semiology. (Translated by Annette Lavers & Colin Smith).
London: Jonathan Cape.
Saussure, Ferdinand de (1922). Cours de Linguistique Gnrale. (Compiled by Bally & Schehaye
from notebooks of Saussures students 1907-11).

14.5. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

59

14.5 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses


14.5.1

Text

Semiotics Source: [Link] Contributors: Mav, The Anome, Andre Engels, Youssefsan,
SimonP, Hannes Hirzel, Mjb, Hirzel, Youandme, Stevertigo, Michael Hardy, Jahsonic, Kku, Zeno Gantner, Delirium, Docu, ,
Andres, Kaihsu, Sethmahoney, Charles Matthews, Jm34harvey, Brantgoose, Pedant17, Hyacinth, Cleduc, Tempshill, Samsara, Jusjih, Marc
Girod~enwiki, Jon Roland, Rhys~enwiki, Robbot, PBS, ZimZalaBim, Benc, Ianml, Mushroom, Wayland, Nagelfar, Unfree, Ancheta Wis,
DocWatson42, Wikilibrarian, Mikeroodeus, Binadot, Gecko~enwiki, Angry candy, Jorge Stol, Sundar, Eequor, Stevietheman, Physicist, Redwalker, Eagletm~enwiki, Phil Sandifer, Rdsmith4, BookgirlST, Krupo, Adrian Sampson, Stevenzenith, Burschik, Mike Rosoft,
Lucidish, D6, Jwdietrich2, Ularsen, Discospinster, Rich Farmbrough, Wclark, Eric Shalov, Mani1, Bender235, Elwikipedista~enwiki,
Sockatume, Project2501a, El C, Joanjoc~enwiki, Antiorario, Art LaPella, Yonghokim, Elipongo, Giraedata, Nlight, Jojit fb, Nk, Slipperyweasel, Ricky81682, Ashley Pomeroy, Schaefer, SidP, SteinbDJ, Ghirlandajo, Ott, Velho, Sburke, Kokoriko, Kzollman, Dmol, Eilthireach,
Graham87, Qwertyus, Amerique, Dpv, Jorunn, KYPark, Xos, The wub, FlavrSavr, Titoxd, Tuaw, David H Braun (1964), Chobot,
DTOx, David91, Bobdc, Bgwhite, NSR, Vmenkov, YurikBot, Borgx, Jlittlet, Fayte, RussBot, Warshy, Maw, Neilbeach, Grant Fletcher,
NawlinWiki, Cquan, Chrishota, Falcon9x5, Scope creep, Maunus, Mareklug, Zzuuzz, Lt-wiki-bot, Arthur Rubin, MaNeMeBasat, JDspeeder1, GrinBot~enwiki, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, FocalPoint, Unschool, Pgk, D'n, Bgiwan, Yuyudevil, Bill3000, Delldot, Nscheey,
Lubos, Miquonranger03, SirGrotius, Kemet, Sadads, VMS Mosaic, Stevenmitchell, Jon Awbrey, Germandemat, Tpwebb, Terrasidius,
Shrumster, Kukini, Drmaik, SashatoBot, Pliny, Rigadoun, Victoria15, Antonielly, 16@r, Moretz, Varuag doos, Hu12, Iridescent, JMK,
JForget, David@[Link], Ibadibam, Kronecker, Mjhoy~enwiki, Cydebot, Baronka, Brelson, Montag451, Quibik, Roberta F., JLD,
Ddball, Lindsay658, SummonerMarc, JAF1970, Epbr123, Qwyrxian, Kablammo, Keraunos, Headbomb, NorwegianBlue, Edhubbard,
Mentisto, Luna Santin, Widefox, Seaphoto, TimVickers, Alphachimpbot, Darrenhusted, Dsp13, The Transhumanist, Bookinvestor, Hurmata, Magioladitis, VoABot II, Gabrieldov, Soulbot, Catgut, Cailil, Dan Pelleg, Cobaltnova, Vandermude, MartinBot, R'n'B, Thomasda,
DandyDan2007, Adavidb, Yonidebot, Trilobitealive, 83d40m, Sparafucil, Bonadea, DASonnenfeld, Reidwikki, EcoRover, RasputinJSvengali, Macedonian, Lemccbr, Adrey, Philip Trueman, TXiKiBoT, Lechatjaune, Fat Burner, Ontoraul, The Tetrast, Davidsclarke, James
Seneca, Synthebot, Ritzemar, Sylent, Cnilep, Steven Weston, GirasoleDE, Newbyguesses, SieBot, Laocon11, Auccl799, Cwkmail, Yintan, Bamkin, Afernand74, Mr. Stradivarius, Mr. Granger, Martarius, ClueBot, PipepBot, FinnishOverlord, HairyFotr, DionysosProteus,
Parkjunwung, Rmallott1, Luke4545, DragonBot, CohesionBot, Jusdafax, Crywalt, Bracton, Hans Adler, Yenlinch, Peelpel, Genesiswinter, XLinkBot, Oldekop, David Delony, Irc-reading, Dr sign, Salam32, The Alchimist, Oileyboyley, Tryxx, Iranway, Wyatt915, Addbot,
Fenbaud, Ave Caesar, Ynaztiw, Br1z, Pirtskhalava, MrOllie, Download, AndersBot, Purplepancho, Suchisuvrasen, Lightbot, OlEnglish,
Informatwr, Legobot, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Roven7, Robson correa de camargo, Evereyes, Richigi, AnomieBOT, Adamstamp, Mike Hayes,
Rjanag, Galoubet, 9258fahskh917fas, Materialscientist, Xqbot, Sailoralexny, Dr Oldekop, Omnipaedista, The Wiki ghost, FrescoBot,
LucienBOT, Altg20April2nd, Somedude202, Haeinous, Mike889~enwiki, Cansem, Joviir, Msasscts, FadulJA, FoxBot, Lotje, Deepak,
DARTH SIDIOUS 2, Jfmantis, Beyond My Ken, Gleaman, Fmuratozdemir, Hermitstudy, EmausBot, Immunize, TheSoundAndTheFury,
Deathtripp, Malcolm77, Jg2904, Rashomon digger, Kelleyhg, Dagko, HandsomeFella, FeatherPluma, ClueBot NG, Squarrels, Primergrey,
Tsk351, CharleyQuinton, Ctsewall, Helpful Pixie Bot, SBennett1, Kkmcbride, BG19bot, Amhawks, Pacerier, , PhnomPencil,
HazielAhn, Aldenjadi, Genspire, Katy121, Schwantner, BlumeTheory, Al12si, Me, Myself, and I are Here, ITstudents, Ahernandez33,
LogertGilby, Robert marty, Lingzhi, Biogeographist, Dani0rad, Crau999, Joeltwilcox, Darth whore, Techcomm2013, Kempleb, Alvinj77,
YiFeiBot, Modciv, Hsh21, Csusarah, FelixRosch, Kallekula2, Comp-heur-intel, Empressrosie, KasparBot, CabbagePotato, Everynone,
Giuseppe Donatiello, Durgan8, Salikgondal, Fountains-of-Paris and Anonymous: 322
Sign (semiotics) Source: [Link] Contributors: Hirzel, Jahsonic, Kku, Ixfd64,
Ugen64, Camryl, Hyacinth, Quoth-22, Fredrik, Widsith, Gecko~enwiki, Jfdwol, Jorge Stol, Sam Hocevar, Stevenzenith, Xezbeth, Bender235, Kwamikagami, Edward Z. Yang, Reinyday, Mdd, TriNotch, Angr, Stefanomione, BD2412, Parrhesiasts, Salix alba, Ground Zero,
BMF81, David91, DanMS, Maunus, Lt-wiki-bot, Vicarious, Thelb4, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Ikip, Ph7ve, Nbarth, Toughpigs, Utgardsloki, Cybercobra, Ryan Roos, Jon Awbrey, Ehheh, George100, Cydebot, Kanags, Warhorus, West Brom 4ever, Daniel Kellis, Deective,
Porlob, 100110100, R'n'B, Maurice Carbonaro, Daniel5Ko, Knulclunk, The Tetrast, Botev, BIsopp, Firstwingman, Anchor Link Bot, SummerWithMorons, Vacio, Mumiemonstret, SchreiberBike, Tmonzenet, Dr sign, Steven Skaggs, MrOllie, Lightbot, Yobot, Gdh26, FrescoBot,
Susan White, Alphanis, Lotje, Rainspeaker, David D Allen, Manytexts, Wisdom315, ClueBot NG, MerlIwBot, BG19bot, PhnomPencil,
Dr. Coal, Sir Leopard Prey, BattyBot, Danielcaleb, Dexbot, Csusarah and Anonymous: 43
Code (semiotics) Source: [Link] Contributors: Mjb, Michael Hardy, Bloodshedder, Suruena, Stefanomione, BD2412, Rjwilmsi, Ewlyahoocom, David91, RussBot, Gaius Cornelius, Tom Edwards, Zwobot, Zzuuzz,
Closedmouth, Sardanaphalus, Robocoder, Jon Awbrey, Antonielly, Warhorus, Frankie816, Magioladitis, R'n'B, JonathanDLehman, AlleborgoBot, Addbot, Dr Oldekop, ClueBot NG, Helpful Pixie Bot, Kyoakoa, PhnomPencil, Marcocapelle, Inanygivenhole and Anonymous:
4
Connotation (semiotics) Source: [Link] Contributors: Michael Hardy,
Netkinetic, KoRnholio8, David91, Angus Lepper, Gaius Cornelius, Igin, Sardanaphalus, Childzy, Onathinwhiteline, Warhorus, Bongwarrior, Animum, Gwern, R'n'B, 2eet2eet, Dorftrottel, The Tetrast, Martarius, ClueBot, Versus22, Dr sign, Addbot, LaaknorBot, Minimac,
Csusarah and Anonymous: 18
Denotation (semiotics) Source: [Link] Contributors: Michael Hardy,
Andres, Ancheta Wis, Gurch, David91, RussBot, Sardanaphalus, Warhorus, Oryanw~enwiki, Bobblehead, R'n'B, Uncle Dick, Juliancolton,
Je G., The Tetrast, Dr sign, Addbot, SwisterTwister, J04n, Csusarah and Anonymous: 17
Content word Source: [Link] Contributors: Beland, Mukerjee, Jnestorius,
Kwamikagami, Mihhkel, Cnilep, Zusasa, YiFeiBot, Mcmisher, Loraof and Anonymous: 4
Modality (semiotics) Source: [Link] Contributors: Michael Hardy, Beland, Bobo192, John Vandenberg, Woohookitty, Josh Parris, Koavf, David91, Dzzl, Stephenb, Sardanaphalus, Jasy jatere, Warhorus,
EagleFan, B9 hummingbird hovering, R'n'B, The Tetrast, Mild Bill Hiccup, SchreiberBike, Dr sign, KLBot2, BG19bot, FluorescentChild
and Anonymous: 4
Representation (arts) Source: [Link] Contributors: Michael Hardy, Jahsonic, Kku, Charles Matthews, Dcoetzee, Andycjp, Rich Farmbrough, Scott Ritchie, Pearle, TheParanoidOne, Woohookitty, Kosher Fan,
Triddle, Plrk, Mandarax, Sparkit, JubalHarshaw, Thekohser, Fintan~enwiki, Anomalocaris, SmackBot, Slashme, [Link], Sephiroth BCR, Grumpyyoungman01, Levineps, FairuseBot, George100, Sadalmelik, Neelix, Gregbard, AndrewHowse, Mattisse, Doolittle,

60

CHAPTER 14. VALUE (SEMIOTICS)

Mr pand, Julia Rossi, RainbowCrane, Geniac, Freshacconci, Hiplibrarianship, CommonsDelinker, DASonnenfeld, TreasuryTag, QuackGuru, The Tetrast, Finbarpurpleton, Flyer22 Reborn, Campbis, Libcub, Addbot, Redheylin, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Ptbotgourou, Anon5000,
AnomieBOT, Jim1138, Galoubet, Ring Cinema, Research Method, Notable Person, Petropoxy (Lithoderm Proxy), FrescoBot, Pinethicket,
Lingust, GoingBatty, ZroBot, ClueBot NG, TimeFliesWhenYoureHavingFun, Helpful Pixie Bot, BG19bot, Scottpohlschmidt, SteenthIWbot, Hamlynart, Csusarah, Kinetic37 and Anonymous: 35
Salience (language) Source: [Link] Contributors: Stevertigo, Robbot,
Nagelfar, Andycjp, Sonjaaa, SYSS Mouse, Pearle, Velho, Rjwilmsi, David91, RussBot, Sardanaphalus, Chris the speller, Jadrax, Rancarmi, Falzn, Warhorus, Mmyotis, BenC7, EagleFan, Adavidb, StAnselm, Jytdog, Addbot, Favonian, Yobot, Anypodetos, AnomieBOT,
Dr Oldekop, I dream of horses, GoingBatty, ClueBot NG, Telpardec, Jeremy112233, Khazar2 and Anonymous: 15
Semiosis Source: [Link] Contributors: Hyacinth, Gecko~enwiki, Jfdwol, Cmdrjameson, Cruccone, FlaBot, Ewlyahoocom, David91, Wavelength, NTBot~enwiki, LeonardoRob0t, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Commander
Keane bot, Stevenmitchell, Mitrius, Jon Awbrey, JzG, Smartse, , Mufka, The Tetrast, Cnilep, Da Joe, Armand Boisblanc, PipepBot, Sustainablefutures2015, La Pianista, Vegetator, Oldekop, Feministo, Lexaxis7, Addbot, Chzz, Luckas-bot, Denispir, AnomieBOT,
Dr Oldekop, Erikbrice, MastiBot, Dark Lord of the Sith, EmausBot, ClueBot NG, Pacerier, Davidiad, Sir Leopard Prey, 314Username,
Mohamed-Ahmed-FG, CabbagePotato, Fountains-of-Paris and Anonymous: 13
Semiosphere Source: [Link] Contributors: Deb, Buridan, R3m0t, Longhair,
Kappa, David91, Sardanaphalus, Lunarian, Thijs!bot, Smartse, VirtualDelight, SieBot, Auntof6, PixelBot, Aleksd, Oldekop, Lexaxis7,
Wilma Clark, Addbot, Innv, IdealisticRealist, Dr Oldekop, Barleybannocks and Anonymous: 12
Semiotic elements and classes of signs Source: [Link]
709146456 Contributors: Darkwind, Goethean, Kwamikagami, BD2412, Koavf, Welsh, Colonies Chris, JzG, SimonD, Gregbard, Alaibot,
Nick Number, Deective, Magioladitis, LookingGlass, R'n'B, The Tetrast, Andrewaskew, Lucasbfrbot, Armand Boisblanc, Mr. Stradivarius, Fadesga, Tom Doniphon, MystBot, Addbot, MrOllie, Yobot, Kithira, Omnipaedista, Cansem, Frietjes, Widr, BG19bot, Solomon7968
and Anonymous: 10
Umwelt Source: [Link] Contributors: Imc, Hyacinth, Xanzzibar, Vir4030, Poccil, Rich
Farmbrough, Bender235, RJHall, Wstfgl, BlueNovember, PhilippWeissenbacher, Koavf, Quiddity, David91, Dj Capricorn, Gaius Cornelius, Cquan, Scope creep, Maunus, Arthur Rubin, Curpsbot-unicodify, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Wegesrand, Commander Keane bot,
Ohnoitsjamie, Thumperward, Mdwh, Cybercobra, Thesmothete, Physis, Cydebot, Jasongallant, Hurmata, R'n'B, 1000Faces, Parneix, Andrewaskew, Rooboy715, Sphilbrick, ClueBot, DionysosProteus, P. S. Burton, Brews ohare, SchreiberBike, Oldekop, Addbot, Crazysane,
Luckas-bot, Yobot, Denispir, AnomieBOT, Obersachsebot, Micheleconunaele, QuixoticWonderer, [Link], Dcirovic, Evanh2008, Josiahstevenson, Pwbmoore, Snow Rise, Me, Myself, and I are Here, Monkbot, Comp-heur-intel and Anonymous: 38
Value (semiotics) Source: [Link] Contributors: Michael Hardy, Delirium,
Bobo192, David91, RussBot, Nirvana2013, Sardanaphalus, Dreadstar, RichardF, Warhorus, Gwern, Le vin blanc, Addbot, LaaknorBot,
Denispir, Kwiki, OgreBot, Fox Wilson, Arch Mute Brave, PhnomPencil, Emeyerandover and Anonymous: 2

14.5.2

Images

File:Ambox_important.svg Source: [Link] License: Public domain Contributors: Own work, based o of Image:Ambox [Link] Original artist: Dsmurat (talk contribs)
File:Aristoteles_Louvre.jpg Source: [Link] License: CC BYSA 2.5 Contributors: Eric Gaba (User:Sting), July 2005. Original artist: After Lysippos
File:Charles_Sanders_Peirce.jpg Source: [Link] License:
Public domain Contributors: [Link] credits it as public domain Original artist: Unknown<a href='//[Link]/wiki/Q4233718' title='wikidata:Q4233718'><img alt='wikidata:Q4233718'
src='[Link]
width='20'
height='11' srcset='[Link] 1.5x,
[Link] 2x' data-le-width='1050'
data-le-height='590' /></a>
File:Chart_Semiotics_of_Social_Networking.jpg Source: [Link]
of_Social_Networking.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Luckycharm 54
File:[Link] Source: [Link] License: Public domain Contributors: The
Tango! Desktop Project. Original artist:
The people from the Tango! project. And according to the meta-data in the le, specically: Andreas Nilsson, and Jakub Steiner (although
minimally).
File:Encoding_communication.jpg Source: [Link] License: CC BY 2.5 Contributors: Transferred from [Link] to Commons by Sreejithk2000 using CommonsHelper. Original artist:
Yupi666 at English Wikipedia
File:Exemple_de_signalement_visuel_du_statut_social_chez_un_Cichlid.jpg Source: [Link]
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Own work Original artist: Master1 Ecologie Ethologie, Universit Jean Monnet, Audrey L
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[Link]
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Frank-Henri Jullien (18821938)
File:[Link]
Source:
[Link]
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14.5. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

61

File:Mona_Lisa,_by_Leonardo_da_Vinci,_from_C2RMF_retouched.jpg Source:
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Created from scratch in Adobe Illustrator. Based on Image:Question [Link] created by User:Equazcion Original artist:
Tkgd2007
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[Link]
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2005 by Wetman, same lename Original artist: ?
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de/home/rueting/[Link]
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[Link] License: Public domain Contributors: Theoretische Biologie 1920 Original artist: Jakob Johann von Uexkll
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based on original logo tossed together by Brion Vibber

14.5.3

Content license

Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0

Common questions

Powered by AI

Peirce's theory of semiosis posits that the process of interpretation is irreducibly triadic, consisting of the sign, its object, and the interpretant . The sign represents the object and creates an interpretant, which is another sign that yields further interpretation . This triadic relationship perpetuates the process of meaning-making by recursively generating new interpretants, ensuring that the interpretation of signs is dynamic and continuously evolving . This means that understanding is not static but involves a continuous dialogue and refinement of meanings, requiring both immediate interpretation and deeper engagement with context and potential meanings .

Roland Barthes suggested that images function with a rhetoric characterized by arrangement and emerging syntax, implying a structured approach to semiotic meaning . Barthes viewed images as indeterminate in meaning, which contrasts with Peirce’s model where signs, including images, are defined by an inherent ability to evoke interpretations through their triadic relationships of sign, object, and interpretant . Peirce's framework implies that all signs, including visual ones, are capable of generating meaning dynamically through interaction with an interpretant, while Barthes sees images as needing additional rhetorical structure to convey meaning effectively .

'Collateral experience' in Peirce's semiotics refers to the background knowledge or contextual basis required to interpret signs accurately . It implies that understanding a sign cannot occur in isolation but demands external contextual information to complete the interpretation. This concept emphasizes that meaning is constructed not just from the sign itself but also from the interpreter's past experiences and familiarity with the sign's references . In practice, this means signs are invariably interpreted through a web of prior knowledge, making 'collateral experience' crucial for deeper comprehension and highlighting the necessity for broader contextual awareness when analyzing and understanding complex signs or texts .

The application of semiotic analysis in human-computer interaction (HCI) and artificial intelligence (AI) involves utilizing semiotic principles to enhance communication between users and machines . By modeling HCI on the concept of semiosis, designers can create interfaces that facilitate intuitive interactions, essentially 'teaching' machines to interpret human signals more effectively . However, the inherent challenge lies in coding the interpretative flexibility of human semiotics into rigid machine logic, which can result in oversimplified representations of complex human interactions . Furthermore, while AI attempts to mimic human cognition, it lacks the dynamic and recursive nature of human semiosis which allows for infinite associations and revisions, indicating a fundamental limitation of semiotic applications in these contexts .

In Peirce’s semiotic theory, 'firstness' refers to the category of possibility and quality of feeling, representing potential and indeterminacy in signs . It is the initial stage in the process of semiosis where a phenomenon is discerned as a potential sign without compulsion or reflection . This concept sets the stage for the development of 'secondness' and 'thirdness', where interaction with an object and the interpretant establishes concrete meaning, thereby transitioning from pure possibility to determined reality in the process of interpretation .

The concept of 'semiosphere' introduced by Yuri Lotman extends traditional semiotic theory by providing a model for understanding cultural semiotics . It positions semiotics within a cultural context, suggesting that meaning-making occurs within environments that are culturally and linguistically charged . This extends beyond Saussurean sign systems to include the wider cultural influences on signs and communication, proposing that culture itself is a space where semiosis happens. It compares the cultural landscape to an organism where all signs and texts initially form a whole, rather than isolated units, requiring interpretation through an interdependent network, reflecting the interconnected nature of cultural symbols and meanings .

Umberto Eco criticized the traditional approach to iconic signs derived from Peirce's semiotic triad of indexes, icons, and symbols . He argued against the simplistic interpretation of iconism, suggesting instead four modes of sign production: recognition, ostension, replica, and invention . Eco's contention was that iconic signs should not be seen merely as reflections of their objects; rather, they should be understood as constructs that involve active processes of interpretation and representation, proposing a more complex understanding of how signs operate, thereby broadening the analytical framework of semiotics .

Cybersemiotics seeks to integrate the Peircean semiotics, emphasizing interpretative processes, with cybernetics and systems theory to enrich information sciences . By bridging semiotics and cybernetics, it introduces a comprehensive framework that surpasses mechanistic models, emphasizing the role of interpretation and context in understanding information systems. This integration allows for a unified understanding of both human cognitive phenomena and the algorithmic logic of computers . However, while this interdisciplinary approach enriches the theoretical base of information sciences, its practical implementation remains challenging due to the complexity involved in aligning interpretative flexibility with system rigidity, often demanding innovative solutions to reconcile these paradigms .

'Thirdness' in Peirce's semiotics is about mediation, where a sign becomes representative through generality and continuity . It allows for the interpretant to mediate between the sign and the dynamic object by establishing rules or habits that govern interpretation. This mediation is crucial as it enables signs to function beyond immediate representation, involving purpose and continuity . Thirdness implies an understanding that signs are not isolated; rather, they are part of a continuum of meanings influenced by cultural and contextual factors, which thirdness as a concept helps explain by linking the complex relationships between signs and their interpretations in ongoing processes .

Christian Metz applied Saussurean semiotics to film to dissect and understand the language of cinema through syntagmatic analysis . By treating film as a language, Metz provided a framework to analyze the sequences and elements of films as structural units, similar to linguistic syntax. This approach allows for the examination of films beyond narrative content, focusing on how meaning is constructed visuospatially and temporally . Metz's work is significant as it established film semiotics as a discipline, emphasizing that films communicate through their own unique set of codes and conventions akin to a linguistic system, enhancing the comprehension of cinematic language and its potential for conveying complex narratives .

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