2AC

Framework: The Kritik has to prove the whole aff bad

A) Moots the 1ACsteals 8 minutes of aff speech time
B) Kills clash and educationfocusing on one part of the aff destroys good debate because it is ultimately
unpredictable

Alt fails- no spillover to other rounds

Permutation do bothWe can talk about the 1AC and Natives
No prior questions
Owen 02 David Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7
Commenting on the philosophical turn in IR, Wver remarks that [a]

frenzy for words like epistemology and ontology often signals

this philosophical turn, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates
concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature
of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches,
and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical
positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I
will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it

has an inbuilt
tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two
were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account
is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any
value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be
sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which
dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a

good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to
exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, i f this is the case, it is a philosophical
weaknessbut this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may
provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of
their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even
necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and
epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problemdriven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible
true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a
perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, theory-driven work
is part of a reductionist program in that it dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that
flows from the preferred model or theory.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is
necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied
in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since whether there are
general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before
conducting that inquiry.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of
empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary
debate in IRwhat might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) the Highlander viewnamely, an image of warring theoretical
approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It
encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only
be one theoretical approach which gets things right , namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This
image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

Permutation: do the aff and reject colonialism

We solve better because of our multilateral approach
Util consequences outweigh- moral absolutism reproduces evil
Issac, 2 (Jeffery, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Dissent, Vol. 49 No. 2, Spring)
Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world one must attend to the means that are
necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that

power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding

concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal
integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of ones intentions does not ensure the achievement of
what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally comprised parties may seem like the right thing, but if such
tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their
supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness, it is
often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics-as opposed to religion-pacifism is always a potentially immoral
stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3 ) it fails to see that politics is
as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of
action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with good may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of good that generates
evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that ones goals be sincere or idealistic;
it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic
and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits THIS judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes
arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

Perm: do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative
Vague alts are a voting issue they have no literature that describes them which makes clash
impossible
Permutation do the plan and the alt in all other instances
Either the alt overcomes this one instance or alt causes take it out.

Realism inevitable states will always seek to survive- the only hope is a transition to human security
R, Associate Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and head of the Centre for Transatlantic
Relations. His interests include U.S. foreign policy, origins of war, political theory, and philosophy of science, 13
[Johannes Gullestad, 2013, Mechanistic Realism and US Foreign Policy: A New Framework for Analysis, p.4445] //RH
By marrying these five assumptions, Mearsheimer (2001: 29) concludes that every state in the system has -considerable reason to think and
sometimes behave aggressively". Prompted by the structural conditions, states constantly look for opportunities to take the offensive
and maximize relative power as they realize that this is the best survival strategy. In effect, Mearsheimer's extrapolation from the
bedrock assumptions amounts to a semi-deterministic account of the consequences of anarchy. I say "semi-deterministic" because Mearsheimer is inconsistent on
this issue. Sometimes he maintains that the system

leaves states no choice but to behave aggressively if they want to survive. This is

pure determinism. At others he maintains that anarchy creates powerful incentives for aggressive behavior. This is a weaker version of structural
determinism. In sum, my argument is that the structure of the international system, not the particular characteristics of individual great powers,
causes them to think and act offensively and to seek hegemony. (Ibid.: 53) This war-driving logic is "tragic" because power maximizing and the
resulting interstate conflicts run counter to a state's desire for survival. States do not want the conflicts they help create as they simply prefer security. They are
neither evil nor possessed by an intrinsic will to power, but merely worried about their continued existence. The security competition and the continuous threat of
war are ultimately suboptimal to all states in the system. It is an unintended fact of international politics that "survival mandates aggressive behavior ... [and that
states] have to seek more power if they want to maximize their odds of survival" (Mearsheimer 2001: 21). [T]he structure of the international system forces states
which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other.... Great powers that have no reason to fight each other that

are merely concerned with their own survival nevertheless have little choice but to pursue power and to seek to
dominate the other states in the system. (Ibid.: 3) Although tragic, little can be done to amend the situation . The lack of a
sovereign authority with a mandate and the capacity to check offensive behavior prescribes continued uncertainty. Had the states been assured of being rescued
in case of foreign aggression, they would have had little reason to fear for their security and future survival. But, contrary to the situation in a well-ordered state, the
international system lacks an agency that penalizes state perpetrators. States can only rely on themselves, making the international system of
self-help" system (Mearsheimer 2001: 32). Moreover, each state knows full well that other states have the capacity and knowledge to produce offensive
military capabilities. As all states realize that "force is the ultimate ratio of international politics" (ibid.: 56), they come to appreciate the unique utility of military
capacity. First, it deters other states from aggression as the costs may outweigh the prospective benefits. Second, it is a necessary instrument of defense if
deterrence fails and an adversary attacks. Third, it is an effective means to acquire more power, either through blackmail, coercion or warfighting. As the prospect
of survival depends on military possessions no state will fail to acquire them. Uncertainty about other states bifurcates at this point. First, states become
uncertain about how much military capability other states have procured . To mitigate this uncertainty states pay close attention to how
capabilities are distrib-uted throughout the system. They also keep a wary eye on other states' "latent power", a term that denotes a state's wealth
and population size (Mearsheimer 2001: 55) - the two variables that best indicate potential growth of military power. When a state surveys its environment to
determine which states pose a threat to its survival, it focuses mainly on the offensive capabilities of potential LA rivals... Second, suites become uncertain about
the intentions of other states to employ the destructive means they possess. This uncertainty is more profound as it cannot he mitigated by rational vigilance. Since
intentions are unknowable, states worried about their survival therefore "make worst case assumptions about their rival's intentions" (Mearsheimer 2001: 45).
"The absence of central authority, the existence of offensive military capabil-ity, uncertainty about other states' intentions,
and the drive to survive foster fear. This is a regularity of fundamental importance to Offensive Realism. Fear is the sole emotional catalyst in the

international system. Fear causes states to strive to be as powerful as possible relative to all others. "Strength ensures safety, and the greatest strength is the greatest
insurance of safety" (Mearsheimer 2001: xi). The ultimate safety guarantee is to become the hegemon in the system, which denotes a
state "that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system" (ibid.: 40). Hegemony is therefore the ultimate
goal of every state. The reasons supporting an expansionist strategy towards hegemony are straightforward. By being relatively more powerful, other states
will be deterred from attacking you. If a state is powerful, but uncertainty neverthe-less makes it fearsome, it has no compelling reasons to cease its unremitting hid
for power until absolute security is reached. It follows there is no such thing as an appropriate amount of power, since there is no meaningful way of knowing when
the level of appropriateness is reached. On the contrary, the appetite for power is insatiable. Small increments of relative power have equal value, independent of
power already achieved, suggesting that states are insensitive to arguments about marginal gains. Even states in a position of considerable power advantage will be
revisionist and crave for more. As Snyder (2002: 155) points out, "Mearsheimer's great powers require a surplus of power over 'appropriateness' to cover
uncertainties, possible miscalculations, and future surprise".

No genocide impact
OKane, Prof Comparative Political Theory, U Keele, 97
(Rosemary, Modernity, the Holocaust and politics, Economy and Society 26:1, p 58-9, AG) Chosen policies cannot be
relegated to the position of immediate condition (Nazis in power) in the explanation of the Holocaust. Modern bureaucracy is not intrinsically
capable of genocidal action (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the
explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy,
organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As
Nazi Germany and Stalins USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned
away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An
analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions
and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the
way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also

economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firm s, each with their
own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprise s. In modern societies this economic pluralism both
promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic,
political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very ordinary and common attributes of truly modern societies. It is these very ordinary

and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern genocides.

No root cause of war

Cashman, 2k-Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University
(Greg, What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict, pg. 9)
Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate
explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost

never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal
explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of causality since
it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war ; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering
explanationsa term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their
occurrence.

Perm do the alt and then the plan

Institutional approaches are the only way to avoid the collapse of all movements and effectively
challenge the flawed state policies
Grossberg, 92 (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture, page 388-389)
The demand for moral and ideological purity often results in the rejection of any hierarchy or organization . The
question-can the master's tools be used to tear down the master's house?-ignores both the contingency of the relation
between such tools and the master's power and, even more importantly, the fact that there may be no other tools
available. Institutionalization is seen as a repressive impurity within the body politic rather than as a strategic and
tactical, even empowering, necessity . It sometimes seems as if every progressive organization is condemned to
recapitulate the same arguments and crisis, often leading to their collapse. 54 For example, Minkowitz has described a
crisis in Act Up over the need for efficiency and organization, professionalization and even hierarchy,55 as if these
inherently contradicted its commitment to democracy. This is particularly unfortunate since Act Up, whatever its

limitations, has proven itself an effective and imaginative political strategist. The problems are obviously magnified
with success, as membership, finances and activities grow. This refusal of efficient operation and the moment of
organization is intimately connected with the Left's appropriation and privileging of the local (as the site of democracy
and resistance). This is yet another reason why structures of alliance are inadequate, since they often assume that an
effective movement can be organized and sustained without such structuring. The Left needs to recognize the necessity
of institutionalization and of systems of hierarchy, without falling back into its own authoritarianism. It needs to find
reasonably democratic structures of institutionalization, even if they are impure and compromised.
Vote aff despite prior questionsimpact timeframe means you gotta act on the best info available
Kratochwil 08, professor of international relations European University Institute, 2008 (Friedrich, The Puzzles of
Politics, pg. 200-213)
The lesson seems clear. Even

at the danger of fuzzy boundaries, when we deal with practice ( just as with the pragmatic turn), we
would be well advised to rely on the use of the term rather than on its reference (pointing to some property of the object under study),
in order to draw the bounds of sense and understand the meaning of the concept. My argument for the fruitful character
of a pragmatic approach in IR, therefore, does not depend on a comprehensive mapping of the varieties of research in this
area, nor on an arbitrary appropriation or exegesis of any specific and self-absorbed theoretical orientation . For this reason,
in what follows, I will not provide a rigidly specified definition, nor will I refer exclusively to some prepackaged theoretical approach. Instead, I will sketch
out the reasons for which a pragmatic orientation in social analysis seems to hold particular promise . These reasons pertain
both to the more general area of knowledge appropriate for praxis and to the more specific types of investigation in the field. The follow- ing ten points are
without a claim to completeness intended to engender some critical reflection on both areas. Firstly, a pragmatic approach does not begin with

objects or things (ontology), or with reason and method ( epistemology), but with acting (prattein), thereby
preventing some false starts. Since, as historical beings placed in a specific situations , we do not have the luxury
of deferring decisions until we have found the truth, we have to act and must do so always under time
pressures and in the face of incomplete information. Pre- cisely because the social world is characterised by strategic
interactions, what a situation is, is hardly ever clear ex ante, because it is being produced by the actors and their
interactions, and the multiple possibilities are rife with incentives for (dis)information. This puts a premium on quick diagnostic and
shortcuts informing actors about the relevant features of the situ- ation, and on leaving an alternative open (plan B) in case of unexpected
difficulties. Instead of relying on certainty and universal validity gained through abstraction and controlled experiments, we know
that completeness and attentiveness to detail , rather than to generality, matter. To that extent, likening practical choices to simple discoveries
cognitive

of an already independently existing reality which discloses itself to an observer or relying on optimal strategies is somewhat heroic. These points have
been made vividly by realists such as Clausewitz in his controversy with von Bulow, in which he criticised the latters obsession with a strategic science (Paret
et al. 1986). While Clausewitz has become an icon for realists, only a few of them (usually dubbed old realists) have taken seriously his warnings against the
misplaced belief in the reliability and use- fulness of a scientific study of strategy. Instead, most of them, especially neorealists of various stripes, have
embraced the theory-building based on the epistemological project as the via regia to the creation of knowledge. A pragmatist orientation would most certainly
not endorse such a position. Secondly, since acting in the social world often involves acting for someone, special

responsibilities arise that aggravate both the incompleteness of knowledge as well as its generality problem . Since we owe
special care to those entrusted to us, for example, as teachers, doctors or lawyers, we cannot just rely on what is generally true, but have to
pay special attention to the particular case . Aside from avoiding the foreclosure of options, we cannot refuse to act on the basis
of incomplete information or insufficient know- ledge , and the necessary diagnostic will involve typification and comparison, reasoning by
analogy rather than generalization or deduction. Leaving out the particularities of a case, be it a legal or medical one, in a mistaken effort to become scientific
would be a fatal flaw. Moreover, there still remains the crucial element of timing of knowing when to act. Students of

crises have always pointed out the importance of this factor but, in attempts at building a general theory of
international politics analogously to the natural sci- ences, such elements are neglected on the basis of the continuity
of nature and the large number assumptions. Besides, timing seems to be quite recalcitrant to analytical treatment.

Simulation allows us to influence state policy AND is key to agency

Eijkman 12
(The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman.
[electronic resource] [Link] . Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent
consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic
Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and
teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an
adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on
Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal)
However, whether as an approach to learning, innovation, persuasion or culture shift, policy simulations derive their power from two central features:

their combination of simulation and gaming (Geurts et al. 2007). 1. The simulation element: the unique combination of simulation with
[Link] unique simulation/role-play mix enables participants to create possible futures relevant to the topic being studied.
This is diametrically opposed to the more traditional, teacher-centric approaches in which a future is produced for them. In
policy simulations, possible futures are much more than an object of tabletop discussion and verbal speculation. No other
technique allows a group of participants to engage in collective action in a safe environment to create and analyse the futures
they want to explore (Geurts et al. 2007: 536). 2. The game element: the interactive and tailor-made modelling and design of the policy game. The
actual run of the policy simulation is only one step, though a most important and visible one, in a collective process of investigation, communication, and
evaluation of performance. In the context of a post-graduate course in public policy development, for example, a policy simulation is a dedicated game
constructed in collaboration with practitioners to achieve a high level of proficiency in relevant aspects of the policy development

policy development simulations as forms of interactive or participatory modelling are

particularly effective in developing participant knowledge and skills in the five key areas of the policy development process (and success
process. To drill down to a level of finer detail,

criteria), namely: Complexity, Communication, Creativity, Consensus, and Commitment to action (the five Cs). The capacity to provide effective learning support
in these five categories has proved to be particularly helpful in strategic decision-making (Geurts et al. 2007). Annexure 2.5 contains a detailed description, in table
format, of the synopsis below.

DA

2AC Top
Case outweighs and turns reflexive conflict prevention frameworks and
multilateralism solve the impact and nuclear terror causes war
And lead swings in both parties prove that prediction is impossible their evidence also doesnt
assume several months and the effects of running mates
Uq overwhelms the link hilllary will win 46 states
Budowsky 6/7 (Brent Budowsky formerly served as policy aide to Sen. Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex)
and Legislative Director to Rep. Bill Alexander D-Ark.), then Chief Deputy Majority Whip. He
holds a law degree from Catholic University, and an LL.M. degree from the London School of
Economics and writes a weekly column for The Hill, 06/07/16 Hillary Clinton Will Win by a
Landslide Against Donald Trump, [Link] //Csmith)
I try to minimize election predictionsespecially long before the voting on Election Daybut I consider this prediction one of the

Clinton will win by a landslide against Donald Trump. I expect her to

win 46 states , and if I am wrong, it is equally likely she will win more than 46 states in November, rather than less. FBI
Director James Comey will announce that he is not recommending a criminal prosecution in the
Clinton email case, which will give her a tremendous boost . To understand the full magnitude of Clintons coming
victory consider the news over the last week, which is a sneak preview of the future. After Trump attacked the judge
in the case against him about Trump University, falsely saying the judge is a Mexican in
terms that even some conservatives and Republicans condemned as racist, virtually every senior
Republican across the landscape of the national GOP harshly criticized Trumps attacking the judge. At one
easiest I have ever made. Hillary

point the lead story on the front page of The New York Times quoted prominent authorities on justice and law, including several
who are staunch Republicans and conservatives, worrying that the election Trump could literally pose a threat to the rule of law
and the constitutional separation of powers. Clinton responded with outrage and with a strong and
sustained political attack against Trump that was universally bannered in the media, which
rallied Democrats and appealed to independents who will be crucial in November . While Clinton
was on the offensive over Trumps attacks on the judge and Trump University, the news was full of interviews with former
customers of Trump University who claimed they were defrauded, and former employees who publicly charged that they were put
under pressure to engage in unethical business practices and decided to resign. I am not judging which party should or will prevail
in the Trump University case. That is for the court to decide based on the evidence. The Trump camp has produced favorable
reviews by other customers of Trump University and at some point, probably after the election, the court will decide the ultimate
outcome of the case, as other courts will decide the outcome of similar cases. Whether Trump University did anything wrongand
I am offering no opinion about thisthe political problem for Trump and Republicans will be that between now and election day
there will be more stories in all media about Trump University customers and employees charging fraud. While Clinton has at
times taken some heat from reporters who believe she has not made herself as open and accessible to them as they would like,
Trumps all out attacks against the mediawhich were reminiscent of a former vice president named Spiro Agnewwere offensive
to virtually all professional members of the media. Republican House Speaker Paul Ryan was highly embarrassed when, after
announcing his support for Trump, he was forced to spend the next several days harshly criticizing the GOP nominee he had just
announced his support for. Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, whose GOP majority is threatened by strong
prospects of a Democratic takeover, was forced to criticize Trump repeatedly over the weekend as his Senate Republican
candidates were forced by local media to either defend Trump, or in most cases, join senior Republicans in deploring his
comments. Clinton continued her attack throughout this period while the free media, reporting on events, gave her ammunition
for her offensive while Republicans were running for cover as Trump kept doubling down on his name-calling. There are several
main factors contributing to the high likelihood of a Clinton landslide in November. The former first lady, United States

Senator and Secretary of State begins with a huge advantage in qualifications for the
presidency. She has a worldwide stature and credibility at home and internationally as a highly
qualified candidate for the presidency. At the very moment Trump achieved the status of presumptive
nominee, which guaranteed a much higher degree of scrutiny and a much greater need for him to
establish his presidential-calibre bona fides, he continued his practice of insulting and berating many Republicans as well as
Democrats, and then began insulting and berating many in the media who will be reporting on whether Trump is qualified to be
president, or not! As a result, the enormous advantage Clinton possesses in presidential qualifications and
stature in the eyes of voters and the press grew even wider with every new insult Trump offers, and doubles down
on, day after day. Another huge advantage Clinton and Democrats possess is the mathematics of
the electoral college. Usually Republicans have the advantage in midterm elections because they are likely to achieve a
stronger turnout than Democrats, while Democrats have the advantage in presidential elections
because their turnout will be higher and, even more, because the state-by-state breakdown of
electoral college math gives Democrats the edge. Because of the insulting and divisive style of the Trump
campaign, the Democratic electoral advantage will be even greater than previous presidential elections. The prospect of a

Trump presidency will galvanize Democratic voters to come out in huge numbers , generate

a wave of anti-Trump Hispanic voters that could win key states for Democrats in both the
presidential and senate elections and alienate and alarm many female, independent and
younger voters. During the last week voters witnessed Clinton launching and escalating her attack, Trump put on the
defensive and repeating his controversial insults against the judge and the media, while leading Republicans either ran for cover
or ran to the television cameras to denounce the latest insult from Trump. Anything is possible in presidential politics but things
are shaping up to produce a Democratic landslide for Hillary Clinton similar to the landslide of Lyndon
Johnson over Barry Goldwater in 1964.

Their link story makes no sense people dont automatically blame Hilary for
Obamas policies or unpopularity, their ev conflates causation and
correlation
Roarty 2015 (Alex, Predictive Intelligence, National Journal, February 14,
[Link]
The best-known forecasting tool of the bunchand one that plainly spells out Clinton's looming troubleis
Abramowitz's "Time for Change" model. He first built it before George H.W. Bush's 1988 election, and he has used it to predict the
winner of the popular vote in the seven White House races since. (The model predicted that Al Gore would win the presidency in
2000, when he became the first person since Grover Cleveland to earn the majority of the popular vote nationally but lose the
Electoral College.) The model uses just three variables to determine the winner: the incumbent's approval rating,
economic growth in the second quarter of the election year, and the number of terms the candidate's party has held the White
House. Official forecasts aren't made until the summer before the presidential election. But reasonable estimates rooted in current
political and economic conditions demonstrate Clinton's vulnerability. Consider this scenario: President Obama
retains equal levels of approval and disapproval, better than he has had most of his second term; and gross
domestic product growth in the second quarter of 2016 holds at 2.4 percent, the same as last year's rate of growth. Under
this scenario, the "Time for Change" model projects that Clinton will secure just 48.7 percent of the
popular vote. In other words, she loses. Slight increases in Obama's approval rating and economic
growth aren't enough to change the outcome for Clinton. Every 10-point improvement in the
president's approvalif, for example, 55 percent of voters approved of Obama while 45 percent didn't earns
Clinton only an additional 1 percentage point of the popular vote. It takes an extra 1 percent year-overyear GDP growth to give Clinton an extra half percentage point of the popular vote. For Clinton to reach 50 percent of the popular
vote, under this model's rules, the president would need to see a 5-point increase in his approval rating and GDP growth would
have to hit 3.5 percent. It's certainly possible, but it's fair to call that a best-case scenario for Obama in his final year as president.

Even if none of their evidence indicates that SCOTUS actions gets tied to Obama executive cant
push for specific rulings in the judiciary which means Republicans cant paint Democrats as being soft
on terror.
Millenials oppose surveillance theyll control the election
Reisinger, 15 [Don Reisinger has been a contributing writer for Cnet since 2007. Millennials' view of Snowden could spur surveillance relief, ACLU says, 21 April 2015,
[Link] Cgilbert
A generational change could help usher in a new era in which governments prune back their surveillance
efforts. That's the message from the American Civil Liberties Union, drawing on a study that looked into the attitude of
millennials in 10 countries toward Edward Snowden, who in 2013 leaked reams of classified documents about spying programs conducted by the
US National Security Agency. What the ACLU found, it said, is that members of this younger generation who know about
Snowden have an "overwhelmingly positive opinion" about him. Millennials -- those born roughly between 1980 and
1999 -- also tend to believe that Snowden's disclosures will help to bring about greater privacy protections,
according to the ACLU. "The broad support for Edward Snowden among millennials around the world should be a message to democratic countries
that change is coming," Anthony D. Romero, executive director of the ACLU, said in a statement Tuesday. "They are a generation of
digital natives who don't want government agencies tracking them online or collecting data about their
phone calls." One of the earliest and most startling revelations from the NSA documents concerned the agency's sweeping collection of
telephone records for domestic calls in the United States. Another program, known as Prism, focused on monitoring Web data. The ACLU published
the results of the survey as a June deadline draws near for the US Congress to vote on whether to renew the Patriot Act. At least one provision of that
national security legislation -- Section 215 -- has been used by the NSA as justification for its collection of US telephone records. Technology

companies including Google, Facebook, Twitter and Apple have called on the US government to reform its
surveillance efforts, including putting an end to bulk collection of data. The civil liberties group also pointed toward efforts in a number of
countries around the world, including the Netherlands, France and Canada, to expand their own surveillance programs. But in those and other
democracies, the ACLU said, millennials are going to make up a sizable portion of votes in the coming years, and

their attitudes against surveillance could spell trouble for governments seeking more of it.

Millenials make up the largest voting block 80% are voting democrat
McCauley, 16 [Lauren McCauley is a staff writer for the Common [Link], The Future is Bright: Millennial Voters Resoundingly Support Climate Action, 11 January 2016,
[Link] Cgilbert

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2015 the millennial generation, now numbering 75.3 million, surpassed baby
boomers as the largest living generation. Yet despite the enormous potential of this voting bloc, the survey
found that only 60 percent are planning to vote in the November presidential election, while only 30 and 40 percent
say they're likely to vote in the respective Republican and Democratic primaries. If they do find their way to the polls, the survey
found that young people are responding to Bernie Sanders' call for "political revolution" with 46 percent of
millennial Democrats and independents backing the Vermont senator compared with 35 percent for his
chief rival Hillary Clinton. Donald Trump, with 26 percent support from millennial Republicans and
independents, has the lead among young conservatives, but those numbers are lower than national polls of GOP voters. The poll was released
in conjunction with the launch of One Nation, a content and event series organized by USA TODAY and Rock the Vote to inform young voters and
encourage voter registration for 2016. The survey is the first of four that will be conducted in the months leading up to the presidential election. "As
the largest generation in our nations history, we have the power to be the most influential force in electing

our next president and our voices deserve to be an integral part of the conversation this election ," said Ashley
Spillane, president of Rock the Vote.

Obama proves
Soave, 14 [Robby Soave is an associate editor at [Link]. He enjoys writing about college news, education policy, criminal justice reform, and television. He is also a columnist for The

Daily Beast and has penned articles for the New York Post, CNN, USA Today, Newsweek, The Orange County Register, and The Detroit News. Forbes named him to the 2016 "30 Under 30" list in the
category of law and policy. Soave is perhaps best known for his early skepticism of Rolling Stone's investigative reporting on sexual assault at the University of Virginia. He won a 2015 Southern
California Journalism Award for his commentary on the subject. The Millennial Scramble, October 2014, [Link]

Cgilbert

After the 2008 elections, you could understand why Democrats got cocky about their hold on the millennial
generation. After all, Barack Obama had slaughtered John McCain among the under-30 presidential vote by a
historic 66 percent to 32 percent, accounting for 7 million out of Obama's 9 million vote margin of victory.
Even more impressive for Democratsand ominous for Republicansyoung people maintained that
enthusiasm in down-ballot races, favoring Team Blue over Team Red for Congress by 63-34 percent. "It's
Official: Millennials Realigned American Politics in 2008," crowed the headline on a post-election analysis by New Democratic
Network fellows Michael Hais and Morley Winograd, published at The Huffington Post. " Contrary to the hopes of many
Republicans, the Millennial Generation's support for Barack Obama is not a one-time phenomenon.
Millennials are every bit as supportive of the Democratic Party as they are of Obama personally," Hais and
Winograd wrote. "As with previous civic generations, they are likely to vote a straight ticket for their preferred party for the rest of their lives.

Negotiations wont solve war

Mark Hibbs 12-30, Berlin-based senior associate in Carnegies Nuclear Policy Program, December 30th, 2013, "A
Year of Too-Great Expectations for Iran," [Link]/2013/12/30/year-of-too-great-expectations-foriran/gxbv
If all goes according to plan, sometime during 2014 Iran will sign a comprehensive final agreement to end a nuclear
crisis that, over the course of a decade, has threatened to escalate into a war in the Middle East. But in light of the
unresolved issues that must be addressed, it would be unwise to bet that events will unfold as planned . Unrealistic
because it squarely put Iran and the powers on a road to end the crisis through diplomacy . The deal calls for Tehran and
the powers to negotiate the final step of a two-stage agreement inside six months. In the best case, the two sides will
with determination quickly negotiate that final step. Iran will demonstrate to the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) that its nuclear program is wholly dedicated to peaceful uses and agree to verified limits on its sensitive
nuclear activities for a considerable period of time. In exchange, sanctions against Iran will be lifted. An effective final
deal could emerge. But Iran and the West will continue to have major differences whether or not there is a final
nuclear pact . Residual mutual suspicion is significant, and the U nited S tates and Iran have competing hardwired
security commitments in the region. The U nited S tates will not pivot away from Israel and the Arab states in the Persian

Gulf, and Iran will not abandon the Alawites in Syria and push Hezbollah to renounce force. The November deal will not
lead to a transformation of the Wests relations with Iran , and the act of signing a deal will not mean Washington and
Tehran have somehow overcome their multiple fundamental differences and become partners, as some observers either
hope or fear. The Clock Is Ticking U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry knew what he was talking about when he
announced in Geneva that the initial step of the Iran nuclear deal had been agreed to and warned that now the really
hard part begins. The Joint Plan of Action says that Iran and the powers aim to conclude the final agreement in no
more than one year. But the issues that remain to be resolved and the amount of work that needs to be done could
delay agreement on the final step for many months . The main problem is not that Iran will refuse to implement what it

agreed to in the initial deal. It will almost certainly stop producing and installing more uranium-enrichment
centrifuges, limit that enrichment to no more than 5 percent U-235 (enriching to higher levels would bring Iran closer
to weapons-grade material), and convert its enriched uranium gas inventory to less-threatening oxide. It is also likely
to halt essential work on the Arak heavy-water reactor project, where Iran is developing the capability to produce

plutonium, which can be used for making nuclear weapons. Tehran has every incentive to comply with these measures.
Were it to cheat, Irans adversaries, convinced that Iran cannot be trusted, would be vindicated and would gain leverage
to add sanctions or use force. Iran knows this. Instead, the potential showstoppers looming before the parties concern

matters that the negotiation of the final step itself must resolve. Crucially, the Joint Plan of Action left open how Iran, the
powers, and the IAEA would resolve two critical matters: unanswered questions about sensitive and potentially
embarrassing past and possibly recent Iranian nuclear activities, and unfulfilled demands by the UN Security Council that
Iran suspend its uranium-enrichment program. Since 2006, Tehran has refused to comply with the Security Councils
suspension orders, and since 2008, it has refused to address allegations leveled by the IAEA that point to nuclear
weapons research and development by Iran. The Joint Plan of Action is deliberately vague about how to handle these
issues, not because Western diplomats were naive but in part because the powers intended the initial deal to build

confidence. That means that groundbreaking and dealmaking were paramount, inviting bold statements, not nitty-gritty
outlines. Also leading to this outcome is the fact that when the United States revved up the negotiation this fall in direct
bilateral talks with Iran, what was originally a four-step road map became a two-step process featuring an initial step
and a final step, with the fine print of steps two and three in the original scheme left to be worked out.

Deterrence applies to the Middle Eastself-interest in collective security of

holy lands
Leaver 7 Director @ Institute For Foreign Policy Studies (Erik, 9/12, Foreign Policy In Focus, Burning the Ships? Iran and the United States,
[Link] AG)
Unfortunately, the television news media often fails to portray this important topic in a mature manner, usually reaching for the lowest common
denominator -- Iran as an irrational nation-state, ready to blow up anything that comes in its way.9 Given Iranian ties to terrorism, some have suggested
that Iran could potentially provide nuclear weapons to terrorist groups, or even help them develop their own. This is a difficult notion to accept, not only from a
strictly realist perspective, but also from a basic understanding of Iran's political structure. Judith S. Yaphe and Colonel Charles D. Lutes of the National Defense
University explain how most "experts agree that the Iranian government is unlikely to share its new nuclear weapons technology
with terrorist groups, including the Lebanese Hezbollah." They cite the level of operational sophistication in the IRGC, which is at the head of such
programs.10 Arguments that seek to break down concepts of nuclear deterrence are based on one or more of the following key concepts: the delegation of authority,
the preemptive use of weapons as a "decapitation" tool, and the emotional impulses of war. The first is the A. Q. Khan example, which points to the suspected
inability of certain countries to keep control over their nuclear capabilities. But Pakistan is dramatically different from Iran, especially in the area of national unity.
For one, Pakistan does not enjoy the natural, long-standing borders that Iran does. And while Pakistan was partitioned from India for religious reasons, Iran as a
nation existed well before the advent of Islam. Today, Pakistan enjoys significant collusion with a variety of external actors, not the least of which are Sunni
Wahhabi fundamentalists, who have opened madrasas (or religious seminaries) and continue to spread their Saudi brand of Islam in the country. The Taliban
continue to mount operations in Afghanistan, using Pakistan as their headquarters. A. Q. Khan himself has been associated with Taliban sympathizers. In Iran,
however, nationalism is of utmost importance, even to the most religious individuals. A nuclear warhead there would be an "Iranian weapon," not a "Muslim" one.
The concept of using nuclear weapons preemptively to decapitate an enemy; that is, to be used in the war theater before anyone can
retaliate, ignores the very notion of collective security . Should Israel be provided with a more unambiguous security guarantee by the United States,
no country could merely seek to "decapitate" its command and control systems without expecting an American nuclear reprisal. Even without the guarantee,
however, America's two most important assets in the region, Israel and Saudi Arabia, enjoy the benefits of sitting on Islam's holiest
grounds (Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem are the three most sacred cities in the faith) -- hardly attractive targets of nuclear annihilation
for any potential rogue fundamentalist.

Case
Violations dont disprove the norm its an institutionalized signaling mechanism for defections
Tim Stevens, associate of the Centre for Science and Security Studies at Kings College, London, 2012, A Cyberwar of Ideas?
Deterrence and Norms in Cyberspace, Contemporary Security Policy 33. 1
Theo Farrell identifies three principal ways in which norms, assuming they are complied with, channel, constrain, and
constitute action: inducement and coercion; moral pressure and persuasion; and social learning and habit.59 These modes
are seen as causal mechanisms that determine action, although only probabilistically so, as actors retain the agency to
reject or ignore norms within normative frameworks. Norms are institutionalized at different levels within global culture.60
Thus we can determine that they exist at the world-systemic level, such as in formal international legal regimes, and in
informal inter-state relations. They are also institutionalized in national policy and practices (strategic culture) and in military
doctrine and structures (organizational culture). Norms are also operable across the porous boundaries of these entities, such as
between militaries who are of different nationality yet also members of an identifiable professional transnational community.
Norms operating at one of these conceptually distinct levels may shape and be shaped by culture at another level, so that we might
see the influence of organizational culture on strategic culture, or of transnational norms on organizational culture. Norm
entrepreneurs, exogenous shock and intra-community personnel changes are important factors influencing these cultural
dynamics.61
Although norms do not require the exercise of material power to persist or proliferate, they are more likely to do so if they
either serve material interests or are supported by them. Norms therefore may be followed both because an actor is interested
in doing the right thing and also because it is seeking to maximize personal utility in doing so. The study of norms does not
therefore reject considerations of rational choice behaviour but rather seeks to augment and deepen the understanding of
actors' strategic decision-making. In the study of deterrence, attention to norms is a means by which to acknowledge the social
context of deterrence and its reflexive characteristics, a suite of factors and processes elided by purely rationalist approaches to
deterrence.62 As Lawrence Freedman argues, such an approach is more suited to understanding how deterrence actually
works in practice.63 A norms-based approach to deterrence as opposed to a strictly interests-based approach is
defined by Freedman as one which reinforces certain values to the point where it is well understood that they must not be
violated.64 Importantly, this requires the exercise of many elements of foreign policy, rather than the use or threatened use of
military force alone.65
Adler notes that deterrence strategy requires that rational actors hold normative assumptions about the appropriateness and
proportionality of military actions.66 They must also be aware of the rules and logic of the [strategic] game, which is
communicated between actors and which serves not only to inform their actions but also their identities.67 During the Cold War,
deterrence became the principal means through which strategic actors interpreted and constructed their world.68 The norms thus
internalized and institutionalized manifest as beliefs that helped shape nuclear policy and strategy for nearly half a century
tions of the effects of retaliation should a first strike be
launched.69 This conceptual understanding and the general cognitive vocabulary of nuclear conflict and deterrence was
translated into concrete policy and strategy through a range of political and institutional processes, and was essential in stabilizing
the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.70 Despite the ideological differences of the two
superpowers, shared norms relating to nuclear weapons were a powerful binding force, without which deterrence would have
been a much more complex and dangerous endeavour.
After the end of the Cold War, and in the absence of the stability afforded by the structural bipolarity of the superpower nuclear
stand-off, deterrence has indeed become a much more difficult proposition. This is not to say that the world itself is necessarily
more complex than previously but that the entrenched deterrence mindset borne of decades of nuclear strategy has perhaps lacked
a certain flexibility that would enable its continuing relevance and application to a range of strategic actors unburdened by solely
nuclear considerations.71 This applies not only to the types of rogue state nuclear or otherwise and non-state actors such
as terrorists whom states might wish to deter, but also to those collective strategic actors such as the United Nations and NATO
with deterrent objectives.72 In this more variegated strategic environment it is argued that norms-based approaches, whether
through the establishment of norms of appropriate behaviours or through the development of deterrence communities, have more
chance of success than interests-based approaches alone.73 I argue in the following section that this observation pertains to current
American cyber strategy and show how this is linked to US cyber deterrence objectives.
. One much-

discussed example is that of the nuclear taboo , the norm of nuclear non-use which developed through the understanding that the use of nuclear weapons is a priori morally repugnant, regardless of any considera

Reps dont shape reality material structures first

Tuathail 96 (Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p.
664, science direct)
While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different,
so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume

that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they
really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic
communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalbys fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-Precisely
because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought-evades

the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make

action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and
leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational
practices . Both here and earlier, Dalbys reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalbys fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is
worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices
of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalbys book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan
administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and
heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalbys interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident
peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachevs
reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of
power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics.
While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing

this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the
political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant . Critical geopolitics, in
other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the
identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.