PRELIMINARYINJUNCTION
CASE:
[Link]
DOCTRINE:Arightoranexistenceofarightisa
prerequisite to the granting of a preliminary
injunction. Withoutit, asufficientgroundforthe
denialofinjunctionexists.
Beforeaninjunctioncanbeissued,itis essential
thatthefollowingrequisites bepresent:1)there
mustbearightinesseortheexistenceofaright
to be protected; 2) the act against which the
injunctionistobedirectedisaviolationofsuch
[Link],isa
prerequisite to the granting of an injunction.
Injunctionisnotdesignedtoprotectcontingentor
[Link]
of a clear and positive right which should be
judiciallyprotectedthroughthewritofinjunctionor
thatthedefendanthascommittedorhasattempted
tocommitanyactwhichhasendangeredortendsto
endangertheexistenceofsaidright,isa sufficient
groundfordenyingtheinjunction.
Itisalwaysagroundfordenyinginjunctionthatthe
partyseekingithasinsufficienttitleorinterestto
sustain it, and no claim to the ultimate relief
sought inotherwords,thatsheshowsnoequity.
Thepossibilityofirreparabledamagewithoutproof
of actual existing right is not a ground for an
injunction.
CASE:
injunction to be directed is a violation of such
[Link]
onusprobandiisonmovanttoshowthat
thereexistsarighttobeprotected,whichisdirectly
[Link],
there mustbe a showing that the invasion ofthe
rightismaterialandsubstantialandthatthereisan
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
preventaseriousdamage.
CASE:[Link]
DOCTRINE:
The injunction bond is intended to protect the
enjoinedparty againstlossordamagebyreason
oftheinjunctionONLY, andthebondisusually
[Link]
judgmentawardbythelaborarbiter.
CASE:
[Link]
DOCTRINE:
Sinceinjunctionis the strongarmofequity, he
whomustapplyforitmustcomewithequityor
with clean [Link] is so because among the
maximsofequityare(1)hewhoseeksequitymust
doequity,and(2)hewhocomesintoequitymust
come with clean [Link] signifies that a litigant
may bedenied relief bya courtofequityonthe
groundthathisconducthasbeeninequitable,unfair
anddishonest,orfraudulent,ordeceitful.
[Link]
DOCTRINE:
Whenever an application for a TRO is filed, the
court may act on the application only after all
parties have been notified and heard in a
summary hearing. In other words, a summary
hearingmaynotbedispensedwith.
Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is
essentialthatthefollowingrequisitesbepresent:(1)
theremustbearightinesseortheexistenceofa
righttobeprotected;and(2)theactagainstwhich
CASE:
SOLID BUILDERS, INC. V.
CHINABANK
DOCTRINE:
Awritofpreliminaryinjunctionisanextraordinary
event which must be granted only in the face of
[Link]
thecourttakingcognizanceofaprayerforawritof
preliminaryinjunctionistodeterminewhetherthe
requisitesnecessaryforthegrantofaninjunction
arepresentinthecasebeforeit.
Inthisconnection,awritofpreliminaryinjunction
isissuedtopreservethe statusquoante,uponthe
applicants showing of two important requisite
conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected
exists prima
facie, and (2) the acts sought to be
enjoined are violative of that right. It must be
proven that the violation sought to be prevented
wouldcauseanirreparableinjury.
Intheabsenceofaclearlegalright,theissuanceof
the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
Wherethecomplainantmovantsrightis doubtful
ordisputed,theissuanceofaninjunctivewritisnot
proper.
Aninjuryisconsideredirreparableifitisofsuch
constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or
reasonableredresscanbehadthereforinacourtof
law,orwherethereisnostandardbywhichtheir
amountcanbemeasuredwithreasonableaccuracy,
that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical
computation. The provisional remedy of
preliminary injunction may only be resorted to
whenthereisapressingnecessitytoavoidinjurious
consequenceswhichcannotberemediedunderany
standardofcompensation.
CASE:
[Link]
DOCTRINE:
Awritofpreliminaryinjunctionmaybeissuedonly
uponclearshowingofan actualexistingright
to
beprotectedduringthependencyoftheprincipal
action. When the complainants right or title is
doubtfulordisputed,hedoesnothaveaclear
legal
rightand,therefore,theissuanceofinjunctiverelief
isnotproper.
Upon the dismissal of the main action, the
question of the nonissuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction automatically died with
[Link]
remedy;itisauxiliary,anadjunctof,andsubjectto
thedeterminationofthemainaction. Itis deemed
lifteduponthedismissalofthemain case, any
appealtherefromnotwithstanding.
CASE: OFFICEOFTHEOMBUDSMANV.
DECHAVEZ
DOCTRINE:
(Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
Administrative Cases is immediately executory
[Link]
notstopthedecisionfrombeingexecutorynorcan
itberestrainedbyaninjunction).
Where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand,suspensionofnotmorethanonemonth,
or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the
decisionshallbefinal,executoryandunappealable.
Inallothercases,thedecisionmaybeappealedto
theCA.
DOCTRINE:
EvenincasesfallingunderSection1(d)ofRule59,
wheretheappointmentofareceiveristhemost
convenient and feasible means of preserving,
administering or disposing of the property in
litigation, it is essential that there is a clear
showingthatthereisimminentdangerthatthe
properties sought to be placed under
receivershipwillbelost,wastedorinjured.
RECEIVERSHIP
CASE:LARROBIS,[Link]
BANK
DOCTRINE:
The period within which respondent bank was
placed under receivership and liquidation
proceedingsdoesnotconstituteafortuitousevent
whichinterruptedtheprescriptiveperiodinbringing
actions.
When a bank is forbidden to do business in the
Philippines and placed under receivership,the
person designated as receiver shall immediately
take charge of the banks assets and liabilities, as
expeditiouslyaspossible,collectandgatherallthe
assetsandadministerthesameforthebenefitofits
creditors, and represent the bank personally or
throughcounselashemayretaininallactionsor
proceedingsfororagainsttheinstitution,exercising
all the powers necessary for these purposes
including, but not limited to,bringing and
foreclosingmortgagesinthenameofthebank.
Thisisconsistentwiththe purpose ofreceivership
proceedings,i.e., to receive collectibles and
preservetheassetsofthebankinsubstitutionofits
formermanagement,andpreventthedissipationof
its assets to the detriment of the creditors of the
bank
Settledistheprinciplethatabankisboundbythe
acts,orfailuretoactofitsreceiver.
CASE:
TANTANO
CABOVERDE
V.
ESPINA
A receiver should not be appointed to deprive a
party who is in possession of the property in
litigation, just as a writ of preliminary injunction
shouldnotbeissuedtotransferpropertyinlitigation
fromthepossessionofonepartytoanotherwhere
the legal title is in dispute and the party having
possessionassertsownershipinhimself,exceptina
veryclearcaseofevidentusurpation.
This Court has consistently ruled that where the
effectoftheappointmentofareceiveristotakereal
estateoutofthepossessionofthedefendantbefore
thefinaladjudicationoftherightsoftheparties,the
appointmentshouldbemadeonlyinextremecases.
Sec.2ofRule59isveryclearinthatbeforeissuing
the order appointing a receiver the court shall
requiretheapplicanttofileabondexecutedtothe
party against whom the application is presented.
The use of the word shall denotes its
mandatorynature;thus,theconsentoftheother
party,orasinthiscase,theconsentofpetitioners,is
[Link],thefilingofanapplicants
[Link],the
requirement of a receivers bond rests upon the
discretionofthecourt. Sec.2ofRule59clearly
statesthatthecourt may,initsdiscretion,atany
time after the appointment, require an additional
bondasfurthersecurityforsuchdamages.
of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond
thefieldofspecializationofLaborArbiters.
Thedeterminationofthequestionofwhohasthe
better right to take possession of the property is
addressedtothecompetenceofCivilCourts.
CASE:
[Link]
DOCTRINE:
REPLEVIN
CASE:
[Link]
DOCTRINE:
The law clearly states that onemay onlyrecover
moraldamagesiftheyaretheproximateresultof
theotherparty'[Link]
elements are required. First, the act or omission
must be the proximate result of the physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation and similar injury.
Second,theactmustbewrongful.
CASE:
SMART
[Link]
DOCTRINE:
Replevinisapossessoryaction,thegistofwhichis
[Link]
reliefsoughtthereinisthereturnofthepropertyin
[Link]
an ordinary statutory proceeding to adjudicate
rights to the title or possession of personal
[Link]
has the right of possession over the property
involvedandifso,whetherornottheadverseparty
haswrongfullytakenanddetainedsaidpropertyas
torequireitsreturntoplaintiff,isoutsidethepale
Therulesprovidethatpropertyseizedunderawrit
ofreplevinis nottobedelivered immediatelyto
the plaintiff (Rule 60, Section 6).In accordance
withthesaidrules,Andresshouldhave waitedno
lessthanfivedaysinordertogivethedefendantan
opportunitytoobjecttothesufficiencyofthebond
orofthesuretyorsuretiesthereon,orrequirethe
return of the seized motor vehicles by filing a
[Link],hefailedtodo.
It matters not that the adverse party was in
possession of the seized vehicles merely for
[Link]
ruleisclearthatthepropertyseizedshouldnotbe
immediately delivered to the plaintiff, and the
sheriffmustretaincustodyoftheseizedproperty
foratleastfivedays.
Inthiscase,thepurposeofthefive(5)daysisto
giveachancetothedefendanttoobjecttothe
sufficiencyofthebondorthesuretyorsureties
thereonorrequirethereturnofthepropertyby
filingacounterbond.
CASE:
[Link]
DOCTRINE:
Nothing in these provisions which requires the
applicanttomakeapriordemandonthepossessor
ofthepropertybeforehecanfileanactionfora
writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a
condition precedent to an action for a writ of
replevin.
or her alimony may
be modified or altered, in
accordancewithhisincreasedordecreasedneeds,
and with the means of the giver. It cannot be
regardedassubjecttofinaldetermination.
CASE:
[Link]
DOCTRINE: The legal obligation to provide for
support extends to the ascendants, both from the
maternalandpaternallines,asintheorderstatedin
Article199oftheFamilyCode.
The concurrentliabilityoftheascendants
arises
notonlyuponthedefaultoftheparentsofthe
childbutalsouponthe
lattersinabilitytoprovide
sufficientsupport.
SUPPORT
CASE:
[Link]
DOCTRINE:
The amount of support is variable and, for this
reason, no final judgment on the amount of
support is made as the amount shall be in
proportiontotheresourcesormeansofthegiver
and the necessities of the recipient. It may be
reduced or increased proportionately according
tothereductionorincreaseofthenecessitiesofthe
recipientandtheresourcesormeansoftheperson
obligedtosupport.
CASE:
[Link]
DOCTRINE:
[Link]
righttosupportisofsuchnaturethatitsallowance
is essentially provisional; for during the entire
periodthataneedypartyisentitledtosupport,his
However,the liabilityoftheascendantsextends
onlytothoseofhisdescendants,orrelativesby
blood of lower degree. It does not extend to
[Link],theobligationtogive
supporttothewifeextendsonlytoherhusband,by
maritalbond.
Thus, although the obligation to provide support
arising from parental authority ends upon the
emancipation of the child, the same obligation
arising from spousal and general familial ties
ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime. .Also,
while parental authority under Title IX (and the
correlative parental rights) pertains to parents,
passingtoascendantsonlyuponitsterminationor
suspension,theobligationtoprovidelegalsupport
passesontoascendantsnotonlyupondefaultofthe
parentsbutalsoforthelattersinabilitytoprovide
sufficientsupport.
CASE:
[Link]
DOCTRINE:
Article 345 ofThe Revised Penal Codeprovides
thatpersonsguiltyofrapeshallalsobesentencedto
"acknowledge the offspring,unless the law
shouldpreventhimfromdoingso,"and"inevery
casetosupporttheoffspring."
[Link],
"theruleisthatiftherapistisa marriedman,he
cannotbecompelledtorecognizetheoffspringof
the crime, should there be any, as his child,
whetherlegitimateorillegitimate."Inanycase,the
accusedisobligedtosupportthechildasitisin
accordancewithlaw.
CASE:
[Link]
DOCTRINE:
ThenewCivilCodeprovidesthattheallowancefor
supportis provisional becausetheamountmaybe
increasedordecreaseddependinguponthemeans
of the giver and the needs of the recipient (Art.
297);andthattherighttoreceivesupportcannotbe
renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third
person;neithercanitbecompensatedwithwhatthe
recipientowestheobligator(Art.301).Furthermore,
therighttosupportcannotbewaivedortransferred
to third parties and future support cannot be the
subjectofcompromise(Art.2035)Thisbeingtrue,
itisindisputablethatthepresentactionforsupport
can be brought, notwithstanding the fact the
previouscasefiledagainstthesamedefendantwas
[Link],shehas
therighttobringanactionforsupport,foritisonly
[Link]
Hence,thefirstdismissalcannothaveforceand
effectandcannotbarthefilingofanotheraction,
asking for the same relief against the same
defendant.