Security Risk Analysis &
Management
Security Risk Analysis & Requirements Engineering
Security in System
Development
Risk Analysis & Management needs to be a part of
system development, not tacked on afterwards
Baskerville's three generations of methods
1st Generation: Checklists
Example: BS 7799 Part 1
2nd Generation: Mechanistic engineering methods
Example: this risk analysis method
3rd Generation: Integrated design
Not yet achieved
[Baskerville, R. (1993). Information Systems Security Design Methods:
Implications for Information Systems Development. ACM Computing
Surveys 25(4): 375-414.]
Security Risk Analysis & Management
Introduction
Risk Analysis and Management Framework
Assets
Threats
Vulnerabilities
Risks
Security Measures
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Analysis
Management
Security Risk Analysis & Management
Definitions 1
The meanings of terms in this area is not universally
agreed. We will use the following
Threat: Harm that can happen to an asset
Impact: A measure of the seriousness of a threat
Attack: A threatening event
Attacker: The agent causing an attack (not necessarily
human)
Vulnerability: a weakness in the system that makes an
attack more likely to succeed
Risk: a quantified measure of the likelihood of a threat
being realised
Security Risk Analysis & Management
Definitions 2
Risk Analysis involves the identification and
assessment of the levels of risk, calculated from the
Values of assets
Threats to the assets
Their vulnerabilities and likelihood of exploitation
Risk Management involves the identification, selection
and adoption of security measures justified by
The identified risks to assets
The reduction of these risks to acceptable levels
Security Risk Analysis & Management
Goals of Risk Analysis
All assets have been identified
All threats have been identified
Their impact on assets has been valued
All vulnerabilities have been identified and assessed
Security Risk Analysis & Management
Problems of Measuring
Risk
Businesses normally wish to measure in money, but
Many of the entities do not allow this
Valuation of assets
Value of data and in-house software - no market value
Value of goodwill and customer confidence
Likelihood of threats
How relevant is past data to the calculation of future probabilities?
The nature of future attacks is unpredictable
The actions of future attackers are unpredictable
Measurement of benefit from security measures
Problems with the difference of two approximate quantities
How does an extra security measure affect a ~10-5 probability
of attack?
Security Risk Analysis & Management
Risk Levels
Precise monetary values give a false precision
Better to use levels, e.g.
High, Medium, Low
High: major impact on the organisation
Medium: noticeable impact (material in auditing terms)
Low: can be absorbed without difficulty
1 - 10
Express money values in levels, e.g.
For a large University Department a possibility is
1,000,000+
High
1,000+
Medium
Low
< 1,000
Security Risk Analysis & Management
Risk Analysis Steps
Decide on scope of analysis
Set the system boundary
Identification of assets & business processes
Identification of threats and valuation of their impact on
assets (impact valuation)
Identification and assessment of vulnerabilities to
threats
Risk assessment
Security Risk Analysis & Management
Risk Analysis Defining the
Scope
Draw a context diagram
Decide on the boundary
It will rarely be the computer!
Make explicit assumptions about the security of
neighbouring domains
Verify them!
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Risk Analysis Identification of Assets
Types of asset
Hardware
Software: purchased or developed programs
Data
People: who run the system
Documentation: manuals, administrative procedures, etc
Supplies: paper forms, magnetic media, printer liquid, etc
Money
Intangibles
Goodwill
Organisation confidence
Organisation image
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Risk Analysis Impact
Valuation
Identification and valuation of threats - for each group
of assets
Identify threats, e.g. for stored data
Loss of confidentiality
Loss of integrity
Loss of completeness
Loss of availability (Denial of Service)
For many asset types the only threat is loss of
availability
Assess impact of threat
Assess in levels, e.g H-M-L or 1 - 10
This gives the valuation of the asset in the face of the threat
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Risk Analysis Process
Analysis
Every company or organisation has some processes
that are critical to its operation
The criticality of a process may increase the impact
valuation of one or more assets identified
So
Identify critical processes
Review assets needed for critical processes
Revise impact valuation of these assets
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Risk Analysis
Vulnerabilities 1
Identify vulnerabilities against a baseline system
For risk analysis of an existing system
Existing system with its known security measures and weaknesses
For development of a new system
Security facilities of the envisaged software, e.g. Windows NT
Standard good practice, e.g. BS 7799 recommendations of good
practice
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Risk Analysis
Vulnerabilities 2
For each threat
Identify vulnerabilities
Assess levels of likelihood - High, Medium, Low
How to exploit a threat successfully;
Of attempt
Expensive attacks are less likely (e.g. brute-force attacks on encryption
keys)
Successful exploitation of vulnerability;
Combine them
Vulne
ra
Likelihood
of Success
Likelihood of Attempt
bility
Low Med High
Low Low Low Med
Med Low Med High
High Low Med High
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Risk Assessment
Assess risk
If we had accurate probabilities and values, risk would
be
Impact valuation x probability of threat x probability of exploitation
Plus a correction factor for risk aversion
Since we haven't, we construct matrices such as
Risk
Impact valuation
Low Med High
Low Low Low Med
Vulnerability
Med Low Med High
High Low Med High
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Responses to Risk
Responses to risk
Avoid it completely by withdrawing from an activity
Accept it and do nothing
Reduce it with security measures
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Security Measures
Possible security measures
Transfer the risk, e.g. insurance
Reduce vulnerability
Reduce likelihood of attempt
e.g. publicise security measures in order to deter attackers
e.g. competitive approach - the lion-hunters approach to security
Reduce likelihood of success by preventive measures
e.g. access control, encryption, firewall
Reduce impact, e.g. use fire extinguisher / firewall
Recovery measures, e.g. restoration from backup
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Risk Management
Identify possible security measures
Decide which to choose
Ensure complete coverage with confidence that:
The selected security measures address all threats
The results are consistent
The expenditure and its benefits are commensurate with the risks
Consider doing less than the BS7799 recommendations?
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Iterate
Adding security measures changes the system
Vulnerabilities may have been introduced
After deciding on security measures, revisit the risk
analysis and management processes
e.g. introduction of encryption of stored files may remove the threat to
Confidentiality but introduce a threat to Availability
What happens if the secret key is lost?
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Conclusion: Problems of Risk
Analysis and Management
Lack of precision
Volume of work and volume of output
Integrating them into a normal development process
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Current Risk Management
Techniques
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Risk Management
Techniques 1
Commercial tools
CRAMM (CCTA Risk Assessment and Management Methodology):
Mostly rely on check lists
UK Government approach
Supported by software
PROTEUS (BSI) software:
Gap analysis to identify necessary actions and existing strengths
Comprehensive practical guidance and the text of BS 7799
Reporting, for easy monitoring and maintenance
Evidence to customers and auditors
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Risk Management
Techniques 2
Generic processes
Threat trees (see below):
Threat analysis
Based on fault trees
Only addresses the threat identification stage
Attack trees (see below)
Vulnerability analysis
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Threat Trees 1
AT&T Bell Laboratories
Categorisation of threats
Disclosure / Integrity / Denial of service
Categorisation of vulnerabilities by view
Personnel view
Physical view
Operational view
Communications view
Network view
Computing view
Information view
[Amoroso, E., W.E. Kleppinger, and D. Majette, An Engineering
Approach to Secure System Analysis, Design and Integration. AT&T
Technical Journal, 1994. 73(5): p. 40-51.]
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Threat Trees 2
Model of system
Calculate risks from
Impact
Vulnerability
Originator
O
Message
Handling
M
Threats to
Electronic Mail
Recipient
R
Disclosure
Integrity
Denial of
Service
Other
Subscribers
S
Electronic
Mail System
External
E
O R M S E
O R M S E
Security Risk Analysis & Management
O R M S E
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Attack Trees
Tree Structure
Goal is root node
Ways of achieving goals are leaf nodes
Costs can be associated with nodes
[Schneier, B, Secrets and Lies. 2000: John Wiley and Sons.]
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Attack Tree Example
Goal: Read a specific message
1. Convince sender to reveal message (OR)
1.1. Bribe user
1.2. Blackmail user
1.3 Threaten user
1.4. Fool user
2. Read message when it is being entered into the computer (OR)
2.1. Monitor electromagnetic emanations from computer screen (Countermeasure: use a
TEMPEST computer)
2.2. Visually monitor computer screen
2.3. Monitor video memory
2.4. Monitor video cables
3. Read message when it is being stored on sender's disk (Countermeasure:
use SFS to encrypt hard drive) (AND)
3.1 Get access to hard drive (Countermeasure: Put physical locks on all doors and windows)
3.2. Read a file protected with SFS.
4. ..
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