What Are International Institutions?

Author(s): John Duffield

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International Studies Review (2007) 9, 1-22

REFLECTION, EVALUATION, INTEGRATION

What Are International Institutions?1

JOHN DUFFIELD

Department of Political Science, Georgia State University

International institutions are a central focus of international relations

scholarship as well as of policymaking efforts around the world. Despite

their importance, our scholarly literature lacks a widely accepted def-

inition of just what they are. Instead, scholars have employed a range of

largely nonoverlapping conceptions, contributing to a fragmentation of

the literature and hindering theoretical cumulation. This essay seeks to

remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs. It first reviews the principal

ways in which international institutions have been conceptualized and

identifies their shortcomings. It then develops a definition that promises

to be inclusive of what are commonly regarded as the most important

institutional forms without losing analytical coherence. A final section

discusses some of the concrete benefits that result from employing the

new definition, both in improving existing scholarship and by suggest-

ing valuable new avenues of research.

There are at least as many definitions of (international) institutions as there are

theoretical perspectives.

Thomas Risse (2002:605).

Over the years, international institutions of various types-treaties, organiza-

tions, regimes, conventions, and so on-have grown greatly in numbers and im-

portance. Paralleling this growth, the scholarly literature on international relations

has seen successive waves of efforts to describe and explain institutional phenom-

ena. Indeed, international institutions have frequently been at the center of leading

theoretical debates in the field.

Nevertheless, this scholarly literature lacks a widely accepted definition of inter-

national institutions, an absence that has had several unfortunate consequences.

First, the term is frequently used to refer to distinctly different empirical phenom-

ena, such as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), international regimes, and

sets of norms. Not only does this practice result in much potential for confusion, but

it means that the findings of most studies of "international institutions" apply

to only limited sets of institutional forms. For example, John Richard's (1999)

'An earlier version of this essay was presented at Georgia State University, Emory University, and the annual

meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, 2002. The author wishes to thank the many

individuals who have, offered helpful comments and suggestions, including Chip Carey, Jeff Checkel, Martha

Finnemore, Jeff Legro, Cecilia Lynch, Ron Mitchell, Dan Reiter, Michael Smith, Nina Tannenwald, and Al Yee, as

well as the editors and anonymous reviewers of a number of journals.

? 2007 International Studies Review.

Publishedby Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

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2 What Are International Institutions?

"positive theory of international institutions," in fact, concerns only interstate

regulatory agreements.

Second, a number of scholarly works may have been unnecessarily flawed

because of their failure to recognize the various distinct forms that international

institutions can take. As a result, some studies have defined institutions in one way,

only to use the term later to refer to other forms. For example, Barbara Korem-

enos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal (2001:762) define international institu-

tions as "explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors, that

prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior," yet they proceed to include in

their analysis the very different form of international organization that performs

various functions as actor or agent. More seriously, it may be unacknowledged

variation in the nature of the institutions themselves rather than other factors that

account for the patterns of outcomes that such studies seek to explain.

Third, the international relations literature remains unnecessarily balkanized as

adherents of different conceptions talk past one another, when they attempt to

communicate at all. In particular, the field is characterized by still largely isolated

rationalist and constructivist camps, which emphasize more or less formal rules and

intersubjective norms, respectively. Although significant progress is being made

within specific research programs, the result has been a patchwork understanding

of international institutions rather than the development of comprehensive theory.

As Martha Finnemore (1996b:326) has noted, "incommensurable definitions mean

that despite similarities in labeling, [rationalist and sociological] approaches-all

called institutionalist--have little in common." Not only do general claims about

the causes or consequences of "international institutions" possess only limited

validity, but potentially important phenomena and interesting questions that

transcend the conceptions employed by individual research programs may be

overlooked.

In order to remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs, a broad definition of in-

ternational institutions that incorporates the most important institutional forms is

required. Certainly, such a definition is a prerequisite for the development of any

equally comprehensive theories on the subject. As Elinor Ostrom (1986:4) has ar-

gued, "no scientific field can advance far if the participants do not share a common

understanding of key terms." Likewise, a comprehensive definition would provide

a common framework within which one could locate more specific types of inter-

national institutions and relate them to one another, facilitating a fuller appreciation

of their similarities and differences as well as the links between them.

This essay seeks to address this need. It first reviews the principal ways in which

international institutions have been conceptualized and identifies their shortcom-

ings. It then develops a definition of international institutions that promises to be

inclusive of what are commonly regarded as the most important institutional forms

without losing analytical coherence. To this end, international institutions are de-

fined here as relatively stable sets of related constitutive, regulative, and procedural

norms and rules that pertain to the international system, the actors in the system

(including states as well as nonstate entities), and their activities. This definition

integrates existing conceptions while expressing two important distinctions, one

ontological and one functional, that are not simultaneously present in any existing

definition. A final section discusses some of the concrete benefits that may result

from employing this new definition. It is proposed that this new definition will both

improve existing scholarship and suggest new avenues of research.

Existing Definitions of International Institutions

Robert Keohane's (1988:382) critical observation that "institutions are often dis-

cussed without being defined at all, or after having been defined only casually" is

hardly less true today than when it was made nearly two decades ago. Indeed, even

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JOHN DUFFIELD 3

works that purport to provide general surveys of institutional phenomena often

offer only the most cursory discussions of the meaning of the term "institution," if

they provide any at all. In his landmark study The Anarchical Society, for example,

Hedley Bull (1977) explores the contributions of the "institutions of international

society" to international order without anywhere defining explicitly the former.2

Likewise, two otherwise valuable recent overviews of the institutional literature fail

to grapple with the fundamental question ofjust what international institutions are.

At least Steven Weber (1997:233) frankly acknowledges that he "will sneak by the

challenge of defining an institution" with the justification that the approaches he

discusses "are sufficiently different that to develop one definition that will travel

across them would be difficult." In contrast, the contribution by Lisa Martin and

Beth Simmons (1998) on theoretical and empirical studies of international insti-

tutions in the special fiftieth anniversary issue of International Organization does not

even raise the question of definitions and, the preface by Martin and Simmons

(2001:1) in a subsequent edited volume on international institutions offers only a

one-paragraph "definitional comment."

When scholars have paid careful attention to definitional issues, they have some-

times offered conceptions that are excessively broad, including elements that are

best viewed as distinct from institutions. For example, K. J. Holsti (2004:20-23)

describes institutions in terms of patterned practices and actions, sets of ideas or

beliefs, and norms and rules. Although he is attentive to the causal links between

these components, many scholars would regard one or more of them as unneces-

sary or superfluous to a definition of institutions per se.

No less frustrating for students of international institutions has been the existence

of several generally nonoverlapping conceptions that are less than comprehensive.

As a result, well-intentioned efforts to bring clarity to the subject have in some ways

only added to the confusion. These conceptions can be grouped roughly into four

categories: institutions as formal organizations, practices, rules, and norms.

Traditional Conceptions: Institutions as Formal Organizations

Traditionally, scholars and others have frequently used the term "international

institution" to refer to formal international organizations, for example, the inter-

national financial institutions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the

World Bank. The equation of organizations with institutions may have made a

certain amount of sense in the 1950s and 1960s when international organizations

were the principal subject of institutional inquiry by scholars. As studies of other

international institutional forms, such as regimes, have proliferated in the past

three decades, however, such a restricted construction of the concept has become

misleading and, as a result, inappropriate.

Nevertheless, the practice has remained common even in highly theoretical

works. For example, Arthur Stein (1990:27, fn. 3) implicitly equates international

institutions with international organizations. In "Institutions and Collective Action,"

Wayne Sandholtz (1993) explicitly identifies the Commission of the European

Community as an institution. In "Institutions for the Earth," Peter Haas, Robert

Keohane, and Marc Levy (1993:397) focus almost exclusively on the activities of

international organizations. Finally, in "Credibility, Costs, and Institutions," Lisa

Martin (1993:423) operationalizes international institutions in terms of interna-

tional organizations.

2See also Barry Buzan (2004:169). More generally, Buzan (2004:167) acknowledges that "[m]ost English School

writers spend little if any time defining what they mean by 'the institutions of international society.' "

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4 What Are International Institutions?

Early Sociological Conceptions: Institutions as Practices

The emergence of the literature on international regimes in the late 1970s and

early 1980s led to the first conscious efforts by international relations scholars to

view international institutions in broader terms and to define them systematically.

Leading regime theorists such as Oran Young (1980:332, 1986:107) and Robert

Keohane (1984:57) argued that regimes should be conceptualized as social insti-

tutions, which, in turn, required that institutions be defined.

Young (1983:93) himself made the first careful attempt to provide a definition of

international institutions. Borrowing from sociology, he developed an initial def-

inition of social institutions as "recognized patterns of behavior or practice around

which expectations converge." In the late 1980s, Young (1989:506) presented a

more refined version: "identifiable practices consisting of recognized roles linked

together by clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the occu-

pants of these roles." Thus, for Young, "international institutions are social insti-

tutions governing the activities of the members of international society." Although

path-breaking, Young's initial attempt to define international institutions never

developed a strong following within the community of international relations

scholars. The precise reasons for this lack of popularity are difficult to ascertain.

Nevertheless, one can identify at least three aspects of Young's definition that

limited its usefulness and attractiveness.

In one sense, this earlier sociological conception was too narrow. Young

(1986:108; also 1989:32) drew a sharp distinction between social institutions and

organizations, which he defined as "material entities possessing physical locations

(or seats), offices, personnel, equipment, and budgets." According to Young

(1989:12-13, 25), social institutions, in general, and international institutions, in

particular, "may or may not be accompanied by explicit organizations." In fact, this

distinction was probably exaggerated. In focusing on the material aspects of

organizations, Young overlooked the fact that many, notably intergovernmental,

organizations are primarily sets of roles and rules.

In another sense, this sociological conception was too broad, at least in the view of

many political scientists, as revealed by Young's (1989:33) statement that "even war

is a social institution" (see also Bull 1977; Young 1986:107). Certainly, the ways in

which wars have been practiced at different times and places may have been shaped

by social institutions, but many would disagree with the assertion that war-"a state

of open, armed, often prolonged conflict carried on between nations, states, or

parties," by one authoritative definition (Morris 1975)-is a social institution, given

that it is not necessarily rule governed (for example, Holsti 2004: chapter 9).

Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the sociological conceptions from which

Young drew inspiration, however, is the close degree to which they associate in-

stitutions with behavior. Whether the precise term used is "behavior" or "practice,"

the primary emphasis is on the actions and activities of the actors concerned rather

than other institutional features. Consistent with this interpretation, Young

empirical identification of regimes." Although this behavioral conception of insti-

tutions may have some uses, it nevertheless requires limiting one's explanatory

ambitions accordingly or risking committing the logical fallacy of first identifying

institutions on the basis of observed behavior and then using them to "explain" that

same behavior (Keohane 1993:27).

Rationalist Conceptions: Institutions as Rules

Much more common in the literature is the rationalist (or rationalistic) conception

of institutions as sets of more or less formal rules. In rationalist analysis, agents are

assumed to act rationally to maximize their utilities, subject to external constraints.

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JOHN DUFFIELD 5

Figuring importantly among these constraints are institutions, which, in the ra-

tionalist conception, are consciously constructed frameworks established by agents

seeking to promote or protect their interests (see Scott 1995:27; Krasner 1999:60).

According to Simmons and Martin (2002:194), "most scholars have come to

regard international institutions as sets of rules meant to govern international be-

havior," such that rules "are often conceived of as statements that forbid, require, or

permit particular kinds of actions." Somewhat more broadly, Keohane (1988:343;

1989:3) has defined institutions as "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or

informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expect-

ations."3 This definition and variations of it have been widely, although not uni-

versally, cited in theoretical studies of international institutions (for example,

Martin 1992:39; Weber 1997:233). Moreover, a leading critic of institutional the-

ories has advanced a very similar definition (Mearsheimer 1994-1995:8), thereby

facilitating a constructive debate between those who find international institutions

to be highly consequential and those who do not.

What have been the attractions of the rationalist conception of international

institutions as rules, especially in comparison with the sociological conception as

expressed by Young? Perhaps most importantly, it distinguishes sharply between

institutions and behavior, given that the purpose of much rationalist theorizing is

precisely to explain actions and outcomes (for example, Simmons and Martin

2002:194). Thus, this conception avoids the danger of tautological reasoning that

has so concerned the critics of behavioral conceptions. Indeed, Young (1996:x)

himself has offered a revised definition of institutions that, like Keohane's, places

primary emphasis on rules and clearly differentiates between them and behavior.

As a result, and in conjunction with rational actor assumptions more generally,

this conception has proven to be very productive in terms of generating powerful

yet parsimonious explanatory theories. Rationalist theories view international in-

stitutions as affecting behavior and outcomes by structuring the incentives and

constraints that characterize the strategic environment within which instrumentally

motivated, utility-maximizing actors operate. More specifically, institutional rules

can reduce transaction costs, establish benchmarks for evaluating the behavior of

others, provide information, promote issue linkage, and facilitate enforcement (for

example, Keohane 1988:386; Krasner 1988:69; Martin 1992:7, 39).

Despite its popularity and demonstrated usefulness, the rationalist conception of

international institutions as sets of more or less formal rules also contains features

that have limited its acceptance-and will in all probability continue to do so. As a

practical matter, this conception, too, seems to omit important classes of interna-

tional institutions. It leaves unclear the status of international organizations--some

definitions include them (for example, Keohane 1989:3-4) whereas others do not

(for example, Simmons and Martin 2002:194)-and international law. And it

would appear to have no place for the most fundamental institutions of the in-

ternational system, such as state sovereignty.4 These omissions may follow from two

more fundamental limitations.

First, the emphasis on rules that are consciously devised by those who would be

subject to them necessarily obscures the intersubjective and deontic characteri-

stics that are often associated with institutions. As an analyst of the kindred new

3Keohane did not himself describe this definition as rationalist. Indeed, he viewed it as being potentially useful

for both rationalist and what he termed "reflective" approaches to the study of international institutions (personal

communication). Nevertheless, the equation of institutions with rules is strongly associated with rationalist schol-

arship, not only in political science but in economics and, in more recent years, sociology as well. And even Keohane

(for example, 1990:733) has sometimes emphasized the more formal forms.

4Keohane (1988:385, 391) himself has treated sovereign statehood as an institution. He has repeatedly described

it, however, as a "practice" (rather than as a set of rules per se) in the context of those institutions that consist of

general patterns of activity, thereby verging on Young's behavioral conception.

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6 What Are International Institutions?

institutionalism in economics has observed, "actors merely [acknowledge] the ex-

istence of the rule systems--recognizing the validity of the rules-without neces-

sarily believing that the rules are fair or justified" (Scott 1995:36). Yet, as Friedrich

Kratochwil and John Ruggie (1986:364-368) argue in a seminal article on inter-

national regimes that could apply just as well to the broader concept of interna-

tional institutions, "we know regimes by their principled and shared understandings

of desirable and acceptable forms of social behavior. Hence, the ontology of regimes

rests upon a strong element of intersubjectivity." In addition, they note, "what

distinguishes international regimes from other international phenomena-from

strategic interaction, let us say-is a specifically normative element."

Second, the rationalist conception's emphasis on the behavioral consequences of

rules diverts attention from the ways in which institutions may endow actors with

certain powers and capacities and, in some cases, even create them. As Ruggie

(1998:871) has argued, rationalist approaches lack "any concept of constitutive

rules." Instead, actors and their interests are typically treated as given and exog-

enous to the institutions in question (see also Krasner 1988:69; Scott 1995:29).

In contrast, Young (1989:15-16), to his credit, places equal weight on the roles

inherent in international institutions and the rights associated with them.

Constructivist Sociological Conceptions: Institutions as Norms

At least partly in response to the limitations of the dominant rationalist conception

just discussed, yet another sociological conception of international institutions,

which is commonly called "constructivist," has emerged in more recent years. In

the words of Finnemore and Sikkink (2001:392), "constructivists focus on the role

of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and argument in politics, stressing in par-

ticular the role of collectively held or 'intersubjective' ideas and understandings on

social life." Accordingly, the constructivist conception places primary, and often

explicit emphasis, on the intersubjective aspect of international institutions. As

such, constructivists regard institutions as fundamentally ideational phenomena,

involving ideas that are shared by members of a collectivity (Wendt 1999:94, 96). In

contrast to the rationalist conception, advocates of this perspective "emphasize that

institutions are often not created consciously by human beings but emerge slowly

through a less deliberative process, and that they are frequently taken for granted

by the people who are affected by them" (Keohane 1988:389; see also Barnett

1996:159).

The term that is most often employed to represent these qualities is "norm."

Within this literature, social institutions are generally viewed as consisting of norms

or sets of norms (for example, Klotz 1995:19; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:891;

Wendt 1999:96). Norms, in turn, are usually defined by constructivists as socially

shared expectations, understandings, or standards of appropriate behavior for

actors with a given identity (for example, Klotz 1995:14; Finnemore 1996a:22;

Katzenstein 1996:5; Legro 1997:33; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:891; Boekle,

Rittberger, and Wagner 2001:106).

Constructivists typically go on to distinguish between two main types of norms

(for example, Klotz 1995:14-15; Katzenstein 1996:5; Finnemore and Sikkink

1998:891; Ruggie 1998:871). First, there are "regulative" (regulatory or prescrip-

tive) norms. These are similar to the rules stressed in rationalist conceptions insofar

as they order and constrain behavior. Unlike more or less formal rules, however,

they have an essentially evaluative or deontic quality. As Finnemore and Sikkink

(1998:891) have written, "it is precisely the prescriptive (or evaluative) quality of

'oughtness' that sets norms apart from other kinds of rules."

Second, and representing a more fundamental departure from rationalist

conceptions, there are "constitutive" norms (for example, Keohane 1988:382;

Krasner 1988:67; Wendt and Duvall 1989:60-63; Klotz 1995:19; Barnett 1996:159;

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JOHN DUFFIELD 7

Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:891; Ruggie 1998). These components of institutions

generate agents, endow them with certain capabilities and powers, and determine

their underlying identities, interests, and preferences. They also define social ac-

tivities and categories of action. Indeed, in the words of John Searle (1995:27),

"they create the very possibility of certain activities."

Not only does the constructivist conception, in contrast to the rationalist

approach, highlight the intersubjective and constitutive aspects of international

institutions, it also distinguishes, if not always explicitly, between institutions and

practices, unlike the earlier sociological approach (see, for example, Wendt and

Duvall 1989:62; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:892). Nevertheless, the constructivist

conception has not yet had an impact on the international relations literature

comparable to that of the rationalist viewpoint. In contrast to the sociological and

rationalist conceptions considered above, it continues to lack a prominent defini-

tional expression comparable with those provided by Young and Keohane. More

generally, it is the least well developed of the various conceptions, in no small part

because many of its adherents have not been primarily concerned with exploring

the nature, determinants, or consequences of international institutions per se (an

important exception is Risse 2002).

A more fundamental problem is that in its attempt to correct for the "thinness" of

its rationalist counterpart, the constructivist conception may go too far in the

other direction. In particular, it seems to neglect the formal features that are

often characteristic of specific international institutions, at least as they are

popularly conceived. Presumably, many scholars would disagree with the conten-

tion that one must necessarily probe beneath the surface for intersubjective norms

before one can regard a particular treaty or organization as an international

institution.

A New Definition of International Institutions

Even though several useful conceptions of international institutions can be found in

the international relations literature, each has limitations that prevent it from serv-

ing as an adequate foundation for the development of comprehensive theories of

international institutions. Still needed is an analytically coherent, yet sufficiently

encompassing definition that can facilitate theoretical progress on a broad front.

The following section aspires to provide such a definition.

This effort is based on several principles. First, an adequate definition should be

comprehensive enough to accommodate all commonly regarded forms of interna-

tional institutions. At the same time, however, a definition should not be so ex-

pansive as to be rendered analytically useless. One must guard against blurring the

distinction between international institutions and related, but arguably distinct,

phenomena such as ideas in general or international cooperation.

Second, in view of the diversity of international institutions, a definition should

facilitate the differentiation and comparison among specific forms. But such a def-

inition should not go as far as Elinor Ostrom (1986:4), who has argued that "the

multiple referents for the term 'institution' indicates [sic] that multiple concepts

need to be separately identified and treated as separate terms." Nevertheless, any

definition that does not simultaneously lay the groundwork for a taxonomy of

international institutions would be inadequate.

Third, and finally, the definition should contain a logical basis for this differen-

tiation. It is not sufficient simply to provide a list and description of different types

of international institutions. Rather, it is important to place any taxonomy on a solid

analytical footing if it is to have a substantial empirical and theoretical payoff (see

also Raymond 1997:226).

In view of these considerations, it is proposed that international institutions be

defined as relatively stable sets of related constitutive, regulative, and procedural

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8 What Are International Institutions?

norms and rules that pertain to the international system, the actors in the system

(including states as well as nonstate entities), and their activities. Any particular

international institution need not contain all of these elements. Indeed, it might

consist of only one, for instance, constitutive norms or procedural rules, although

most international institutions are unlikely to be so simple. It is also important to

acknowledge that the terms "relatively stable" and "related" are inherently sub-

jective, so some clarification may be helpful. By the former is meant that an in-

stitution will exhibit at least some persistence, durability, and resilience in the face

of changing circumstances. By the latter is meant that institutional elements are

associated or connected in some meaningful way, such as by a functional or formal

relationship. However, where one locates the boundaries of any particular insti-

tution may not be obvious and may be disputed by others.

This definition clearly represents an amalgamation and synthesis of existing

conceptions of international institutions and, thus, owes a substantial debt to the

conceptual efforts of others, especially Keohane and Young. As such, though,

it also seeks to express two important distinctions--one ontological and one

functional-that are not simultaneously present in any other definition and that

serve as the analytical basis for a comprehensive taxonomy of international

institutions. These two distinctions are explored in some detail in the remainder of

this section.5

Ontological Distinctions: Intersubjective versus Formal Elements

The first distinction is between the intersubjective and formal elements of institu-

tions as emphasized by the constructivist and rationalist conceptions, respectively.

Although these elements may often be tightly intertwined as a practical matter, they

can and should be distinguished conceptually. In order to express this distinction,

let us use the word "norms," as used by constructivists, to refer to the intersub-

jective elements and the word "rules," as used by rationalists, to refer to the formal

elements. Admittedly, this linguistic choice is not unproblematic, and some readers

may object to it. The words "norms" and "rules" have been assigned numerous

meanings in the international relations literature. Typically, moreover, these mean-

ings are quite similar, and the words are often used interchangeably (see, for

example, Keohane 1988:383; Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989:129-130; Cortell and

Davis 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse 2002:604; Holsti 2004). Never-

theless, such a distinction is not inconsistent with their broader usage and, for lack

of better terms, would seem to provide an adequate way of expressing the onto-

logical difference that is of concern here.

Although few institutions may be entirely ideational in nature, constructivists

have made a compelling case for viewing them as intersubjective, at least in part.

Thus, to an important extent, institutions may exist in the minds of people and

need not be written down anywhere. As such, they may be characterized as "shared

mental models" (Denzau and North 1994; Wendt 1999:96; see also Kratochwil and

Ruggie 1986:764-765). These features of institutions typically arise spontaneously

rather than through a process of negotiation, although they may subsequently be

codified in writing or formal statements. This has been the case for many human

rights norms, laws of war, and diplomatic conventions. Likewise, given their

implicitly consensual nature, norms cannot be imposed, although they can be

5These are not the only potentially important distinctions one can make among international institutions. For

example, Young (1989:13) distinguishes between international orders-broad framework arrangements governing

the activities of all or almost all members of international society-and international regimes that are more spe-

cialized arrangements that pertain to well-defined activities, resources, or geographical areas and often involve only

some subset of the members of international society. Similarly, the English School literature differentiates between

primary institutions, which define the basic character and purpose of international society, and secondary insti-

tutions, which are more akin to regimes (Buzan 2004:xviii, 167).

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JOHN DUFFIELD 9

inculcated via such processes as persuasion and socialization (see, for example, the

norm "life cycle" described in Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:895-905).

The other fundamental characteristic of the intersubjective elements of interna-

tional institutions that bears repeating is their deontic, evaluative, or "normative"

quality.6 They are shared beliefs about the way things should be, or how things should

be done. Norms, as the term is used here, carry "a sense of obligation, a sense that

they ought to be followed" (Chayes and Chayes 1995:113, emphasis in the original;

see also Goertz and Diehl 1992:638-639; Raymond 1997:217-218). One conse-

quence of this characteristic of norms is that they "are counterfactually valid. No

single counterfactual occurrence refutes a norm. Not even many such occurrences

necessarily do." Rather, whether a violation weakens a norm does not depend on

"how the community assesses the violation and responds to it" (Kratochwil and

Ruggie 1986:767; see also Raymond 1997:218; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:892).

For instance, the fact that noncombatants are sometimes intentionally targeted in

war does not necessarily mean there is no norm of noncombatant immunity.

Nevertheless, norms do vary in strength (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:892) and,

as a result, they are likely to exert differing degrees of influence. The strength of a

norm is determined by at least two factors. One is the fraction of the members of a

social system that share the norm, or what has been called "concordance" (Legro

1997:35) or "commonality" (Boekle, Rittberger, and Wagner 2001). For example,

there is near universal agreement that chemical weapons should never be used

(Price 1995), whereas the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention remains highly

contested (for example, Roberts 2003). Another is the intensity with which the

norm is typically held by members of the social system. Some norms may involve

little sense of obligation whereas others may be so deeply internalized as to be taken

for granted. Contrast the proscription of the use of force with the antislavery norm.

How do we know whether such institutions actually exist? More specifically, how

can we assess how widely shared a particular norm is or how strongly it is held? No

scholarly consensus exists on the measurement of norms. Nevertheless, nonbehav-

ioral evidence for the existence of norms can be culled from a number of sources,

including surveys, experiments, interviews, and participant observation (see, for

example, Hechter and Opp 2001). And in the study of international norms, in

which it is often difficult to interact directly with the actors involved, one can and

must examine what people say and write, using such methods as content, discourse,

and historical analysis (see, for example, Raymond 1997).

As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:892) note, because norms exist in the mind,

"we can have only indirect evidence of their existence just as we can only have

indirect evidence of most other motivations for political action." Nevertheless,

precisely because "norms by definition embody a quality of 'oughtness' and shared

moral assessment, norms prompt justifications for action and leave an extensive

trail of communication among actors that we can study." Indeed, norms must be

expressed, from time to time, verbally or on paper, consciously or unconsciously,

for otherwise they could not be shared by members of a social group. What people

say and write not only reveals but reaffirms or reinforces their beliefs and in some

cases even helps create new norms.

Thus, a number of constructivist international relations scholars have pointed to

the need to examine communicative processes or discourse in order to identify

norms (see, for example, Klotz 1995:29-33; Finnemore 1996a:23-24, 2003:15).

Indeed, as much as two decades ago, Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986:774) argued for

the need for an interpretive approach to the study of regimes in light of their

inherently dialogical nature. In this sense, identifying norms is akin to the process

6Likewise, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:891) maintain that "both the intersubjective and the evaluative di-

mensions are inescapable when discussing norms," and Goertz and Diehl (1992:635) write that the term "[n]orm

reflects the deontological component that is lacking in the term rule."

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10 What Are International Institutions?

of determining whether a customary international law exists. States must perceive

that a particular practice is obligatory or required by law. How then do we know

this is the case? According to international legal scholars, an important part of the

process is an examination of the statements of government leaders and spokes-

persons (Arend 1999:48).

Nevertheless, reliance on evidence of this type sometimes poses novel challenges.

For instance, the more strongly held a norm is, the less evidence there may be of its

existence. Finnemore (1996a:23) has pointed out that "many norms are so intern-

alized and taken for granted that violations do not occur and the norm is hard to

recognize." As an illustration, she cites the norm of statehood as the only appro-

priate and legitimate political unit in international politics. Indeed, so deeply root-

ed is this norm that "most scholarship has treated and continues to treat states as

naturally occurring and inevitable rather than as socially constructed and histor-

ically contingent" (Finnemore 1996a:23).

Intersubjective norms do not exhaust the characteristics of institutions, however.

Institutions typically have formal elements as well, to which above we assigned the

term "rules." Indeed, it is these elements of international institutions that are most

familiar. Consider, as illustrations, the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic

Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, or the North American Free Trade Agreement

(NAFTA). As these examples suggest, moreover, the formal elements of interna-

tional institutions, in contrast to norms, can have an existence that is entirely

separate from the agents that devised them. Norms and other intersubjective

phenomena require human consciousness to be sustained.

A related feature of rules, as the term is used here, is that they need not cor-

respond to what any affected party actually prefers or thinks should be the case. In

contrast to the intersubjective elements of international institutions, they need not

possess any evaluative or deontic content; no moral opprobrium is necessarily at-

tached to their violation. Rather, rules simply concern what things are and how

things are done, for instance, the membership of the UN Security Council,

the dispute resolution mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and

the voting rules of the IMF. Indeed, as these examples suggest, rules may clash with

the normative beliefs of many of the actors to which they apply. Thus, a rule may be

imposed by one actor on others, whereas a norm may not; and those upon

whom the rule is imposed may feel no sense of obligation to adhere to it, although

they may comply for other reasons.

Just as norms may vary in strength, rules may exhibit differing degrees of for-

mality or formalization. Charles Lipson (1991) has distinguished between more or

less formal agreements on the basis of the level at which the agreement is made

within the government and the form that it takes. Thus, a rule may be stated

verbally, such as through an oral agreement, or written down, such as in an inter-

state treaty (Aust 2000). For their part, treaties may simply be signed, as in an

executive agreement, or be subject to formal ratification by a legislative body. Other

possibilities lying along this spectrum include memoranda of understanding,

exchanges of notes, and joint communiques. Similarly, some international legal

scholars have sought to make a distinction between hard legalization and

various instruments of "soft law" (Chinkin 1989; Abbott and Snidal 2000). Among

the latter figure interstate agreements that are explicitly nonlegally binding (such as

the Helsinki Final Act), nonbinding or voluntary resolutions formulated

and adopted by international and regional organizations (such as those issued by

the UN General Assembly), formal treaties that lack identifiable rights and obli-

gations, and codes of conduct or guidelines adopted by IGOs. The degree of

formalization determines the strength of a rule, especially when it is made

legally binding.

Intentionally omitted from this definition is any conception of institutions as

practices or patterns of behavior. As noted above, some scholars have defined

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JOHN DUFFIELD 1

institutions in terms of practices, but this approach has found little favor within the

field of international relations. Indeed, the need to distinguish institutional norms

and rules from behavior is a leading area of agreement among rationalists and

constructivists. One reason is that a pattern of behavior, such as recurring attempts

to maintain a balance of power, may not conform to, or be influenced by, any

particular norm or rule. More fundamentally, the equation of institutions with

behavior or practices precludes the use of the former to explain the latter.

In practice, specific institutional elements can assume a wide range of forms.

Some will be pure rules; others will be pure norms; and yet others-perhaps

most-are best characterized by some combination of rule-like (formal) and norm-

like (intersubjective) characteristics. For example, a formal rule may be accompan-

ied by a strong intersubjective belief in its legitimacy. Moreover, the nature of a

particular institutional element can change over time. Thus, a norm may become

formalized-one can point to many illustrations from the laws of war, human

rights, and diplomatic relations-whereas a formal rule may gradually lose moral

force over time.

Nevertheless, it should be possible to locate any particular institutional element at

a given moment within a two-dimensional ontological space. Figure 1 attempts to

do this, using examples from a variety of domains. One of the dimensions-in this

case the vertical-is defined in terms of the strength of the norm-like character-

istics, if any. The other dimension-the horizontal here-is determined by the

degree of formalization of the rule-like characteristics, if any. It is important to

stress that, in this ontology, the norm- and rule-like characteristics are orthogonal to

US-Soviet measures to

Peaceful dispute

settlement, Racial

Self-defense, ABM treaty,

reduce risk of nuclear war,

Chemical Weapons Ban, Anti-

COCOM, Wassenaar

slavery convention, Partial

Anticipatory self-defense,

arrangement, SALT II,

test ban

Nuclear taboo, pacta sunt

NATO force goals, National

servanda

self-determination, UNGA

equality, Just war theory,

Strong

(Formal rule, strong norm)

resolutions

(Strong norms, not

formalized)

Norm
Spheres of influence,

US-Soviet incidents at sea

Humanitarian intervention

agreement, Universal

Ban, Nuclear non-

Declaration of Human

proliferation, Anti-corruption

Rights, GATT rules, Climate

conventions, WTO rules,

Change Convention,

Comprehensive Test Ban

Non-intervention, Land Mine

(Strength)

(Emergent norm, not

Helsinki Final Act, Rio

yet formalized)

Declaration, Torture

(Formal rule, less than

convention

universal norm)

General disarmament,

US-Soviet "hotline"

General proscription of the

Preventive war, Balance

agreement, OPEC quotas,

threat and use of force,

of power

Interwar strategic bombing

Protection of Wetlands

Weak or

agreement

Convention, Territorial

Nonexistent

(Weak norm, no

waters, Navigational rules,

formal rule)

Postal conventions

(Unratified rule, little

normative content)

(Formal rule, weak or

nonexistent norm)

Rule

Low (Degree of High

formalization)

FIG. 1. Locating Institutional Elements

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12 What Are International Institutions?

one another rather than lying along a single continuum, as is sometimes suggested

(see, for example, Steinmo 2001:7554).

Functional Distinctions

The second important distinction captured by the definition concerns the functions

that different institutional elements perform. These functions can be divided into

three broad categories: the constitutive, the regulative, and the procedural. The

distinction between the constitutive and regulative functions is already quite com-

monly made. As explained below, it is also useful to distinguish a third, the pro-

cedural function. Before proceeding, it should be noted that some norms and rules

may be both constitutive and regulative at the same time. For example, the rules

regarding the movement of a chess piece simultaneously define what that piece is

(see also Schauer 1991:7). Similarly the documents establishing many international

bodies also stipulate what those bodies can and cannot do. But many norms and

rules are not both constitutive and regulative; thus, it remains important to be able

to distinguish analytically among these three functions.7

Constitutive Function. The constitutive function of international institutions is

in a sense the most fundamental, given that constitutive rules and norms "create

the very possibility of engaging in conduct of a certain kind" (Schauer 1991:6).

Without the prior constitution of actors, for instance, there can be no action to

regulate. Although some rationalist writings on institutions hint at their consti-

tutive role (for example, North 1990), this aspect has been developed primarily

in the work of constructivists and the closely related English School theory of

international relations (see Buzan 2004).

It is useful to distinguish among several more specific constitutive functions. In

the first place, institutional rules and norms can create social entities (actors) and

determine their very capabilities and other endowments related to action, such as

rights. Indeed, this phenomenon is perhaps most obvious in the realm of in-

ternational relations, in which virtually all actors are institutionally constituted to

an important extent. The most familiar example of such entities is the sovereign

state. By now, it has been well established that the state is a social construct (see,

for example, Biersteker and Weber 1996; Hall 1999). As an actor in the inter-

national system, the state is essentially a bundle of roles and related rights as-

sociated with a given geographical territory that are determined by the "basic

rules of authority that define international relations" (Philpott 2001:3). The in-

stitution of state sovereignty has become increasingly formalized over the years,

but it still rests on a strong intersubjective basis.

The state is not the only institutionally constituted actor of consequence in

international affairs, however. A number of others are associated with interna-

tional organizations. Most common among these are collective intergovernmental

bodies, such as the UN Security Council and General Assembly, the North At-

lantic Council (NAC), the Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU), and

the IMF Board of Governors as well as supranational executive bodies, such as

the UN Secretariat, the European Commission, and the staff of the World Bank.

Also possible, but still quite rare, are supranational judicial and legislative

bodies composed of elected or appointed individuals, such as the International

Court of Justice, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament.

7Young (1999) offers a typology of regime or institutional tasks that distinguishes between regulative, proced-

ural, programmatic, and generative regimes. Despite the seeming similarity, his typology differs from the one

offered here in an important respect. Young's typology refers to the overall task or tasks performed by a regime or

institution, while the present essay is concerned with the basic range of functions performed by institutional elem-

ents. Thus, any programmatic or generative regime, for example, can in principle be decomposed into some

combination of constitutive, regulative, and procedural elements.

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JOHN DUFFIELD 13

Intergovernmental and supranational actors are typically constituted by formal

treaties, agreements, and conventions among states, such as the UN Charter and

the North Atlantic Treaty, or the decisions of intergovernmental bodies, such as

the resolution establishing the UN Human Rights Council.

Yet other noteworthy institutionally constituted actors may involve individual

persons. Consider, for example, the UN Secretary General, the NATO Supreme

Allied Commander, the Director-General of the WTO, the President of the World

Bank, and diplomatic envoys. Although the individuals involved already possess

a physical existence, rules and norms endow them with significant roles and

rights.

Before proceeding, it is important to recognize that international organizations

are not institutions per se. Rather, they typically possess the qualities of both

institutions, as defined here, and agents. The UN Security Council, for example,

is simultaneously a collective actor and an arena or forum in which member states

interact. In contrast to truly unitary actors, moreover, much of the activity of such

collective bodies is aimed at setting regulative rules for members and authorizing,

legitimizing, or condemning actions taken by them (see Claude 1966). Whether it

is more fruitful to regard an international organization as an institution or as an

actor will depend upon the precise question that one seeks to answer. As a prac-

tical matter, however, it may be difficult to distinguish between organizational

actors, on the one hand, and the norms and rules that constitute them, regulate

their behavior toward other actors, and determine their internal processes, on

the other.

Analytically distinct from the creation of actors is the role that institutions can

play in determining their identities, interests, goals, and preferences, which is a

prominent theme in the constructivist literature on norms (see, for example,

Klotz 1995; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996; Katzenstein 1996). In

some cases, these characteristics may be conferred simultaneously with the very

creation of an actor. Thus, the secretary general of an international organization

will generally possess an identity that is distinct from that of any other entity and

an interest in promoting the well-being of the organization and its membership.

In other cases, however, preexisting actors, notably states and their leaders, may

acquire new identities and preferences as a result of their presence, participation,

or embeddedness in an international institution through processes of persuasion

and socialization (Johnston 2001). In this regard, particular attention has been

paid to socializing processes within European institutions such as the EU and

NATO (see, for example, Checkel 2005).

Moreover, institutions may constitute activities and categories of action (Dessler

1989:455; Schauer 1991:6; Searle 1995:27). To be sure, many forms of behavior,

especially those of a physical nature, can and do take place without the mediation

of institutions. But institutions often play a role in determining their social

meaning, such as whether a use of force is to be viewed as an act of aggression or

a justifiable intervention, or whether a tariff is a violation of international law or a

legitimate retaliatory activity. They specify what counts as a particular activity.

And, in some cases, they may define activities that would not otherwise even exist,

such as the exercise of the veto in the UN Security Council. Like sovereignty, the

actions in which states may or must engage have become increasingly formalized

over the years; consider the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the

Law of Consular and Diplomatic Immunities. But formalization is not a pre-

requisite for their existence, even though it may affect their impact and influence.

Regulative Function. Perhaps most familiar is the regulative function of insti-

tutions. Many rules and norms seek to regulate the everyday behavior of actors

(see also Ostrom 1990:52). In this sense, Young (1989:16) has defined rules as

"well-defined guides to action or standards setting forth actions that members [of

an institution] are expected to perform (or to refrain from performing) under

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14 What Are International Institutions?

appropriate circumstances." Similarly, constructivists typically describe norms as

shared expectations or standards of appropriate behavior.

Regulative (or operational) norms and rules can assume three basic forms

(Dessler 1989:457; Schauer 1991:7-8). They may be prescriptive, requiring or

obligating actors to behave in certain ways. Examples include the provision of

military assistance to allies when attacked, the payment of assessed dues to an

international organization, and intervention to prevent or stop genocide. They

may proscribe, prohibit, or forbid various actions. Here one might cite the UN

Charter's broad injunction to refrain from the threat or use of force, the ban on

torture, and restrictions on the application of quotas to traded goods. Regulative

norms and rules may also be permissive, allowing actors to engage in actions that

nevertheless remain optional, such as self-defense, the imposition of tariffs up to

agreed levels, and the exploitation of resources on the continental shelf. When

fully specified, such norms and rules indicate the type of action, the relevant

actors, and the circumstances under which they are operative.

Another useful distinction is between primary norms and rules of behavior and

secondary or auxiliary regulative elements intended to increase the likelihood of

compliance with the primary ones. The secondary category includes transpar-

ency norms and rules concerning the provision, gathering, and sharing of in-

formation about actors' policies and actions in order to facilitate determinations

of compliance and noncompliance (Mitchell 1998). Examples are IMF reporting

requirements, inspection provisions in arms control agreements, and surveillance

rights such as those contained in the Open Skies Treaty. This category also in-

cludes rules and norms regarding how actors should respond to instances of

noncompliance by others. Although such enforcement measures are somewhat

rarer, one can readily point to prominent examples, such as the Covenant of the

League of Nations, which required members to sever all economic relations with

an aggressor, and the provisions in the WTO agreements that allow members to

impose trade sanctions in certain circumstances.

Procedural Function. The procedural function of international institutions

bears a strong resemblance to the regulative function and might well be thought

of as a subset of the latter. Nevertheless, institutional scholars have sometimes

taken pains to differentiate between the two (see, for example, Young 1989;

Ostrom 1990), and some self-described "institutionalist" studies have focused

entirely on procedures (for example, Garrett and Tsebelis 1996). How do they

differ? Regulative rules and norms typically concern behavior that directly affects

the physical world (Ostrom 1990:50), whereas procedures typically govern ac-

tions by actors with respect to one another within the context of institutions or

with respect to the institutions themselves. In particular, procedural arrange-

ments often provide mechanisms that allow participating actors to arrive at col-

lective choices regarding problems that arise in the issue areas covered by an

institution (Young 1999:28).

Obviously, a clear line does not always exist between these two functions, in

part because they are often closely related. For example, the UN Charter con-

tains both regulative elements, such as the general prohibition on the threat and

use of force, and procedural elements, notably the voting rules of the UN Gen-

eral Assembly and Security Council (as well as important constitutive elements).

Likewise, the institutions concerning international imports both regulate the

restrictions that countries can place on trade and provide procedures for the

negotiation of lower trade barriers and the resolution of disputes.

Although the procedural function of institutions is often associated with formal

rules, especially in the context of IGOs, in some contexts it is performed

primarily or exclusively by intersubjective norms. Moreover, even the

decision-making procedures of IGOs are not always formalized. Those of

the UN Security Council, EU, and IMF are spelled out in considerable detail in

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JOHN DUFFIELD 15

TABLE 1. Typology of International Institutions

Ontological Forms

Combinations of

Norms and

Intersubjective Rules (Includes But

Norms Not Limited to

(Includes Codified Customary Formal Rules

Customary International (Includes Imposed

International Law, Law and Some Regimes and Some

Spontaneous Negotiated Negotiated

Functions Regimes) Regimes) Regimes)

Constitutive Sovereignty Status of diplomats IGO constitutions

statehood, and (for example, IMF

racial equality diplomatic missions Articles of

(e.g., Vienna Agreement, ICAO

Convention on Convention)

Diplomatic

Relations)

Regulative Traditional laws of Codified laws of war Interstate

(includes regime war (for example, regulatory

norms and rules) (for example, Just Geneva agreements (for

War doctrine) Conventions), example, 200 mile

General Assembly limit, GATT trade

declarations rules, postal

conventions, Open

Skies Treaty)

Procedural Norms of Procedures for Formal IGO

(includes regime consensus, treaty negotiation, procedures

procedures) unanimity, and ratification, and (for example,

sovereign interpretation Security Council

equality (one state, (e.g., Vienna voting rules, WTO

one vote) Convention on the dispute resolution

Law of Treaties) procedure)

the agreements on which those bodies are based. In contrast, the North Atlantic

Treaty is silent on the procedures to be followed by the NAC, in which decision

making has consequently been guided by the norms of sovereign equality and

consensus.

Potential Contributions of the New Definition

It is one thing to argue in the abstract that a particular definition is superior to the

alternatives but yet another to demonstrate that its adoption will result in better

theoretical and empirical research. Accordingly, this final section discusses three

potential contributions of the new definition.

Clarifying the Nature of Particular International Institutions

In the first place, this definition can help scholars make clearer the nature of the

particular institutions that are the subject of inquiry and thus the range of phe-

nomena to which their claims and findings actually apply. The ontological and

functional distinctions expressed in the definition provide the analytical basis for a

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16 What Are International Institutions?

comprehensive taxonomy of international institutions as delineated in Table 1.

Here, the columns are defined in terms of the ontological nature of the institution,

ranging from the purely formal to the purely intersubjective or involving some

combination of formal and intersubjective elements. The rows capture the various

functions that institutions can perform.

Consistent with the objective of providing a comprehensive definition of

international institutions, it should be possible to situate each of the distinct

forms of international institutions within this taxonomy. To be sure, the task is

complicated by the fact that many institutions have multiple elements, often making

it difficult to assign them to a single category. As a result, some scholars may object

to the specific characterizations suggested here. But such objections should

not negate the value of attempting to clarify the nature of particular institutional

elements.

Improving Existing Institutional Scholarship

The failure to recognize important variations in institutional forms can result in

flawed research on the causes and consequences of international institutions. The

definition proposed here can help illuminate such flaws and suggest how they

might be remedied or avoided in the first place. One potential problem that the

definition may help prevent is the failure to specify the full range of possible out-

comes when treating international institutions as dependent variables. An example

can be found in the Rational Design project as presented by Barbara Koremenos,

Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal (2001), which seeks to explain differences in

the forms that international institutions take. An important recent contribution to

the theoretical literature on international institutions as dependent variables, the

project defines them as "explicit arrangements, negotiated among international

actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior" (Koremenos, Lipson,

and Snidal 2001:762). By emphasizing the regulative function, however, this def-

inition neglects the important constitutive choices that are often involved in the

creation of international institutions. Not only must actors decide whether or not to

establish formal organizations, but they must choose between different types of

bodies (intergovernmental, supranational, and so on) and determine what func-

tions, authority, and capabilities to grant to those bodies. As a result of its con-

stricted focus, the Rational Design project may overlook important trade-offs in the

design of international institutions.

A second potential pitfall that this definition may help with is the failure to specify

the full range of relevant institutional causal variables when exploring the effects of

international institutions, thereby running the risk of omitted variable bias. For

example, the explanatory framework employed in the Rational Design project

overlooks the possibility that norms may also be an important determinant of in-

stitutional design. A design that seems optimal on efficiency grounds may never-

theless be regarded as inappropriate or illegitimate and thus may not be chosen on

the basis of normative considerations. Indeed, one of the case studies executed for

the project on prisoners of war treaties shows how a preexisting set of norms were

formalized in treaty form (Morrow 2001).

A similar oversight mars Jeffrey Legro's (1997) otherwise valuable effort to com-

pare the relative impact of international norms and organizational culture. Exam-

ining eight cases involving the use of particular means of warfare-chemical

weapons, strategic bombing, and submarine warfare-during World War II, he

finds that organizational culture provides a more consistent explanation of state

preferences than do international norms. Legro's analysis does not, however, dis-

tinguish explicitly between the formal and intersubjective aspects of international

institutions. In fact, some of the international "norms" that he considers, such as

the 1925 Geneva Protocol, had important formal components. Indeed, the limited

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JOHN DUFFIELD 17

data presented by Legro suggest a stronger correlation between state preferences

and international institutions than the study found if the latter are measured in

terms of formalization. Consequently, instead of generating a single prediction for

each of the three institutions under consideration, it might have been advisable to

measure norm strength and rule formalization separately. Doing so would have

made it possible to assess the influence of both intersubjective and formal insti-

tutional elements as well as that of organizational culture.

A third potential problem that the definition may help avoid is the failure to

identify and differentiate among distinct causal pathways, as suggested by Andrew

Cortell and James Davis's (1996) path-breaking study of the ways in which inter-

national norms and rules affect state behavior through the actions of domestic

political actors. A key condition, or intervening variable, in their model of insti-

tutional influence is the domestic "salience" of a rule or norm. They measure

salience in terms of the legitimacy accorded the rule or norm in the domestic

political context as well as level of domestic commitment indicated by declarations

of support by authoritative actors, ratification, concrete alterations in policy

choices, and formal incorporation into domestic processes. They, then, assess

the model through an examination of two "heuristic" case studies of US policy-

making: (1) the US semiconductor industry's efforts to persuade the Reagan

Administration to press Japan to comply with the rules of the General Agreement

on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and (2) congressional efforts to pressure the

Bush Administration to pursue a multilateral strategy following Iraq's invasion of

Kuwait.

Because the study explicitly does not differentiate between formal and intersub-

jective institutional elements, however, it obscures the possibility that very different

causal mechanisms may be at work in different international institutional contexts,

even if the outcomes are similar. In particular, the case studies suggest that different

types of institutions lend themselves to different forms and degrees of domestic

salience. More formal institutions such as the GATT rules are more likely to be

formally incorporated into domestic laws and procedures, whereas the impact of

primarily intersubjective phenomena, such as the norm of collective security, de-

pends largely on the extent to which they acquire legitimacy in the domestic con-

text. Thus, explicit recognition of the ontological distinction proposed here could

help produce a richer, more differentiated theory of institutional effects.

A fourth potential problem with which the definition proposed here could help

concerns the failure to select institutional cases that are as comparable as possible,

which is suggested by Liliana Botcheva and Lisa Martin's (2001) useful effort to

explain the effects of international institutions in terms of whether they promote

convergence or divergence in state behavior. These scholars hypothesize in par-

ticular that convergence is more likely to occur when states recognize that

noncompliance will result in substantial externalities and the relevant institutions

possess adequate monitoring mechanisms. To establish the plausibility of this

hypothesis, they explored three cases that exhibit variation in the level of exter-

nalities: (1) development aid cooperation among OECD countries, (2) the estab-

lishment of the Single European Market, and (3) international cooperation to limit

stratospheric ozone depletion.

The three cases also, however, exhibit significant differences in the nature of the

regulative rules and norms of state behavior on which the institutions were based.

Both the Single European Market and international cooperation on ozone involved

formally agreed upon, legally binding rules that lent themselves to enforcement. In

contrast, the OECD development aid regime was based on a goal (0.7% of GNP

annually) that was neither legally binding nor enforceable. Indeed, this aspirational

target did not even command a normative consensus, given that many OECD

members expressed reservations, and two had not accepted it even with reser-

vations as late as 1985 (Lumsdaine 1993:247). Arguably, these fundamental

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18 What Are International Institutions?

differences in the nature of the basic rules and norms could by themselves account

for much of the variation in institutional effects that Botcheva and Martin found.

Consequently, future research on this subject might benefit from the careful se-

lection of cases involving institutions based on highly similar sets of regulative

norms and rules.

Generating New Research Questions

A further potential benefit of the definition proposed here is that it can help gen-

erate useful new research questions that might otherwise be overlooked. The types

of questions scholars ask are constrained by the assumptions that underlie their

models. Thus, rationalists and constructivists, by emphasizing the rule- and norm-

like characteristics of international institutions, respectively, may have unnecessarily

and inappropriately restricted the ambit of institutional research. In their otherwise

laudable survey of the institutional literature, for example, Martin and Simmons

(1998:742-757) present a purely rationalist research agenda for the study of in-

stitutional effects-one which must perforce neglect the ways in which a large

number of international institutions matter.

At least two broad sets of questions suggested by the definition seem worth

pursuing. One concerns the differing causal relationships between regulative

norms and rules as independent variables, on the one hand, and international

behavior and outcomes as dependent variables, on the other. The reconsideration

of the Legro (1997) data above suggests that, as a first step, it is important to study

the relative impact of regulative norms and rules under different circumstances.

Such work should, in turn, stimulate and inform efforts to develop a better com-

parative understanding of the different mechanisms through which formal rules

and intersubjective norms operate to shape behavior, the value of which is sug-

gested by the Cortell and Davis (1996) study. Throughout this process, scholars

should be attentive to possible interactions between the intersubjective and formal

elements of particular institutions, rather than treating them simply as alternative

explanatory variables. What difference does it make, for example, whether or not a

strong norm is formalized or a highly formalized rule is accompanied by a strong

sense of obligation?

A second broad and potentially valuable area of research concerns the basic

forms-intersubjective or formal-that international institutions take. For instance,

some otherwise functionally similar institutions, such as the prohibitions on the use

of chemical and nuclear weapons, have assumed very different forms. Why is this

the case? A related question is when and how the basic nature of institutions

change. Some primarily formal arrangements may acquire a strong intersubjective

element of obligation over time, whereas others may not, and yet others may ex-

perience a loss of legitimacy. Conversely, states have formalized some international

norms as treaties but not others. And what roles might formal rules play in the

development of norms, and vice versa? For example, although Finnemore and

Sikkink (1998:900) do not explicitly differentiate between the two, they state that in

most cases an emergent norm must become institutionalized in specific sets of

presumably formal rules and organizations before it is widely adopted. Arguably,

their path-breaking analysis of the norm life cycle would have been richer and more

accurate if it had been informed by the definition presented here.

Conclusion

This essay began with the premise that the formulation of adequate definitions of

key concepts is essential to the process of theory development. The scholarly lit-

erature on international institutions has suffered from the lack of a widely accepted

definition that includes all the most important forms. The purpose of this essay was

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JOHN DUFFIELD 19

to remedy this deficiency by elaborating a comprehensive, yet differentiated def-

inition of international institutions that can serve as a solid foundation for the

development of a better understanding of their nature, causes, and consequences.

Integral to the definition are two distinctions-one ontological and one function-

al-that, in turn, serve as the basis for a taxonomy within which all types of

international institutions can be located.

This definition promises to advance the study of international institutions in

several ways. At a minimum, it should promote an appreciation of the full range of

possible institutional forms and, simultaneously, help clarify the extent and limits of

existing and future studies of international institutions. In addition, the definition

should help improve work on the subject by making scholars more attentive to

potential variations in institutional forms. Beyond simply helping remedy or pre-

vent the repetition of past mistakes, it should stimulate the development of both

richer and more comprehensive theories of international institutions. And no less

important, the definition should help open potentially valuable avenues of research

by generating new questions and inspiring fruitful comparisons. Theoretical

progress will inevitably occur as scholars seek increasingly to relate different in-

stitutional forms to one another. At the same time, by facilitating the differentiation

of institutions into their constituent ontological and functional components, the

definition may help deepen our understanding of specific institutional types.

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