ERSQuickGuides

PR
Myths

Preface by Vernon Bogdanor

Professor of Government, Oxford University
ERSQuickGuides

PR
Myths
The facts and
the fiction on
Proportional
Representation

Preface by Vernon Bogdanor

Professor of Government, Oxford University
PR Myths

What’s
inside

9 Myth 1
Small parties rule the roost under PR
13 Myth 2
First Past the Post is tried and tested
15 Myth 3
PR is incomprehensible
17 Myth 4
PR doesn’t let you kick out an unpopular
government
19 Myth 5
First Past the Post is best for
representing a constituency
23 Myth 6
PR does nothing for turnout
27 Myth 7
PR creates weak coalitions
31 Myth 8
PR lets in extremist parties
35 Myth 9
The STV form of PR is bad for party
cohesion and therefore government
37 Myth 10
PR caused the problems in the 2007
Scottish elections
PR Myths 5

Preface
No political issue attracts more fallacious arguments than
proportional representation (PR). Perhaps the most foolish
one is that a proportional system would be too difficult for
the voters to understand. The implication must be that Eng-
lish voters are the most stupid in Europe. For every other
European country except France uses a proportional system,
and proportional representation is now used for the Scottish,
Welsh and Northern Irish devolved bodies and for local gov-
ernment in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Only Westminster
and local authorities in England and Wales remain as a last
redoubt of First-Past-the-Post.
The weaknesses of First-Past-the-Post have become even
clearer in recent years. Do we really want to continue with a
system which allows a party to ‘win’ an election, as in 2005,
on just 36% of the vote – i.e. when nearly two-thirds of vot-
ers are opposed to it? Do we really want to continue with a
system which gives the Conservatives 92 fewer seats than
Labour in England, even though the Conservatives won more
votes than Labour in England?
The crucial weakness of First-Past-the-Post is that, under it,
the number of seats a party wins depends not only upon the
number of votes it receives but upon the geographical distribu-
tion of its vote. Parties whose support is geographically concen-
trated, such as Labour, will gain more seats for a given vote than
parties, such as the Liberal Democrats, whose support is more
evenly spread. The central argument for proportional represen-
tation is that it takes the element of geographical unfairness out
of elections.
Lewis Baston has performed a public service in producing
this trenchant pamphlet exposing the fallacies of some of the
arguments used against proportional representation. I hope
that it is widely read. For it is only when the fallacies have
been exposed that the real debate can begin.
Vernon Bogdanor,
Professor of Government
Oxford University
PR Myths 7

Introduction

In January 2008 the Government published its Review of

Voting Systems. This was, in the main, a fair and detailed
treatment of the issues around electoral systems. The review
demolishes some of the arguments most cherished by oppo-
nents of electoral reform. It also provides support, although
carefully phrased, for arguments favoured by reformers.
The Government’s report follows ten other reports in the
last ten years which assessed the merits of different vot-
ing systems. Each one furthered our understanding of
how different voting systems in the UK have had an effect
on the way we are represented and governed.
Despite this wealth of information, some common mis-
conceptions are still quoted in the debate on electoral
reform. This pamphlet draws on the Government’s own
report, previous studies, international experience and the
Society’s original research to counter such PR myths.
Lewis Baston
Director of Research
Electoral Reform Society
 1
Myth: Small
PR caused Myth 1 9

1
the problems
parties rule the
in
the 2007
roost underScottish
PR
elections.
Reality: Under
Reality:
FPTP a small
Bad
ballot design
group of swing
causeddecide
voters ‘hang­ Studies of what happens under coalition governments show

ing chads’
who is in in that the idea that the tail wags the dog is not borne out by the
facts. The smaller party achieves some of its objectives, but
the programme for government is by and large more closely

the notorious
government. based on the manifesto of the larger party. The larger party
has most of the executive appointments and therefore more

2000 election
of an opportunity to use the power of government in line with
its philosophy.
Often it is perfectly clear where a small party stands, and if the

in Florida. Bad electorate do not want it to be in government they can vote

against it. This happened when the FDP was ejected from

design can
power by the SPD and Greens in Germany in 1998. Small par-
ties that overplay their hand and use their power unwisely, as
the New Zealand First Party did in the first PR parliament in

happen under 1996, are generally punished by the electorate in the next elec-
tion. Sometimes, as in the British parliament elected in Febru-
ary 1974, or in the German grand coalitions, the bigger parties

any system. get together formally or informally to prevent the smaller parties
gaining too much from the situation.
People who make the argument that small centre parties
rule the roost under PR usually run out of examples after
mentioning the FDP in Germany (a party that has been out
of power since 1998). The idea of a small party holding the
balance between two big parties is an outmoded picture in
many countries, including Germany and Britain. What sort
of coalition is formed will depend very much on the context
of politics at a given time, and deeper differences between
10 Myth 1 Myth 1 11

political culture in different nations. Politics in most coun- Where Votes Don’t Count:
tries, even in Britain, is decreasingly about a simple left-right ‘Safe Seat’ constituencies held by the same
spectrum, and agreement on different issues can be found party since 1970
in the most surprising places. In the Netherlands recent gov- Based on 2005 boundaries
ernments have included the Labour Party (PvdA) in a grand
coalition with the Christian Democrats (CDA), the CDA with
the right-Liberal VVD, and even Labour in coalition with the
VVD. Arguments against coalitions have not caught up with
the reality of multi-party politics and the decline of the two
party left-right monoliths.
First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) itself creates the problem of a
small swing group deciding who is in government. Because
election results depend on the outcome in a rather small
number of marginal seats, and the number of voters who
might change their mind in such seats is itself smaller, elec-
tion manifestos and campaigns are crafted to appeal to this
group who were estimated in 2005 to consist of only 800,000 Labour
electors out of 45 million. This small group of voters has an Conservative
Liberal Democrats
effective veto over a wide range of policies on taxation, pub- Speaker
lic services and climate change. They are, in effect, a ruling DUP
minority but without the stated policy positions that a small
party would have. p
 2
Myth: First Past Myth 2 13

the Post is tried

and tested.
Reality: FPTP
fails decisively
on three counts
– seats that look It is certainly true that FPTP is an old-fashioned system. It

like the votes was designed for a time when few people could vote, literacy
was low and there were not many contested elections. How-
ever, some features are more recent – two MPs per seat was

cast, voter choice the norm before 1885 and single-member only representa-
tion dates from 1950.

and representing Most countries abandoned FPTP at the same time they were
embracing democracy and a mass franchise – PR is tried
and tested in many other countries and the FPTP countries

society fairly. are the ones that are out of step.

FPTP has also produced poor results. In 1997 the government
in its brief to the Jenkins Commission outlined four desirable
features in an electoral system – a reasonable relationship be-
tween votes and seats, stable government, voter choice and
a link between the MP and a geographical constituency. We
might also add fair representation of women and minorities.
FPTP fails decisively on three counts – seats that look like the
votes cast, voter choice and representing society fairly. It is
also pretty poor on the other two, about which there are many
myths that need exploding.
British FPTP has also got the result ‘wrong’ in three out of
four close elections, giving the party with fewer votes more
seats. In 2000, Al Gore was the choice of American voters,
but the FPTP Electoral College decided it for the popular vote
loser, George W Bush. Can one look at any of these results
and feel that FPTP even passes the basic test of electing the
government for which people have voted? p
 3
Myth: PR is Myth 3 15

incomprehensible
Reality:
Opponents of PR
sometimes try to
make it sound
complicated The recently published Government review of voting sys-

when it is not. tems found that “We do not find, on balance, any evidence
to suggest that voters find one voting system easier or more
confusing than another voting system.”
Under most PR systems, there is a simple relationship of
cause and effect for the voter. If you vote for a candidate, you
increase his or her chances of getting elected. If you vote
for a party, you increase that party’s entitlement to seats. By
doing this, you achieve more representation for your views.
This does not happen under FPTP. Many votes are wasted,
and voters often have to make tactical choices because if
they vote for their real preferred candidate who lies in third
place, they could help the chances of a candidate whose
views they strongly dislike.
Opponents of PR sometimes try to make it sound complicat-
ed when it is not. These sorts of people often find the term
‘d’Hondt’ amusing and have a bit of anti-intellectual fun talk-
ing about Belgian mathematics. But one needs a precisely
defined way of allocating a certain number of seats to parties
in order to make sure that the voters’ choice is most accu-
rately represented, and ‘d’Hondt’ simply means taking some
averages. It is not rocket science. p
 4
Myth: PR doesn’t Myth 4 17

let you kick out

an unpopular
government.
Reality: Under
FPTP by taking
safe seats for There are many examples of countries using PR where there

granted and has been a clear choice between different governments and
an election has resulted in the incumbents being kicked out.
Recent elections in Poland, Norway and Sweden, all highly

focusing on proportional systems, have seen this sort of alternation. The

same has happened in Spain, Portugal, Greece, New Zea-

marginals, a
land, Italy and Germany, and of course in Scotland.
The ability of FPTP to kick out an unpopular government is
also overstated. Only in 1970 has a clear majority for one party

party can win in government been replaced by a clear majority for another
in the last 120 years. All other cases of transfers of power

an election
have involved coalitions, hung parliaments or unworkably
small majorities. By taking safe seats for granted and focusing
on marginal seats, a party can win an election despite being

despite being unpopular. Labour’s vote share in 2005 was only 36 per cent,
and this was a drop of 5.5 percentage points since 2001 and
8 points since 1997. This is the largest fall in support over the

unpopular term of any government since the war, with the exceptions
only of the Conservative governments of 1970-74 and 1979-
97. But Labour was punished only very lightly for this big
withdrawal of support.
FPTP also means that governments with high support some-
times get kicked out, as with Labour in 1951 when the party
polled a record high percentage of the vote and defeated the
Conservatives in terms of popular support. p
 5
Myth: First Past Myth 5 19

the Post is best

for representing
a constituency.
Reality: A con-
stituency link
established on It is sometimes argued that there is something special and

a feeble mandate unique about the link between a single representative and
their constituency under FPTP. This argument is often made
without much reference to what the voters might want from

does not look their representatives, and without giving proper considera-
tion to alternatives.

that strong In some systems, such as Mixed-Member Proportionality

(MMP) – known in Scotland as the Additional Member System
(AMS) – every constituency keeps its local representative

from the voters’ who has a watching brief over that area, and adds a number
of regional members.

point of view. But in most areas of life competition rather than monopoly
is generally thought to give a better service to the consumer.
The House of Commons is one of the only public services
where this is not seen to be the case. Not surprisingly,
the consequence can be dissatisfaction on the part of the
consumers.
The claim that single member monopoly representation is
the only way to achieve good local representation has never
been recognised even in British electoral practice – it was
only uniformly imposed for the House of Commons in 1950.
In local government, where the relationship between elected
representative and constituent is even more about casework
than with MPs, multi-member wards are the normal pattern.
The Government’s review of voting systems concluded in
2008 that ‘FPTP has the simplest direct relationship be-
20 Myth 5 Myth 5 21

tween representative and constituent. The Single Transfer-

able Vote (STV) also allows for a direct relationship, but there
are a number of potentially competitive representatives and
greater choice for the electorate… Whether the connection
between constituents and representative is stronger under
FPTP or STV (both candidate based systems) depends on
one’s perspective about whether there should be single or
multi-member constituencies and representatives.’
Under FPTP the election winner often does not have major-
ity support from his or her constituents. In 2005, two-thirds
of MPs returned to Westminster did not have majority sup-
port from local voters. Because of low turnout, no MPs had
the support of a majority of their constituents and only three
could claim more than a 40 per cent local mandate. A con-
stituency link established on such a feeble mandate does not
look that strong from the voters’ point of view.
In safe seats the lack of competition at election time means
that there are no incentives for incumbents to work hard at
representing their constituents. The fact that many do is a
tribute to their diligence and integrity, and is in spite of the
FPTP electoral system rather than because of it.
A system where several members represent a ward has a
number of advantages for the voter. The chances of a voter
having a candidate for whom they have voted, and with whom
therefore feel a sense of ownership and connection, are high
under STV. In the 2007 Scottish local elections under STV, 74
per cent of voters elected their first choice candidate. This
was an advance on 52 per cent in the last FPTP elections.
This strengthens the link between voter and representative.
STV also creates competition at a local level, encouraging
a high standard of service to constituents in every seat, not
only in the marginals. p
 6
Myth: PR does Myth 6 23

nothing for
turnout.
Reality: The
things that
turn people off
politics – the Low and declining turnout is a source of concern about the

obsession with health of democracy in Britain.

One sometimes hears it said that electoral reform cannot be

swing voters in
the answer because turnout in the FPTP elections for the
House of Commons is higher than it is for proportionally
elected bodies like the Scottish Parliament and the Europe-

marginal seats an Parliament. This is a highly suspect argument because it

does not compare like with like. It is obvious that elections
for the most important elected body will tend to have higher

that makes all turnout than those for subsidiary institutions, simply because
more people will be interested in the result. Political scien-

the parties
tists have long distinguished between ‘first order’ elections
like UK General Elections, and ‘second order’ elections that
do not determine control of government, such as European

sound alike – Parliament and local elections, which nearly always have sig-
nificantly lower turnout. The Scottish Parliament occupies an
intermediate position.

are all products Election turnout for the same body will vary depending
mostly on two factors; how certain the result seems, and the

of FPTP perceived difference between alternative results. But there

are also longer-term factors, and the steep decline in turnout
(particularly youth turnout) at Westminster elections since
the mid 1990s suggests that there is something more fun-
damentally wrong.
A comparative international study, and the research for the
Government’s review of electoral systems in 2008, conclud-
24 Myth 6 Myth 6 25

ed that proportional systems tend to produce higher turnout Turning out or turning off?
than FPTP. This should not come as a surprise to anyone, Turnout figures for legislative elections
because with PR every vote can count towards the result.
Country Last Turnout Electoral
However, it would be wrong to argue that the connection is Election System
straightforward, and we do not claim that electoral reform
Australia Nov’07 94.8% AV – Single member districts (CV)
would itself automatically raise turnout. But FPTP is impli-
cated in many of the things that turn people off politics at Malta Mar’08 93.3% STV – 5 member, compensated
the moment – the safe seats that the campaign treats as ir- Belgium Jun’07 91.1% List PR – regional, compensated (CV)
relevant, the targeting of swing voters in marginal seats that
Luxembourg Jun’04 90.0% List PR – regional, open (CV)
makes all the parties sound alike even when they are not and
the adversarial posturing that goes on at and between elec- Cyprus May’06 89.0% List PR
tions. Reforming the voting system is a vital part of the proc- Chile Dec’05 87.7% List PR – two member districts
ess of reconnecting people and politics, but not sufficient of Denmark Feb’05 84.5% List PR – local, compensated
itself to achieve this aim. p
Turkey Jul’07 84.2% List PR – 10% threshold
Sweden Sep’06 82.0% List PR – local, compensated
Italy Apr’08 80.5% List PR – win bonus
Netherlands Nov’06 80.4% List PR – national
Germany Sep’05 77.7% MMP – national compensation
Norway Sep’06 77.1% List PR
South Africa Apr’04 76.7% List PR – half regional, half national
Spain Mar’08 75.3% List PR – local, uncompensated
Austria Oct’06 74.2% List PR – regional, compensated
Greece Mar’07 74.1% List PR – win bonus, open
Japan Sep’05 67.5% MMM – Regional PR seats
Ireland May’07 67.0% STV – 3’5 member
Finland Mar’07 65.0% List PR – regional, open
Portugal Feb’05 65.0% List PR – regional, closed
Canada Jan’06 64.7% FPTP – Single member districts
Czech Republic Jun’06 64.5% List PR
Hungary Apr’06 64.4% MMP’ two rounds, national PR
New Zealand Sep’05 61.6% MMP – national compensation
UK May’05 61.3% FPTP – Single member
France Jun’07 60.4% Two ballot, single member
Poland Oct’07 53.9% List PR
USA Nov’06 36.8% FPTP – Single member districts
(CV) Compulsory voting
 7
Myth: PR creates Myth 7 27

weak coalitions.
Reality: The
most unstable
governments
are often those
governments Single party governments can exist under proportional rep-

with a small, resentation – all that is required is for a party to command

wide support among the electorate. In Greece and Spain the
normal pattern has been for single party government despite

or no, overall PR. In Ireland Fianna Fáil fell just short of a majority in 2002
– largely because the electorate wanted to return it to power

majority that
but did not trust it with an overall majority.
In many countries, even with highly proportional systems, sta-
ble coalitions are formed which alternate in government. In

FPTP throws up. recent elections in Norway and Sweden centre-right and left
alliances have exchanged power in clear cut election results.
The most unstable governments are often those govern-
ments with a small, or no, overall majority that FPTP throws
up – as in Britain in 1974-79 and 1992-97, and frequently
in Canada. These governments tend to be threatened as
much by their own backbenchers as minority parties, and
are forced into short term calculations in the hope of hang-
ing on or calling another election to win a majority. FPTP in
Britain is increasingly likely to produce such weak periods of
government, but without the accompanying change in po-
litical culture that enables mature and effective coalition or
minority government. Changing to a situation where coalition
is regarded as normal rather than a temporary aberration will
mean that politicians adapt accordingly.
In many parts of the UK that adaptation has already begun
and the UK Government’s own review of electoral systems re-
28 Myth 7 Myth 7 29

ported that “We do not find a difference between PR systems Minority Mandates
and FPTP in terms of delivering stable and effective govern- Votes cast for the government 1974-2005
ment” and that “In the experience of the UK, coalition govern- % of electorate voting for winning party
ments can be just as stable as single-party governments.”
It is usually a sign of underlying weakness when someone
continually boasts about their strength, and the same is true 100%
when discussing government under FPTP. How strong, real-
ly, can a government be with a popular mandate amounting
to just over 20 per cent of the electorate and 35 per cent of
those voting? British government is a minority legislating over 90%
the heads of a majority. It is a recipe for ill-considered legisla-
tion, abrupt reversals in policy and weakness in the face of
entrenched interests. True strength and lasting achievement 80%
in government depends on commanding popular consent. p

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%
Conservative

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
Labour

Labour

Labour

Labour
10%

0 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005

(OCT)
 8
Myth: PR lets in Myth 8 31

extremist parties.
Reality: It is only
in FPTP that there
is the possibility
of having
representation PR represents parties that achieve a reasonable share of the

monopolised vote (ranging from 0.7 per cent support in the Netherlands
to 10 per cent in Turkey). If people vote in sufficient
numbers for a party under PR, their voice will be heard.

by an extremist This applies to small parties with democratic values and

something to contribute, such as the Greens, but also to

party.
extremist parties.
Under some circumstances FPTP can also let extremist par-
ties in. What, after all, has happened in local government
in Barking, Stoke-on-Trent, Burnley and other urban areas
under FPTP? Under FPTP a party can win seats by exploit-
ing local grievances in a small area rather than trying for a
broader appeal.
There is a vital difference between representation and con-
trol. While obnoxious parties can get represented under PR,
it is virtually impossible for them to gain control; even in
March 1933 the Nazi party did not obtain an overall majority
in the German Reichstag.
It is only in FPTP that there is the possibility of having one’s
representation monopolised by an extremist party. The Brit-
ish National Party (BNP) has all the borough council seats in
part of Burnley despite nowhere near a majority of the vote –
where can residents there turn if they do not like that party?
Voting for extremist parties is often a sign not so much of
massive popular support for their values as an indicator that
voters want to make a protest against the political system.
32 Myth 8 Myth 8 33

Designing a system (like FPTP) to make sure that these votes

are wasted is only likely to increase cynicism about politics
Winning representation is often a step towards political de-
feat for extremist parties. The public scrutiny that comes
with being in office quickly exposes the inadequacy of their
politicians and policies. Once the threat has been seen off
the electorate are more wary of parties that offer easy an-
swers in future.
Not all forms of PR are equally susceptible to electing splin-
ter and extreme parties. Most have some sort of threshold
to stop tiny parties winning. Because voters rank candidates
in order of preference under STV, people can choose to use
their lower preferences to help other democratic candidates
defeat anti-democratic candidates. p
 9
Myth: The STV Myth 9 35

form of PR is bad
for party cohesion
and therefore
government.
Reality: Many
voters would not The Single Transferable Vote, in particular, has been accused

feel that it is a of leading to bad government because it weakens parties

internally. The reason is that STV often involves candidates
of the same party fighting a seat, with the hope that each

bad thing that will be elected but always with the possibility that one or
more might not make it. Election campaigns are sometimes

candidates are
as much a battle within as between parties. Parties also lose
some control over their representatives, because it is easier
for them to fight and hold their seats as independents if dis-

more dependent
ciplined by the party.
The evidence varies from place to place. Party discipline is

on their local base

fairly relaxed in Ireland but in Australia and Malta STV coexists
with extremely disciplined political parties. Whether this means
worse government than FPTP (or other forms of PR) is another

than the approval question. While one would not wish to defend every aspect of
Irish government, the Republic has run a successful economic
and social policy for some time while being highly accountable

of head office. to the electorate. There are also incentives for parties to avoid
disunity, as divided parties are unattractive to voters regardless
of how much their representatives do locally.
Many voters would not feel that it is a bad thing that can-
didates are freer to defy party instructions and more de-
pendent on their local base than the approval of head office.
Politicians are less inclined to pursue policies that go further
than, or run contrary to, their voters’ views than they are un-
der unrepresentative electoral systems. Giving voters more
choice sometimes does produce results that politicians find
inconvenient, but that is what democracy is all about. p
 10
Myth: PR caused Myth 10 37

the problems in
the 2007 Scottish
elections.
Reality: Bad
ballot design can
happen under The independent Gould report into the problems with the

any system. Scottish elections in May 2007 exploded the myths about a
link between PR and spoiled ballots.
The main cause of the problem was the redesign of the bal-
lot for the Scottish Parliament elections in which the regional
and constituency votes were combined on one paper. Rates
of spoilage had been very low (below 1 per cent) in Scotland in
previous elections when separate papers were used. In other
countries using similar systems, like Wales, New Zealand and
Germany, spoilage is also much lower than it was in Scotland
in 2007, consistently below 1.5 per cent. A sudden change, as
in Scotland in 2007, cannot be explained by a constant factor
like having a PR electoral system. Nor was spoilage much of
an issue in the local government elections that did use a new
system, STV – the electorate coped with it very well.
Bad FPTP ballot design caused ‘hanging chads’ and votes
cast in error thanks to the Palm Beach ‘butterfly ballot’ in
the notorious 2000 US Presidential election in Florida. Bad
design can happen under any system.
The rate of rejected votes in Scotland in 2007 is a very poor
argument against a fairer electoral system. p
ERSQuickGuides

PR
Myths

“No political issue attracts more fallacious arguments than

proportional representation. Perhaps the most foolish one is
that a proportional system would be too difficult for the voters
to understand. The implication must be that English voters
are the most stupid in Europe.” Professor Vernon Bogdanor
Imagine a country with voting so complex that no one really
understands it;  where small parties rule the roost; a coun-
try plagued by extremism, lacking strong government or any
meaningful connection to the voters. 
Critics have conjured up a nightmare vision of Britain under
proportional representation. Yet the increasing body of evi-
dence and the Government’s own research has proved many
of these fears groundless. So as the flaws in first-past-the-
post politics become ever more obvious, it’s time to set the
record straight – and separate the facts from the fiction. 

Thomas Hare House

6 Chancel Street
London SE1 0UU
[Link]
Telephone
020 7928 1622
Fax
020 7401 7789
Email
ers@[Link]

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0 903291 41 X
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