Nordic Journal of African Studies 10(3): 299-319 (2001)

Chinyanja and the Language of Rights

HARRI ENGLUND
The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden

ABSTRACT
Discourses on human rights are among the most enduring consequences of the wave of
democratisation that swept across sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s. The rights-talk is
spread by, among others, non-governmental organisations that consider civic education on
rights as one of their major tasks. This article examines the case of Chinyanja in order to
highlight challenges in the attempts to translate the rights-talk into vernacular languages. In
Chinyanja, human rights are translated as ufulu wachibadwidwe wa munthu, literally the
freedom that the person is born with. In the context of persistent poverty and insecurity
among many Chinyanja-speakers, such a translation appears to feed reactionary counterdiscourses that criticise democracy for bringing too much freedom. The article discusses
theoretical problems in translation, particularly the question of linguistic relativity, and argues
that translation is best seen as conversation with existing notions. By exploring the notion of
interdependence in Chinyanja proverbs, the article finally demonstrates how extreme
individualism and conservative counter-discourses do not have to constitute the only
alternatives in Chinyanja debates on rights and democracy.
Keywords: Chinyanja, human rights, democracy, proverbs

INTRODUCTION
The wave of democratisation that swept across sub-Saharan Africa in the early
1990s, bringing multiparty politics in its wake, has had some enduring
consequences despite widespread concern over its depth and sustainability.
Much has changed at the level of discourse, if not always in practice. The
making of claims, often asserting various rights, has become vociferous in
tandem with a perceived freedom of expression and association. However
precarious their achievements are, the organisations, groups and individuals
promoting and claiming rights are in many countries the most visible custodians
of the new pluralism in sub-Saharan Africa. A new public discourse has
emerged, its liberal tenets shared by virtually all politicians and nongovernmental organisations. This discourse, if shared, does not entail consensus.
On the contrary, what is shared is a certain world-view in which subjects are
rights-bearing groups and individuals, all engaged in perpetual struggles to
claim their rights in society. As rights-talk (Adams 1997; Dembour 1996), the
new pluralist discourse depends on particular linguistic strategies in order to be
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While there is every reason to celebrate, and to consolidate, the deliverance
of many African polities from the iron rule of autocratic leaders, the current
discourse on rights must not be taken for granted. One fundamental issue is
whether the rights-talk, based on liberal tenets, can ever address effectively
social and economic injustices that are structural and historical; whether, in fact,
the rights-talk merely claims shares in an ultimately unequal distribution of
welfare without confronting the structural causes of inequality. Another
important issue to be researched further is the emergence of counter-discourses
in political pluralism. Some of these alternative discourses are reactionary and
yet products of the rights-talk itself. For example, it has been observed that the
introduction of human rights as a modern and civilised phenomenon has
produced assertions of valued traditions and cultures. Culture-talk
opposes rights-talk while both are in fact elements of the same contemporary
situation and reinforce each other (see Mamdani 2000).
This observation raises another fundamental issue in understanding rights
and democratisation in countries emerging from autocratic rule. The issue is
how rights, as discursively imagined objects of thought, are introduced to the
populace in these countries. In sub-Saharan Africa, this inevitably leads to ask
how rights are translated, because many are dependent on vernacular languages
in communicating their grievances. Culturally insensitive translations may
provoke reactionary counter-discourses and undermine popular participation in
the democratisation process. This article explores some of the theoretical issues
in the translation of rights, including the relation between language and worldview. Against the spurious notion that a transformation in world-view is indeed
necessary if comprehensive human rights are to be attained, this article also
considers certain proverbs for the light they shed on the issues of rights, value
and dignity. Proverbs deserve attention, because they have existed in society
longer than the rights-talk.
The concerns of this article arise from political and economic
transformations among the Chinyanja-speakers in Malawi and Mozambique
with whom I have been engaged in ethnographic research over the past ten
years.1 Although shaped by very different colonial and postcolonial regimes,
both countries came to embrace elements of liberal democracy during the 1990s.
Malawi remained under the conservative and oppressive rule of Life-President
Kamuzu Banda from its independence in 1964 until the multiparty elections in
1994, following a referendum in 1993 where the majority had rejected the one1

In Malawi, where Chinyanja is a national language, the official name of the language was
Chichewa from 1968 until 1999 (Nkhoma 1999: 210). Kamuzu Banda, the autocrat who was
ousted from power in 1994, is widely seen to have acted tribalistically when he ordered in
1968 that Chinyanja should be called Chichewa. Chewa was the ethnic identity which
received Bandas tacit approval as the core of Malawian culture (see Vail and White 1989).
Although there are people who consider themselves as Nyanja, Chinyanja is a trans-ethnic
language, its name referring to nyanja, lake, and to the peoples living in the region near
Lake Malawi. The language is also widely spoken in parts of Mozambique, and it is a lingua
franca in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, and in Zambias Eastern Province.
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party system of government (Phiri and Ross 1998). In 1994, Mozambique also
held multiparty elections, following a peace treaty in 1992 that had ended a
prolonged civil war (Hall and Young 1997). Both countries have since then
sustained multipartyism and civilian rule, with numerous non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), responding to aid donors call for good governance and
a vibrant civil society, playing their part in ensuring the flow of development
aid. One conspicuous section of these NGOs focuses on rights, from the most
encompassing human rights to more specific group rights. An important aspect
of their own understanding of their purpose is the need to educate and
sensitise the populace on rights, inevitably leading to attempts to translate the
discourse on rights into various vernacular languages.
In Chinyanja, human right is translated as ufulu wachibadwidwe wa
munthu. During my field studies, I have noticed that it is the notion of ufulu that
frequently causes controversy, with many claiming that democracy (dimokalase)
itself is problematic because of ufulu. The notion connotes freedom, the
Chinyanja monolingual dictionary explaining it as mwai wokhala momasuka,
mokondwa ndi mopanda mantha (a chance to live liberated, with happiness and
without fear; see Centre for Language Studies 2000: 345). The problem with this
translation of human rights may arise from the way in which freedom is defined
as wachibadwidwe wa munthu, the core here being the verb kubadwa, to be
born. Ufulu wachibadwidwe wa munthu is, therefore, freedom that a human
being is born with.
In both Malawi and Mozambique, the democratic reform has been followed
by a widespread sense of unfulfilled promises, with rampant poverty posing a
threat to public security (Englund 2001). This experience of insecurity among
the poor no less than the well-off is compounded by the way in which
politicians and NGOs seem to cherish ufulu as the essence of democracy. Many
of my interlocutors including both villagers and the urban poor have pointed
out that ufulu, when not restrained, has much in common with insolence
(chipongwe) and lack of respect (kusowa kwa ulemu). By insisting on such
freedom as a birth-right, human rights activists may inadvertently evoke their
own criticism. It is necessary, therefore, to pay close attention to the problem of
translation in the rights-talk, and to investigate how specific notions receive their
meaning in a particular language.

1. TRANSLATION AND WORLD-VIEW

The dominant discourse on human rights is universalist, vehemently opposing
the relativist argument that the preoccupation with human rights is a historically
and culturally specific phenomenon that is restricted to the West (see e.g.
Wilson 1997). Its universalism is predicated on the assumption of shared
humanity, a condition that cuts across all distinctions based on sex, age,
nationality, culture, religion, occupation, health, education, and so forth. The
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aim of this article is not to assess the truth of this view the fact that the
universalist discourse on human rights has been adopted by many Africans
themselves makes the pragmatic task of investigating its consequences much
more urgent. However, whether its universalism is warranted or not, it is
plausible to examine the tenets of the discourse as elements of a particular
world-view. After the Cold War, the discourse on human rights has gained new
momentum with the expansion of liberal democracy in the world. An emerging
critical scholarship on this trend argues that liberal democracy is not the end of
history, a technical and final solution to the ills of the humankind. Critical
attention is being devoted to liberal democracy as a cultural project in which
particular values, norms and practices are inculcated into ordinary citizens.
Crucial to the attendant world-view is a distinct notion of the human subject, a
notion that trumpet[s]the uncompromising autonomy of the individual,
rights-bearing, physically discrete, monied, market-driven, materially inviolate
(Comaroff and Comaroff 1999: 3).
In many sub-Saharan African countries, human rights activists confront,
therefore, the challenge to convey a new world-view to people who have long
experienced autocratic rule. In so far as the liberal world-view presumes that
human subjects are, or ought to be, autonomous individuals, the challenge may
seem formidable. African ethnography has demonstrated that numerous ritual
and mundane practices on the continent make the human subject a composite, a
relational being composed by various social and spiritual relationships (see
Riesman 1986). In this regard, African languages may not offer apt lexical and
idiomatic notions for the autonomous and discrete individual postulated by the
liberal world-view; not, at least, notions that would carry a positive value among
native speakers. The challenge for human rights activists is to either accept the
possibility of misunderstanding when they translate the rights-talk into
vernacular languages, or to devise neologisms. Both alternatives, it would seem,
require additional interventions, such as civic education, in order to be
successful.
My discussion carries, however, an assumption that must be made explicit.
Not only do I assume that the rights-talk represents a particular world-view; my
concern with the translation of this rights-talk also seems to assume a
correspondence between language and world-view. According to this
assumption, the speakers of particular languages are likely to subscribe to
particular world-views. Expressed in this way, the assumption is unvarnished
and in need of critical scrutiny. The idea, often associated with the thesis of
linguistic relativity, that language, thought and culture are inter-linked has
appeared in various philosophical and religious traditions for centuries (see
Gumperz and Levinson 2000: 3). In linguistics and anthropology, the thesis
came to be known as Sapir-Whorf hypothesis after Benjamin Whorfs initial
formulations in the early 1940s (Koerner 1992). This hypothesis came under
attack especially from the 1960s onwards, when cognitive science appeared to
permit the identification of universals even in linguistics (see e.g. Rosch 1977;
Lucy 1992). The highly technical approach of cognitive linguistics has had its
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common-sensical counterpart in the assertion that the relative ease with which
persons can learn new languages disproves the assumed correspondence
between language and thought.
The thesis of linguistic relativity, in its unvarnished form, is unambiguously
discredited, and a recent effort to revisit the debate admits, it would be
pointless to attempt to revive ideas about linguistic relativity in their original
form (Gumperz and Levinson 2000: 7). There are, however, salient issues in
the thesis that may inspire further research. An important pre-condition for
identifying these issues is the realisation that the original thesis may have been
mistaken in its focus on linguistic expressions in isolation, as if meanings were
lodged in lexicon and grammar. Recent developments in anthropological
linguistics, drawing upon the ethnographic approach, have shown that cognitive
science is not the only alternative to the discredited thesis. The salient issues of
variable meanings and the attendant challenges to translation can be readdressed when linguistic utterances are studied in context. Talk is embedded in
a framework of other activities, and it is through this framework that it becomes
meaningful (Goodwin and Duranti 1992: 17). Theories of use in context replace,
therefore, theories of context-free lexical and grammatical meaning (Gumperz
and Levinson 2000: 8).
One set of theoretical issues opens out as another disappears. Context is by
no means a self-evident notion, and major descriptive problems are raised when
it is analytically demarcated. For example, talk may presuppose context in order
to be meaningful, but talk also shapes context and provides a context for further
talk (Goodwin and Duranti 1992: 31). The demarcation of context is not an
empirical given; the decision on what constitutes enough context for a
particular phenomenon must be theoretically motivated (cf. Silverstein 1992).
The contextual meanings that the rights-talk assumes, moreover, bespeak
relations and contests of power that must be made explicit. Critical Discourse
Analysis an approach to the study of talk that has emphasised the importance
of political context has devoted insufficient attention to these issues and, as a
consequence, treated the political context as mere background (Blommaert
2001: 17). What Critical Discourse Analysis is expected to highlight and clarify
hidden power relations have already been given in its background
description of an unequal and asymmetric context in which linguistic events
take place.
Social and political context is, in other words, more than mere background to
discourse. More fruitful perspectives into translation are possible when
discourse and its social and political context are understood to constitute one
another social relations and political processes generate conditions for
discourse, but precisely because they are discursively imagined, they are also
generated by language. Conversation, in fact, provides a better metaphor than
textual translation for the problems of understanding between variable
discourses, because those discourses and their attendant world-views are
embedded in one continuous history (Plsson 1995). In this sense, it is no
wonder that differences in grammar and lexicon do not alone explain
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interpretive diversity and the consequent challenges to translation (cf. Gumperz
and Levinson 2000: 10). Idioms and other lexical items are embedded in a
dynamic field of social and political relations. If ufulu, for example, puts the
understanding of human rights in peril and provokes reactionary counterdiscourses among contemporary Chinyanja-speakers, the explanation must not
be confined to the assumed unsuitability of an isolated lexical item. The
question as to why this particular lexical item should be unsuitable must be
posed, its answers to be sought in an ethnographically and historically informed
analysis of Chinyanja-speakers social and political context.

2. RIGHTS AS FREEDOM
The above theoretical reflections indicate that even if it is plausible to equate the
tenets of liberal human rights discourse with a particular world-view, difficulties
in translating that discourse do not inhere in grammatical and lexical differences
which would signify incompatible discrepancies in the way that languages
structure perception and thought. In so far as problems of translation are
problems of conversation between different world-views, these problems must
be understood historically, in the context of changing social and political
relations. It is evident that ufulu, connoting freedom, came to be chosen as the
translation for rights as a result of a specific political history. Malawi,
reflecting the countrys prominence in standardising Chinyanja, spearheaded
this translation, and its intellectuals, activists and opposition politicians saw
democratisation precisely as a process of achieving freedom. Ufulu denoted
all those privileges and rights that Kamuzu Bandas government had denied for
the vast majority of the populace. A leaflet used in Malawian civic education,
for example, asks ufulu ndi chiani? (what is freedom?) and gives this answer:
ufulu ndi ngati chishango chokutetezani kwa boma kapena anthu ena (freedom
is like a shield which protects you against the government or other people). The
answer in English in this bilingual leaflet reads: Rights are like a shield that
you can hold up against the state, and sometimes against other people (see
CHRR n.d.a). Not only are rights misleadingly translated as ufulu, the
Chinyanja translation also lacks the qualifying can and sometimes of the English
version.2
Liberty may be a common ideal that inspires popular protests against
dictatorship everywhere in the world, but for Chinyanja-speakers its semantic
field has become an entrenched aspect of the post-authoritarian era. The
translation has established rights as freedom instead of defining specific
freedoms of expression, worship, and association, among others as rights,
2

Note also the difference in the titles of this bilingual and illustrated leaflet. In English, the
title is Simplified Graphical View of Human Rights in Malawi. In Chinyanja, it is Kufotokoza
za Ufulu wa Anthu, explaining the freedom of people a considerably more assertive and
sweeping title than its English counterpart.
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always controlled by other rights. This order of the rights-freedom interface is
highly consequential for the way in which the discourse on human rights has
come to be understood by Chinyanja-speakers.
Political history may explain how ufulu came to denote rights in
Chinyanja, but the ensuing controversies over its meaning can hardly be
understood without considering the qualifying wachibadwidwe wa munthu, that
which the person is born with, which apparently gives a Chinyanja definition
for human rights. As my discussion of Chinyanja proverbs later in this article
suggests, this translation is at variance with established Chinyanja notions of the
human subject. In order to appreciate the ways in which human rights NGOs and
activists have used this translation, it is necessary to begin by examining the
translations of key documents in this field. Human rights NGOs commonly
regard this translation work as crucial to their attempts to reach the grassroots
in sub-Saharan Africa. However, it appears that the work of translation has so
far been conducted in a rather haphazard manner, with little co-ordination
between NGOs and between the translators they use. In Malawi, NGOs appear
to put more effort into producing simplified English texts of legal documents
than into critically assessing their translations into Chinyanja and other
vernacular languages. NGOs often contract outsiders to provide the translations,
but the experts used is a diverse group of people, from secondary-school
teachers to qualified lawyers to professional linguists at the Centre for Language
Studies in the University of Malawi. While the University houses the most
competent linguists, NGOs show little consistency in enlisting its services, but
nor, on the other hand, is it obvious that its linguists have time for the kind of
research that the translation of a new discourse would require.3
In this article, my own translations of the Chinyanja translations used in the
human rights education and advocacy are not in idiomatic English, nor have I
always consulted the official English translations that provide the basis for the
Chinyanja translations. Instead, I try below to give a sense of how these
translations are likely to appear to Chinyanja-speakers themselves. Thus, for
example, The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, a document of the
Organisation of African Unity, is translated as Pangano la mu Afrika la Ufulu
Wachibadwidwe wa Anthu, the African agreement on the freedom with which
people are born (MHRRC n.d.a). United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights is translated as Ufulu Wachibadwidwe Wokhazikitsidwa ndi
Maiko, the freedom that the person is born with as established by the countries
(MHRRC n.d.b). United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child is
translated as Mgwirizano wa Malamulo pa Ufulu Wachibadwidwe wa Mwana,
an agreement on the rules (laws) on the freedom that the child is born with
(Unicef n.d.).
The notion of the human subject in these translations is that of an
autonomous, independent individual. For example, The African Charter on

On the Centre for Language Studies in Malawi, see Kamwendo (1999).

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Human and Peoples Rights defines an essential human being, stripped of his or
her social and cultural identities:
Munthu aliyense ali ndi ufulu mpanganoli mosayanganira mtundu
wake, khungu kaya ndi wamkazi kapena wamwamuna, mpingo, ndale
kapena maganizo ena, dziko kapena gulu limene akuchokera, chuma,
kobadwira kapena udindo uliwonse (MHRRC n.d.a: 3; every person has
freedom in this agreement disregarding his or her tribe, skin or whether
the person is a woman or a man, church, politics or other opinions,
country or group where he or she comes from, wealth, the place of birth
or any position).
The Declaration of the Rights of the Child conveys a similar sense of the human
subject:
Mwana aliyense ali ndi ufulu malinga ndi mfundo zimene
zakhazikitsidwa mu mgwirizano uno mopanda tsankho, mosayangana
mtundu wa mwanayo, maonekedwe a khungu, mkazi kapena mwamuna,
chilankhulo, chipembedzo, ndale kapena kusiyana maganizo, fuko,
kochokera, chuma, kulumala, chibadwidwe kapena mkhalidwe uliwonse
wa mwanayo, makolo, ena omulera ndi mmene aliri (Unicef n.d.: 3;
every child has freedom, according to this agreement, without
discrimination, disregarding the tribe of that child, the look of the skin,
female or male, language, religion, politics or differences in opinion,
clan, the place of origin, wealth, disability, a characteristic he or she was
born with or any habit of the child, parents, others who care for him or
her and how they are).
In accord with basic liberal views on the human subject, the autonomous
individual is in these definitions an abstraction, embodying essential humanity
that exists prior to all social relationships. This essential humanity is equated
with freedom, ufulu, and the ideas of what constitutes a child are especially
provoking for established Chinyanja notions of the human subject. According to
the translated human rights discourse, the child is a full human being, complete
with his or her individual freedom. The translation of the Declaration of the
Rights of the Child asserts that mwana ali ndi ufulu wolankhula maganizo ake
(Unicef n.d.: 7; the child has the freedom to speak out his or her opinions). A
leaflet entitled Kuzunza mwana (to harass a child), published by a Malawian
NGO in its series entitled Dziwani ufulu wanu (know your freedom), states
that kuzunza mwana ndi kumuonongera mwanayo ufulu wake wina womwe ndi
wofunikira kwa mwanayo mchikhalidwe chili chonse (CHRR n.d.b; to harass a
child is to destroy his or her freedom which is important to the child in every
culture). My discussion later in this article on established Chinyanja notions of
the human subject highlights the potential for miscommunication in these
translations.
Another way of exploring the notion of the human subject in the Chinyanja
translations of the human rights discourse is by considering how the limits to
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individual sovereignty are expressed. The translation of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples Rights contains a section entitled Udindo, duty
(MHRRC n.d.a: 11). It states that munthu aliyense ayenera kugwiritsa ntchito
ufulu wake popanda kusokoneza ufulu wa ena (MHRRC n.d.a: 11; every
person must exercise his or her freedom without confusing the freedom of
others). The translation of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child also states
that
Ufulu uli ndi malire, koma malirewa angakhazikitsidwe pokhapokha
malamulo atero ndipo ndi wofunikira pofuna: a) kulemekeza ufulu
wachibadwidwe kapena mbiri ya anthu ena; kapena b) kuteteza dziko,
kukhazikitsa bata, kapena ndi umoyo wa anthu (Unicef n.d.: 7; freedom
has a limit, but this limit should be established only when the laws so
demand, and when it is necessary to a) honour the freedom that other
people are born with or their reputation, or b) to protect the country, to
establish calm or well-being among people).
According to these translations, freedom is the ultimate value, and its
infringements are permissible only in so far as their exercise threatens the
freedom of other autonomous individuals. Significantly, when this translated
human rights discourse draws upon such salient Chinyanja notions as ulemu
(respect), kulemekeza (to honour), and umunthu (humanity), they are also
represented as properties of autonomous individuals. For example, the
translation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights stipulates that
munthu aliyense ali ndi ufulu wopatsidwa ulemu pa umunthu wake ndi mphamvu
ya chilamulo (MHRRC n.d.a: 4; every person has the freedom to be given
respect for his or her humanity by the power of law). A leaflet from a
Malawian NGO also insists that inu monga munthu, muyenera kulandira ulemu
wa umunthu. Choncho boma ndiponso anthu ena ayenera kulemekeza ufulu wa
munthu alieyense (CHRR n.d.a; as a human being, you must receive respect for
humanity. Thus the government and other people must honour every human
beings freedom). Missing in these translations is, on the one hand, a notion of
rights in the plural, with some rights taking precedence over others, thereby
constraining and qualifying abstract freedom. The translation of rights as
freedom, on the other hand, also fails to acknowledge humanity as a social
condition in which fundamental moral sentiments bind persons together and
oblige them to show mutual respect. Such an obligation is likely to arise less
from an individuals claim to freedom than from his or her experience as a social
being who is related to others.
In the light of such unfortunate translations, miscommunication and
misunderstanding, feeding conservative counter-discourses, are virtually
inevitable. Among Chinyanja-speakers, a major counter-discourse against the
rights-talk revolves around a perceived conflict between youths and elders. For
instance, when some school children in Malawi took advantage of the festivities
during the National Education Day in 2001 by consuming alcohol, their teachers
referred to the excessive freedom that democracy had brought to the country.
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One teacher is reported to have commented rather despairingly, There is just
too much freedom in this country. If we discipline them [school children] they
will take us to court and we will be the losers.4

3. DISCOURSES FOR AND AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS

The Chinyanja translations of the human rights discourse are ubiquitous in
Malawi and parts of Mozambique and Zambia. Together with the discourse on
HIV-AIDS, the discourse on human rights is cherished by aid donors and ruling
politicians as a persuasive index of change in these countries; the more there
is talk about HIV-AIDS and rights, it is assumed, the more open and democratic
is the society. The difficulties of urban-based human rights NGOs to reach the
rural grassroots are compensated by the fact that the human rights discourse is
also spread by radio programmes and other forms of mass communication, by
religious leaders, politicians and development workers speeches, and, perhaps
most significantly in rural areas, by the current school curriculum. Both primary
and secondary schools provide lessons that introduce pupils to the discourse.
These lessons are not only part of Social Studies, they are also included in the
study of various other subjects, such as languages. Textbooks on Chinyanja,
which is a compulsory subject in schools that follow the Malawian curriculum,
contain chapters on ufulu wachibadwidwe wa munthu in both primary and
secondary schools. The following abbreviated extract from a Chinyanja textbook
for Form 1, the first year in secondary school, is an illuminating example of how
pupils are taught to grapple with this discourse. The story is entitled Moyo wa
anyamata ndi atsikana amakono (the life of boys and girls nowadays) and
presents a conversation between three men.5
Inu a Chakamba, ine moyo wa anyamata ndi atsikana athu a masiku
anowa ukundidabwitsa, adatero a Chakhala pokamba ndi a Chakamba
uku akusasa fumbi kumbuyo kwa buluku lawo.
Mwatero a Chakhala, mukudabwa nawo bwanji moyo wa anyamata ndi
atsikana amenewa?, adafunsa motero a Chakamba.
Masiku ano mtsikana kapena mnyamata ukamulangiza kuti
asamabwere mochedwa pakhomo la makolo ake chifukwa choti kunja
kuno kwaopsa, mumadziwa momwe amayankhira?, a Chakhala
adafunsa motero.
Ayi ndithu ambwana, amati chiyani?, adatero a Chakamba poyankha.

Quoted in Drink mars Schools Day, The Nation (Blantyre), 20 July, 2001.
In the interest of brevity, I have left out sections that describe the enviroment and other
aspects that are not germane to the conversation on human rights. As before, my translation
into English is not idiomatic but a rendering of the senses in which the story is most likely to
be understood by Chinyanja-speakers.

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Aa! Koma inu muchita ngati simukukhala mdziko mwathu momwe
muno. Bwanji mufuna kundikambitsa mbwerera. Inu simudziwa kuti
achinyamata athuwa masiku ano ukawalangiza kuti akule ndi moyo
wabwino kuti tsogolo lawo lidzakhale labwino, poyankha amangoti, Izo
ndi zanu ine ndili ndi ufulu wanga wachibadwidwe woti ndingathe
kuchita zomwe ndifuna. Ngati inu makolo anu amakuuzani zimenezi
kalelo lidali vuto lanu. Kodi ufulu wachibadwidwe utanthauza
kusamvera makolo ako omwe adakubala?, adatero a Chakhala
pokambirana ndi anzawo aja.
Ndipo inu a Chakhala mwangotokosa pa chilonda chomwe
chikundivuta ine tsiku ndi tsiku. Vuto lomwe ndili nalo ine ndi limeneli.
Anyamata anga awiri aja, safuna kumwera zomwe ine ndi mayi wawo
timawalangiza, a Chakamba adadandaula motero. Pano ndinenepa
anyamata amenewa sikuti ali kunyumbaku ayi. Wawo ndi mowa ndi
fodya wanadzeradzera wadzayu basi.
Vuto lalikulu lomwe ana athu ali nalo tsopano ndi loti amaganiza kuti
miyambo ya makolo athu ija yomwe yatithandiza ife kuti tikule ndi moyo
wabwino ndi kufika misinkhu yathu ino iwo alibe nayo ntchito. Amati iwo
tsopano ali ndi ufulu wonse wachibadwidwe wochita zomwe afuna
popanda wina owaletsa, adatero a Chakhala mkudandaula kwawo.
Aa! Moti amaganiza kuti kuba katundu, kupha anthu ena kapena
kusutha fodya kapena kumwa mankhwala ozeledzeretsa munthu, monga
achitiramu ndi ufulu wachibadwidwe?, adafunsa motero a Chakamba
akupukusa mutu wawo.
Ndi chonchitu ambwana, a Chakhala adavomereza mwamtheradi.
Ayi, si zoona izi a Chakhala, a Chikadza adadula pakamwa a
Chakhala motero.
Ine ndaonadi kuti mukuunthama pachipande akuluakulu inu, adatero
a Chikadza poyamba kufotokoza kwawo. Akati ufulu wachibadwidwe
sikutanthauza kuchita zoipa zokhazokha ayi. Komanso ufulu
wachibadwidwe siukhalira anyamata ndi atsikana okha ayi. Umakhalira
ife tonse. Ufulu wachibadwidwe utanthauza kuti munthu aliyense, kaya
ndi mwana kapena wamkulu, mtsikana kapena mnyamata, mayi kapena
bambo, ali ndi ufulu wakewake wochita zinthu zomwe mtima wake
ulakalaka mosamkakamiza ayi. Pa nkhani yokakamizayi, ife amuna
ndiye timanyanyira kukamiza amayi kapena ana kuchita zinthu zomwe
iwo eni safuna kuchita.
Tsono mawu ali mkamwa mwanu a Chikadza mukateronso ndiye
mwakamba zinthu zosagwirizana ndi nkhani yomwe ine ndi a
Chakambawa timadandaula yokhudza mavuto omwe tikukumana nawo
ochekera kwa ana athuwa, a Chakhala adawalongosolera motero a
Chikadza.
A Chakadza adanetsa nati, Nkhanizi ndi zogwirizana pagona nkhani
yonse ndi pomkakamiza mwana, mayi kapenanso bambo, kuchita
chinthu china chilichonse chomwe iye mwini sakufuna kuchita. Taonani
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mumati munachoka panyumba panu kupita kuntchuwa chifukwa choti
simumafuna kuti akazi anu akusiyireni mphika woti muzisonkhezera
moto. Nanga pamenepa inu simunaonetsa ufulu wanu wachibadwidwe?,
adafunsa motero a Chakadza uku akumwetulira.
Iyo ndi ntchito yachikazi mukunena apa, inu a Chakadza. Ife tikunena
za vuto la ana athu masiku ano losasamalira miyambo ya makolo athu
yomwe ndi yaphindu, a Chakamba adafotokoza motero.
Mukanena kuti ntchito yachikazi a Chakamba, ndiye chifukwa chake
tikugwiritsa amayi, amuna, anyamata ndi atsikana ntchito yolemetsa
pamene ife abambo tikugwira ntchito yopepuka. Kodi sikuwakaniza
anthu ena ufulu wawo wachibadwidwe uku wogwira ntchito yolingana
ndi mphamvu zawo?, adafunsanso a Chikadza.
A Chakhala powayankha adati, Nanga imeneyo ndi nkhani? Tsono
mumati ana anu angathe kuphunzira bwanji ntchito zapakhomo kuti
asadzakuchititseni manyazi akadzalowa mbanja?
Kodi inu a Chakhala, kukakamiza mwana wamngono kukagwira
ntchito ya tikiti kwa anthu ena mmalo momtumiza kusukulu kuti mwana
uja aphunzire kapenanso kuwakakamiza ana kuti atsate miyambo
yopanda phindu pamene eni ake sakufuna, sikuwalanda ana amenwa
ufulu wawo wachibadwidwe?, adatero a Chikadza posavomereza
zomwe adakamba anzawo.
Ambana, ine ndiye ndafika pachigono panga. Nkhani imeneyi
tidzailondoloze bwinobwino mawa kuntchuwa tikabwera kutsosa. Ine
ndikuona kuti enafe sitimvetsetsa bwino tikati anthu onse akhale ndi
ufulu wawo wachibadwidwe. Ineyo ngati bambo ndikuona kuti ana
pamodzi ndi akazi athuwa amatilandanso ufulu wathu wachibadwidwe
wotha kusankha choti tiwachitire, a Chakhala adatero pomaliza.
(Chilora and Kathewera 2000: 170-172.)
You Chakamba, the life of boys and girls puzzles me nowadays, said
Chakhala when he was talking with Chakamba and wiping dust from the
back of his trousers.
Is that so Chakhala, how does the life of those boys and girls puzzle
you?, asked Chakamba.
These days when you advise a girl or a boy that they should not come
home late at night because it is not safe outside after dark, do you know
how they answer to you?, Chakhala asked.
Not really, what do they say?, Chakamba said in reply.
Ha! You are as if you did not live in this country of ours. Dont you
know that when you instruct our youths nowadays so that they grow up
with a good life and their future will be good, in return they just say, I
have my freedom I was born with and I can do what I want. If your
parents told you those things in the past, that is your own problem. Does
the freedom that the person is born with mean that one does not obey the
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parents who gave birth to oneself?, Chakhala said while talking with his
friend.
Now you Chakhala have touched on my sore spot. The problem that I
have is precisely this. Those two boys whom I have do not want to listen
to what I and their mother want to tell them, Chakamba bemoaned.
Even now when I am speaking, the boys are not at home. Their life is
only in drinking and smoking.
A big problem which our children have these days is that they think that
our ancestral customs are useless, although those customs helped us to
grow with a good life to reach the stage where we are now. Youngsters
say that they have all the freedom they were born with to do what they
want without anyone preventing them, Chakhala complained.
Ha! Indeed do they think that stealing, killing other people or smoking
or drinking alcohol are all freedom that they were born with?,
Chakamba asked, shaking his head.
Thats how it is, Chakhala admitted knowingly.
No, it is not true, Chakhala, Chikadza cut short what Chakhala was
saying.
I feel that you elders are telling lies, Chikadza said, beginning his own
explanation. The freedom that the person is born with does not mean
doing only bad things. Nor does the freedom that the person is born with
belong to boys and girls only. It belongs to us all. The freedom that the
person is born with means that every person, whether a child or an adult,
a girl or a boy, a woman or a man, has their own freedom to do what they
desire without anyone forcing them. We as men force women and
children to do what they do not want to do.
What you are saying now, Chikadza, does not agree with what I and
Chakamba are complaining about the problems with our children which
we face, Chakhala explained to Chikadza.
Chakadza continued to say that what I am saying concerns all those
instances in which a child, a woman or a man is forced to do what the
person in question does not want to do. For example, you leave your
house to play ntchuwa, because you do not want your wife to give you
the task of taking care of cooking. By so doing, dont you display your
freedom that you were born with?, Chikadza asked, smiling.
What you are talking about is womens work, Chikadza. We are talking
about our childrens difficulty to look after the ancestral customs which
are beneficial, Chakamba explained.
When you say womens work, Chakamba, you give an excuse for us to
make women, young men, boys and girls do heavy work while we
grown-up men perform light work. Is that not denying others their
freedom that they were born with to do work according to their
abilities?, Chikadza asked again.

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Chakala answered, Is there a problem? How can your children learn
domestic chores in order to prevent you from being embarrassed when
they found their own families?
You Chakhala, to force a young child to have a job instead of sending
him or her to school to learn, or to force him or her to follow customs
which are not beneficial while the child does not want them, is it not to
steal the childs freedom that he or she was born with?, Chikadza said
without consenting to what his friend said.
My friends, I have had enough. Well discuss this issue carefully
tomorrow at ntchuwa. It seems to me that some of us do not understand
when we say that everyone should have his or her freedom that they were
born with. I as a man think that children together with our wives also
steal our freedom that we were born with to choose what we want to do
for them, Chakhala said in the end.
This text is followed by a number of questions and exercises which ask the
pupils to reflect on the arguments in the story from different angles. For
example, after making the pupils describe Chakhalas and Chikadzas
contrasting perspectives, the textbook requests them to reflect on the question
nanga inu muganiza kuti ana amawalandanso bwanji makolo awo ufulu
wachibadwidwe wawo? (Chilora and Kathewera 2000: 172; do you think that
children also steal the freedom that their parents were born with?). This lesson
in Chinyanja also expects that the pupils hold debates and write essays on the
issues raised in the story. In debates, one group (gulu limodzi) is asked to
agree with the statement abambo masiku ano ana ndi akazi awo akuwalanda
ufulu wachibadwidwe powakakamiza kuchita zomwe safuna (Chilora and
Kathewera 2000: 173; nowadays men steal the freedom that their children and
wives were born with by forcing them to do what they do not want to do),
while another group (gulu lina) is asked to argue against this statement.
The textbook story is a rich and, according to my field experiences, realistic
account of the current Chinyanja discourses for and against ufulu
wachibadwidwe wa munthu. It illustrates a major conflict that many Chinyanjaspeakers consider as integral to the discourse on human rights - the conflict
between elders (akuluakulu) and youths (achinyamata). The protagonists in
the text associate elders with ancestral customs (miyambo ya makolo) and
youths with ufulu wachibadwidwe. On the basis of his own experience,
Chakhala bemoans the way in which youths appeal to the discourse on ufulu
wachibadwidwe when they refuse to obey their parents and claim, emboldened
by the freedom that the new discourse appears to promise, I can do what I
want (ndingathe kuchita zomwe ndifuna). Chakamba articulates the sinister side
of the new discourse when he refers to killing, stealing and drunkenness as
corollaries of ufulu wachibadwidwe. Chikadza is left with the task of defending
the new discourse against the two mens misconceptions. He insists that both
elders and youths are included in the notion of ufulu wachibadwidwe and that
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some individuals, especially women and children, are subjected to abuse that
makes the new discourse indispensable.
It is crucial to observe that ufulu wachibadwidwe is not the only new
discourse in this exchange of opinions. Its opponents also have to define such
notions as miyambo ya makolo in novel ways in order to enter the debate in the
first place. In other words, ufulu wachibadwidwe does not only stimulate
positive discourse; it also defines a framework in which its critique can be
expressed. As such, the subtleties of Chakhalas view on the human subject are
easily lost when he finds himself forced to defend miyambo ya makolo against
arrogant youngsters, embroiled in a counter-discourse that is abstract rather than
subtle, conservative rather than innovative. Traces of subtlety in miyambo ya
makolo can be detected, for example, in Chakhalas view that these customs
enabled him and his peers to grow (kukula) and to reach our stage in life
(kufika misinkhu yathu). The customs are not, in this view, oppressive tools in
the hands of exploitative elders, but, on the contrary, means by which every
person becomes a responsible adult. The underlying assumption is that no one is
born as a complete person; one continues to grow in a moral sense even after
attaining physical maturity. Instructive is also Chakhalas reaction to Chikadzas
denial of gender differences in the work that persons can perform. Chakhalas
concern is not only whether a woman knows household work as an individual;
he asks, How can your children learn domestic chores in order to prevent you
from being embarrassed when they found their own families? A woman who
does not know her work, in Chakhalas view, causes embarrassment not only to
herself but also to those who are responsible for her growth as a person her
parents. The view, refusing to consider the woman as an autonomous individual,
calls into attention those relationships that gave birth to you (adakubala),
made one a person in the first place.
In the end, Chakhala is unable to counter ubale wachibadwidwe with these
subtleties. The power of the new discourse is such that it provides its own
critique. Chakhala notes, rather lamely, that elders ufulu wachibadwidwe is
stolen by their children when children choose what elders can do to them. He
yields, in other words, to the power of the new discourse, not by succumbing to
youths themselves but by adopting some elements of the discourse in order to
defend his interests. In this emerging counter-discourse, miyambo ya makolo are
likely to denote little more than abstractions, bearing meagre resemblance to
dynamic cultural practices, ever more alienated from the concerns and
aspirations of the 21st century youths. In this counter-discourse framed by the
translated human rights discourse, the freedom to practice and impose on
others miyambo ya makolo comes to define the ufulu wachibadwidwe of elders.
What was once a distinct notion of the human subject is now subsumed under
the individualism of the human rights discourse.

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4. THE PROVERBIAL PERSON

What are the prospects for Chinyanja-speakers to achieve consensus on the
meaning and value of human rights? Are they, as long as there are tangible
differences in interests, locked into an endless dispute that, in point of fact, is a
conversation of the deaf? My discussion above suggests that the current
translation of the human rights discourse, insisting on rights as freedom, is
indeed in the process of creating a distinct context for Chinyanja-speakers
arguments about rights. The process demonstrates how discourse, after emerging
in a political context in which freedom appeared as a paramount value, itself
becomes a context for further discourse and action. Ufulu wachibadwidwe has,
in other words, framed the scope of what Chinyanja-speakers are likely to
apprehend as politically possible. Is, therefore, their particular brand of
liberalism and its critique the end of history?
The answer would be affirmative only if particular discourses could exhaust
the potential of natural languages. Like any living language, Chinyanja is
versatile, offering vast linguistic resources for alternative world-views. The
critical question is not so much what are the limits of the language than what are
the historical conditions under which that language is put into use. Many
Chinyanja-speakers continue to subscribe to world-views that are difficult to
reconcile with the discourses for and against the rights-talk. The most obvious
examples are those religious world-views in which persons experience such
unity with their spiritual brothers and sisters that the autonomous individual of
the liberal rights-talk becomes a suspect proposition (see Englund 2000).
Somewhat similar notions of personhood are also apparent in more mundane
contexts of moral thought in Chinyanja. The continuing use of ageless proverbs
in both urban and rural areas gives evidence of the potential in Chinyanja to
offer linguistic resources that may help its speakers to counter the unfortunate
consequences of the rights-talk. Although proverbs are amenable to variable
uses and meanings according to the situation, a striking aspect of Chinyanja
proverbs is their view on the human subject. After the recent publication of
Chakanzas (2000) collection of over 2,000 Chinyanja proverbs, the opportunity
to explore the Chinyanja proverbial person has been greatly enhanced.6
This exploration can begin with a consideration of how the notion of ufulu
appears in Chinyanja proverbs. Chakanzas collection contains three proverbs
that explicitly focus on ufulu. One of them is ufulu wa ngombe wokweteza
mchira, the freedom of the cow to wag its tail, followed by the Chinyanja
explanation pali anthu amene amati akachitiridwa zabwino sathokoza, there
are people who are not grateful when something good is done to them.7 Ufulu is
6

My understanding of the proverbial person resonates with ethnographic observations on

everyday non-discursive practices among rural Chinyanja-speakers, especially with those
practices that sustain their livelihoods and kin-relationships (see Englund 1999).
7
Chakanzas collection is based on both his own field research and previously published
collections. Each proverb has an explanation in Chinyanja and a literal and idiomatic
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here associated with animal behaviour, the morally dubious state of simply
receiving without the requirement to reciprocate. Another proverb brings ufulu
to the human domain by stating the imperative of reciprocity: ufulu ubwezera
ufulu, freedom gives back freedom, explained as zabwino zimabwezera
zabwino, good things give back good things. The third proverb on ufulu is
even more explicit about the nature of ufulu as an acquired condition, as
opposed to something one is born with: ufulu nukhala nako, freedom is to have
something, explained as munthu wosauka sangathe kuchitira anthu ena za
ufulu, koma munthu wosasowa ndiye apatsa mwaufulu, a poor person cannot
freely do things to others, but a well-off person gives freely. These notions of
freedom are considerably less abstract than ufulu wachibadwidwe. They take
into account the fact of socio-economic differentiation, even inequality, and
point out that freedom is contingent upon human action. Only animals have
freedom as their birthright.
The accompanying view on the human subject stresses interdependence, not
simple dependence nor independence. This view is again expressed as a contrast
between humanity and animality in the proverb kali kokha nkanyama, tili tiwiri
ntianthu, what is by itself is a little animal, when we are two we are little
human beings. Human beings are, in other words, defined by their sociality,
and the limited moral and practical value of one is a recurrent theme in
Chinyanja proverbs. To cite but a few: chiswe chimodzi sichiumba chulu, one
termite does not mould an ant-hill; munthu satola kanthu ndi chala chimodzi,
a person does not lift anything with one finger; mutu umodzi susenza denga,
one head does not carry the roof; and, a proverb that is unlikely to endear
women and most Christians, mkazi mmodzi, diso limodzi; akazi awiri, maso
awiri, one wife, one eye; two wives, two eyes. These proverbs do not exclude
the possibility of the subject as an autonomous individual; they reveal the
practical and moral difficulties that follow from such a disposition.
Interdependence entails recognition of the relational production of distinct
entities. In simple terms, one exists and prospers by virtue of ones relation to
the other. Chinyanja proverbs assert, for example, that nkhokwe ilimba ndi
mphanda, the granary is firm on strong poles; nkhali ilira mafuwa, the
cooking pot needs supporting stones; and mtsinje wopanda miyala susunga
madzi, a stream without stones does not keep water. People are like the
granary, the cooking pot and the stream, all embedded in supportive
relationships. A similar insight is expressed by those proverbs that deplore
selfishness and audacity. They include, among many others, ine-ine,
sindimtenga, the one who says me-me, I wont take him; nzeru nzanga
adaphika nyemba zofumbwa, the one who trusted his or her own wisdom
cooked beans which were eaten by weevils; and kangakanga kanakanga,
translation into English, all presumably Chakanzas own contributions. I give here the
Chinyanja explanations as they appear in his collection, but most translations into English are
mine, again intended to capture the Chinyanja meanings rather than to produce idiomatic
English.
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insistence that this is mine failed. As the elaboration of the last proverb puts
it, munthu usamati izi nzanga ndekha, chifukwa tsiku lina ukadzapeza vuto,
udzasowa wokuthandiza, do not say this is mine alone, because one day you
will be in trouble and lack assistance. Reciprocity in times of trouble is a major
theme in Chinyanja proverbs; for example, mnzako akapsa ndevu, mzimire,
mawa adzazima zako, when your friends beard catches a fire, extinguish it for
him, because tomorrow he will extinguish the fire on yours; and maliro
nkulirana, to have a funeral is to weep together. Related through such
practical and moral imperatives, persons depend on one another to the extent
that, as one proverb states, posamba mfulu kapolo asambira pomwepo, where
the free person washes, the slave washes too. The elaboration of this rather
provocative proverb is munthu ukakhala pantchito, chomwe bwana wako
wapeza monga phindu, ndalama kaya ndi zida, nawenso umadyerera nawo,
ngakhale usanapemphe, when you are working, your masters profit makes you
eat more, even before you have asked for it.
Lest I am suspected of an unduly selective reading of the multifaceted corpus
of Chinyanja proverbs, it is necessary to consider also those proverbs that stress
the value of self-reliance. Dependence is no less deplorable than independence.
One proverb states that khasu liposa mako ndi tate wako, a hoe is more
important than your mother and father. This proverb is elaborated in the
statement munthu uyenera uzidzidalira wekha pa moyo wako pogwira ntchito,
you must help yourself in your life by working. Another proverb makes the
underlying moral sentiment explicit: munthu sakula pakamwini, akula pakake,
a person does not grow on someone elses resources but on ones own. Such
proverbs do not justify individualism, because they merely state the precondition for morally acceptable personhood. Persons are embedded in social
relationships, but they can be moral agents in those relationships only in so far
as they make the appropriate effort. Khasu lobwereka silikhala kuthyoka, a
borrowed hoe does not take long to break, outlines the need to possess
resources if this effort is to be successful. As mentioned above, ufulu nukhala
nako, freedom is to have something it is only by commanding the necessary
resources that a person can engage in moral behaviour and acknowledge the
fundamental interdependence of human subjects (cf. Englund 1999).

CONCLUSION
The extensive Chinyanja corpus of proverbs demonstrates considerable
linguistic resources for discourses on morality. Both the extreme individualism
of ufulu wachibadwidwe and its conservative critique can be countered by the
nuanced wisdom of the proverbial person. It is not their language that confines
Chinyanja-speakers to certain narrow-minded understandings of human rights,
prompting the need for civic education. The critical question is why the
translation of the rights-talk has not been more attentive to the subtleties of
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moral thought that Chinyanja offers. Why, for example, has little use been made
of proverbs, even though many human rights NGOs recognise the need to utilise
various techniques in conveying their messages to the grassroots, such as
drawings, drama and music? Neither of the two answers that suggest themselves
is particularly flattering to the advocates of human rights. On the one hand, the
neglect of proverbs and other existing linguistic resources may indicate
condescending attitudes towards vernacular languages among human rights
advocates, or sheer ignorance of their potential. On the other hand, if the full
implications of the proverbial person are appreciated, they may reveal more
problems in the dominant liberal view on the human subject than human rights
advocates care to contemplate. In any case, a natural language is not be blamed
for controversy and misunderstanding. After all, ufulu wachibadwidwe reveals
that Chinyanja can also be manipulated to produce an extremely individualistic
notion of the human subject.
In spite of the liberalisation of their politics and economies, Chinyanjaspeakers in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia continue to live under conditions
of poverty and fragile public security. Unfulfilled expectations feed discontent,
even conflict, and divergent interests are not, therefore, likely to become less
acute in society. Under such conditions, the translation of a potentially
emancipatory discourse is a precarious undertaking, bound to spark off more
controversy if it is not developed in conversation with existing notions. Rather
than to look for a correct translation in isolated lexical items, the case of
Chinyanja obliges us to establish a language of rights that accepts sociality as
intrinsic to the human subject.

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