UNCLASSIFIED

Generic SCADA Risk

Management Framework
For
Australian Critical Infrastructure
Developed by the
IT Security Expert
Advisory Group (ITSEAG)
(Revised March 2012)

Disclaimer: To the extent permitted by law, this document is provided without any liability
or warranty. Accordingly it is to be used only for the purposes specified and the reliability
of any assessment or evaluation arising from it are matters for the independent judgement
of users. This document is intended as a general guide only and users should seek
professional advice as to their specific risks and needs.

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Document Change History

Version

Change Description

1.0a

Initial version for internal review

1.0b

Incorporated internal review feedback

1.1

Final changes for ITSEAG presentation

1.2

Incorporated monitoring cycle into section 3.7.

2.0

Added preface and addressed final review comments.

2.1

Reviewed and updated to latest standards Dec 2011

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Table of Contents
1

2
3

5
6
7
8

Introduction............................................................................................................................
1.1
Background 5
1.2
Scope
5
1.3
Key Terms and Definitions 6
1.4
References 7
1.5
Acknowledgements 7
Tailoring the Risk Management Framework.........................................................................
Risk Management Methodology............................................................................................
3.1
Overview
9
3.2
Framework 9
3.3
Establish Context 11
3.4
Identify Risks
13
3.5
Analyse Risks
15
3.6
Evaluate Risk
17
3.7
Treat the Risk
18
3.8
Communication and Consultation 19
3.9
Monitor and Review 19
3.10
Risk Assessment Terms and Conventions
21
Generic SCADA Assets........................................................................................................
4.1
Generic SCADA Process Model
22
4.2
Generic SCADA Enablers - Example
23
Worked Example of Threat and Risk Assessment Framework.........................................
Example SCADA Threat and Risk Assessment..................................................................
Example SCADA Risk Treatment Plan (RTP)......................................................................
Presentation of Results to Senior Management................................................................
8.1
Overview
43
8.2
Sample Radar Chart
44
8.3
Sample Executive Summary Risk Status Table
44
Ongoing Monitoring and Review.........................................................................................
9.1
Overview
47
9.2
SRMF Reviews
47
9.3
Communicating Risk Exposures 48
9.4
Risk Assessment Updates 48

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Preface
SCADA systems have traditionally been viewed as being isolated and therefore
safe and less exposed to remote cyber attacks. Risk assessment and
management methodologies, correspondingly, have largely been directed at
legacy SCADA systems in which underlying protocols were designed without
modern security requirements in mind.
Business drivers for SCADA integration with enterprise management systems,
load management and smart grid environments has meant that SCADA
systems have become interconnected with corporate business networks,
customer premises and directly or indirectly with the Internet. This, together
with the rapid advancement of technology, shifting threat landscape and the
changing business environment, is increasing the exposure of SCADA systems
to network vulnerabilities and Internet security threats.
Recent incidents such as Aurora and Stuxnet demonstrate that a directed cyber
attack can cause physical harm to critical infrastructure. Traditional threat
sources have evolved to now include focused foreign nation cyber intrusions
and industrial espionage capabilities.
Such changes and attitudes require a new all hazards approach to risk
management one that takes into account Industrial Control Systems, IT,
Communications, physical security, supply chains and services and the
interconnection of SCADA systems with corporate, partner and service provider
networks and the Internet. Organisations are encouraged to foster a culture of
security for SCADA system management, operations and procedures.
The SCADA Community of Interest, an Information Technology Security Expert
Advisory Group1 (ITSEAG) working group, has identified risk management as a
key issue in maintaining continuity of business and in protecting Australias
critical infrastructure.

The ITSEAG is part of the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) for critical infrastructure
resilience which enables the owners and operators of critical infrastructure to share vital information on
security issues. The TISN consists of a number of Sector Groups (SGs) and Expert Advisory Groups
(EAGs) which are overseen by the Critical Infrastructure Advisory Council (CIAC). One of the expert
advisory groups is the ITSEAG providing advice to the TISN on IT security issues relating to critical
infrastructure. The ITSEAG consists of academic specialists, vendors and government representatives
who are leaders in the information technology/e-security field. More information on the TISN can be found
at [Link] For more information on the ITSEAG, please contact the Secretariat in the
Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE) on (02) 6271 1595 or
SCADA@[Link].

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The Generic SCADA Risk Management Framework (RMF) is a high-level

document that provides a cross-sector approach to identifying and assessing
risks for owners and operators of SCADA systems. The RMF can be tailored to
suit a particular sector or organisation and also contains advice on how
information security risks can be simplified, included in existing corporate risk
management frameworks and presented to senior management.

1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The Australian Government Critical Infrastructure Advisory Council (CIAC)
oversees a number of expert advisory and sector groups and advises the
Attorney Generals Department on matters associated with the national
approach to Critical Infrastructure Resilience (CIR).
Sector Groups (SGs), cover key industry sectors across Australia. The IT
Security Expert Advisory Group (ITSEAG) advises all SGs on IT Security
matters affecting all industry sectors.
This report has been commissioned via the ITSEAGs SCADA working group
that contributes to the TISN objective of enhancing the resilience of critical
infrastructure (CI) and systems of national importance by assisting with the
assessment and implementation of security for SCADA systems across
industry sectors.

1.2 Scope
The scope of this report is to detail an industry-wide framework whereby owners
and operators of key SCADA systems can assess security risk exposures
of these systems and implement security controls to mitigate and manage
these risk exposures within acceptable limits.
SCADA systems considered within the scope of the report comprise distributed
control systems designed to deliver essential and stabilising services
within the Australian economy.

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1.3 Key Terms and Definitions

Term
ISM 2012

DSD
All hazards approach
AV
BCP
COTS
DR
DRP
ITSEAG
NII
OS
PSPF

ISMP

QoS
SCADA
SRMS
TRA
RTP
Current risk exposure
Treated risk exposure
Controlled risk

Description
The Australian Government Information Security Manual
published by DSD containing minimum information security
standards for Commonwealth Government organisations and
often used as a reference by other Australian organisations.
ISM 2012 is available from DSD at:
[Link]
Defence Signals Directorate.
A risk assessment approach intended to identify generic risks
common to most, if not all, SCADA systems.
Antivirus.
Business Continuity Plan.
Commercial Off The Shelf a term used to describe software
and devices that can be purchased and integrated with little or
no customisation.
Disaster Recovery a component of business continuity
management.
Disaster Recovery Plan.
Information Technology Security Expert Advisory Group.
National Information Infrastructure.
Operating System.
Australian Government Protective Security Policy Framework
published by the Australian Attorney Generals Department
PSPF is available from AGD at:
[Link]
Australian Government Information Security Management
Protocols specify information security controls to be used in
Commonwealth Government organisations and often used as a
reference by other Australian organisations.
ISMP is available from AGD at:
Information Security Management Protocols
Quality of Service.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition.
SCADA Security Risk Management System.
Threat and Risk Assessment.
Risk Treatment Plan.
The level of risk associated with an asset before the application
of any risk mitigation measures.
The level of risk associated with an asset after the application of
risk mitigation measures.
Level of risk posed to system assets after specific/additional risk
mitigation controls are implemented to address current risk
exposure.

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Term
Residual risk

Description
Level of risk remaining after additional risk treatment.

1.4 References

International Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) Handbook

2008/2009.
ISM 2012 Australian Government Information Security Manual, Defence
Signals Directorate.
Defence Signals Directorate Top 35 Mitigations July 2011.
IEC 60870.1 Telecontrol Equipment and Systems General Considerations.
IEC 60870.5 101 to 104 Telecontrol Equipment and Systems Transmission
Protocols.
AS/NZS 31000:2009 Risk Management Principles and Guidelines, Standards
Australia.
ISO/IEC 27005:2011 Information Security Risk Management, Standards
Australia.
AS/NZS ISO/IEC 27001:2006 Information Security Management systems
requirements, Standards Australia.
AS/NZS ISO/IEC 27002:2006 Code of practice for information security
management, Standards Australia.
Australian Government Protective Security Policy Framework 2010, Attorney
Generals Department, June 2010.
Australian Government Information Security Management Protocols and
guidelines 2011, Attorney Generals Department, July 2011.
System Protection Profile Industrial Control Systems, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), Version 1.0.
The Cross-Sector Roadmap for Cyber Security of Control Systems, 30
September, 2011(developed by the Industrial Control Systems Joint Working
Group (ICSJWG), with facilitation by the US Department of Homeland Securitys
National Cybersecurity Division (NCSD)).

1.5 Acknowledgements
Saltbush would like to acknowledge those who contributed to the 2012 review of
this framework:

CERT Australia: Clint Felmingham

Water : Helen Foster

Energy : Andrew Tanner, Babu Srinivas, Rob Evans

Police : Barry Blundell, Tom Cleary

Transport : Darren Wolff

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DBCDE, SCADA CoI Secretariat: Chris Marsden, Peter Webb

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2 Tailoring the Risk Management Framework

When tailoring this Generic SCADA RMF to suit a particular sector or organisation,
the following points should be noted:

The framework has been developed to cover the basic functions of

a distributed SCADA system. Organisation and sector-specific risks will
need to be evaluated, and if necessary, incorporated into SCADA risk
management frameworks at the sector or organisational level.

Where organisations have existing Corporate Risk Management

and Security Frameworks in place it is important that this SCADA risk
framework aligns with the corporate frameworks to ensure organisational
consistency.

The definition of threat likelihood, consequence of risk realisation,

and the matrix in which risk is calculated at a National Information
Infrastructure level is given in Section 3.5 and Section 3.6. It is
recommended that organisations align these values to their internal
corporate risk parameters.

When establishing the context of any sector or organisational risk

management activities, Figure 3-2 should be assessed and possibly refined
as appropriate to the applicable sector or organisation this will also lead to
a re-evaluation and update of SCADA process enablers as shown in
Figures 3-2, 4-1 and Table 4-1.

Risks associated with external interdependencies such as an

incident impacting multiple organisations (for instance with supply chains
and business partners) should be considered.

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In accordance with the definitions in Section 3.4, the Current Risk columns in the
Section 6 TRA will need to be updated should these values be altered.
Treatment options in Section 7 (RTP) are in some cases opportunistic. A significant
goal of this RTP is to highlight the desirable requirements of a secure SCADA
system, and it is recommended that each of the RTP security controls be used
when determining the most appropriate information security configuration for a
secure SCADA system.
Finally, the determination of information security risk exposures, and the level to
which they are reported to senior management, often results in the confusion
of security issues with technical and operational details. Section 8 of this
framework suggests a mechanism by which such information can be
summarised and presented.

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3 Risk Management Methodology

3.1 Overview
The methodology is adopted for the generic SCADA risk management process
is detailed in the following subsections.
The methodology is compliant with recognised standards including

ISO/IEC 31000:2009 Risk Management Principles and Guidelines.

ISO/IEC 27005:2011 Information Security Risk Management.
ISO/IEC 27001:2006 Information Security Management Systems
Requirements.
ISO/IEC 27002:2006 Code of Practice for Information Security
Management.

Of note is that the risk management methodology encompasses an all hazards

approach to risk management for SCADA systems and can be used to
identify and analyse the risk exposures presented through a wide variety
of potential security vulnerabilities.

3.2 Framework
The RMF is based on traditional standards based risk management
frameworks, as described in ISO/IEC 31000 - Risk Management and
ISO/IEC 27005 Information Security Risk Management standards and
shown in the following figure.

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Figure 3-1 Risk Management Framework ISO 31000 and ISO27005

Establishment of the context for the Generic SCADA RMF involves defining the
framework scope and identifying the assets that are potentially at risk.
Identification, analysis and evaluation of risks together comprise the Threat &
Risk Assessment (TRA) component of the framework.
The risk treatment component comprises the development of a Risk Treatment
Plan to address the risk exposure to the assets identified in the threat and
risk assessment process.

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There are two Risk Decision points that ensure sufficient and accurate
information has been obtained or that another iteration of risk assessment
or risk treatment is initiated.
The risk acceptance activity ensures that residual risks are explicitly accepted
by the SCADA stakeholders and senior management of the organisation.
During the whole security risk management process it is important that
communication and consultation with stakeholders and operational staff
associated with the secure implementation and operation of the SCADA
system under consideration.
The monitor and review component of the process comprises the controls put in
place specifically to ensure that the Generic SCADA RMF operates
effectively over time.

3.3 Establish Context

The scope of the Generic SCADA RMF encompasses the core components of a
distributed SCADA network that would be expected to be found in the
majority of critical infrastructure service provider organisations.
This comprises the process components as shown in Figure 3-2.

Figure 3-2 Generic SCADA Processes

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The assets that are likely to be threatened can therefore be derived by

considering the enablers2 that allow the identified processes in Figure 3-2
to occur.
These enablers can be derived by identifying the people, the places, and the
products required to ensure the processes can be carried out.
Each enabler is owned. The owner is the responsible authority within
operational sections of the organisation for ensuring that mitigating
controls are appropriately implemented.
The typical authority responsible for the enablers is contained in the Owner
column; however each organisation using this guide ultimately determines
who the responsible authority is.
The owner and description should be modified to suit the positions in each
organisation.
Examples of typical owners:

Owner

Description

CEO

Chief Executive Officer Head of organisation

CIO

Chief Information Officer IT infrastructure and

architecture

HR

Human Resource Executive personnel and

contracting

SA

Security Advisor covering physical and

environmental enablers

ITSA

Information Technology Security Advisor covering

information security and logical access controls

CFO

Chief Financial Officer covering asset

purchasing/disposal and financial delegation

Senior Engineer

Senior Engineer Manager of technical services

Table 3-1 Owners of Enablers

Enablers are those assets that support the delivery of in-scope business processes

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Each organisation should identify their internal asset owners.

Section 4 of this framework identifies example generic enablers through the
analysis of the generic SCADA processes.

3.4 Identify Risks

Having identified the assets required to enable generic SCADA processing to
occur, the next activity is to identify the vulnerabilities to which each asset
is exposed.
Vulnerabilities to assets can be identified through consideration of the potential
threats, whether they are malicious, accidental, natural or environmental,
to the:

Confidentiality of systems and information;

Integrity of systems and information; and/or
Availability of systems.

3.4.1 Threat Sources

A threat is defined as an action perpetrated by a threat agent. While such
sources are often people, natural and environmental factors can also
contribute to the realisation of a threat. In addition, not all threat sources
will attempt to enact a threat with malicious intent.
The following subsections list the general categories for threat sources that may
lead to the realisation of a threat to the identified assets under
consideration.
Trusted Sources with Malicious Intent T1
Such sources comprise individuals or organisations with which the system
owner shares some level of trust, but wish to deliberately cause harm to
the in-scope control system.
Examples could include a disgruntled systems administrator or user, criminal
elements within a partner organisation such as a business peer, or a
subcontractor unhappy about the impending termination of their contract.
Trusted Sources without Malicious Intent T2

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Sources will generally be individuals or business partners with whom the

system owner shares some level of trust, but who unknowingly cause
harm to the in-scope system.
Examples could include an error by a control system administrator or user, a
business partner being unable to supply critical system services, or a
procedural operating error that leads to an undesirable system state or
inappropriate information disclosure.
External Sources with Malicious Intent T3
These sources are typically individuals or organisations that have a desire to
threaten the in-scope system, but do not share an implicit trust relationship
with the control system owner.
Examples could include industrial spies, hackers, activist groups, criminal
elements, foreign government agencies.
External Sources without Malicious Intent T4
Such sources will have neither an implied level of trust within the in-scope
assets nor the desire to cause harm to the system.
Examples could include users of communications infrastructure and suppliers of
services on which the control system indirectly depends.
Environmental T5
Such sources are usually disruptive natural events, or significant man-made
accidents such as an aircraft crash, or oil refinery explosion.
Examples could include fire, flood or storm and additionally the potential effect
on control system assets from dangerous goods (e.g. a nearby chemical
factory) and epidemics (bird flu, swine flu etc).

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3.5 Analyse Risks

Having identified vulnerabilities to assets, they should be analysed to determine
the assets current risk exposure with current controls in terms of:

Likelihood of occurrence; and

Consequence of realisation.

Each of these parameters is to be determined in accordance with appropriate

scales suited to the organisations internal risk management framework.
The scales used in this generic framework are shown in Tables 3-2 and 33, and correspond to those used by the Australian Government NII
agencies.
3.5.1 Likelihood of Occurrence Example
Likelihood
Descriptor
Almost Certain
Likely

Likelihood Description Statements

The event is EXPECTED to occur in most circumstances.
The event will PROBABLY occur in most circumstances and is
expected at some time.

Possible

The event MIGHT occur at some time but is not expected.

Unlikely

The event COULD occur at some time.

Rare

The event MAY occur in exceptional circumstances.

Table 3-2 Likelihood of Occurrence

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3.5.2 Consequence of Realisation - Example

Consequence
Descriptor

Catastrophic

Major

Moderate

Minor

Insignificant

Financial

Safety

Business
Productivity

Permanent
injuries/
deaths

Catastrophic impact on
operations

Possible loss
$16M - $40M

Permanent
injury /stress

Failure of one or more key

organisational objectives
leading to major disruption

Possible loss
$4M - $16M

Injury requiring
medical
treatment /
long term
incapacity.

No threat to achievement
of objectives but could
result in some moderate
disruption

Possible loss
>$40M

Possible loss
$1M - $4M

Possible loss
<$1M

Injury requiring
first aid treatment /
temporary loss of
time.
Injury resulting in
no loss of time

Reputation

Supply disrupted >

2,000,000 customers
Major Failure to entire
Grid
Black Start

Extended media
coverage; major
government
embarrassment or loss
of public support; public
enquiry
Removal of CEO

Loss of operating
licence or
directors/senior
management charged
and convicted

Heavy media coverage;

government
embarrassment or loss
of public support.

Inquest in to business
resulting in an
enforcement order fine
and court conviction

Customer comments
escalated to
management; minor
media coverage.

Likely fine or
prosecution.
Administrative
undertaking

Adverse customer
comments

Warning issued by
regulator

Manageable adverse
customer comments

No legal or regulatory
consequence.

Supply disrupted >

1,000,000 customers
Major Failure to parts of
the Grid

Supply disrupted >

200,000 customers
From a single event

Supply disrupted to <

Minor reduction in
1000 customers for less
effectiveness and
than 1 week
efficiency for a short period
Negligible impact to
effectiveness and
efficiency

Legal

Operational

Supply disrupted to <

100 customers for less
than 1 day

Regulatory

Table 3-3 Consequence of Realisation

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3.6 Evaluate Risk

3.6.1 Risk Matrix - Example
Current risk exposure, in terms of likelihood and consequence values, can be
determined using the risk matrix table below:
Consequence
Insignificant

Minor

Moderate

Major

Catastrophic

Low

Low

Low

Medium

Medium

Unlikely

Low

Medium

Medium

Medium

High

Possible

Low

Medium

High

High

High

Likely

Medium

Medium

High

High

Extreme

Almost
Certain

Medium

High

High

Extreme

Extreme

Likelihood

Rare

Table 3-4 Risk Calculation Matrix

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3.6.2 Risk Exposure & Risk Acceptance - Example

Risk exposure levels and responsibility for acceptance or residual risk are as follows:
Risk
Rating

Responsibility for
Risk Acceptance

Extreme

Board;
CEO

High

CEO;
Executive;
Risk Manager

Action
Would be expected to seriously damage the organisations
ability to continue to operate with the confidence of its
customer base or corporate owners. Could result in serious
social or economic damage and may affect the
organisations ability to continue operations.
Would be expected to have a significant impact on corporate
budgets and organisational reputation. Could lead to
extended service disruption and seriously inconvenience or
have health impacts on a wide section of the customer base.

Medium

Risk Manager
Senior Manager

Likely to result in short term, localised, disruption to services

and require escalation through line management. Could
generate localised adverse media comment and moderate
penalties or costs unable to be borne via normal operational
budgets.

Low

Risk Manager
Senior Manager

Unlikely to have an impact that could not be satisfactorily

dealt with via normal operational procedures.

Table 3-5 Risk Exposure Levels & Risk Acceptance

3.7 Treat the Risk

Once risk exposure has been determined all risks must be treated. Treatment
options include:
a) Accept: - do nothing and accept the current level of evaluated risk;
b) Avoid: - cease doing the business activity that brings about the possibility of
the threat occurring;
c) Transfer: - pass the responsibility for implementing mitigating controls to
another entity. Responsibility for threat and risk management remains the
responsibility of the organisation, and
d) Reduce: - implement controls to reduce risk to an acceptable level.

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The risk table provided in Section 5 contains a column for recording risk treatment. It
also contains a cross-reference to the Risk Treatment Plan (RTP) which is
shown in Section 6.
This plan details the controls that may be used to reduce risk to an acceptable level.
Organisations may interpret these controls for their own use and provide
additional controls if required. The cross-reference in the RTP points to where
the identified threat has been addressed.
The RTP provides for a reassessment of risk, once controls have been selected and
implemented. The RTP can also act as a management plan to provide a
status of implementation.
An example work through is provided in Section 4, illustrating the process flow used
in this risk framework.

3.8 Communication and Consultation

This environment comprises the identification and involvement of all stakeholders
involved in the operation of the SCADA network and the management of
corporate risk across the organisation.
In addition to the day-to-day operation of the SCADA system(s), it is important to
ensure that risk information is communicated through the organisations
management and is highlighted (generally in summarised form) to the
executive forum charged with overall organisational risk management.
The manner in which this environment is implemented will be highly dependent on
the operation of each affected organisation, and is therefore considered to be
outside the scope of this report, however suggested management reporting
techniques are included in section 8.

3.9 Monitor and Review

The monitoring and review component needs to be implemented to ensure that:
a) Risk exposures are monitored, re-evaluated and revised as appropriate over
time;
b) Risk exposures are updated in a timely fashion in response to significant
events such as changes to the organisations operations and influencing
external events;
c) Ensuring that identified remediation controls are effective and efficient in both
design and operation;
d) Identification of emerging risks; and
e) The risk management framework itself is operating effectively.
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As with the communications and consultation environment, the mechanism(s) used

to implement this component of the risk management framework need to be
implemented within current organisational management and monitoring
processes.
The following diagram and table provides a guide to successful implementation and
ongoing effectiveness.

Figure 3-3 PDCA model applied to SCADA Security Risk Management System

ISO 27001

SCADA Security Risk Management System

Information Security
Management System Process
(ISMS)

Plan

Do

Check

Act

Establish SCADA Security Risk Management Framework, applicable

policies, objectives, processes and procedures relevant to managing
risk and improving security to deliver results in accordance with an
organisations overall policies and objectives.
Implement and operate the SCADA Security Risk Management
Framework policy, controls, processes and procedures.
Assess and, where applicable, measure process performance against
SCADA Security Risk Management Framework policy, objectives and
practical experience and report the results to management for review.
Take corrective and preventative actions, based on the results of the
internal audit and management review or other relevant information to
achieve continual improvement of the SCADA Security Risk
Management Framework.

Table 3-6 SRMS Management and Monitoring Guide

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3.10 Risk Assessment Terms and Conventions

3.10.1 Terms
Risk levels referred to throughout this Generic SCADA RMF(and which are
recommended for use in any Security risk management plans) are:

Current Risk is the level of risk posed to system assets with existing and
implemented risk mitigation controls;

Controlled Risk is the level of risk posed to system assets after

specific/additional risk mitigation controls are implemented to address current
risk exposures; and

Residual Risk is the level of risk remaining after additional risk treatment.

3.10.2 Conventions Risk Assessment

The following table describes the abbreviations used within the Risk Assessment
below.
Term
Threat Type

Risk Rating

Value

Description

Confidentiality refers to unauthorised disclosure

Integrity refers to unauthorised alteration

Availability refers to unauthorised loss or destruction

Extreme Risk

High Risk

Medium Risk

Low Risk

Table 3-7 Conventions of Risk Assessment

3.10.3 Conventions Risk Treatment Plan

The following table describes the abbreviations used within the Risk Treatment Plan
to demonstrate the effective implementation of controls documented.
Term
Controls Legend

Value

Description
Proposed security control or mitigation strategy
Proposed security control that has been rejected by management
Security control that is not implemented and effective
Security control that is only partially implemented and effective
Security control that is fully implemented and effective

Table 3-8 Conventions Risk Treatment Plan

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4 Generic SCADA Assets

4.1 Generic SCADA Process Model
The following diagram illustrates the generic nature whereby the SCADA-related
processes have been decomposed in order to implement a generic risk
management framework.
This facilitates the identification of affected organisational SCADA assets through the
identification of the enablers associated with these processes.

Figure 4-4 Generic SCADA Process Model

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4.2 Generic SCADA Enablers - Example

As partially identified in the previous subsection, the following table identifies the
enablers likely to be found in a generic SCADA system:
Category

People

Enabler

Owner

Asset ID

HR Mgr

Pe.1

Property Mgr

P.1

CIO

P.2

SCADA Application Software

Senior Engineer

P.3

SCADA Hardware and Operating System (OS)

Senior Engineer

P.4

SCADA Field Devices

Senior Engineer

P.5

Supporting Utilities

CIO

P.6

Management Control and Feedback

CEO

Pr.1

Information Management

CIO

Pr.2

Corporate Reputation

CEO

Re.1

Users and operators of the SCADA system

Buildings and Sites
Communications and Networks

Products

Processes
Reputation

Table 4-9 Generic SCADA Process Enablers

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5 Worked Example of Threat and Risk Assessment Framework

Step 1 Identify what process we are protecting in this instance it is SCADA system
Step 2 We identify the enablers that make this process occur in this example we will select Application Software.
Category

Product

Enabler

Owner

SCADA Application
Software

Asset ID

P.3

Notes

SCADA Application that monitors and manages SCADA assets

Step 3 Threat and Risk Assessment Assess risk against the threat of the Loss of Confidentiality, Availability or Integrity. This gives the Current Risk,
which is the level of risk with existing and implemented controls in place. (NB: only loss of confidentiality is demonstrated in this example.)
Current Risk
Asset ID

P.3
(SCADA
Application
Software)

Common potential points of failure and known vulnerabilities

Threat
Type

Threat
sources

T1,T2, T3,T4

Lack of security hardening

Consequence

Likelihood

Risk
Rating

Moderate

Likely

High

Treatment
Option &
reference

Reduce
F1

Ref

Controlled Risk
Control
Objectives

Selection of controls to achieve objectives

Controls

Consequence

Likelihood

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Residual
Risk

Step 4 Risk Treatment Plan as the current risk rating in this example is High, treat the risk by selecting the Reduce option. How this risk reduction is
realised is detailed in the Risk Treatment Plan at C2. An extract from the RTP is provided below

Ref

Controlled Risk

F1

Selection of controls to achieve objectives

To ensure
software
Control
can
withstand
Objectives
Controls
Secure SCADA software configuration aligned with (ISO 27002),
(CIP Standards)
unauthorised access
Attempts

Moderate

Unlikely

Table 5-10: linkage between the Asset Register, TRA and RTP
Step 5 once the control can be proven to be in place, the controls are assessed for effectiveness and the risk level for that threat can be re-evaluated. In
this example, risk has been reduced from High to Medium because the likelihood has been reduced from Likely to Unlikely.
A reference to a control identified in a standard is included to demonstrate compliance and linkage to the standard.

Page 27 of 49

Residual Risk

UNCLASSIFIED

Medium

UNCLASSIFIED

6 Example SCADA Threat and Risk Assessment

Current Risk
Asset ID

Common potential points of failure and known vulnerabilities

Threat
Type

Social Engineering obtaining information on system layout and on those who

manage it. Known to have occurred
Employee vetting employees with access to SCADA control systems do not have the
appropriate background checking conducted prior to engagement resulting in possible
data leakage, data corruption, damaged reputation and business relationships

Pe.1
People

Information security breaches - past employees or service providers freely disclose

information to unauthorised persons

T1, T2

Disgruntled Staff including contractors who subsequently lose their integrity in

relation to job performance

T1, T2

3rd Party dependencies where the integrity of the 3rd party is essentially unknown

T1,T2
T1, T2

Loss of Key Personnel and/or Corporate Knowledge

T1, T2

Lack of skills / knowledge leads to accidental issues with irregular data modification

T1, T2
A

Health related event absenteeism

Ineffective change/configuration/release management introduction of unapproved,

untested hardware or software

Likelihood

Risk
Rating

Moderate

Likely

High

Reduce A1

Moderate

Likely

High

Reduce A2

Moderate

Almost
Certain

High

Reduce A3

Likely

Extreme

Reduce B1

T1, T2
I

Issue-motivated interference leading to biased or one dimensional thinking which

affects job performance

Inappropriate management structure, lack of security framework, poor allocation of

security roles and responsibilities

Consequence

T1, T2
C
T1, T2

Industrial relations breakdown leading to staff not being available for long periods of
time or to perform critical functions. Legal activity may result.

Treatment
Option &
reference

T1, T2, T3

Account management sharing of passwords by employees leading to poor chain of

evidence and/or information compromise

Ineffective security awareness training - leads to the introduction of malicious code or

viruses, disclosure/ theft of information via portable storage devices

Pr.1
(Management
Control &
Feedback)

Threat
sources

T1, T2
T1, T2

T1, T2, T3,

T4, T5

Catastrop
hic

T1, T2, T3,

T4, T5

Page 28 of 49

UNCLASSIFIED

Current Risk
Asset ID

Common potential points of failure and known vulnerabilities

Threat
Type

Ineffective management forum/committee, limited stakeholder participation or

leadership, poor corrective and preventative actions for security issues, increased
severity of incidents

T1, T2, T3,

T4, T5

Ineffective or lack of defined service level agreements (SLAs) with business owners,
ICT Teams and service providers

T1, T2, T3,

T4, T5

Incident management poor evidence gathering, preservation and inability to identify

that a compromise has actually occurred

Business functionality driven initiatives verses security - introduce vulnerable systems

and applications

T1, T2, T3,

T4, T5

T1, T2, T3,

T4, T5

Project management lack of security and/or system considerations during project

planning, implementation, operation and review resulting in avoidable issues and/or
incidents

T1, T2, T3,

T4, T5
A

Ineffective and/or one-way communication no security committee to manage and

provide oversight of security
Degraded security environment through site isolation

Likelihood

Risk
Rating

Catastrop
hic

Likely

Extreme

Reduce B2

T1, T2, T3,

T4, T5

Catastrop
hic

Likely

Extreme

Reduce B3

T1, T2

Minor

Possible

Medium

Reduce C1

Minor

Possible

Medium

Reduce C2

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Reduce C3

T1, T2
I

Environmental disaster
Natural disaster

Consequence

T1, T2, T3,

T4, T5

Vandalism
Poor maintenance

Treatment
Option &
reference

T1, T2

Failure in duty of care, lack of security policy and direction

Business Continuity Management (BCM) lack of resiliency and redundancy, lack of

identification of Maximum Acceptable Outage, Recovery Point Objectives, Recovery
Time Objectives resulting in variable business continuity responses

P.1
Building / Site

Threat
sources

T1, T2
T1, T2

T1, T2

DR process failure

T1, T2

Accidental damage - environmental impact resulting in loss of service, damage to

servers, infrastructure, possible harm to employees

T1, T2

Sabotage and wilful damage

T1, T2

OH&S non-compliance

T1, T2

Page 29 of 49

UNCLASSIFIED

Current Risk
Asset ID

Common potential points of failure and known vulnerabilities

Threat
sources

Poor design & Planning lack of input concerning physical and protective security
resulting in unsafe and/or insecure buildings and sites.

T1, T2

Inappropriate access control Overuse of Local administrative privileges

T1, T2

Inappropriate equipment disposal No sanitisation

T1, T2

Account management accounts not deactivated resulting in unauthorised access by

past employees/service providers. Weak password policies leading to easy access to
systems, accounts and infrastructure by unauthorised actors

Pr.2
Information
Management

Threat
Type

T1, T2

Lack of security controls in contractual agreements

T1, T2

Poor version control and data quality

T1, T2

Lack of information ownership and information classification

T1, T2

Lack of monitoring and audit processes.

Too much information

T1, T2
T1, T2

Lack of documentation

T1, T2

Incorrect documentation

T1, T2

Untested procedures (Back-up etc.)

T1, T2

Lack of capacity planning

Change/Configuration/Release management introduction of unapproved, untested
hardware or software
P.2
Unauthorised disclosure via 3rd party carrier services
Communications & Open communication protocols are used
Networks
Mis-configuration leading to unauthorised access and disclosure
Security holes in protocols and equipment
Data path over shared networks resulting in uncontrolled access to data
Failure to segment network allowing entire network compromise

T1, T2

Consequence

Likelihood

Risk
Rating

Moderate

Almost
Certain

High

Reduce D1

Moderate

Almost
Certain

High

Reduce D2

Moderate

Almost
Certain

High

Reduce D3

Minor

Likely

Medium

Reduce E1

T1, T2
C

T1, T2

Treatment
Option &
reference

T1, T2
T1, T2
T1, T2
T1, T2
T1, T2

Page 30 of 49

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Current Risk
Asset ID

Common potential points of failure and known vulnerabilities

Threat
Type

Threat
sources

Unsecured wireless networks allowing unauthorised access, network compromise

T1, T2

Lack of diversity in communication paths lead to communication failure

T1, T2

Data path interference redirections, man-in-the-middle attacks, eavesdropping

T1, T2

Irregular system log analysis - resulting in information security incidents not being
analysed to further improve information security

Poor or non-existent software patch management vulnerabilities to communications

equipment routers, switches, firewalls

T1, T2
T1, T2

Vendor pricing or service level changes

T1, T2
C

T1, T2

T1, T2

Off shoring vendor / service provider moves offshore or sub contracts application
support

T1, T2
I

T1, T2

Change management and lack of flexibility to adapt to changing requirements and lack
of user acceptance testing process

T1, T2

Technology changes leading to software being outdated

T1, T2

System complexity

T1, T2

Unaware of implications in implementing security controls

T1, T2

Lack of visibility and access to source code

Risk
Rating

Moderate

Almost
Certain

High

Reduce E2

Moderate

Almost
Certain

High

Reduce E3

Moderate

Likely

High

Reduce F1

Major

Likely

High

Reduce F2

Major

Likely

High

Reduce F3

T1, T2, T3,

T4

Loss of provider and no escrow agreement

Takeovers and mergers

Likelihood

T1, T2

Interference from other transmissions

P.3
Lack of security hardening
SCADA Application Poor or non-existent software patch management vulnerabilities to operating
Software
systems and/or applications

Consequence

T1, T2

Lack of monitoring capacity planning and QoS issues

No redundancy / false redundancy

T1, T2

Treatment
Option &
reference

T1, T2

Lack of scalability in software solutions

T1, T2

SCADA Application failure

T1, T2

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UNCLASSIFIED

Current Risk
Asset ID

Common potential points of failure and known vulnerabilities

Threat
Type

Vested interests in particular products

T1, T2

Obsolete equipment or Operating System unable to be patched

T1, T2

Lack of hardening system open to vulnerabilities.

Poor Patch Management Operating Systems

Malicious software

T1, T2

T1, T2
T1, T2
T1, T2

No spares management

Default security configuration

High

Reduce G1

Moderate

Likely

High

Reduce G2

Moderate

Almost
Certain

High

Reduce G3

Moderate

Likely

High

Reduce H1

T1, T2

T1, T2

Bypassing traditional security framework

Almost
Certain

T1, T2

Lack of redundancy hardware

Open access security issues including access back to central systems

Moderate

T1, T2

Lack of capacity monitoring and planning

As for SCADA HW, SW App

Risk
Rating

T1, T2

Environmental failure such as air conditioning, UPS

Damage as a result of lack of electrical isolation

Likelihood

T1, T2

Improper patch management / change management

P.4
Incompatibility with the application
SCADA Hardware
including operating Vested interests in particular products
System
Equipment failure

T1, T2,
T3,T4

Treatment
Option &
reference

Consequence

T1, T2
C

Inappropriate access controls

P.5
SCADA Field
Devices

Threat
sources

T1, T2
C

T1, T2
T1, T2
T1, T2
T1, T2

Default security configuration retention of default user names and passwords

T1, T2

Lack of security hardening also inability to security harden

T1, T2

Page 32 of 49

UNCLASSIFIED

Current Risk
Asset ID

Common potential points of failure and known vulnerabilities

Threat
Type

As for SCADA HW, SW App

Dependency and use of COTS devices.

A
More vulnerable to physical damage

C
I

Minor

Likely

Medium

Reduce H2

T1, T2

Moderate

Almost
Certain

High

Reduce H3

T1, T2
T1, T2

Minor

Possible

Medium

Reduce I1

T1, T2

Moderate

Likely

High

Reduce I2

Major

Likely

High

Reduce I3

T1, T2

Lack of backup power No alternative supply or generator installed

Non-diversity of supply leads to failure due to external influences in grid.

T1, T2

T1, T2

Loss of air-conditioning Leads to equipment overheating, shutdown and loss of

availability

Lack of UPS, generator maintenance results in power failure

Risk
Rating

T1, T2

Lacking in remote management capability

P.6
Supporting Utilities

Likelihood

T1, T2

Failure to operate - dependence on communications links (Denial of Service)

Loss of power supply leads to equipment shutdown and loss of availability

Consequence

T1, T2

As for SCADA HW, SW App

Lack of power & air-conditioning Quality and reliability

Treatment
Option &
reference

T1, T2

Introduction of open technology field devices (inc unstable operating Systems, less
robust hardware)

Breach of confidentiality when power fails

Threat
sources

T1, T2
A

T1, T2
T1, T2

Damage to supporting utilities due to Lightning, Fire etc.

T1, T2

Lack of capacity planning to cover peak loads

T1, T2

Page 33 of 49

UNCLASSIFIED

Example SCADA Risk Treatment Plan (RTP)

Ref

Control Objectives

Consequence

Likelihood

Residual
Risk

Controlled Risk

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Selection of controls to achieve objectives

(Control Reference)

Confidentiality Agreements in employment contracts

Include survivability clauses and obtain legal advice on drafting (ISO 27002 Section 6.1.5
Confidentiality agreements).

A1
People
Confidentiality

Confidentiality Provisions in 3rd Party and outsourcing contracts

Mandate security briefing for new providers who are working in critical areas to highlight obligations
ISO 27002 Section 6.2.3 Addressing security in third party agreements.

To ensure that people

maintain the
Position applicant references and referees are checked and reasonable care is taken to ensure the
confidentiality of sensitive background of the applicant prior to employment. This includes a police background check to confirm
SCADA information
suitability (ISO 27002 Section 8.1.2) (ISM 0434) (PSPF Persec-01).
SCADA security training at induction and ongoing awareness training including security incident
reporting.
Incident reporting should define alert levels and timely reporting of critical incidents (ISO 27002
Section 13 Information Security Incident Management, ISM Information Security Awareness
Training) (PSPF Gov-1).

A2
People
Integrity

To ensure that SCADA

resources are
appropriately trained,
motivated and are
trustworthy

Personnel vetting
The Australian Government PSPF Personnel Security Protocol provides guidance on vetting (ISO
27002 section 8 Human resources security).
Concise job descriptions in. (ISO 27002 section 8 Human resources security).
On-going training and assessment in operating SCADA systems (ISO 27002 8.2.2 Information
security awareness, education and training, ISM Information Security Awareness and training).
Privileged accounts are not shared, uniquely identifiable for each user, approved only on a need-tohave basis, and used for administrative purposes only. A general user account is to be used for
business as usual access. (ISM 0444).
Privileged accounts are audited in accordance with the security calendar to confirm access is required
and account use is within the information security policy requirements. (ISO 27002 Section 11.2 User

Page 34 of 49

UNCLASSIFIED

Ref

Consequence

Likelihood

Residual
Risk

Controlled Risk

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Minor

Unlikely

Low

Minor

Unlikely

Low

Selection of controls to achieve objectives

Control Objectives

(Control Reference)

access management).
Defined Entry and Exit procedures.
Different levels of briefing/interviews depending on the job performed. Exit interviews are particularly
important for staff & management in operational areas (ISO 27001 8.3 Termination or change of
employment, ISM Personnel Security).

A3
People
Availability

Fully documented operating procedures.

Operating procedures should be in place to supplement training and reduce the risk of accidents.
Training environments should be established to support learning objectives (ISO 27001 10.1
To ensure that
appropriate resources are Operational procedures and responsibilities, ISM System Security Plans, Standard Operating
available to manage and Procedures).
operate SCADA systems Implement a combination of resource types including contractors, 3rd parties.
Have a different type of resource to backup primary resourcing.
Implement cross-skilling for critical areas.
Develop Security Framework set security direction, objectives, allocate roles and responsibilities,
reporting requirements, steering committee to provide oversight of security (ISO27001 Section 4.2.1).

B1
Management
Control &
Feedback
Confidentiality

B2
Management
Control &
Feedback
Integrity

Establish a data classification schema - (ISO 27002 7.2 Information Classification, ISM Media
Security)
To control SCADA
Develop and implement change and configuration management process ISO27001 12.5.1 change
Management information control procedures. - (ITIL Change Management), NIST 800-128.
Formal procedures for publication of SCADA management information.
Information is often incorrectly published to web sites when it should be for internal use only often as
a result of confusing internal unclassified documents with information intended for the general public
-.(ISO 27001 Section 7.2 Information Classification).
To provide correct and
controlled access to
SCADA information

Controlled repository for SCADA related information.

An information/knowledge management system may assist with achieving a controlled and secure
storage - (ISO 27002 Section 10.1.1 Documented operating procedures).

To provide incident
Formal Incident response and readiness procedures are developed and implemented - NIST SP800response and readiness 61 Incident handling guide.
processes
Forensic readiness is the ability of an organisation to maximise its evidence collection capability whilst
minimising the cost of doing so. (draft ISO 27037 identification, collection, acquisition and preservation
of digital evidence) (Aus Standards HB 171 Management of IT Evidence)

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Ref

Control Objectives

To provide competent
and effective
management support

Consequence

Likelihood

Residual
Risk

Controlled Risk

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Minor

Unlikely

Low

Minor

Unlikely

Low

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Selection of controls to achieve objectives

(Control Reference)

Documented Management Outcomes

These should be endorsed with executive support (ISO 27002 Section 6 Organisation of Information
Security)

Establish Key Performance Indicators for Management

To assess management
These should be reportable, repeatable and achievable (ISO 27001 Section Management review of
effectiveness
the Information Management System ISMS) (ISO 27001 Section 0.2b)

B3
Management
Control &
Feedback
Availability

C1
Building / Site
Confidentiality
C2
Building / Site
Integrity
C3
Building / Site
Availability

Approved and documented Roles and Responsibilities for Management (ISO 27001 Management
To ensure that required Responsibility) (ISM Roles and Responsibilities)
management controls are Approved Management Framework and Charter
defined
Quality Management procedures provide guidance on how a management framework should function
(ISO 27001 Section 4.2 Establishing and managing ISMS)
To provide dedicated and
Documented SCADA management policies and procedures
effective Management
These document should be brief and not change significantly over time (ISO 27001 Section 4.3
support for SCADA
Documentation Requirements) (ISM Information Security Documentation)
systems
Equipment site standards for remote devices
To prevent compromise
Suitable racks/cabinets may be identified for remote servers/switches. Do not allow unprotected, live
of assets and interruption
network access points (ISO 27002 Section 9 Physical and Environmental Security) (ISM Physical
to business activities
Security)
To minimise impact of
Site loss and damage

Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity Plans

These site specific strategies should be aligned with the whole of organisation DR strategy
(ISO 27002 Sections 13 Security Incident Management, 14 Business Continuity Management) (ISM
Incident Response and Emergency Procedures)

To prevent loss of assets Defined security perimeters

and interruption to
Restrict access to sites do not allow broad access simply for convenience (ISO 27002 Section 9
SCADA operations
Physical and Environmental Security) (ISM Physical Security)
Redundant power supply
Consider Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) or alternate power supply for key sites.
(ISO 27002 Section 9 Physical and Environmental Security)
Implementation of cabling standards
All cabling should be bundled, labelled and use proper layout trays. (ISM Communications

Page 36 of 49

UNCLASSIFIED

Ref

Consequence

Likelihood

Residual
Risk

Controlled Risk

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Selection of controls to achieve objectives

Control Objectives

(Control Reference)

Infrastructure) (ISO 27002 Section 9.2.3 Cabling Security)

Documented SCADA access control policy
A high level access policy should be part of Information management controls communicated to
management and users (ISO 27002 Section 11 Access Control) (ISM Access Control)
D1
Information
Management
Confidentiality

To control access to
SCADA information

Formal user registration procedures in place

Registration should exist for all user types: staff, contractors, and contracted service providers (ISO
27002 Section 11 Access Control) (ISM Access Control)
Regular audit review of access rights
Ensure that all remote and temporary accounts are also reviewed (ISO 27002 Section 11 Access
Control) (ISM Access Control)
Encrypt sensitive information stored on Networks
Encryption of certain classifications should be part of an organisational information classification
schema. (ISO 27002 12.3 Cryptographic Controls), (ISM Cryptography) (NIST FIPS encryption
standards)

D2
Information
Management
Integrity

Documented SCADA operating procedures

To have full effect; operating procedures should be consistent, available, clear and changes must be
efficiently applied according to proper versioning control.
To ensure the correct Incident management and response procedures
operation of information Should be documented and tested regularly - Available tools include Network and Host Intrusion
processing facilities
Detection Systems, System Integrity Verification , Log Analysis and Intrusion Repulsion (ISO 27002
Section 13 Information Security Incident Management, ISM Section Managing Security Incidents)
Appropriate segregation of duties for information processing tasks (ISO 27002 Section 10
Communications and operations management)

D3
Information
Management
Availability

To maintain the
Documented and tested backup procedures
availability of information Often only certain types of systems are backed up. Organisations should ensure that ALL critical
processing
information is backed up and that effectiveness is tested on a regular basis (ISO 27002 10.5
Backup)
Capacity monitoring and forecasting
Network monitoring and service delivery reports from vendors may effectively provide these
controls(ISO 27002 10.3.1 Capacity Management)
Change Management

Page 37 of 49

UNCLASSIFIED

Ref

Control Objectives

Consequence

Likelihood

Residual
Risk

Controlled Risk

Minor

Unlikely

Low

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Selection of controls to achieve objectives

(Control Reference)

All SCADA systems, applications and communications infrastructure should be subject to formal
change management control (ISO 27002 Change Management Sections10.1.2, 12.5.1, 13.2) (ITIL
Change Management)
E1
To protect the
Communications transmission of SCADA
& Networks
information broadcast
Confidentiality
over Public Networks

Encrypt transmission of SCADA information

Ensure that appropriate encryption protocols are applied (ISM Cryptography, ISO 27001 Section
12.3 Cryptographic controls, NIST FIP Encryption Standards)
Perform vulnerability assessments on a periodic basis on all access points into the SCADA network
Regular scenarios should be defined and tested to identify network vulnerabilities (ISO 27002 12.6
Technical Vulnerability Management, (ISM Vulnerability Management)

E2
Communications To verify SCADA network
Deploy network monitoring services to identify and localise network trouble spots
& Networks
configurations
Integrity
E3
Communications
& Networks
Availability
F1
SCADA
Application
Software
Confidentiality

For key services, route communications lines via multiple exchanges / mediums
To maintain SCADA
network connectivity

Deploy intelligent networking devices to handle peak loads

Routing devices and modern switching equipment can be tailored to meet specific load patterns and
provide alerts for unusual activity

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

To ensure that such

software utilises
recognised best practice
security mechanisms and
is able to withstand
unauthorised access
attempts.

Secure SCADA software configuration

Where possible, computerised systems should be hardened to minimise the opportunity for
unauthorised access. Hardening should also ensure that any vendor application software support is
maintained throughout the life of the product whilst the underlying system is hardened.
Access control mechanisms should also exist to ensure that centralised system access controls are
protected in accordance with corporate password and account usage policies.

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Minimisation of user access rights

Users should only be granted the minimum access required in order to perform their duties. Such
access, and the functionality assigned to SCADA system roles, should also be regularly reviewed and
updated. (ISO 27002 Section Access Control)
Logging of access attempts and user actions - All access attempts, whether they are successful or not,
should be logged to a protected audit trail.
The audit trail should be regularly backed up and kept as long term evidence (12mths) to prevent
erasure or tampering of evidence.

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Ref

Control Objectives

Consequence

Likelihood

Residual
Risk

Controlled Risk

Major

Unlikely

Medium

Major

Unlikely

Medium

Selection of controls to achieve objectives

(Control Reference)

In addition, significant activities (such as the changing of state of SCADA devices and updates to
access lists) should also be logged. (ISO 27002 Section 10.10 Monitoring)
The audit trail should be periodically reviewed for suspicious activity.
It is desirable that suspicious activity be alerted to operational personnel in near real-time.
Implement patch management process (DSD 35 Mitigations, ISO 27001 Section 12.6 Technical
vulnerability management, ISM - Vulnerability Management)

F2
SCADA
Application
Software
Integrity

Vendor support arrangements

Contractual arrangements should be in place with the software vendor to ensure that:
Software patches are made available in a timely manner
To maintain the correct Support arrangements such as subcontracting and off-shoring do not occur without the agreement of
operation of the software all contracted parties
over time.
The customer is to be notified of any takeover or merger activities that may affect the level or manner
in which the vendor support arrangements are provided (ISO 27002 Section 6.2 External Parties)
Critical software escrow arrangements
Where a SCADA system comprises a vendor-specific software package, an escrow agreement should
be entered into with the vendor to ensure product availability should the vendor organisation fail to be
able to support the product into the future. (ISO 27002 Section 10.8.2 Exchange agreements)

F3
SCADA
Application
Software
Availability

Capacity planning
SCADA systems should be designed to provide scalability for future growth and information storage
requirements. Collection and retention of audit trails should also be addressed.
(ISO 27002 Section 10.3.1 Capacity Management)
Capacity monitoring
SCADA functionality should include a function to allow for potential bottlenecks such as CPU, memory,
disk and communications usage to be monitored and analysed.
(ISO 27002 Section 10.3.1 Capacity Management)
Acceptance testing
Acceptance testing procedures and criteria should be developed for all changes to SCADA software.
These procedures should encompass software updates, bug fixes and security patches.
In cases where emergency security patching is required, Business Continuity Plans should allow for
the implementation of such patches and the recovery from failed operational implementations.
(ISO 27002 Section 10.3.2 System Acceptance)
Use of open architectures and protocols

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Ref

Control Objectives

Consequence

Likelihood

Residual
Risk

Controlled Risk

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Moderate

Possible

High

Selection of controls to achieve objectives

(Control Reference)

Where possible, open architectures and protocols should be adopted to prevent vendor-specific
architectures and protocols from potentially hiding security issues and constraining system scalability
and interoperability.

G1
SCADA
Hardware
including
operating
System
Confidentiality

To ensure that the

SCADA computing
platform is resilient
against unauthorised
access attempts.

Security hardening of the computing platform

Computer platforms should be hardened to remove unnecessary services, accounts and software
packages.
Vendor support agreements should allow for basic hardening of supported computer platforms. ( ISM Software Security Standard Operating Environments) (ISO 27002 Section 12 Information systems
acquisition, development and maintenance) (DHS Procurement Guidelines)
Operating System access controls
OS access controls should be implemented to ensure that sensitive information is protected from
unnecessary and unauthorised disclosure
Unnecessary user accounts should also be removed and default account passwords changed. (ISO
27002 Section 11 Access control)
Vendor support arrangements
Vendor support arrangements should ensure that system hardening measures do not void support
arrangements and that measures such as timely security patching of systems are supported.

G2
SCADA
Hardware
including
operating
System
Integrity

To ensure that the

configuration of the
SCADA computing
platform is in a known
and approved state.

G3
SCADA
Hardware
including
operating
System
Availability

To ensure that the

SCADA computing
platform is reliable in the
event of component
failure, environmental
disturbance, or attempted
malicious disruption.

Formal configuration management and control procedures

There should be measures in place to ensure that the SCADA system is in a known and approved
state, and that changes are appropriately analysed, tested and authorised.
Vendor support arrangements
Contractual support arrangements should be in place with the SCADA software vendor to ensure that
timely installation of security patches to supported hardware and OS is possible.
System redundancy
Critical system components should be designed to withstand single points of failure.
Business Continuity Plans (and/or if necessary, Disaster Recovery Plans) should be updated and
tested to ensure that systems are able to withstand loss of single physical, personnel and procedural
dependencies.
Spares holdings
Adequate spares should be held (or covered by vendor support arrangements) for timely recovery
from component failures.

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Ref

Control Objectives

Consequence

Likelihood

Residual
Risk

Controlled Risk

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Minor

Unlikely

Low

Selection of controls to achieve objectives

(Control Reference)

Protection against malware

Antivirus measures should be implemented on SCADA networks as they would with other corporate IT
environments.
Malware protection should be applied and updated in a timely manner on SCADA server, FEP, field
device and workstation platforms.
NOTE: it is becoming increasingly common to find field devices operating via well-known operating
systems. Any virus attack on the system can therefore also have major repercussions on field devices
and they should therefore be brought into the corporate AV regime.
ISO 27002 Section 10.4 Protection against malicious and mobile code
Capacity planning and monitoring
Measures should be in place to monitor and manage SCADA system capacity and address potential
bottlenecks in advance of them impacting on system operations. (ISO 27002 Section 10.3.1
Capacity Management)
Business Continuity Plans
BCPs and associated DRPs should be in place and tested to ensure that the SCADA system can cope
with the loss of components (and potentially sites) and that the system can be restored to normal
operations as faults are rectified. (ISO 27002 Section 14 Business Continuity, HB 292 A
Practitioners Guide to Business Continuity Management, ISM Business Continuity and Disaster
Recovery)

H1
SCADA Field
Devices
Confidentiality

Encrypted data communications

Where communications with field devices occurs over a communications line susceptible to external
interception and / or compromise, information should be encrypted to minimise the opportunity for
external parties to compromise the communications channel. (ISO 27002 Section 12.3
To prevent unauthorised Cryptographic Controls, ISM Section Cryptography, NIST FIPS encryption standards)
monitoring and control of
Deactivation of default configuration accounts where technically feasible default configuration
these devices.
accounts should be deactivated
Private communications channels
Where possible, sensitive communications with field devices should be performed over dedicated
leased-line services rather than using a public communications infrastructure.

H2
SCADA Field

To ensure that these

devices are in a stable

Periodic device polling

Field devices should be periodically polled to ensure that their status is verified to the central control

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Ref

Control Objectives

Devices
Integrity

and known state

H3
SCADA Field
Devices
Availability
I1
Supporting
Utilities
Confidentiality

I2
Supporting
Utilities
Integrity

I3
Supporting
Utilities
Availability

Consequence

Likelihood

Residual
Risk

Controlled Risk

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Minor

Rare

Low

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Major

Unlikely

Medium

Selection of controls to achieve objectives

(Control Reference)

system and, if necessary, that discrepancies are investigated and verified.

Device maintenance
A maintenance regime should be in place to ensure that all peripheral devices are regularly tested

To ensure that these

devices can be monitored Alternate communications channels
Critical field establishments and devices should be connected to the SCADA system via redundant
and controlled as
communications channels.
required.
The central control station should also be configured such that it has control over the communications
channel(s) available to the field device. (ISO 27002 9.2.2 Supporting utilities)
To ensure that power
Backup power source
failures do not lead to a
Critical system components should be fed through both mains and backup power supplies. (ISO
security compromise of
27002 9.2.2 Supporting utilities)
the SCADA system.

To ensure that SCADA

systems operate as
expected during power
supply disruptions.

Backup power source

A medium-to-long term power supply alternative (such as a long term diesel power unit) should be
available to power critical SCADA system components during power interruptions.
Should core SCADA components be installed in dedicated control environments, power supply should
also be capable of powering support environments such as air conditioning and fire detection. (ISO
27002 9.2.2 Supporting utilities)
Power conditioning
System-critical devices should be connected to a conditioned and uninterruptible power supply.(ISO
27002 9.2.2 Supporting utilities)

To prevent disruption to Backup power source

SCADA operations during Critical system components should be fed through both mains and backup power supplies.(ISO 27002
power failure conditions. 9.2.2 Supporting utilities)
Redundant control centres
There should be redundancy built into centralised control sites to mitigate against damage to, or loss
of availability of, critical establishments.(ISO 27001 Section 14 Business Continuity)
Contingency planning
Contingency plans should ensure that centralised services can be transitioned to alternative
arrangements during such interruptions and be able to be transitioned back into service once central

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Controlled Risk
Ref

Control Objectives

Selection of controls to achieve objectives

(Control Reference)

Consequence

Likelihood

sites are restored to normal operations. (ISO 27001 Section 14 Business Continuity)
Disaster recovery testing
Contingency plans should be tested periodically. Where a physical failover test is not able to be
performed, formal scenario testing should be undertaken, with results and lessons learned
documented, analysed and actioned as appropriate. (ISO 27001 Section 14 Business Continuity)

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Residual
Risk

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8 Presentation of Results to Senior Management

8.1 Overview
Whilst the detailed analysis and documentation contained within an organisations
full SCADA risk management plan is likely to form a significant report, it is
suggested that measures be undertaken to summarise the plan for
presentation to senior management.
Whilst detailed documentation is available to senior management personnel, a
summarised report is more often an effective format to communicate the results
to such an audience.
A number of organisations already use a traffic light approach to present such data
to senior management, where each risk is assigned a green, amber or red
status depending on the current health of risk management measures.
The following subsection presents the use of a radar chart to display risk
management status to an organisations senior management. It can be a
highly effective mechanism in cases where identified SCADA process enablers
are not overly complex and it has a number of advantages as follows:

The entire risk management story is presented via a single graphic

diagram
It is easy to explain and intuitive to understand
It can be used to show risk management progress over time by including
historical data to demonstrate the organisations risk profile over time.

[Link] The radar chart is a standard Microsoft charting option. Applications such as
PowerPoint or Visio can be used to create the background colour scheme
onto which the chart can be overlayed for presentation purposes.

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8.2 Sample Radar Chart

Figure 8-1 provides a sample radar chart based on the enablers identified in this
report and arbitrary treated risk exposure data.
It shows on the one diagram:

The health of risk management against each of the identified enablers;

and
The current (May 11) risk management profile in comparison to the profile
12 months previous (May 10).

8.3 Sample Executive Summary Risk Status Table

Table 8-1 provides a sample executive risk status obtained by taking the highest
likelihood and consequence from each enabler as a high level overview

It should be noted that the colour in the current columns refer to the current
level of risk described in section 3.10.2 Conventions Risk Assessment
The colour in the controlled columns refers to the effective implementation of
controls documented see section 3.10.3 Conventions Risk Treatment
Plan.

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Figure 8-5 Sample Radar Chart Presentation of Risk Management

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Current Risk

Controlled Risk

Asset
Consequence

Likelihood

Risk Rating

Treatment
Option

Consequence

Likelihood

Risk Rating

Moderate

Almost Certain

High

Reduce A1-3

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Catastrophic

Likely

Extreme

Reduce B1-3

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

P.1 - Building Site

Moderate

Possible

Medium

Reduce C1-3

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Pr.2 - Information Management

Moderate

Almost Certain

High

Reduce D1-3

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

P.2 - Communication & Networks

Moderate

Almost Certain

Very High

Reduce E1-3

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

P.3 - SCADA Application Software

Major

Likely

High

Reduce F1-3

Major

Unlikely

Medium

P.4 - SCADA Hardware including

Operating System

Moderate

Almost Certain

High

Reduce G1-3

Moderate

Possible

High

P.5 - SCADA Field Devices

Moderate

Likely

High

Reduce H1-3

Moderate

Unlikely

Medium

Major

Likely

High

Reduce I1-3

Major

Unlikely

Medium

Pe.1 - People
Pr.1 - Management Control &
Feedback

P.6 - Supporting Utilities

Table 8-11 Executive Summary Risk Status Table

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9 Ongoing Monitoring and Review

9.1 Overview
The effectiveness of a risk management approach is dependent not only on the
methodology applied to the development of risk assessment data, but also on
its continued update as influencing factors change over time.
Examples of such factors can include:

Changes to business processes and / or technologies within the

organisation
Alteration to the external threat environment (e.g. the organisation may
decide to undertake a project that brings it into conflict with an issuemotivated group).

In addition, the risk management framework itself needs to be monitored, measured

and refined to ensure that it continues to provide relevant information to the
organisation.
The subsections to follow indicate measures that are likely to contribute to the
ongoing effectiveness of the SCADA Risk Management Framework.

9.2 SRMF Reviews

The overall SCADA Security Risk Management Framework should be reviewed over
time to ensure that it functions effectively. Measures that can be undertaken to
assist in this activity include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:

Internal process reviews

External (independent) process reviews and audits
Implementation of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) designed to monitor
SRMF processes.

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Where possible, it is recommended that KPIs be chosen, and limited in number, to

an easily measurable set to minimise the impact of process monitoring on
normal day-to-day activities.

9.3 Communicating Risk Exposures

Having measured corporate risk exposures associated with the operation of the
SCADA system(s), Section 8 of this document provides a suggested
management reporting tool.
Where the organisation implements risk management at an organisation-wide level
(e.g. a risk and audit committee reporting directly to their Board or senior
Executives), SCADA risk exposures should also be formally reported to this risk
management group to allow SCADA risk exposures to be assessed and
managed at the corporate level.

9.4 Risk Assessment Updates

As noted, both the internal and external threat environment is likely to change over
time.
To maintain the currency of RMF deliverable(s), a program should be put into place
to:

Trigger a refresh at defined intervals (e.g. annually).

Allow the risk environment to be re-evaluated in response to defining
changes (e.g. the introduction of new technologies or the emergence of a
significant external threat source).

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