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Equitable Fairness in Injunctions

The document discusses the concept of equitable fairness in the context of injunctions. It provides background on the development of equity from common law in England. It defines injunctions and describes different types like Mareva, Anton Piller, and super injunctions. It evaluates the merits of equitable fairness as applied to injunctions.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
16 views9 pages

Equitable Fairness in Injunctions

The document discusses the concept of equitable fairness in the context of injunctions. It provides background on the development of equity from common law in England. It defines injunctions and describes different types like Mareva, Anton Piller, and super injunctions. It evaluates the merits of equitable fairness as applied to injunctions.
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

DISCUSS THE MERITS OF EQUITABLE FAIRNESS IN THE CONTEXT OF

INJUNCTIONS
Background infora!ion
Before Norman Conquest in 1066 AD, people in England used their customs to resolve disputes
among them. A ne !ing came to poer ho anted to have formal s"stems of dispute
resolution. #e appointed $o"al Commissioners ho ent round the countr" to o%serve ho each
communit" resolved its disputes. &n coming %ac' to (ondon, these set up a court at )estminster,
here the" heard cases and resolved disputes. *he +udgments and rules of this court ere then
called common la, as the" ere derived from the practices of each communit".
1
Equit" developed as an alternative to common la. -ince common la as administered in the
old ro"al courts and its rules ere rigid. .ts strict application led, in man" cases, to in+ustice and
oppression. *hose unsatisfied ith common la +udgments ould see' +ustice from the !ing, as
the /fountain of all +ustice/.
0
*he !ing1s residuar" poer permitted him to temper the
infle2i%ilit" of the ordinar" la and to do +ustice according to reason, good faith, good
conscience and the current ideas of moralit", hen he as petitioned to do so. *he (ord
Chancellor, ho as the head of the !ing3s Council, handled these cases on %ehalf of the !ing.
*his ne s"stem of +ustice developed to %ecome the Chancer" Court and came to %e 'non as
4equit".3 Equit" means fairness.
T"# conc#$! of fairn#%% in E&ui!'
5airness denotes the state, condition or qualit" of %eing fair.
6
5air on the other hand means free
from %ias, dishonest" or in+ustice.
7
.t also means a mar'ed impartialit" and honest".
8
-ince
Equit" developed to redress the in+ustices occasioned %" the common la, it as largel"
e2pected to %e a fair s"stem, devoid of the %ias and dishonest" associated ith common la. .t
as meant to treat people equall" ithout regard to status.
)ith common la +udges ta'ing %ri%es to decide cases in favour of certain litigants, Equit"
sought to create an impartial s"stem made up of honest people to redresses such ills of the
common la. *hat is h" it as a fair s"stem.
In(unc!ion%
Among the advantages of equit" as provision of ne remedies here common la remedies
ere not sufficient. $ather than allo %reach to continue then claim damages later, the common
la courts developed the remed" of in+unctions. .t as initiall" an order stopping the defendant
from engaging in further actions hich ould amount to %reach of a contract.
.n+unctions have %een defined in different a"s. .t is an equita%le remed" in the form of a court
order that requires a part" to do or refrain from doing certain acts.
6
.t3s also a court order
1
For a detailed description of the development of common law, see Pollock, Maitland (1898),
The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, p. 1-10.

For detailed description of the development of e!"it#, see $erl#, %M (1890), History of
Equity, p .
&
'ee de(nition at) http)**dictionar#.[Link]*+rowse*fairness
,
'ee de(nition at) http)**dictionar#.[Link]*+rowse*fair
-
'ee de(nition at) http)**[Link]-we+[Link]*dictionar#*fair
.
For de(nition, see http)**[Link]*topic*/n0"nction
prohi%iting a part" from a specific course of action.
9
.t is also a court order that commands an act
that the court regards as essential to +ustice, or prohi%its an act that is deemed to %e contrar" to
good conscience.
:
5inall", it has also %een defined as a court order hich restrains one of the
parties to a suit in equit" from doing or permitting others ho are under his control to do an act
hich is un+ust to the other part".
;
.n+unctions can %e ma+orl" classified into to< prohi%itor" and mandator" in+unctions.
=rohi%itor" in+unctions restrain the commission, continuance or repetition of a rongful act.
>andator" in+unctions either require the defendant to undo a rongful act, or compel the
defendant to carr" out some positive o%ligation to remed" some rongful ommission.
*he" can also %e classified into perpetual and interlocutor" in+unctions. .nterlocutor" in+unctions
are granted %efore or during trial of an action so that the parties can maintain a status quo until
the issue at hand has %een resolved. =erpetual in+unctions on the other hand are granted onl"
after the plaintiff has esta%lished his right and its infringement %" the defendant. *he" are thus
granted after a full hearing and continue to %e in force, provided that the conditions that
produced them remain permanent.
10
.n addition to the a%ove general classification, there are special t"pes of in+unctions. 5irst is
>areva .n+unction, also called a free?e order. *his is an interlocutor" @normall" e2 parteA
in+unction hich is granted to prevent defendants in proceedings %efore the Courts from
removing assets out of the +urisdiction ith the aim of avoiding or frustrating the enforcement of
an" +udgment against them.
11
.t derives its name from the decision of the English Court of
Appeal in<
Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International Bulkcarriers S.A.
12

*he claimants ere ship oners and the defendants ere charterers under a vo"age charter. *he
defendants had received pa"ments for the freight in that %an' account, %ut the" had failed to pa"
the hire charges due to the claimants *he Court of Appeal upheld an in+unction to restrain the
defendants from removing or disposing out of the +urisdiction mone" standing to the credit of the
defendants in a (ondon %an'.
*he second special t"pe of in+unction is an Anton =iller order. *his is a preemptive remed"
designed to prevent a defendant from disposing of or dealing ith material, propert" or assets in
such a a" as to frustrate enforcement of a +udgment.
16
*he court ma'es an order requiring the
defendant to permit access to hisBher premises ith the o%+ect of searching for illicit materials
and documents. *he order also has the effect of permitting such propert" to %e ta'en aa",
1
'ee, http)**[Link]*topic*in0"nction
8
'ee, http)**le2al-dictionar#.thefreedictionar#.com*in0"nction
9
'ee, http)**[Link]*def*i0,..htm
10
For detailed disc"sson on the vario"s t#pes of in0"nctions, see 3ean 4 Parr# (00.),
Injunctions, ('weet and Ma5well, 6ondon), pp. ,-10.
11
'ee %avid 7apper (00-), The Need for Mareva Injunctions econsidered, 1& Fordham 6.
8ev. p. 1. availa+le at) http)**[Link]"*9r*vol1&*iss-*8, (last accessed
nd

:pril 01).
1
C1;:0D 1 All E.$. 016 @C.A. 1;98A.
1&
'ee 'teven ;ee (1998), Mareva /n0"nctions and :nton Piller 8elief, ('weet 4 Ma5well,
6ondon), p. &.
detained and 'ept in safe custod" until the full trial of the action.
17
*his order as developed and
derives its name from the case<
Anton Piller KG v. Manufacturing Processes t!
1"
*he plaintiff1s sought an urgent e2 parte order alloing entr" the Defendant1s premises in order
to inspect a range of materials that might contain evidence of the defendant1s infringement of
cop"right and confidential material of the =laintiff. (ord Denning alloed an order forcing the
Defendant1s to allo inspection, removal or cop"ing of documents that might contain such
evidence.
Another unique t"pe of in+unction emerging recentl" in English courts is the super in+unction.
*his is an interim in+unction hich restrains a person from pu%lishing information hich
concerns the applicant and is said to %e confidential or private and pu%licising or informing
others of the e2istence of the order and the proceeding. )hen the names of either or %oth of the
parties to the proceedings are not stated, it ma" %e called an anon"mised in+unction.
16
.t has also
%een defined as an in+unction o%tained in a secret convening of the court here in the result, the
court file, the names of the parties and even the terms of the in+unction order are secret e2cept as
%eteen the parties, counsel, the +udge and the court staff.
19
M#ri!% of E&ui!a)*# Fairn#%% of in(unc!ion%
*his shall %e discussed for each of the a%ove three special t"pes of in+unctions.
>areva .n+unction
*o %e granted this relief, one must prove four things< a cause of action ithin the +urisdiction of
the court as'ed to grant relief, a /good argua%le case/ on the merits of that cause of action, a real
ris' that an" +udgment the plaintiff o%tains in the proceedings ill go unsatisfied and finall" that
it is +ust and convenient to grant relief.
1:
Although the" are interlocutor" orders, >areva in+unctions can also %e granted after +udgment
and normall" are continued after +udgment. *he" are usuall" granted against assets ithin the
+urisdiction of the court, %ut the English Court of Appeal
1;
has since e2tended relief to
e2traterritorial assets.
00
*he rationale for granting these orders is good. .n man" instances hen a de%tor is ta'en to court
and reali?es he has no case and shall definitel" lose, he ma" decide to dissipate his properties or
transfer them outside the +urisdiction of the court so as to defeat the +udgment of the court. *his
1,
i+id
1-
<191.= 7h --, availa+le at) http)**www.+ailii.or2*ew*cases*>?7:*7iv*191-*[Link], (last
accessed
nd
:pril 01).
1.
'ee @nited $in2dom A"diciar# (011), e!ort of the "ommittee on #u!er$Injunctions%
#u!er$Injunctions, &nonymised Injunctions and '!en (ustice, p. iv, availa+le at)
http)**www.0"diciar#.2ov."k*8eso"rces*A7B*%oc"ments*8eports*s"per-in0"nction-report-
[Link], (last accessed
nd
:pril 01).
11
For de(nition see, http)**www.d"haime.or2*6e2al%ictionar#*'*'"per/n0"nction.asp5, (last
accessed
nd
:pril 01).
18
'"pra, note 11.
19
'ee decision in %er+# 4 7o. 6td. v. ?eldon (Cos. & 4 ,), <1990= 1 7h. .- (1989).
0
Bn e5traterritorial nat"re, see %avid 7apper, )orldwide Mareva Injunctions, -, Mod. 6.
8ev. &9 (1991), and 6awrence 7ollins, The Territorial each of Mareva Injunctions, 10- 6aw
D. 8ev. . (1989), which disc"ss this aspect at len2th.
has %een made much easier %" modern technolog" hich ena%les assets to %e his'ed aa" in
an instant using electronic transfer means.
5ailure to deal ith such conduct ould allo the legal process to %e treated ith contempt.
Courts ould find themselves acting in vain on most occasions, here the" issue +udgments that
cannot %e enforced.
#oever, the pertinent question ould %e is it fair to issue such a remed"E Equita%le fairness in
this remed" can %e e2amined from three perspectives, that of the claimant, the de%torBdefendant
and that of other creditors.
5rom the perspective of the claimant, he goes to court not merel" to in the case, %ut also collect
the de%t. Enforcement is thus central to achieving success for the claimant. .t ould thus %e
counter,productive to his cause if the defendant is alloed during the su%sistence of the case to
ta'e aa" the ver" vehicle through hich he can enforce an" +udgment arising out of court
process, that is, propert".
*o prevent a de%tor from ta'ing aa" his propert", either %" transferring it outside the
+urisdiction of the court or dissipating it %" granting preference rights to other creditors, the onl"
fair thing to do is to free?e transitions on such propert".
.n addition, granting an e2tra,territorial effect to this remed" as ver" fair for the claimant. .n
a%sence of such, the claimant ould have %een forced to locate a forum in hich the defendant
had su%stantial assets, enough to cover his de%t and appl" for the remed" in that +urisdiction.
*his ould create additional costs in form of hiring foreign attorne"s, logistics of filing cases in
foreign +urisdiction and all the hardships that go ith proving foreign la. *he fair thing to do is
thus to issue the in+unction and leave the claimant to see' recognition and enforcement of the
in+unction as a foreign +udgment. 5oreign +udgments are generall" enforcea%le.
#oever there is a real fear that since this order is granted e2,parte, man" claimants ma" a%use it
to free?e propert" of their de%tors at ill even hen the" do not have reasona%le cause. *his fear
is ell addressed %" the standard of proof required %efore such a relief can %e granted. &ne must
prove that he has a /good argua%le case/ on the merits of that cause of action. *his eliminates
possi%ilit" of a%use of this relief %" malicious claimants. 5urther, as ith all interlocutor"
in+unctions, the applicant usuall" gives an underta'ing in damages to compensate the defendant
should it %ecome clear later that the in+unction should not have %een granted. .f for instance the
defendant successfull" applies to the court to discharge the in+unction, the applicant is ordered to
pa" damages. *o eliminate possi%le a%use, the practice of courts is to to revie in+unctions at an
inter partes hearing a short time after the grant of an e2 parte order. *he foregoing thus guards
against a%use of the remed" %uttressing its fairness.
-o in conclusion, the remed" is fair from the perspective of the plaintiff since it prevents
inequita%le conduct on the part of defendants
*he remed" ma" seem unfair from the perspective of the de%tor. 5irst it seems to negate the
historic principle that %efore +udgment, an unsecured creditor has no rights in the propert" of the
de%tor. *his is not entirel" true %ecause the in+unction gives creditors no rights to de%tors1 assets,
%ut simpl" stops creditors from engaging in inequita%le conduct.
*he second reason for unfairness ould %e that free?ing causes enormous hardship to the
de%tors. .t is true that free?ing of assets has capacit" to cause serious hardships to an" person.
#oever in vie that the defendant can ta'e advantages of free ill to deal ith propert" to
defeat court +udgments, it is %etter to provide a measure of relief for claimants, hile providing
some protection for defendants, than to ignore the pro%lem all together. *he remed" itself
addresses this challenge in to a"s. 5irst a defendant1s assets are fro?en su%+ect to a limited to a
ma2imum sum, hich is not more that the claimants de%t. -econd the order normall" specifies a
sum for reasona%le living e2penses. *hird, the defendant is alloed to see' variation to have the
set limits ad+usted in light of an" hardships that he ma" %e a%le to prove in court. 5inall", the
defendant is alloed to see' discharge of an" in+unction that causes unnecessar" hardships to
him. #e a%ove chec's and %alances thus eliminate the unfairness that ma" %e caused %"
occasioning hardship on the defendant.

.n conclusion therefore, the concerns over the de%tor are adequatel" addressed ma'ing the
remed" fair to him.
*hird, the remed" is fair in the perspective of other creditors. *hough it ma" seem as if granting
one creditor the in+unction grants him preference over others, this is not the correct position. *he
in+unction never gives an" creditor a right to de%tors1 assets, %ut preserves the assets hich ma"
even %enefit other creditors in the long run.
*he second fear in respect to other creditors ould that granting it ould ma'e other creditors to
race to the courthouse see'ing protection. *his is a rong vie point %ecause the relief does not
give a right to the de%tors1 assets so as to improve their position of an" creditor in case of
%an'ruptc". *here is thus no motivation for other creditors to race to court.
*he other fear is that the remed" ma" %e granted to a de%tor hose interests are in opposition to
interests of other creditors. )here a potential conflict e2ists %eteen the applicant creditor and
others, it is left to the court1s discretion hether to grant relief in that particular case. .n deciding
hether to grant the relief or not, the court e2amines the competing interests to determine the
proper one. *his e2amination eliminates an" possi%ilit" of treating deserving creditors unfairl".
.t is thus evident that the remed" is eventuall" fair from the perspective of other creditors,
despite concerns hich have %een adequatel" addressed.
5inall", the remed" is fair from the perspective of the courts. .n its a%sence, the courts ould
issue +udgments hich ould %e in man" instances unenforcea%le. .t is a principle in equit" that
courts should not act in vain %" giving orders that are unenforcea%le. *his remed" preserves the
court1s a%ilit" to render a +udgment that ill prove enforcea%le.
.n summar" therefore, despite concerns a%out unfairness of this remed", these have %een
adequatel" addressed leaving the remed" to %e equita%l" fair to all parties in a suit.
Anton =iller &rders
.t is usuall" granted on an e2 parte application to the court. *his is permissi%le %ecause surprise
is essential %ecause if the defendant ere to have prior 'noledge of the application, there ould
%e a ris' that heBshe ould destro" or hide the propert" in question. *o get this order, the
claimant must prove three things< there is an e2tremel" strong prima facie case against the
respondent, the damage, potential or actual, must %e ver" serious for the applicant, and there
must %e clear evidence that the respondents have in their possession relevant documents or things
and that there is a real possi%ilit" that the" ma" destro" such material %efore an inter partes
application can %e made.
01
*he rationale for granting the order is that people ho have incriminating evidence are %ound to
destro" it rather than su%mit it to court. *he courts of la are mainl" guided %" evidence in their
decisions, and thus an" actions see'ing to destro" evidence amount to an affront to +ustice. *he
courts in such cases thus issue this order. *he order does not grant a right of entr" to defendants3
premises, %ut permits the representatives of a plaintiff to request entrance into a defendant3s
premises to search for and sei?e relevant documents and other materials that the defendant is
li'el" to destro". .f the defendant refuses to allo entr", he or she ma" %e held in contempt. *he"
are relevant for emplo"ers hen dealing ith incriminating evidence in the hands of fello
emplo"ees and also intellectual propert" oners hen dealing ith people infringing on their
rights.
*he orders are equita%l" fair from the perspective of the court %ecause the" allo the court to get
access to crucial evidence that ould have %een lost, ma'ing the determination of a case
difficult. *he" allo the court arrive at an informed decision at the end ith %enefit of having
access to untampered evidence and evidence hich ould otherise not have %een produced in
court, %ut destro"ed.
*he" are also fair from the plaintiff3s perspective %ecause the" increase his chances of getting
+ustice due to availa%ilit" of crucial evidence. -ince the plaintiff is aare of the evidence he is
see'ing to rel" on, he is %est placed to identif" it at the defendants premise for confiscation
purposes. B" granting him the in+unction e2 parte, it ensures am%ush, not giving the defendant
enough time to hide, tamper or destro" the evidence in an" a".
#oever, from the defendants perspective, several concerns arise. 5irst is potential a%use.
=laintiffs ma" appl" for these orders to merel" harass defendants suspected of infringing their
rights, ithout an" reasona%le cause of action. #oever, this concern is addressed severall". *he
plaintiff must prove certain facts %efore granting of the order. *hese include a strong prima facie
case< ver" serious damage either potential or actual, the fact that the defendants have in their
possession incriminating documents or things, and finall", that there is a real possi%ilit" that the"
ma" destro" such material %efore an" application inter partes can %e made. *hese proofs though
e# parte allo the court to assess the proportionalit" of the damage that might %e suffered and
the e2tent of the relief granted. *he courts thus onl" grant the order if satisfied that the ris' of a
denial of +ustice to the claimant is more that the damages that ma" %e suffered %" the defendant.
*his removes ar%itrariness and ensures fairness.
1
Ehe re!"irements were set +# Brmrod 6A in the :nton Piller case.
.n addition, courts assess the capa%ilit" of the claimant to pa" the defendant1s costs in the event
that the order as rongl" made. >ost courts insist on full capa%ilit" to pa" such damages, a
%an' guarantee in the alternative or some other means of securit" from the claimant prior to
ma'ing the order sought. *he 'noledge that an applicant shall pa" damages for ever" rongful
orders sought discourage frivolous and malicious applications, providing a safeguard against
a%use.

5urther, Fustice #ughes of the Canadian -upreme Court has added to more requirements to
granting of this order, %eing that the applicant must prove that the e2ecution of the order ould
not harm the defendant or its case, and that the interests of +ustice ould not %e %rought into
disrepute.
00
*hese additional tests address an" mischief that an applicant ould %e up to that is
not deterred %" the initial requirements.
*he second concern ould %e that granting of these orders has the cumulative effect of
destro"ing the hole of a %usiness custom, %" revealing important information to its competitors.
#oever, this concern is addressed severall". *he defendant has an option of refusing access to
information he considers trade secrets and later +ustif" his actions in an" contempt proceedings
that ma" %e commenced against him. 5urther, the applicant is onl" entitled to access and
confiscate onl" the relevant evidentiar" material, and not ever"thing, thus limiting potential
a%use. 5inall", the practice of courts, especiall" Canadian courts, has %een to provide for a
supervising part" in the sei?ure, ho is an independent part" and is deemed an officer of the
court under hose custod" all contested evidence should vest. *his minimi?es ris' of disclosing
secrets to competitors.
5rom the foregoing discussion, it is thus clear that most of the concerns are adequatel"
addressed, thus ma'ing the remed" to %e equita%l" fair to all parties.
-uper .n+unctions
-uper in+unctions are the most controversial of all. *here is a slight difference %eteen super
in+unctions and anon"mised in+unctions. *he latter simpl" %ar disclosure of parties %ut the
previous %ar repotrting of an" details and information considered private. *he upsurge in these
in+unctions has %een traced to the enactment of the #uman $ights Act 1;;:. *o of the rights
granted %" the Act are the individual1s right to a private life and the universal right to freedom of
e2pression. -ometimes the" clash. Fudges are thus left ith the unenvia%le tas' of reconciling an
individual1s right to privac" against the right to freedom of e2pression usuall" advanced %" the
press.
#oever, there are genuine reasons for the grant of super,in+unctions. *he in+unctions are not
simpl" meant to gag the media or conduct secret trials, derogating from the principle of open
+ustice, %ut rather to prevent harassment and un+ustified intrusion into the lives of claimants and
their families. *he" prevent %lac'mail.

'ee Net*ored Inc+ v+ &very Holdings Inc 00- F7 1,0-, availa+le at)
http)**[Link].or2*en*ca*fct*doc*00-*00-fc1,0-*00-fc1,[Link], (last accessed
nd

:pril 01).
)hen in possession of potentiall" damaging media stor" a%out a high profile individual, man"
individuals attempt to %lac'mail the individuals %" threatening to pu%lish the stor" unless the"
are paid a large sum of mone". *he fair thing to do in such instances ould %e to use the courts
to prevent such threats from %eing carried out. *he +ustification for anon"mit" is that if the courts
ere required to pu%lish the fact that an in+unction had %een sought, revealing the parties, it
ould defeat its ver" purpose.
.n this sense, the in+unctions not onl" protect the influential high profile individuals, %ut innocent
third parties, especiall" their children, famil" and %" e2tension relatives from harassment and
intrusion..
*hough the high profile applications are %ased on infidelit" claims for high profile individuals,
the collected data shos that man" claimants are omen or children, and in man" cases have
concerned information hich as not se2ual in nature. *he" are thus not the preserve of ealth",
adulterous foot%allers. 5urther the" are also used to protect t"pes of confidential information
passed %eteen individuals in a commercial or an esta%lished and confidential personal
relationship. #oever, there are several concerns that have %een raised a%out these in+unctions,
questioning their fairness.
*he first concern is that the" are mainl" used to cover up marital infidelit". *hough this is true to
some e2tent, there is +ustification for it. )idespread reporting of infidelit" cases is in man" cases
not driven %" pu%lic interest. .n several cases also, the sources of the information are partners
ho have disagreed and after failing to get proper cash compensations rush to the media to hit
%ac' at former lovers so to tarnish their names, %eing prominent persons. .n addition, there have
%een cases here %oth parties to a past relationship have ished to 'eep it private %ut a
nespaper ished to pu%lish the details.
-econd, the" are critici?ed for %eing an affront to the principle of open +ustice. #oever, this
principle must %e tempered ith fairness. .n some instances, it is alloa%le to derogate from the
principle in order not to frustrate the court3s a%ilit" to administer +ustice properl".
06
.n addition
the" are onl" granted hen a prima facie case has %een proven rendering their issue strictl"
necessar". *his eliminates ar%itrariness and ensures fairness sin the process.
*he third concern is their ide application. *he" do not onl" %ind those against hom the" are
issued, %ut also an" third parties ho have notice of the in+unction. *o %ind a small num%er
ould %e counter,productive, since the remaining populace ould disclose the information
defeating the purpose of the in+unction in the first place. *he ide coverage has merit on the
a%ove %asis.
*he final concern has %een their tendenc" to %ecome permanent. *heir uniqueness is that the"
%ind not onl" the defendant %ut also other third parties ith notice. *here is ala"s fear on the
applicant that should the hearings come to an end, a final in+unction has %een granted against the
defendant, the" stop to %e %inding on third parties.
07
)here therefore a claimant has served an
interim in+unction aimed at protecting privac" on a third part", he gains an incentive to prolong
&
'ee decision in Ntuli v ,onald <010= >?7: 7iv 11., p. ..
,
Ehis fear has +een compo"nded +# the holdin2 in Aocke# 7l"+ v 3"Fham <00&= D.3. ,.,
where it was held that interim in0"nctions do not +ind third parties once the proceedin2s
come to an end.
its life %" not prosecuting the case to trial. #oever, this has %een overruled %" the practice
guidelines issued %" the >aster of $olls in England that such in+unctions should last for no
longer than an" other non,disclosure or anti,tipping,off order can properl" last. .t is thus
concluded that the" are onl" %eing granted to protect information, pending trial or the conclusion
of the hearing, in order to ensure that the purpose of the proceedings is not frustrated pending
trial.
08
*o %uttress equita%le fairness sin issuance of this remed", (ord Neu%erger, the >aster of $olls
has pu%lished a practice direction for super in+unctions. *his guidelines stress that privac" can
onl" supersede open +ustice het it is strictl" necessar" in order to achieve +ustice. *he" guide
the +udges to stri'e a %alance %eteen the rights of claimants and defendants, hich has limited
the circumstances in hich such in+unctions can %e issued. *he guidelines ensure fairness in the
hole process. Although it is issued as guidance, not as a practice direction, it is e2pected to %e
folloed %" all parties and the courts are referring to it in determining applications for this relief.
*he foregoing discussion thus shos that these in+unctions are fair, meant to protect the right to
privac" %ut not merel" a tool for the rich %u"ing silence.
Conc*u%ion
.n+unctions are thus important for proper administration of +ustice. *he" assist courts ensure
production of evidence, ensure enforcea%ilit" of court +udgments and rulings and safeguard
rights of parties %efore the court. )ith severe consequences on defendants, the la has created
proper safeguard measures to guard against a%use and frivolous applications for this relief. *he
a%ove safeguards have ensured fairness, ma'ing sure their equita%le origins are maintained. *he"
thus resonate ell ith equit" hich means fairness.
-
'ee decision in (ohn Terry v -erson .n/nown <010= 1 F78 .-9, pp. 1.-0.

Common questions

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Super injunctions challenge the principle of open justice primarily because they are issued in secret and prevent the disclosure of not only the sensitive information related to the parties involved but also the existence of the injunction itself . The justification for their use includes the protection of an individual's right to privacy against unwarranted media attention, harassment, and blackmail, which can arise in cases where sensitive information is at risk of being publicized . They are employed not as a tool to conduct secret trials but to prevent misuse of personal information, ensuring that justice is not thwarted by public dissemination that could impede court proceedings . The guidelines provided by Lord Neuberger emphasize that privacy should only override open justice when strictly necessary to achieve justice, thus aiming to maintain balance and fairness .

To balance defendants' rights and prevent the abusive use of injunctions, several legal safeguards and procedural checks are in place. For instance, the requirement for a strong prima facie case or a "good arguable case" ensures that injunctions are not granted on frivolous grounds . There is also the mechanism of undertakings in damages where the applicant agrees to compensate the defendant if it is later shown that the injunction was wrongly granted . Additionally, procedural protocols require an early inter partes hearing after an ex parte injunction is issued, providing the defendant a fair chance to contest the decision . These measures demonstrate a commitment to upholding defendants' rights while preserving the utility of injunctions as equitable remedies .

The primary justifications for issuing a Mareva injunction are to prevent a defendant from disposing of or dealing with assets in a way that would frustrate the enforcement of a judgment. It aims to preserve the plaintiff's rights by ensuring that any judgement obtained can be satisfied. To address concerns related to equity and fairness, there are strict standards the applicant must meet before obtaining such an injunction—they must prove a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the court, a good arguable case on the merits, a real risk of judgement going unsatisfied, and that it is just and convenient to grant relief . This system guards against unfairness by ensuring the injunction does not confer rights over a debtor's assets but merely preserves them . Furthermore, safeguards such as the requirement for an undertaking in damages and the review of ex parte orders help prevent abuse and protect the defendant's rights .

Super injunctions differ from standard injunctions primarily in their scope and applicability by not only restricting the publication of specified information but also preventing the disclosure of the existence of the injunction itself. This dual-layer secrecy is intended to ensure that the purpose of the injunction is not undermined by publicity . Unlike standard injunctions, which are typically public and known to those specifically involved, super injunctions extend their binding effect to any third parties who have notice of them, thus broadening their applicability and making them more effective in preventing the dissemination of sensitive information .

The fair issuance of super injunctions, despite their secretive nature, is achieved through a robust procedural framework. They are not granted arbitrarily; a prima facie case demonstrating their necessity is required, countering potential claims of misuse and preserving judicial fairness . Furthermore, the guidelines issued by Lord Neuberger state that privacy should only replace open justice when strictly necessary to achieve justice, ensuring that such injunctions are issued in exceptional circumstances only . They are also subject to ongoing judicial oversight to ensure that they remain necessary and that they do not inadvertently extend beyond their intended purpose, which ensures fairness to both sides of the legal dispute .

Several checks and balances are in place to prevent the abuse of Mareva injunctions. Firstly, the applicant is required to demonstrate a "good arguable case" on the merits of their cause of action, reducing the chances of frivolous claims . Secondly, the standard practice of requiring an undertaking in damages from the applicant acts as a financial safeguard for the defendant, ensuring compensation in case the injunction is inappropriately granted and later discharged . Courts also review ex parte orders in an inter partes hearing shortly after issuance, providing an opportunity for the defendant to contest the injunction . Finally, Mareva injunctions typically freeze assets only up to a maximum sum specified in accordance with the claim and include provisions for reasonable living expenses for the defendant .

Anton Piller orders are considered necessary in cases where there is a significant risk that a defendant may destroy or conceal material evidence that is crucial to the plaintiff's case. They allow for the entry to the defendant's premises to search for and seize evidence without the defendant's prior knowledge, thereby preserving potential evidence . These orders are granted only under strict conditions: the claimant must establish an extremely strong prima facie case against the respondent, demonstrate that the potential damage to the claimant is serious, and show clear evidence that the defendant possesses relevant documents or items and that there is a real possibility these may be destroyed before a full hearing .

Mareva injunctions can significantly impact debtors by freezing their assets, potentially causing financial hardship. However, there are several provisions in place to mitigate these impacts. The injunction typically specifies a maximum sum, not exceeding the claimant's debt, and allows for reasonable living expenses for the debtor . Defendants can apply to the court to vary these conditions if they can demonstrate undue hardship, offering a mechanism for judicial oversight to ensure these orders do not impose excessive burdens . Additionally, defendants have the right to seek the discharge of the injunction if it appears to have been granted inappropriately or to their undue detriment .

Anton Piller orders are instrumental in protecting intellectual property rights by enabling the search and seizure of evidence that might be destroyed if the defendant had prior knowledge of the legal proceedings. This makes them crucial in cases where evidence of infringement, such as copyrighted materials or confidential information, needs to be preserved . The justification for their issuance lies in satisfying certain conditions: an extremely strong prima facie case against the respondent, significant potential or actual damage to the claimant, and clear evidence that the respondent possesses relevant material with a real possibility of destruction before a full hearing . This ensures that such orders are used effectively and judiciously to uphold the rights of intellectual property holders.

Fairness concerns about super injunctions revolve around their potential to override the principle of open justice and provide undue secrecy advantage to influential individuals. Legal guidelines have addressed these concerns by emphasizing that such injunctions should only be issued when strictly necessary to protect the rights involved and to ensure justice is not frustrated . The practice guidelines issued by Lord Neuberger stress the necessity of balancing privacy against the public interest in open justice, thereby promoting fairness in the issuance and prolongation of super injunctions . These guidelines help ensure that the application of super injunctions is not arbitrary but based on a rigorous assessment of the specifics of each case.

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