Kuroda vs.

Jalandoni
G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949

Facts:
1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and commanding
general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He was tried before the
Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities committed against military and
civilians. The military commission was establish under Executive Order 68.

2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military
commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:
- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)

3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US
prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid

Held:
1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by the
President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war as an
instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles of
international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international
jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty
of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of
war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and
regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. They
were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan)

2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest because its
country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being charged of.

3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and
representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special law.

Razon v. Tagitis
G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009

Facts:
Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis), a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, together with Arsimin
Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007
from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis
asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When
Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and
even sent a text message to the latters Manila-based secretary, who advised Kunnong to simply wait
for Tagitis return.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim
studies and Tagitis fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo
Police Station. More than a month later, or on December 28, 2007, the respondent, May Jean Tagitis,
through her attorney-in-fact, filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) directed against Lt. Gen.
Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine
National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group
(CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel
Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force
Comet (collectively referred to as petitioners), with the Court of Appeals (CA). On the same day, the
CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo and set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008.
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an
enforced disappearance under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearances. The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the
investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case
qualified as an enforced disappearance. Hence, the CA extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis
and his family, and directed the petitioners to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the
life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the
CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military,
Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the
military, that was involved.

On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the
motion in its Resolution dated April 9, 2008. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for review with
the Supreme Court.
Issues:
Whether or not the requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts, i.e. complete in
every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victims rights, is indispensable in
an amparo petition.
Whether or not the presentation of substantial evidence by the petitioner to prove her
allegations is sufficient for the court to grant the privilege of the writ.
Whether or not the writ of amparo determines guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
alleged enforced disappearance of the subject of the petition for the writ.
Answers:
No. However, it must contain details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while
presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security
through State or private party action.
Yes.
No.
Held:
1. REQUIREMENTS IN AN AMPARO PETITION
The requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts must be read in light of the nature and
purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty The framers of the Amparo
Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual
violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the
ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition,
however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which
addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the
victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the
victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who
caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and
precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a
token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation,
the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the
petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the
victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition should
likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the
required elements namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or
threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are present.
2. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AN AMPARO PETITION
Burden of proof of Amparo petitioner [T]he Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with
the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the
allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must
then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable
case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing
a violation of the victims constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of
the investigating authorities to appropriately respond.
Substantial evidence required in amparo proceedings The [characteristics of amparo proceedings]
namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in
contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court
proceedings) reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an
administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard
of diligence required the duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence
point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the
consequent handling and investigation of extra- judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance
and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by
substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond
and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course,
must show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the
victims constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating
authorities to appropriately respond. The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations
provided the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid
decision in administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay: Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. The statute provides that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts
of law and equity shall not be controlling. The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter
which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative
order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to
justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.
Minor inconsistencies in the testimony should not affect the credibility of the witness As a rule,
minor inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication and only tend to
strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on
every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to
were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated story.
3. ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES in relation to THE WRIT OF AMPARO
The writ of amparo does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance,
rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability , for the enforced disappearance for
purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [The writ of amparo
is] a protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and
security. It embodies, as a remedy, the courts directive to police agencies to undertake specified
courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis.
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors
have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among
them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the
proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the
level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those
who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our
primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty
and security are restored.
The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain
to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may
promulgate [T]he unique situations that call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the
considerations and measures necessary to address these situations, may not at all be the same as
the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should
be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time
and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.
The concept of enforced disappearances is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction The
Amparo Rule expressly provides that the writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. We note that although the writ specifically covers enforced
disappearances, this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the
Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the
Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced
disappearance: x x x In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of
Representatives and in the Senate on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and
resolved to do away with a clear textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead
focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its power to address and provided the
appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing
legislative efforts. As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this
jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry
out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal
Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the
determination of what acts are criminal and what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts
should carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact under the
countrys constitutional scheme and power structure. Source of the power of the Supreme Court to
act on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances Even without the benefit of directly
applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances, however, the
Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts, since extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by their nature and purpose,
constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and
security. Although the Courts power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful
through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The
Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the
public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the
obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference even if only procedurally in a situation when
the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual
violations of constitutional rights.
DISPOSITIVE: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7,
2008 under the following terms:
Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance
covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the government
(through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim accountable for the
enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;
Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly responsible
for the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices regarding the
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper investigations using
extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results acceptable to this Court;
Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with
the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his assets in relation with the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the
monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the
PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for further
investigation, periodically reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and action;
Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its recommendations,
copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the respondent, with the
first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;
The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the Court
of Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter
counted from the finality of this Decision;
The abovementioned directives and those of the Court of Appeals made pursuant to this Decision
were given to, and were directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the
Philippine National Police and its Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of contempt
from the Supreme Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute less
than the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the circumstances of this
case demand.
Given the unique nature of Amparo cases and their varying attendant circumstances, the
aforementioned directives particularly, the referral back to and monitoring by the CA are specific
to this case and are not standard remedies that can be applied to every Amparo situation.
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General
Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-
Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City.
Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons
90 Phil. 70 (1951)

Facts:
Herein petitioner, an alien illegally in this country was kept under prolonged detention while
arrangements for his departure are being made filed a petition for habeas corpus. For two years, the
Government has not found ways and means of deporting the petitioner because no ship nor country
would take the latter. It is insinuated that the petitioner might join or aid the disloyal elements if
allowed to be at large.



Issue:
Whether or not an alien, not enemy, against whom no charge has been made other than that
their permission to stay has expired, may be detained indefinitely for as long as the
Government is unable to deport him.

Held:
No, a foreign national, not enemy, against whom no criminal charges have been formally made or
judicial order issued, may not indefinitely be kept in detention. He also has the right to life and liberty
and all other fundamental rights as applied to human beings. Petitioner is ordered to be released
upon the condition of being under surveillance and exact bail in a reasonable amount with sufficient
sureties. The possibility that he might join or aid disloyal elements if turned out at large does not
justify prolonged detention.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003

Facts:

Petitioner Republic, through thePresidential Commission on Good Government(PCGG), represented
by the Office of theSolicitor General (OSG), filed a petition forforfeiture before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitionersought the declaration of the aggregateamount of US$356 million (now estimated tobe more
than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The
funds were previously heldby the following five account groups, usingvarious foreign foundations in
certain Swissbanks. In addition, the petition sought theforfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million
intreasury notes which exceeded the Marcoscouples salaries, other lawful income as wellas income
from legitimately [Link] treasury notes are frozen at theCentral Bank of the Philippines
by virtue of thefreeze order issued by the PCGG. Before thecase was set for pre-trial, a General
Agreementand the Supplemental Agreement datedDecember 28, 1993 were executed by theMarcos
children and then PCGG ChairmanMagtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlementof the assets of the
Marcos family to identify,collate, cause the inventory of and distributeall assets presumed to be
owned by the Marcosfamily under the conditions contained therein.


Issue:
WON the Swiss funds can be forfeitedin favor of the Republic, on the basis of theMarcoses
lawful income.

Held:

[Link] 1379 raises the prima faciepresumption that a property is unlawfullyacquired, hence subject
to forfeiture, if itsamount or value is manifestly disproportionateto the official salary and other lawful
income of the public officer who owns it. The followingfacts must be established in order thatforfeiture
or seizure of the Swiss deposits maybe effected: (1) ownership by the public officerof money or
property acquired during hisincumbency, whether it be in his name orotherwise, and (2) the extent to
which theamount of that money or property exceeds, i.e., is grossly disproportionate to, thelegitimate
income of the public officer. Herein,the spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcoswere public officials
during the time material tothe present case was never in [Link] spouses accumulated salary of
$304,372.43 should be held as the only knownlawful income of the Marcoses since they didnot file
any Statement of Assets and Liabilities(SAL), as required by law, from which their networth could be
determined. Besides, under the1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos asPresident could not receive
"any otheremolument from the Government or any of itssubdivisions and instrumentalities".
Likewise,under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand [Link] as President could "not receive duringhis
tenure any other emolument from theGovernment or any other source."Their only known lawful
income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairlyserve as basis for determining the existence of
a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swissfunds. The Republic did not fail to establish aprima facie
case for the forfeiture of the [Link] Swiss deposits which weretransferred to and are
deposited in escrow atthe Philippine National Bank in the estimatedaggregate amount of
US$658,175,373.60 as of 31 January 2002, plus interest, were forfeitedin favor of the Republic.










Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
G.R. No. 1833591, October 14, 2008

Facts:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through
the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for
upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the
MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior
agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations
began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General
Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of
Intent on August 27, 1998.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters
of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete
and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the
MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public
consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional.
Issues:
1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of
the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and

(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is
considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft;
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and
initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;
4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern
(1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public
consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]
If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is an appropriate remedy;
5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
BINDING itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF
1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
DOMAINS)[;]
If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines;
6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga,
Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered
by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and
7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

Held:
The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles,
Territory, Resources, and Governance.
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue
advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The
limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to
the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening
respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo.
Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual
dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present
petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation
of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public
interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the
present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or
significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.
That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no
serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In
previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register
of Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility of a
public employee, the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public
officials, the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the identity of party-list
nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the
present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he
failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No.
7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated
entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.

Taada, et al., v. Angara, et al.,
G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

Facts:
Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the
Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. Further, they contended that the national
treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First
policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.



Issue:
Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is
liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

Held:
[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the
Presidents ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is
liberalized, deregulated and privatized.
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine
concurrence in the WTO Agreement.
[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world
on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against
foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend
to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited
entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In
fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair.
[T]he constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not necessarily
rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic
seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. As explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or
economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community.
Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in
such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without discrimination
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that
apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity,
the fundamental law encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets, thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but
one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the
foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and
tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and
managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the
best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino
labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such
principles while serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in themselves sources of
causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon
by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and
utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity and the
promotion of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby
justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise
of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the
WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its
sovereign duty and power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of
passion or personal hostility in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at
least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the
national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute
grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave
abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid
exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the
realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the
people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and
economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers.
After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of
a member.