Solipsism in Wittgensteins Tractatus
1 Introduction
In the eld of philosophy, there is a quite radical theory called solipsism,
the etymology of which is Latin solus (only) and ipse (itself), and which in
typical cases states that there exists only I (or ones own mind). Solipsism
has emerged for discussion in dierent ways in the history of philosophy. In
most cases, it was described as a vicious theory, but a few philosophers had
a positive discussion on it. Ludwig Wittgenstein is one of those philosophers.
He argued it in a distinctive way in his Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
1
To
date, solipsism in his Tractatus has been discussed to a great extent, and
it has been characterized in various ways, for example, as phenomenalistic,
transcendental or linguistic.
The problem seems to lie in what is ipse which solipsism states as a sole
existence. In typical solipsism, which is often considered epistemological due
to its origin of being derived from the idea that it is ones own mind (or
ones thoughts) that is most certain in all knowledge, all that exists is I (or
my mind). From this point of view, everything is considered as phenomenon
which occur in ones conciousness. For these points, solipsists have been usu-
ally attacked. However, solipsism in Wittgensteins Tractatus is completely
dierent from one of the epistemological type. It can be considered as an
ontological statement about how the world as a whole exists. Litte study
has been done in order to explore the possibility of reading the Tractatus in
this way, and it is important that the possibility of the ontological interpre-
tation of solipsism is discussed. The present study was undertaken in order
to illuminate solipsism in the Tractatus from an ontological perspective.
In this paper, rst, the statement of epistemological solipsism as one of
the typical type will be explained (2.12.3). It should be given a lot of
attention that solipsism in Wittgensteins Tractatus is strictly distinguished
from one of this type. Furthermore, solipsism in the Tractatus will be argued
in detail mainly on the basis of the analysis of the concepts I and world
1
Wittgenstein (1922)
1
in the Tractatus (3.13.3). Finally, the dimension of the mystical in the
Tractatus will be elucidated in the light of the two concepts which could be
observed through Wittgensteins solipsism. That is to say, considering the
metaphysical concepts of the being of the world as the primitive contingency
and the possibility of the not-being of the world, what is the mysticalness
of the the mystical will be brought into daylight (3.4).
2 Epistemological Solipsism
2.1 Statements of Typical Solipsism
Generally speaking, solipsism is the idea which states that all that exists
is ones own mind, and that minds of other people and all other things are
merely the contents of his or her consciousness. Such an idea stems from the
epistemological skepticism about the external world and minds of other peo-
ple. One can tell nothing of absolute certainty about whether a cup which
is in front of him or her exists in actual fact. If the cup does appear to him
or her in some way, however, only the fact that it does appear in the way is
indisputable. In general, there is a great doubt as to whether there exists in
actual fact something which corresponds to what is perceived in ones own
conciousness. In addition to that, it is doubtful even just exactly whether
there really exists the external world. However, if a person does perceive
something in some way, only the fact that it is perceived in the way is in-
disputable. Concerning minds of other people, all that one can experience
about another person is the external appearances such as his or her mo-
tions, expressions, utterance, and speech. Therefore, one can tell nothing of
absolute certainty about whether the mental states which correspond to the
appearances exist in actual fact. What is more, it is doubtful even just ex-
actly whether he or she has a mind to which various mental events occur.
However, if it does seem to a person that another have a pain, only the fact
that it does seem thus is indisputable. After all, what is of absolute certainty
is only ones own perception, thinking or consciousness. No matter how hard
one tries to ascertain the existence of the external world and minds of other
people, he or she can tell nothing other than that he or she thinks.
From these points of view, epistemological skeptics come to the con-
clusion that what can be said to exist authentically is only I (or ones
own mind), and all other things do not exist (or exist only as the contents
of ones own consciousness), and that one can tell nothing of absolute cer-
tainty other than how it seems to him or her. Solipsism which is advocated
in this way can be called a subjectivistic, phenomenalistic and epistemo-
2
logical statement in that it gives a privilege to a cognitive subject, namely
I, and denies the recognizability and the existence of what does not oc-
cur to its consciousness. Consequently, this type of solipsism can be called
epistemological solipsism.
2
2.2 Criticisms to Solipsism
In epistemological solipsism, the recognizability and the existence of the
external world and other minds is completely denied. Therefore, for those
people who tries to justify the existence of them by proving the certainty
of cognition in some way, this type of solipsism is a vicious theory which
should be denied. This is the reason why the expression fall into solipsism
is often used in philosophical discussions.
Furthermore, there is an argument which is often presented against epis-
temological solipsism. Although solipsist states I as a sole existence, every-
one can state thus and in fact there have been plural polemists who stated
thus, and so, in this point, the falseness of solipsism is evident.
3
This type
of argument is sometimes integrated into the words solipsism advocated by
a multitude. Y. Nakajima, with regard to the eccentricity of solipsism,
states:
For example, there will be no diculty in establishing Japan
Solipsism Association. In the colloquium of the association, one
will state with passion to hundreds of members that there exists
only I, . . . and the members will agree with each other on
that all that exists is I, going home with satisfaction. It is
quite eccentric.
4
In short, according to the argument of this type, the fact that solipsism
can be advocated by plural persons is the counter-evidence for solipsism.
From these points of view, solipsism has been often attacked by a lot of
philosophers.
2
Although George Berkeleys idealistic theory (Berkeley 1963) is usually considered
as a representative sample of this type of solipsism, it will need a careful examination
to decide how it is in fact solipsistic. At any rate, because this paper does not aim at
giving concrete consideration based on theories of specic philosophers to epistemological
solipsism, this problem will not be handled any more.
3
cf. Toyoshimas 2004 study (Toyoshima 2004, p.98).
4
Nakajima (1995), p.192
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2.3 The Cognitive Subject in the Tractatus
Between solipsism in Wittgensteins Tractatus and one of the type which has
been explained above, there is a huge gulf which can not be bridged. For one
of the fundamental statements of solipsism in the Tractatus is completely
dierent from that of epistemological solipsism. It is the statement that there
is no subject in the world. Wittgenstein states as follows:
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The thinking, presenting subject; there is no such thing.
If I wrote a book The world as I found it, . . . of it [the
subject] alone in this book mention could not be made. (5.631)
The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of
the world. (5.632)
As have been explained in the subsection 2.1, I which is considered as a
sole existence in epistemological solipsism is one whose consciousness, think-
ing or representation includes the world as a whole. The Tractatus, however,
eliminates the subject which thinks and represents.
6
That is to say, the
cognitive subject to which epistemological solipsism gives a privilege is not
5
In what follows, the quotation from the Tractatus is based on the English translation
by C. K. Ogden.
6
This is the elimination in the following double senses: (1) in the outside of the world,
there is no subject whose thinking or representation includes the world. (2) Also in the
inside of the world, there is no subject as a object which thinks and represents. The
elimination in the sense of (1) has a close relation to the rejection of epistemological
solipsism and considering of the subject as a limit of the world, and it is the subject of
this paper. On the other hand, the elimination of the sense of (2) has a close relation to
the question whether the subject is a object, namely whether it is a individual existence
in the world. Although the elimination of the subject in the sense of (2) is not the subject
of this paper, let me explain it briey in the rest of this footnote.
As to the sentences which include the propositional attitudes such as A believes that p
or A thinks that p, Wittgenstein denies the notion that it is described by these sentences
that the thinking subject as a object A has a intentional relation such as believe or
think to the fact p. Then, he states that a co-ordination of facts in the form of p
says p is mentioned in these sentences (5.541, 5.542). In other words, it is pointed out
that the fact that the proposition p is composed has a relation of say to the fact in
the world p, that is to say, the fact that the former has a relation of being a picture to
the latter is mentioned there. In the Tractatus, it is denied that there exists the thinking
subject as a individual in the world (there is no such thing as the soul the subject,
etc. as it is conceived in supercial psychology(5.5421)), and it is considered that the
essential constituent of thinking is the relation of being a picture which a fact of the
composition of a proposition has to another fact (as to the fact and the language as a
picture, see the subsection 3.1 in this paper ) .
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regarded as a exitence in the Tractatus. Therefore, solipsism in the Tracta-
tus must be distinguished fundamentally from one to which epistemological
skepticism lead.
In the Tractatus, the subject is not looked upon as an existence but only
as a limit of the world. What it is will be argued in the next section.
Speaking in advance, solipsism in the Tractatus can be considered as an
ontological statement about how the world as a whole exists. Paradoxically,
solipsism which is radicalized by the description of the Tractatus corresponds
exactly to realism, and what is revealed there is a singular property which
is called single-and-total-ness in this paper. In this sense, solipsism in the
Tractatus is no longer one in the usual sense, and it can be regarded as a
objective truth about the way in which the world exists. If these are correct,
naturally, the criticisms mentioned in the previous subsection in not eective
against it for the following reasons: rst, since the subject which thinks and
represents is not considered as an existence in the Tractatus, the question
of the recognizability of the external world and minds of other people has
nothing to do with it. Second, since it is an objective statement about how
the world exists, there is no contradiction even if it is advocated by plural
persons.
References
Berkeley, G. (1963). A treatise concerning the principles of human knowl-
edge. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
Nakajima, Y. (1995). Tetsugakuno dojo [Dojo of philosophy]. Tokyo:
Kodansya.
Toyoshima, T. (2004). Dokugaronha nanide arienaika [On what solipsism
cant be]. Gendai shisou 7, 98107.
Wittgenstein, L. (1922). Tractatus logicophilosophicus. London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul.
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