Getting smart: foresight, scalability and learning for future oriented, modular and adaptive capabilities
Smart Defence (SD) should not envision only joining resources, or jointly developing critical capabilities. A SD approach needs to be built on foresight, scalability and a sound lessons-learned mechanism in order to be truly smart. In the current allied language the SD is about prioritization, specialization and cooperation for an efficient (low-cost) manner of developing especially critical capabilities. Nevertheless, this approach needs a more specific framework for implementation, since it is clear that some of the above-mentioned principles are inherent to the Alliance, such as cooperation. Therefore, I have tried to identify some current evolutions, which could be used as an anchor point for a SD resilient framework. First of all, the capabilities development process must be oriented toward the future and the futures studies (especially foresight) would provide some tools for that purpose; secondly, scalable capabilities could basically provide a wide range of configurations according to each crisis specifics; last, but not least smartness implies the ability to easily learn or understand ground-breaking things or to deal with new or difficult situations. Foresight is not entirely new to NATO. Between 2008 and 2009 we have witnessed the first foresight exercise within NATO, in the framework of Multiple Futures Project (MFP). In MFP development, the Allied Command Transformation took in consideration two views: one with a focus on the future of the security environment and the other imagining future plausible NATOs. Even though - in the analysis of the envisioned futures - the allies found around 33 security implications, the interesting conclusion was that the top five of these implications were mainly of non-military nature (e.g. disruption of vital resource flows or negative impact on economy). Another facet of the foresight exercise envisaged a range of alternative "future NATOs", based on capturing NATO's main dimensions of change (such as the transatlantic link, the US leadership, the area of operations and a few more other characteristics). Of course, each of the identified "future NATOs" needs a different set of capabilities: a strong toolbox NATO would especially need expeditionary capabilities for operating in full spectrum major theatre operations, unlike a dispersed toolbox NATO would be in need of low-spectrum capabilities, necessary to perform stabilization and reconstruction operations1. The scalability could be defined - by analogy with the telecommunications and software engineering - as the ability to handle growing amounts of work / tasks in a flexible and efficient manner. In relation with capabilities, I will refer to scalability in the light of two characteristics: connectedness and modularity. While modularity could be defined by principles such as cohesiveness, encapsulation, decoupledness and reusability / commonality, the connectedness has as center of gravity the concept of Network Centric Warfare, which is not only about hardware and routers - it is about people, organizations, and processes. A suitable model for a better understanding of the idea of scalability is the NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF was designed as high readiness and technologically advanced force [] capable of performing tasks worldwide across the whole spectrum of operations2, which is composed of core - deployable headquarter, land / air / naval units - and enabling
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modules (such as intelligence, combat support and so on)3. As such the SD capabilities should be designed in order to provide diverse and flexible response options, along with the ability to flawlessly connect themselves, irrespective of their configuration. The third issue would regard NATOs case on lessons learned system. Since 1996, the need to extract the appropriate lessons from NATO operations and exercises and the process of converting analysis results into remedial actions led to the idea of building a Lessons Learned capability. Subsequent actions, beginning with the establishment of the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre and the development of a Lessons Learned Database, finally cleared the path towards the connection of this process to strategic planning. Last, but not least, in approaching the problem of lessons learned we have to take into account that in periods of dynamic change learning must be nonlinear and provide for the right mix of capabilities. We could argue that the raw elements are already set for implementing the innovative mindset needed for implementing SD: there is a foresight system in place, the network is perceived more and more as an indispensable instrument for NATOs future, and last but not least, an operation lessons learned system is up and running. But, given the (often surprising) strategic discontinuities of the current security environment, the Alliance is in need of a continuous process to scan the future, the dispersed toolbox of the Allied capabilities must perform as a scalable network of networks and the learning mechanism should be governed by a nonlinear approach.
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